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Oddballs: The Shermans of ‘Kelly’s Heroes’

Post author By Mark Nash
Post date June 22, 2024
44 Comments on Oddballs: The Shermans of ‘Kelly’s Heroes’

United States of America/Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1970)
Movie Prop Tank – 3 Tanks Modified For The Role

In June of 1970, the hybrid war/heist-film comedy-drama Kelly’s Heroes was released by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM). It was a collaboration between American and Yugoslavian production companies. Most of the film was shot on location in Yugoslavia and Croatia (Croatia being a republic within Yugoslavia in the 1970s). The film, set in September 1944, saw a motley band of American GIs and Tankers go behind enemy lines to steal US$16 million worth of Nazi gold hidden in a bank in a small French town. The film featured an all-star cast of Clint Eastwood as the titular ‘Private Kelly’, Telly Savalas as Sergeant ‘Big Joe’, Donald Sutherland as ‘Oddball’ the Tank Commander, and Don Rickles as Supply Sergeant ‘Crapgame’, among many other well-known actors.

Unknown to most is that the relatively far-fetched plot of this film was based on a true story from the Second World War, known as the ‘Greatest Robbery on Record’. It featured in multiple editions of the Guinness Book of World Records as a regular feature between 1956 and 2000. The account recalled that “The greatest robbery on record was that of the German National Gold Reserves in Bavaria by a combination of U.S. military personnel and German civilians in 1945“. This is confirmed by an official letter dated 12/4/68 from Elliott Morgan, MGM’s Head of Research, to the Guinness Book of World Records requesting information on this topic.

The film also featured an interesting cast of vehicles. Many M4 Shermans were shown used in the film by the US Army, but these were not just standard M4s. The tanks used were post-war up-gunned M4A3E4s – formerly of the ‘Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija’ (Yugoslav People’s Army). The tanks of Oddball’s platoon – and Oddball’s tank in particular – featured several ‘upgrades’ that, while unique, probably would not be too practical to real-life combat operations.

Kelly’s Heroes released in June 1970 and featured the all-star cast of Clint Eastwood, Telly Savalas, Donald Sutherland and Don Rickles, among many other well-known actors of the day. Photo: MGM

“A Sherman Can Give You a Very Nice…Edge”

The M4 series of tanks is without question one of the most recognized to come out of the Second World War. Starting life in 1941 as the T6, it was later serialized as the M4. The British named it ‘Sherman’ after William T. Sherman, General of the Union Army in the American Civil War. The tank officially entered service in 1942 and saw its first action at the Second Battle of El Alamein that October with the British 8th Army.

The Shermans of Kelly’s Heroes were a rather special model, one of the less well-known and less common to appear. The M4A3E4 was a post-war development of the M4A3. It took the standard model of M4A3 – welded hull, vertical volute suspension (VVSS), early turret, Ford GAA V8 engine – and up-gunned them with the addition of the 76 mm Tank Gun M1. Other additions to the older turret – such as the ‘All-Round Vision Cupola’ and cut-in loader’s hatch – were made to the Sherman between 1943 and 1944. Despite their use as such in the film, the E4s never served the US Military. Having previously trialed this configuration prior to the adoption of the T23 turret. However, it was found to be much too cramped for US military tastes. Instead, they were produced for the post-war ‘Military Aid Program’. The ‘MAP’ benefited war-ravaged countries by providing them the means to rebuild their military and defenses. One of these countries was Yugoslavia. Between 1948 and 1955, Yugoslavia would receive 599 M4A3E4s. Other countries that received M4A3E4s included Belgium, Denmark, and Portugal.

Yugoslavian M4A3E4 in the late-1960s. Although an uncommon variant, the length of the added 76 mm Gun M1 makes these Sherman variants rather unmistakable. Photo: Sase Family via Srpski Oklop

The E4s would serve Yugoslavia well, equipping armored units as a supplement to an existing quantity of Soviet-origin T-34-85s. Yugoslavian armor officers were quite happy with the Shermans, although they were of the opinion that the American offering lagged behind the T-34 somewhat when it came to combat effectiveness. However, the Yugoslavians did appreciate the higher levels of user comfort of the M4, such as padded seating, powered turret traverse, gun stabilization, and better ventilation. The Yugoslavian Army would begin to phase out the E4s from 1966. They would not be immediately sent to the scrap yard, but rather gradually phased out over the following years, with some being used for up-gunning experiments and others effectively mothballed for spare parts. This meant there were plenty of operational Shermans available for the Kelly’s Heroes production team to acquire.

In Kelly’s Heroes, the tanks are represented as being standard Sherman 76s. In September 1944, however, any 76 mm gun-armed Sherman would likely have been the M4A1 (76)W. This tank was a combination of the M4A1 cast-hull Sherman with the new T23 turret and 76 mm Tank Gun M1. This version of the M4 was accepted for service in January 1944 but did not see service until Operation Cobra in that July. The addition of the 76 mm M1 gun gave the Sherman a much-needed boost to its tank-killing capability.

US M4A1 (76)W in France, 1944. The 76 mm Tank Gun M1 added a much-needed punch to America’s front-line tank. Photo: US National Archives

“Nobody Said Nothing About Locking Horns with no Tigers…”

In early September 1944, units of the American 35th Infantry Division were nearing the French town of Nancy. During an incursion behind enemy lines, Private Kelly (Clint Eastwood), from a mechanized recon platoon within the 35th, manages to capture one Colonel Dankhopf (David Hurst), of Wehrmacht Intelligence. After taking the Officer back to his unit’s position in a farm complex, Kelly begins his interrogation. Rifling through the Officer’s file case, Kelly comes across a mysterious gray metal bar. Dankhopf insists it is lead and that it was in the case so that – should there be the risk of capture – it would sink if thrown into a body of water. Unconvinced, Kelly scrapes at the bar, revealing a disguised bar of Nazi gold. Kelly steps up his interrogation by sharing a bottle of brandy with the Officer in extremely generous measures. After killing the bottle, the half-unconscious Officer reveals that there are 14,000 more gold bars – totaling some US$16 million – held in a bank in the small French town of Clermont (Not based on the real one west of Lyon), 30 miles (50 km) behind enemy lines. The nearby German forces, led by a squad of Tiger tanks, soon advance on the town. Kelly’s platoon pulls out in a hurry, and the German Colonel gets killed in the crossfire.

Multiple Shermans (M4A3E4s) pass in convoy as Kelly (Eastwood) makes his way to recruit Supply Sergeant ‘Crapgame’ – his first encounter with Tank Commander ‘Oddball’. Photo: MGM

Kelly becomes set on stealing the gold in an unsanctioned raid behind enemy lines – without his superiors finding out. The trick would be convincing the rest of his unit to join him. At a forward operating base, Kelly recruits Supply Sergeant ‘Crapgame’ (Don Rickles) to obtain the supplies and weapons needed for the heist. After eavesdropping on the plan, a spaced-out 6th Armored Division tank commander named ‘Oddball’ (Donald Sutherland) suggests that he could assist in the operation with his small, three-tank platoon.

Oddball’s platoon is made of three rough-looking Shermans with equally rough-looking crews. This is purposely done, so the troop appears to be out of action. When Kelly first meets them, they are lounging about in the sun, drinking wine with ‘French peasant girls’ and roasting meat on a spit. Oddball explains:

“We see our role as essentially defensive, in nature. While our armies are advancing so fast and everyone’s knocking themselves out to be heroes, we are holding ourselves in reserve in case the Krauts mount a counteroffensive which threatens Paris… or maybe even New York. Then we can move in and stop them. But for 1.6 million dollars, we could become heroes for three days…”

Oddball then introduces Kelly to his tanks, showing the unique modifications he has had made to them. These include the addition of loudspeakers, upgraded engines, and the use of 76 mm ‘paint’ shells. Maybe against better judgment, Kelly recruits the Tankers. With the promise of armored support, it becomes a lot easier to convince his unit to join him.

Oddball (right) introduces Kelly to his troop of 3 Sherman Tanks, held ‘in case of defense’. Photo: MGM

With Oddball’s tankers recruited, Kelly decides to split his forces, advancing separately to a position near Clermont to link up. Kelly’s unit would proceed more discreetly cross country with Jeeps and Half-Tracks. Despite being a noisy column of three tanks, Oddball opts for a route that would avoid most German contact. This course led Oddball’s platoon – made up of himself, ‘Moe’ commanding one tank, and ‘Whiskey’ commanding the other – through a rail tunnel, at the mouth of which was a German-operated railway siding full of defending troops.

With no choice but to proceed, Oddball formulates a plan of attack and leads his tanks in a charge out of the tunnel mouth. His platoon proceeded to lay waste to the entire complex. All while blasting out ‘All For the Love of Sunshine’ by Hank Williams Jr. from the loudspeaker attached to the turret (highly anachronistic, as this track was released the same year as the film; 1970). After leveling the installation, killing the 100+ strong garrison, and blasting the tunnel closed behind them, Oddball moves his men out to the tune of ‘Working on the Railroad’ (much more appropriate for the era).

Oddball and his platoon level the German-operated rail yard. Photo: MGM

Pressing on from the railyard, Oddball approaches a bridge over a river they need to cross, only for it to be blown by Allied air support as they arrive. Oddball, parked up at a French bar, contacts a US engineering unit to build a bridge for the crossing, enticed by the offer of Nazi gold.

For Kelly, things start taking a turn for the worse. The unit lost its light vehicles to another ill-timed Allied air strike, leaving the men to proceed on foot. They accidentally stumble into a minefield and are forced to engage a small Wehrmacht Convoy – losing several men. Demoralized, Kelly’s unit takes refuge in a shack on the road to Clermont and waits for Oddball to link up with them. Oddball soon arrives with his troop and the engineer units in tow, proudly standing atop his tank with the tune of ‘Battle Hymn of the Republic/Blood on the Risers’ echoing from his speaker (‘Blood on the Risers’ famously being the song of US paratroopers during the war).

Oddball proudly stands atop his iron steed as he approaches the link up with Kelly with Engineer units in tow – the echo of the ‘Battle Hymn’ surrounding them. Photo: MGM

The now combined force battles their way across the river to Clermont. Radio chatter intercepted by Allied radio attracts the attention of Major General Colt, who misinterprets this as an unknown US Army unit breaking through an otherwise dead-locked front line. Oddball loses his two accompanying Shermans in the battle over the river. Oddball makes it across, but one tank is left burning on the opposite bank, with another drowned in the river (the fate of the crews are unknown, but are presumed dead as they are not seen again). Kelly and his men eventually make it across, leaving the engineers to finish building a pontoon bridge. Under artillery barrage, they press on to Clermont.

On a hilltop overlooking the town, Kelly, his Sergeant ‘Big Joe’ (Telly Savalas), and Oddball attempt to formulate a plan. Two men from the unit have already snuck into a bell tower in town. With an over-watch of the bank – they feed intel to Kelly. Clermont is defended by three Tiger I tanks (props built on T-34-85s) of the 1st SS Panzer Division and accompanying infantry support. The Tigers – sat in the town square in front of the bank – start-up, according to Oddball, this is ‘standard practice’ as they need to turn their engines over every so often. Using this noise as cover, a plan is formulated to divide forces. ‘Big Joe’ would lead his men on foot, while Oddball would be a distraction for the Tigers, using the Tiger’s large size against them in a small town. This did not please Oddball, objecting that:

“The only way I got to keep them Tigers busy is to let them shoot holes in me!” and, addressing Supply Sergeant ‘Crapgame’, “To a New Yorker like you, a hero is some type of weird sandwich! Not some nut who takes on three Tigers!”

Top, Oddball, and Kelly make their way into Clermont. Bottom, one of the Tigers of the 1st SS Pz.Div. in the town square Photos: MGM

With the small group of GIs taking care of the infantry, Kelly hitches a ride with Oddball so he can guide them on foot. The tank navigates its way into the shell of a ruined building, with the Sherman’s main gun effectively stuck through a window. Oddball had previously said that:

“…A Tiger has only one weak point – that’s its ass. Ya gotta hit it point blank, and ya gotta hit from behind…”

This is a bit of an exaggeration, the side and rear of Tiger I – turret and hull – were 80 mm (2.4 in.) thick at maximum. The 76 mm M1 was more than capable of defeating this. Lined up on the rear end of one of the Tigers in the town square, the Sherman fires and the Tiger bursts into flames. Escaping crew are quickly mopped up by ‘Big Joe’s’ men. Alerted, one Tiger pivots around as Oddball withdraws. The Tiger then crashes through the same wall and fires just as Oddball moves out, missing him. A game of cat and mouse ensues, with the Tiger having to navigate through increasingly tight streets. Oddball manages to outflank the Tiger, coming up behind, he orders the gunner to fire, only for an explosion of paint to cover the engine deck of the Tiger. Attempting to respond, the Tiger tries rotating its turret around, only for the gun barrel to be obstructed on both sides. With the ammunition issue sorted, Oddball orders another shot at the Tiger, which scores a hit and renders the tank destroyed. Kelly machine guns the escaping Tiger crew with the Browning atop Oddball’s tank.

Top, wrong shell. One of Oddball’s special paint shells impacts the back of the Tiger instead of an armor-piercing shot. Bottom, the TIger’s gun is obstructed. Photos: MGM

Two Tigers down and one to go. However, all is not well. ‘Big Joe’s’ men have dealt with the German infantry but are wounded themselves. Secondly, Oddball’s tank has broken down. His driver tries to fix it to no avail. Oddball, Kelly, and Big Joe come up with a peaceful solution – make a deal with the German tank crew. The three men advance on the tank slowly, the Commander (Karl-Otto Alberty) eventually emerging and hopping down to meet them. Big Joe offers the Commander a cigarette which he turns down as the Tiger has a fuel leak and there is fuel everywhere. The Americans talk it out with the man and tell him what’s in the bank and offer a deal of equal split of the gold. The German accepts and uses his tank to blow the Bank’s doors off.

A large pile of Gold is sat waiting in the Bank’s foyer. The German Tankers and the American GIs divide the spoils, each gold share amounting to around US$875,000 (at the set time, more than US$15.1 million today). Kelly’s men load the gold into a truck. In the meantime, Oddball had ironed out his own deal, trading some gold to the German Tank Commander, effectively buying the leaky Tiger from him, much to his engineer’s distaste claiming “It’s a piece of junk!”. Everyone goes their separate ways, leaving the town just before the still-oblivious General Colt finally arrives to a crowd of French townfolk celebrating their apparent liberation. Kelly and his merry band of thieves, in the meantime, are driving off into the sunset with their prize….

Top, Kelly and his Gold. Bottom, Oddball, and his Tiger prize. Photos: MGM

Oddball’s M4s in Detail

Armament

The main armament is portrayed as a ‘normal 76 mm’, with the tanks used filling the part of the M4A1 (76)W. The film plays on the old trope that Shermans were all but useless. As Oddball says:

“…all the tanks we come up against are bigger and better than ours, so that all we can hope to do is, like, scare them away. This gun is a normal 76 mm, but we add this piece of pipe onto it and the krauts think, like, maybe it’s a 90mm…”

Despite Oddball’s pessimism, the 76 mm M1 gun was quite effective. Firing the standard M62 Armor-Piercing, Capped (APC) round, the 76 mm gun could punch through 109 mm (4.3 in.) of armor at 0° obliquity up to 1,000 meters (3,300 ft.), with a muzzle velocity of 792 m/s (2,600 ft/s). While this still would have struggled against a head-on battle with Tigers or Panthers, it was more than powerful enough to kill later-model Panzer IVs and similar vehicles. It was not until later in the war, with the development of High-Velocity Armor-Piercing (HVAP) rounds, that the 76 mm could penetrate a Tiger head-on. The gun also fired an effective High-Explosive (HE) shell.

As to the ‘pipe’, disguising the length of one’s gun was not an unusual tactic during the war, with both US and British armored units undertaking this subterfuge. It was more common to disguise a gun to make it look shorter, rather than make it look bigger. Making it look bigger would make a tank look more dangerous, making it more of a priority target. The British found this out with their 17-pounder-armed Sherman Firefly. It was soon becoming apparent that the Germans easily distinguished this new, more deadly Sherman thanks to its longer gun. Crews would paint white wavy lines halfway down the length of the gun to break up the outline. This was often accompanied by a fake muzzle break to give the impression that it was a standard M4 75. Later in the war, some US units did ‘faux up-gun’ their tanks. A notable example are the M24 Chaffee light tanks of the 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 740th Tank Battalion, where crews added pipe to the muzzles of their short 75 mm guns.

Oddball discusses the terms of the deal with Kelly and shows him the tank’s specialized equipment while his engineer ‘Moriarty’ (Gavin MacLeod) works on the engine. Note the stacked up (presumably 76 mm) shells and length of pipe. Photo: MGM

Again perhaps as a result of the ‘useless Sherman trope’, Oddball is equipped with his own ‘paint shells’. As he explains:

“We have our own ammunition, it’s filled with paint. When we fire it, it makes pretty pictures. Scares the hell out of people!”

Such a thing does not and did not exist. Would they have been practical? Not in the slightest. There is an argument that it could be used to obscure vision on enemy vehicles, but this simply would not have worked. For one, a 76 mm shell would probably carry little more than a pint of paint. Even if a hit was scored, the paint would likely vapourize to a mist rather than coat a periscope or vision block. For obscuration, many tanks carried White-Phosphorus (WP, also known as ‘Willie-Pete’) shells. On impact, these shells created a vast plume of thick smoke. This shell also had the bonus of being hazardous to enemy troops carrying burning particles of Phosphorus.

For secondary armament, the Shermans of the film carry the standard bow and coaxial .30 Cal. (7.62 mm) Browning M1919s and also the roof-mounted .50 Cal. (12.7 mm) Browning M2s. However, these do not appear to be a standard M2, but rather the M3 variant, at least on Oddball’s tank. The M3s were operationally the same as the more well-known M2s, but had a perforated heat shield that extended the full length of the barrel. Quite why these are equipped on the Shermans is unknown. It is unclear if the tanks were equipped with them when they were originally shipped to Yugoslavia, or whether they were acquired for the film.

A good view of what appears to be an M3 Browning .50 Cal. (12.7 mm) mounted to the top of Oddball’s tank. Photo: MGM

Loudspeaker

Another odd addition to the M4s – Oddball’s at least – was that of a large loudspeaker bolted to the side of the turret. As Oddball explains:

“…We got a loudspeaker here, and when we go into battle we play music very loud. It kind of calms us down…”

This is a pure fallacy in the context of the film. Quite how a record player was expected to operate inside the shaking interior of a tank during battle can’t be said. Also, Shermans – and tanks in general – are loud things so the music would be muffled anyway. The effectiveness of a single 1940s loudspeaker is highly questionable. However, this is not purely fictional. It is a rare feature in reality, but a small number of vehicles throughout history have been equipped with such devices.

Examples of such additions in reality can be found with the little known ‘Sonic Half-Tracks’ of the US Army, and ‘Amplifier Vans‘ of the British Army. Such vehicles have a complicated history, but to summarize, they were used in what would today be called ‘Psychological Operations’ or ‘PsyOps’. These specialist vehicles – which were made by simply placing speakers and broadcasting systems on trucks, halftracks and even tanks – were used to literally talk the enemy into surrender, amongst other roles. A post war example is the Churchill AVRE – FV3903. It had rear-facing loudspeakers attached to the turret. These were added to communicate with any following infantry. It is not clear why these were added exactly, especially as the Churchill VII had an infantry telephone (‘grunt phone’ in the US) fitted to the back of the tank as standard. It may be that this was used to communicate with a whole infantry squad at once, instead of a single man with the telephone.

Oddball’s tank proceeds down the narrow alleyways of Clermont. Note the large speaker on the side of the turret. Photo: MGM

Engine

It is not made clear exactly what engine the Sherman tanks of Kelly’s Heroes have. However, the matter does arise. When Oddball introduces Kelly to his troop, he explains:

“This engine has been modified by our mechanical genius here, Moriarty. These tanks are faster than any other tanks in the European Theater of Operations – forwards or backwards. See, man, we like to feel that we can get out of trouble quicker than we got into it…”

While automotive field repairs are often necessary for any tank, to say that a crew member could drastically increase the vehicle’s speed is quite absurd. The average top speed for the Sherman was a hard-pressed 15 – 30 mph (24 – 48 km/h) – depending on the model of the M4 and the engine used, as well as the terrain.

This brings up another interest line. When formulating their plan to attack Clermont, Oddball is concerned that the German garrison will “hear their Detroit motors coming”. This is false as the M4A3 used a Ford Engine. The actual engine of the M4A3 vehicles used in the film was the Ford GAA V8 gasoline engine that produced 450 hp. Shermans did have several engines throughout their service, from the original radial of the M4/M4A1, or the infamous ‘Multibank’ of the M4A4. The M4A2, however, did use twin Detroit Diesel engines, although this model was not used by the US Army in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO), the only American use was that of the US Marines fighting the Japanese in the Pacific Theatre. In the ETO, British forces had the largest use of the A2. Under lend-lease, the Soviets also received a small number of A2s, the diesel engines being better suited to colder climates.

Of course, it could be said that this is overly analytical. The more likely explanation for Oddball’s phrasing is simply that, in the common parlance of the set era (1940s), Detroit, Michigan, was very much still the Automotive Capital of the United States. As to the fastest-tracked vehicle in the ETO, that title goes to the M18 Hellcat Tank Destroyer, which saw its first action in the spring of 1944.

Stowage

Oddball’s tank – and those of his platoon – is positively festooned with stowage. All sorts of items seem to be carried on the tank. From the usual jerrycans, packs, and bedding rolls, to more eclectic items such as a watering can, a milk churn, and an oil lamp. While these latter items were probably chosen by the production team to match Oddball’s eccentricities, it is not completely wrong to say that tankers built up collections of items that they would then carry on their tanks. Perhaps not to the level as seen in the film, however. This ‘collecting’ only increased as the war went on. It was not uncommon to see Allied tanks covered in fuel cans, crates of rations, tins of small arms ammunition, bedding rolls, tarps, logs, sandbags, track links, etc, as well as other items that they found on their ‘travels’.

Left, Oddball’s tank in the film. Note the bright blue watering can. Right, a heavily stowed M4A3 at the Battle of Cologne. Photos: MGM/Pintrest

Prop Tigers

The prop Tigers used in the film have an interesting history themselves, as this excerpt from another Tank Encyclopedia article by Marko Pentelic describes:

“Although perhaps less well known in the world today, during the 1960s, Yugoslav cinema entered its golden age. Thanks to the participation in several different foreign film productions, a series of well-known movies were filmed in Yugoslavia or had Yugoslav actors in them. For example, Winnetou and the Crossbreed, a 1966 Western was filmed in Yugoslavia. War-related movies were also filmed, probably the best known being Kelly’s Heroes. The three Tiger tanks used in the Hollywood picture were the same ones used during the filming of ‘Bitka na Neretvi’ (‘Battle of Neretva’), based on the actions of Yugoslav Partisans. This film was released a year before Kelly’s Heroes, in 1969. Of course, given that this was a cooperation between the American and Yugoslavian film industries, the visual effects were much improved, and these are best seen on the tank themselves. The quality of the detail added to the tanks is extraordinary and resembles a real Tiger quite well. In the movie itself, the overall combat action is more realistic, to some extent. The downside is that they still portrayed some myths, such as that the Tiger was an unstoppable tank.”

One of the prop ‘Tigers’ seen in ‘Kelly’s Heroes’. Photo: MGM

The fate of the mock-ups is generally unknown, but they were probably given back to the army and converted back into regular tanks. These may have then been scrapped or they may have even seen service in the Yugoslav wars that followed. A similar – albeit objectively worse – ‘dressed up’ T-34 would later be seen in Steven Spielberg’s ‘Saving Private Ryan’ (1999).

Conclusion

Kelly’s Heroes remains something of a cult classic, and in the grand scheme of things, its inaccuracies are not that great, especially compared to films of a similar ilk. It at least shows some effort from the production team to keep things as authentic as possible. It is clear that they did their research in that respect. In 1970, the default for ‘German tank’ was ‘paint a cross on the side and call it good’. There are many examples of this, the most egregious of these might be the ‘King Tigers’ of the 1965 film ‘Battle of the Bulge’ which were simply Spanish Army M47 Patton IIs painted gray with a Balkenkreuz applied to the sides. Compared to this, the prop Tigers of Kelly’s Heroes constitute and impressive effort from the production team, especially for 1970.

The same type of Sherman in the movie Battle for Neretva, where they were used to portray German tanks. They have none of the external additions from Kelly’s Heroes, but does sport a large Balkenkreuz on the side. Photo: IMBD

This film was not the first to feature Yugoslavian E4s, having already appeared in the movie Battle for Neretva, together with the aforementioned prop Tigers. However, in that movie, they were used to portray Nazi tanks, with a large Balkenkreuz painted on the side and none of the external additions used in Kelly’s Heroes.

What happened to the M4A3E4s post-filming of Kelly’s Heroes is unfortunately unknown. By the time of the Yugoslav Wars, most were scrapped due to a lack of parts for their maintenance. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that Shermans participated in any of the conflicts in Slovenia, Croatia, or Bosnia and Herzegovina. They did find some use as decoys for NATO aviation during the 1999 Kosovo War. After the Kumanovo agreement and subsequent demilitarization negotiations, it is highly likely that they were all demilitarized and turned into monuments, range targets, or scrapped. At least one M4A3E4 used in the film survives today in the private collection of military vehicle dealer Marcus Glenn, based in East England.

Surviving M4A3E4 in Yugoslavia at the entrance to the town of Gornji Milanovac, Serbia. Photo: Vladan Savic via Srpski Oplop

Oddball’s Sherman, a dressed-up Yugoslavian Army M4A3E4 as it appeared in the 1970 film, ‘Kelly’s Heroes’. Illustration produced by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

Sources

Kelly’s Heroes, (1970), Directed by Brian G. Hutton, Written by Troy Kennedy Martin, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
R.P. Hunicutt, Sherman: A History of the American Medium Tank, Presidio Press, 1978.
Wheels & Tracks No. 39, pages 10-11; ‘MVs in Service: Yugoslavia’, April 1992
Patrick Stansell, Son of Sherman, Vol. 1, The Ampersand Group, 2013
Pierre-Olivier Buan, Joe DeMarco and Leife Hulbert, Sherman Minutia
www.srpskioklop.paluba.info
dimitrijeostojic.com
MDAP Information

Cold War Yugoslav Tanks Has Own Video

M-84

First series M-84 tank, distinguishable by the new A10X (MB) meteo-sensor, mounted on the long, foldable carrying arm. Illustration made by by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Main Battle Tank – ~650 Built

Introduction

The development and production of the M-84 main battle tank (MBT) by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia perfectly embodied their national slogan, “Brotherhood and Unity,” bringing together the economies and production capacities of all six Yugoslav republics to create a source of national pride. Regarded as one of the best copies of the T-72 main battle tank, the M-84 was a unique product of the Yugoslavian geopolitical situation, combining an Eastern license with Western technology, the tenacity of its own military industry, and the long-standing aspirations of the Yugoslav People’s Army. Ironically, a decade after its construction, the country would collapse, and the tank built to protect Yugoslavia would instead be used as yet another tool in its destruction.

M-84 tanks of the zero series during the 1985 Victory Day parade. This was the first parade to feature M-84 main battle tanks and the last Victory Day parade in SFR Yugoslavia.
Source: mod.gov.rs

Birth of a Tank Army

Emerging from the aftermath of World War II, the Yugoslavian National Army inherited a diverse array of Allied-supplied and captured armored vehicles. The primary tank forces, concentrated in the 1st and 2nd tank brigades, were equipped with M3A3 Stuarts provided by the British and T-34/85s supplied by the Soviets throughout the war. Recognizing the contribution of these brigades during the country’s liberation, a decision influenced by Soviet military doctrine, led to their expansion into tank divisions with supporting elements. These divisions were then organized into the First Tank Army, together with four independent tank brigades comprising captured Axis vehicles and 65 newly bought T-34/85s. However, challenges such as inadequate training and a lack of spare parts and ammunition for captured equipment rendered these units unfit for combat, prompting the abandonment of the Tank Army concept.

M3A3 Stuarts of the 1st Tank Regiment in liberated Šibenik, 3rd November, 1944.
Source: Wikipedia

The arrival of 308 more T-34/85s initially alleviated the issue of captured tanks, but the deterioration in relations after the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 severed ties with the Soviet Union, making it impossible to acquire new tanks and spare parts. Consequently, efforts were made to establish overhaul facilities and domestic production lines for T-34/85 spare parts, which was accomplished with moderate success. Enthralled by the notion of military self-sufficiency, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) pushed for the full-scale production of a copy of the T-34/85, named “Vozilo A.” However, after the limited run of the five tanks, it became evident that the attempt had failed. Subsequently, the decision was made to acquire new tanks from Yugoslavia’s newfound partners in the West.

The Vozilo A during the May Day parade in Belgrade, 1950.
Source: srpskioklop.paluba.info

In the late 1950s, facing the potential threat of a Soviet invasion, the Yugoslav Government openly sought material assistance from the United States, Britain, and France to equip its armed forces. In response, Western countries included Yugoslavia in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP), leading to the delivery of American World War II-era surplus equipment. Alongside large amounts of M4E3A4 Sherman tanks, M18 Hellcat tank destroyers, and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, 319 M47 Patton tanks were also provided. However, the availability of spare parts for these aging machines dwindled quickly, rendering about one-fifth of the tank fleet inoperable by the end of the 1950s.

Despite the supply of M47 Pattons to Yugoslavia, the JNA consistently displayed a clear preference for Soviet tanks, such as the T-34/85.
Source: srpskioklop.paluba.info

Sitting on Two Chairs

The thaw in relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began in the mid-1950s, following Stalin’s death. With the diminished threat of a Soviet invasion, Yugoslavia withdrew from the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, opting for a more balanced geopolitical approach that emphasized neutrality. This shift culminated in the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement, comprising countries not aligned with either power bloc. The improved relations also resulted in Soviet approval for credit for weapons purchases, enabling Yugoslavia to once again procure weapon systems from its preferred supplier. However, these sales contracts came with conditions, often obliging Yugoslavia to acquire obsolete weapon systems as a prerequisite for obtaining more modern equipment, such as T-55 tanks.

President Tito (left), sitting on one of the chairs, together with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev (right) on the Yugoslav President’s Luxury Yacht, the Galeb.
Source: glossy.espreso.co.rs

Between 1961 and 1980, over 1,600 T-55 tanks were purchased, along with substantial stocks of older T-34/85 models. The latter decade of this period is often considered the golden age of the armored and mechanized formations of the JNA, as the constant inflow of new military equipment allowed for experimentation in unit organization and tactics. By this time, general overhauls and the production of most spare parts for the T-34s had been successfully established in the country. Predictably, an order was issued to initiate local production of spare parts for the T-55 as well, and an attempt was made to copy and locally produce the tank in its entirety, though the project was unsuccessful once again. This failure led the JNA leadership to recognize the need for foreign assistance in such matters. Consequently, it was decided to obtain a production license for a modern main battle tank as an intermediate step.

A JNA T-55 during the “Sloboda 71” military exercise.
Source: srpskioklop.paluba.info

Program “Kapela”

In August 1974, a meeting of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense took place to discuss the initiation of main battle tank production in Yugoslavia. Reflecting on previous unsuccessful attempts at domestic tank manufacturing, some members of the secretariat and representatives from the Military-Technical Institute (Vojnotehnički Institut – VTI) expressed reservations about this undertaking. However, representatives from the military-industrial complex, no doubt aware of the massive investments such a project would bring, were confident in their ability to successfully handle the challenge. The obsolescence of the Yugoslav People’s Army’s tank fleet, which still included 1,040 WWII-era T-34/85 tanks in the mid-1970s, and the urgent need for their replacement eventually forced the issue, leading to the inception of the Kapela (Chapel) project. As was tradition in Yugoslavia, military projects were named after rivers, mountains, cities, and animals. Project Kapela was named after a hill.

By the end of the following year, a task force comprising experts from the army and administration of the military-industrial complex was established to assess the readiness of the Yugoslav military industry for the task of domestic tank production. Once the license would be obtained, the Kapela team would transition to an oversight role, monitoring progress and serving as the final arbiter in any disputes or issues that arose.

By this point, most American supplied tanks were out of service due to a shortage of spare parts.
Source: srpskioklop.paluba.info

Which country should be approached for the license was hardly considered, given the Yugoslav People’s Army’s preference for Soviet gear, making the choice obvious. Similarly, selecting the tank to be licensed was a straightforward process. The T-55s were already obsolete, and the first 1,000 in the JNA were scheduled for decommissioning within a decade. The T-62s faced challenges in the export market due to their higher cost and maintenance requirements while offering comparatively little upgrade value over the T-55s. As a result, even Warsaw Pact countries, except for Bulgaria, opted out of the T-62. The decision was made to pursue a license for the newest T-72 main battle tank. However, there was a problem—the Soviet Union was not interested in selling it.

The T-72 “Ural”. These initial T-72s could be distinguished by the protrusion of the TPD-2-49 sight located on the right side of the turret.
Source: https://www.themodellingnews.com/2022/05/preview-135th-scale-t-72-ural-full.html

Soviet Backbone

Though often touted as a cheaper, less sophisticated mobilization model of the T-64, the T-72 did not neatly fit that description and actually began its life as a modernization program for the T-64 main battle tank. After the failure of Object 167M program, Uralvagonzavod was allotted six T-64As to experiment with previously developed solutions, such as their own AZ ( Автомат Заряжания – Automatic Loader ) carousel-type autoloader, V-45K engine, and T-54-style cooling system. These modified T-64As were dubbed Object 172s. Once the reworked suspensions from Object 167 were incorporated into the project, the tank became known as the Object 172M. The prototype passed all state trials and was accepted into service in August 1973 as a T-72 “Ural”. The transition to the next major T-72 variant was gradual, with an interim model known as T-72 “Ural-1”, which entered service in 1975 and encompassed the majority of the early T-72 production run. These were the tanks presented to the Yugoslav delegation during their visit to the Vystrel military academy near Moscow.

The Object 172 in the Kubinka Tank Museum. The running gear and suspensions on this tank would later be replaced with components from the Object 167, giving birth to the Object 172M.
Source: tankmuseum.ru

This delegation comprised members of the VTI, army officers, and representatives from the civilian industrial sector, who would be responsible for any theoretical tank production. They were welcomed by the head of the academy, Lieutenant General Davydov, who, along with his entourage, proceeded to introduce the delegation members to the new tank. Following a brief oral presentation, the delegation was permitted to enter the tank and ask questions, to which the elusive Soviets would, in turn, attempt to answer while revealing as little detail as possible. Subsequently, the delegation was guided through the academy’s classrooms and shown a training mock-up of a tank used during the class before concluding the visit with a dinner.

Although Soviet officers were not talkative and only basic characteristics of the tank were obtained, the delegation was nonetheless impressed by what they saw. However, there was also consensus that the Soviet construction quality was subpar, and some design solutions that were implemented were not particularly cutting-edge. Upon return, the delegation recommended that the license for the T-72 should be obtained, but any such talk was promptly shot down by the Soviet Government under the excuse that the licensed production of such a tank would be too complicated for Yugoslavia, and co-production agreements with Czechoslovakia and Poland were offered instead. Changing their minds required intervention from the boss himself, Marshal Josip Broz Tito, who, during his 1977 visit to the Soviet Union, personally negotiated the sale of the license with the Soviet General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, despite protests from the Soviet Defense Minister. Once the sale of the license was approved, there was another attempt to weigh down this contract with “unacceptable terms,” which once again required Tito to intervene. In the end, the production license was finally sold for US$39 million, though, like before, it came with certain conditions. The purchased license was valid for the next 10 years or the production of 1,000 tanks. The SFR Yugoslavia was not allowed to modify, sell, or co-produce the tank without the approval of the USSR, and some production models and components would have to be delivered to the USSR for testing.

A Polish T-72M.
Source: aw.my.games/en/news/general/historical-skins-t-72m-lwp

The T-72M export model, for which the license was bought, was an amalgamation of parts from the older “Urals” and the newest T-72A variant. The tank featured a 2A46 (D-81TM) 125 mm smoothbore main gun, 902A “Tucha” smoke launchers, rubber-mesh side-skirts, V-46-6 engine, and a 44-round ammunition capacity, all carried over from the T-72A. Only the older BM-9 and BM-12 APFSDS rounds were offered for the tank, as well as the older 80-105-20 armor layout without the composite filler in the turret.

The fire-control system was watered down, comprising the TPD-K1 stabilized gunner’s sight and a secondary separate TPN-1-49-23 night sight, a coincidence rangefinder and a ballistic computer. This fire-control system, as well as other electric systems and the tank’s mobility, were rated poorly by the VTI. Nevertheless, the T-72M represented a significant technological leap over the T-55, and the JNA asked for the licensed tank to be produced exactly as is, with modifications and upgrades being developed only after the successful start of the production. This request was dismissed by the VTI, which created a realization plan for the Kapela program including the provision to modify the license to address its shortcomings before the tank entered production. In October of 1980, the Kapela team approved the realization plan , and with this act, the M-84 tank was born.

A T-72M tank in Yugoslavia. In addition to the license, SFR Yugoslavia bought close to 80 of these tanks.
Source: Srpski Oklop

Twenty tonnes of the documentation for the tank arrived in the town of Subotica in mid-1979, transported via train in 40 freight carts. Before the tank production could commence, the extensive paperwork had to be thoroughly examined, translated and distributed by VTI to the hundreds of Yugoslavian companies vying for contracts. This process, which took years, involved both a meritocratic and a political approach, as the distribution of work among the republics was a sensitive issue. During a meeting held on this matter, representatives of the socialist republics that constituted Yugoslavia each presented their case for why their republic should receive the major share of the production contracts relating to the project. Representatives of the Socialist Republic (SR) of Slovenia even requested to be given the production of the tank in its entirety, citing the lack of involvement of their republic in the overall defense sector of the country. However, following the advice of JNA representatives, the Yugoslav government chose to pursue a balanced distribution of work among the constituent republics instead.

For example, three factories applied for the role of final assembly of all parts: Đuro Đaković from Slavonski Brod, Goša from Smederevska Palanka, and Mašinska Industrija from Niš. All of the applicants offered similar conditions, as they were all metal engineering plants and rolling stock manufacturers. Out of these, the Đuro Đakovic metal engineering factory was chosen due to its location in the Socialist Republic of Croatia, which was less involved in tank production compared to the SR Serbia, from where the other two competing companies originated. According to one analysis from 1992, the monetary value of each republic’s share in production was as follows:

Yugoslav Republic	Contributing share in the value of the final product (%)
SR Bosnia and Herzegovina	33.25% *
SR Serbia	22.01%
SR Croatia	21.73%
SR Slovenia	17.93%
SR Macedonia	3.39%
SR Montenegro	1.69%

* – 14.67% of this value came from companies located within today’s Republic of Srpska, marked in light gray color on the map below.

Map of the six socialist republics that made up Yugoslavia.
Source: Wikipedia

The SFR Yugoslavia stood out as a rare example of self-sufficiency in tank production, with nearly all components manufactured within the country. Only about 8% of the total cost for the production of a single tank came from the imports of materials and parts from abroad.
The bulk of the work was to be done by industrial giants of the SFR Yugoslavia, but in total, around 290 civilian factories, enterprises, companies, and firms were involved in the production of the tank. Each participant had to establish its own specialized department with a construction bureau in charge of drawing up the technological documentation and interpreting the construction documentation passed onto it by the VTI, while adhering to strict secrecy guidelines. Most participants approached the task with relentless optimism, promising timely deliveries, superb quality, and even pledging to develop their own design solutions superior to the Soviet ones. Those who were more honest with their capabilities risked being politically ostracized. This approach would later backfire, as companies that overestimated their capabilities struggled to start production, causing delays to the entire project.

The VTI begrudgingly accepted its role in the project, likely feeling that their talents as a research and development institution would be better spent on something other than copying a Soviet weapon. Nevertheless, they were placed in charge of the project development, verification of technological documentation, development of product quality regulations, and approval of modifications to the final product. TOC (Tehnički Opitni Centar – Technical Test Center) was in charge of testing the finished tank and determining its parameters.

Some of the major companies involved in production were:

Đuro Đaković – Slavonski Brod (SR Croatia): final assembly
Rudi Čajavec – Banja Luka (SR Bosnia and Herzegovina): fire-control system final assembly, ballistic computer, RUT-1 radio system, NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) protection, firefighting systems, and many other electronic components
Bratstvo – Travnik (SR Bosnia and Herzegovina): 2A46 125 mm main cannon
Pretis – Vogosca (SR Bosnia and Herzegovina): 125 mm ammunition
Zrak – Sarajevo (SR Bosnia and Herzegovina): day-night sights for the FCS, DNKS-2 commander’s sight, periscopes, andM87 anti-aircraft machine gun scope
FAMOS – Pale (SR Bosnia and Herzegovina): engine
FAMOS – Hrasnica (SR Bosnia and Herzegovina): M-84 transmission
RMK – Zenica (SR Bosnia and Herzegovina): turret bearings
14th Oktobar – Krusevac (SR Serbia): M-84A transmission
Sever – Subotica (SR Serbia): autoloader
Rekord – Rakovica (SR Serbia): rubber parts of the tracks and running gear
Zastava – Kragujevac (SR Serbia): machine guns and small arms
Prvi Partizan – Uzice (SR Serbia): ammunition
Prva Petoletka – Trstenik (SR Serbia): hydraulics
21 Maj – Rakovica (SR Serbia): manual turret traverse system
Sova, Ei Niš – Niš (SR Serbia): light amplifiers for aiming devices and periscopes (these were imported from abroad throughout most of the production run).
CEO Iskra (Fotona) – Ljubljana (SR Slovenia): laser rangefinder and other electronic components
Slovenske Železarne – Ravni (SR Slovenia): armor plates, turret, and metal parts of the tracks
Sava – (SR Slovenia): rubber screens
Metalski zavodi Tito – Skoplje (SR Macedonia): parts of the transmission
Aluminijumski kombinat Podgorica – Podgorica (SR Montenegro): wheels

Foreign Assistance

The task of distributing work to companies and factories was made harder by the fact that documentation arrived in Yugoslavia incomplete. While the construction documentation, which described individual tank parts and their properties, arrived in full, much of the technological documentation on the machinery and processes required for the production of parts listed in the construction documentation was missing. Some of the documentation, such as that concerning the NBC protection system, was deliberately omitted, as it was deemed too confidential to share, and the Soviet Union promised to supply these parts instead. The license provisions did not include technical assistance from the Soviet Union regarding the startup of production in Yugoslavia, and Yugoslav engineers were not allowed to visit Soviet tank production facilities.

Only a small team of instructors from the Soviet Union was dispatched to Yugoslavia in 1982 to help their engineers disassemble two T-72M tanks and answer questions during their short stay. However, this opportunity was wasted since the Soviet team arrived prematurely, before the Yugoslav engineers had even fully commenced the work on the project. This premature arrival left the engineers somewhat embarrassed, as they were not well-versed with the task and thus could not pose meaningful questions. Consequently, once the work actually commenced, Yugoslav engineers had to figure out most of the production process on their own. To find solutions, an engineering delegation was sent to Czechoslovakia.

Before Yugoslavia, the T-72M license was sold to both Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Source: www.militaryimages.net

During the visit, the animosity between the Czechs, Slovaks, and the Soviets was exploited, as the Czechs and Slovaks were more than willing to assist with anything the Soviets would not. On one occasion, the Yugoslav delegation was invited to dinner at the home of the chief engineer of a Czechoslovak “Pal Magneton” tank factory located in the town of Kroměříž. During the dinner, the delegation members noticed that the engineer had a malfunctioning CRT television set, which they managed to repair. In gratitude, the chief engineer returned the favor by providing the delegation with all the documentation relating to tank production from the factory. Much of the documentation that was not granted through the license was obtained through similar methods, but all the components (the lower-right part of the drawing) were cut out because each document had an ownership number and confidentiality in that corner.

The days following the return of the delegation home were the most productive days of the entire project, as many problems regarding production and the new fire-control system in development were fixed. The production process was significantly aided by the ample utilization of the emerging field of informatics. Computers played a crucial role in monitoring the procurement of parts and the overall dynamics of tank production.

The Cost of Doing Business

Acquiring the license and establishing production proved to be an expensive affair for an already debt-ridden country. Beyond the initial US$39 million spent on the license, an additional US$7 million was allocated for processing, interpretation, and translation of the related documentation. Supporting infrastructure, factory modernization, tools procurement, and the creation of specialized tools for tank production required another US$121 million. An additional US$13 million were earmarked for the production of the M-84 tank prototype series. These combined expenses totaled US$180 million for the Kapela project. As per Dr. Prof. Milorad Dragojević, the Head of the Kapela project, the average production cost of an M-84 tank was estimated to be around US$700,000, which was nearly half the price of a T-72M.

Thanks to these substantial investments, the SFR Yugoslavia managed to commence mass production of main battle tanks, a feat few countries worldwide could accomplish at that time. The anticipated production rate was approximately 120 tanks per year. Studies conducted in the late seventies for the Kapela project indicated that the license purchase was justified, sensible, and cost-effective, even if the tanks were produced solely for the needs of the JNA, without factoring in potential export opportunities after completing the 1,000 tanks by 1995. The plan envisioned Yugoslavia breaking even after producing the 1,000th tank while retaining the benefits from the previous investments in the industrial sector. For example, many factories were re-equipped with expensive multipurpose machinery, which could later be used for projects beyond tank construction.

Several M-84A tank hulls in the Đuro Đaković factory. All M-84 tanks, except for the armored recovery variants, were assembled here.
Source: www.vecernji.hr

The economic reality of the 1980s brought about stagnation, high unemployment, and international debt, pushing the Yugoslavian economy into a downward death spiral. Consequently, even before the first prototype was completed, Yugoslavia began marketing it to foreign buyers, with a particular focus on Libya.

Design of the M-84

Once all the paperwork was settled, earnest work on producing the first prototype could commence. In addition to the licensed documentation, one T-72M was delivered to Yugoslavia in 1979 to serve as a reference. Sometime later, two more T-72Ms arrived for testing, followed by a batch of a dozen more in 1981. These tanks underwent extensive testing to assess the compatibility of locally produced parts and to experiment with domestic upgrades, including a new fire-control system that would soon characterize M-84 tanks. Delays caused by the size and incompleteness of the delivered license paperwork meant the project fell behind schedule. Consequently, engineers assigned to the tank had to work under a lot of pressure, all while managing visits from both foreign envoys and domestic political commissions. In such conditions, the focus was put on rectifying the most visible issues first.

One of the T-72MJ prototypes preparing for a fording test. This tank’s crew consisted of:
Commander Franjo Bunčić, Gunner Nikolaj Milev, and Driver Ivan Židov
Source: www.paluba.info

The first tank from the prototype batch was ready in April 1983. At that time, due to the ongoing license conditions, the tank was designated T-72MJ. Like the rest of the prototype batch, this tank was a blend of foreign and domestic components and might have been largely based on one of the imported T-72Ms. Externally, the prototype closely resembled the early T-72Ms, with the most noticeable difference being the DNNS-2 aiming device from the SUV-M-84 fire-control system.

The same tank entering the water. Notice the absence of smoke grenade launchers on the front of the turret. No tank from the prototype series had them.
Source: www.paluba.info

SUV-M-84

The T-72M’s fire-control system (FCS) was deemed unsatisfactory from the outset, and the VTI began lobbying for its replacement as soon as the license was acquired. However, the heads of the army insisted on the prototype batch having an identical fire-control system to the T-72M, while work on the improved fire-control system would be done in parallel. When the costs of developing and producing two fire-control systems were presented to the Kapela group, the plan changed to ordering finished fire control systems for the prototype batch from the Soviet Union. However, it was discovered that the Soviets had already moved on to a better fire-control system and were refusing to supply it. Consequently, VTI’s proposal to remove the Soviet fire-control system was approved.

Fortunately, engineers had a suitable replacement in mind. Prior to the Kapela project, the JNA had initiated the modernization of its T-55 tanks through the Igman project, conducted in collaboration with the Swedish company Bofors. This endeavor led to the development of the SUV-T-55 (Sistem Upravljanja Vatrom – Fire-Control System). Although the serial modernization of the JNA’s T-55s never commenced, and only about 10 T-55s were modified with the new fire-control system, technological and construction documentation for the components of the fire-control system were available and could be reused for the new M-84 tank. As the license for the fire-control system was exclusively granted for the T-55 tanks, the installation of the systems on the new domestic MBT was carried out with utmost secrecy. Production of the components for the fire-control system was entrusted to the Rudi Čajavec company in SR Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A T-55 modernized through the Igman project. The DNNS-1 aiming device is clearly visible on the left of the turret.
Source: https://www.mycity-military.com/

With the hardware for the fire-control system settled, new software for the system also had to be developed. While Project Igman was on the back burner, the software for it, previously stolen by the Yugoslav secret service from the Volvo car of Bofors employees, was unfortunately unusable as it was booby-trapped with hard-to-detect malware code, rendering it inaccurate in practice. Consequently, VTI and Rudi Čajavec were both tasked with writing the new software from scratch. As VTI was also in charge of choosing a winning software, it chose its own, and once their software was merged with the available hardware, the SUV-M-84 fire-control system for the new tank was ready.

The most important component of the fire-control system was the gunner’s independent DNNS-2 combined sight, replacing the previously separate TPD-K1 day sight and TPN-1-49-23 night sight. The new sight was designed to be compatible with the T-72M turret, enabling its retrofit into these tanks without modifying the base.

Separate day and night sight on the Soviet T-72A. Export versions of the tank would feature TPN-1-49-23 night sight instead of the TPN-3-49.
Source: https://www.mycity-military.com/

The DNNS-2 gunner’s aiming device on the M-84 tank.
Source: www.mycity-military.com

The DNNS-2 features three-plane stabilization and three channels for the gunner: day, night, and a laser channel for the rangefinder. The day channel offers a magnification of x3, providing a 20° field of view, and x7, granting a 9° field of view. The night channel is capable of x8.5 magnification, allowing the gunner a 5.4° field of view. On a moonless night, the DNNS-2 can detect targets at 1,500 m and identify them at 1,200 m. Accurate fire can be opened at 1,000 m if the tank is stationary. The laser rangefinder can measure distances to targets within the range of 200 to 9999 m.

A DNNS-2 gunner’s combined sight.
Source: www.paluba.info

Day and night DNNS-2 sights of the M-84 tank.
Source: srpskioklop.paluba.info

The DNNS-2 was designed with the ability to be paired with a camera providing a live feed (albeit in black and white, as cameras in the 1980s were not very advanced) to the commander inside the tank or personnel outside of it. Though envisioned for training purposes, this system not only allows immediate insight into the crew’s shooting procedures with real-time correction via a radio link during training but, in theory, if paired with a command vehicle, it could also enable the live monitoring of an effect on target during the engagement from a command center.

The DNNS-2 on this M-84 is coupled with the camera, allowing the commander to also look through the gunner’s sight.
Source: www.paluba.info

While the tank is on the march, the gunner’s DNNS-2 aiming device is usually covered by a protective cap, which can be lowered from inside the tank using a somewhat flimsy cable designed under pressure. Because of it, the cable is prone to deformation and snapping, leading to the redesign of the lowering mechanism in later M-84AB export variants.

A M-84s during a march. The DNNS-2 protective caps are on, shielding the delicate gunner’s sight.
Source: www.paluba.info

The initial version of the DNNS-2 gunner’s aiming device had only first-generation night vision equipment. Consequently, tanks equipped with this sight also had two IR headlights, which contributed to the picture quality, but the aiming device could still be used without them. Starting with the second production series, DNNS-2 devices were equipped with second-generation night vision equipment, rendering the IR headlights somewhat redundant. Hence, they were removed.

Although this gunner’s aiming device was satisfactory, ongoing development led to the introduction of an updated DNNS-2A aiming device together with the M-84A tanks. In comparison to the DNNS-2, which featured either first or second-generation night vision capabilities powered by a voltage of 6.5 volts, the DNNS-2A incorporated second+ generation image intensifiers powered by 2.65 volts. It is important to note that these two systems are not fully interchangeable and require different amplifier boxes which look the same but provide different voltage output. The easiest way to differentiate which aiming device is mounted is to check the gunner’s panel. First, older DNNS-2 panels only have a simple “Night Channel” on-off switch, while the DNNS-2A panels have a rotary potentiometer for image adjustment in its place.

The M-84AB tanks destined for Kuwait were equipped with their own DNNS-2A/6400 aiming device, featuring a distinct reticle and a key in place of a switch for turning on the laser. Due to a different method of rounding up the Pi number, Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavian sights featured 6,000 milliradians as opposed to 6,400 as used by the West, and as requested by Kuwait for their own tanks.

The DNNS-2 gunner’s aiming device
Source: www.paluba.info

The DNNS-2A/6400 gunner’s aiming device in a Kuwaiti M-84AB.
Source: www.paluba.info

The DNNS-2A/6400 gunner’s sight on the Kuwaiti M-84AB tank.
Source: www.mycity-military.com

There were plans for further development, culminating in the DNNS-2TI, which included thermal vision and was expected to complete all tests and enter production in following years. Unfortunately, due to the war and the subsequent breakup of the state, all future development came to a halt.
The Serbian M-84AS1 (2017) prototype was equipped with a DNNS-2ATK sight, which is said to have a thermal imager. As this modernization package was not put into production, little else is known about it, but it is likely that the sight mounted was actually the previously developed DNNS-2TI.

The DNNS-2 TI functional prototype with thermovision was ready by 1989.
Source: www.mycity-military.com

Finally, there was a downgraded wartime version of the aiming device, designated DNNS-R. This device lacked the x3 and x7 zoom options and was produced only with parts already available at Zrak (Sarajevo) during the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is unknown if any were ever mounted on the M-84 tanks, but one found in the warehouse was later mounted on the command version of the M-80 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). This command IFV is currently in service with the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

DNNS-R sight. It is not known if more than one was produced.
Source: Vladimir Ivanović

The TKN-3 commander’s sight from the T-72M was replaced with the domestic DNKS-2 commander’s sight. The DNKS-2 comes equipped with both day and night channels, offering a wide operational range of 360° horizontally and -8° to 12° vertically. In the day channel, the sight provides a magnification of x4.9 with a field of view of 10°, while the night channel features a passive image intensifier, delivering a magnification of x4.3 and a field of view of 10.9. During use, the commander manually rotates his cupola, in which the sight is embedded, utilizing it for fire correction or independent target acquisition. Like on the T-72M, the commander can horizontally rotate the turret in the same direction as his DNKS-2 device, although he cannot engage targets by himself. Instead, the gunner would need to vertically guide the gun onto the target before opening fire.

The cupola-mounted DNKS-2 commander’s sight is visible on the right side of this Serbian M-84A tank.
Source: https://www.mycity-military.com/

A ballistic computer is employed to compute the elevation and azimuth (pitch and yaw axes) angles of the main cannon based on the data collected by the 4 KB microprocessor, including:

longitudinal and lateral inclination of the tank
the engagement distance and the speed of the target, gathered via the laser
available meteorological information gathered by the meteorological sensor at the top of the tank
the type of ammunition used, noted via a switch on the ballistic computer’s control panel
gunpowder temperature, collected by the sensor located in the commander’s panel

The FCS computer can calculate firing solutions for subcaliber and cumulative projectiles at distances from 200 to 4,000 m, high-explosive projectiles from 200 to 9,400 m, and the PKT coaxial machine gun from 200 to 1,500 m.

The fire-control system of the early M-84 tanks featured the A20X (MBL) meteorological sensor manufactured by the Swiss company Geotec, which provided information on wind speed, atmospheric pressure, and air temperature. Some parameters, like air density or humidity, were not recorded because their impact on the projectile accuracy was considered negligible. These sensors were capable of detecting longitudinal wind speed and crosswind of up to 40 m per second. On the prototype and zero series tanks, A20X (MBL) sensors were placed on a short carrying arm with a rubber damper, while on the first series tanks, they were known as A20X (MB) and were mounted on the longer, folding carrier arm.

First series M-84 tank equipped with a A20X (MB) meteorological sensor.
Source: https://dimitrijeostojic.com/blog/

During testing, it was observed that the impact of longitudinal wind on accuracy was less pronounced on the M-84 tanks, thanks to their better-stabilized and faster projectiles, compared to the modernized T-55s from which the initial meteorological sensors were adapted. As such, starting with the second series, the A20X sensors were replaced by the simpler and more affordable A10X (MB) sensors which could not measure longitudinal wind and which were capable of measuring crosswind of up to 25 mps. The two sensor types were not fully interchangeable, and switching from one to the other required adjustments to the software of the ballistics computer. Since the new A10X (MB) sensors were somewhat bigger, a new telescopic mount with a rubber cap was designed by VTI.

Tanks of the second, third, and fourth series were equipped with A10X (MB) meteo-sensors on a telescopic mount.
Source: https://www.indiedb.com/members/arma-srbija/images/m842

The design of the new meteo-sensor incorporated a retracting mechanism utilizing a rubber cable inside a coil spring, making the whole system susceptible to getting jammed if mishandled. When pulled, the cable would lower the meteo-sensor via the coil spring, but sometimes the cable would get stuck between the coils, leading to the damaging or snapping of the cable, leaving the meteo-sensor protruding outside the telescopic carrier. Furthermore, if the insulation of another cable present in the coil, SUV cable number 7, was damaged, rainwater could enter it and slide down to the commander’s panel, causing further damage.

Another problem was identified with the protective rubber cap on top of the telescopic carrier. This cap increased the atmospheric pressure inside it to levels beyond what the sensor could handle, resulting in the failure of hundreds of these sensors shortly after the introduction of the second and third series tanks. Since VTI was refusing to accept the responsibility but hundreds of sensors still had to be repaired, blame was shifted to Geotec for supplying supposedly subpar products. A substantial batch of damaged sensors was returned to Geotec for overhaul, accompanied by a delegation from VTI, including members from the Zemun Institute of Physics. During their visit, the delegation gained insights into the production process. Following their return, production of domestic copies of these sensors, designated MS1 and MS2, was initiated.

A M-84 with tucked in A10X (MB) meteo-sensors.
Source: www.paluba.info, Vladimir Invanović

Regrettably, this telescopic meteo-sensor design remained unchanged until the sixth series of M-84AB tanks for Kuwait. Even today, meteo-sensors remain a frequent source of breakdowns for M-84 tanks in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In contrast, Croatia and Slovenia have taken measures to modify these sensor carriers, likely in an effort to address the longstanding bugs and enhance their reliability. Luckily, in case of a malfunctioning meteorological sensor, data can still be manually typed into the ballistics computer.

The gunner has over a hundred switches, buttons, levers, water and air valves, and similar controls which enable a robust system of backup modes of operation, considering the systems on the tank that may have been damaged, disabled, or destroyed. An analogue mode of operation exists in case there is no electricity in the tank at all. This ensures that there is always a possibility of deriving some use from the intact parts of the tank, even if other parts are defective.

The SUV-M-84 was an effective fire-control system for its time. Once all the bugs were ironed out, the FCS showed impressive accuracy during domestic tests and trials conducted in foreign countries. In a comprehensive evaluation conducted alongside a T-72M tank, the M-84 was judged to be two to three times more precise than its Soviet counterpart. Live-fire demonstrations in Pakistan and Indian tests of the SUV-M-84, modified to fit on a T-55 tank, also left very good impressions. In Kuwait, M-84AB tanks often outperformed the M1A1 Abrams tanks in terms of accuracy during joint exercises. When the M1A1s were particularly under-performing, the exercises were prone to getting abruptly canceled.

The M-84 performed well during tests in Pakistan. Unfortunately, Yugoslavia refused to trade it for cotton, as per Pakistan’s request.
Source: www.mycity-military.com/

Soviet Pot, Yugoslav Kettle

Differences between the T-72 and M-84 were somewhat more pronounced from inside the tank. The replacement of the old fire-control system necessitated the removal of both gunners’ aiming devices and a commander’s sight, and their subsequent substitution with the domestic systems. Nearly all original Soviet electronics were also swapped, including the radio equipment and intercom, an antenna mount and antenna, the stabilization system and the three-phase voltage converter. The NBC protection system, fire extinguishing system, and voltage regulator were also replaced with domestic components made by the Rudi Čajavec company. This was done both because domestically available electronics were superior and due to the incomplete Soviet documentation, particularly concerning all electric systems, making their replacement essentially necessary. The turret bearings also had to be lightly modified, making M-84 turrets incompatible with other T-72M tanks in service with the JNA without an overhaul.

A T-72M (left) next to a M-84 (right) at the Pivka Military Museum.
Source: Park of military history Pivka Facebook page

A number of parts from the T-72M that lost their function with the new modernization were removed. One such part was the linear accelerometer, which used to be located in front of the commander. This tool was used to give the stabilizer additional power, which was used to spin the turret in cases where extra effort was required, such as when the tank sat on a sharp slope. The M-84 had a different solution for supplying power to the stabilizer, thus the linear accelerometer was removed. Another one is the cosine potentiometer, intended for calculating the speed of rounds during firing. However, this part was never connected to the system and started being removed from the second series onwards.

Curiously, some other parts were never removed despite them losing their function, such as the holder of the high-voltage probe for TPN-1-49-23 night sight, gunner’s fuse board and various protrusions on the 125 mm gun which were a part of the stabilization system on the T-72M.

The frontal mudguards include four holes, allowing for so-called “gill” armor to be mounted on the tank. This type of protection was, however, never serially installed on M-84 tanks due to the introduction of rubber side skirts, making the holes an unnecessary leftover from a T-72 tank as well.

T-72 tank with the “Gill” armor. Notice how the frontal plates are attached to the mudguards.
Source: Quora

Kuwaiti M-84AB tank. Notice how the four holes still exist on both mudguards, despite these tanks never being intended to have “gill” armor.
Source: Wikimedia

Main Armament

The M-84 tank’s main armament is the 2A46 (also known as D-81TM) 125 mm L48 smoothbore cannon. This gun was developed by the OKB-9 Design Bureau from Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg) as a modernization of the older 2A26M model. The most notable improvement was the implementation of a hydraulic recoil buffer fluid expansion compensatory mechanism, departing from the fluid-air mixture used in the 2A26. This design change resulted in a more even recoil stroke, enhancing the dynamic motion of the round inside the gun barrel and, consequently, improving firing accuracy. In Yugoslavia, cannons were produced by the MKK Bratstvo factory located in Novi Travnik, SR Bosnia and Herzegovina. When guns are subjected to prolonged exposure to the sun, the top part of the barrel facing the sun expands faster than the bottom part in the shade. To address this, the barrels are wrapped in thermal insulation linings made from tin.

The 125 mm 2A46 cannon was used on all M-84 tanks.
Source: https://dimitrijeostojic.com/blog/odlucan-odgovor-2009/

The 2A46 gun on the M-84 tank is 6.12 m long, with 5.11 m protruding out of the turret. It has a maximum gun depression of -6°13′ and elevation of 13°47′. The rounds are typically loaded into the barrel by the carousel AZ autoloader at a speed of 8 rounds per minute, but the gun can also be manually loaded, reducing the fire rate to around 2 rounds per minute. The autoloader on the tank is an electromechanical carousel-type with a 22-round capacity. All 22 rounds are stored in individual cassettes arranged radially around a central hub that houses the carousel rotation motor, drive, and the power supply for the turret. However, this design is susceptible to catastrophic failure if the ammunition in the carousel is detonated, such as in the event of a direct hit or a larger anti-tank mine explosion. The autoloader relies on a carousel storage memory unit to identify the position of each round within the carousel and determine the status of each cassette, whether it is empty or not. The carousel can spin at two different speeds. It spins at maximum speed until the required round is two cassettes away from the loading position. At this point, it changes to a slower rotating speed.

A loader filling up the carousel with ammunition.
Source: Srpski Oklop

Turret rotation speed can range from 0.07° to 18°/s, and gun elevation speed ranges from 0.05°/s to 3.6°/s. If the turret is rotated and the gun barrel protrudes over the side of the tank, the driver is notified via two lights in his periscope. This allows him to estimate the amount of space needed to allocate to the left or right of the tank to avoid damaging the barrel while driving. Additionally, the driver can force the turret rotation with a switch “Akvizicija Vozača” (Driver’s Acquisition) to the left of his periscope in case the gun barrel is blocking his escape hatch.

During marches, the turret is usually locked with the gun pointing slightly to the right of the tank. This is done to avoid unnecessary inertial swinging of the turret during the tank’s movement, which can damage the rotation mechanism or injure the crew inside.

These parading Croatian M-84A4 tanks do not have their guns pointing to the right just for the looks, but actually to leave space for the driver and protect the turret drive..
Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/109766220@N03/20209032771

To fire, the tank has to complete the preliminary and immediate preparation. Preliminary preparation is done before the combat and includes:

preparation of weapons and aiming devices
ammunition preparation
determining ballistic and meteorological conditions
terrain study, selection of landmarks, and determination of the distance to individual lines, points and local facilities, and
preparation of the crew

Immediate preparation is the firing procedure, and it includes:

target Identification: the gunner identifies the target and assesses its distance, direction and speed
target acquisition: the gunner places the chosen target in his sight. In case any part of the system is malfunctioning, spare reticles can be employed as an alternative
ammunition Selection: the gunner chooses the type of ammunition to be used
loading: the autoloader loads the selected projectile into the breach of the main cannon
target lasering: the gunner chooses the firing mode, and measures the distance to the target using a laser
lead angle adjustment: if either the target or the tank is moving, the gunner activates the “Lead Angle” feature to account for the movement
issuing the fire command: fire!

BAM!
Source: www.va.mod.gov.rs

The loading process of the autoloader, with some overlap between the steps, is as follows:

the gunner selects an ammunition type on his selector dial and presses the “load” button
the gun moves to the loading angle, and simultaneously, the stub catcher is raised to eject the stub casing from the previous shot
the carousel spins until it reaches a cassette containing a cartridge of the selected ammunition type
the cannon vertically moves to the loading position and then gets mechanically locked in place
the carousel stops when the cassette is directly under the elevator
the elevator lifts the cassette to ramming position No. 1, positioning the projectile behind the breech
the power rammer extends to ram the projectile and retracts
the elevator lowers the cassette to ramming position No. 2, positioning the propellant behind the breech
the power rammer extends to ram in the propellant charge and retracts
the elevator lowers the cassette back into the carousel, and the memory unit marks the cassette as empty

The barrel life of the gun is poor, and influenced by the type of ammunition used. APFSDS-T (Armor-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot Tracer) ammunition wears out the barrel fastest, requiring only 250 rounds. Approximately 900 to 1,000 HE-FRAG (High-Explosive Fragmentation) and HEAT-T (High-Explosive Anti-Tank Tracer) rounds can be fired before the cannon diameter expands to 127.5 mm, making it unusable. For each 0.1 mm diameter expansion, the initial speed of the HE-FRAG round drops by 2.7 m/s. Once the projectile speed sufficiently drops due to cannon wear or inadequate cleaning, there is a growing risk of permanent barrel deformation because of the additional pressure exerted by a decelerated round. Rounds are also prone to getting stuck in the breach or between the gun trunnions during the recoil cycle, putting the entire tank and its crew at risk.

A Croatian M-84A4 tank on the “Eugen Kvaternik” training field.
Source: Poligonska ispitivanja tenkovskog streljiva – Hrvatski Vojnik

All tank rounds feature a copper ring designed to seal the gaps between the round and the barrel, preventing the combusted propellant gasses from escaping around the loaded round regardless of the barrel wear (caliber size). After firing several rounds, these rings would leave a copper layer inside the gun, which then must be cleaned to prevent the interior of the gun from becoming deformed. Although the cleaning process is unpleasant and emits a strong odor, it is an unavoidable step in tank maintenance to ensure the gun’s continued functionality. Regrettably, proper gun maintenance and cleaning were neglected during the civil wars in Yugoslavia. Consequently, the explosion of the tank barrel due to poor maintenance emerged as one of the most common reasons for the loss of a tank. In one such incident, a round exploded in the gun breach, launching the barrel 30 m ahead of the tank. Fortunately, the crew suffered only minor injuries.

Cleaning the gun barrel is a tough job, but someone has to do it.
Source: Serbian MoD

Secondary Armament

For close-range anti-infantry purposes, the tank is equipped with a Zastava M86 7.62 mm machine gun in a coaxial mount to the right of the main gun. This licensed copy of the Soviet PKT has an effective range of 600 m against individual targets and 800 m against groups of targets. The theoretical rate of fire is 650-750 rounds per minute, but in practice, it is closer to 250 rounds per minute. The machine gun’s standard loadout consists of eight belts of 250 rounds.

The PKT coaxial machine gun, visible to the right of the main gun.
Source: Serbian MoD

Additionally, the commander’s cupola is armed with the Zastava M87 12.7 mm Heavy Anti-Aircraft machine gun. This licensed copy of the Soviet NSVT machine gun, equipped with the domestic K10-T sight, can engage air targets up to 1,500 m and ground targets up to 2,000 m away. The machine gun has a full 360° rotation capability independent of the commander’s cupola, with a maximum depression of -5° and elevation of 75°. The theoretical rate of fire is 800 rounds per minute, but in battle conditions, the practical rate of fire is usually around 150 rounds per minute. The typical loadout consists of five to six belts of 60 rounds.

The Zastava M87 anti-aircraft machine gun mounted on the M-84 tank.
Source: Wikimedia

Ammunition

Due to the placement of the new ballistic computer and amplifier box in the tank, the number of rounds in the tank’s turret had to be reduced by one compared to the T-72M. Thus, the standard loadout for the M-84 was 43 rounds, 22 of which would be located in the autoloader’s carousel and the rest in the tank’s turret. SFR Yugoslavia was granted license production of three types of rounds: APFSDS-T, HEAT-T, and HE-FRAG. All rounds are two-piece, with a separate powder charge that is identical for all projectile types.

The ballistic computer firing table allows APFSDS-T and HEAT-T rounds to be fired at distances of up to 4,000 m, and HE-FRAG rounds at distances of up to 9,400 m. If the gun barrel moves up above 59 thousand milliradians, the tank enters indirect fire mode, and a topographical map has to be used while firing.

The three types of projectiles produced in the former Yugoslavia: APFSDS-T Subcaliber round, HEAT-T Cumulative, and HE-FRAG instantaneous-explosive round.
Source: Srpski Oklop

The standard round for engaging enemy armor is the Armor-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot Tracer (APFSDS-T) 3BM-9 / 3BM-12 round. The only difference between the 3BM-9 and 3BM-12 rounds was that the 3BM-12 had a tungsten carbide plug, making it slightly longer. These two rounds are used interchangeably. Thanks to their initial speed of 1,800 m/s (~4,000 mph), this type of round is able to punch through 290-350 mm of homogeneous steel armor placed at 0° at 2 km (1.2 miles). At 150 m (~500 feet) after firing, the sabot would discard, leaving the steel dart penetrator stabilized by the fins.

A Yugoslavian M-88 round at the moment of sabot separation.
Source: http://fofanov.armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/ARM/apfsds/ammo.html

The ballistic computer’s firing table for this type of round was made for targets located as far as 4,000 m (2.5 miles), but in practice, the round can fly much further. In Yugoslavia, live fire of this type of round was allowed only at the Kalinovik training field, due to the high chances of ricochet and therefore collateral damage when this type of round is used. In service, these rounds were designated PKO M88 and PKO-J M88 and referred to as Potkalibarna (Subcaliber).

The PKO-J M88 ‘Potkalibarna’ APFSDS-T round.
Source: Srpski Oklop

When the APFSDS-T does not cut it, there is a High-Explosive Anti-Tank Tracer 3BK-14 (HEAT-T) round. Though flying at half the speed of an APFSDS-T round, HEAT-T has better penetration capabilities, being able to defeat 500 mm of homogeneous steel armor placed at 0° at 2 km. This round is especially suitable for far away armored targets, as its penetrative capabilities do not diminish with distance, at the cost of longer travel time and worse accuracy. In service, this round is designated KOP M88 and referred to as Kumulativna (Cumulative).

The KOP M88 ‘Kumulativna’ HEAT round.
Source: Srpski Oklop

The High-Explosive Fragmentation (HE-FRAG) round is used against everything else, including infantry, bunkers, unarmored vehicles, and other soft targets. These rounds can be set to explode on impact or with a delayed fuze via switch and the rotating cap at the top of the warhead. HE-FRAG is the cheapest type of round, costing around US$2500 in the mid-1980s (equivalent to around US$7,165 nowadays). As such, live fire training and exercises are usually conducted with these rounds. The firing table in the ballistics computer allows for this round to be fired at targets located up to 6 km (3.7 miles), though in practice, it could be manually fired at targets twice as far. Indirect fire, akin to self-propelled artillery, is not viable with this projectile, as it is prone to spinning out on the vertical axis when fired at a high arc. In service, this round is designated TFP M86 and referred to as Trenutno-Fugasna or Razorna (Instantaneous-Explosive or Destructive).

The TFP M86 ‘Trenutno-Fugasna’ HE-FRAG round.
Source: Srpski Oklop

In certain scenarios, usually while testing the recoil mechanism of the gun, live fire can be simulated by using a powder charge and an amount of water equivalent to the weight of the round. This practice also allows crews to go through the motions of firing without expending actual ammunition.

A Slovenian M-84 tank, demonstrating its ability to shower spectators by firing a “water projectile”.
Source: Slovenian MoD

The standard ammunition loadout depended on the mission profile. Infantry support missions often required a higher proportion of HE-FRAG rounds loaded, whereas a theoretical ambush mission in which the tank would go up against a column of enemy armored vehicles would require a larger percentage of anti-armor rounds. The gunner had to take into account and manually select in the ballistic computer which ammunition type was being loaded, as different ammunition types required different ballistic settings. There was an attempt to update the loading mechanism of the tanks to take into account which round is being loaded automatically, though this work remains uncompleted, and only some of the tanks have their hardware modified in such a way.

During the Yugoslav Wars, tank-on-tank fights were rare. As a result, the vast majority of rounds used were of the HE-FRAG type.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, VJ

Of the 43 rounds, tanks were doctrinally expected to carry:

20 M86 HE-FRAG rounds (10 in the autoloader’s carousel)
16 PKO/PKO-J M88 APFSDS-T rounds (8 in the autoloader’s carousel)
7 KOP M88 HEAT-T rounds (4 in the autoloader’s carousel)

In practice, during the Yugoslav Wars, the tanks were loaded with whichever ammunition was available at the moment, and HE-FRAG rounds were used the most.

The development of ammunition has continued in Serbia, where new 125 mm subcaliber, training, and canister rounds have been developed. As 125 mm ammunition continues being manufactured only in Serbia, Slovenian, and Croatian M-84s are currently using ammunition imported from Eastern European countries such as Ukraine.

The new Serbian PKO-TM subcaliber 125 mm projectile (right), showcased at the Partner Military Exhibition.
Source: Blic

Protection

The M-84 tank’s armor, built according to the license and identical to the T-72M tanks, features a hull composed of welded plates. The front glacis is set at an angle of 68° (with an above obliquity of 22°), and is the only section made out of composite materials. This design comprises two layers of rolled homogeneous steel (RHA) plates with a layer of glass-reinforced plastic material known as textolite in between. The front-most RHA plate is 80 mm thick, while the second plate is 20 mm and serves both as support for the glass textolite layer to prevent delamination and as a final defense against kinetic penetrators. The textolite layer between the two RHA plates serves as an anti-shaped charge filler, and is 105 mm thick. This 80-105-20 armor layout is recognizable by the four anti-ricochet “ribs” in front of the driver’s periscope. This armor configuration provided the tank with protection equivalent to 305 to 330 mm of Rolled Homogeneous Armor (RHA) against APDS, or 450 mm of RHA against shaped charges.

Four ribs and the V-shaped mudguard on the upper front plate. Later M-84As only have two visible ribs.
Source: Igor Salinger, Odbrana

The V-shaped mudguard is present on the upper front plate, and the lower front plate has a dozer blade attached for the tank to dig itself in. The process of digging a tank trench can take anywhere between 10 and 40 minutes, influenced by ground conditions such as soil hardness. During this operation, the commander typically guides the driver using hand gestures or signal flags from outside the tank. The trench is typically dug to a depth that reaches the roof of the hull, leaving only the turret protruding outside of it.

A M-84 tank digging its own trench.
Source: Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija Facebook Page

The 12-tonne turret, constructed from cast homogeneous steel, has an estimated maximum thickness of 410 mm, with the machine gun port and gun mantlet area potentially reaching thicknesses of up to 475 mm. The turret cheeks become progressively thinner towards the rear, but effective thickness from the front remains similar due to its rounded shape. Roof armor is 45 mm thick, with the part above the gun breech being perhaps twice as thick. Due to the roof being set at an angle between 78° and 80°, it provides effective thickness of around 210 mm from the front, though the steep slope is likely to cause most offending projectiles to ricochet.

In summary, the frontal armor of the M-84 was largely immune to early 105 mm APDS and HEAT rounds, as well as light shoulder-fired HEAT grenades, although it was considered dated by the second half of the 1980s, when the M-84 tank first entered service.

Soviet testing of the 80-105-20 armor layout eventually revealed structural deficiencies in the thin back plate when faced with long rod penetrators. Subsequent testing aimed at eliminating this deficiency showed that the thickness of the frontmost plate could be reduced to 60 mm, the minimal thickness required to disrupt a shaped charge jet, while the thickness of the rearmost plate could be increased to 50 mm, improving performance against newer APDS ammunition. This armor layout, consisting of a 60 mm RHA plate + 105 mm textolite layer + 50 mm RHA plate, began to be implemented on late Ural-1 T-72s before becoming standard on T-72As. Protection against APDS projectiles was increased to 360 – 400 mm of RHA, and against shaped charge projectiles, it was elevated to the equivalent of 490 – 500 mm of RHA.

The upper front plates manufactured for the Polish PT-91 “Twardy” tanks, which are the same as the ones on the M-84A tanks, which are, in turn, the same as on the T-72M1. The sandwiched Textolite is split into two equal layers, and this configuration is likely consistent across all the aforementioned tanks.
Source: thesovietarmourblog.blogspot.com

After capturing and testing the Israeli M111 “Hetz” ammunition, it was discovered that the front plate of the T-72 tanks is still vulnerable to 105 mm guns. The stopgap solution developed by the Soviets was the addition of 16 mm high hardness appliqué armor to the front plate. The physical thickness of the armor array was thus increased to 231 mm, and the effective thickness was increased to 617 mm. This updated armor layout did not fully protect the tank from the newest 105 mm ammunition and new 120 mm guns fielded by the West, but it certainly improved its odds of stopping the enemy projectiles at long ranges. The effective armor thickness against the M111 APFSDS projectile was increased to the equivalent of around 430 mm of RHA.

The turret of the tank also saw an upgrade with a composite, sand-like material being added to the cavities in its cheeks. As the new turret became a three-layer sandwich like the upper front glacis, the shape of it also changed, with the maximal physical thickness now being close to 540 mm, of which 115 mm is the composite material in cheeks. The composition of this material has not yet been declassified, so its exact effectiveness is hard to estimate. The reason it was added to the turret was to increase its protection against shaped charges, providing the tank with 500 mm equivalent of RHA protection against HEAT warheads. Against APFSDS rounds however, the protection remained nearly the same as the old homogenous turret, rated at around 410 mm of RHA.

Cutout of a Soviet “Kvartz” turret, which has the same layout as the one on M-84A tank.
Source: thesovietarmourblog.blogspot.com

Eventually, these armor upgrades, in the form of the T-72M1 license, were offered for sale to the T-72M license holders, including SFR Yugoslavia in the second half of the 1980s, priced at US$7,000,000. This cost was deemed excessive for an optional, simple upgrade of the armor protection, which was already considered satisfactory. Yugoslav engineers asserted they could implement this upgrade without purchasing the license. However, in the spirit of camaraderie, it was proposed to exchange the T-72M1 license rights for the SUV-M-84, one example of which had previously been sold to the Soviet Union along with one M-84 tank. The Soviet side agreed to this arrangement, and the T-72M1 license was transferred to Yugoslavia.

A subsequent order was issued to incorporate the upgraded armor layout into the M-84 tank and begin production of the updated M-84A tank by March 1988.

A M-84A tank in the early Serbian three-tone camouflage. Notice how there are only two “ribs” on the upper front plate. The other two ribs had to be removed to not obscure the driver’s line of sight. Upon closer inspection, the appliqué armor can also be discerned.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Jester

The side armor of the M-84 tanks consisted of 80 mm rolled homogeneous steel (RHA) plates, providing a mediocre level of protection. The rear armor, slightly thinner, measured 70 mm in thickness. To enhance protection against shaped charges, the tank featured 10 mm wide side skirts made of synthetic rubber reinforced with polymer fabric and steel wire mesh. However, it is noted that these skirts might not be entirely effective, as 67 mm M80 Zolja portable one-shot anti-tank launchers were known to cut right through them. In addition to their primary role in protection, the skirts on the M-84 tank served a secondary purpose by shielding the engine air intake from the dirt and dust kicked up by the tracks.

Side profile of a Slovenian M-84A4. Flexible rubber skirts on M-84 tanks allow the dirt and mud built up above the tracks to fall out.
Source: armyrecognition.com

What helps the side protection somewhat is the small silhouette and low profile of the tank. The side profile is notably compact, with a surface area 2.5 m² smaller than that of the M1A1. With a height of only 2.19 m, a length including the gun of 9.53 m, a length of the body (excluding the gun) of 6.96 m, and a width of 3.46 m, the M-84 achieved its compact dimensions largely thanks to the replacement of the fourth crew member with an autoloader.

Rough size comparison between the M1A1 Abrams main battle tank and an M-84A main battle tank.
Source: https://sr.wikipedia.org/wiki/M-84

To further enhance their defensive capabilities, the tanks were equipped with the 902A “Tucha” smoke grenade launchers. The layout of these launchers on the turret serves as a key differentiator between major variants of the M-84 tank:

the zero to fourth series M-84 tanks featured 5 launchers in the “U” layout on the right side of the turret, with another 7 launchers on the left side
Source: Srdjanlazarphoto
M-84As had two sets of 6 launchers symmetrically placed in lines on both sides of the turret
Source: dimitrijeostojic.com
M-84AB tanks designed for Kuwait had 5 launchers in the “L” layout on the right side of the turret, with another 7 launchers on the left side.
Source: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kuwaiti_Tanks.JPEG

The “Tucha” smoke grenade launchers can create a smoke screen 150 m in front of the tank, with an adjustable width ranging between 15 and 110 m. Once fired, the smoke grenades start generating smoke within 10-12 seconds, lasting for 3.5 to 5 minutes. The gunner operates the smoke grenade launcher.

Additionally, the tank can deploy smoke without the use of Tucha system by injecting diesel fuel into the exhaust manifold, which produces a thick white smoke on the right side of the tank. This alternative method is initiated by the driver, who has to flip and hold a switch. However, deploying smoke in this manner increased the tank’s fuel consumption by an additional 10 liters per minute.

A M-84 deploying a smoke screen via fuel injection.
Source: www.paluba.info, Rade

Engine and Transmission

Most versions of the M-84 tank are propelled by the licenced V-46-6 V-12 four-stroke diesel engine, generating 780 hp (574 kW) at 2,000 RPM. At the time of its adoption by the JNA, this was considered to be barely acceptable for a modern vehicle, at just 13.8 kW/t (18.7 hp/t). The engine allowed the 41.5-tonne tank to achieve a nominal top speed of 60 km/h on asphalt and maintain an average speed of 35 to 40 km/h on dirt roads.

the V-46-6 engine inside of an M-84 tank.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Jester

The engine is multi-fuel capable, accommodating low octane gasoline (A-66 and A-72), standard Soviet military-grade diesels, kerosene (TS-1, T-1, and T-2), and petroleum naphtha (paint thinner). However, using petrol or kerosene results in a power decrease of up to 20%. Fuel consumption ranges between 260 and 450 liters per 100 km, offering a travel range of 460 to 700 km on a single refueling, depending on the terrain. The fuel tanks of the M-84 have a capacity of 1,200 liters, which can be increased to the maximum of 1,600 liters by adding two 200-liter barrels behind the tank. M-84A tanks carry 150 liters less due to a modified external fuel tank arrangement.

To facilitate winter starts, the engine features a heater activated at outside temperatures below +5°C. Despite its advantages, the V-46 engine is noted for its relatively high specific oil consumption due to larger clearances in the cylinder group.

Brochure of the V-46-6 engine, which is used on M-84 tanks.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Jester

A Serbian M-84 tank from the “Combat Group 21” rushes towards the frontlines during a field exercise in 2018.
Source: dimitrjieostojic.com

In response to concerns about engine performance and its effect on potential exports and development of the new domestic tank, a decision was made to modify the engine to improve its capabilities. Studies of the problem began in 1980, and actual work began in 1983, resulting in the development of the V-46-TK engine (TK being short for Turbokompresor – Turbocharger) capable of producing 735 kW (1,000 hp). This improved power output was achieved through the removal of the centrifugal compressor, where two S4 Schwitzer turbochargers with an intercooler have been installed instead. The high pressure pump and the combustion chambers also had to be modified. The V-46-TK engine, while operating under increased strain, experienced a reduction in reserve torque, which negatively impacted the tank’s mobility and maneuverability in challenging terrain. Despite this, the new engine represented a significant achievement, and there was eager anticipation for its practical testing and production by the VTI’s young team that designed it. The V-46-TK engine underwent initial testing in the factory, running for 500 hours without encountering any issues. Subsequently, one M-84 tank was equipped with the engine and tested alongside a T-72M. The results of the test indicated that the modified M-84 exhibited an average speed increase of 30%, lower engine noise, and a temperature reduction of 10°C in the engine cooling liquid, though the final point seems to be contested. The results were considered a huge success, as Yugoslav engineers were able to upgrade the engine years ahead of the Soviet Union’s development of a comparable engine. The V-46-TK was approved to enter production in 1988. However, delays with the M-84A tank project meant that these engines would not enter service until 1991, with the first and only shipment of these tanks to the JNA. In Yugoslavia, all engines were produced by FAMOS from Pale, SR Bosnia and Herzegovina. As this factory had the capacity to produce more engines than required for the Kapela project, around 2,000 engines were also produced for the Soviets, who were very pleased with their quality.

Brochure for the V-46-TK engine which is used in M-84A tanks.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Jester

The tank’s transmission is mechanical, utilizing dual planetary gearboxes with hydraulic control. The gearboxes incorporate seven gears for forward movement but only one for reverse, severely limiting the tank’s speed in reverse. Thanks to this limitation, the transmission is cheap, light, compact, and reliable. The M-84’s transmission, with its dual gearboxes, enables the tank to achieve various turning radii depending on the selected gear. According to the Tankograd blog, the turning radii of the comparable T-72 tank are as follows:

Gear	Turn radius (m)
R	2.97
1	2.97
2	6.04
3	13.42
4	13.93
5	10.23
6	10.1
7	8.76

The M-84 can steer by slowing down one track, de-clutching one track, or with a combination of de-clutching and braking, which is done only in the first gear or reverse.

Suspension

The M-84 features independent suspension using full-length torsion bars, with each bar running across the entire width of the hull. The first, second, and sixth wheels are reinforced with hydraulic shock absorbers. The running gear comprises a sprocket in the back and an idler wheel in the front, along with three return rollers and six evenly spaced road wheels per side. These 8-spoked road wheels are made of aluminum to reduce weight and decrease rolling resistance. The tracks are metal, measuring 580 mm wide, and consist of 96 links connected by rubber-metal hinges.

As per Kuwaiti request, these tracks would be replaced with a new type, capable of mounting rubber pads for improved performance on paved surfaces. Most of these were shipped off to Kuwait together with M-84AB tanks, but limited numbers remain in use with other countries.

A Slovenian M-84A4 during the track replacement procedure. This tank features the new tracks developed for Kuwait.
Source: www.slovenskavojska.si

The M-84 tank is capable of climbing obstacles up to 0.85 m tall with its mudguards on. When the mudguards are removed, its climbing ability improves further. However, these mudguards, made of sheet metal, are prone to bending and deforming if a large amount of mud accumulates underneath them. Consequently, they were often removed during use in the Yugoslav Wars. Additionally, the M-84 tanks can overcome trenches up to 2.8 m wide and can traverse ascents of up to 30° and side slopes of 25°.

A M-84 tank with its mudguard lifted up.
Source: www.paluba.info

Without any preparation, the tank is capable of driving through water up to a depth of 1.2 m. With minimal preparation, water obstacles of a depth of 1.8 m can be overcome. For larger water obstacles, the tank is equipped with a deep water fording kit, allowing it to traverse depths of up to 5 m over a length of up to 1 km at a speed of 5 km/h. This maneuver is one of the most challenging tasks a tank platoon could be asked to perform, as even the slightest error could leave them stranded at the bottom. Therefore, this practice is prohibited during night and poor weather conditions, and the tanks are always assisted by divers and an armored recovery vehicle.

An alternative and safer way of crossing water obstacles is a pontoon bridge.
Source: Serbian MoD

Since the tank is not hermetically sealed, it is equipped with a pump that removes water throughout the process. During fording, the air intake opening on the engine cover is closed, and air is instead drawn from the crew compartment, which is connected via a long tube to the water surface to allow air intake. Crews breathe through their own oxygen masks and are equipped with safety vests in case they need to swim to the surface.

As the practice was dangerous and seldomly used, the Yugoslavian Army issued an order in 1995 for all units to discard their fording kits. However, it appears that this order was not followed through.

Crew and Training

Soldiers of the Army of Republika Srpska together with the M-84 training mock-up. This picture was taken during the class, held by Dušan Samardžić (second one from the left) who would later go on to become Head of the Technical Service of the Army of Republika Srpska.
Source: www.paluba.info

M-84 tank crews consist of three: commander, gunner, and driver. The role of a loader was removed, thanks to the introduction of the autoloader. However, it can hardly be said that the introduction of the autoloader reduced the amount of necessary personnel required to operate the tank, since throughout its use, three crew members proved far too little for field maintenance and repair of the tank, and other tasks, such as keeping guard during rest. As such, spare tankers or other soldiers sometimes had to be attached to tank crews to keep their combat readiness at an acceptable level.

The three musketeers: driver (bottom-center), gunner (top-left of the tank, behind the DNNS-2A), and commander (top-right of the tank).
Source: Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija Facebook Page

The driver is considered to have the easiest job, as his main job is to drive the tank via a set of steering levers and pedals, which is said to be easier to operate than driving a car. The driver also has the most spacious compartment, with good legroom and pedals placed comfortably underneath the level of the seat, which is somewhat negated by his rather awkward sitting position, as he is forced to lean forward to took through the TNPO-168V periscope while operating the tank buttoned up. For night driving, a PPV-2 passive night periscope can be installed instead. The taller the driver is, the more the seat has to be reclined backwards, meaning the driver has to lean further forward, making this position particularly uncomfortable for tall crew members. Two TNPA-65 auxiliary periscopes facing towards the front-left and front-right are also available to the driver, positioned just above his primary sight. The front of the tank, in addition to the driver and his controls and instruments, houses the battery and fuel tanks.

Above the driver is a 50 mm thick escape hatch, through which the driver can poke his head out, allowing him to drive the tank in a more natural position at the expense of his safety. When this hatch is open, some features, such as turret rotation and smoke grenade launchers, are disabled so as to not hurt the driver. In addition to driving the tank, the driver is tasked with basic engine maintenance, and keeping track of fluids and additives required for its operation.

Drivers control panel (left) and manual transmission (right)
Source: www.paluba.info

A M-84 driver training in Slovenia.
Source: Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija Facebook Page

Driver training for tank operators in the former Yugoslavia lasted for less than three months and initially took place at the Zalužani training field in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, the training for Serbia and Montenegro was relocated to the town of Vršac. While most candidates would typically possess a civilian driver’s license, it was not an official requirement.

The training curriculum began with small arms practice, followed by moto-technical theory classes, and practical experience in simulators. The hands-on training started with basic back and forth driving exercises within the tank, progressing to realistic driving scenarios. Regardless of weather conditions or seasons, training continued throughout the year, concluding with night driving exercises. Instructors, situated in the tank commander’s position, communicated with the drivers through intercom systems. Supervisors closely monitored and graded the trainees throughout the process.

Upon successful completion of the training, the new tank drivers were assigned to their units, where their education continued, particularly focusing on teamwork and understanding other roles within a tank. Conditioning training was a regular component, occurring at least once a month and intensifying every six months, when new gunners joined the unit.

M-84 driver training in Serbia.
Source: B92.net

The gunner is positioned on the left side of the turret, with his primary responsibilities including operating the 125 mm main gun and PKT coaxial machine gun, along with the maintenance of all related parts. He has to be familiar with different modes of operation of the fire-control system, including the analogue mode of firing the main cannon, entirely without the FCS. The gunner is also tasked with loading the main gun in semi-automatic and manual mode, which is in practice a rare occurrence due to the reliable autoloader. In addition to his primary sight, the gunner has one TNP-165A periscope and another unknown periscope in his hatch, both facing forward-left at his disposal.

Despite having less space in the turret compared to other crew members, the gunner still enjoys more room than on the T-55 tank. His situation is helped by having his own roof hatch through which the gunner can get some fresh air or independently escape if anything goes wrong. Just behind his hatch, there is a rear-facing number light and a red positional light, which, when combined with two other lights above the rear mudguards, forms a triangle. The use of these lights is mandatory at night, allowing personnel behind the tank to estimate the direction in which the tank’s turret is pointed. Left and right positional lights can also be used as turn signals and brake lights.

Number light (the big one), positional light (small one above it), and the AT-22 antenna stand just behind the gunner’s hatch.
Source: www.paluba.info

A M-84 tank from behind. Number light, top positional light, and the left positional light, as well as the good old log can be seen.
Source: en.m.wikipedia.org

Gunners embark on their practical training by engaging in live-fire exercises with the tank’s 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun. Initially, the PKT is fired from a stationary position, then from short stops and, finally, while the tank is on the move. The entire process is repeated during nighttime training. Upon successful completion of this training phase, gunners move on to the next stage on a larger training field. Here, they participate in the standard “tank platoon on the attack” drill using a specially modified M-84 tank equipped with a 12.7 mm heavy machine gun inside of its main cannon. Gunners are provided with limited ammunition and tasked with knocking down at least 70% of the presented targets. During this drill, targets appear suddenly, challenging the gunner’s perception skills. Some targets are set in motion, allowing the gunner to practice using the automatic lead function of the fire-control system. This feature, which automatically tracks the target upon its lasering, enables the gunner to aim for the center mass of a target without the need to compensate for its movement.

A M-84 firing its PKT at moving targets.
Source: Serbian MoD

Upon successful completion of this training course, gunners are dispatched to tank firing ranges, like the Pasuljanske livade training grounds in Serbia, where they get to practice with live 125 mm ammunition for the first time. It is a common experience among gunners, both veterans and newly trained, to feel unease and nervousness right before firing their first shell. This anxiety is so prevalent that some individuals resort to coping mechanisms, including illegal alcohol consumption. Those who fail the course may find themselves demoted and reassigned to less prestigious roles as IFV gunners in mechanized infantry units. However, as soon as the tank fires and the built-up tension releases, the initial anxiety dissipates, allowing gunners to proceed with their duties.

During the first day of live-fire training, targets are positioned at a distance of 2 km, and gunners engage them with APFSDS-T rounds from stationary tanks. Despite the perceived challenge, this exercise is generally considered straightforward, with the majority of gunners successfully hitting the target on their first attempt. The remainder of the day involves live firing with the Zastava M-87 anti-aircraft machine gun. Targets for it are placed on the ground at distances close to 1 km, and tracer ammunition is used in abundance, enabling gunners to quickly adjust their fire while practicing with telescopic and iron sights. This baptism of fire is followed up by a promotion of successful gunners to the rank of lance corporal (razvodnik) in the evening, creating a sense of euphoria within the camp.

On the following day, the tank platoon on the attack drill is repeated, this time with live ammunition. The drill kicks off with coaxial machine gun practice. Three or four tanks move down the course, each in its own parallel line. As the tanks advance, targets appear that must be engaged using the PKT machine gun. The entire crew actively participates in spotting these targets, with the tank commander typically guiding the gunner to acquire a target. If the gunner becomes disoriented or confused due to various factors such as anxiety, noise, heat, or smoke, the commander can turn the turret in the direction of his sight, assisting the gunner in target acquisition.

A tank platoon on the attack.
Source: Serbian MoD

Midway through the course, a stationary tank-sized target emerges at a distance of 1.5 to 2.5 km. The crew must engage this target with the main gun while the tank is in motion, and this task is generally completed with a high success rate, similar to the initial exercise. At the conclusion of the course, the crew exits the tanks and conducts small arms practice. The commander and driver use their M84 “Škorpion” machine pistols, while the gunner employs the Zastava M-70 AB2 assault rifle.

After completing this task, the crew returns to the tank and drives back to the starting position, where they receive a grade. However, any euphoria is immediately and deliberately cut short by the order to load the tanks onto flatbed railcars and tank transporters under strict discipline. This is done so that tank crews are instilled with the principle of not allowing themselves to relax or let their guard down after a successful combat mission. Upon returning to the unit’s barracks, tanks are refueled, and only then do the crews get some well-deserved rest. The subsequent days are dedicated to field maintenance and the cleaning of the main gun, ensuring the tanks are in optimal condition for future operations.

A MAZ-537 tank transporter carrying a M-84 tank.
Source: Wikimedia

If the tank crew is supposed to live and breathe as one, then the tank commander is the brain of such an organism. In addition to commanding the gunner and the driver, the commander is also tasked with target identification and designation and communication with other units on the battlefield. The commander observes the battlefield through his main DNKS-2 sight, two TNP-160 periscopes, and two TNPA-65 auxiliary periscopes embedded into his clam-shaped cupola. This configuration provides the commander with an impressive 288° field of view, with only a 72° dead zone to the rear.

The commander of a M-84A4 tank of the Slovenian Army.
Source: www.paluba.info, Brok

Rather than undergoing specialized training from the start, prospective tank commanders are selected from among sharp and high-performing gunners during their initial 6-month training. After completing the standard training, these chosen gunners undergo additional training specific to the commander role, attaining the rank of corporal (desetar). In contrast, tank drivers do not progress in rank and are never selected for commander training during peacetime.

Source: Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija Facebook Page

Nearly all JNA M-84 tanks were equipped with the RUT-1 (Radio Uređaj Tenkovski) radio set, which includes the PD-9 radio station, internal communications box, Šlemofons, AT-22 antenna stand, and the antenna itself. The Šlemofons contain noise-canceling headsets and a laryngophone, enabling the crew to communicate despite the very loud engine noise. In addition to the three crew members, there is also one Šlemofon mounted outside the tank, allowing infantry to communicate with the crew. Command variants and M-84AB export variants are equipped with multiple, foreign radio stations.

Yugoslavian Variants

T-72MJ Prototype Series

Five prototype T-72MJ tanks were produced by the end of 1983. Internally nicknamed ‘Mutants’ due to the nature of their construction, these were a mashup of delivered Soviet T-72Ms and domestic components. Though not assigned production numbers, they were given designations ranging from ‘001’ to ‘005’. Prototype series tanks were never intended to be issued to units. Instead, they were used for testing, overhaul training in repair facilities, and further research and development (R&D) work. Although three of these tanks were disassembled and rebuilt as training props for tank schools, at least one has escaped such a fate.

Tank ‘003’ was initially given to the Technical Testing Center (Tehnički Opitni Centar – TOC), where it stayed until passed onto the training battalion before ending up in the 3rd Brigade. Once the value of the tank as a prototype became recognized, the brigade gifted it to The Belgrade Military Museum. Currently, the tank is located in the warehouse in Kačarevo, together with other museum property not already displayed on the Kalemegdan fortress, including a Vihor tank prototype. This tank appears to be equipped with a DNNS-1 sight taken from one of the previously modernized T-55s from project Igman. The meteorological sensor on the folding carrier must have been added later, as such a design was not introduced until the tanks of the first series entered production.

T-72MJ tank ‘003’.
Source: www.paluba.info

Furthermore, tank ‘005’ was given to the Military-Technical Institute (Vojnotehnički Institut – VTI) for R&D of new subsystems. Although its fate is uncertain, if it escaped scrapping, it is likely housed alongside ‘003’ in Kačarevo.

A distinctive feature of the tanks in the prototype series is the absence of smoke launchers at the front of the turret. This might be because the turrets were taken from the previously delivered T-72M tanks. T-72MJs also featured a short, non-collapsible carrying arm for the meteorological sensors, a trait shared only with the tanks of the zero series.

A self-entrenched T-72MJ. Notice the short carrier for the A20X (MBL) sensor.
Source: www.paluba.info

Zero Series Tanks

The first real challenge for the Yugoslavian military industrial complex was the production of the zero series, comprising 10 M-84 tanks. Initially anticipated for completion by the end of 1984, this deadline was narrowly missed, and the tanks were finalized at the beginning of 1985. In contrast to the T-72MJ prototype series, these tanks were entirely constructed using domestic components.

The public debut of M-84 main battle tanks took place during the 1985 Victory Day parade on 9th May. Due to the limited availability, they were accompanied by freshly painted T-72M tanks, of which 65 had been procured for the 1st Guards Armored Regiment before M-84 production commenced.

Multiple M-84s during the 1985 parade. Notice the short carrier arms of A20X (MBL) meteo-sensors just above the gun mantlet.
Source: mod.gov.rs

Several T-72Ms from the same parade. Can you tell the difference? The audience probably could not.
Source: mod.gov.rs

The M-84s of the zero series were the first tanks to be assigned registration numbers, ranging from ‘21052’ to ‘21061’. In contrast to the T-72MJ tanks, M-84s of the zero series were equipped with smoke launchers at the front of the turret, and all featured rubber side skirts. They shared the short meteorological sensor carrier arm with a rubber damper with the T-72MJ prototype series, setting them apart from the remaining M-84 tanks.

Like the prototype series, these tanks were set aside for training and testing purposes. Initially, all of them were dispatched to the training centers near Banja Luka, specifically Manjača and Zalužani. On 24th February, 1989, tanks ‘21053’ and ‘21057’ were sent to the Technical-Repair Institute (Tehničko-Remontni Zavod – TRZ) in Hadžići for the overhaul training for M-84s. Some tanks from the zero series eventually underwent scrapping, repurposed as training props. Others remained in the SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, becoming a part of the 2nd Armored Brigade of the Army of Republika Srpska.

First Series

After the delivery of the zero series M-84s, an order was placed for the production of the first series, consisting of 55 tanks with some minor adjustments. This series saw the first batch of deliveries to the Yugoslav People’s Army, with the 252nd okbr. (Oklopna Brigada – Armored Brigade) in Kraljevo receiving the initial shipment of 47 tanks. The remaining 8 were allocated for different purposes.

A first series M-84 tank, showing off its two IR headlights and folded A20X (MB) meteorological sensor.
Source: Wikipedia

One tank from the initial series (registration number ‘21183’, chassis number ‘00006016D’, 16th produced in 1985), was assigned the designation ‘S1’ and dispatched to the USSR for testing in accordance with license requirements. The use of the M-84 designation for the Yugoslav tank had been a subject of significant dispute with the Soviets. However, the arrival and subsequent testing of this particular tank demonstrated sufficient differences from the licensed T-72M to warrant a designation change. Subsequent negotiations with the Soviets alleviated various restrictions, including those related to exports, ultimately allowing Yugoslavia to legally pursue sales abroad. Tank ‘S1’ was later returned to Yugoslavia, and another M-84 would be sent (according ot the Dr. Prof. Milorad Dragojević, sold) to the Soviets instead.

Additionally, two tanks from the first series, designated ‘L1’ (registration number ‘21177’) and ‘L2’ (number ‘21178’), were used for demonstrations to the potential Libyan buyers.

Another tank (registration number ‘21426’) was earmarked for conversion into an M-84K radio command tank.

Ultimately, all these first-series tanks that did not join the 252nd Armored Brigade, excluding one sent to Nikinci as an exhibition piece, found their way to the Banja Luka area for training purposes. Most first series tanks bear registration numbers between ‘21062’ and ‘21112’, but there are exceptions to this rule such as the ‘S1’ tank which received its registration number upon returning from the Soviet Union.

A first series M-84 tank as a part of the 2nd Armored Brigade of the VRS.
Source: Војска Републике Српске Facebook Page

In 1985, 14 tanks from the first series were delivered, with the remaining units supplied the following year. A distinctive feature of this series is the elongated, foldable carrier arm designed for the A20X (BL) meteorological sensor and two infrared radiation (IR) spotlights. The larger L-2AG IR spotlight is positioned to the right of the main cannon, while a smaller OU-3GK is mounted on the commander’s cupola, opposite the anti-aircraft machine gun. These spotlights were initially included to enhance the night-fighting capabilities of first series tanks, which were equipped only with passive night vision periscopes and sights. However, as the second production series of tanks introduced new second-generation night vision equipment, the spotlights were deemed redundant and were removed in subsequent series.

A fourth series M-84, followed by a tank from the first series. Different meteorological sensor carriers are clearly visible.
Source: Serbian MoD

Second, Third, and Fourth Series

The second series of M-84 tanks, delivered from 1986 onwards, introduced second-generation night vision equipment. This included the DNNS-2A gunner’s sight and DNKS-2 commander’s sight, enhancing the tank’s capabilities in low-light conditions. Additionally, the A10X (MB) meteorological sensors were utilized in the second series, replacing the more advanced A20X (MB) sensors which were present on previous M-84 tanks.

All second, third, and fourth series tanks were equipped with a telescopic A10X (MB) meteorological sensor.
Source: avaz.ba

The tanks produced in the second, third, and fourth series were virtually identical to each other, except for the M-84T subseries consisting of 40 tanks intended for Libya before the export deal fell through. The M-84T designation, where “T” stands for tropical, was informal rather than official. These tropical tanks were unique only in that the labels inside the tank were in English and their chassis numbers ended with a letter “T”. Following their completion, the M-84T tanks were not allocated to the JNA but were instead sent to Vrhnika, Slovenia, for storage as part of the war reserve.

Chassis number of an M-84T tank ending with a “T”
Source: www.paluba.info

One tank from the second series (without a JNA registration number) was sent (possibly sold) to the Soviet Union for testing and remains on display at the Kubinka Tank Museum. Another one was modified by Yugoslav Army into an M-84K command tank variant.

The M-84 main battle tank is displayed at the Kubinka Tank Museum in Russia. Its camouflage appears to be an attempt at recreating the Serbian three-tone camouflage pattern.
Source: www.paluba.info

Before the deliveries of M-84AB tanks commenced, the first tanks sent to Kuwait were from the fourth series from the JNA stock, taken from the 211th Armored Brigade stationed in Niš. Either four or six of these tanks were dispatched to Kuwait for crew training while their variant of the tank was being produced and delivered. While they were not painted in desert camouflage like other Kuwaiti tanks, they might have been modified before delivery. One was pictured with two antennas, so it was likely equipped with the same Racal Dana radio stations as Kuwaiti M-84ABs. Unfortunately, these tanks found themselves in the midst of the Iraqi invasion and at least one was captured and later pressed into service by Iraq. One Iraqi M-84 appears to have been subsequently captured by the United States Army, and transported back to Texas.

Either four or six M-84 tanks were sent to Kuwait before the Iraqi invasion.
Source: https://ddsv.hr/en/tenk.php

The initial 60 M-84 tanks of the second series were manufactured in 1986, following the completion of the 41 first series tanks. In 1987, the remaining 20 M-84s from the second series were produced, along with 40 M-84Ts. Production of the third series commenced the same year, delivering 60 tanks. In 1988, an additional 20 tanks of the third series were supplied, followed by 100 tanks of the fourth series. Once all fourth series tanks were delivered, the production transitioned to M-84As. In total, 300 tanks of the second, third, and fourth series were made.

M-84A

In accordance with the license, the Soviet Union was obligated to share developments related to the T-72M tank with Yugoslavia. When the new 60-105-50 composite armor from the T-72A was declassified and incorporated into the T-72M1, Yugoslavia obtained the new license, and work on updating the M-84 tank began. Alongside the new armor layout, a new V-46-TK 1000 hp engine and modified transmission were introduced. These modifications meant that the new tank would significantly differ from previous iterations of the M-84, warranting its classification as a separate variant. On 29th April, 1987, the General Staff ordered the designation of this new variant to be M-84A. This tank was both better protected and faster than its predecessor, being able to reach road speeds of up to 65 km/h.

M-84A tanks can be differentiated from others thanks to the appliqué armor, two “ribs” on the upper front plate instead of four on M-84 tanks, and a symmetrical arrangement of smoke grenades on the turret.
Source: DW Dukic-Pejic

In 1988, an order was placed for the production of the first 30 M-84A tanks of the fifth series. Two M-84A tanks, designated as ‘P1’ and ‘P2’, were delivered ahead of the others and were dispatched for testing in Pakistan, which had expressed interest in acquiring these tanks. Although most of the M-84As were completed by 1991, issues with transmissions caused delays in their introduction into service. The JNA military commission refused to accept the finished tanks until all problems were resolved. Simultaneously, production of M-84AB tanks was underway, sidelining the M-84A until it became evident that conflict was brewing in Yugoslavia.

In early 1991, the situation flipped, and the JNA suddenly became eager to take over the approximately 60 finished M-84A tanks, while the Đuro Đaković factory began dragging its feet and delaying deliveries. Once the military authorities approved the tanks for delivery, the JNA took over most of the completed M-84As. In May 1991, a worker strike at the factory instigated by the HDZ (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – Croatian Democratic Union) political party halted all further deliveries of finished M-84s. Thanks to these, 21 tanks, primarily M-84AB tanks from the sixth series, which the JNA also attempted to take over, were retained by the factory. How many M-84As the JNA managed to take for themselves is not known for certain, but the number seems to be in the range of 55 to 64.

M-84A (left) and M-84 (right).
Source: Serbian MoD

One notable difference between the M-84A and its previous variants is the arrangement of the external fuel tanks. The M-84A lacks the fourth fuel tank on the right side, and the fifth tank is reduced in size, resulting in M-84A tanks carrying 150 fewer liters of fuel, with a total capacity of 1,050 liters. In the space formerly occupied by the removed fuel tank, a new air filter has been installed on M-84A tanks.

Air filter mounted on the M-84A and M-84AB tanks.
Source: N. Dimitrijević

A M-84A tank followed by an M-84 tank. Pay attention to the air filter on the right back side of the M-84A, which is absent in the subsequent M-84 tank.
Source: Kurir.rs

M-84AB

Originally, the plan was to produce tanks for the Yugoslav People’s Army until the 1,000th tank was manufactured in 1995. Following this production run, the focus would have shifted towards the export market, with approval for extending the production run past 1,000 tanks already granted by the Soviet Union. However, the bankruptcy of SFR Yugoslavia and the increased interest in the M-84 from Kuwait led to a shift in priorities. Negotiations for the sale began in 1988, and a deal for the purchase of 200 tanks and 15 armored recovery vehicles (215 tanks according to some sources) was signed by the end of 1989. The contract was valued at half a billion USD, and to fund the production, Kuwait agreed to pay 30% of the contract price in advance. The contract also covered training, ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance of the tanks. Once the contract was fulfilled, new orders were expected to follow.

The Kuwaiti variant would be based on the newest M-84A, which was just entering production, and would be modified to meet specific Kuwaiti requirements. These variants would be designated M-84ABs, with sub-variants including the navigational M-84ABN and the command M-84ABK. The price at which Kuwait purchased M-84AB tanks was US$1,500,000 per unit.

M-84AB tanks have a regular search light mounted to the right of the main gun.
Source: Snapper_q8

Compared to the M-84As, the M-84AB featured the following changes:

new tracks with removable rubber track pads
the addition of a searchlight to the right of the main cannon
two new radio stations, with an additional third one for command variant
new navigational equipment for the command and navigational variants
a modified DNNS-2A/6400 gunner’s sight, featuring a different reticle
new ballistics software, accounting for 6400 milliradians and expanded temperature range
an electric coolant level indicator
a case winder for phone on the back of the turret
translation to Arabic of all labels in the crew compartment
sand color camouflage paint

Two Racal Dana radio sets in the Croatian M-95 “Degman” tank. Same radio stations are used in the Kuwaiti M-84AB tank.
Source: https://arhiva.nacional.hr/en/clanak/47840/kuwait-has-not-backed-out-of-the-m-84

Notably, there were no changes to air filters or the addition of air conditioning to enhance the tank’s operability in desert conditions. The M-84AB could be easily distinguished from other M-84 tanks by the combination of two ribs at the front, the 5+7 setup of smoke grenade launchers at the front, and the presence of a phone case winder at the back of the turret.

An M-84AB from the left side. The phone case winder box is visible behind the snorkel.
Source: www.paluba.info

Kuwaiti M-84AB and M-84ABK tanks were also utilized by the Croatian Army during the war against the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Serbian Army of Krajina. The exact number of tanks used and produced by Croatia remains unknown, but 15 of these commandeered tanks had to be recalled from the front and returned to Kuwait during the war. All other undelivered M-84AB tanks were kept by the newly created Croatian Army.

An M-84AB of the Croatian Army. Many of these tanks were subsequently refitted to the M-84A4 standard.
Source: https://ddsv.hr/en/tenk.php

M-84K and M-84AK

The command version of the M-84 tank, designated M-84K, was initially planned in 1988, with actual work commencing after the initiation of the M-84ABK command tank project for Kuwait. Two M-84 tanks are known to have been modified to the M-84K standard. The first tank, originally from the first series with registration number ‘21426’, was disassembled in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991. VTI (Military Technical Institute) engineers had been working on adapting the tank to the M-84K standard by replicating the disassembled T-72K tank, but the outbreak of the civil war in the republic halted their efforts. Vladimir Ivanović, an engineer who was previously heavily involved in the construction of the M-84 tank, had to put the M-84K back together using only the available parts.

From right to left: Engineer Vladimir Ivanović holding a class for Kuwaiti tank crews, an unnamed British captain from the visiting UN mission, and the generator mounted in the M-84ABK command tanks.
Source: Vladimir’s personal archive

This particular tank featured the standard RUT-1 radio set, a PD-9 radio and a high-power radio set produced by Ei Niš, sourced from a captured Croatian T-55 command tank. Navigational equipment and an intercom system were taken from the command version of the BVP M-80 Vidra prototype, which was located in Rudi Čajavec at the time. Unfortunately, an extra generator, commonly present on command tanks, could not be added due to unavailability. Upon its completion, the tank was sent to a military unit and survived the war. It was later converted back to the standard M-84 configuration. This M-84K variant can be identified by the additional antenna mounted on the stowage box at the back of the turret. Unfortunately, no pictures of it appear to have survived to this day.

The M-84K as a part of the 252nd Armored Brigade of the Yugoslav Army, Kosovo & Metohija, 1999.
Source: RT International

The same tank from another angle.
Source: Čojstvo Facebook Page

In 1994, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, initiated the conversion of one M-84 and one M-84A (registration number ‘21458’) to the M-84K and M-84AK standards, respectively. These tanks were intended for use as armored brigade command vehicles, with the M-84K assigned to the 252nd Armored Brigade from Kraljevo and the M-84AK assigned to the 211th Armored Brigade from Niš. Unlike the M-84ABK command tanks for Kuwait, these tanks feature only two radio stations and two antennas, both located at generatorthe back of the turret. The specific radio stations used are not known, but they likely included one Racal Dana Jaguar V and one RU-20 or the domestic Pupin TRC 9310-3A. The tanks are equipped with a teleprinter, Teldix navigational equipment, and an auxiliary generator for producing power when the tank is not running.

A M-84AK, which used to belong to the 211th Armored Brigade. The second small antenna can clearly be seen at the back of the turret.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Kos93

The same M-84AK tank from another angle.
Source: jna101.blogspot.com

Due to extra radio stations and other equipment taking up limited space in the crew compartment, command tanks feature less ammunition compared to the standard M-84 tank. In addition to two antennas, M-84K and M-84AK tanks can be recognized by the helmets their crews use. Instead of the domestic Šlemofons, which were incompatible with the new radio stations, crews of command tanks were issued with plastic helmets with microphones made by Racal. While these helmets did not provide ballistic protection, their purpose was to protect the crew inside the tank from injuries that could occur during movement. One improvement of these helmets compared to the standard Šlemofon is their better waterproofing. Regular Šlemofon is prone to soaking up water like a sponge, thus weighing itself down and causing discomfort for the wearer.

The helmet for the command version, made by Racal. Notice the regular Šlemofon for the tank’s commander in the background.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Jester

Production Numbers

In total, including the 5 prototypes and 10 zero series tanks, a production run of 370 M-84 tanks was completed. Out of these, 358 were accounted for by the JNA, including the 40 M-84Ts. The remaining units were utilized for testing, research, and development, with one tank sent to the Soviet Union for evaluation, where it remained. The exact number of produced M-84A and M-84AB tanks is challenging to determine due to the circumstances surrounding their production. Most, if not all, of the 80 M-84A tanks from the fifth series were likely produced by spring 1991. The majority of these tanks were then taken over by the JNA, with a small number left in the Đuro Đaković factory. Any remaining M-84A tanks on the production lines were probably completed by Croatia during or immediately after the war. As for the M-84AB tanks, 149 were delivered to Kuwait before production priorities shifted for the Croatian Army’s needs. In total, it can be estimated that 599 M-84 tanks were produced for sure (assuming that all 80 M-84A tanks were completed), with approximately 50 or more tanks produced in the independent Republic of Croatia during and after the war.

Victory Day Parade in Serbia, 2019. In addition to 50 M-84 tanks, one Russian T-72B3 also participated.
Source: dimitrijeostojic.com

Table of production in SFR Yugoslavia

Series	Tank model	Chassis number	Registration number (JNA)	Year of the delivery of last tank	Number of tanks produced
Prototype series	T-72MJ	/	/	1984	5
Zero series	M-84	‘NUS 1’ – ‘NUS 10’	‘21052’ – ‘21061’	1985	10
First series	M-84	‘006001’ – ‘006055’	‘21062’ – ‘21112’	1986	55
Second series	M-84	‘007001D’ – ‘007080D’	‘21113’ – ‘21239’	1987	80
Second series (Tropical)	M-84 (M-84T)	‘007001T’ – ‘007040T’	‘21113’ – ‘21239’	1987	40
Third series	M-84	‘061001’ – ‘061070’	‘21240’ – ‘21314’	1988	70
Third series	M-84	‘060001’ – ‘060010’	‘21240’ – ‘21314’	1988	10
Fourth series	M-84	‘059001’ – ‘059040’	‘21315’ – ‘21418?’	1988	40
Fourth series	M-84	‘062001’ – ‘062030’	‘21315’ – ‘21418?’	1988	30
Fourth series	M-84	‘097001’ – ‘097030’	‘21315’ – ‘21418?’	1988	30
Fifth series	M-84A	‘150001’ – ‘150080’	‘21418?’ – ‘21481’	1991	80 ordered all delivered?
Sixt series (Kuwait)	M-84AB	‘160001’ – ?	/	1991	200 ordered, 149 delivered
Total					599

Tank assembly typically took around two months, assuming all required parts were available, although this was not always the case. As part of the production process, every hundred tanks included one produced empty hull specifically for armor testing purposes. The component hampering the production pace the most was the aiming devices, with 60% of the materials for it needing to be imported, resulting in slow and uneven deliveries.

During the transition from M-84 to M-84A tanks, something went wrong at the FAMOS factory, and the reliability of transmissions plummeted. It was later discovered that the main culprit causing these issues was the transmission oil used. To address this, the 14th Oktobar factory was introduced as a parallel transmission producer. However, this too led to quality problems with the delivered modules, as the new facility was mastering the production process. Despite these challenges, the Đuro Đaković factory managed to achieve the assembly of 120 tanks per year, with peak production reaching as high as 150 tanks.

Croatian M-84AB tanks in the Đuro Đaković factory. These tanks were not converted to the M-84A4 “Sniper” variant.
Source: Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija Facebook Page

After March 1991, production was characterized by growing mistrust among cooperative partners. In one of the final orders from the Đuro Đaković factory to Rudi Čajavec, they requested an additional delivery of 20 RUT-1 sets and 100 Šlemofons. Commercialist Đoko Kaluđerović who received the order expressed disbelief, exclaiming, “What do they think we are, stupid?”, before tearing up the order and throwing it into trash.

The parts for the fifth batch of M-84AB tanks were delivered in May 1991. However, after the Federal Secretariat for National Defense (Savezni Sekretarijat za Narodnu Odbranu – SSNO) lost control of the Đuro Đaković factory, the delivery of all parts ceased on 6th May, 1991. Despite this, work on the tanks continued at a slower pace, now for the needs of the new Croatian Army. Parts were sourced from previously delivered stocks, cannibalization of destroyed vehicles, and from abroad, as many parts of the T-72M and T-72M1 tanks were compatible with the M-84s.

May 1991 also marked the final batch of tanks delivered to the JNA, as the 211th Armored Brigade was compensated for the loss of their tanks to Kuwait with the delivery of six new M-84As.

To prevent the lucrative contract from falling through, Yugoslavia explored various options to continue the production of M-84 tanks independently. Discussions relating to this were held in winter 1991 at a resort in Kruševac, attended by representatives from many companies involved in tank production and a delegation from the Đuro Đaković factory. According to the created study, the republics of Serbia and Montenegro were already producing parts covering approximately 23.70% of the monetary value of the tank, and an additional 10% of parts could be put in production with relative ease. Another 14,67% was expected from companies in the Republika Srpska, and the remaining value was to be covered by foreign imports.

Serbian M-84 tanks. Despite the best efforts of the remaining experts from the FR Yugoslavia, production could not be restarted there.
Source: Serbian MoD

Although this plan was set in motion and the 14th Oktobar plant was prepared to start production, the conflict in Bosnia severed crucial ties with important suppliers such as Rudi Čajavec, undermining the feasibility of the idea. Unwilling to abandon the project, the leadership of the 14th Oktobar plant decided in April 1992 to shift towards the production of M-84AI recovery vehicles, 15 of which had been previously ordered by Kuwait.

M-84AI

Even before the outbreak of the conflict, collaborative efforts with Poland were underway to develop an armored recovery vehicle (ARV) variant based on the M-84AB, akin to their WZT-3. By 1992, substantial progress had already been made through prior cooperation between the Đuro Đaković factory and Polish suppliers. A delegation from the 14th Oktobar factory successfully negotiated to obtain copies of the related documentation and redirect deliveries of purchased knock-down kits to their facility. While the Poles supplied the casemates, 14th Oktobar took on the responsibility of producing the chassis for installation. Due to time constraints, these chassis were assembled from predominantly imported parts, obtained through less conventional means, despite the arms embargo against FR Yugoslavia. This allowed production to commence, and an order for a test batch of 5 M-84AI tanks was placed to evaluate the new production line. The first ARV was completed by August 1992, with the rest of the batch following soon after. Regrettably, the M-84AIs could not be exported to Kuwait due to the embargo, leading to their incorporation into the Yugoslavian Army instead. In total, 5 M-84AIs were manufactured by the 14th Oktobar factory, with the possibility of the Đuro Đaković factory having one prototype as well.

The first M-84AI Armored Recovery Vehicles were painted in a sand color, as there was an expectation that they would be sent to Kuwait.
Source: Srpski Oklop

Later on, the vehicles were inherited by the Serbian Army and painted in the standard Serbian three-color camouflage.
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:M84AI_VS_Sretenje_2009.jpg

Service during the Yugoslav Wars

Anticipating political instability and facing a decreasing number of new recruits, the Yugoslav People’s Army initiated a substantial reorganization program in 1988 known as Plan Jedinstvo (Unity). The program aimed to overhaul the chain of command to mitigate the influence of political factors on army leadership, enhance the homogeneity of the army, and curb the growing influence of territorial defense units. Three military area commands were set up to replace the six army commands, whose areas of jurisdiction previously overlapped with the borders of republics. The plan also called for the disbandment of all divisions, to be replaced by new corps-size units comprising armored, mechanized, or motorized brigades. The praetorian 1st Guards Proletarian Mechanized Division in Belgrade was the sole exception to this reorganization. While the Jedinstvo Plan was completed by the end of 1989, a revised plan, Jedinstvo 2, was introduced in February 1990, followed by Jedinstvo 3 in July of the same year. These urgent reorganizations initiated a process of demilitarization in politically sensitive regions, transitioning motorized brigades stationed there to reserve status until their conversion to mechanized brigades. The rationale behind this move was the perceived elimination of the threat to these regions following the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. However, this decision had a dual impact. The demobilization of units in future conflict zones left the Yugoslav People’s Army without the necessary infrastructure, local support, and reserves essential for conducting operations in these areas. Consequently, power vacuums in these regions were filled by territorial defense units, militias, and police forces loyal to the leaders of individual republics and secessionist regions rather than the centralized authority of the Army.

JNAs brigades according to Plan Jedinstvo, summer 1988;
Source: Srpski Oklop

Once the reforms were complete, the disposition of M-84 tanks in the units of the JNA was as follows:

1st Armored Brigade (14th Corps) – Vrhnika, SR Slovenija – half a brigade worth of M-84 tanks (left to VRS)
4th Armored Brigade (10th Corps) – Jastrebarsko, SR Croatia – one battalion worth (left to RKS)
211st Armored Brigade (21st Corps) – Niš, SR Serbia, with one battalion stationed in Leskovac – included large amounts of M-84As
243rd Armored Brigade (41st Corps) – Skoplje, SR Macedonia – one battalion worth
252nd Armored Brigade (37th Corps) – Kraljevo, SR Serbia – equipped with the first series tanks
329th Armored Brigade (5th Corps) – Banja Luka, SR Bosnia and Herzegovina – half an armored brigade
51st Motorised Brigade (24th Corps) – Pančevo, SR Serbia – one battalion worth (left to RKS)

Map of the armored and mechanized battalions in January 1990.
Source: Srpski Oklop

Additional M-84 tanks were stationed at:

Pivka (SR Slovenia) – training field for Vrhnika VP (Vojno Podrucje – Military Area) 5312
Slunj (SR Croatia) – training field for Jastrebarsko VP 2465
Kindrovo (SR Croatia) – Đura Đaković factory proving grounds
Pasuljanske livade (SR Serbia) – training field for the Serbian military areas, including Kraljevo VP 8977, Niš VP 6592, and Belgrade VP 1552
Nikinci (SR Serbia) – single exhibited first series tank.
Međa (SR Serbia) – training field for Kraljevo VP 8977
Deliblatska Peščara (SR Serbia) – training field for the 51st Motorised Brigade from Pančevo
Orešac (SR Serbia) – training field for military schools and academies
Kalinovik (SR Bosnia and Herzegovina) – proving ground for the APFSDS-T ammunition
Manjača (SR Bosnia and Herzegovina) – training field for the M-84 gunners
Krivolak (SR Macedonia) – training field for Skopje (VP 4466)

Seemingly turning a blind eye to the deplorable economic situation in the country, the JNA envisioned an ambitious expansion of the mechanized fleet, with most infantry trucks and all M-60 APCs being replaced by the new M-80A IFVs by 2005. Additionally, the plan outlined the replacement of T-34/85 tanks with M-84As by the end of 1995, followed by the start of the production of the new Vihor MBT at a rate of 100 tanks per year until 2010, by which point all T-55 tanks would have been replaced. The modernization of M-84 tanks was also planned, incorporating components developed for the Vihor tank, such as explosive reactive armor and an updated fire-control system with integrated thermovision. However, all such plans came to a halt due to the harsh reality of civil wars and the subsequent collapse of the country.

The political situation in the late 1980s and early 1990s was marked by deteriorating relations between the Slovenian and Croatian republics, seeking greater autonomy and a reorganization of the state into a loose federation, and the Republic of Serbia-dominated bloc resisting these changes. Hopes for a resolution to the political turmoil at the 14th Congress in January 1990 were dashed when the Slovenian delegation walked out after their reform proposals were not approved. The Croatian delegation, unwilling to continue without the Slovenian delegation, also walked out, effectively signaling the end of the unified Communist Party. In 1990, the first multi-party elections were held in the Yugoslav republics, with anti-communist and nationalist parties beating communist parties in all republics except Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro.

Given the JNA’s prior takeover of weapon depots in sensitive regions, the leadership in Croatia and Slovenia began importing arms from Eastern Europe to strengthen their ministries of interior and territorial defense units, creating loyal militias as precursors to republican armies. Facing persecution from the new nationalist government and opposing Croatia’s secession from SFR Yugoslavia, ethnic Serbs in Croatia petitioned for changes and greater cultural autonomy. When these petitions were denied, Serbs in Croatia organized a referendum on the creation of an autonomous Union of Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika, a precursor to the independent Republic of Serbian Krajina. The Republic of Croatia vowed to stop the referendum by any means necessary, leading to the Balvan (Log) Revolution. Blockades were erected on major roads leading to Serbian ethnic areas in southern Croatia to prevent Croatian Ministry of Interior troops from canceling the referendum. The Union of Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika was soon joined by other majority-Serbian municipalities, leading to its name change in December 1990 to Srpska Autonomna Oblast (Serbian Autonomous Region – SAO) Krajina. This entity began establishing its own police and territorial defense units, leading to clashes with Croatian forces along the entire contact line. On the 19th January, 1991, the JNA was ordered to disband the two quasi-armies on Croatian territory. However, this order could not be carried out. In March, the army leadership sought approval from the presidency to declare a state of martial law. This request was denied, and in response, the army’s leadership publicly expressed their frustration, stating that they were handicapped and unable to prevent ongoing weapon smuggling. To discourage further escalations between conflicting sides, the Yugoslav People’s Army was authorized to deploy units in Croatia to create buffer zones between the conflicted sides, drawing from a strategy previously successfully employed in Kosovo in 1989. These deployments marked the first combat use of the M-84 tanks, as JNA units occasionally came under fire from opposing forces.

Slovenian Territorial Defense and the Ten Day War

Emblem of the Slovenian Army
Source: Wikipedia

Although the conflict in Croatia seemed on the brink of erupting into a full-scale war, the first hot war was the one between Slovenian Territorial Defense forces and the Yugoslav People’s Army. On the 25th June, 1991, both the republics of Croatia and Slovenia declared de facto independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On the same day, the Federal Council of the Assembly of SFRY dismissed these declarations as unconstitutional, instructing the JNA to take control of all border crossings in the Republic of Slovenia. While the JNA anticipated Slovenia’s declaration of independence, there was internal debate on the appropriate course of action to bring the republic back into alignment.

Colonel-General Blagoje Adžić, the Chief of Staff of the JNA, advocated for a large-scale invasion to depose the secessionist Slovenian government. However, General of the Army Veljko Kadijević, the Yugoslav Defence Minister, argued for a more cautious approach, hoping that a show of force would be sufficient to dissuade the Slovenian government from pursuing independence with minimal casualties. Ultimately, Veljko Kadijević’s approach prevailed, and a limited military operation commenced the following day.

JNA troop movements during the Ten Day War
Source: https://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rat_u_Sloveniji

A JNA armored column made up of T-55 tanks on the border with Slovenia.
Source: https://topportal.info

The task of recapturing border crossings fell to the 5th Military District and its subordinated units, including the 14th and 31st Corps stationed in Slovenia, supported by JNA units in Croatia. The 5th Military District comprised around 40,000 officers and soldiers, with a substantial artillery presence and the backing of the Yugoslav Air Force. According to a 1989 report, the district had 752 tanks at its disposal, including 96 T-34/85s, 520 T-55s, 15 PT-76s, and 121 M-84s. The majority of the M-84s belonged to the 1st Armored Brigade in Vrhnika, Slovenia (64 at full strength). The remainder consisted of a single M-84 battalion (21 tanks at full strength) from the 4th Armored Brigade in Jastrebarsko, Croatia, supplemented by a war reserve of 40 M-84 tanks stationed in Vrhnika, originally produced for Libya.

M-84 tanks and M-80A IFVs on their way to capture the Brnik airport.
Source: Tomi Lombar, Museum of Recent History of Slovenia.

Despite this apparent superiority on paper, the JNA was crippled by low deployment numbers, a peacetime mindset among its soldiers, desertions, and poor morale. As a multiethnic force, the JNA suffered from internal divisions, as Slovenians serving in the JNA especially refused to fight their fellow countrymen, with Croatians, Albanians, and to a lesser extent Bosniaks and Macedonians showing similar reluctance to combat Slovenians they had no animosity towards. Similar insubordination existed throughout the entire chain of command, extending up to the highest levels of authority.

The initially deployed force included about a hundred tanks, a hundred other vehicles, and 2,000 personnel. Some of these units were allegedly sent into Slovenia without ammunition.
Source: https://www.paluba.info, Brok

On the opposing side were approximately 35,000 mobilized personnel from the Slovenian territorial defense and police. Although lacking the firepower of the JNA, these well-motivated mobile units, armed with light anti-tank weapons and trained for asymmetrical warfare, would prove to be a formidable challenge, delivering a harsh reality check to the JNA and punishing it for its apathetic approach to warfare.

Despite starting without any, the Slovenian Territorial Defense forces managed to capture a number of tanks, including M-84s, throughout the war. None appear to have seen combat, though.
Source: Politika.rs

The war commenced on 26th June, 1991, when JNA vehicles from Slovenia and Croatia began leaving their barracks to seize control of border crossings and other strategically vital locations. At first, Slovenian units offered no resistance, as both sides adhered to the principle of not firing first. The only form of opposition encountered by the JNA were civilian roadblocks, which were bypassed with minimal effort. By the following day, most JNA units reached their objectives, even as Slovenian forces began harassing targets of opportunity. On 28th June, Slovenian forces launched a general counter-offensive against JNA positions, persisting until the war’s conclusion. Exposed JNA units guarding border crossings and garrisons in Slovenia that remained loyal to the federal government found themselves effectively besieged by Slovenian forces. These units were cut off from supplies and reinforcements, with relieving JNA columns halted by roadblocks and subsequently attacked by small anti-tank teams, often resulting in their surrender to Slovenian forces. Upon surrender, weapons from these garrisons or columns were distributed to Slovenian Territorial Defense units, further bolstering their capabilities. This kind of maneuver warfare with sporadic fighting had JNA leadership puzzled, as they could not devise an effective counter-strategy without escalating the war. Slovenia also outmaneuvered Yugoslavia in the geopolitical arena, employing a well-planned media campaign that garnered international support and pressured Yugoslavia to end the war.

Yugoslav T-55 hit by Slovenian anti-tank fire on the Italian border post, Rožna Dolina, Nova Gorica. Static vehicles guarding border posts proved easy pickings for the Slovenian anti-tank teams.
Source: Wikipedia

Despite Chief of Staff General Blagoje Adžić’s fervent lobbying for unleashing the JNA’s full might and resorting to the backup plan of a large-scale invasion, his proposals were once again rebuffed by Yugoslav leadership. At this point, the top was willing to let the ethnically homogeneous Slovenia leave the federation without strings attached. The low-intensity conflict eventually subsided, marked by a ceasefire signed on the 3rd July and the Brioni Agreement, which deferred Slovenian and Croatian independence for an additional three months. In exchange, the JNA had to completely withdraw from Slovenia, and the Slovenian Territorial Defense assumed its responsibilities of defending the Republic. The evacuation of the JNA commenced soon after the agreement was signed, with RV & PVO (Ratno vazduhoplovstvo i protivvazdušna odbrana – Air Force and Anti-Aircraft Defence) units being the first to leave, followed by the 31st Corps and then the 14th Corps. Evacuating heavy equipment, including tanks, proved challenging due to sabotage from within the JNA ranks. Disloyal officers and tank crews deliberately disabled tanks to prevent them from leaving Slovenia. Batteries were damaged and drained to immobilize the tanks and prevent their loading onto trains. At Vrhnika, one Slovenian officer even took a pickaxe to the DNNS-2 aiming sights of M-84 tanks, and one M-84 is said to have been filled with concrete from a cement mixer. Evacuating the equipment through the Republic of Croatia posed significant risks, as the Croatian National Guard and other militias would occasionally try to intercept and plunder these trains. As the conflict in Croatia intensified and transformed into a full-fledged war, further evacuation of JNA equipment became impossible, as the land route to Yugoslavia was cut off. Consequently, the JNA left the remaining heavy equipment of the 14th Corps in Slovenia and evacuated its personnel via air and sea.

JNA troops leaving Slovenia after the signing of the Brioni Agreement.
Source: Srpski Oklop

Some of the M-84s would be evacuated to Bosnia and Herzegovina, ending up in the Army of Republika Srpska.
Source: www.espreso.co.rs

Casualties on both sides remained remarkably low due to the sporadic nature of combat in Slovenia, with fewer than 70 fatalities and 350 individuals sustaining injuries. Approximately 5,000 JNA soldiers either deserted, surrendered, or were captured during the course of the conflict. According to Konrad Kolšek, six M-84 tanks were lost during the Ten-Day War. The first tank was lost on 27th June, near the town of Meste after suffering a breakdown and being abandoned by the 1st Armored Brigade. Upon discovery by Slovenian members of the territorial defense, the tank was blown up. The Brigade experienced a further two losses and two damaged tanks before the end of the war. The 4th Armored Brigade, arriving from Croatia, similarly had a streak of bad luck. Initially, a column of their M-60 armored transporters was encircled by the Slovenian Territorial Defense. The relief force, comprising an armored company and a mechanized company, was halted by Territorial Defense units and accidentally bombed by the Yugoslav Air Force, resulting in one destroyed M-84 and three others damaged.

This tank, left behind by the JNA, was subsequently set on fire by civilians. The ensuing detonation of the ammunition stored in the tank threw off its turret.
Source: Srpski Oklop

After the conclusion of hostilities, Slovenia found itself in possession of at least 57 M-84 tanks, comprising those captured during the war, sabotaged tanks, tanks of the 1st Armored Brigade left behind by the JNA, and a number of M-84Ts from the war reserve which could not be fully evacuated in time. Two batches of 27 M-84 tanks were assigned to the newly formed 54th and 24th armored-mechanized battalions, while another 4 tanks were allocated to a training unit.

Captured M-84 tanks remain in service with Slovenian Armed Forces to this day.
Source: https://en.topwar.ru/

Croatian Army and the Civil War in Croatia

Emblem of the Croatian National Guard
Source: Wikipedia

The Brioni Agreement did little to ease tensions in the Republic of Croatia. Following the establishment of SAO Krajina, two additional autonomous regions, SAO Western Slavonija and SAO Eastern Slavonija, Baranja, and Western Syrmia, were formed by Croatian Serbs with the tacit support of the JNA. Concurrently, the Croatian forces launched a series of attacks on JNA bases, collectively known as the Battle of the Barracks. By this stage, Croatian troops, much like their Slovenian counterparts during the Ten-Day War, primarily relied on light infantry. This force was composed of territorial defense units, police forces, the Croatian Defence Forces paramilitary organization, and the newly established Croatian National Guard (Zbog Narodne Garde – ZNG), initially part of the Ministry of Interior before being later renamed into the Croatian Army (Hrvatska Vojska – HV).

Members of the Black Mambas posing with a disabled JNA M-84 tank after the Battle of New Farkašić on 19th October, 1991.
Source: portal.braniteljski-forum.com

No M-84 tanks appear to have been captured during the Battle for the Barracks, as the sole JNA unit in Croatia equipped with M-84 tanks, a battalion from the 4th Armored Brigade, was stationed in Serbian autonomous regions and later integrated into the Serbian Army of Krajina. Instead, Croatian forces primarily acquired M-84 tanks from the Đuro Đaković factory, supplemented by a smaller number captured on the battlefield during the conflict. As tanks coming from the factory were predominantly M-84A and M-84AB models, Croatia possessed qualitatively the best M-84 tank park throughout the war, rendering the first to fourth series M-84 tanks in the Croatian Army somewhat rare. Two of those tanks were captured from the JNA’s Technical Military Academy in Črnomerec, Zagreb, thanks to Captain Zoran Tintor, who disabled their engines, preventing their evacuation when the JNA withdrew from the city. Furthermore, during the Battle for Vukovar, Croatian troops seized a first series M-84 from the 252nd Armored Brigade.

First series M-84 tank (registration number ‘21098’) previously belonging to the 252. Armored Brigade. After this tank was left abandoned at the frontline, the Croatian 109. Brigade beat the JNA recovery team to it.
Source: https://www.paluba.info/smf/index.php?topic=1473.6135

The exact number of tanks acquired by the Croatian National Guard from the Đuro Đaković factory remains unclear. Many sources indicate that a worker strike on 5th of May, 1991, prevented the JNA from taking control of 21 finished tanks, including at least 7 M-84As from the fifth series. On 17th September, 1991, these M-84A tanks, along with three M-84AB tanks completed for Kuwait, were handed over to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia. Subsequently, all M-84A tanks were seemingly allocated to the 109th Brigade along with eight tank crews. In September 1991, the 108th Brigade was established and equipped with M-84AB tanks. On 24th September, 1991, this brigade had at its disposal 10 M-84AB tanks, one M-84ABK command tank, and 12 tank crews. Another M-84A tank, nicknamed “Crni Leptir” (Black Butterfly), was delivered to the 1st Mechanized Guard Brigade from the Đuro Đaković factory. Later, the Brigade seems to have been reinforced with two more M-84ABs and one M-84ABK. Throughout the conflict, other units of the HV would receive M-84 tanks as well.

The “Crni Leptir” M-84 of the 1st Mechanized Guard Brigade, pictured under an overpass near Bročice and Novska in January 1992.
Source: www.maketarstvo.net, dragisa1956

The same tank would later receive a camouflage scheme and designation number ‘1-101’.
Source: www.maketarstvo.net, Taurus

Đuro Đaković was likely able to complete whatever tanks were left on the assembly line in 1991, after which the focus of the factory was shifted to repairing damaged and captured tanks. In November 1991, three such tanks were present in the factory. The reduced work pace led to factory workers being sent to the front as mechanics and tank crews. The first recorded use of an M-84 tank by Croatian forces occurred during the attack on the Gromačnik military depot on 15th September, 1991. Although the depot was successfully captured, it was nearly empty, disappointing the Croatian forces.

A M-84AB in service with HV. The mete-sensor carrier remained unpainted, revealing the original sand color underneath.
Source: Gardijada-Dani Ponosa i Slave Facebook Page

The Croatian M-84 tank force faced a maintenance challenge in 1992, experiencing a shortage of ammunition and spare parts. The only available method to obtain new spare parts was through the cannibalization of other tanks. Complicating matters further, Croatia was operating tanks that belonged to Kuwait. On the orders of Franjo Tuđman, the President of Croatia, on the 15th February, 1992, 15 Kuwaiti tanks, including those from the 108th Brigade, were taken from the Croatian Army and sent to the Đuro Đaković factory for refurbishment. Demonstrating that business and money have no allegiance, the tanks were sent to Bar Harbor in the Republic of Montenegro in April 1992 and handed over to the Yugoslavian company Yugoimport, responsible for their export. Before the tanks could be shipped to Kuwait, a two-man military commission consisting of Srđan Radovanović and Vladimir Ivanović conducted a thorough examination to ensure they were in factory condition. As the Đuro Đaković factory, the finalizer of the tanks, was obligated to rectify any issues, the commission was especially thorough, demanding the complete replacement of any parts showing the slightest signs of use and wear. Among other parts, five main guns had to be replaced with new ones because their increased diameter indicated prior combat use. Even a plaque on the training mock-up, reading “ĐĐ Slavonski Brod Jugoslavija”, had to be replaced, as someone had scratched off “Jugoslavija” (Yugoslavia) from it. Begrudging workers had to travel back to the Đuro Đaković factory just to bring a new plaque.

Alongside 15 M-84ABs, this training mock-up was a part of the final delivery to Kuwait.
Source: www.paluba.info, Vladimir Ivanović

Once all the tanks were refurbished to factory condition, the commission granted an export license, and the tanks were sent to Kuwait. Through connections and backroom deals by the secret service, the truck transporting all the removed parts from the exported M-84AB tanks ended up in Republika Srpska instead of returning to the Đuro Đaković factory. These parts, although previously used, were still in good condition and were utilized for refurbishing the tank force in Republika Srpska until the end of the war. In return, the Republic of Croatia successfully obtained much-needed funds to pay workers at the Đuro Đaković factory, along with shipments of ammunition and spare parts from Kuwait. This not only helped address some of the maintenance issues but might have even allowed Croatia to resume tank production at the Đuro Đaković factory during the war.

A Croatian M-84A of the 1st Mechanized Guard Brigade.
Source: www.novska.in

In February 1992, the Republic of Croatia achieved international recognition. This was followed up by the replacement of JNA peacekeepers (who were, at this point, trying to keep pieces of Croatia rather than peace) with the United Nations Protection Force, which drastically reduced the intensity of the fighting. The conflict then evolved into Croatian forces launching a couple of major operations each year, gradually exerting pressure on the Republic of Serbian Krajina until the decisive Bljesak (Flash) and Oluja (Storm) operations brought it to a definitive end.

Map of Operation Storm
Source: Wikipedia

These operations also resulted in the Croatian Army acquiring additional M-84 tanks, as those of the Serbian Army of Krajina that were not destroyed or evacuated ended up in Croatian possession. Some M-84 tanks of the Serbian Army of Krajina are known to have been captured near Petrova Gora. The total number of tanks captured on the battlefield is unknown, but it was probably around a couple dozen. Considering that the Croatian Army currently owns 75 tanks, the remaining tanks were delivered by the Đuro Đaković factory. The exact number of tanks delivered throughout and after the conflict is unknown, though tank production and modernization work seemed to have continued until 2003, when the last two M-84A4 tanks were delivered. Additionally, three T-72M tanks were captured by Croatian forces during operations in 1995, and along with other M-84 tanks. These tanks were converted to the M-84A4 standard in 1996 and 1997.

Croatian Army M-84A (or AB) tank during the Summer 95 operation.
Source: mmportal.net

JNA in Yugoslav Wars

JNA coat of arms (1991)
Source: Wikipedia

After the conflict in Slovenia, it became increasingly evident that the original goal of the JNA to preserve the unity and integrity of Yugoslavia would not be achieved. Consequently, the JNA, which was given more leeway in handling the conflict in Croatia, began to throw its support behind the local Serbs. During this time, the JNA began transitioning from a multiethnic force to a predominantly Serb army, exacerbating its manpower issues, as conscripts could now only be drawn from Serbia and Montenegro, where general mobilization was never carried out. Reservists called up for service were often poorly trained and motivated. Despite this, they were entrusted with expensive equipment, such as M-84 tanks, leading to these becoming inoperable due to inappropriate use and maintenance. The leadership of the army also suffered, as non-Serbian officers deserted, and the remaining corps exhibited slow and reactive decision-making. Overall, the army was in a state of disintegration when the Battle of the Barracks began.

M-84 tanks on the streets of Belgrade, during the 9th of May protests.
Source: insajder.net, Srđan Ilić

JNA M-84A tanks in the suburbs of Vukovar, 1991.
Source: www.politika.rs

In response to Croatian attacks, the Yugoslav People’s Army escalated its involvement by planning a campaign aimed at disarming the Croatian Military, removing its leadership from power and unblocking besieged JNA barracks in conjunction with local Serb forces. The operation began on the 3rd October, 1991 along the entire border. One effort aimed at relieving besieged barracks near the town of Vukovar escalated into the biggest battle of this short stage of a war – the Battle for Vukovar. This protracted engagement unfolded in multiple phases, with the town subjected to regular artillery fire and gradual encirclement. As the JNA refused to bypass the town, the entire offensive in eastern Slavonija got bogged down by the fighting around Vukovar.

Map of the final phase of the Battle of Vukovar.
Source: Wikipedia

A JNA M-84 damaged by a mine during the Battle for Vukovar.
Source: Telegraf.rs

Despite being the trump cards of the JNA, the M-84 tanks found themselves out of their depth. Rampant and irregular minefields laid by Croatian defenders could not be cleared due to a lack of engineers, confining the tanks to roads. Infantry support often was not available due to failed mobilization and the disintegration of JNA units. When infantry was available, it would demand that the tanks lead the way, often leaving them to battle the enemy on their own. A particularly poignant moment occurred during ambushes on Trpinjska Street near Borovo Naselje, where the JNA suffered considerable losses, including 4 M-84 tanks, 1 T-55 tank, 3 BVP-80 armored fighting vehicles, and an armored recovery vehicle, all succumbing to attacks from light handheld anti-tank launchers. At the time of the ambush, JNA infantry was being held back by mortar and sniper fire. Deficiencies in infantry support forced the tank crews to compensate with sheer firepower, allowing themselves liberal rules of engagement and reliance on artillery support.

This M-84 experienced a catastrophic ammunition detonation, launching its turret into the air. Upon landing, the turret embedded itself into the ground, gun-first.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, VJ

After the reorganization in the JNA chain of command in the second half of September, the situation began to improve, as trained engineers and well-motivated volunteer paramilitaries from Serbia started substituting JNA infantry in tank support roles. Thanks to these reforms, JNA and territorial defense forces started making steady gains around the town once again in early October. The Battle of Vukovar saw one of the rare tank-on-tank confrontations of the Yugoslav Wars, when on 13th October, 1991, T-55 tanks and possibly one M-84 of the Croatian 109th Brigade sought to relieve Vukovar but instead ran into entrenched M-84 tanks of the 252nd Armored Brigade from Kraljevo. After losing half a dozen tanks, the 109th Brigade was compelled to retreat, and the town surrendered soon after.

A JNA M-84 tank on the streets of Vukovar.
Source: https://www.reddit.com/media?url=https%3A%2F%2Fi.redd.it%2F3lvydn9l7sc41.jpg

The Battle of Vukovar thoroughly exhausted the Yugoslav People’s Army, and the attempt to continue the offensive afterwards quickly ran out of steam. In November 1991, the Croatian Army attempted a counter-attack, erasing some of the JNA’s gains. However, by the end of the year, both sides were spent and locked in a stalemate. This pattern was replicated throughout the entire front, with the JNA’s offensive initially making gains before becoming bogged down and checked by Croatian counter-attacks. One of the last military operations in 1991 was a Croatian offensive named Vihor (Whirlwind). During this operation, the Croatian 102nd Infantry Brigade managed to establish a brief bridgehead across the River Kupa near the town of Glina. However, a platoon of M-84 tanks, coincidentally moving through the area at that time, played a crucial role in halting the attack, forcing the 102nd Brigade to retreat back across the river without much of its heavy equipment, including 8 tanks, 2 APCs, and 7 boats.

Republic of Serbian Krajina

Emblem of the Serbian Army of Krajina
Source: Wikipedia

On 26th February, 1992, the self-proclaimed autonomous regions SAO Krajina, SAO Western Slavonija, and SAO Eastern Slavonija, Baranja, and Western Syrmia united to form the de facto independent Republic of Serbian Krajina. Despite controlling close to one-third of the territory of the Republic of Croatia, totaling about 17,000 km2 at its peak, the new state only had one-tenth of its population. As such, the Republic of Serbian Krajina heavily relied on subsidies from the JNA and volunteer formations recruited from Yugoslavia. Krajina’s geopolitical situation was also unenviable. It had only two allies, the Republika Srpska and the reorganized Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Apart from the western exclave, most of the Republic of Serbian Krajina’s territory was isolated from the Yugoslavian mainland. Its supply lines passed through Republika Srpska, which, also fighting for its life, was more than willing to tap into the supplies intended for its weaker ally to enhance its own chances of survival. The situation worsened when the JNA peacekeepers left the Republic of Serbian Krajina around the time of its founding, leaving it to fend for itself against the increasingly formidable Croatian Army.

Borders of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (in red) upon its proclamation.
Source: Wikimedia

To increase its chances of survival, local territorial defense units, special police brigades, and disbanded units of the Yugoslav People’s Army were reorganized into the Serbian Army of Krajina (Srpska Vojska Krajine – SVK), officially established on the 17th October, 1992. This army was structured into six under-strength corps, comprising 26 brigades and 5 independent regiments. Fielded manpower estimates range from 35,000 to 55,000 personnel, falling short of the goal of 80,000 due to mobilization challenges. Heavy equipment for this Army was previously provided by the JNA, which deliberately left some of its weapons during its retreat out of Croatia. According to the Krajina Territorial Defence High Command, soon after its formation, the SVK was equipped with 262 tanks, 56 BTRs and BVPs, 1,360 artillery pieces of all calibers, 2,574 transports and utility vehicles, and even a tiny air force of about 30 planes and helicopters. Among the equipment were 31 M-84 tanks, left behind by the 622nd Motorized (51st Motorized) and 4th Armored Brigades of the JNA.

M-84 tanks of the SVK, during a Vidovdan parade in 1995.
Source: Vidovdanska smotra 1995. – Slunj Republika Srpska Krajina – dellija, www.mycity-military.com – VJ

Despite stocks of heavy equipment later boosted by additional deliveries from Yugoslavia putting its level of mechanization on a near-peer level with the Croatian Army, the Serbian Army of Krajina struggled to reform effectively from its origins as a territorial defense force. It remained characterized by immobility, supply shortages, poor training, and lack of discipline and motivation. This was reflected in its use of tanks, which were evenly distributed along the front as static artillery pieces for infantry fire support, with few attempts to concentrate them into more mobile formations or use them as reserves. In 1995, all M-84 tanks would be grouped in the 2nd Armored Brigade of the Corps of Special Units, one of the few reserve formations ever created in the Republic of Serbian Krajina. The wide front with little strategic depth and the poor state of the army eventually led to the Serbian Army of Krajina’s defeat in 1995. Surviving M-84 tanks retreated into Republika Srpska, where they were interned. At least five M-84 tanks were destroyed by the 2nd Armored Regiment to prevent them from falling into Croatian hands intact.

Republika Srpska

Army of Republika Srpska coat of arms (1991)
Source: Wikipedia

Amidst the War in Croatia, another conflict was brewing in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will come to be characterized as the most vicious war on the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

While there was no one single trigger for this conflict, the violence began escalating with the 1992 independence referendum, where Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote, while Bosniaks and Bosnian Croatians voted in favor. By April of 1992, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a three-way battleground among its three constituent peoples, with a brief intervention from the JNA and the Croatian Army also becoming involved in the chaos.

Frontlines in 1993.
Source: Wikimedia

A M-84 of the Army of Republika Srpska, Brčko 1993. Bottom plate reads “God protects his Mercedes” as a reference to the song “God protects his Serbs” released the same year.
Source: Војска Републике Српске Facebook Page

Anticipating the need to withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar to its withdrawal from Croatia after it achieved international recognition, the JNA played a key role in creating the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, soon after renamed to Army of Republika Srpska (Vojska Republike Srpske – VRS). The army was established on 12th May, 1992, incorporating dismissed JNA units, consisting exclusively of Bosnian Serbs, along with territorial defense forces and other political militias. Once again, heavy equipment, including M-84 tanks from the remaining 1st Armored Brigade, which had only partially evacuated from Slovenia, was left behind by the JNA during its retreat to the remaining Yugoslav territory. These tanks would later be merged with the remnants of JNA’s 329th Armored Brigade to form the 1st Armored Brigade of the Republika Srpska, the largest armored unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This unit played a crucial role in Operation Corridor 92, the largest and arguably most successful operation devised by the Army of Republika Srpska, soon after its establishment.

A M-84 of the Army of Republika Srpska during Operation Corridor 92
Source: Војска Републике Српске-ВРС Facebook Page

Operation Corridor 92 marked the first instance in the Yugoslav Wars where tanks were employed in accordance with their military doctrine, enjoying robust support from other branches of the military and particularly close collaboration with infantry. Consequently, the Operation achieved its objectives of re-establishing the connection between the isolated capital of Republika Srpska and Serb-controlled southeastern territories, while also pushing Croatian forces out of northern Bosnia, all with relatively moderate losses. In the same battle, the opposing Croatian Army and Croatian Defence Council could muster fewer than 50 tanks, with just 4 M-84s among them. The VRS had 24 M-84 tanks at its disposal, as well as 92 other tanks.

Map of Operation Corridor 92.
Source: Wikipedia

In another rare tank-on-tank engagement, one of these Croatian M-84s ambushed an M-84 (T-55 according to some sources) of the Army of Republika Srpska near Bosanski Brod, resulting in the crew becoming the final casualties of Operation Corridor 92.

Recreation of a Croatian M-84 ambushing an M-84 tank of the Army of Republika Srpska.
Still from a documentary movie Corridor 92.
Source: RTS

The Army of Republika Srpska also put to use leftover T-72M and M-84 tanks from the training schools in Banja Luka, Manjača, and Zalužani, including some from the zero and first series. These tanks were allocated to the 2nd Armored Brigade. In an interesting episode, a complete company of female tankers for the M-84 tanks was formed in the town of Kupres. However, due to their lack of training, the company was quickly disbanded, as it was decided that their skills would be more effectively utilized in field kitchens.

The M-84 “Fish Stew” used by the 2nd Herceg Light Infantry Brigade of the VRS, 1994. Before the war, this tank was exhibited at Nikinci. At some point after March 1994, the tank was captured by the Bosnian forces.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Werdum1

Throughout the early stages of the war, the Army of Republika Srpska maintained a relative superiority over its Bosnian and Bosnian Croatian adversaries. There were instances when the latter factions even turned their focus on each other rather than on Republika Srpska. However, the turning point occurred in 1994, when NATO initiated an air campaign against the Army of Republika Srpska. Simultaneously, Washington brokered a peace deal between the Croatians and Bosniaks, uniting them against their common Serbian enemy. Forced to fight defensively on all fronts, its international reputation tarnished by the Srebrenica massacre, Republika Srpska eventually succumbed, signing the Dayton Peace Agreement on 14th December, 1995, which marked the definitive end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Notably, the Republika Srpska acquired 23 M-84 tanks from the Serbian Army of Krajina that survived the fall of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

M-84 tanks of the Army of Republika Srpska, 30th December, 1995.
Source: novosti.rs

The immediate post-war period in the Republika Srpska was characterized by a gradual disarmament process, with much of the old and damaged equipment ending up on the cutting table under the watchful eye of SFOR. While the exact number of M-84 tanks retained by the Army of Republika Srpska at the end of the war is unknown, Srpski Oklop website lists 73 M-84 tanks in 1999, decreasing to 57 by 2004, just before the unification of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

M-84 tanks during a parade commemorating a 10 year anniversary of the establishment of the VRS.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, VJ

Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Emblem of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Source: Wikipedia

The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would start the civil war on ‘hard mode’, with some sympathies from the international community but otherwise no real allies anywhere in the world. Despite the vast size of their newly established Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it grappled with significant under-equipment, particularly in terms of heavy weaponry, such as tanks. The Bosnian Battle of the Barracks yielded minimal results, prompting the need to smuggle in weapons, primarily through Croatia. Predictably, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine – ARBiH) experienced a series of defeats against the Army of Republika Srpska in 1992. The situation worsened in 1993, when the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia turned against each other, leading to the effective closure of the only available supply route through Croatia.

The Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would capture and reuse a few armored vehicles, including just two M-84 tanks until near the end of the conflict. The first M-84 tank was captured from the 2nd Armored Brigade of the Army of Republika Srpska near Doboj in good condition on 30th November, 1992, after its track snapped and the tank got stuck in a ditch. This tank was recovered and was accepted into service with the 1st Tešanj Brigade. It earned the nickname “Garavi Zeko” (Black Rabbit), an amalgamation of the brigade’s nickname (Garava) and the nickname (Zeko) of one of the deceased tankers from the brigade. As luck would have it, this happened to be the ‘L1’ tank (registration number ‘21177’, chassis number ‘00006001T’) that had been previously prepared for shipment to Libya. Like with the other atypical M-84s, this tank had been sent to the training schools around Banja Luka once the export deal fell through.

The tank “Garavi Zeko” of the 1st Tešanj Brigade of ARBiH, later renamed to 372nd “Garava” Mountain Knight Brigade.
Source: http://www.srpskioklop.paluba.info/amir/tekst.htm

Amir Halep with his “Garavi Zeko”.
Source: http://www.srpskioklop.paluba.info/amir/tekst.htm

“Garavi Zeko” played a key role in the capture of the second M-84 tank (registration number ‘21222’) in the early morning of 22nd August, 1993, near the town of Miljanovci, close to Tešanj. According to Amir Halep, the tank’s commander, the previous day, “Garavi Zeko” managed to score a hit on an unknown VRS tank and chase away an armored train sent from Doboj. In the evening, “Garavi Zeko” was dispatched to Miljanovci to disperse the VRS infantry guarding the M-84 tank that was previously disabled by the ARBiH forces. Once this was accomplished, early in the morning, the disabled tank was towed away by “Garavi Zeko” under the cover of friendly infantry. The captured M-84 tank had been previously disabled by an M80 Zolja shot into the area of the exhaust. Fortunately, the brigade had enough spare parts to repair it and put it back into action under the nickname “Sultan”. This tank was one of the M-84T tanks previously evacuated from Vrhnika.

“Sultan” tank, post-war. It is immobile due to engine breakdown, awaiting assistance from the Stabilization Force (SFOR) for towing.
Source: www.paluba.inf, Vladimir Ivanović

The 5th Corps of the ARBiH managed to capture two M-84 tanks in 1995. The first one was captured in August near the village of Krivaja, near Cazin, during the offensive named Scorched Earth. Another tank was captured in September, close to Bosanski Petrovac in the Sana 95 Operation. Another M-84A may have been captured close to Bosanski Petrovac as well.

One first series M-84 tank (registration number ‘21110’, chassis number ‘00006-051D’) was also captured by the 5th Corps from the Serbian Army of Krajina. This tank was captured in July 1995, painted brown, and nicknamed “Pegasus”.

M-84 number ‘21110’ captured by the 5th Corps in 1995
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Misirac

This tank featured the inscription “Pozna. Korida. Zorić” and artwork on the left rubber skirt
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Misirac

Additional M-84 tanks were either captured or recovered in the late stages of the conflict and after the Dayton Agreement, which ended the war. Before the merger of the Army of Republika Srpska into the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ARBiH had 6 M-84 tanks.

Soldiers of the 5th Corps, riding on the same M-84 tank, now painted brown and named “Pegasus”.
Source: https://twitter.com/Dzebic_Dean/status/1733849218157068703

Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia

Emblem of the Hrvatsko Vijeće Odbrane
Source: Wikipedia

The Autonomous Region of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia was established to protect the interests of the Bosnian Croatians within Bosnia and Herzegovina. While de jure not separatist in nature, in practice, it was heavily influenced by Republic of Croatia and largely acted independently, and its armed force, called the Croatian Defense Council (Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane – HVO), fought against the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina whenever it deemed necessary. Like the ARBiH, the HVO struggled to equip itself with heavy weapons. Out of approximately 50 tanks operated throughout the conflict, none were of the M-84 model. However, if stories are to be believed, one M-84 tank did see service on their side. This tank was reportedly rented from the Republic of Srpska to be used against the forces of ARBiH, who the HVO was also fighting at the time.

Members of the HVO posing with a destroyed M-84 tank. This tank was destroyed by a 9M14 Malyutka near the town of Donji Rujani, on 23rd April, 1992.
Source: Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane – HVO Facebook Page

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Emblem of the Army of the Republic of North Macedonia
Source: Wikipedia

The Republic of Macedonia was the only Yugoslav republic to peacefully secede. Its independence referendum was not contested, leading to the declaration of independence on 8th September, 1991. With the Yugoslav People’s Army no longer serving as the armed force of the new Macedonia, it withdrew from the region. Although the Army of Macedonia did not inherit any M-84 tanks, the departing JNA left behind T-34/85 tanks as a parting gift. These tanks were used for crew training until Macedonia received T-55 tanks from Bulgaria.

Yugoslavian Army

Coat of arms of the Yugoslav Army
Source: Wikipedia

After the JNA pulled out of Bosnia, it lost its purpose, as the state it had served ceased to exist. The restructured Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprising only Serbia and Montenegro, transformed the remnants of the JNA into the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije – VJ). The Yugoslav Army was reorganized into three armies, encompassing seven corps and consisting of 34 brigades. It inherited the majority of JNA equipment, including 1,300 tanks, of which approximately 250 were M-84s, 568 IFVs, 1,200 cannons of all calibers, 200 MLRS, 1,665 mortars, 2,000 anti-aircraft cannons, 135 anti-tank launchers, and 60 anti-aircraft missile systems.

The M-84 tanks were concentrated in three formations:

1st Guards Brigade in Belgrade
211th Armored Brigade in Niš
252nd Armored Brigade in Kraljevo

Additionally, some tanks were stationed at tank schools and training centers. The ground forces numbered around 85,000 personnel, while the air force, with 16,700 personnel, operated with 200 largely outdated aircraft and 50 helicopters. This new army would be tested in the final conflicts of the Yugoslav Wars, the insurgency in Kosovo and Metohija and the Preševo Valley.

A M-84 tank of the Yugoslav Army in Kosovo, 1999.
Source: Расељени са Косова и Метохије Facebook Page

The situation in the Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija became increasingly unstable following the federal crackdown against protesters in the 1980s. Throughout the second half of 1990s, passive resistance among Albanians seeking independence gradually transformed into an armed insurgency, fueled in part by the chaos unfolding in the Republic of Albania at the time. As Chinese-made weapons from the Albanian Armed Forces flowed into the province unobstructed, separatist terrorist organizations swelled in size.

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began operating in 1995, launching attacks on federal buildings, Yugoslav police forces, Albanian collaborators, and ethnic Serbian civilians. As the KLA’s activities intensified, particularly in spring of 1998, its controlled territory expanded to cover 40% of the province. This territory was primarily composed of mountain ranges, forests, and isolated villages, while major urban centers in the province remained under federal control but were effectively under siege.

A M-84 tank participating in the clearing of a village somewhere in Kosovo and Metohija.
Source: en.topwar.ru

Since the overstretched troops of the Yugoslavian Ministry of Internal Affairs struggled to control the escalating situation in Kosovo and Metohija, the 3rd Army of the VJ was deployed to assist them in restoring order. In the initial stages of the conflict, tanks were deployed in single platoons, accompanied by a platoon of Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), and a few M53/59 Praga vehicles for fire support. While the JNA had experimented with tank platoons consisting of four tanks just before its dissolution, the VJ returned to the practice of having three tanks per platoon during the conflict. The only unit in Kosovo and Metohija equipped with M-84 tanks during this period was the second mechanized battalion of the 211th Armored Brigade, stationed at Podujevom, with the remainder of the Brigade being transferred to the area by the end of the year. However, tanks of the Battalion were employed sparingly, with a notable instance being the battle for Bajgora in late 1998. The decision to limit their use was strategic. The mountainous operational area with poor infrastructure was considered more suitable for the lighter, cheaper, and more numerous T-55 tanks. In the context of counter-insurgency warfare, the M-84s, except for their superior frontal armor, were seen as offering little additional advantage. Instead, the M-84s were held in reserve within the country, anticipating a potential confrontation with NATO.

Following the KLA’s unsuccessful attempt to capture the town of Orahovac, the Yugoslavian Army launched a counteroffensive, reclaiming much of the territory previously held by insurgents. The increasing humanitarian toll of the conflict prompted Western powers to pressure Yugoslavia to halt its campaign, which had led to the displacement of numerous Albanian civilians. In compliance with international pressure, FR Yugoslavia initially agreed to cease its operations. However, peace negotiations faltered when Slobodan Milošević refused to sign the controversial Rambouillet Agreement. In response, NATO initiated a bombing campaign on 24th of March, 1999.

NATO propaganda leaflet dropped over Kosovo and Metohija, depicting an A-10 Thunderbolt II attacking a Yugoslavian M-84.
Source: www.kmnovine.com

Three days later, the VJ high command decided to deploy the 252nd Armored Brigade to Kosovo and Metohija. The M-84 tanks of the Brigade were transported by trains, while supporting elements and trucks traveled by road. The excruciating journey took four days, as trains often had to be concealed in tunnels to evade reconnaissance drones and NATO aircraft. Tank crews remained inside their vehicles, prepared to disembark them off the flatcars and disperse them at a moment’s notice in case of an imminent air strike on the train. The 252nd Brigade successfully reached the town of Lipljan without any losses, earning the nickname “An Invisible Brigade.” With the addition of this Brigade, the total number of tanks in Kosovo rose to approximately 350. The majority of these tanks were concentrated in the 15th Armored Brigade (equipped with T-55s), along with the 211th and 252nd Armored Brigades (equipped with M-84s). The remaining tanks were T-55s located in the tank battalions of the 243rd Mechanized Brigade, and 78th, 125th, and 548th motorized brigades.

Tanks of the 252nd Armored Brigade near the town of Dernica, Kosovo and Metohija, 1999.
Source: Tragom Prištinskog korpusa Facebook Page

A M-84 operating in conjunction with the police, Kosovo and Metohija, 1999.
Source: Milicija Butik Facebook Page

During the bombing campaign, the focus of NATO’s strike missions outside Kosovo and Metohija was on targeting infrastructure and industry. However, within the province, NATO also conducted close air support missions in support of the KLA, compelling the armored formations of the VJ to implement extensive camouflage measures. Tanks were dispersed to the greatest extent possible, with tanks from the same platoon positioned several hundred meters apart. In response to NATO’s reliance on thermal cameras, the practice of pre-heating the engines was prohibited, and tanks were not allowed to keep their engines running unless they were about to advance or change position. When tanks needed to move, they did so in “jumps” from one cover to another. Movements were typically carried out during the night or in bad weather conditions. If movement was necessary on a clear day, tanks moved while covered in fresh vegetation, with significant distance between them, often minutes apart. Tanks on the march were equipped with water tanks to spill water on the engine decks in case of an air alarm, cooling them down to reduce their thermal signature. An alternative approach involved placing a water-soaked blanket over the engine deck.

A Serbian M-84 tank covered in foliage during a 2009 exercise.
Source: RTS

Upon reaching a new position, each tank crew had to prepare multiple fallback positions and additional, more conspicuous fake positions, typically spaced between 500 and 1000 m apart. Tank tracks had to be covered or cleared unless leading to a false position, where a decoy target would be placed. In instances where damaged tanks or decommissioned T-34/85s, M4A2E4 Shermans, and M18 Hellcats were unavailable, the JNA improvised tank dummies. This involved covering cars or agricultural vehicles with sheet metal, wood, tires, and old camouflage nets. Tree trunks or unloading pipes from combine harvesters were left protruding through garage doors to create the illusion of a hidden tank. To enhance the realism, empty ammunition boxes and clothing store mannequins were arranged around the decoys. Occasionally, fires were lit in the engine compartment or gun barrel, or a stove was placed inside to simulate warmth. The effectiveness of decoys also relied on their visibility on enemy radars. Passive triangle-shaped radar reflectors were often utilized for this purpose, with two reflectors needed to simulate one tank. Typically, a cluster of around six reflectors would be strategically placed to mimic a tank platoon.

A M-84 tank, Kosovo and Metohija, 1999.
Source: Lessons of Kosovo: The Limits of Air Power (1999)

These decoys were used until they literally fell apart, often sustaining multiple hits from precision projectiles during the conflict. It is estimated that 80% to 90% of all decoys were detected and hit throughout the war.

The 78-day NATO bombing campaign concluded following the signing of the Kumanovo ceasefire agreement. Despite around 3,000 sorties targeting mobile assets, only 1,995 were initially considered successful. Of these, 181 strikes were directed at tanks, with 93 tanks believed to be disabled or destroyed. Yugoslavia reported the loss of 13 tanks throughout the entire war, including 9 M-84s. However, post-war assessments, such as the one carried out by Munitions Effectiveness Assessment Team, identified only 14 destroyed tank hulls in Kosovo and Metohija. The lower estimates of destroyed Yugoslavian armor are underscored by the fact that the modern Serbian Armed Forces still possess 232 M-84 tanks, with another undisclosed number earmarked for training and modernization projects.

On 2nd April, 1999 M-84 tanks from the 252nd Armored Brigade were caught while refueling in the open, becoming targets for multiple bombing and cluster bombing strikes. Six personnel lost their lives, and four tanks were damaged or destroyed. On 2nd May, three more M-84s belonging to the 252nd “Tactical Group” were lost. Due to inadequate camouflage, two tanks were identified and subsequently targeted by NATO aircraft. A third M-84, attempting to conceal itself in a garage, was destroyed because the crew failed to clear the track marks leading to its location.

One of the tanks destroyed on 2nd April, 1999.
Source: cojstvo.rs

Two M-84s hit on 2nd May, 1999.
Source: Srpski Oklop

A VJ M-84 tank being transported out of Kosovo and Metohija, after the signing of the Kumanovo agreement.
Source: en.topwar.ru

The last engagement involving M-84 tanks was the Battle of Oraovica, a confrontation between the Yugoslav Army and the Liberation Army of Preševo, Medveđa, and Bujanovac (UÇPMB). Serbian Special Forces, accompanied by tanks from the 211th Armored Brigade, effectively recaptured the insurgent-controlled town in southern Serbia without incurring any losses.

A M-84 tank in Oraovica, 2001.
Source: Srpski Oklop

Service Outside of Yugoslavia

Kuwait Army

Emblem of the Kuwait Army
Source: Wikipedia

The first Kuwaiti M-84 tanks were lost in unclear circumstances. Either four or more likely six M-84 tanks of either second, third, or fourth series were sent to Kuwait just before the Iraqi invasion in 1991. According to some sources, they were used by the Emiri Guard in the defense of the palace. All of these initial Kuwaiti M-84 tanks were either destroyed or captured, with at least one good condition M-84 being captured by Iraq.

One of the M-84 tanks delivered to Kuwait. Unlike the M-84AB tanks, these tanks were not painted in sand color. The big box in the back is an air conditioning unit.
Source: www.jutarnji.hr

Due to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the M-84ABs had to be redirected to Saudi Arabia, where the Kuwaiti government in exile was stationed. By 6th February, 1991, 71 M-84AB tanks had arrived in Saudi Arabia and equipped the 35th Al-Shaheed Armored Brigade. These tanks saw limited action during Operation Desert Storm, performing well and sustaining only minor, repairable damage. Additional deliveries increased the number of M-84AB tanks in Kuwait to 149. However, due to the collapse of Yugoslavia, the contract had to be canceled and further deliveries came to a halt. Besides training and parades, Kuwaiti M-84ABs have not seen action since the conclusion of the war with Iraq.

A Kuwaiti M-84AB during Operation Desert Storm.
Source: sh.m.wikipedia.org

A Kuwaiti M-84ABs during a 2012 exercise.
Source: www.dvidshub.net

Iraqi Republican Guard

Emblem of the Iraqi Republican Guard
Source: Wikipedia

During the Victory Parade in Baghdad on 31st December, 2000, the Iraqis showcased a captured M-84 tank. It remains unclear whether this was the only captured example or if there were more. Some sources, albeit unreliable, suggest that four tanks were destroyed during the Iraqi invasion, and two were captured from Kuwait.

A M-84 tank captured by Iraq, identifiable thanks to the DNNS-2 sight on the left side of the tank.
Source: www.paluba.info, Dus510

At least one captured M-84 tank, potentially the same one from the Baghdad parade, seems to have been used by the Republican Guard during the 2003 Iraq War. It is unknown whether the tank saw action during Operation Desert Storm before that. One of the Iraqi M-84 tanks is also said to have been recaptured and repaired by American forces and is currently used for OPFOR training, either at Fort Bliss, Fort Moore (formerly Fort Benning), or Fort Cavazos (formerly Fort Hood).

This M-84 tank, used by the Iraqi Republican Guard in 2003, was allegedly disabled in an air attack.
Source: https://archive.org/details/IraqiArmyEquipment1930-2017SpecialReportVol.2/page/n1/mode/2up?view=theater

Combat Performance Assessment

It is not easy to gauge the performance of the M-84 tanks during the wars they participated in. At times, they were used incompetently, as seen during the early JNA operations in Slovenia and Croatia. At other times, their usage was atypical, such as in the post-1992 Croatian Civil War and Bosnian Civil War. In certain conflicts, like Kosovo and Metohija and Operation Desert Storm, they were barely used at all.

Rarely were the M-84s concentrated and employed in well-thought-out combined arms offensives with ample infantry and air support, as seen in operations such as Corridor 92 and Operation Storm. In those cases, the M-84 proved to be a powerful tool for those capable of wielding it, but in the grand scheme of things, these operations were infrequent. More commonly, the tanks functioned as static fire support, rolling up to the pre-prepared firing positions on the frontline, unleashing hell upon the enemy, and then retreating upon task completion.

A M-84 tank of the 1st Armored Brigade of the Army of Republika Srpska, Gradačac, 1994.
Source: Srpski Oklop

Before offensive operations, the tanks conducted their own artillery preparation, firing for hours at a time toward a target while continuously being resupplied with ammunition, before moving to capture the target in conjunction with infantry. Strangely enough, because they were used this way, tanks were often captured on the frontlines, and sometimes entire battles were fought over a single tank abandoned on a good firing position. Tanks damaged at the frontline had to be recovered quickly, else they would find themselves stolen by the other side or peppered with anti-tank fire until they became unusable. Some JNA M-84s disabled in the Vukovar area suffered dozens of hits from light anti-tank launchers, rendering them useless by the time the area was secure enough for recovery.

The JNA recovering a damaged first series M-84 tank during the battle for Vukovar.
Source: en.topwar.ru

The main reason why tanks were employed in such an unorthodox way can be attributed to commanders allowing their forces to disperse over a wide operational area instead of maintaining concentration. For example, at one point in 1992, the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Armored Brigade of the Army of Republika Srpska found itself defending 10 different locations in Posavina, none of which were in proximity to each other. The standard JNA doctrine, which emphasized three tanks forming a platoon and three platoons plus a command tank constituting a company, was quickly abandoned. Instead, individual tanks were given names and used as basic units. In some cases, the mere presence of a tank provided a morale boost among infantry, far outweighing the actual combat value of the lone vehicle.

A M-84 of the Yugoslav Army, Kosovo and Metohija, 1999. Picture on the tank is of the American actress and model Marilyn Monroe.
Source: www.tportal.hr

Ironically, the M-84’s main advantage, its modern fire-control system, became nearly irrelevant in the context of the conflicts in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. Most of the fighting during these wars occurred at close range, and long-distance fire was often approximate at best. Tank-on-tank duels were extremely rare, and the majority of projectiles fired were HE-FRAG rounds. Other ammunition, such as HEAT, was only used when HE-FRAG rounds were unavailable. The true advantage of the M-84 tanks turned out to be their ability to withstand fire from light anti-tank weapons better than any other available tank. In the field, crews sometimes made modifications to their machines to further enhance their defensive capabilities. For example, in the Army of Republika Srpska, it became a standard practice to add extra rubber skirts and weld empty ammunition boxes filled with rubber to the front of the tank. While these ad hoc modifications instilled confidence in tank crews, their practical effectiveness remains questionable.

A M-84 tank of the VRS, with ammunition boxes welded to the front and extra rubber skirts on the turret.
Source: Srpski Oklop

A M-84 tank of the SVK with additional rubber armor on the turret.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Misirac

Damage Assessment and Repairs

The most common type of damage suffered by M-84 tanks was from light anti-tank launchers like the Armbrust and M80 Zolja. While these could not penetrate the front of the tank, they often found their mark when fired from the sides or rear. Tanks damaged by these light anti-tank launchers were rarely complete write-offs. Most of them were successfully repaired and reintroduced into service, with some tanks undergoing repairs multiple times. Notably, one fourth series M-84, registration number ‘21316’, endured six hits from Zoljas, and each time it was repaired and put back into active duty.

A M-84A tank damaged by the M80 Zolja from the front. The hole is deep, the stick could be placed inside of it up to the thumb, but the shaped charge jet did not penetrate inside the tank.
Source: www.paluba.info, Vladimir Invanović

Until the commencement of the NATO bombing campaign, no M-84 tanks were lost to airpower. Some tanks were lost to mines and very few fell in tank-on-tank combat. One such instance involved M-84 tank number ‘21423’, which participated in Operation Corridor 92 within the Army of Republika Srpska. This tank was struck by a Croatian T-55, resulting in two indentations on the left side of the front plate. Although the tank’s interior remained undamaged, the hull suffered deformation from the impact, and it had to be scuttled. The turret from this tank was later mounted on the M-84 tank that experienced a barrel launch due to an exploded shell in the breach—a mishap attributed to inadequate gun maintenance by the crews, which was another common reason for the loss of a tank.

A M-84 tank destroyed by a light handheld anti-tank launcher. It looks like the ammunition inside the tank detonated, leaving the vehicle in a completely wrecked state.
Source: promise.hr

The case of M-84 number ‘21318’ is interesting, and highlights the chaotic and unpredictable nature of warfare. The tank, originally part of the war reserve in Vrhnika, found itself involved in a unique incident during autumn of 1991 in Slavonia, Croatia. After the capture of a Croatian village, the crew of the M-84 tank reportedly left the vehicle to participate in looting. Seizing this opportunity, a Croatian tank crew hiding in a basement jumped into the empty M-84 tank and attempted to drive it away. The JNA responded by opening up on them with everything they had, including a 120 mm mortar that somehow scored a direct hit on the runaway tank. As a result of the damage sustained, the tank underwent a lengthy and challenging 8-month repair process but was nevertheless fixed and put back into action.

The mortared tank after the repairs.
Source: www.paluba.info

In early 1994, this same tank was once again hit by a mortar round, this time near the end of the gun barrel. With no available spare 125 mm guns, a decision was made to address the issue by shortening the damaged barrel by 243 mm. This was done on 2nd February, 1994, in the TAS (Tvornica Alatnih Strojeva – Machine Tool Factory) enterprise in Banja Luka. To compensate for the reduction in weight, a counter-weight was installed at the end. While this modification allowed the tank to remain in service, the effective firing range of the tank was decreased to about 1 km.
Corruption was another unfortunately common reason for the loss of a tank. Some tanks that could have been feasibly repaired and returned to service were instead unjustly deemed irreparable, and sold as scrap metal.

Foreign Interest and Testing

Soviet Union

As per the licensing requirements, one tank was sent to and another one was bought by the Soviet Union for testing purposes. The first series tank was returned, while the second series tank was retained and is currently located in the Kubinka Tank Museum in Russia. That tank is in a driveable but otherwise poor state. It does not have a battery so for it to be turned out it has to be pulled by another tank.

The retained M-84 tank in Kubinka Tank Museum.
Source: Wikimedia

The Kubinka M-84 tank being taken out for a ride.
Source: Vladimir Ivanović

Soviet reports highly rated the build quality, the fire-control system, and the night-fighting capabilities of the M-84 during their tests.

State of Libya

Early on, the sale of tanks to Libya was already a foregone conclusion. Libyan generals closely monitored the tank’s development and production, and Libyan tank crews were already undergoing training in Yugoslavia by 1985. It is possible that Libya even made advance payments for the first batch, which is why the engineers were pressured to finish the job as soon as possible. In 1983, during one of the initial live-fire tests of the new M-84 tank, there was not enough time to finalize the fire-control system. Since the entire presentation was arranged for the Libyan delegation, it was deemed unacceptable for the new tank to miss the target. A clever solution was devised. Soon after the demonstration began, the M-84 was parked behind some large bushes, and out of them came a T-72M, which subsequently completed the firing trial by hitting a tank wreck at 1,500 m (0.93 mi). To enhance the explosion’s impact, the wreck was filled with explosives and gasoline the day before. The Libyan delegation left satisfied, and orders were placed for the production of 40 second-series M-84T tanks. Libya initially intended to purchase 1000 tanks, later revised to 200. However, none were ever sent, as this promising business opportunity fell through due to the combination of Libyan belligerence on the global stage and the Soviet Union outbidding Yugoslavia with a better deal. The ‘L1’ tank ended up in the Army of Republika Srpska, captured later by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the ‘L2’ most likely went to the Serbian Army of Krajina. The 40 tanks designated as war reserve were stationed at Vrhnika, Slovenia, with half remaining there and the rest evacuated to Republika Srpska, joining the ranks of its army.

Republic of India

In 1988, Rudi Čajavec factory adapted a T-72M with the SUV-M-84, and this modernization was offered to the Indian Army. Following successful testing, the Indian Army placed an order for 1,000 kits for the T-72 tanks and another 1,000 for the T-55s. There were expectations that this business deal would lead to India ordering M-84 tanks and subsequently acquiring the production license from Yugoslavia. However, the collapse of Yugoslavia canceled all such plans, the money was embezzled and no kits were ever sent in the end.

T-72 (registration number ‘20642’) modified with the SUV-M-84. Manjača, 1989.
Source: www.paluba.info, Vladimir Ivanović

Islamic Republic of Pakistan

The Pakistani Intelligence network swiftly learned of the Indian Army’s order for the SUV-M-84 kits. In response, the Pakistani Army, seeking to maintain parity with its rival, requested to test the M-84A tank. Two tanks, designated ‘P1’ and ‘P2’, were dispatched and arrived in Pakistan in August 1990. This operation was conducted in strict secrecy to avoid angering the Indians, which could jeopardize Yugoslavian business ventures with them. The maintenance standards set for these tanks were extremely rigorous, ensuring that they arrived for testing in perfect condition.

Following a brief oral presentation, the tanks underwent rigorous testing with Pakistani crews. They traveled 1,600 km in temperatures ranging from 45°C to 50°C, enduring sandy and marshy soil conditions. The tank’s abilities in regards to water fording, self-entrenchment, smoke screen laying, and towing another tank were also tested. Despite the harsh conditions, there were no breakdowns or oil leaks. The M-84As demonstrated high accuracy on the firing range, with crews reporting an 80% hit rate regardless of the weather and time conditions. The domestic RUT-1 radio kit performed exceptionally well, prompting the Pakistan Army to consider placing a separate order for them.

Ultimately, the tanks passed all trials with flying colors, and the Pakistan Army expressed interest in ordering 200 tanks and obtaining a production license for another 1,000. The total cost of the deal was estimated to be between US$3 and US$4 billion. However, Pakistan was prepared to pay under the condition that 30% of the deal be paid in cotton, a condition which the Yugoslavian delegation refused. Unfortunately, the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia, as with India, brought an end to all further negotiations with Pakistan. The ‘P1’ and ‘P2’ tanks were returned to the Đuro Đaković factory.

One of the M-84A tanks in Pakistan. In the picture are test driver Ivan Židov(left) and electrician Savo Nenadović(right).
Source: www.paluba.info

Islamic Republic of Iran

Yugoslavian relations with Iran were distant, since Yugoslavia sought to maintain good relations with its rival, Iraq. Nevertheless, Yugoimport began eyeing the country as a potential export destination for weapons since February 1989, when the first cooperation agreement between them and the government of Iran was signed. Nine months later, an offer was made for technology transfer, license for the production of 1,000 tanks, and technical assistance with getting the production off the ground for a price of US$2.5 billion. This price was based on the price for the previous sale of tanks to Kuwait. Not all parts were to be produced in Iran, as around 30% assemblies and aggregates would have to be imported from Yugoslavia. Other countries also made their offers, and the Iranian commission eventually narrowed down the choice to the Yugoslav M-84 and the Russian T-72S. What held the M-84 back was the fact that it could not fire anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) through its main cannon like the Soviet tank, and more importantly, the price, which Iran was unwilling to pay. Yugoimport was ready to compromise, and negotiations continued throughout the 1990s, but like with other deals, the collapse of Yugoslavia put an end to all negotiations, leaving Iran to accept the Russian offer.

Current Operators and Modernization Programs

Republic of Serbia

As the primary inheritor of the vast JNA arsenal, the Serbian Army today operates more M-84 tanks than any other entity. Montenegro, which peacefully separated from Serbia in 2006, inherited no M-84 tanks.

Following the post-war army reform, the 211th and 252nd Armored Brigades were reorganized into four tank battalions: the 15th, 26th, 36th, and 46th, which were subsequently integrated into the four army brigades.

Officially, each brigade possesses a tank battalion with 53 tanks, along with another 20 tanks in reserve, making for a total of 232 tanks, 28 of which are M-84As. Unofficially, a couple more tanks are likely to have survived the wars and scrapyards and are currently used for training, R&D, and by Yugoimport for marketing. Throughout the years, there have been multiple attempts to develop modernization packages for these tanks.

Serbian modernization projects presented in 2009. A M-84M is to the left of M-84AB1 in the photo. Neither tank was accepted into service.
Source: Srpski Oklop

M-84AB1

The first attempt, the M-84AB1, was a venture project undertaken by Yugoimport in the early 2000s, banking on potential sales to Kuwait, which would in turn fund the modernization of Serbia and Montenegro’s own tank forces. As post-war tank development basically had to start from scratch, the M-84AB1 modernization package was developed with ample help from Russian and Ukrainian tank manufacturers, bringing the M-84 MBT to the standard of the early T-90S export tanks.

The M-84AB1 displayed at the 2015 Partner Exhibition
Source: sr.wikipedia.org

The defensive capabilities of the M-84AB1 were improved with the incorporation of several advanced systems. These included the Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armor, which provided enhanced protection against anti-tank threats. Additionally, the Shtora-1 soft-kill passive protection system was integrated, capable of disrupting semi-automatic command-to-line-of-sight (SACLOS) anti-tank guided missiles.

To further bolster its defensive capabilities, the M-84AB1 was equipped with laser warning receivers and passive radar warning receivers. These systems provided the crew with early detection and warning of incoming threats, allowing for timely countermeasures. The firepower of the M-84AB1 saw notable improvement with the introduction of a new gun that offered enhanced field replaceability and the capability to fire anti-tank guided missiles. Furthermore, the fire-control system was entirely replaced and the crew also benefited from multiple new thermal imagers, cameras, and the new TOMS panoramic sight, improving their situational awareness.

The M-84AB1 main battle tank. Only one has ever been converted.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Adekvatan

M-84M

After the rejection of the M-84AB1 by both Kuwait and Serbia and Montenegro, a new, cheaper modernization package was developed by TRZ (Tehnički Remontni Zavod – Technical Overhaul Workshop) “Čačak” in 2009. This variant, named M-84M (sometimes referred to as M-84S), was based on the M-84 tank, unlike the M-84AB1, which was based on the M-84A, and comprised largely domestic components. One of the most visible differences was the addition of the domestic KAO-M99 explosive reactive armor, equivalent to the Soviet Kontakt-1.

The M-84M, as presented in 2009. The tank used was the M-84 registration number ‘21063’.
Source: sr.wikipedia.org

The 780 hp (574 kW) engine was modified with a new fuel injection system and a high-pressure fuel pump, increasing its power output to 840 hp (626 kW). While the main gun remained the same, it received a new, thick, thermal sleeve of questionable construction since it probably ruined the balance of the gun. Additionally, the PKT coaxial machine gun was paired with a device known as a “fire regulator,” providing the gunner with more control over the weapon.

The M-84M from behind. The KAO-M99 explosive reactive armor was mounted only at the front.
Source: sr.wikipedia.org

Other enhancements included the addition of new firefighting equipment and longer rubber skirts for improved protection. Though the M-84M was also initially rejected, it would continue to be developed and evolve throughout the years.

The M-84M in 2013. Notice the addition of the M16 12.7 mm remote controlled weapon station (RCWS).
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Jester

M-84AS1/AS2

In 2017, a modified version of the M-84M was showcased during the Partner Military Exhibition as the M-84AS1. This iteration of the tank underwent a more extensive modernization, including thermal imagers for both the gunner and commander, addition of slat armor around the engine compartment and Kontakt-5 panels on the sides, new ammunition, radio equipment, radar warning receivers and other electronics. Despite its participation in the Steel 2017 military exercise and the announcement of its adoption into service, the tank’s adoption was not finalized. It appears that the Army decided to delay its introduction to await the completion of the new explosive reactive armor in development at the time.

A M-84AS1 (2017).
Source: Dimitrijeostojic.com

The first modernization package accepted for service was the M-84AS1/AS2, unveiled in 2020. Unlike the previous prototype that shared the same name, this latest version of the tank underwent a comprehensive redesign. It featured an entirely new ERO-19 explosive reactive armor system, along with the integration of two dozen other new subsystems. These included the addition of 360° low-light cameras and a new commander’s panoramic sight, among others.

A M-84AS1 (2020).
Source: KTV Televizija

The M-84AS1 and M-84AS2 upgrade packages have minor differences, with the latter being accepted for service and marked for serial production. Currently, the first 26 tanks are undergoing modernization to this standard, with 12 of them already completed at the time of writing (March 2024).

M-84AS2 followed by an M-84AS1 during the military exercise in 2020. The main differences between the two are the layout of the explosive reactive armor and the type of RCWS used.
Source: www.vijesti.me

Hibridni Artiljerijsko Raketni ProtivAvionski Sistem

The HARPAS (Hibridni Artiljerijsko Raketni ProtivAvionski Sistem – Hybrid Artillery Missile Anti-Aircraft System) deserves special mention as the only currently active conversion project for the M-84 tank hull. Developed as a dedicated anti-aircraft system for mechanized formations equipped with tracked vehicles, the HARPAS was first unveiled in 2023 during that year’s Partner Military Exhibition. It is armed with two 40 mm Bofors L/70 anti-aircraft cannons and two pairs of domestic RLN-TK and RLN-RF anti-aircraft missiles. According to Dr. Nenad Miloradović, two Bofors cannons were mounted because one was deemed insufficient against drone swarms, which this vehicle is expected to face. The weapon systems on the HARPAS are paired with the Thales Ground Smarter GS-40 radar, mounted on top of the vehicle.

The HARPAS prototype at the 2023 Partner Military Exhibition.
Source: tangosix.rs

Republic of Croatia

The Croatian Army currently possesses 75 M-84 tanks, though as with Serbia, there may be additional tanks not officially counted in this figure. It is hard to estimate how many tanks the Croatians captured, and how many they produced for themselves. Some sources suggest that the Croatian Army ended the war with 27 M-84 tanks. Production estimates on the higher end place the total post-independence (wartime and post-war) production at over 50. Journalist Milan Jelovac, in 2001, mentioned that more than 650 tanks were left at the Đuro Đaković factory in total, aligning with this figure. The final production contract for 20 M-84A4 tanks was signed in 1999 with the Croatian Ministry of Defense, and the last two were delivered in June 2003. The subsequent planned contract for M-84A4 tank production was canceled, shifting the focus to the acquisition and maintenance of new Patria AMV armored personnel carriers.

Đuro Đaković factory personnel hard at work on the M-84A4 tank.
Source: https://www.mycity-military.com/uploads2/158759_1408245159_Djurina%20Patria.pdf

Croatian M-84A4 tanks during the Brave Warrior 17 exercise with US troops.
Source: paluba.info

The Croatian M-84 tank fleet is the best maintained one, largely thanks to the presence of the Đuro Đaković factory in the country, which is in charge of their maintenance. It is also the youngest one on average, with most tanks produced after the war using parts imported from Eastern European countries formerly part of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact. The Croatian Army operates perhaps the most diverse M-84 tank fleet, including T-72 tanks converted to the M-84A4 standard, captured M-84 tanks from the first, second, third, and fourth series, M-84A tanks taken from the JNA, M-84AB tanks produced for Kuwait but never delivered, and a number of locally produced M-84ABs with foreign parts. By the end of the decade, the majority of tanks had been converted to the M-84A4 standard. All Croatian M-84 tanks are part of the Armored-Mechanized Guard Brigade.

A Croatian M-84A4 tank during an amphibious transport exercise in Lora military port, 2016. This tank has a DShK machine gun instead of the Zastava M87 (NSVT).
Source: https://slobodnadalmacija.hr/split/desantni-brodovi-hrm-a-po-kastelanskom-zaljevu-prevozili-tenkove-304234

M-84A4 Sniper

Development of the new Croatian variant of the M-84 tank began during the civil war, and the first prototype of the new M-84A4 Sniper was produced in 1996. The main difference between the new variant and the M-84 tanks from which they were often converted lies in the EFCS3-84L (Enhanced Fire-Control System, sometimes nicknamed Omega-84) developed by the Slovenian company Fotona. This upgrade was likely implemented due to challenges in maintaining and replacing damaged components of the original SUV-M-84 system after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Similar to the DNNS-2A, the new SGS-84 (SGS-84L, SCS-84 in other sources) gunner’s sight on the M-84A4 Sniper tanks features three channels: a day channel, a night channel with second-generation image intensifier, and a laser channel for the rangefinder, capable of measuring distances of up to 10 km.

A SGS-84 gunner’s sight on the Slovenian M-84A4 tank.
Source: https://paluba.info/

While the exact specifications and capabilities of the EFCS3-84L system are not fully known, it would be almost certainly be incorrect to simply label it as a flat upgrade over the old SUV-M-84 system, considering that the EFCS3-84L started out as a budget fire-control system for the JNA T-55 tanks before undergoing further development by Fotona to bring it up to the level of the SUV-M-84.

A M-84A4 tank and an OH-58D Kiowa Warrior during a military exercise, 12th January, 2017.
Source: https://www.reddit.com/media?url=https%3A%2F%2Fi.redd.it%2Fs1sp65wimn901.jpg

The M-84A4 Sniper tanks began to be equipped with “LIDR” (Laser Identification and Detection Receiver) laser warning receivers manufactured by Fotona in the second half of the 1990s. The engine powering the M-84A4 tanks was never specified, but it is likely that they use either the old V-46-6 and V-46-TK engines or similar T-72 engines imported from abroad. Additionally, the radio stations used in the M-84A4 Sniper tanks are a mix of old ones produced by Rudi Čajavec and foreign ones, such as the Racal Dana radio sets used in Kuwaiti tanks.

A LIRD laser warning receiver, above the phone case winder box.
Source: https://www.skyscrapercity.com/threads/croatia-hrvatska-kopnena-vojska-croatian-army-hkov.1819684/page-128

M-95 Degman

Compared to Serbia, Croatia benefited far more from the development done on the M-84 tank and its successor Vihor before the collapse of Yugoslavia, and even continued the development for a short while afterward. The result of this development was the M-95 Degman and the M-84D upgrade package for the M-84 tank.

The M-95 Degman utilized one of the two Vihor hulls that were left in Croatia, but features a new larger turret of welded construction powered by an all-electric drive. The exact thickness and composition of the turret are unknown, but considering the new tank had a weight of 46 tons, 2 tonnes heavier than the M-84A, its protective capabilities are unlikely to be worse than its predecessors. Furthermore, to enhance protection, the front and sides of the turret and hull are covered in RRAK explosive reactive armor, developed and supplied by the Israeli company RAFAEL Advanced Defense Systems.

The main armament remained the same 125 mm gun, while the fire-control system is Fotona‘s Omega-D, equipped with an SGS-D gunner’s aiming device comparable to the one found on M-84A4 tanks, although the TSGS-D sight with thermovision is also stated as an option. The commander has the ability to take over or override gunner’s controls and perform his activities, including target engagement, via his COMTOS system integrated into the DNKS-2 sight.

You can tell the M-95 Degman from the M-84D by the height of the turret.
Source: ddsv.hr

The Degman also features new German tracks, the addition of the LIRD laser warning receiver, new domestic NBC and fire suppression systems, and CODRIS-E periscope for the driver. One aspect that was not improved is the engine, as the tank uses the V-46-TK engine, the same one as on the M-84A tanks. However, considering the weight of the Degman rose by only 2 tonnes, that should not be too much of a problem.

At most, two M-95 Degmans were ever made, with one being completed in 2003 and another one possibly being completed in 2008. Although the Đuro Đaković factory signaled its readiness to commence mass production, no orders for this tank were ever placed.

A M-95 Degman on the production line.
Source: https://old-forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/564913-m-95-degman-armored-predator/

The M-84D modernization package was initially conceived as a proposal to modernize Kuwaiti tanks. It integrated numerous solutions previously developed for the M-95 Degman tank, including improvements to the fire-control system and the integration of RRAK explosive reactive armor. One tank was modified and offered to Kuwait as a modernization proposal for their own tanks. Unfortunately, Kuwait rejected the proposal, and despite sporadic interests from the Croatian Army only, no tanks were ever ordered, and only one M-84D tank appears to have been converted. This tank has been tested with multiple different remote controlled weapon stations.

A M-84D tank.
Source: www.mycity-military.com, Duško

M-95 Cobra ATGM Carrier

The experimental M-95 Cobra ATGM carrier vehicle is noteworthy, as it was developed based on an M-84A4 tank hull. This vehicle features a custom turret equipped with hatches, a Zastava M87 machine gun, smoke launchers, and a crane. The crane has the capability to extend its bucket up to a height of 14 m, enabling the Cobra to engage targets with its 9K111 Fagot ATGM while remaining hidden behind cover. Only a single prototype-demonstrator of the M-95 Cobra was built.

The M-95 Cobra ATGM carrier.
Source: srpskioklop.paluba.info

Republic of Slovenia

Slovenia currently operates a total of 54 M-84 tanks. Out of these, only a single company comprising up to 14 tanks is in active use, while the remaining tanks are in reserve and stationed at Pivka. The active company often participates in NATO exercises, often playing the role of the “aggressors.” Additionally, some Slovenian tanks have been stationed in Germany exclusively for this role.

A Slovenian M-84A4 tank during a field exercise.
Source: Slovenska vojska/Slovenian Armed Forces

All Slovenian tanks have been upgraded to the M-84A4 standard, which includes several improvements. These upgrades include the installation of the EFCS3-84L fire-control system developed by Fotona in 1996, the integration of the LIDR laser warning receiver, and the implementation of two new radio stations for improved communication capabilities.

A Slovenian M-84A4 tank.
Source: fire2hr

Fotona continued the development of this fire-control system, and one M-84 (registration number ‘10135’, note: this is not a JNA assigned number) was equipped with the experimental TFCS3, which in addition to the SGS-84 sight also features a separate STIGS-84 sight equipped with the thermovision channel. COMTOS commander’s takeover system and CODRIS-E driver’s sight were also installed on this tank. The laser warning receiver installed on this tank was designated LIRD-3A.

A M-84 modified with the TFCS3 fire-control system.
Source: https://forum.warthunder.com/t/m-84-tfcs3/9194

A clear picture of the STIGS-84 sight (right, in relation to the tank) next to the SGS-84 sight (left)
Source: Paluba.info

Two observable drawbacks of this tank were the fact that the main sight was moved to the left, possibly causing discomfort to the gunner. The gunner’s periscope also had to be relocated, so that it now looks further to the left than on the base variant of the M-84 tank, possibly negatively affecting his situational awareness.

Gunner’s periscopes on the modified M-84 tank.
Source: Paluba.info

Unfortunately, this sole prototype appears to have been taken apart, and only the chassis of this modified M-84 tank now remains.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were formed following the amalgamation of the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Army of Republika Srpska in 2005. Upon the disbandment of these respective armies, both entities within Bosnia and Herzegovina were permitted to retain some of their equipment as their own property. For the Army of Republika Srpska, this included the majority of their M-84 tanks, which had been part of the 101st Armored Brigade of the VRS up to that point.

A M-84A stationed at Manjača
Source: Vladimir Ivanović

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina currently operate 16 M-84 tanks, with the majority stationed at Manjača. This number includes five tanks from the second series, one from the third series, four from the fourth series, and five M-84A tanks. Additionally, there is one decommissioned M-84A at Manjača. One active first series M-84 tank is also present in Derventa.

The remaining M-84 tanks, totaling 45 to 50 units, including 15 M-84A tanks, belong to the Republika Srpska and are located at Kozara barracks. Unfortunately, these tanks have been heavily looted, rendering them useless.

A first series M-84 tank, formerly known as “Fish Stew”, stationed at Derventa. This tank was captured by the ARBiH during the war since this is one of the few M-84 tanks belonging to the Federation, rather than Republika Srpska.
Source: www.paluba.info

A few M-84 tanks belonging to the Federation are located in Lukavica and Nedžarići.

The Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to their limited budget, utilize these tanks very sporadically. In fact, there have been no live-fire exercises involving these tanks for a period of 20 years, starting from 1997 until 2017, when two tanks participated in an exercise on 16th and 17th March.

M-84 tanks at Manjača training field, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2017.
Source: Vladimir Ivanović

State of Kuwait

The Kuwait Army still has M-84AB tanks, with all 149 delivered units presumed to be in their possession. However, these tanks were withdrawn from active service after an incident during the 2011 Kuwait National Day parade, when one of the tanks broke down.

A M-84AB tank, broken down during the 2011 parade
Source: Snapper_Q8

Conclusion

For a modest price, coupled with a considerable amount of effort, skill, and optimism, Yugoslavia was able to create a competitive, domestically produced main battle tank. If the country had not collapsed, the M-84 could have continued to evolve and be sold, potentially becoming a backbone of multiple armies around the world. Unfortunately, history took a different turn, and these tanks were instead used in conflicts between the republics that used to build it.

Combining all the numbers from above, a figure of approximately 575 tanks that are still accounted for can be reached, indicating that around 25 to 75+ tanks (depending on the final production number) were lost, scrapped, or otherwise unaccounted for. The responsibility for the maintenance and development of M-84 tanks now falls on the independent nations that previously comprised Yugoslavia. However, with respect to their efforts, these nations are unlikely to ever match the resources and capacities that SFR Yugoslavia once provided.

The author hopes you have enjoyed the read.
Thanks to Mr. Ivan Ivanović for reviewing the article and providing feedback.
Source: https://9gag.com/gag/aDDNLZd

T-72MJ, one of the 5 built in the prototype series. The tank does not have smoke grenade launchers or side skirts. Its A20X (MBL) meteo-sensor is mounted on a short hort carrying arm with a rubber damper. Illustration made by by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

M-84 tank of the zero production series, equipped with the A20X (MB) meteo-sensor. Only 10 of these tanks were made, before the first series entered production. Illustration made by by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

First series M-84 tank, distinguishable by the new A10X (MB) meteo-sensor, mounted on the long, foldable carrying arm. Illustration made by by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

Second to fourth series tanks were identical. These tanks were introduced with second-generation night vision capabilities, rendering the IR headlights redundant, hence why they were removed. Illustration made by by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

The M-84A tanks were the first major improvement over the base vehicle. It introduced improvements to the armored protection, turbocharged engine and the night vision equipment of the second+ generation. Illustration made by by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha

Modified M-84 tank, one of the few that were sent to Kuwait before the invasion. Illustration made by by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

M-84AB during the unloading in Saudi Arabia. The anti-aircraft machine guns would arrive separately from the tanks. Illustration made by by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

M-84AB during Operation Desert Storm. Dark protective covers for the rubber skirts were painted over with the Coalition’s markings. Illustration made by by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

M-84AB featuring a mine plow during a field exercise, 2009. Illustration made by by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

M-84AB during the 2011 Kuwait Day parade. For some reason, this tank had a different color turret, perhaps indicating a repair job. The Syrian flag is present because the parade commemorated all participants of the Operation Desert Storm that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Illustration made by by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

M-84AB1, as presented in 2004. Illustrated by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

M-84AB1, as seen during the 2011 Partner Exhibition at the Belgrade Fair. TOMS has been removed. Illustrated by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

M-84AB1 with a promotional sticker, as seen during the 2011 Sretenje Exhibition. Ušće, Belgrade. Illustrated by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

M-84AB1 as seen during the 2017 Partner Exhibition. Tank is painted in the variant of the Serbian standard three-color camo pattern. For some reason there are two shades of green instead of one. Illustrated by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha.

M-84/M-84A Specifications
Dimensions	Total length 9.53 m Hull length 6.96 m Width 3.46 m Height 2.19 m
Ground clearance	470 mm
Total weight, battle-ready	41,5 tonnes (M-84) 42 tonnes (M-84A)
Armor	(M-84A) Turret: 410 mm RHA Hull: 80 mm plate + 105 mm textolite + 20 mm plate (M-84A) Turret: 410 mm RHA + 115 mm of composite material Hull: 16 mm plate + 60 mm plate + 105 mm textolite + 50 mm plate
Propulsion	780 hp V-46-6 (M-84), 1,000 hp V-46-TK (M-84A)
Top Speed	60 km/h (M-84) 65 km/h (M-84A)
Suspension	Torsion bar, shock absorbers
Transmission	Manual, 7 forward, 1 reverse gear
Fuel capacity	1,600 liters (M-84) 1,450 liters (M-84A)
Range	700 km on-road, 460 km off-road
Armament	125 mm smoothbore 2A46 cannon with 43 rounds 12.7 mm Zastava M87 with 300 rounds 7.62 mm PKT with 2000 rounds
Crew	3 (commander, gunner, and driver)

Sources

Razvoj Našeg Naoružanja – VTI kao sudbina – Prof. dr Milorad Dragojević

Tenkovi I Tenkovske Jedinice – Grupa Sovjetskih Autora

Mr. Vladimir Ivanović

Smrt Oklopne Brigade – Oklopno-mehanizirane postrojbe JNA u ratu protiv Republike Hrvatske – Davor Marijan

http://www.vti.mod.gov.rs/index.php?view=actuality&type=reference&category=4&id=128

http://www.vti.mod.gov.rs/index.php?view=actuality&type=reference&category=4&id=129

https://thesovietarmourblog.blogspot.com/2015/05/t-72-soviet-progeny.html#tpn

https://thesovietarmourblog.blogspot.com/2017/12/t-72-part-2.html#6010550

http://www.srpskioklop.paluba.info/

https://www.mycity-military.com/Oklopna-tehnika/Tenk-M-84.html

Ex-Đurko Đaković production manager, going by the forum name S. Palestinac

Ex-tanker, going by the forum name Jester

http://www.army-guide.com/

https://www.yugoimport.com/en

https://www.paluba.info/smf/index.php?topic=1473.0

http://fofanov.armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/ARM/apfsds/ammo.html

https://web.archive.org/web/20160304115510/http://www.ddsv.hr/download/Tenk_M-84A4_engleski.pdf

https://web.archive.org/web/20070105041218/http://www.ddsv.hr/tenk_degman.html

https://web.archive.org/web/20110919171436/http://www.ddsv.hr/download/tenk_degman_hrvatski.pdf

https://ddsv.hr/en/tenk.php

https://web.archive.org/web/20140211190113/http://www.duro-dakovic.com/_Data/Files/01.pdf

https://web.archive.org/web/20120226141522/http://hr.aalan.hr/Katalog/tabid/3637/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/11583/Main-Battle-Tank-Upgrade–Overhaul–Retrofit.aspx

[PARTNER 2023] Ministarstvo odbrane za Tango Six: Zbog čega projekat novog domaćeg hibridnog artiljerijsko-raketnog sistema PVO HARPAS

https://archive.org/details/IraqiArmyEquipment1930-2017SpecialReportVol.2/page/n11/mode/2up

https://forum.warthunder.com/t/m-84-tfcs3/9194

Has Own Video WW2 French Tactics WW2 German Tactics

Defence of Lyon and Chasselay Massacre

Post author By Marisa Belhote
Post date January 31, 2024
4 Comments on Defence of Lyon and Chasselay Massacre

Panzer IV Ausf.C “320”. Illustrations by Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.

German Reich (10th Panzer-Division, Infanterie-Regiment Großdeutschland, 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”) vs France (25th Senegalese Tirailleurs Regiment)

The crimes committed by German forces during the Second World War are a topic which has received a large amount of attention in the post-WW2 historiography. However, while much has been written, misconceptions still exist, perhaps most notably about which armed forces committed crimes, the Waffen SS, of course, but often also the Wehrmacht, and when and where. While the largest scale crimes took place in the East from 1941 onward, there were already significant atrocities performed earlier in the war, in 1939 and 1940, not just in Poland, but also in France. The Chasselay massacre is a particularly interesting, if very grim, case. An atrocity initially and for decades attributed to either the SS 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf” or the Wehrmacht’s highly politicized Infantry Regiment Großdeutschland. However, the uncovering of previously unknown pictures in 2019 demonstrated the real culprit was the Wehrmacht’s 10th Panzer Division, a unit previously viewed as a much more “regular” formation.

Le Vol Noir des Corbeaux: German Forces March Through France

The Second World War escalated when, beginning on May 10th 1940, German forces advanced through northeastern France and the previously neutral Netherlands and Belgium. The exact details of the early campaign, how German troops were able to encircle the British BEF, Belgian and Dutch armies, and much of the French Army, particularly the French cavalry divisions and much of the best equipped infantry ones, are very well known. However, after the pocket containing these units was closed at Dunkerque, the campaign did not immediately end. While the Allies had suffered a major loss that almost certainly doomed France’s ability to hold its mainland, there were efforts made from mid-May onward to re-establish a defensive line, mostly along the Somme. General Maxime Weygand, who had been the second-in-command to Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied forces on the Western Front in 1918, replaced Maurice Gamelin as the commander of French forces organizing this defense.

A 1940 railway map of France for French schools. Note the location of Dijon and Lyon, as well as the wide-line going through them, marking the Paris to Marseille railway line. This was a major communication axis linking the French capital to the country’s largest Mediterranean port, going through Dijon and Lyon, meaning it visited the three largest French cities. It also was, and remains, a major transit axis by road as well. Source: Piclick FR

On June 5th 1940, after the Dunkerque pocket had been taken, German forces began Operation Fall Rot (Case Red), meant to pierce through the remaining French defensive line and occupy the rest of France. The earliest phases of Fall Rot caused heavy losses to German troops, which have often been forgotten in modern historiography. However, significantly outnumbered by German troops and having lost much of their best equipment at the Dunkerque pocket, French troops soon started to be overrun and encircled, as a lightning-fast German advance through France began. The Normand city of Rouen, and with it the Seine, the next large potential river obstacle after the Somme, were reached on June 9th. As the French government fled Paris, under pressure from municipal authorities, the city was declared open on June 11th to avoid fighting and destruction within the French capital. The German troops seized it on June 14th. German troops also spread to the southeast from the Somme area to the rear of the now useless Maginot Line. On June 16th, the Burgundian capital of Dijon was bombed, before being seized the next day. The troops advancing through Burgundy were those of Panzergruppe von Kleist (Kleist Armored Group), which comprised 4 German corps. At the forefront of German advance south were the Infanterie-Regiment “Großdeutschland” (a Wehrmacht unit, though a highly politicized one, being created from Berlin’s ceremonial guard by National-Socialist authorities following Hitler’s takeover and generally considered to be one of the Wehrmacht units most indoctrinated in National-Socialist ideology), the 10th Panzer Division, and the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”. At a glance, it seemed that within a couple days, German forces could hope to reach Lyon, about 200 km south of Dijon, unopposed, with a direct road (Nationale 6) linking the two cities. Lyon was (and still is) near the position of second largest French agglomeration, having historically competed with the Mediterranean city of Marseille for this position. The city and particularly its agglomeration counted a large amount of industrial, but also academic and cultural facilities.

On the Backline of Alpine Troops

On June 10th 1940, Italy declared war on France and Great Britain, evidently due to the imminent collapse of France, and began an offensive attempt on the French border. However, unlike in the northeast, French troops held Italian troops at bay, due to a combination of easily defensible terrain, significant defensive works already present (the Alpine Line), and good training of French alpine troops. However, the quick advance of German troops in eastern France, evident notably with the fall of Dijon, threatened to smash through the backlines and logistics that enabled the army of the Alps’s resistance against the Italians.

It is largely for this reason that the French High Command decided to attempt to organize a defensive line on River Rhone, with reconnaissance of potentially defensible areas beginning around June 15th. This defensive group was to be commanded by General Jean Tiburce de Mesmay, a veteran of the French cavalry who had served within the French High Command during the First World War. The objective was to establish a 32 km-long defensive line from Crépieux-La-Pape, on the northeast of Lyon’s urban area, to the more rural Tarare, more than a dozen kilometers from the Lyon urban area to the northwest.

A map of the area to the northwest of Lyon, where French troops attempted to establish a defensive line. Note Tarare, the western edge of this defensive line, far to the west on the Nationale 7 road, and Chasselay, near where the 1st Battalion of the 25th RTS is indicated on the map. Source: General François Lescel via the FARAC website.

To defend this frontline, Mesmay had a meager force under his orders: the “Lyon subdivision” as well as troops from a variety of units retreating before the German tide. It was composed of a number of old, retreating soldiers from northern France, conscripts from Lyon and the relatively close city of Saint-Etienne, some undertrained Foreign Legionnaires, and logistic and artillery troops from the Lyon area disorganized without a clear unit structure. Troops from one particular logistical depot which were called into the defensive forces, men of Saint-Etienne’s Depot 131, were reported to be armed with Modèle 1916 rifles (Berthier rifles with extended 5-round magazine), “old machine guns” (likely Hotchkiss model 1914s, still standard within the French Army), but quite shockingly, did not have any protective helmets. An officer of Clermont-Ferrand’s Depot 132, also called into the defensive line, described the state of his men as having “Very little armament, equipment almost nonexistent, apparel lacking”.

Artillery equipment included 10 anti-aircraft 75 mm pieces which had been taken out of their defensive mounts in Lyon and placed on improvised wooden carriages, and which had to be moved by hand without motorized tractors or seemingly even horses. The exact 75 mm gun model is unclear. These could have been modern pieces, such as the Schneider model 1930, 1932, 1933 or 1936, but they could also, and perhaps more likely, be older pieces, such as the model 1915, directly based on the 75 mm model 1897 field gun.

A Model 1932 Schneider 75mm anti-aircraft gun. The 1930s Schneider AA guns generally shared ballistic characteristics and differed in mounts; they were fairly modern, high rate of fire pieces with a muzzle velocity of around 700 m/s. Source: https://www.quartermastersection.com/

A 75mm model 1915 anti-aircraft gun; this was a ballistically identical anti-aircraft adaptation of the ubiquitous French 75mm mle 1897 field gun. This older type was still very common by 1940. While definitely outdated against planes, it remains a medium-velocity, high rate of fire gun that could still be of decent use as an impromptu field gun, including against tanks fielded by German forces in 1940 if armor-piercing shells were available. Source: https://www.militaer-wissen.de/

More positively, 8 modern 47 mm SA 37 anti-tank guns were present, recently delivered to the Lyon train station. These were very potent pieces, though also very few when it came to defending a 32 km-long front against multiple armored units. They were delivered without any training, meaning the crews would have to familiarize themselves with the guns as they first used them.

Beyond these disorganized forces, two better organized ones were present. Elements (though evidently not the entire unit, as it was dispersed between varied locations in France, some elements having already fought Germans in Belgium a month prior) of the 405th Anti-Aircraft Artillery regiment (405th RADCA), and, likely the centerpiece of the French defense, the 25ème Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais (ENG: 25th Senegalese Tirailleurs Regiment)/ 25e RTS.

De Mesmay described this regiment as “un bon régiment colonial, intact, frais, et bien armé” (ENG: a good colonial regiment, intact, fresh and well-armed). The unit had been formed in mid-April 1940 near Bordeaux, with battalions that had been shipped to France in late 1939. The regiment comprised three battalions

the 1st had been formed in Thiaroye, 30 km north of Dakar
the 2nd had been formed in Ouakam, in Dakar’s suburbs
the 3rd had been formed in Bamako, the capital of French Sudan, modern-day Mali

The regiment was about 3,000 strong, divided between 71% “indigenous” (black) troops, with the rest being European men in various positions of command, logistics, and organization. The unit was organized within the “Nord-Est” French regimental table. In short, this meant it had 3 fighting battalions, each comprising 3 companies of riflemen and a support company including a machine gun section, a mortar section outfitted with two 81 mm mortars, and an anti-tank section outfitted with two 25 mm SA 34 pieces. In total, and including some additional regimental assets part of three specialized companies (a command, a logistical “hors-rang”, and a heavy assets company) not part of the battalions themselves, the regiment’s noteworthy equipment included 48 heavy machine guns (typically 8 mm Hotchkiss model 1914s), 113 automatic rifles/light machine-guns (FM 24/29s), 9 60 mm mortars, 8 81 mm mortars, 12 25 mm anti-tank guns (SA 34 or SA-L 37), 146 rifles equipped with rifle-grenades, and 6 Renault UE logistical tankettes/tractors.

A likely Interwar era map of French colonial holdings in Western and Equatorial Africa. Note the border of French Occidental and French Equatorial Africa, near the current Niger-Chad border, as well as a number of modern-day borders not being in existence or not being identical, such as the Niger-Chad border or the Saharan borders of Mali and Mauritania. Source: senegal-online.com

It is worth noting here that the name of “Senegalese Tirailleurs” may be slightly misleading. While many of the men were indeed from Senegal, where French colonial authorities were most thoroughly implanted, with Dakar being one of, if not the largest center of French colonial authority in Sub Saharan Africa, recruitment was not limited to this specific subdivision. It extended to all of the AOF (Afrique Occidentale Française – ENG: French Occidental Africa), meaning modern-day Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. In total, by April 1940, about 180,000 Senegalese Tirailleurs were reported to be serving, which would likely have been far too much for Senegal alone to support.

The 25th RTS had been moved to the reserves of the Army of the Alps during spring 1940, being based in Montélimar, south of Lyon. On June 14th, the 3rd Battalion of the Regiment was separated to be given other orders, with the core of the unit given the order to move towards Lyon to take part in its defense, reaching Lyon on June 16th and taking defensive positions from June 17th to 19th. The unit commander was 50-years old WW1 veteran Colonel Bouriand, who had been gravely injured and captured in August 1914. During the Interwar, he had been deployed in Niger, but also Morocco and Syria, where fighting to “pacify” the French protectorates was still taking place.

Defenders Thrown Away in a Collapsing France

The establishment of the defensive line to the north of Lyon took place in particular circumstances, even by the standards of a France in nationwide collapse facing Fall Rot. The 25th RTS had not yet reached its defensive position as French Président du Conseil (ENG: Council President – A position roughly equivalent to a British prime minister, the French 3rd Republic being a parliamentary system where the President mostly had ceremonial power) Paul Reynaud resigned and was replaced by WW1 figure Philippe Pétain. The next day, on June 17th, Pétain transmitted to German authorities that he was seeking an agreement to ceasefire, and pronounced a speech heard on French radios nationwide in which he called for an armistice with words that would remain famous:

“C’est le cœur serré que je vous dis aujourd’hui qu’il faut cesser le combat.”

ENG: It is with the heart clenched that I tell you today that we must stop fighting.

Pétain’s speech hastened an already ongoing process of French troops mass surrendering or ceasing to fight, with the numbers of prisoners taken by German troops increasing dramatically from June 17th onward. In the case of the 25th RTS, this nationwide context of abandonment of fighting was supplemented by local efforts by the municipality of Lyon. On June 18th, Pétain approved a request from Edouard Herriot (the very popular mayor of Lyon, who had been leading the city since 1905, and would resume his role post-war from 1945 to 1957) to declare Lyon an open city, in a move similar to Paris, in order to avoid fighting and destruction within the agglomeration. General Weygang, current commander of French forces, gave the order not to destroy bridges on the Saône and Rhône, the two rivers which meet at Lyon. In practice, the troops preparing the defense of the line to the northwest of Lyon saw the city they were supposed to defend give up on its defense just behind them. There were also efforts by the mayors or officials of some of the smaller localities French troops were preparing to defend north of Lyon, for example in Tarare, to convince commanding French officers to surrender.

The Desperate Defense of Lyon’s Approaches

Despite Pétain’s speech and Lyon being declared an open city on June 18th, defensive preparations did not cease. It had become evident that the meager forces available to General Mesmay, essentially two thirds of a colonial regiment supplemented by a number of disparate soldiers from various sources, could never hope to defend the entire stretch of the 32 km-long frontline. It was instead decided to organize a limited number of defensive positions reinforced as much as possible within the short timeframe the defenders had to prepare, concentrated on the two nationale roads that linked Lyon to the north and west. Straight to the north, the 1st Battalion of the 25th RTS was to hold positions near Nationale Road 6, coming from the Dijon direction, within the localities of Chasselay, les Chères, Lessieu, Crépieu-La-Pape, Neuville-sur-Saône, and Montluzin. The 2nd Battalion was to hold positions along Nationale Road 7, coming from Orléans, to the northwest, notably including locaties such as Lentilly, L’Arbresle, Bully, Tarare, and Fleurieux-sur-l’Arbresle. Crossroads were blocked and fortified, individual foxholes were dug, and a few select bridges were mined. Notably, in Montluzin, around a hundred soldiers took positions within a convent.

Information began to spread on the morning of June 19th that the arrival of German troops was imminent. With defensive positions located on the nationale roads, a constant stream of refugees and soldiers who had lost their units passed through them.

The Nationale 6 Front on June 19th

A rough map of the Nationale 6 area defended by the 1st Battalion of the 25th RTS. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

The first fighting of the 25th RTS happened on positions on the Nationale 6 (1st Battalion, commanded by Commandant Alaury) at around 8 am on June 19th. At that moment, a German column of the Großdeutschland entered Villefranche-sur-Saône, a locality just slightly beyond the French defensive line. Alaury reports that a French motorcyclist arrived at the forefront of the French defensive line at 9:15 am, warning of the impending arrival of German forces. Minutes later, the first German reconnaissance troops arrived. At first a small number of soldiers progressed with a white flag and tried to convince the French that an armistice had been signed and that the fighting was over. French troops followed their orders and began firing on the German scouts, near Montluzin. A French adjutant reported that German troops that had reached the barrage immediately retaliated with submachine guns. The leading German car had been followed by armored cars and trucks loaded with infantry. These were first fired upon by the French, and quickly fired back. This specific location, Montluzin and its convent, included two of the 405th RADCA’s anti-aircraft 75 mm pieces, placed in the convent courtyard. French reports state their fire was very effective, though a piece was swiftly destroyed by opposing fire. Telephone communications with defensive positions on the Nationale 6 were reported as ruptured at around 1 pm. German progression continued, with increased infantry presence in the afternoon. French troops claimed to have destroyed several German armored vehicles. In the early afternoon, French troops were forced out of external positions and into the convent itself. At some locations, Commandant Alaury reported bayonet fighting.

The convent of Montluzin, hosting Sisters of Nevers, an important location of fighting on June 19th. Source: ebay

The Montluzin convent was overrun around 4pm, the vast majority of its defenders having been wounded during the fighting. After the position was overran and French troops surrendered, Senegalese wounded were “finished off” by German troops, the first of many executions on the Nationale 6 front. Casualties on the French side are reported to have been of 50 military and one civilian killed for the French, who claimed to have caused around 40 German casualties.

As the Montluzin convent offered significant resistance, German troops had attempted to circumvent it through the locality of Lissieu, on the other side of the Nationale 6, only to meet another French point of resistance in the small village and on neighboring hill 272. This defending location also sported two 75 mm guns. Fighting took place in Lissieu until the late afternoon of June 19th, when German troops overran French defensive positions around 5 pm, after having destroyed the two 75 mm guns. Executions of Senegalese prisoners were also reported there.

On another crossroad slightly further, German troops were again stopped, this time by the 47 mm anti-tank guns, though these were destroyed after some resistance. However, while progression around the Nationale 6 was slow, German troops managed to circumvent the French defenses by going eastward, where they were able to breakthrough in locations such as Neuville-sur-Saône and Fontaine-Sur-Saône, which were defended by disparate, poorly-trained and equipped Foreign Legion elements. German troops broke through at Neuville around 11 am. By mid-afternoon, German scouting elements were entering Lyon from the east, unopposed, and by 4 pm, they seized the Lyon prefecture in the city center. No resistance was met within the city of Lyon itself.

A Panzer III leading a column of Panzer II Ausf.A within the streets of Lyon, likely in 1940. Source: Le Progrès

However, somewhat paradoxically, while Lyon had fallen, the Nationale 6 segment in front of it was still partially held by the troops of the 25th RTS. Some positions, such as the one in front of Limosnet, encountered German troops but held. Crucially, a single fortified point, Chasselay, was not reached by German troops.

The Nationale 7 Front on June 19th and June 20th

The defensive sector on Route Nationale 7, to the west of Lyon, held by the 2nd Battalion of the 25th RTS, and surviving element of the 131st RI. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

Fighting on the Nationale 7, to the west of Nationale 6, also began on June 19th, but later during the day. In this area, the leading German formation was the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”, which had been following the Nationale 7 road from Nevers, taken on June 16th. The leading elements of Totenkopf reached the western edge of the northern Lyon defensive perimeter in the mid-afternoon at Tarare. The French positions there were held by remnants of the 131e Régiment D’Infanterie (ENG: 131st Infantry Regiment – a standard, European unit). Resistance there was unexpected and the SS troops took some losses, but were able to rapidly re-organize and use support from light armored vehicles and artillery to overrun 131st RI positions first in Tarare, and later in Pontcharra, forcing the remaining elements of the 131st RI to flee south.

Totenkopf troops reached the next major point of resistance at Arbresle. This position was held by the 2nd Battalion of the 25th RTS. The Tirailleurs did not occupy the town due to fears of causing civilian casualties, perhaps due to pressure from municipal authorities, but instead took position at a major crossroad located near the town. At around 6 pm on June 19th, Totenkopf troops entered Arbresle and found it empty, before coming under fire from French positions at the eastern exit of the town. Intense combat took place on the evening of June 19th and continued at a lowered intensity, but never completely stopped, during the night, seeing German troops stuck in Arbresle against the French position at the neighboring crossroad. French positions were subject to significant artillery fire which also spread into the town.

Orders to retreat were given to the entire 25th RTS from 4:32 pm onward, with more following during the evening and night, from June 19th to June 20th. However, with the unit already engaged, a complete retreat was found to be barely possible, and at best, the troops retreated to the next position still held within the defensive line.

Fighting resumed at high-intensity on the morning of June 20th, with SS troops having to finish taking the French positions at the Arbresle crossroad, then onto the directly neighboring villages of Fleurieux and Eveux, which had a commandeering position on the south of the Nationale 7 road. In the late morning, German troops faced the final resistance of two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 25th RTS at the entrance of Lentilly, on a plateau to the west of Lyon. Anecdotally, a French commander wrote that German troops assaulted the French marching and chanting, seemingly not expecting intense fighting this late in the campaign and perhaps having been informed of the fall of Lyon, and that losses were heavy for both sides. The last French troops there were overrun around 2 pm. The prisoners taken were grouped into three categories and treated accordingly. European officers were taken aboard trucks towards Tarare to be taken into custody. European men of the rank and NCOs were taken towards Tarare on foot. Lastly, the African prisoners, numbering 28, according to General François Lescel, were immediately shot.

The Nationale 6 Front on June 20th: The Battle of Castle Plantin

A historic postcard of Chasselay’s castle, more akin to a manor than a fortification. It still exists to this day. Source: PicClick FR

Back to the Nationale 6 front, to the east of the Nationale 7 and more directly north of Lyon, during the late afternoon and evening of June 19th, remaining elements of the 1st Battalion were regrouped under Captain Gouzy. Having taken very high losses during the day, with several defensive points overrun outright, Capt. Gouzy decided to regroup his troops within one last defensive point, rather than several dispersed ones, in order to resist for as long as possible. While the defensive line always had more of a delaying than a stopping role, with the fall of Lyon behind the defending troops, it was evident that the best they could do now was hold German units attacking them in place for as long as possible, and evidently this would be best done with a single, as strong as possible position, rather than a number of dispersed ones that would be too undermanned to hold for long.

French troops gathered in Chasselay. More precisely, they did not occupy the town of Chasselay, but rather the small castle of Plantin, within the municipal area of Chasselay but not within the town itself. The castle was hastily fortified as best as could be done by remaining troops during the night.

Fighting resumed in the mid-morning of June 20th, as a German reconnaissance patrol was spotted and fired upon by Tirailleurs. It appears German troops were once again not expecting resistance this late into the campaign and with Lyon having fallen behind the French defensive line. The main German assault on the castle of Plantin began around 1:30 pm, from the two localities of La Chère and Montluzin taken the previous day. German troops meticulously searched the town of Chasselay, unoccupied by French troops, before launching an infantry assault supported by armor on the castle of Plantin around 3 pm. The small position held for an hour. Around 4 pm, with most men out of ammunition, Capt. Gouzy ordered his last defenders to surrender. German troops entered the castle, and captured a total of three officers (including Gouzy), two European NCOs, three European men of the rank, and 51 African Tirailleurs.

A few remaining elements of the 25th RTS were able to escape the battles around the northern Lyon defensive line, and were located far to the south, in Ardèche, when the armistice signed on June 22nd entered in application on June 25th.

The Chasselay Massacre: Prisoners Executed by Tanks

(Warning: this section is by default collapsed due to photos in it, as their content can be very grim and graphic. Click to open.)

The most well known massacre of the Lyon region was undertaken on a road between Chasselay and Les Chères on June 20th. It was this well known in large part because it had French surviving witnesses, in the form of European prisoners. French Adjutant Rauquier wrote the following statement, which was kept in French military archives. This statement is here coupled with a number of photographs from the event.

“The next day, the 20th, around noon thirty, all personnel of the defensive position grouped themselves in the castle, German reconnaissance having entered Chasselay in the morning. Around 1:30pm, fighting began in Chasselay, lasting around two hours; then, faced with the number of German troops and the arrival of tanks; the captain gave orders to cease fire. The Germans gathered us on the small road next to the castle; at this moment, a German fired multiple shots, and Captain Gouzy was hit in the thigh [Note: it has been claimed that this was because Gouzy protested rough treatment of his men; it has been claimed at times that Gouzy was shot in the knee rather than the thigh, he in any case survived]. The three officers [Captain Gouzy, Lieutenant Bigois, and sous-lieutenant Paguer, the last of whom was wounded in the fighting] were separated from us and we departed, the blacks first, towards Les Chères. There were 16 European NCOs and men of the rank, and 57 or 58 indigenous men, who walked between two tanks.

German soldiers advancing and giving orders as the *Tirailleurs* walk by the side of a Panzer IV tank. Note German soldiers have bayonets fixed. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

African *Tirailleurs* walking. In his conference, historian Julien. Fargettas noted the visible anguish, discomfort, and fear in their faces. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

Around 800 m away from Chasselay, on the road to Les Chères, the column was stopped and the indigenous (black) men led to a pasture that bordered the road, their backs towards said road.

The *Tirailleurs* are taken to a pasture bordering the road they were marching on. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

At this moment, a German, of whom I couldn’t make out the rank, gave the Tirailleurs a sign to flee into the countryside; The first few men had barely started moving when the machine guns of the tanks, still on the road, began to crackle and bring down our tirailleurs with no mercy.

One of the German tanks, a Panzer IV Ausf.C, opens fire into the pasture. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

Two Germans tanks around the moment they opened fire into the pasture. Note the clearly identifiable Panzer IV Ausf.C “320”. Fargettas noted the apparent calm of the German men, with the tank’s commander and a crewmember seeming to converse with a soldier outside the tank. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

In this exceptionally tragic photograph, African *Tirailleurs* are seen running while under fire from German tank machine guns. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

Along them, a few Germans fired with rifles on fleeing tirailleurs.

The pile of bodies left in the pasture after the execution. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

One of the tanks pursues fleeing *Tirailleurs*. It has sometimes been claimed that it went over the pile of bodies, possibly crushing some, which does not seem improbable seeing its trajectory. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

A last, more focused picture showing some of the massacre’s victims. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

Finally, the tanks fired with their main gun into the pile of lying corpses. One of the tanks then left the road, pursuing the men who had managed to escape the massacre. I think only a few escaped. Some of the Germans also took photographs. Then, they took us to Les Chères, and on the way, I saw bodies that were still twitching”

For decades, this testimony of an European adjutant was the most detailed breakdown of the events that took place at Chasselay. His testimony provides some precious details, but tragically, does not clearly identify the unit which committed the crime. The crime was typically assumed to have either been committed by the SS Totenkopf Division, or the highly politicized Wehrmacht Großdeutschland Regiment. With no clear indicator, this was where most writing on this particular massacre ended, until 2019.

A Breakthrough Uncovering a Wehrmacht Crime

More information about the Chasselay massacre would emerge from a totally unexpected source in 2019. That year, a photograph enthusiast from Troyes, in Champagne, hundreds of kilometers from Chasselay or Lyon, purchased a photo album that had belonged to a German soldier, seeking pictures of Troyes from the occupation era. He ended up surprised to find previously unknown pictures that showed, in detail, the execution of a massacre. This would soon be linked to the Chasselay massacre, with a terrain feature being identified as a large hill that commandeers the town of Chasselay.

This photo, likely taken before the massacre, shows Panzer IV Ausf.C 320, present on later photos, entering the town of Chasselay. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

A following Panzer IV Ausf.D, as evident by the fenders not being bent in the same way, from almost the same position. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

A Panzer III Ausf.E or Ausf.F, part of the same series of photographs and likely taken within the town of Chasselay. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

Beyond just being identified as showing the Chasselay massacre, the pictures actually allowed for something that previously could not be done, identifying the German unit which committed the massacre. The markings of a particular German tank, Panzer IV Ausf.C 320, allowed it to be identified as a tank of the 2nd Section of the 3rd Company of Panzer-Regiment 8, part of the 10th Panzer-Division, a Wehrmacht unit, arguably the least overtly political of the three units known to have fought against the French defensive line.

The finding of these pictures made a lot of news, notably being on a front cover of Le Monde, one of the most read French newspapers. From what is known, the photographer was not actually part of the 10th Panzer-Division, but of a German rearguard, logistical unit. How exactly he found himself at the location of the massacre, or why precisely he decided to document it, is unknown, but his photographs have undoubtedly proved extremely valuable to historians studying the events of Chasselay.

Amidst a Nightmare of Crime: Attempting to List the Executions

In a 2022 conference on the fighting and executions in the Lyon area, French historian Julien Fargettas, who has long worked on the topic, attempted to establish a list of known executions:

“The first executions took place as early as the fall of the Montluzin defensive position on June 19th. One of the Sisters of Nevers, still there, describes a “furor” animating the German soldiers seizing the convent. All the buildings were searched, with wounded Tirailleurs being “finished off” on the convent’s terrace. The next day, several bodies with entry and exit holes through the skull were found in the convent. The corpses of four artillerymen (European men of the 405th RADCA, who manned the anti-aircraft guns) were found near the convent, by the side of a pond.

Progressively, the furor is replaced by “colder” crimes. Eight soldiers of French origins from the 25th RTS, including two officers, captured at the convent, were taken more than 400 m from the convent and shot against the wall of a garage, where their bodies were found days later. Executions followed on Nationale Road 6, towards Lyon where prisoners were to be taken. Two Tirailleurs were executed at Champagne-au-Mont-D’Or, at the meeting point of Louis Tourte Street and Lanessan Avenue. Five other Tirailleurs are executed at 2, Avenue Lanessan, in the same municipality. When exhumed, their bodies had their hands and feets impeded by iron wire. A bit further, towards Vaise, 27 Tirailleurs were shot against the wall of an orphanage on a small street. The next day, June 20th, summary executions followed on the other part of the front, near the Arbresle heights [the Nationale 7 front manned by the 2nd Battalion]. In Eveux, where tirailleurs resisted, three were found on a pile of manure. The civilian owner of the neighboring house was found dead, shot in the head. Fourteen corpses of Tirailleurs were found in the municipality of Eveux, without the circumstances of their death being clear. Five more tirailleurs were executed at Florieut, on the Arbresle. On the same day, 13 others were captured at a property in Lentilly; they were forced to stay lying on the town square until the late afternoon, and were then taken outside the town and shot in the unincorporated locality called La Rivoire. Three other Tirailleurs were shot within the town. In Lozanne, eight Tirailleurs were captured and immediately shot according to correspondence from the mayor of the time. Prisoners taken in this sector [Nationale 7] were taken towards Tarare. Other executions took place along this road. Two Tirailleurs in Bully; two others in Saint-Romain de Popey; four Tirailleurs at Pontcharra-sur-Turdine; a Tirailleur at the exit of Arbresle; finally, the same day, a Tirailleur is shot at Marcy-Les-Toiles

After describing these initial events, Fargettas switched to the northern front/Nationale 6, and described the previously mentioned massacre, for which he mentions around 50 victims, noting that 48 bodies can be counted in the field.

Three days later, three other Tirailleurs are executed in plains in the neighboring department of Loire. From 24th to 26th, a column of prisoners marched towards Dijon. On June 24th, six Tirailleurs of this column were shot in Fleurieu-sur-Saône. On the same day, a Tirailleur is executed in Guéreins. Finally, on June 26th, two Moroccan soldiers were shot.

This grim panorama couldn’t be complete without the mention of three civilians, two of whom were Algerians and the other a Black African, shot in the basement of the Rhone prefecture [in Lyon]. No one knows why they were arrested; they were taken to the basement on June 20th and shot under the eyes of French policemen who would later testify to the event.

Between June 19th and June 26th, at least 170 soldiers were executed by German troops in the Lyon region and neighboring departments; around 80% were African Tirailleurs. It is worth noting not all captured Tirailleurs were executed; some were taken to the German prisoner camps, the Frontstalags, within occupied France, as African prisoners were not to be taken into Germany proper. How many prisoners were taken into these camps is unknown, as the archives of the regiment [the 25th RTS] accidentally burned in 1944”

A memorial to the Tirailleurs shot by German troops in Lentilly. Notably, this memorial mentions 18 victims, while Fargettas only lists 16 in Lentilly. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin

The Rhone departmental prefecture in Lyon, in the basement of which three civilians were shot by German troops after the city was occupied. 1901-1902 photo. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Fargettas notes that the deaths of Tirailleurs of the 25th RTS did not entirely stop after June 1940, as a small number of Tirailleurs died in German captivity or transit. He mentions that the last Tirailleurs of the 25th RTS to die in mainland France passed away on March 12th 1946. This Tirailleur, by the name of Guimelly Sené, died in a psychiatric hospital of the Lyon region, of pulmonary tuberculosis and “mental troubles”. His death was recognized as linked to his military service in 1953. This Tirailleur had been taken in 1940 to the German prisoner camps in Châlon-sur-Marne and Saumur, and was then transferred from one hospital to another, notably reported as in the mental hygiene center of Marseille in February 1944, before being taken to Brons, near Lyon, in March 1944. He was said to “show signs of divagation and persecution, and have attempted suicide several times”. His death was only found out by the French Army in January 1953, with the family informed in March, 13 years after Senné had left French Occidental Africa to fight in mainland France.

Known Numbers of the Chasselay Massacre

It is hard to have exact numbers with the victims of Chasselay and other executions and fighting around the Lyon area, especially as some executions might still remain unreported. In a 2022 presentation, Fargettas counted:

61 men executed on July 19th
61 men executed on July 19th
98 on July 20th
3 on July 23rd
7 on June 24th
2 on June 26th

In the same presentation, Fargettas presents an attempt at statistics with the victims of known executions. He established that:

84% of the victims were Senegalese Tirailleurs
8% were European troops
5% were North-African troops
3% were civilians.

Fargettas also attempted to differentiate between different types of executions. Notably, between immediate executions committed in the minutes or very few hours following the capture of a location, typically immediately at said location, out of “frustration” or anger (typically after having encountered unexpected resistance) and more organized executions, which took place in the hours to few days following the capture of prisoner and typically involved taking the prisoners to a secondary location where they were eliminated. He establishes that:

12% of executions were of the type committed immediately after the capture of a position
12% were undertaken between the capture and the transfer of prisoner to another location
72% were undertaken during the transfer of prisoners to another location
The last 4% were “marauders executions” committed on found stragglers or prisoners out of opportunity.

Interestingly, he also attempts to establish statistics on which branches of German forces committed the atrocities. He found that only 29% of executions were committed by troops of the SS (the Totenkopf Division, as well as some detached troops of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler). A total of 71% could be blamed on the Wehrmacht, either in the form of the Großdeutschland or, as in the case of the Chasselay-Les Chères massacre, by the 10th Panzer-Division. At last, 70% of the bodies could be identified with the French equivalent of a military “dog tag”, with 30% staying unidentified.

French Historian Julien Fargettas promoting his book on Senegalese Tirailleurs. Julien Fargettas is considered the leading expert on the topic and has been instrumental in bringing new information to light on the massacre. Source: Booknode

The Reasons for Such a Massacre

Identifying why exactly German troops massacred Senegalese Tirailleurs in the numbers and with the regularity that they did in 1940 would be a complex task that would belong as much to sociology as history. Nonetheless, a number of key factors can be identified.

A first one is, quite obviously, widespread racism against Africans within German media and propaganda, arguably going earlier than even the National-Socialist regime itself. While its focus on Jews has been more thoroughly remembered, Blacks were also discriminated against in 1930s Germany, with elements of Black culture, such as Jazz or the works of black artists being labeled as “degenerate”, and Nazi race theory placing Africans, among others, near the bottom.

Beyond this general anti-black racism was a more focused hate specifically against French colonial troops. German propaganda during WW1 had already underlined the use of African troops by the French and assimilated them to barbarians. This was further extended upon during the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr by French troops, where the involvement of colonial troops in an occupation of Germany raised strong racial anger in the German press, with French African soldiers compared to savages pillaging Germany. The birth of about a hundred mixed German-African babies following this occupation did not ease things. While more than 15 years old by 1940, these episodes were still within German memory and had been widely used by German propaganda.

A German postcard, dated January 1923, showing an African and a Czech soldier of the French Army with the banner “Brutalité, Bestalité, Egalité!” (ENG: Brutality – Bestiality – Equality). Source: Wikimedia Commons

These elements of racial hatred were likely brought to a breaking point by the surprise of facing significant resistance after having made virtually unopposed progress for hundreds of kilometers. A number of executions are reported to have been committed by frustrated or outright angry German soldiers, before more calculated and planned out massacres could be carried out. While the number of European troops from colonial regiments killed was lesser, it is interesting to note that a particular disdain of German troops was sometimes noted against Europeans who fought by the side of Africans or commanded them within the same unit.

There were no orders from German command to massacre colonial troops, unlike massacres which would later be committed by Germans in the East. However, there were also no efforts ever made to punish the perpetrators of atrocities against colonial troops within the German army.

An African Grave in French Lands: the Chasselay Tata

In the days that followed the executions, German troops issued repeated warnings to the population not to touch or bury the dead. Despite this, most bodies would be buried by the local population, within a disparate amount of collective or individual graves in the various localities where executions were committed.

A necropolis would quickly be built, despite the peculiar political situation of occupation France. A WW1 veteran and leader of the departamental branch of the National Office for Veterans and Victims of War, Jen Marchiani, lobbied officials to allow the construction of a memorial site in the months that followed the massacre. When Vichy officials refused to fund the construction, he launched a funding campaign himself, resulting in the construction of the Chasselay tata which was inaugurated on November 8th 1942, days before German troops would occupy Lyon again on November 11th. The cemetery was built in a style inspired by the graveyards of French Sudan (modern-day Mali), with earth from Dakar being brought to Chasselay for the inauguration of the tata. The necropolis was built as close as possible to the location of the massacre on the road from Chasselay to Les Chères.

Surprisingly, the Chasselay Tata was able to be constructed under Vichy, and survived the war. After the liberation of France, the tata was visited on September 24th 1944 by Free French Senegalese Tirailleurs that had fought during the liberation of France. To this day, two yearly ceremonies are organized at the Chasselay Tata, one held by the French Army, and another by French-African students of the Lyon University alongside the families of victims.

A total of 196 soldiers are buried within the Chasselay tata. Of these, 188 belong to African Tirailleurs, six to colonial soldiers from North Africa, and the final two to Foreign Legionnaires, one Albanian and one Russian.

The ceremony in the Chasselay Tata on September 24th 1944. The Tirailleurs wield Enfield 1917 rifles, typical of American-equipped Free French troops. Source: La Tribune de Lyon.

The entrance of the Chasselay Tata in recent times. It is interesting to note that, as early as its construction, the tata included not just a Cross and Christian graves, but also Muslim ones, as well as eight fetishist funerary masks sculpted on oak, on the entrance portal. Source: https://www.lesmotsjustes.org/

An Unprosecuted Massacre

For a long time, the exact perpetrators of the Chasselay massacre were not known. It appears that, as a whole, the large number of executions committed around Chasselay from June 19th to 26th were not committed solely by one unit, but rather by soldiers of the Totenkopf Division, Großdeutschland Regiment, and 10th Panzer-Division. Nonetheless, in the case of the execution of around 50 Tirailleurs on June 20th near Chasselay, the 10th Panzer-Division and its Panzer-Regiment 8 are clearly identified.

It is worth noting that the city of Lyon, close to Chasselay, has a very significant history in terms of war crimes trials in France. Most famous is likely the trial of Klaus Barbie, the leader of the Sido-SD’s 4th section – the “Gestapo” – of Lyon during the war. Arrested in Bolivia in 1983, Klaus Barbie was brought for trial in Lyon, where he was the first person to be found guilty of crimes against humanity in France in 1987, being condemned to life in prison and dying in 1991. Perhaps not as famous, but still very significant, was the trial of Paul Touvier, who had been the leader of the Vichy regime’s militia in Lyon. Touvier was found in 1989, after having been in hiding with his family within French evangelical circles, always in relative proximity to Lyon, for 44 years. Touvier was found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to life in prison in 1994, a sentence he served until his death in 1996. Touvier was the first Frenchman found guilty of crimes against humanity.

No individual from either the Totenkopf, Großdeutschland, or 10th Panzer-Division was ever prosecuted, even less convicted, for the war crimes committed around Chasselay. The commander of the 10th Panzer-Division during the campaign of France, Ferdinand Friedrich Schaal, is mostly remembered for taking part in the failed military coup of August 20th 1944. He was not, however, executed. After the war and in the following decades, participation in this event has become the aspect of his life most covered by historiography. Schaal died in Baden on October 9th 1962, aged 73. To this day, he is mostly known as a figure of German resistance, and not as the commander of a unit that committed a massacre.

The commander of Panzer-Regiment 8, Botho Henning Elster, has also mostly been portrayed in a positive light by historiography, after, in September 1944, in command of a significant contingent of German troops attempting to flee southern France and avoid encirclement, he refused orders to apply a scorched earth policy, and negotiated a surrender “with honor” of more than 20,000 German troops that took place at Beaugency, on the Loire, on September 14th 1944. In American captivity, an honorary council of other German officers found him clear of any “dishonorable conduct” after some ardent National-Socialist officers had criticized his surrender. Returning to Germany in 1947, Elster was later offered to help in the creation of the Bundesgrenzschtz (Federal Border Guard of the Federal German Republic), but declined. He is reported to have spent many efforts to rehabilitate his image during the denazification process, until he passed away on June 24th 1952, aged 58, due to a heart attack. As with Schaal, Elster’s image has been untarnished by the Chasselay massacre.

German General Ferdinand Schaal. Source: Mémoires de guerre

Botho Henning Elster, by the end of the war, a general. Source: armedconflicts.com

Tragically, the Chasselay massacre would not be the only massacre of Senegalese Tirailleurs during the Second World War. First, executions of prisoners are known for every African unit which fought during the campaign of France. While the 25th RTS suffered the most documented atrocities, some estimations have gone as high as possibly up to 3,000 French colonial troops being executed during the campaign of France. Tragically, even the fall of France would not mean the end of massacres against African Tirailleurs. On December 1st 1944, at Thiaroye, in Senegal, recently repatriated Senegalese prisoners of war that had been liberated by the French staged a protest after they had remained unpaid, with signs the French were trying to underpay them. The protest was repressed by French gendarmerie and colonial troops. French estimates of the time claimed either 35 or 70 were killed, with more modern estimates by Senegalese historians ranging from 191 to several hundreds killed.

Conclusion

The Chasselay massacre, the defense of the northern Lyon defensive line and following executions as a whole, are some of the most tragic and horrifying episodes of the 1940 Battle of France. They saw the almost systematic murder of prisoners of after a town was taken. While some efforts to keep the memory of massacred Tirailleurs were seen just months after the war, the bloodbath has nonetheless been somewhat obscured by history, in the context of German troops committing more atrocities in the East, and in the context of Lyon, where later crimes would be more widely reported on and could be more easily prosecuted, such as the no less horrifying crimes of Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier.

Nonetheless, despite having been obscured for decades, the Chasselay massacre is also an example of how renewed historical interest and finds can still have an impact decades later. Obviously, it is almost certain the perpetrators of the massacre are now dead, with hopes of prosecuting them long gone. Nonetheless, French historian Julien Fargettas has reported how, after the renewed attention the massacre got following the finding of photos in 2019, he was able to identify a previously unknown victim, bringing closure to his daughter, who was born after the Tirailleur had departed for France and never got to know her father. Beyond this specific but noteworthy example, the identification of the perpetrators from photographs also showcases how new historical finds can shake previously assumed knowledge, in this case the massacre not being carried out by SS or highly politicized Großdeutschland troops, but rather by much more “regular” men of the 10th Panzer-Division. One could argue this demonstrates how the myth of a “clean Wehrmacht” had little relation to reality, not just after the invasion of the USSR, but starting from some of the first campaigns of the war.

Panzer IV Ausf.C “320”. Illustrations by Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.

Sources

FARAC (Fédération des amicales régimentaires et d’anciens combattants de Lyon et de la région – ENG: Federation of Regimental and Veterans Associations of Lyon and its region): text of FARAC president Divisional General François Lescel: https://www.farac.org/index.php/memoires-farac/seconde-guerre-mondiale-1939-1945/item/combats-pour-l-honneur-au-nord-de-lyon

Presentation by Julien Fargettas (Directeur du service départemental de la Loire de l’Office National des Anciens Combattants et victimes de guerre – ENG: Director of the Loire departemental service of the National Office of Veterans and Victims of War) and Baptise Garin (co-author of several works alongside Fargettas) via the CHRD (Centre d’histoire de la résistance et de la déportation – ENG: Center for the History of the Resistance and Deportation): https://www.chrd.lyon.fr/sites/chrd/files/content/medias/documents/2021-06/CHRDLyon_Conference_1940-MassacresRegionLyonnaise.pdf

Conference by Julien Fargettas, made available by the CHRD: https://www.chrd.lyon.fr/musee/conference/juin-1940-combats-et-massacres-en-lyonnais

Visit to the CHRD

Series of photographs from an unnamed German soldier

Collection of documents of the Rhone prefecture’s fund, prefect’s office, General department’s archives 1935-1964, made available by the departmental archives of the Rhone and Lyon métropole: https://archives.rhone.fr/document/le-tata-senegalais

William Robin-Detraz. Le Tata sénégalais de Chasselay : ancrage spatial et appropriations de la mémoire des tirailleurs sénégalais. Géographie. 2019: https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-02898135/document

Juin 1940: Combats et Massacres en Lyonnais, Julien Fargettas, Editions du putin, 2020

Testimony of French Adjutant Rauquier, 1940

Chemins de Mémoire (French government website), le tata de Chasselay: https://www.cheminsdememoire.gouv.fr/fr/le-tata-senegalais-de-chasselay

Cold War French Prototypes Cold War West German Prototypes Has Own Video

Spähpanzer 1C

SP. 1C., German turret. Illustration by Rolan Reboso

France/Federal Republic of Germany (1955?-1961)
Anti-Tank Reconnaissance Vehicle – 1 to 2 Prototypes Built

With the formation of the Bundeswehr in 1955, the new army of West Germany, a decision was made to acquire small tracked armored reconnaissance vehicles for use in the so-called Panzeraufklärungstruppe (Armored reconnaissance troop). The Schützenpanzer (Kurz), somewhat loosely translated as Infantry Fighting vehicle (Short), was born.

The Schützenpanzer was offered by the French company Hotchkiss-Brandt, which was unable to sell the design to the French in sufficient numbers due to budgetary constraints. The reconnaissance vehicle was offered as a family, ranging from infantry fighting vehicles to ambulances. Among the vehicles offered was a reconnaissance tank destroyer, which would be known as the Spähpanzer 1C (Reconnaissance tank 1C) or SP. 1C for short. This vehicle was interesting enough for the German staff to take the concept further and to let the German company Rheinmetall design a turret which matched German requirements. In the end, technical difficulties and the decreasing effectiveness of the chosen 90 mm gun caused the project to be closed.

The SP. 1C at the Museum of Military Technology in Koblenz.
Source: Spähpanzerjäger SP.I.C. Hotchkiss 90mm | 270862 | Flickr

The Founding of the Bundeswehr

Following the end of the Second World War, the defeated German Reich was divided into four occupation zones. As a result of the Potsdam Conference which took place from July to August 1945, France, Great Britain, and the United States occupied West Germany and the Soviet Union occupied East Germany. The four occupying powers decreed on August 30th, 1945, under Order no. 1, that the German Army was dissolved, with full dissolution of the armed forces under Law no. 8 on November 30th, 1945.

In the years following the occupation of Germany, a large string of events would open the door to German rearmament. The Cold War would slowly start as a result of the Soviet spread of communism through satellite states, the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Blockade of 1948-1949, the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb, the formation of the separate West and East German states, the formation of NATO, the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and the Korean War from 1950 to 1953.

The Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany, commonly known as West Germany) was founded on May 23rd, 1949. With the beginning of the Korean War a year later, a large group of ex-Wehrmacht officers met at the Himmerod Abbey to discuss the formation of a new West German Army. In 1951, the Bundesgrenzschutz (BGS) was formed as a lightly armed police force to patrol the West German border with the Soviet-aligned states.

Eventually, after a failed European Defence Community which attempted to put all the European Armies under a single overarching command structure, Germany was invited to NATO and joined on May 5th, 1955. On June 7th, 1955, the West German Federal Ministry of Defense was formed and, on November 12th, the Bundeswehr was created with the enlistment of its first 101 volunteers.

The Panzeraufklärungstruppe

With the formation of the Bundeswehr, a new reconnaissance force had to be rebuilt and reintegrated within the new West German Army units. NATO considered that a war with the Soviet Union would involve significant clashes of armored combat units. As a result, more divisions received an armored reconnaissance battalion, as they were integrated into Grenadier divisions as well. The expectation that the troops would have to fight for reconnaissance led to the integration of the M41 Walker Bulldog into the reconnaissance units.

The first Bundeswehr structure, in use from 1956 to 1958, called for 5 heavy reconnaissance squads with two M41s each, 11 light reconnaissance squads with 2 Bren Carriers each, a headquarters, and a supply company.

The battalion structure of a reconnaissance battalion within a tank division.
Source: Heeresstruktur 1 (1956–1958) – Die goldgelben Seiten (pzaufkl.de)

The second Bundeswehr structure, which was in use from 1959 to 1970, would initially struggle with what it actually wanted to achieve. The units were initially to receive 8 reconnaissance squads of 2 M41s each, 10 light reconnaissance squads with 2 SPz Kurz each, and 3 heavy squads were created, of which 2 received 2 M41s and 1 received an M41 and an IFV for radio. These new reconnaissance battalions and companies were so understrength that the units were not capable of performing combat missions according to a study of the Panzertruppenschule (Tank troop School).

By 1961, an additional heavy company was added to the understrength units, increasing the manpower of a reconnaissance battalion from about 287 men to almost 900. The increase was so significant that the reconnaissance battalions were on par with other battalions and were almost renamed to Panzerkavallerie-Bataillone (Armored Cavalry Battalions). The increase would cause the reconnaissance troops to be somewhat incorrectly deployed as either delaying or even offensive troops in practice maneuvers, besides their main reconnaissance tasks.

The 1961 restructure required a headquarters, 8 heavy squads with 2 M41s and 1 SPz Kurz each, 8 light squads with 2 SPz Kurz each, 2 infantry platoons with 9 SPz Kurz each, 2 armored platoons with 6 M41s each, a mortar platoon, and an Engineer platoon. The M41s would be replaced in 1965 by either the Leopard 1 or the M48 Patton after the Ru 251 light tank project had been canceled. The SPz Kurz would keep on serving into the third Bundeswehr structure until 1976, when it was replaced by the wheeled Luchs reconnaissance vehicle.

The 1961 restructured reconnaissance battalion.
Source: Heeresstruktur 2 (1959–1970) – Die goldgelben Seiten (pzaufkl.de)

The Schützenpanzer (Kurz)

The story of the Schützenpanzer (Kurz), from now on called SPz Kurz, began all the way back in 1946. The French company SEAM came up with a general purpose light tracked vehicle for the French airborne troops. The French airborne troops would eventually request such a vehicle and the French Ministry of Defense transferred the requirements to DEFA for study. DEFA would contact SEAM, Hotchkiss, and AMX to come forward with a proposal and evaluated them on August 11th, 1947. The SEAM and Hotchkiss proposals were selected and the companies were contracted to build prototypes. Eventually, Hotchkiss was chosen as the winner. At some point, the protection requirements increased and the airdrop capability of the vehicles became less important.

The SEAM prototype carried an 81 mm mortar.
Source: Les Véhicules blindés français, 1945-1977 (Bibliothèque ÉPA) by Pierre Touzin, 1978

Hotchkiss built prototypes of both cargo carriers and troop transport versions, known as CC 2-52 and TT 6-52 respectively. The vehicles were tested in France, North and South Africa, and the United States, after which the vehicle received favorable recommendations in 1952. A number of redesigns were incorporated, like a new Talbot/Hotchkiss engine instead of the original Ford engine. In total, the French ordered and built around 100 pre-series vehicles, but, due to the conflict in Indochina and later the Algerian War, full-scale mass production was unfeasible for the French Army.

The TT6-52 prototype, note the suspension already resembling that of the SPz Kurz.
Source: Les Véhicules blindés français, 1945-1977 (Bibliothèque ÉPA) by Pierre Touzin, 1978

This was where the newly founded Bundeswehr came in. The Germans were looking for a new vehicle to equip their reconnaissance units with and, in September 1955, the Cargo and APC versions were presented to the German Officials. The subsequent trials were promising enough for the Germans to order the Cargo version and to request 5 additional types to be designed. These were an Infantry fight vehicle, an 81 mm mortar carrier, an observation vehicle, a radar carrier, and an armored ambulance.

The combat weight of the vehicles was increased from 7 to 8.4 tonnes, the amount of road wheels was increased from 8 to 10, and the armor shape was redesigned. In practice, the vehicles were completely redesigned from the original basis to meet German requirements. Production began in 1958 with a total production run of 2,374 vehicles between 1958 and 1962, with the vehicle serving all the way up to the 1980s in the radar configuration.

An SPz Kurz Typ 11-2 armed with a 20 mm autocannon.
Source: https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/530477-sch%C3%BCtzenpanzer-spz-11-2-kurz/

The French SP. 1C

Supposedly, the SP. 1C was presented to the Germans somewhere in 1955 as a Spähpanzerjäger (reconnaissance tank hunter/destroyer), but the vehicle shown with the French turret was clearly altered for German requirements as it already had 10 road wheels. Thus, either the Germans were quite quick in handing over new requirements and the French then built adjusted prototypes in just 3 months, including a one-off tank destroyer variant which the Germans did not seem to have initially asked for, or the date provided in sourcing is incorrect.

The French SP. 1C carrying an early version of the H-90 turret and armed with the French D921 90 mm cannon.
Source: Jagdpanzer der Bundeswehr

The Jagdpanzer der Bundeswehr book claims that the German officials were presented with the tank destroyer vehicle in 1955, but that, after tests, it was determined that Rheinmetall should redesign the turret in 1957. It seems much more likely that the vehicle was actually built somewhere around 1956-1957 and then tested.

The French proposal was essentially a Schützenpanzer (Kurz) redesigned to accommodate the turret and the increased weight of the vehicle. The SP. 1C carried a H-90 like turret, closely resembling that of the AML-90. The vehicle had a height of 2.07 m, used a 90 mm DEFA D921 gun as main armament and an unspecified coaxial 7.5 mm machine gun. It carried 50 rounds of 90 mm and 2400 rounds of machine gun ammunition. The vehicle was crewed by the driver, a gunner, and a commander/loader. The main gun could fire a HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank) round with a penetration of 320 mm (12.6 inch) flat and a muzzle velocity of 800 m/s, granting an effective range of 1500 meters.

These changes resulted in the vehicle’s weight increasing from 8.2 to 9.5 tonnes (9 to 10.5 US tons). This, in turn, required an uprated engine to 195 hp to maintain a power to weight ratio of 20.5 hp/tonnes. The transmission was upgraded as well, from 4 speeds forward to 5. Supposedly, the tank destroyer version also came with neutral steering.

When the vehicle was shown to the German Army staff, they were quite enthused with the notion of offering their reconnaissance units greater anti-tank protection. It was thus a likely possibility that the German staff considered the SP. 1C as a replacement for the M41 Walker Bulldogs which were, at that point, to be used as reconnaissance tanks. It is also a possibility that they simply wanted to add or replace a vehicle with an SP. 1C in the Schützenpanzer units to strengthen the light reconnaissance squads or to field dedicated tank hunter squads complementary to the existing structure. In the end, the H-90 turret was too cramped for German requirements and, in 1957, Rheinmetall was ordered to design a turret of their own for the potential Spähpanzerjäger.

A sketch of the SP. 1C from a French brochure.
Source: Châtellerault archives, photographed by Colasix

The German SP. 1C

Rheinmetall initiated the development of a new turret at the request of the Bundeswehr. The new turret incorporated a number of fundamental changes, most notably the Belgian 90 mm Mecar gun instead of the French 90 mm D921. Why this decision was made is unknown, but it is a possibility that the French simply refused to export their gun without exporting the turret as well. This was, for example, the case when the Brazilians wanted to import the guns for their X1 program, but ended up buying the entire turret as well, just to remount the guns into locally developed turrets.

The 90 mm Mecar was a bit of an odd gun. Very little is known about it and the gun only seems to appear on Swiss projects. After World War 2, the Swiss made an anti-tank gun known as the Pak 57, which seems to use the same muzzle brake and ammunition. It is a possibility that the Swiss bought a license from the Belgians or imported them and then started making their own anti-tank guns and arming vehicles with them. In any case, the Belgian 90 mm Mecar ended up on the SP. 1C as the main armament.

The 90 mm Pak 57 from Switzerland with the characteristic muzzle brake of the Mecar 90 mm.
Source: PAK 57 mobil-01 – Pak 57 – Wikipedia

The Mecar gun was, without a doubt, worse all across the board compared to the French D921. It only had access to two types of ammunition at the time, HEAT and High Explosive (HE). It fired the ammunition at much slower muzzle velocities, reducing the effective range from 1.5 km (1640 yards) to 1 km (1090 yards) and making the gun less accurate. The penetration performance of the gun was also thought to have been worse, as the HEAT projectile weighed about 2.4 kg (5.3 lbs) compared to the 3.64 kg (8 lbs) of the French gun, but is listed in sourcing as having the same penetration.

The 90 mm Mecar ammunition with the HEAT round on the left and the HE round on the right at Koblenz Tank Museum.
Source: Granate_90_mm.JPG (2304×3072) (discordapp.com)

The prototype turret was designed out of mild steel and sported a taller and more spacious shape. It also offered a much larger gun shield. This made the German vehicle 2.39 m (7.8 feet) tall compared to the French 2.07 m (6.8 feet), and increased the weight from 9.5 to 10.2 tonnes (10.5 to 11.2 US tons). The turret was designed with a multi-loading device. This meant that the turret would have some form of a magazine system, not to be confused with an autoloader. The vehicle was delivered for testing in 1961.

The Rheinmetall turret with the Mecar gun.
Source: https://live.staticflickr.com/4317/35411514284_d7a00ae703_b.jpg

The multi-loading magazine system showed significant deficiencies and the gun used was already becoming outdated in the 1960s for the European theater. Due to the vehicle weighing 10.2 tonnes, which the drive train could handle, the suspension was on the edge of being overloaded. It is, however, interesting to note that the Koblenz museum lists the weight at 9.5 tonnes instead, while Rolf Hilmes lists it at 10.2 tonnes. It is unknown why this discrepancy exists, but considering the increased turret size, it is unlikely the weight stayed the same.

The overloaded suspension meant that no upgrade in armament could be carried out and that any weight increase would likely lead to intensive wear on the suspension system. The lack of armor and limited gun performance at range also meant that the vehicle could only properly carry out its tank destroying tasks from prepared ambushes, and would most likely be destroyed in any other scenario if it faced an armored opponent. Due to these deficiencies, the SP. 1C was rejected by the Bundeswehr and never entered service.

The SP. 1C in detail

Considering the range of specifications of the French SP. 1C and the German SP. 1C are quite similar, both will be included in the technical description. The French SP. 1C weighed 9.5 tonnes (10.5 US tons) and was 4.42 m (14.5 feet) long without the gun forward and 4.90 m (16 feet) with the gun included. It was 2.3 m (7.5 feet) wide and 2.07 m (6.8 feet) tall. The SP. 1C had a crew of three, consisting of the commander/loader (turret left), gunner (turret right), and the driver (front hull left side).

The German SP. 1C weighed 10.2 tonnes (11.2 US tons) (or 9.5 tonnes according to Koblenz) and, considering the caliber lengths of the Mecar and D921 gun were almost the same, would have likely had fairly similar length dimensions compared to the French vehicle. The width was also the same, but the height was increased to 2.39 m (7.8 feet). The German SP. 1C had a similar crew layout except that the gunner might also have been the commander instead of the commander also being the loader.

Side angle of the SP. 1C at Koblenz.
Source: Англо-немецкий разведчик (livejournal.com)

Hull

Both the French and German SP. 1C hulls were practically the same. The hull was armored with a 10 mm (0.4 inch) upper front plate inclined at 74° from vertical and a lower front plate of 15 mm (0.6 inch) inclined at 28° from vertical. The driver’s frontal plate with the bulge was 10 mm thick. The sides were 8 mm (0.3 inch) thick inclined at 23° from vertical, with the rear being 8 mm thick as well and an inclination ranging from 19° to 31° from vertical. The top was 15 mm thick and the floor ranged from 15 mm to 8 mm at the rear.

The SP. 1C had two sets of light blocks, one on each side of the upper front plate. These blocks included a headlight, a black-out light and an orange light (presumably turn signals). In between the light blocks was the gun lock with behind it a large removable plate to give access to the engine and transmission but also the driver’s compartment. In essence, the entire front plate could be taken off.

The upper front plate, note the plate sections that could be removed.
Source: https://yuripasholok.livejournal.com/10635162.html

The driver’s position was clearly distinguished by the large bulge welded on the upper front plate. This bulge contained the mountings for three periscopes and a rotating sliding hatch for the driver. The driver steered with two tiller bars and had to manually shift gears. A fire extinguisher was located to the front right of the driver. The clutch pedal was located on the left, the brake on the right, and the accelerator pedal to the right of the brake pedal. The instrument panel was located to the left of the driver. The driver also had access to a floor hatch underneath the seat if needed.

The driver’s position on the SP. 1C.
Source: https://yuripasholok.livejournal.com/10635162.html

The engine was located to the right of the driver. The engine air intake was located on the top hull on the front right. Behind the left light block was a siren and on either side of the upper front plate would have been side mirrors. At the front right side plate was the exhaust for the engine and behind it were belts to enable attachments of stowage. On the left side plates were attachments for pioneer tools.

The rear had two rear lights combined with turn signals on each side. The upper rear plate offered two hatches for unknown purposes. On top of one of the hatches was a stowage system for either spare tracks or perhaps the convoy driving cross. The lower front plate featured a towing hook.

The side and rear.
Source: https://yuripasholok.livejournal.com/10635162.html

Mobility

The SP. 1C was powered by a 195 hp Talbot/Hotchkiss 6-cylinder in-line petrol engine. This was effectively the same engine as on the original SPz Kürz, with the exception that the cylinders were bored out to increase the cylinder volume from 4.678 l to 4.977 l. This increased the horsepower from 164 to 195 and the torque from 324 to 353 Nm (238 ft lbs to 260 ft lbs). The engine was coupled to a 5 speed forward and 1 speed reverse transmission, in contrast to the 4 speed forward transmission of the standard vehicle.

Gear	Gear ratio	Speed at 3900 rpm
1	7.7	7.5 km/h
2	4.12	14 km/h
3	2.45	23.6 km/h
4	1.48	39.2 km/h
5	1	58 km/h
Reverse	7.1	8.3 km/h

This gave the vehicle a maximum speed of 58 km/h (36 mph) and 8.3 km/h (5.15 mph) in reverse. The power to weight ratio for the French variant would have been 20.5 hp/tonne and 19.1 hp/tonnes for the German SP. 1C. The vehicle had a 355 l (93 US gallons) fuel tank, of which 85 l (22.5 US gallons) was put away for reserves. This gave the vehicle an operational range of about 360 km (224 miles).

The Talbot/Hotchkiss engine.
Source: Chatellerault archives by Colasix

The SP. 1C used a torsion bar suspension with 5 road wheels on each side. The suspension system was reinforced to better handle the increased weight of the design on the French proposal. The suspension utilized shock absorbers and rubber stops to limit the travel of the suspension arms. The drive sprocket was located at the front and the idler wheel was at the rear. The total of 98 track links of each track were further supported by 3 guide wheels. The tracks were 308 mm (12.1 inch) wide and had a total on-ground track length of 2.38 m (7.8 feet). This gave the SP. 1C a ground pressure of 0.65 kg/cm2 for the French vehicle and 0.69 kg/cm2 for the German vehicle.

Turrets

The SP. 1C had two separate turrets available. One was an early form of the French H-90 turret which would be used on the AML-90 and the other was a turret developed by Rheinmetall at the request of the Bundeswehr. With the German turret also came a new main armament which seems to have been inferior to the French gun.

The reasons for choosing another main armament is unknown, but it can be noted that, when the Brazilians tried to buy 90 mm guns from the French in 1974, they had to buy both the turrets and guns in a single package. It is possible that this policy was already in place as early as the late 1950s, which forced the Germans to find a different gun.

The French Turret

The French turret was armored with 15 mm of welded steel plates at the front and had a decreasing thickness of 15 to 10 mm on the side from front to rear. The rear had a thickness of 10 mm and the top had a thickness of 8 mm. This armor would provide protection against small caliber rounds.

The French turret, note the different muzzle brake.
Source: Jagdpanzer der Bundeswehr

The commander/loader, positioned on the left side of the turret, had 4 periscopes available and the gunner on the right as well, with a single main firing periscope available in front of him totaling to 5 periscopes. It is unclear if the gunner had access to an emergency direct fire telescope fixed to the right of the main gun, in the gun mantlet. In the middle of the turret top, behind the commander and gunner hatches, was the outlet for the ventilation system. The coaxial machine gun was located on the left side of the main gun. The antenna of the radio was located behind the gunner and attached to the rear side plate. Two smoke launchers were mounted on each of the rear of the turret side plates, for a total of four.

It is unknown how far the interior of this early H-90 turret was similar to the H-90 production turret. As such, the following information is provided in case the layout was almost exactly the same. The turret stored 24 rounds of 90 mm ammunition, of which 12 rounds on the left side of the turret bustle and another 12 rounds in two 6 round-revolver style magazines behind the gunner and the commander. The turrets stored 2,400 rounds (12 boxes) for the 7.5 mm coaxial machine gun, of which at least 9 were stored in a magazine in the frontal part of the turret basket floor. The turret had a gun depression of -8° and an elevation of +15°.

The ammunition stowage in the turret bustle of an AML-90.
Source: http://www.primeportal.net/tanks/david_lueck/aml-90/

A schematic interior view of the HS-90 turret.
Source: Panhard Armored Car Enthusiasts’ manual

The German turret

The German turret developed by Rheinmetall was manufactured out of mild steel, as opposed to armor grade steel. The German turret has a reasonable amount of unknown details. Some of this has been a result of the lack of interior picture of the turret or lack of measurements. As the Koblenz Museum, where the SP. 1C is preserved, is still closed, this information cannot yet be obtained.

The armor was likely somewhat similar to the French turret and is not thought to have offered more than protection against small arms. Interestingly, Rolf Hilmes claims the armor of the German SP. 1C was 20 mm, which could refer to the thickness of the gun shield. This could have theoretically barely provided the front with protection against .50 cal machine gun fire.

The German turret was octagonal shaped and welded. The vehicle had a distinct gun shield with a direct fire telescope on the right side of the gun and the coaxial machine gun to the left. On both sides of the gun shield were two protrusions with small sliding hatches, the purpose of which is unknown. The gunner, located on the right, had 4 periscopes and what seems to be a main telescope for the main gun on the right of the front periscope.

An excellent view of the SP. 1C turret, with the very large plate on the middle top and the protrusion next to the gun shield.
Source: https://live.staticflickr.com/4317/35411514284_d7a00ae703_b.jpg

The commander/loader on the left only had two periscopes pointing to the side of the vehicle. This seems strange and might suggest that, in the German turret, the gunner was also the commander and the loader only had loading duties, in contrast to the French layout. Both crew men had relatively small hatches. The middle of the turret top was occupied by a very large plate. It seems that the purpose of this plate was to help facilitate the magazine loading system of the main gun. If the gun was depressed past a certain point, the magazine system would move upwards to still accommodate loading the gun. This moving plate was located from the gun shield to the rear of the turret and had hinge attachments on the front. The turret had a gun depression of -8° and an elevation of +15°.

The two rear side plates had three smoke launchers each and the rear plate had two smoke launchers and an antenna attachment. The rear plate also had a small brass plate with the writing: Turm 2 Sp Kurz, Flußstahlausführing, Rh.-Nr.WK-G2 (Turret 2 Sp Short, mild steel version, Rh.-Nr.WK-G2). This could suggest that Rheinmetall developed two turrets or that the initial French turret was considered as turret 1.

The small brass plate.
Source: https://yuripasholok.livejournal.com/10635162.html

Nothing is known of the turret interior. It is assumed that a very large portion of the turret interior would be occupied by the magazine loading system of the vehicle. According to the information sign in front of the SP. 1C at Koblenz, the magazine loading system could house an astonishing 18 main rounds. Sadly, as pictures are non-existent, this cannot be confirmed visually, nor is it known if the prototype even retained its magazine loading system to begin with.

An excellent view of the turret rear. Note the smoke discharger layout, the middle antenna and the small brass plate below.
Source: https://yuripasholok.livejournal.com/10635162.html

Armament

The SP. 1C used both the French 90 mm D921 and the Belgian 90 mm Mecar gun. Of these guns, the French gun was both superior in performance and ammunition load-out. The Mecar gun only offered High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) and High Explosive (HE) ammunition. The French gun could also fire smoke and canister ammunition.

90 mm D921
Round	Capability	Effective range	Velocity
HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank)	320 mm (12.6 inch) flat at any range.	1,500 meters (1,640 yards)	750 m/s
HE (High Explosive)	Lethal radius of 15 meters (16 yards)	1,500 meters (1,640 yards)	650 m/s
White Phosphorus – Smoke	50 meters wide smoke screen for 20 to 30 seconds	1,500 meters (1,640 yards)	750 m/s
HEAT-TP (High Explosive Anti-Tank – Training Projectile)	Inert (no explosive filling)	1,500 meters (1,640 yards)	750 m/s

The Belgian gun was inferior performance wise in both muzzle velocity and effective range. The Belgian HEAT round only had a muzzle velocity of 630 m/s against 750 m/s of the French gun. This made the Mecar gun less accurate and gave it an effective range of 1200 m (1,310 yards) opposed to 1500 m (1,640 yards). The HE round was even more problematic due to the 338 m/s muzzle velocity, opposed to the French 650 m/s.

90 mm Mecar
Round	Capability	Effective range	Velocity
HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank)	320 mm (12.6 inch) flat at any range.	1,200 meters (1,310 yards)	630 m/s
HE (High Explosive)	Lethal radius of 15 meters (16 yards)	–	338 m/s

The French vehicle had a total of 50 rounds of 90 mm ammunition, of which an estimated 24 could be found in the turret, while the German version was said to stow around 40, of which potentially 18 in the magazine loading system. The French SP. 1C also came with a 7.5 mm machine gun as opposed to the MG 42 for the German variant.

Fate

In the end, the SP. 1C’s already overloaded chassis was bound to cause reliability issues in any long term operation of the vehicle. The main armament’s suitability was falling off rapidly by the 1960s against increasingly heavy Soviet material. The magazine loading system, which was perhaps the vehicle’s only redeeming factor, also proved to have been lacking during tests. This system was perhaps one of the few features which could have made the SP. 1C deadly in ambushes due to the potentially rapid loading times. As such, the SP. 1C could only effectively contribute to the anti-armor capability of the reconnaissance troops from covered positions in an ambush. For these reasons, the SP. 1C was rejected by the Bundeswehr and the prototype remains at the Koblenz Tank Museum.

A Mystery

While researching the SP. 1C, the writer found a picture of a vehicle on a Quora thread which suspiciously looks like some form of SP. 1C. The turret seems to be a much lower profile variant of the current turret and overall much more simplified. The turret almost seems like a mock-up or a home-built. It is unclear if this turret was perhaps the turret 1 prototype from Rheinmetall or just a hobby construction. Any information regarding the vehicle’s origin and owner would be much appreciated.

The SP. 1C image posted in the Quora thread.
Source: What is the cheapest military tank? – Quora

Conclusion

The SP. 1C was an interesting yet faulty concept. Had the vehicle been developed much earlier and perhaps not as a weapon against the increasingly heavily armored Soviet tanks, the results might have been different. The SP. 1C simply pushed the boundaries of its own capabilities too far and with technical systems that proved to be faulty. By the 1960s, it also became clear that the Leopard 1 would be replacing the M41 Walker Bulldogs in the reconnaissance units, which had a much higher fighting chance against its Soviet counterparts. The SP. 1C remains as an interesting light tank and an attempt to take the SPz Kurz family full circle by offering a dedicated anti-tank vehicle.

SP. 1C., German turret. Illustration by Rolan Reboso

SP. 1C., French turret. Illustration by Rolan Reboso

Specifications	French SP. 1C	German SP. 1C
Dimensions (L-W-H)	4.9 x 2.3 x 2.07 m (16 x 7.5 x 6.8 ft)	4.9 x 2.3 x 2.39 m (16 x 7.5 x 7.8 ft)
Total weight, battle-ready	9.5 tonnes (10.5 US tons)	10.2 tonnes (11.2 US tons)
Crew	3 (driver, gunner, commander/loader)	3 (driver, commander?/gunner, loader)
Engine	Talbot/Hotchkiss 6-cylinder in-line 195 hp petrol	Talbot/Hotchkiss 6-cylinder in-line 195 hp petrol
Speed	58 km/h ( mph)	58 km/h ( mph)
Range	360 km ( mi)	360 km ( mi)
Power to weight ratio	20.5 hp/tonne	19.1 hp/tonne
Suspension	Torsion bar	Torsion bar
Transmission gearing	5 forward – 1 reverse	5 forward – 1 reverse
Fuel capacity	355 l (93 US gallons)	355 l (93 US gallons)
Armament	Primary: 90 mm DEFA D921 Coaxial: 1 x 7,5 mm	Primary: 90 mm Mecar Coaxial: 1 x 7.62 mm MG42
Elevation and traverse	15° elevation 8° depression	15° elevation 8° depression
Ammunition capacity	50	Around 40
Armor	Hull: 15 mm lower front plate 10 mm upper front plate 8 mm sides and rear Turret: 15 to 10 mm	Hull: 15 mm lower front plate 10 mm upper front plate 8 mm sides and rear
Production	1 prototype	1 prototype

Sources

Kanonen/Raketen-Jagdpanzer der Bundeswehr – Peter Blume
Jagdpanzer der Bundeswehr – Rolf Hilmes
Schützenpanzer – Frank Köhler
Schützenpanzer kurz, Hotchkiss/ lang, HS 30 – Peter Blume
Bundeswehr und Ausrüstung – Thomas Haslinger
Koblenz Tank Museum
Chatellerault archives by Colasix
https://pzaufkl.de/

Has Own Video WW2 Italian Tactics

Italian Armored Units During the Italian Invasion of Albania

Post author By Daniele Notaro
Post date November 29, 2023
3 Comments on Italian Armored Units During the Italian Invasion of Albania

Kingdom of Italy (1939)

On 7th April 1939, the armed forces of the Kingdom of Italy invaded the small Albanian Kingdom. Among the attacking forces, there were armored units that took part in the few clashes that occurred during the three-day invasion.

All units were equipped with Carri Armati L3/35 (English: 3 ton Light Tanks Model 1935), which formed the core of the Italian armored forces until 1940. They were able to hold to reign supreme solely due to the Albanian forces’ lack of anti-tank weapons.

Carri Armati L3/35 of the Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’ (English: Tank Assault Group) after having just landed in Durrës.
Source: Wikipedia

Relations between Albania and Italy before 1939

The relationship between the Kingdom of Italy and Albania was close during most of the early Twentieth century. During World War I, Italian forces were deployed in Albania to combat the Central Powers, and the Treaty of London signed between Italy and the Allies in 1915 included a provision for Italian sovereignty over the territory of Vlora. However, in 1920, an Albanian uprising expelled the Italians from Vlora. In 1928, the President of the Albanian Republic, Ahmet Zogu, proclaimed himself King of Albania under the name Zog I, establishing the Albanian Kingdom.

King Zog I.
Source: Wikipedia

From 1933 onwards, King Zog began distancing himself from collaboration with Italy and started leaning towards Greece and Yugoslavia.

This displeased Mussolini, the Head of the Italian Government and Duce, as he had expansionist aspirations in the region.

Starting in 1937 with the various trips of Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, a study of the Albanian territory began in anticipation of annexation. The following year, an “economic colonization” of the country began and, in 1939, a plan for invasion was devised.

The Invasion

On 25th March 1939, Italy sent a proposal of annexation to King Zog, who refused it. On 2nd April, an ultimatum was issued, which was once again rejected by the Albanian king. However, King Zog chose to flee to Greece, leaving the Ushtria Mbretërore Shqiptare (English: Royal Albanian Army) in disarray and unprepared to counter the Italian invasion.

The Albanian Armed Forces

The Albanian armed forces were poorly equipped and lacked motivation. The Italians estimated a force of 45,000 men, but in reality, there were only 15,000, of which 8,000 were considered effective.

The Ushtria Mbretërore Shqiptare was trained and equipped by the Italians while the Xhandarmërisë was trained by the British.

Albanian soldiers during a parade. Note the Italian armament.
Source: Pinterest

The Ushtria Mbretërore Shqiptare was under the command of the Chief of the General Staff, General Xhemal Aranitasi, and was organized into four territorial sectors.

Albanian forces in April 1939
Sector	Command Headquarters	Commander	Forces
First	Milot	Lieutenant Colonel Bega	Three infantry battalions Two batteries One engineering company
Second	Milot	Lieutenant Colonel Vulagaj	Two infantry battalions One Xhandarmërisë battalion Two mountain artillery batteries
Third	Vlora	Lieutenant Colonel Kuku	Two infantry battalions One Xhandarmërisë battalion Two artillery sections One engineering platoon
Fourth	Saranda	Lieutenant Colonel Topalli	Two Border Guard battalions One Xhandarmërisë battalion
Durrës garrison	Durres	Major Abaz Kupi	One Border Guard battalion One Xhandarmërisë battalion One engineering company One platoon of sailors Six cannons

The Albanian defense plan aimed to hold out for at least ten days, awaiting Yugoslav intervention, and its objective was to defend the capital city of Tirana for as long as possible. The defense of Tirana was organized into four defensive lines, with the final line positioned in strong positions along the Dajti mountain range.

Albanian defensive lines meant to protect the capital Tirana.
Source: Le truppe italiane in Albania

The Ushtria Mbretërore Shqiptare, however, quickly disintegrated, while the main resistance came from the Xhandarmërisë, which had approximately 4,000 men, especially around Durrës, where the Albanian Navy Sergeant Mujo Ulqinaku died heroically. Alongside other sailors and armed with only a machine gun, he fought until he was killed by a grenade, inflicting casualties on the Italians.

A group of xhandar (English: gendarmes) photographed in the 1930s.
Source: bunkart.al

Italian Forces

For the occupation of Albania, the Italians had a force of 22,000 men, 64 cannons, 125 Carri Armati L3/35, 860 other vehicles, 1,200 motorcycles, 5,500 bicycles, and 2,500 pack animals included in the Corpo di Spedizione Oltre-Mare Tirana (English: Overseas Expeditionary Corps Tirana) under the command of General Alfredo Guzzoni.

General Alfredo Guzzoni
Source: generals.dk

To transport the troops, the Italian Regia Marina (English: Royal Navy) provided 22 steamers, the seaplane carrier Miraglia (which carried the tanks), and five tanker ships, supported by two battleships, seven cruisers, 16 destroyers, 14 torpedo boats, and other smaller vessels.

The Italian Regia Aeronautica (English: Royal Air Force) had an observation squadron, two bomber wings, and three air transport wings. However, no aerial bombardment was carried out.

Bersaglieri enter an Albanian town.
Source: eastjournal.net

For the invasion, the Italian forces were divided into three waves, but only the first wave actually took part in the invasion, while the others landed after the country was occupied.
The I Scaglione (English: First Wave) was under the command of Colonel Arturo Scattini and was supposed to land simultaneously at Durrës, Vlora, Shëngjin, and Saranda. The wave was divided into four columns, listed below:

I Scaglione
Name	Commander	Objectives	Forces
Colonna Durazzo	General Giovanni Messe	Tirana	Reggimento di formazione ‘Mannerini’ Five Bersaglieri battalions Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’ 65 mm battery of the 3° Reggimento Granatieri di Sardegna’ 20 mm anti-aircraft battery of the 14° Reggimento Artiglieria ‘Murge’
Colonna Valona	Colonel Tullio Bernardi	Shkodra and Lezhe	Two Bersaglieri battalions Two Camicie Nere battalions
Colonna San Giovanni di Medua	Colonel Arturo Scattini	Devoll and Valona	Three Bersaglieri battalions Two companies of marine infantry battalion San Marco
Colonna Santi Quaranta	Colonel Mario Carasi	Delvinë and Gjirokastër	Two Bersaglieri battalions III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci ‘San Giorgio’ Two companies of marine infantry battalion San Marco

The II Scaglione (English: Second Wave) had an infantry battalion of the 47° Reggimento di Fanteria ‘Ferrara’ (English: 47th Infantry Regiment), a machine gun battalion, three artillery groups, a garrison infantry company, two engineer companies, and two light tanks squadrons. The III Scaglione (English: Third Wave) had two infantry battalions and the 14° Reggimento di Artiglieria ‘Murge’ (English: 14th Artillery Regiment) of the 23a Divisione di Fanteria ‘Murge’ (English: 23rd Infantry Division) and the Gruppo Battaglioni Camicie Nere ‘Peano’ (English: Blackshirt Battalion Group).

Italian invasion plan.
Source: albanianstudies.weebly.com

The Italian attack began on 7th April 1939, and within three days, the entire country was occupied, though the Italian command made various mistakes and the organization of the invasion was poor.

The Albanian resistance was modest, except for the clashes in Durrës, and the Italian losses were 12 dead and 81 wounded. In Bernd Fischer’s book, Albania at War 1939-1945, the author estimates Italian losses of 200 dead in Durrës alone, for a total of 700 casualties overall.

The Carro Armato L3

The Carro Armato L3 was the only tank used by Italian forces during the invasion of Albania because it was the only armored vehicle produced in large enough numbers by the Italian arms industry. It also equipped all Italian armored units in 1939. The development of these light tanks began in 1928, and the following year, the Carro Veloce 29 (English: Fast Tank 1929), an Italian version of the British Carden Loyd, was adopted.

Carro Veloce 29 pulling a trailer during the Giornata dell’Arma Chimica (English: Chemical Corps Day) in 1935.
Source: Pinterest via ww2photo.se

In 1933, the Carro Veloce 33 (English: Fast Tank 1933) was adopted, which was quite different from the older model and served as the basis for subsequent developments.

A Carro Veloce 33, armed with two Breda Modello 1938 machine guns, captured by British soldiers during Operation Compass in 1941.
Source: Wikipedia

The Carro Veloce 35 (English: Fast Tank 1935), developed and introduced in 1935, was based on the Carro Veloce 1933. It differed from the previous model in terms of its armament, which consisted of two 8 mm Fiat Modello 1914/1935 machine guns (replaced in 1938 by two Breda Modello 1938), and the armor, which was bolted and not welded to the sides.

A Carro Veloce 35 driving onto a truck to be transported
Source: gli autoveicoli da combattimento dell’esercito italiano

The Carro Veloce, then Carro Leggero (English: Light Tank) since 1939, was developed for mountain combat, as Italian commanders believed that a new war would be fought in the Alps.

Consequently, it was a small, light, and fast vehicle armed only with machine guns, making it already obsolete by the mid-1930s, especially for the lack of a turret.

Its use in Ethiopia in 1935 and 1936 and in Spain from 1936 to 1939 highlighted its significant deficiencies when facing other tanks or armored vehicles and its vulnerability to anti-tank weapons or even heavy machine guns.

The Italian Tank Units during the Invasion

Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’

The Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’ (English: Tank Assault Group) of Colonel Giovanni D’Antoni was part of the first landing wave. It was included in the Colonna Durazzo (English: Durrës Column) under the command of General Giovanni Messe that was supposed to land in the corresponding location and to advance all the way to Tirana, the capital of the Albanian Kingdom.

The Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto was formed from the VIII and X Battaglione Carri (English: 8th and 10th Tank Battalions), belonging to the 4° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista (English: 4th Tank Crew Infantry Regiment), which had a total of 31 Carri Armati L3

The invasion began on 7th April and the two battalions were transported to Albania by the seaplane carrier Miraglia. However, they were unable to immediately disembark the tanks because the assigned docking pier had been occupied by the Italian steamship Aquitania, which took 12 hours to unload 30 trucks.

At 1:00 p.m., the tank landing began, by which time the resistance of the Albanians in Durrës had been suppressed.

Carro Armato L3/35 while disembarking from the seaplane carrier Miraglia in the port of Durrës.
Source: Istituto Luce

The following day, a mechanized group was formed, which started advancing rapidly towards Tirana at 8:45 a.m. The Albanian forces defending the capital were mainly composed of xhandar, who were caught off guard by the Italian attack, and almost all of them surrendered without a fight. By 9:30 a.m, the Italian column entered the city.

Immediately after the occupation of Tirana, Colonel Giovanni D’Antoni was ordered to advance towards Elbasan.

A new column was formed, consisting of the XVIII Battaglione (English: 19th Battalion) of the 2° Reggimento Bersaglieri (English: 2nd Bersaglieri Regiment), the XIV Battaglione (English: 14th Battalion) of the 5° Reggimento Bersaglieri (English: 5th Bersaglieri Regiment), and the X Battaglione Carri.

A column of Carri Armati L3/35 of the Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto passes by a truckload of Bersaglieri.
Source: British Pathé

The column departed from Tirana at 4:00 p.m., and after two and a half hours, it reached Qafa Krrabes, where the Albanian defenders, under the command of Prince Hjssein Dolshisti, surrendered without a fight. The Italians captured a significant amount of equipment and two artillery batteries.

The advance resumed, and by 8:30 p.m, they reached Elbasan, covering a distance of 54 km in four and a half hours. The VIII Battaglione Carri remained in Tirana, while one of its platoons was left in Durrës to defend the vital port.

Advance of the Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’.
It occupied Tirana and Elbasan.
Source: albanianews.al modified by author

Colonel Giovanni d’Antoni was awarded the Bronze Medal for Military Valor for his actions during the invasion.

Sailors of the seaplane carrier Miraglia disembark an Carro Armato L3/35 with a crane.
Source: British Pathé

III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci ‘San Giorgio’

The III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci ‘San Giorgio’ (English: 3rd Squadron Group of Fast Tanks) was created in 1934 by the Reggimento Scuola Carri Veloci (English: Fast Tank Training Regiment) and was organized into four squadrons, totaling 61 Carri Armati L3.

In January 1935, it was placed under the command of the IIIa Brigata Celere ‘Principe Amedeo Duca d’Aosta’ (English: 3rd Fast Brigade) and, later, the 3a Divisione Celere ‘Principe Amedeo Duca d’Aosta’ (English: 3rd Cavalry Division).

During the invasion of Albania, the III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci was part of the Colonna Santi Quaranta (English: Saranda Column), under the command of Colonel Mario Carasi. Its objective was the occupation of Delvinë and Gjirokastër.

On the morning of 7th April, Italian troops landed in Saranda, quickly eliminating the limited resistance from the Xhandarmërisë. They then began to advance towards Delvinë, which was occupied later that evening, and reached Gjirokastër the following day.

Advance of the III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci ‘San Giorgio’.
It occupied Delvinë and Gjirokastër.
Source: albanianews.al modified by author

The advance was swift and no enemy resistance was encountered, although the poor condition of the roads posed a significant challenge.

Carro Armato L3/35 of the III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci ‘San Giorgio’ during the Second World War.
Source: unitalianoinrussia.it

Reggimento Provvisorio di Cavalleria

The Reggimento Provvisorio di Cavalleria (English: Provisional Cavalry Regiment), commanded by Colonel Raffaele Pelligra, consisted of the I Gruppo Squadroni (English: 1st Squadron Group) of the Reggimento ‘Lancieri di Aosta’ (English: Lancers Regiment), the II Gruppo Squadroni (English: 2nd Squadron Group) of the Reggimento ‘Genova Cavalleria’ (English: Cavalry Regiment), a machine gun platoon of the Reggimento ‘Genova Cavalleria’ and a command unit.

The Reggimento Provvisorio di Cavalleria landed in Durrës as part of the III Scaglione on 14th April and deployed near Devoll and Fier before being divided into two columns with the objective of reaching Peshkopi.

The I Gruppo Squadroni passed through Tirana, Lezhe, and Shkodra, and finally arrived in Peshkopi.

The II Gruppo Squadroni, initially descended towards southern Albania, reaching Berat and Permet, and then headed north, skirting the border with Greece and Yugoslavia, and finally arrived in Peshkopi.

Advance of the Reggimento Provvisorio di Cavalleria. In blue the I Gruppo Squadroni, in black the II Gruppo Squadroni.
Source: albanianews.al modified by author

Considerations on the Use of the Carro Armato L3 in Albania

The Carro Armato L3 had been specifically designed for combat in mountainous terrain, and during the invasion of Albania, it performed relatively well, despite facing some difficulties due to the poor condition of the roads.

Additionally, the lack of anti-tank weapons in the Albanian forces and their limited resistance meant that the Carri Armati L3 faced minimal challenges during their few encounters with the Xhandarmërisë and the small number of Albanian soldiers who fought back.

Due to the poor organization of the operation and the absence of significant challenges, the invasion of Albania did not lead to any improvements in the use of Italian tanks, nor did it make Italian commanders fully realize the obsolescence of the Carro Armato L3.

When the Kingdom of Italy entered the war on the side of Germany on 10th June 1940, the Carri Armati L3 was still the backbone of the Italian armored forces but by then it was virtually useless for modern warfare.

During the early fighting in the Alps or in the Libyan desert, the old Carri Armati L3 still demonstrated its imitated warfare capabilities and was slowly (but never completely) replaced by the new medium tanks.

Carri Armati L3/35 of the Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’ during the advance towards Tirana
Source: Gli autoveicoli da combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano

Aftermath

After the Italian invasion, the Kingdom of Albania was annexed by Italy as the Protettorato Italiano del Regno d’Albania (English: Italian Protectorate of Albania), and on 16th April, King Vittorio Emanuele III was crowned as the King of Albania.

Italian rule over the country lasted until 8th September 1943, when, due to the Armistice between the Kingdom of Italy and the Allied forces, Germany occupied Albania and installed some collaborationist leaders, with Balli Kombëtar at the forefront.

German control was short-lived, and by October 1944, the country transformed into the Qeveria Demokratike e Shqipërisë (English: Democratic Government of Albania), which in 1945 became the Republika Popullore Socialiste e Shqipërisë (English: People’s Socialist Republic of Albania).

Conclusion

The contribution of the Italian armored forces to the invasion of Albania was very limited.

With the exception of the Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’, which had some clashes with the Xhandarmërisë, the rest of the units were able to reach their objectives without major combat and mostly unmolested.

Sources

Ufficio Storico dello SME Le truppe italiane in Albania (Anni 1914-20 e 1939) Roma 1978
Niccolò Lucarelli Italiani in Albania 1939-1945 Parma 2021
Bernd Jürgen Fischer Albania at war 1939-1945 West Lafayette 1999
Antonello Biagini and Fernando Frattolino Diario Storico del Comando Supremo Volume I Tomo II Roma 1986
Rodolfo Puletti, Dante Saccomandi and Dario Cerbo I Lancieri di Aosta dal 1774 al 1970 Out-of-print edition 1971
Rodolfo Puletti Genova Cavalleria 1683 1983 Padova 1985

Has Own Video WW2 German Heavy Tank Prototypes

Panzerkampfwagen VI (7.5 cm) VK30.01(H)

Post author By MarkoPantelic
Post date November 25, 2023
No Comments on Panzerkampfwagen VI (7.5 cm) VK30.01(H)

Panzerkampfwagen VI (7.5 cm) VK30.01(H). Illustrations by the illustrious Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.

German Reich (1939)
Heavy Tank – 4 Built + Components For 4 Additional Vehicles

Despite having a rather underdeveloped military industry that was barely providing enough tanks for the new Panzer Divisions, the Germans decided to begin developing a new heavy tank project in 1937. After a few years, the 30-tonne heavy VK30.01 would emerge. Despite the resources invested in its development and the production of components for eight vehicles, the project was eventually canceled in favor of the Tiger tank. Nonetheless, the VK30.01 was a vital stepping stone in the German heavy tank development program.

The German VK30.01(H) heavy tank. Source: Twitter Char1A

Start of the German Heavy Tank Projects

The history of German early heavy tank projects is, unfortunately, poorly documented. Finding reliable sources that talk about this topic in detail is difficult due to the destruction and loss of many original documents during the war.

The first notable German attempt to develop a heavy tank can be traced back to the K-Wagen project in 1917. The K-Wagen was envisioned as a massive breakthrough vehicle weighing approximately 120 tonnes. It was designed to be armed with four 77 mm guns and numerous machine guns. The project faced several challenges, including a late start, limited resources, and production capabilities. As a result, only two K-Wagen vehicles were partially completed before the end of the First World War.

The two partially completed K-Wagen at a Berlin factory. Source: Reddit

After this war, the German industrial infrastructure was ravaged and completely worn out. Given the economic and infrastructural challenges, it would take a considerable amount of time before the Germans could even consider proposing and undertaking heavy tank development. Despite the difficulties, German officials wanted to participate in the emerging arms race. Germany, despite being limited by the Treaty of Versailles, began developing new designs in secrecy. These early designs were aimed at gaining valuable experience in tank design. To speed up development and to hide from the Allies (the WWI victors), the Germans decided to team up with another Interwar era pariah, the Soviet Union. The Soviets themselves were in a rather precarious situation regarding tank development, failing to achieve any noticeable success in this regard. Germany collaborated with the Soviet Union from 1927 to 1933. This partnership provided German engineers with valuable experience and knowledge in tank development. The cooperation between the two countries came to an end when the Nazi Party gained power in Germany, as they pursued their own military strategies and priorities.

Thanks to the rapid expansion of early Panzer divisions and increased investment in the army and industry, the staging ground for the creation of the first heavy tanks was prepared. The development of heavy tank concepts was initiated by the Heeres Waffenamt (Eng. German Army Weapons Agency) in 1935. The desire to build such a vehicle was driven by the felt need to counter the French tanks, particularly the formidable Char 2C and Char D1. The initial focus was on equipping the new heavy tank with a 7.5 cm gun capable of a high muzzle velocity, of around 650 m/s. The weight of the tank was also a critical consideration, as exceeding 30 tonnes would compromise mobility and create challenges during bridge crossings.

To balance weight and protection, initial calculations suggested an armor thickness of approximately 20 mm. However, this was deemed insufficient to withstand French 2.5 cm gunfire. Furthermore, achieving reasonable speed required a powerful engine. It was anticipated that Maybach, a German engine manufacturer, could develop a 600-hp engine to meet this requirement. Despite these plans, the German industry was not yet fully capable of producing such components. Nevertheless, the initial proposals provided a starting point for further development and served as a catalyst for progress in German heavy tank manufacturing.

In 1937, after discussions on the necessity of a new vehicle, Wa Prüf 6 (the German Army’s Ordnance Department office responsible for designing tanks and other motorized vehicles) instructed Henschel to develop a 30-tonne chassis for the tank. Given their experience, Krupp had been tasked with developing a suitable tank turret already in 1936, in anticipation of the tank project 1936. Given that high-velocity guns would not be available for years to come, the Germans decided to go with what they had available and reused the Panzer IV’s 7.5 cm L/24 gun. This was a short barrel gun with low velocity intended to deal with enemy-fortified positions.

The development of a suitable engine posed another problem for the project. Initially, calculations indicated that a 600 hp strong engine would provide sufficient power, equating to around 20 hp per tonne. However, Maybach was in the early stages of testing a 300 hp engine at that time. The development of a desired 600 hp engine would take years.

Due to the weight limitation of 30 tonnes, the armor thickness was limited to be 50 mm. Although relatively thin by later standards, this thickness was considered sufficient to protect against most anti-tank weapons prevalent during that pre-war era. Overall, the challenges faced in the early development of the heavy tank project included debates about the necessity of the vehicle, the need for suitable turrets and guns, engine development issues, and the requirement to balance armor protection within weight limitations.

The early heavy tank project work would evolve into the Durchbruchswagen (Eng. Breakthrough vehicle) or simply D.W. The project was poorly documented, and as a result, not much information is available about it. Henschel produced two chassis for the D.W., designated as D.W. I and D.W. II, which differed in some details. While the D.W. project was not adopted for mass production or operational use, it played a significant role in the development of future heavy tanks. It served as a crucial step in the advancement of German heavy tank design, providing valuable insights and lessons that influenced subsequent tank development in the country.

The only known photograph of the German D.W., the first heavy tank. Source: Tiger and its Variants

The VK30.01(H)

In September 1938, the German military, specifically the Heeres Waffenamt, issued a request to continue the development of a 30-tonne heavy tank. They were satisfied with the progress made on the heavy tank project and decided to expand and improve upon it. The previous tanks in the series, the D.W. I, and II, served as the basis for the new heavy tank project, known as VK30.01(H).

The VK30.01(H) inherited several components from its predecessors, including the armament, armor thickness, overall hull design, and internal layout. However, some new components were introduced, such as a new suspension system and a Maybach HL 116-type engine. The tank was designed with a single-piece hull. The weight limit for the tank remained at 30 tonnes. In terms of protection, the VK30.01(H) was designed with 50 mm of armor. During the initial stages of the project, there were discussions about the armament of the tank. Due to the weight limitations, there was no space to install stronger and heavier armament, so the tank was equipped with a short 7.5 cm gun.

In November 1939, representatives from Krupp and Wa Prüf 6 met to discuss the next steps for the project. They agreed that Krupp would provide one VK30.01 alte Konstruction (Eng. old construction) hull and three VK30.01 neue Konstruktion (Eng. New construction) hulls and superstructures. The older construction hull refers to the initial D.W. multi-part hull. It was scheduled to be completed by April 1940 and transported to Kummersdorf for armor penetration firing trials. However, due to production delays, the old hull was not finished until September 1940, when it was finally delivered for testing. The hull underwent a series of firing tests against a 37 mm anti-tank gun. The sources stated that the 50 mm armor provided protection from this caliber gun. However, they do not go into detail about at which distances or under which circumstances these firing trials were carried out. At shorter ranges, the 37 mm anti-tank gun was able to piece such a thick armor plate.

A drawing of what a D.W. might have looked like. Source: Tiger and its Variants

A VK30.01(H) drawing for comparison. A number of similarities, mostly in the area of the hull and superstructure, can be seen. The main armament and some suspension were also shared between both designs. Source: Panzer Tracts 6

Name

This vehicle received the official designation Panzerkamfwagen VI (7.5 cm) in October 1940. Given its connection to its predecessor, it was also code-named D.W. However, the code name was later changed to VK30.01 (sometimes written as VK 3001). “VK” stands for Vollketten, which means “fully-tracked” in English. The number “30” represented its weight in metric tonnes, and the number “1” indicated that this was the first version of a 30-tonne tank from Henschel.

In order to distinguish it from another similar project that shared the same VK30.01 designation, it received the “H” suffix, indicating its developer, Henschel. The other project, VK30.01(P), was developed by Porsche and was a different design.

Production

Krupp was responsible for providing the hull, superstructure, and turret components, while Henschel was in charge of the final assembly. Initially, Krupp was supposed to provide components for three hulls and superstructures without the turrets. These three vehicles were intended for drive tests and were assembled by Henschel using weight ballast instead of the turret. The delivery schedule agreed upon mentioned one vehicle delivered by 15th March, another by 15th April, and the last one by 15th May 1940.

In January 1940, Krupp received a new order to produce components for a total of eight vehicles (including the three already ordered), expected to be delivered between July and October 1941. The contract for the delivery of the turret was signed in October 1940, with completion expected by January 1942.

However, in September 1940, Krupp was informed that, after completing the eight vehicles (chassis number 150411-150418) and conducting tests, the Army could not guarantee any further orders. This was due to indications that the VK30.01 project would be canceled. The Army deemed other Panzers already in production as more urgent, diverting available resources towards them.

The last fully completed hull arrived at Henschel in November 1941, while the last turret arrived in late January 1942. Due to workforce shortages at Henschel, there were concerns about delays in the final assembly. Consequently, Wa Prüf 6 instructed that only four vehicles would be fully built. Two were to be completed in March 1942, and the remaining two the following month.

The completion of the remaining four vehicles was planned for the future but never occurred due to various delays and the low priority of the project.

The first three VK30.01(H)s were used for testing the overall drive performance and thus did not need a fully operational turret. Instead, additional weights equivalent to that to a real turret were added on top of the superstructure. Source: https://www.pinterest.com.au/pin/274156696052022799/

The production of VK30.01(H) vehicles ran at a slow pace. This is the third vehicle being assembled at the Henschel factory in May 1942, behind its successor, a Tiger. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.22-1 Staende mit Pz.Kpfw.Tuermen

Design

Chassis

The VK30.01(H) chassis shared its overall layout with other German tank designs. The front part of the hull housed the transmission, followed by the crew compartment and the engine. The front hull, including the glacis plate, was designed to be heavily armored to protect the vital components and crew from enemy fire. It was fully enclosed, meaning there were no access hatches located on the glacis plate armor. This design feature helped enhance the protection of the tank’s front-facing components. However, to allow the crew to escape in case of emergencies, escape hatches were added on the hull sides, just behind the first set of return rollers.

Suspension

The VK30.01(H) utilized a torsion bar suspension system. This type of suspension was also employed by the D.W., but there were some notable differences between the two. The VK30.01(H) featured seven interleaving road wheels, which contributed to improved weight distribution and overall driving performance. This design choice, although somewhat complex, offered advantages in terms of the tank’s maneuverability and stability. To ensure effective shock dampening, shock absorbers were installed on the first two and the last two road wheels of the VK30.01(H). This helped to enhance the vehicle’s ride comfort and reduce vibrations caused by rough terrain.

Initially, the VK30.01(H) was equipped with road wheels having a diameter of 500 mm. However, in January 1940, these were replaced with larger wheels measuring 700 mm in diameter. The VK30.01(H) had a front drive sprocket and a rear idler. Additionally, it featured three return rollers, which were directly taken from the D.W..

As for the tracks themselves, the VK30.01(H) utilized tracks that were 520 mm wide. These tracks had a single centrally positioned guide, which helped maintain the track’s alignment and prevent excessive lateral movement.

The VK30.01(H) utilized a torsion bar suspension system with seven interleaving road wheels. While more complicated, it offered improved weight distribution and overall driving performance. Also note the hull escape hatch, positioned just behind the first front return roller. Source: https://yuripasholok.livejournal.com/9967199.html

Superstructure

The VK30.01(H)’s superstructure was square-shaped and fully enclosed, with mostly flat armored sides that were welded together and bolted down to the hull. The driver’s vision port was positioned on the left side of the front plate. While the sources do not mention it, this was likely the Fagrersehklappe 50-type protective cover, which was 50 mm thick, and was possibly taken from the Panzer IV Ausf.F tank. Another feature possibly taken from the Panzer IV was the machine gun ball mount. In this case, the Kugelblende 50 was also 50 mm thick. It was positioned opposite the driver’s vision port.

Surviving photographs indicate that not all vehicles were equipped with a machine gun ball mount or protective driver vision port. Instead, a simple round-shaped metal cover was added in place of the machine gun port on some vehicles, while the driver’s vision port was left open or covered with a glazed window. Given that only four vehicles were ever fully completed, the Germans likely did not bother adding such components to the remaining four incomplete vehicles.

The VK30.01(H) had a simple box-shaped superstructure added on top of the hull. On the front plate, a driver vision port and a machine gun ball mount were placed. Two more observation ports (one on each side) were installed on the superstructure sides. Source: http://catainium.blogspot.com/2016/04/vk-3001-hpanzer-vi-h-heavy-tank.html

While the superstructure usually only covered the front part of the tanks (such as on the Panzer III and IV), while the rear had a separate construction, on the VK30.01(H), the superstructure covered the engine compartment as well in one piece. On top of this compartment, two hatches were added for access to the engine. Further back, two smaller doors were added to provide the crew access to the fan drives. Some vehicles received protective air intake ports located on the engine side.

This vehicle lacks a number of features on its superstructure. This includes the protective air intake port, machine gun ball mount, side vision port, and possibly even the protective driver vision port. This should not be surprising as only four vehicles were fully completed. The remaining four were used for various tests and left uncompleted. Source: https://warspot.ru/9324-predvestniki-tigra

Some vehicles, such as this one (the second vehicle produced given the chassis number), received protective air intake ports located on the engine sides. Despite having a turret, it too lacks the machine gun ball mount. In addition, the driver’s vision port design is somewhat strange, resembling the one used on the Tiger tanks. Source: Twitter Char1A

Engine

The VK30.01(H) was powered by a six-cylinder Maybach HL 116 300 hp@ 3,000 rpm engine. With a weight of 32 tonnes, the VK30.01(H) could reach a maximum speed of 35 km/h on good roads. Off-road performance is unfortunately unknown. The fuel load of 408 liters provided an operational range of around 150 km. The engine was cooled by two radiators with four fans.

During its development, there were various proposals for alternative engines. For example, HL 150 and HL 190 engines, with power outputs of 375 and 400 horsepower respectively, were among the proposed alternatives. However, it is unclear whether any of these engines were actually mounted in the vehicles that were built.

Similarly, different transmission units were also considered. The SSG 77 transmission, which was used on the Panzer III series but had proven to be problematic, and the SMG 90 transmission were among the options evaluated. Unfortunately, the information available does not indicate whether these alternative transmission units were ultimately used in any of the produced vehicles.

Turret

The VK30.01(H) turret was built using six welded angled plates. The front hexagonal-shaped armor plate housed the main armament with its curved gun mantlet. On the turret sides, small observation ports were installed. In May 1940, Wa Prüf 6 informed Krupp that the turret had to have a firing port placed to the rear. Krupp responded with the installation of small oval holes that were protected with an armored guard and a pivoting armor plate. Two such ports were added on the turret’s rear curved armor plate. The commander cupola was located on the turret top. In contrast to other German tanks, such as the Panzer III and IV, the VK30.01(H)’s commander’s cupola was much smaller in dimension. To provide the commander with a good view of the surroundings, a rotating ring with seven small periscopes was added.

Besides the command cupola, two turret crew hatches were added. Changing the position of the hatches from the side to the top made the construction of the VK30.01(H) turret much easier. In addition, it increased the protection level, as the two side hatches used on the Panzer III and IV presented a rather large weak spot. In addition, the Germans added one protective ventilation port and three observation periscopes on the top.

A good side view of a VK30.01(H) turret used as a static defense emplacement. The rear-positioned machine gun port and the side vision port can be seen. In addition, note the small commander’s cupola with its seven rotating periscopes. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.22-1 Staende mit Pz.Kpfw.Tuermen

Armament

Due to weight limitations and nothing more capable being available at the time, the Germans decided to arm the VK30.01(H) with the 7.5 cm KwK 37 L/24 gun. It had a semi-automatic breech, which meant that, after firing, the spent cartridge would be self-ejected, thus increasing the overall firing rate. The 7.5 cm L/24 gun was primarily designed to engage fortified positions using high-explosive rounds. However, the Germans knew that their tanks armed with this gun could encounter enemy tanks. To counter them, an armor-piercing round with a muzzle velocity of 385 m/s was developed for it, which could pierce around 39 mm of 30° angled armor at a distance of 500 m.

The 7.5 cm L/24 gun was the main weapon of the early Panzer IV and StuG III series. It was a good weapon able to deal with enemy-fortified positions. What it lacked were anti-tank capabilities, and would be, after 1942, replaced with longer guns. Source: https://world-war-2.wikia.org/wiki/7.5_cm_KwK_37

The VK30.01(H)’s gun had an elevation of -10° to +20°. The turret could be rotated either manually or using an auxiliary engine. For engaging targets, a T.Z.F.9 gun sight was used by the gunner. It had a magnification of 2.5x and a 24° field of view. With it, enemy armor could be engaged at 1.2 km and fortifications up to 2 km (using high-explosive rounds). The ammunition load of the 7.5 cm gun ranged between 90 to 100 rounds.

Besides the main gun, the VK30.01(H) had at its disposal two 7.92 mm MG 34 machine guns for use against infantry. One machine gun was placed in a coaxial configuration with the main gun and was fired by the gunner. Another machine gun was positioned on the right side of the superstructure and was operated by the radio operator. It had an elevation of -10° to +20° and a traverse of 15° in either direction. The radio operator, who was responsible for firing this machine gun, used a K.Z.F.2 sight. It had a magnification of 1.8x and an 18° field of view. The total ammunition load for both machine guns was 4,350 rounds.

The VK30.01(H)’s main armament was the 7.5 cm L/24 gun that was protected with a large curved gun mantled. A similar design would be later employed on Panzer III vehicles armed with the same gun. Source: Twitter Char1A

The main armament was effective in the early stages of the war. However, by 1941 standards, it was becoming obsolete, particularly in terms of its anti-tank capabilities. In October 1941, Wa Prüf 6 sent a request to Krupp to test the feasibility of installing a stronger armament on the VK30.01(H). One suggestion was to install a slightly longer 7.5 cm L/34.5 gun, but this idea was discarded because it would require extensive modifications to the turret.

Other options considered were the 5 cm L/50 and L/60 guns, but they were not adopted. Another option, the 75/55 mm tapered-bore gun known as Waffe 0725 was also quickly discarded, as the gun itself was never adopted for service.

In December 1941, a new proposal emerged, suggesting the installation of the newly developed 7.5 cm L/43 gun. Krupp informed Wa Prüf 6 that this installation would be possible but would require extensive modifications. However, in January, Wa Prüf 6 officially abandoned any real attempt to rearm the VK30.01(H).

Armor

This vehicle was well protected for early German standards. The lower hull front plate was 35 mm thick and placed at a 75° angle. The front hull plate was 50 mm at a 14° angle, while the glacis was 35 mm thick and placed at an 82° angle. The hull sides were 50 mm, the bottom 20 mm, and the rear between 35 to 50 mm thick.

The superstructure’s armored sides were made using a 50 mm thick armored plates. While the rear and side plates were upright, the front plate was placed at an angle of 9°. The top of the superstructure, including the engine compartment, was 25 mm thick.

The front turret armor sides, including the gun mantlet, were also 50 mm thick. The front armor was positioned at a 10°, sides at 15°, and rear at a 13° angle. The top turret armor was 15 mm thick. The small command cupola was protected with 50 mm of curved armor. In April 1941, Wa Prüf 6 sent a request to Krupp to use face-hardened armor plates. It is unclear if this was ever implemented on the VK30.01(H).

Crew

The VK30.01(H) had a crew of five, which included the commander, gunner, and loader, who were positioned in the turret, and the driver and radio operator in the hull. The driver was seated on the left side of the front hull. Opposite him sat the radio operator. The gunner, as on most German tanks, was positioned to the left of the main armament. The loader was right next to him. Lastly, the commander was positioned under the command cupola.

The Fate of the Project

While the construction of the eight ordered vehicles was underway, the rapid developments on the Eastern Front during 1941 led to a drastic change of priorities. The Soviet tanks proved to be superior to German designs. The Germans recognized the need to counter the Soviet tanks and responded by introducing improved tanks and self-propelled tank hunters. In 1942, the decision to prioritize the Tiger heavy tank project led to the termination of all other heavy tank projects. Despite having the necessary components to complete all 8 vehicles, Henschel was told that only four vehicles would be needed. These four vehicles were completed and used for training. As for the remaining four VK30.01(H) hulls, they were repurposed for other purposes. The specific modifications and test purposes varied depending on the needs and objectives of the German military at that time.

One of the four completed vehicles was captured by the Allies at the end of the war. Source: Twitter Char1A

In Combat

No fully completed VK30.01(H) would ever see combat. Technically speaking, some of their components would see the action, but not as part of the tank.

Static Defence Points

Some of the VK30.01(H) turrets were repurposed and reused as static emplacement bunkers. The concept of using the turrets in such a role was first mentioned in the early drawings of the Atlantic Wall in 1942. The Atlantic Wall was a series of fortifications constructed by Germans along the coast of Western Europe.

It was not until 1944 that the first such emplacement was constructed. On 11th February, six turrets were in the process of being modified by Krupp for this role. The 7.5 cm recoil guard was reinforced. In addition, small metal tubes were welded on the turret sides. These served as connection points when camouflage nets were used.

In this new configuration, the turret was fully traversable and had an elevation range of -10 to +20 degrees. The emplacements were stocked with approximately 168 rounds for the main gun and 21,000 rounds for the auxiliary machine gun.

Four of these modified turrets were placed on the Atlantic Wall, while the remaining two were used on the Siegfried Line, another German defense. It is unclear from the sources whether these emplacements saw actual combat action. However, it is highly possible that the crews operating some of these turrets fired rounds at the enemy. At least two of these turrets were captured intact by the Allies.

Six VK30.01(H) turrets were repurposed and reused as static emplacements. Four (including the one photographed) were placed at the Atlantic Wall. This particular turret was captured by the Allies in 1944, after the Normandy landings. Source: Wiki

12.8 cm Selbstfahrlafette L/61

When the Germans encountered the T-34 and the KV Soviet tanks, they had few weapons that could deal with these new threats. The 8.8 cm Flak anti-aircraft guns could effectively destroy these Soviet tanks at long distances. However, this was not the largest anti-aircraft gun that the Germans had in their inventory. The 12.8 cm Flak 40 was another weapon that was slowly entering production as the war progressed. Thanks to its large rounds, long barrel, and high velocity, it had huge potential as an anti-tank weapon. Moving such a huge weapon was no easy task. In 1941, an idea was slowly forming of mounting this gun on a self-propelled chassis. The chosen chassis had to be sufficiently robust to resist the strong recoil force and to cope with its weight. As there were a few VK30.01(H) chassis available, the Germans decided to construct two test vehicles. Both would see action on the Eastern Front during 1942 and 1943. While both would be lost, they proved to be potent anti-tank weapons, with one of them alone destroying 22 Soviet tanks. Given the urgency of the Tiger heavy tank projects, no more modifications were ordered. One of the two vehicles employed on the Eastern Front was captured by the Soviets near Stalingrad, after the German defeat. It can be now seen now at the Russian Military Museum at Kubinka. It represents the only known VK30.01(H) component that has survived the war.

The 12.8 cm Selbstfahrlafette L/61 was built using two modified VK30.01(H) chassis. They were slightly extended and received a new upper superstructure to house the huge gun. Source: https://www.materielsterrestres39-45.fr/fr/index.php/chasseurs-de-chars/170-chasseurs-de-chars-allemagne/697-sturer-emil-max

The single surviving 12.8 cm Selbstfahrlafette L/61. Source: Wiki

VK30.01(H) Trench Digging Modification

One or more VK30.01(H) vehicles were modified in order to test various trench digging equipment. Such tests were carried out at the start of 1944. The whole project appears to not have gone beyond the prototype stage, as no such vehicle was issued for troop use. The victorious Allies managed to get their hand on one such modified vehicle. The final fate of that particular vehicle is unknown.

A VK30.01(H) was modified as an experimental trench-digging vehicle, which was tested in 1944. Source: https://warspot.ru/9324-predvestniki-tigra

To the rear, a large movable plow was installed. Thanks to it, infantry trenches could be dug relatively quickly. Source: https://www.armedconflicts.com/VK-30-01-H-t90742

The same (or at least similarly modified) vehicle was captured by the Allies at the end of the war. Source: https://www.armedconflicts.com/VK-30-01-H-t90742

A collection of captured German equipment, including two King Tigers, one Jagdtiger, and one modified VK30.01(H). Source: https://panzerplace.eu/haustenbecks-heritage-rise-and-fall/

Fate

While the VK30.01(H) did not enter mass production, components for eight vehicles were produced. Out of these eight, four were assembled and used as training vehicles. Their exact fates are uncertain. Two more of the vehicles were modified for an anti-tank project. One complete vehicle and one trench-digging modification were captured by the Allies in 1945. The fate of these two captured vehicles beyond that point is unknown, but they do not seem to have survived to this day.

The remaining four vehicles were likely stored somewhere in Germany and captured by the Allies towards the end of the war. However, as none of these vehicles have survived, it is possible that they were scrapped or destroyed. According to some internet websites, one VK30.01(H) hull was present at the Sennelager ranges in Germany at least until 1980.

A photograph that appears to be a VK30.01(H) hull taken at the Sennelager ranges (Germany) in 1980. Source: https://www.armedconflicts.com/VK-30-01-H-t90742

Conclusion

The VK30.01(H) was an early German attempt to develop a heavy tank during the Second World War. It incorporated some components from its predecessor, the D.W., and featured fairly good protection for the early stages of the war. However, by the time the VK30.01(H) was intended to enter production, around late 1942 or early 1943, its level of protection was deemed insufficient for a heavy tank. The armament also became mostly obsolete in effectively dealing with new enemy armor. The weight limitation of 30 tonnes imposed further constraints, preventing any attempts to install stronger armor and armament.

In contrast, the Panzer IV Ausf.G, which entered production in 1942, had similar or even better frontal armor protection, superior armament, and was much lighter. The VK30.01(H) did offer better side and rear protection, but the additional 10 tonnes made this advantage insignificant.

Due to a lack of information, it is unclear if there were any major mechanical issues with the VK30.01(H)’s design. While it was not adopted for service, the experience gained in building and designing this vehicle was a vital stepping stone in the development of the famous Tiger tank.

Panzerkampfwagen VI (7.5 cm) VK30.01(H). Illustrations by the illustrious Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.

VK30.01(H) Technical specifications
Crew	5 (Commander, driver, gunner, loader, and radio operator)
Weight	32 tonnes
Dimensions	Length 5.7 m, Width 3.1 m, Height 2.6 m
Engine	Maybach HL 116 300 hp @ 3,000 rpm engine
Speed	35 km/h
Range	150 km (road)
Primary Armament	7.5 cm L/24
Secondary Armament	Two 7.92 mm machine guns
Armor	50 mm

Sources

T. Anderson (2017) History of the Panzerwaffe Volume 2 1942-1945. Osprey Publishing
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2001) Panzer Tracts No.6 Schwere Panzerkampfwagen
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2001) Panzer Tracts No.20-1 Paper Panzers
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2004) Panzer Tracts No.22-1 Staende mit Pz.Kpfw. Tuermen
.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2000) Germany’s Tiger Tanks, Schiffer publishing
K.W. Estes (2018) German Heavy Fighting Vehicles Of The Second World War, From Tiger To E-100, Fonthill
D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.

Has Own Video WW2 Italian Tactics

Italian Medium Tank Crew Training During the Second World War

Post author By Arturo Giusti
Post date November 11, 2023
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Kingdom of Italy/Italian Social Republic (1940-1945)

When speaking of Italian armor during the Second World War, it is important to analyze the training that Italian tank crew members received before being assigned to frontline units.

Although the Italian war industry was unable to keep up with the production capabilities of the Allied nations, it could have matched Nazi Germany in the experience gained by its crews due to the large number and variation of operations it was involved in. Unfortunately, training was completely ignored by the Italian Regio Esercito (English: Royal Army) High Command during the war, leading to catastrophic results.

Italian Training Before Second World War

Before joining the bloodiest war of the 20th Century, the Kingdom of Italy relied on a large and heterogeneous fleet of light and obsolete tanks for training.

In order to train crew members in driving light tanks, many Carri Veloci 33 and CV35 vehicles were employed together with older FIAT 3000s. In order to train medium tank crew members, the only Schneider CA at the Departmental Headquarters for the Tank School in Bologna was available. The vehicle remained in service as a training vehicle until 1936, two decades after it was first introduced.

The French Schneider CA WWI era tank at the Bologna Training School in 1937. Source: Nicola Pignato

Surprisingly, the High Command of the Italian Regio Esercito (English: Royal Army) did not consider the lack of training a notable issue, instead blaming the defeats suffered during the Spanish Civil War on the obsolescence of the vehicles used. A prime example of this is the absence of any change in the training of the Regio Esercito infantry or tank drivers during and after the Spanish Civil War.

The Regio Esercito focused on developing new fighting vehicles to deal with more modern threats, such as the Soviet armored fighting vehicles encountered in Spain.

Despite the development of new vehicles, such as the Autoblinda AB40 and the M11/39 tank, the Regio Esercito remained anchored on the concept of mountain trench warfare that had seen it victorious in the Great War, but in which armored fighting vehicles were not considered a priority.

One of the most serious problems that would be faced by the Italian Regio Esercito (English: Royal Army) during the Second World War was not the enemy, but the effectiveness of its armored vehicles. On many occasions in North Africa, entire Italian armored units failed to adequately confront similarly sized Commonwealth units because of the Italian crews’ poor training.

The Italian 3 tonnes Carri Armati L3 light tanks had been delivered to cavalry schools to replace horses with tracks. Medium tanks, on the other hand, were delivered to tank schools where prospective crews had already completed infantry courses and then received tank crew members training. In fact, in Italy, the tank units were called fanteria carrista (English: tank crew infantry), meaning that they were infantry and tank crew members at the same time.

Miscellaneous Training during World War II

Training on armored cars and light tanks is barely reported in the relevant sources. The armored car training courses were held, for the duration of the war, at the Scuola Militare di Cavalleria (English: Military School of Cavalry) in Pinerolo, Piemonte.

The old Scuola Militare di Cavalleria, now the Museo Storico dell’Arma di Cavalleria, Italian Cavalry Museum. Source: tripadvisor.com

Armored car crew members were recruited from soldiers that had already been trained as cavalrymen or from the Italian assault light infantry, also known as Bersaglieri.

The only difference between the two types of recruits was their nomenclatures: Bersaglieri units were composed of coppia (English: couples) consisting of 2 armored cars, plotone (English: platoons) composed of 2 couples, compagnie (English: companies) composed of one command platoon (one command car) and four platoons, for a total of 17 armored cars. Battaglioni (English: battalions) consistedof one command company and two to four companies, for a total of 35 or 69 armored cars. The cavalry units used squadrone (English: squadrons) instead of compagnie and gruppi (English: groups) instead of battaglione in the nomenclature.

The cavalry crew of an Autoblinda AB41 with desert tires in the Pinerolo countryside. Source: facebook.com @Curzio Cobetti

Interestingly enough, some armored car training units were deployed on Italian coastal patrols after completing basic driving training in Piemonte.

The war diary of the VIII Battaglione Bersaglieri Blindato Autonomo (English: 8th Armored Bersaglieri Autonomous Battalion) shows that the crew training lasted from mid-August 1941 (the unit was established on 10th August) and ended in October 1941. Some of the companies of the battalion were shortly after sent to North Africa, with less than 3 months of training.

Bersaglieri crew members of an Autoblinda AB41. Despite the desert environment, Italian crew members usually wore heavy leather coats to protect themselves from shock and flammable liquids inside the vehicle. Source: Archivio Centrale dello Stato

On 14th December 1941, the Ispettorato delle Truppe Motorizzate e Corazzate (English: Inspectorate of Motorized and Armored Troops) issued the rules for the training of the first three squadrons of Carri Armati L6/40.

Carro Armato L6/40 number 13 crossing a river during training. Due to the lack of spare 20 mm automatic cannons and small amounts of ammunition, crew members usually trained without main guns. Pinerolo countryside. Source: italie1935-45.com

Training lasted a few days and consisted of firing exercises up to 700 m. Also included were driving over varied terrain and practical and theoretical instruction for the unit personnel assigned to drive heavy trucks. Each Carro Armato L6/40 had at its disposal, during training: 42 rounds for the 20 mm main armament, 250 rounds for the coaxial 8 mm machine gun, 8 tonnes of gasoline. For the logistic truck drivers, there was 1 tonne of diesel fuel for training.

A concentration of Carri Armati L6/40 in a depot near Bologna during crew training in 1941. Source: italie1935-45.com

The Italian training on armored vehicles was very poor. Because of the lack of availability of equipment, Italian tank crews had few opportunities to train to shoot in addition to substandard mechanical training.

Medium Tank Training during World War II

Italian medium tank crew members were recruited from soldiers who had first completed their training as infantry. They were then selected by commanders from those with a minimum knowledge of engines or those who had a driver’s license. An elementary school diploma was compulsory for all participants in the tank crew course.

Carri Armati M13/40 commanders. The man on the right with his arms folded is a second lieutenant. All of them are wearing different overalls of different military origin, but are all armed with Beretta Modello 1934 pistols in leather holsters. Behind them is a Carro Armato L3/35 Lanciafiamme. All the crew members are wearing the standard cork-bodied leather-covered Modello 1932 tanker helmet with protective glasses. Source: Italian Soldiers in North Africa

In many cases, the officers and NCOs were replacements and had barely finished the officer academy, being sent to war before they had a chance to even finish their courses.

Production of the Carro Armato M13/40 (English: M13/40 Tank) started in January 1940 and the first training courses were started for 12 officers, 12 non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and 30 soldiers at the Corso Carrista (English: Tank Crew Course) in the Centro Addestramento Carristi (English: Tank Crew Training Center) of Bracciano near Rome, under the guidance of Colonel Scalabrino.

A Carro Armato M14/41 scale model produced by Ansaldo, used to train new crew members. Photo taken in March 1942. Source: fondazioneansaldo.it

The crew members first trained on a Carro Armato M11/39, 5 Carri Armati L3/35 light tanks and, surprisingly, also on the Carro Armato M13/40 prototype.

Each soldier was trained to perform multiple tasks, not just one. For example, almost all crew members were taught how to use radios, which were nonetheless almost absent in the first produced Carri Armati M13/40.

Unfortunately, there were few practical lessons. Each tank commander fired only 5 rounds with the 47 mm gun and a magazine of machine gun ammunition, while drivers and machine gunners/radio operators fired 3 47 mm rounds and a magazine with the Breda. The loaders probably followed a mechanical course to be able to maintain and repair the tank.

Unfortunately, due to the demands of war, the Carri Armati M13/40 training course was interrupted on 4th February 1940, by which time the 54 crew members had not yet fully completed their training on the new medium tanks.

Some courses also started at Ansaldo-Fossati of Genoa on 15th July 1940. The first of these lasted only 19 days, weekends included. The crew members trained on a single Carro Armato M13/40 and on the new vehicles that were tested after production on the Ansaldo testing ground. The first 15 Carri Armati M13/40 produced by Ansaldo were delivered to the Bracciano Tank Training School in mid-July 1940 to train the new crews.

However, only on 29th August did the courses restart at the Bracciano training school. The number of students greatly increased to about a battalion, but with very limited numbers of vehicles available for training: one Carro Armato M11/39, 5 Carri Armati L3/35, and 8 Carri Armati M13/40. Nothing is known about the other 7 Carri Armati M13/40 delivered a few weeks earlier.

A total of 14 crew members were trained as general mechanics and engine mechanics during a 10-day course at the Centri Addestramento Carristi (English: Tank Crew Training Centers). Of these 14 soldiers, 7 carried out the course at Ansaldo-Fossati of Genoa, while the other 7 carried out the course at Società Piemontese Automobili plant in Corso Ferrucci, in Turin.

Carri Armati M13/40 and a Carro Armato L3 light tank crews lined up near their vehicles. These belong to the 31° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista of the 131ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Centauro’. This photo was taken when the unit arrived in Greece, in late 1940.
The crew members are wearing green gray uniforms under black leather jackets and Modello 1932 helmets. The two officers on the left, near the light tank’s tracks, are a Captain and a Lieutenant. Source: Archivio Storico dello Stato

On 27th October 1940, General Mario Roatta complained in the Foglio N.9,722 (English: Paper Number 9,722) about the scarcity of trained personnel at the tank crew infantry regiments. Out of 3,905 soldiers, only 1,166 were specialists.

The Italian Army High Command was convinced that, in 3 months, the tank school could adequately train a driver or a tank commander, while, in the other Axis and Allied countries, the tank training courses were longer.

Another serious problem was the lack of instructors. The few officers and NCOs that were trained to operate the medium tanks were all deployed to North Africa and, to a lesser extent, also to the Balkans. In some cases, the drivers trained with the tanks, but they did not fully know the machinery at their disposal.

The theoretical courses were full of superfluous details and failed to teach the crews important tactical considerations, such as which terrain was best for an ambush or how to overcome obstacles.

These serious learning gaps were signaled by Ansaldo and FIAT, first to Gen. Caracciolo of the Ispettorato Superiore Servizi Tecnici ed alla Direzione Generale della Motorizzazione (English: Superior Inspectorate of Technical Services) and then to General Augusto de Pignier of the Ispettorato delle Truppe Motorizzate e Corazzate (English: Motorized and Armored Troops Inspectorate). The two inspectors slightly modified the training.

With the start of 1941 and the need to form new tank units, the courses intensified. In January and February, the fourth and fifth courses took place, while on 5th February, the first course for NCOs arriving from infantry and cavalry units began. They trained on the Carro Armato M13/40, but also on Carri Armati L6/40 light reconnaissance tanks and Autoblinde AB41 medium armored cars.

On 6th April, a course for Carri Armati M13/40 officers began and, on 1st March 1941, the fourth Carri Armati M13/40 course for an entire tank battalion began. On 13th April, a course on Carri Armati M13/40 for self-propelled gun crews began, as the Carro Armato M13/40 and Semovente M40 da 75/18 shared the same chassis and similar internal layout. The Ispettorato delle Truppe Motorizzate e Corazzate also had a first advanced course for Carri Armati M13/40 tanks for tank officers lasting 25 days, which began on 1st December 1941.

The crews were trained to shoot only while the tank was stationary, so it was common during the North African Campaign for the crews to stop for a few seconds, permitting the gunner to aim and shoot while advancing against British positions or fighting against British tanks.

On 29th December 1941, the Italian High Command created the rules for the training of the battaglioni esploranti corazzati (English: armored reconnaissance battalions), which were equipped with Autoblinde AB41 armored cars and Semoventi M40 da 75/18.

On 12th March 1942, Centri di Istruzione (English: Instruction Centers) for tank crews were established in North Africa. These centers were created with the goal of facilitating the acclimatization of crews to the hot and arid North African environment.

The same 31° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista crew members in Greece in the same period and same uniforms. Source: facebook.com

The

Mixed training sessions were also organized. In 1941, one was held south of Bologna from 10th to 12th June by the IX Battaglione Carri M13/40 with 5 light tanks, 41 Carri Armati M13/40, and a Renault R35 light tank. During that training, all the Carri Armati M13/40 suffered mechanical failures, while the use of radios by the crews was judged to be good.

General Roatta, who had become Chief of Staff of the Regio Esercito on 24th March 1941, sent the results of the training to the Ispettorato Superiore Servizi Tecnici ed alla Direzione Generale della Motorizzazione on 15th June 1941, highlighting the problems of the Carri Armati M13/40.

He suggested increasing the training courses to 12 days, permitting the crews to train for 2 days in the Brughiera di Sequals near Udine, which had a similar terrain to the Marmarica region in Libya, and to carry out experiments on similar terrain with a Carro Armato M13/40 with a powerful engine and to compare the results with results of the Somua S35 and Skoda T22 tanks. In the same letter, he required a 15 day training course for units equipped with Renault and Somua tanks directly in Libya.

Tank crew members during training in Sardinia. All are wearing black leather jackets over Modello 1926 suits and Modello 1932 helmets. All the soldiers (apart from the officer on the right) are equipped with bandoliers and holsters for Beretta Modello 1934 pistols. Source: ferreamole.it

In general, the units equipped with semoventi were better trained. Light tanks were crewed by cavalrymen and medium tanks by infantrymen, while the semoventi were employed by artillery units.

These vehicles, based on the same Carro Armato M13/40 (and then Carro Armato M14/41) chassis, broke down significantly less often. This was not because of a change in weight, as semoventi weighed roughly as much as medium tanks and were equipped with the same engines. The reason seems to have been that the drivers and crew members had been previously trained to repair military heavy trucks or prime movers to tow their artillery pieces.

As can be seen, the training on Italian armored vehicles was scarce and suboptimal. Due to the limited availability of vehicles, the Italian tank crew members had few opportunities to conduct live fire training, which led to lower rates of fire and poorer precision in combat. Mechanical training was likewise scarce, increasing the time needed for repairs of the tanks and lowering availability.

Some crew members take cover from sunlight behind a Carro Armato M13/40 during a break. Source: Bundesarchiv

In order to train the soldiers to operate and repair the tanks, from the start of the war, on 10th June 1940, up to 1st July 1942, FIAT deployed a total of 120 workers and technicians. The project, completely financed by FIAT, provided FIAT workers to training schools on the Italian mainland and on the battlefront. Of these 120 workers, one died during fighting against Allied troops, another died due to other causes, and 19 were taken prisoner.

In the book Carro M, Volume I, a document from Engineer Lieutenant Picciafuoco is mentioned, which states that in the training school of Bologna, some tank commanders and officers were instructed in the use of radios.

One tank was called a stazione (English: station), multiple tanks were called a maglia (English: network), and many maglie with a command stazione were called nodo (English: knot, node).

The communications were never meant to be stated in the clear, in usual language. The voice mode on the radio was only used between the tank commander and radio operator. The radio operator repeated orders received in Morse code to the commander or repeated unclear messages.

Crews were urged to use voice mode only with short messages and, if possible, in dialect. There are 20 regions in Italy, each with different dialects that, in some cases, vary significantly even within the same region. This was a great method of disguising communications because, even if enemy troops could listen to Italian communications, it was improbable that any one enemy soldier could understand all the different Italian dialects. On the other hand, this difficulty also applied to the Italians themselves.

Each company of a battalion was usually nicknamed using an Italian city in radio messages, such as: Bologna, Ferrara, Genoa, or Turin. Each platoon was given a number along with the company’s city name: Primo (English: First), Secondo (English: Second), Terzo (English: Third), or Quarto (English: Forth). So the first platoon of the company would have been Bologna Primo. Each platoon commander was distinguished with numbers from 1 to 9, while each tank distinguished itself with two-digit numbers, the first one being the number of its platoon and the second was the number of the tank in the platoon (from 2 to 5). It could be, for example: Torino Secondo 5 or Torino 2-5 meaning that it was the 5th tank of the second platoon of the 2nd Company. In some other cases, the names of platoon commanders were used instead of the numbers primo, secondo, etc.

Italian tank commander posing for a propaganda image on top of his Carro Armato M in North Africa. Source: pinterest.com

Crew members sometimes used the voice mode to send messages on the frontline. Commonwealth tanks were called Elefanti (English: Elephants), armored cars Gazelle, and armored trucks, reconnaissance vehicles, and jeeps were called Volpi (English: Foxes). Colonels were referred to as il papà (English: the father) and generals il padrone (English: the boss).

Crews were instructed to destroy their radio equipment to avoid the enemy capturing them and using them to intercept Italian radio communications.

Post-Armistice Training

Due to the desperate situation after the Italian Armistice of 8th September 1943, the problem of trained crew members became even more serious.

After the Armistice, many military leaders, ignoring the disbanding of the Regio Esercito, remained loyal to Fascism and to Dictator Benito Mussolini.

Soldiers regrouped, in some cases in their dozens, in some other cases, even entire battalions, under their command and operated quite independently from the Italian High Command. There was also a confusing difference between training units, and different examples of well documented training courses that Italian soldiers received after the Armistice are illustrative.

In this desperate situation, Italian Defense Minister Marshal Rodolfo Graziani met Adolf Hitler on 13th October 1943 in Germany to speak about reorganization of the Italian army with divisions trained in Germany by German instructors and partially equipped with German equipment.

A Carro Armato M15/42 of the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leoncello’ during crew training. Source: pinterest.com

In other meetings between Italian and German commands, 8 infantry divisions and a single armored division were programmed to form up in Germany with Italian personnel.

At the same time, in October 1943, the German Panzer-Ausbildungs-Abteilung Süd (English: Tank Training Unit South) was created to train German soldiers to operate on Italian captured vehicles. The training unit was located in Montorio Veronese, near Verona.

In November 1943 a total of 120 Italian officers, NCOs and crew members were gathered in Montorio Veronese and went to create the 1a Compagnia Addestramento Italiana (English: 1st Italian Training Company) with German trainers.

The 120 Italian soldiers were former Italian veterans or fresh young volunteers. It was commanded by Lieutenant Alberto Santurro and was divided into 10 to 15 men squads under a German instructor’s command.

In the book Come il Diamante! I Carristi Italiani 1943-35 written by Sergio Corbatti and Marco Nava, an Italian veteran’s recounting of training is given. Each Italian volunteer was trained in practical courses of tank driving, operating radio apparatus, maintaining and lubricating guns and repairing engines and electrical systems on the tanks.

The Germans meant to train each crew member in as many tasks as possible to prepare them for any threats and be capable of substituting a wounded comrade. The theoretical courses were harder due to the language differences. In these cases some German soldiers from Sudtirol were helpful. This is the northernmost region of Italy which is still, to this day, majoritarily German in ethnicity.

Beautiful image of two Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ crew members discussing with the rest of the crew inside this Autoblinda AB41. Source: Archivio Centrale dello Stato

Everyday life started at 6 am, with an hour a day dedicated to the vehicle’s refueling and engine starting. The Italian veteran explained that starting the Italian tracked vehicle engines by means of the electrical starter was forbidden by the German instructors due to frequent failures which necessitated consequent electrical system repairs. The crew had to start their tanks manually with cranks.

Driving and shooting lessons were made north-east of the Panzer-Ausbildungs-Abteilung Süd base, at the Montorio castle area. The fields around the castle were used to train the crews to cooperate during the fights and shoot at concrete targets located at various distances.

The Montorio Veronese castle and surrounding area nowadays. Source: verona-in.it

After months of trainings, in June 1944, the 1a Compagnia Addestramento Italiana was disbanded. The 120 Italian soldiers that had trained for over 6 months were reassigned back to the original units from which they came over or to other Italian units. With the skills they earned in the training, the majority of the soldiers were assigned to frontline and rear line units. Sadly, some were assigned to units that did not have any armored vehicles, making their training useless.

The Italian veteran reported that he (together with 3 comrades of the company) were assigned to the 29. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (italienische Nr. 1) (English: 29th SS Mechanized Division (Italian No. 1)) that was not equipped with armored vehicles. They later asked to be assigned to the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ (English: Armored Group).

The soldiers of the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ had trained in Montichiari near Brescia. A few officers and soldiers of the disbanded 1a Divisione Corazzata Legionaria ‘M’ (English: 1st Legionnaire Armored Division) had refused to obey the Armistice, recovered as many vehicles as they could in Rome (were they were previously located) and reached Montichiari on 29th September 1943.

The unit only had a few armored vehicles so, until December 1943, the soldiers did not train but departed throughout northern Italy to find armored vehicles. During this time, freshly enlisted volunteers joined the unit and awaited training. Among the crew members who joined the unit in that period were 5 officers that were part of the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ (English: 132nd Armored Division) before the Armistice. Two of them had already been decorated with medals for bravery.

A crew member of the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ poses near his Carro Armato M13/40. Source: …Come il Diamante

Between early December 1943 and February 1944, the unit trained in the hilly area near Montichiari, even if its training regimen is not detailed in the sources. In March 1944, the unit reached Turin.

In December 1944, the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’, which in the meantime had become the biggest armored unit of the Fascist Italian forces after the Armistice, established a supply and workshop unit in Milan.

The unit, known as the Distaccamento di Milano (English: Milan Detachment) was moved from Turin and received the tasks of resupplying Italian troops in the Piacenza area and sending spare parts to Turin to repair some damaged tanks. Another important task of the unit was to train the young militiamen in the training company. The training unit was located in the former barracks of a cavalry regiment, with some nearby fields for exercises.

The commander of the Distaccamento di Milano received the task of creating an armored battalion for the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ under dependencies of Milan command. The training company in Milan then received the order of training the new companies.

The training company created a workshop and a driving class in two enormous depots of the barracks. The training courses were divided into engine maintenance, driving courses, shooting courses and radio operator courses. Each recruit received driving lessons on armored cars and tanks and, at the end of the training, they received their tank driving license.

The armored car driving lessons were undertaken in the deserted streets of Milan, after curfew. This allowed the drivers to improve their skills in urban terrain.

The tank driving lessons were given in the fields near the barracks. From veteran testimonies, during the war, these fields were erroneously bombarded by the Allies. Italian training officers then created an off-road route along the bomb craters in order to train the drivers.

A Carro Armato M13/40 of the Raggruppamento Anti Partigiani (RAP) being transported on a trailer back to Turin after an anti-partisan operation in the Turin countryside. The man in the photo is a ‘Leonessa’ officer that was reassigned to the RAP to train the crew members. Source: I Mezzi Corazzati Italiani della Guerra Civile 1943-1945

The instructors were former combat-experienced Regio Esercito crew members. They had at their disposal a pair of L3 light tanks, 2 medium tanks, and a Semovente L40 da 47/32 self-propelled gun. Unfortunately, the exact number of Italian crew members that finished the tank courses in Milan is unknown.

After their training, the soldiers were not deployed to form new armored companies as planned. They were instead assigned to various Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ garrisons around northern Italy.

Conclusion

During the Second World War, the Italian armored vehicle crews received poor training that usually led, together with the vulnerability of the Italian vehicles, to the total defeat of numerous Italian units in all theaters of war.

From 10th June 1940, the day when Italy joined the war, to 2nd May 1945, the training of Italian crews lacked resources, time, vehicles, men, and instructors.

With the continuation of the war, ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and even armament were rarely delivered to training schools, which were forced to buy equipment from private individuals and use obsolete tanks instead of modern vehicles.

As repeatedly seen in the century-long history of the tank, one need not necessarily have the best vehicle on the battlefield, well-trained crews are sufficient in some cases. The Regio Esercito, unfortunately, had neither effective tanks nor trained crews.

Sources

La Meccanizzazione dell’Esercito Italiano fino al 1943 Volume I Parte I – Lucio Ceva and Andrea Curami – Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 1994

La Meccanizzazione dell’Esercito Italiano fino al 1943 Volume I Parte II – Lucio Ceva and Andrea Curami – Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 1994

Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano Volume II Tomo I – Nicola Pignato and Filippo Cappellano – Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 2002

Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano Volume III Tomo I – Nicola Pignato and Filippo Cappellano – Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 2002

Italian Soldiers in North Africa 1941-1943 – Piero Crociani and Pier Paolo Battistelli – Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013

Carro M – Carri Medi M11/39, M13/40, M14/41, M15/42, Semoventi ed Altri Derivati Volume Primo and Secondo – Antonio Tallillo, Andrea Tallillo and Daniele Guglielmi – Gruppo Modellistico Trentino di Studio e Ricerca Storica, 2012

Andrea Viotti Uniformi e Distintivi dell’Esercito Italiano nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale 1940-1945 Roma 1988

Andrea Viotti Uniformi e Distintivi dell’Esercito Italiano fra le Due Guerre 1918-1935 Roma 2009

Andrea Viotti e Stefano Ales Le Uniformi e i Distintivi del Corpo Truppe Volontarie in Spagna 1936-1939 Roma 2004

Ruggero Belogi Regio Esercito Italiano. Uniformi 1919-1933 Pubblicazione dell’autore 1989

Sergio Coccia e Nicola Pignato Le Uniformi Metropolitane del Regio Esercito dalla Riforma Baistrocchi all’Inizio della Seconda Guerra Mondiale 1933-1940 Roma 2005

Uniformi e Armi magazine, number 163, Parma 2009 – Roberto Manno, Rudy A. D’Angelo e Marco Ghedini article title: Segni di distinzione. Medaglie e distintivi della seconda guerra mondiale – Page 132

Nicola Pignato e Filippo Cappellano Le Armi della Fanteria Italiana (1919-1945) Parma 2008

Ministero Forze Armate Istruzione provvisoria sull’uniforme dell’Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano(1944 – XXII)

Paolo Crippa Storia dei Reparti Corazzati della Repubblica Sociale Italiana 1943-1945 Marvia 2022

https://www.zimmerit.com/zimmeritpedia/italia_rsi/ITALIA_RSI_UNIFORMI.html

Has Own Video WW2 Italian AT Weapons

Cannone a Grande Gittata da 75/32 Modello 1937

Post author By Daniele Notaro
Post date September 6, 2023
8 Comments on Cannone a Grande Gittata da 75/32 Modello 1937

Cannone a Grande Gittata da 75/32 Modello 1937. Illustration by Shreyas Das.

Kingdom of Italy (1941-1945)
Field Gun/Anti-Tank Gun – 172 Built

The Cannone a Grande Gittata da 75/32 Modello 1937 (English: 75 mm L/32 Long-Range Cannon Model 1937), better known as Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937, was an Italian field gun developed before the Second World War to equip the Italian Regio Esercito’s (English: Royal Army) infantry divisions with a high velocity and long-range field gun.

It was conceived in 1937 by reusing the carriage of the Obice da 75/18 Modello 1935 (English: 75 mm L/18 Howitzer Model 1935) and installing a new longer barrel. Although it originated as a field gun, it turned out to also be an adequate anti-tank gun. The delay in its production, which did not begin until 1941, did not allow wide use of this gun.

Front view of the Cannone a Grande Gittata da 75/32 Modello 1937. Source: comandosupremo.com

Before the Cannone da 75/32

In 1934, the Regio Esercito adopted the Obice da 75/18 Modello 1934 (English: 75 mm L/18 Howitzer Model 1934), which was supposed to replace the outdated Obici Škoda da 75/13 Modello 1915 (English: 75 mm L/13 Škoda Howitzer Model 1915) used by mountain artillery units, and the Cannoni da 75/27 Modello 1906 and Modello 1911 (English: 75 mm L/27 Cannon Model 1906 and Model 1911) used by artillery units of the Italian infantry divisions.

The Obice da 75/18 Modello 1934 during a test. Source: picclick.it

The Obice da 75/18 Modello 1934 had a range of 9,000 m and had a gun shield to protect its crew. In 1935, a new version was introduced, the Obice da 75/18 Modello 1935 (English: 75 mm L/18 Howitzer Model 1935). The Modello 1935 had a new gun shield and wheels with bigger diameter to ease towing by mechanized vehicles.

An early production Obice da 75/18 Modello 1935 with its characteristic two chambers disc muzzle brake that was abandoned after the first guns produced. Source: Archivio dell’Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito

Due to low production numbers, the Obice da 75/18 never really replaced its predecessors. It was not even adopted as a mountain artillery piece, the purpose for which it was created. In fact, it was mainly deployed as a field howitzer and occasionally even as an anti-tank gun with minor success against light armored vehicles.

One of the new howitzer’s problems was the purpose for which it was created. The Regio Esercito favored a light, easily transportable gun at the cost of a small caliber for divisional artillery and a limited range. The Regio Esercito used the Obice da 75/18 as a short-range support gun, deploying heavier and larger caliber howitzers for indirect and counter-battery fire.

A few years later, the Servizio Tecnico Armi e Munizioni (English: Weapons and Munitions Technical Service) requested a new gun for divisional artillery. The main specification was an increase over the Obice da 75/18’s firing range, which only reached a maximum of 9,000 m. This was significantly inferior to the ranges of its counterparts, such as the German 10.5 cm leFH 18 (10,600 m) or British Ordnance QF 25 lb (12,200 m).

The Regio Esercito also wanted to standardize divisional artillery production as much as possible, so the new gun was mounted on the same carriage as the Obice da 75/18 Modello 1935.

During a meeting of the Comitato Superiore Tecnico per le Armi e Munizioni (English: Superior Technical Committee for Weapons and Munitions), the importance of the use of the Cannoni da 75/32 for long-range anti-tank firing was emphasized, which was useful for hitting vehicles outside the range of the Cannoni da 47/32 Modello 1935 (English: 47 mm L/32 Cannon Model 1935), the main anti-tank gun of the Regio Esercito.

History and Development

In 1937, the Comitato Superiore Tecnico per le Armi e Munizioni (English: Superior Technical Committee for Weapons and Munitions) had approved the creation of the Cannone da 75/32 to enable use against tanks and to increase the range of the field cannon.

The first prototype was built by the Arsenale Regio Esercito di Napoli or AREN (English: Royal Army Arsenal of Naples), one of the biggest artillery producing plants in Italy. It was unveiled by Ansaldo in 1937.

The Cannone a Grande Gittata da 75/32 Modello 1937 prototype during testing. Note the characteristic two chamber disc muzzle brake. Source: Wikipedia.org

After some tests of an experimental battery of 5 Cannoni da 75/32, the gun barrel was shortened to 32 calibers (2,400 mm) and equipped with a “pepper pot” muzzle brake which was also used by the Obici da 75/18 mounted on Semoventi.

The original 34 caliber-long barrel version was modified and then used to equip the Carro Armato P26/40 heavy tank and some Italian semoventi.

Drawing of a Cannone a Grande Gittata Modello 1937 production version. Source: Storia Militare N.188

In 1938, 192 Cannoni da 75/32 were ordered from Ansaldo, but production was not given high priority and it was not until 1941 that the first pieces were delivered.

Although little consideration was given to the Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937, some members of the Regio Esercito’s High Command understood the capable anti-tank characteristics of this piece. One of these was Ispettore Superiore dei Servizi Tecnici (English: Superior Inspector of Technical Services) General Mario Caracciolo di Feroleto, who in November 1940 made a proposal to the Stato Maggiore del Regio Esercito (English: General Staff of the Royal Army) to adopt the Cannone a Grande Gittata da 75/32 piece on a large scale. The proposal was rejected by the Regio Esercito, which on 9th December 1940 denied the permission to increase production of the cannon in roundup No. 39853. This was justified by stating that crews needed too much time to put the gun in position, aim accurately, and fire against moving targets, such as armored vehicles.

Close-up of a Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937. The cannon is not of the standard model because it has a different shield.
Source: Storia Militare: l’Esercito Italiano nel 1943

In 1943, modifications were planned for the Cannoni da 75/32 ordered in the second batch from OTO and Ansaldo Pozzuoli. The new Cannoni da 75/32 would have improved performance against armored vehicles by adopting an automatic breech, providing a thicker shield, and adding an elevation and firing lever to the left of the breech but in the end, none of them were built with these modifications.

A Cannone da 75/32 with a “pepper pot” muzzle brake. A Pavesi P4/100 artillery tractor can be seen behind it.
Source: vojsko.net

Production

The Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 began to be produced in 1941 by Ansaldo in its plant in Pozzuoli with a price of 470.300 lire for each gun, and the first examples left the factories at the end of this year.

Production proceeded very slowly. By September 1942, there were only 49 pieces available, while by summer 1943, there were 172.

In 1943 a second order was placed by the Italian Army for a total of 483 guns: 303 to Ansaldo Pozzuoli (170 guns ordered by Regio Esercito + 133 guns previously ordered by Portugal and taken over by the Army) 180 to OTO.

A document from the Direzione Generale Artiglieria – Reparto Produzione (English: General Artillery Directorate – Production Department) dated June 1943 stated that Ansaldo Pozzuoli could produce 60 Cannoni da 75/32 per month

No guns of this order were completed due the armistice.

Production of the Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937
Number	Year
1941	30
1942	44
1943*	98
Total	172
Notes	* Until 8th September 1943

A Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 fresh out of the factory. It seems to have a barrel cover.
Source: Storia dell’Artiglieria

Design

One of the goals of the Regio Esercito was to standardize the production of field artillery, so the Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 gun was created by mounting a 32 caliber barrel on the Obice da 75/18 Modello 1935 carriage. The muzzle brake was intended to increase the accuracy and range and absorb some of the recoil which decreased as the elevation of the cannon increased.

The carriage was 2-tailed and could be spread apart and folded into 2 parts, which allowed for adaptability to various terrain elevations and allowed a 50° traverse and an elevation of -10° to +45°. The cannon was also equipped with a 4,2 mm shield.

The breech block is exclusively manual.

The spoked wheels were initially made of Elektron, a Magnesium and Aluminium alloy. During production, steel sheet was used instead.

The wheels of the Cannone da 75/32. On the left, the wheels are spoked and made of Elektron, a magnesium and aluminum alloy while on the right, the wheels are made of steel sheet.
Source: Storia Militare N.188

The suspension was elastic and formed by torsion bar axles, the same as those of the Obice da 75/18 Modello 1934 and 1935.

The mount has two wheel tracks available: wide (for fire and mechanical towing) and narrow (for mountain towing).

The cannon weighed 1,160 kg. It was designed to be towed by light prime movers like the FIAT-SPA TL37, although animal transport by horse was also possible. Officially, a towing speed of 45 to 60 km/h was estimated, but in regular use, the speeds were probably much lower.

A Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 towed by a FIAT-SPA TL37. Source: Wikipedia.org

A Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 firing. Note the gun crew holding ammunition.
Source: ww2incolor.com

A Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 towed by a FIAT-SPA TL37.
Source: Storia dell’Artiglieria

Other versions

In 1943, two different versions of the gun were studied. The first was an aviation version of the Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937, while the second was to be installed inside the fortifications of the Vallo Alpino del Littorio (English: Littorio Alpine Wall), the complex of bunkers and other defensive positions that defended Italy’s Alpine borders with Austria, France, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.

Unfortunately, nothing is known about the fate of these projects, but they were most likely abandoned because of the Armistice of 8th September 1943.

There are some photos of a Cannone da 75/32 at Ansaldo in Genoa Cornigliano in 1942 that appears to be undergoing testing for installation on an aircraft. The cannon was placed inside a structure that simulated the nose of an aircraft, possibly to test the resistance of the nose to the muzzle flash during firing.

Cannone da 75/32 inserted inside a probable mock-up of an aircraft nose; perhaps the piece was intended to be used as an anti-tank cannon mounted on an aircraft.
Source: 2020.fondazioneansaldo.it

Crew

The Cannone da 75/32 had a crew of four men, including the aimer who sits on the left and has control over horizontal aiming while the shooter sits on the right and has control over the firing lever and elevation adjustment. The other two crew members were responsible for supplying ammunition to the cannon.

Ammunition

The Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 used a variety of semi-fixed ammunition types.

Ammunition for the Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937
Name	Type	Muzzle velocity (m/s) with first charge	Muzzle velocity (m/s) with second charge	Weight (kg)	Penetration in mm of a RHA angled at 90° at		Penetration in mm of a RHA angled at 60° at
500 m	1,000 m	500 m	1,000 m
Granata Dirompente da 75/32	High-Explosive	//	570 (estimated)	6.35	//	//	//	//
Granata Dirompente da 75/32 a d.e.	High-Explosive	360	570	6.30	//	//	//	//
Granata Dirompente da 75/27 Modello 1932	High-Explosive	350	490	6.35	//	//	//	//
Granata Perforante da 75/32	Armor Piercing	//	630	6.10	70	60	55	47
Granata da 75 Effetto Pronto (early type)	High-Explosive Anti Tank	//	580	4.50	55**	55**	50**	50**
Granata da 75 Effetto Pronto (late type)	High-Explosive Anti Tank	//	557***	5.20	*	*	*	*
Granata da 75 Effetto Pronto Speciale (early type)	High-Explosive Anti Tank	//	*	5.20	*	*	*	*
Granata da 75 Effetto Pronto Speciale Modello 1942	High-Explosive Anti Tank	//	399****	5.30	*	*	70	70
Notes	* Data not present British estimation * Muzzle velocity of the projectile fired from the L/34 gun **** Muzzle velocity of the projectile fired from the L/27 gun

Granata Dirompente da 75/32. Source: Kennblätter fremden Geräts D 50/8 b

Granata Dirompente a.d.e. da 75/32. Source: Kennblätter fremden Geräts D 50/8 b

Granata Perforante da 75/32. Source: Kennblätter fremden Geräts D 50/8 b

Cartridge case of the Cannone da 75/32. Source: Kennblätter fremden Geräts D 50/8 b

Service History

Eastern Front

The Cannone a Grande Gittata da 75/32 Modello 1937 saw very limited use. The first unit to use this piece was the 201° Reggimento d’Artiglieria Motorizzato (English: 201st Motorized Artillery Regiment) assigned to the Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia or CSIR (English: Italian Expeditionary Corps in Russia), which was later renamed ARMata Italiana in Russia or ARMIR (English: Italian Army in Russia, or 8th Army). Under the overall command of Colonel Enrico Altavilla, the regiment and its 36 guns were organized into 3 groups: Lieutenant Colonel La Guardia’s 1° Gruppo (English: 1st Group), Lieutenant Colonel Francesco Zingales’ 2° Gruppo (English: 2nd Group), and Major Vitale’s 3° Gruppo (English: 3rd Group).

On the Eastern Front, a gun battery supported the attack of the Battaglione Alpini ‘Vestone’ (English: Alpine Battalion), belonging to the 2a Divisione Alpina ‘Tridentina’ (English: 2nd Alpine Division), against a Soviet stronghold in the village of Scach on 31st August 1942. Another battery was sent as reinforcement, along with the 1a Compagnia Motociclisti (English: 1st Motorcycle Company), to the village of Bolschoj to reinforce the 2a Divisione di Fanteria ‘Sforzesca’ (English: 2nd Infantry Division) on 5th September.

The whole 201° Reggimento d’Artiglieria Motorizzato was destroyed during the Second Defensive Battle of the Don (during Operation Little Saturn and the Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh offensive) between December 1942 and January 1943. There is little information on the Regiment’s employment during this time. On 16th December 1942, the 1a Batteria (English: 1st Battery) of the 1° Gruppo, assigned to the 9a Divisione di Fanteria ‘Pasubio’ (English: 9th Infantry Division), was involved defending against the attack of the Soviet 38th Guards Division. The battery of Cannoni da 75/32 was completely destroyed by Russian forces who killed all the artillerymen. On 18th December, a section of the 3° Gruppo defended the village of Taly together with an amalgamation of Italian and German troops until the next day, when the defense passed into the hands of German units only.

Cannoni da 75/32 of the 1° Gruppo belonging to the 201° Reggimento d’Artiglieria Motorizzato on the Eastern Front.
Source: Le operazioni delle unità italiane sul fronte russo

A Cannone da 75/32 employed on the Eastern Front.
Source: Wikipedia.org

Italian Front

By 1943, there were only 4 Cannoni da 75/32 Modello 1937 groups left. Two (24 pieces) of which were assigned to the 135a Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete II’ (English: 135th Armored Division), which was deployed near Rome. They took part in the clashes against the Germans after the Armistice of 8th September 1943.

Albania

The other two groups were assigned to the 11a Divisione di Fanteria ‘Brennero’ (English: 11th Infantry Division) deployed in Greece and Albania. A photograph shows two guns of the 11a Divisione di Fanteria ‘Brennero’ used by the Battaglione Partigiano ‘Gramsci’ (English: Partisan Battalion) formed after the Armistice of 8th September 1943 by soldiers from the 41a Divisione di Fanteria ‘Firenze’ (English:41st Infantry Division), the 11a Divisione di Fanteria ‘Brennero’, and the 53a Divisione di Fanteria ‘Arezzo’ (English: 53rd Infantry Division). The Italian soldiers, under the command of Sergeant Terzilio Cardinali, joined the 1st Partisan Brigade of the Albanian Liberation Army in the days after the Armistice, preferring to fight against the Germans.

Two Cannoni da 75/32 of the Battaglione Partigiano ‘Gramsci’ towed by a FIAT 626 N.M. medium truck (left) and a FIAT-SPA TM40 prime mover (right) parade through the streets of Tirana. Source: Instagram via Forza Italiana

Other Users

Germany

After the Armistice, the Germans captured 48 guns intact, naming them 7.5 cm FeldKanone 248(i) (English: 7.5 cm Field Cannon 248 Italian), using them both on the Italian front and in Yugoslavia against Tito’s partisans.

The only photo of German use shows us a Cannone da 75/32 used by a Fallschirmjäger unit, probably in Italy.

German Fallschirmjäger use a Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 after the armistice.
Source: flickr.com

Peru

In the book Latin American Wars. 1900-1941 “Banana Wars, Border Wars and Revolutions” by Philip S. Jowett, it is mentioned that Peru acquired some Cannoni da 75/32 in 1941, but no further information is available.

Portugal

Portugal ordered 133 Cannoni da 75/32 during the war, but it was later canceled and taken over by Regio Esercito, and no cannons were built afterward.

Use on Vehicles

The Cannone da 75/32 was mounted on a few vehicles, but it was also the basis for the creation of the Cannone da 75/34, which was mounted on the Carro Armato P26/40 and on some self-propelled artillery vehicles.

Carro Armato P26/40

In July 1940, General Mario Caracciolo di Feroleto, the Ispettore Superiore dei Servizi Tecnici (English: Superior Inspector of Technical Services), had two mock-ups of the Carro Armato P26/40 tank built, one by Ansaldo and the other by the Direzione della Motorizzazione (English: Directorate of Motor Vehicles).

Both models were armed with a Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 and a 20 mm Cannone-Mitragliera Breda da 20/65 Modello 1935 in the turret. The Cannone da 75/32 on Ansaldo’s mock-up did not have a muzzle brake, as it was not yet necessary for recoil management.

The Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 was chosen because it had already been in development since 1937 and preferred over the Obice da 75/18 included in earlier mock-ups.

The first prototype of the Carro Armato P26/40 was equipped in December 1941 with a Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 wooden dummy. Eventually, in spring 1942, the Cannone da 75/34 was chosen as the main armament because it was specifically developed for use on vehicles. It featured a fully semi-automatic vertical sliding breechblock and a completely revised and more suitable recoil mechanism designed for enclosed vehicles.

Mock-up of the Carro Armato P26/40 armed with Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 and a Cannone-Mitragliera Breda da 20/65 Modello 1935.
Source: P40. Il mito del più potente carro armato italiano

Carro Armato P26/40 prototype with Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 wooden dummy.
Source: La meccanizzazione dell’esercito fino al 1943

Semovente M40 da 75/32

In summer 1941, the Army General Staff had to choose whether to mount the Obice da 75/18 or the Cannone da 75/34 Modello SF [Sfera] (English: 75 mm L/34 Cannon Model Spherical Support) on self-propelled guns. With circular No. 11914 of 21th June 1941, the choice fell on the latter, but since the Cannone da 75/34 was not yet available, a Cannone da 75/32 was mounted on the hull of the Semovente M40 self-propelled gun on an experimental basis. The model, however, was not approved.

Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 for use on semoventi
Source: 2020.fondazioneansaldo.it

The Semovente was armed with a Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 and an 8 mm machine gun.

Semovente M40 da 75/32, note the “pepper pot” muzzle brake.
Source: La meccanizzazione dell’esercito fino al 1943

Some sources mistake the main gun of the semovente with the Semovente M40 da 75/32 itself. In fact, they state that 24 or 25 of these semoventi were deployed by the 135a Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete II’ during the defense of Rome on 9th and 10th September 1943. This is wrong. The 135a Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete II’ had only 24 Cannoni a Grande Gittata da 75/32 in its ranks and these were deployed in the defense of the Italian capital city. Apart from the prototype, license plate R.E. 4443, on an early production Carro Armato M14/41, the Semovente M40 da 75/32 was not produced.

Semovente M40 da 75/32 with license plate R.E. 4443 inside a production line at Ansaldo
Source: worldwarphotos.info

Autocannone da 75/32 su Autocarro Semicingolato FIAT 727

In 1943, Ansaldo was studying the installation of the Cannone da 75/32 Modello 1937 on the hull of the 3-ton Maffei-FIAT 727 half-track. The development was never finished due the Armistice of 8th September 1943. The Germans also stopped the production of the 3-tonne FIAT 727 half-track, putting an end to any further German development.

One of the few pre-series Maffei-FIAT 727 half-tracks outside a FIAT plant.
Source: Wikipedia.org

Conclusion

The Cannone a Grande Gittata da 75/32 Modello 1937 was a potent artillery piece, perhaps the best anti-tank gun developed by the Kingdom of Italy. Nevertheless, it suffered greatly due to the underdeveloped Italian industry and the lack of foresight of the Regio Esercito’s high command.

Mass production starting from 1937 would surely have allowed equipping Italian soldiers with a decent anti-tank weapon with which to counter enemy armor, primarily the Matilda tanks in North Africa, which spearheaded the British counteroffensive in Libya in winter 1940-1941.

Although it also performed well in Eastern Front against T-34s, the Cannone da 75/43 (Italian designation for the German PaK 40), which was adopted in 1943 by the Regio Esercito, was eventually preferred by the Italian troops for its precision and better anti-tank characteristics, even if many soldiers considered it too heavy.

A big thanks to Arturo Giusti and Enrico Micheli

Cannone a Grande Gittata da 75/32 Modello 1937. Illustration by Shreyas Das.

Specifications of Cannone a Grande Gittata da 75/32 Modello 1937
Caliber	75 mm
Weight in battery	1,200 kg
Barrel length	2.574 m
Elevation	-10°/+45°
Traverse	50°
Muzzle velocity	624 m/s
Maximum range	12,300 m
Rate of fire	10 shots per minute
Shell weight	6.35 kg (explosive grenade Model 1932)

Sources

Filippo Cappellano and Nicola Pignato, Andare contro i carri armati – l’evoluzione della difesa controcarro nell’esercito italiano dal 1918 al 1945, Udine, 2007

Enrico Finazzer, Guida alle artiglierie italiane nella 2a Guerra Mondiale – Regio Esercito Italiano, Repubblica Sociale Italiana e Esercito Cobelligerante, Genova, 2020

Nicola Pignato and Filippo Cappellano, Gli autoveicoli da combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano Volume II, Roma, 2002

Lucio Ceva and Andrea Curami, La meccanizzazione dell’Esercito fino al 1943. Tomo I, Roma, 1994

https://web.archive.org/web/20160307045330/http://www.vecio.it/cms/index.php/armamento-delle-opere/344-cannone-7534-mod-sf

Departments of the Army and the Air Force, Italian and French explosive ordnance, Washington, 1953

Ufficio Storico, Le operazioni delle unità italiane sul fronte russo (1941-1943), Roma, 1977

Carlo Montù Esegesi, Storia della Artiglieria Italiana. Parte V (dal 1920 al 1943). Volume XV (l’evoluzione dei concetti d’impiego, del tiro, della tecnica e dei materiali), Roma, 1953

Roberto Bartolini, Il carro armato M13/40 e derivati featured in Studi Storico-Militari from page 303 to 372, Roma, 1993

Filippo Stefani, Storia delle dottrine e degli ordinamenti. Volume II. Tomo 2 La 2a Guerra Mondiale (1940-1943), Roma, 1985

https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/539844-carro-pesante-p40-7532/

Massimo Coltrinari, La resistenza dei militari italiani all’estero. Albania, Roma, 1999

https://web.archive.org/web/20120829231929/http://comandosupremo.com/cannone7532.html

Gabriele De Rosa, Storia dell’Ansaldo Vol.6. Dall’IRI alla guerra 1930-1945, Bari, 1999

Filippo Cappellano, Le artiglierie del Regio Esercito nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Parma, 1998

Nicola Pignato, Oto Melara 1905-2005, Fidenza, 2006

Nicola Pignato, L’ultimo ‘75’ dell’artiglieria italiana from Storia Militare N.188, Parma, 2009

Andrea Curami and B. Benvenuti, Le artiglierie italiane tra le due guerre from Storia Militare N.16 and 17, Parma, 1995

Nicola Pignato and Filippo Cappellano, La produzione di artiglierie in Italia durante la seconda guerra mondiale from Storia Militare N. 74 and 75, Parma, 1999

Deutsche Wehrmacht, Kennblätter fremden Geräts; Heft D50 / 8b, Berlino, 1941

Ministero della Guerra, Addestramento dell’artiglieria Volume I Addestramento al pezzo Obice da 75/18 Mod. 35 – Cannone da 75/32 Mod.37 Istruzione sul materiale e sulle munizioni, Roma, 1942

Ministero della Guerra, Dati tecnici sulle artiglieria in servizio, Roma, 1938

Ministero della Guerra, Addestramento dell’artiglieria Volume I Addestramento del pezzo Obice da 75/18 Mod.34 Istruzione sul materiale e sulle munizioni, Roma, 1938

Ministero della Guerra, Nozioni di armi, tiro e materiali vari per i corsi allievi ufficiali di complemento dell’arma di artiglieria: Parte I. Armi, materiali e munizioni, Roma, 1942

Nicola Pignato, P40. Il mito del più potente carro armato italiano della seconda guerra mondiale, Parma, 2009

Filippo Cappellano and Nicola Pignato, Il Regio Esercito alla vigilia dell’8 Settembre 1943, Parma, 2003

Has Own Video WW2 Australian Prototypes WW2 British Vehicles in Foreign Service

Matilda Hedgehog

Matilda Hedgehog, ilustration by Pavel Alexe.

Commonwealth of Australia (1945)
Tank-Mounted Spigot Mortar – 6 Built

Troopers Hoskin, Lear and Elton sitting on the cupola turret of tank 10194, the markings of the 4th Armoured Brigade Group and the 2/4 Armoured Regiment can be seen on the front of the vehicle. The angled side plates of the production projectors and the mesh anti-bomb screens fitted to the top of the projector and engine decks are visible. Australia 1946. Source Australian War Memorial 124796

Rumble in the Jungle

Beginning in 1942, as Australian forces battled against the Japanese through New Guinea and the South West Pacific, it became apparent that there was an increasing need for offensive armaments capable of demolishing Japanese defensive positions. The typical Japanese bunker was a fighting pit reinforced by interlocked palm logs and roofed with timber or sheet metal. On top of this, a layer of earth approximately 18 in (46 cm) thick was placed on the roof and sides of the bunker. Its low profile made it incredibly difficult to identify in a jungle environment, and its construction made it very resistant to light weapons fire, particularly weapons with impact or graze fuses, where the earth layer absorbed the explosive force. Australian forces encountered great difficulty when faced with these defenses. The resilient structure meant that even if the firing port was destroyed, the soldiers inside were often unharmed, which resulted in attacking Allied soldiers bypassing the presumably destroyed bunker only to be attacked from behind by the emerging Japanese defenders.

Major R.C Grover of the Operational Research Section standing outside a Japanese style bunker constructed for weapons testing. The low profile of the structure and narrow firing slit provide less of a target than a standing soldier. Wandokai, New Guinea 1944. Source Australian War Memorial 072392

A soldier from the 2/9th infantry battalion emerges from a captured Japanese bunker. Shaggy Ridge, New Guinea 1944. Source Australian War Memorial 064272

Bunker Buster by Hand

The initial tool for dealing with these defenses was the ‘blast bomb’, otherwise known as the ‘Grenade Initiated Ammonal Charge’, a field expedient constructed by attaching a standard infantry grenade to a two pound (0.9 kg) tin of ammonal explosive. Although effective enough to be adopted for standardization as a production armament and recommended for further refinement, the blast bomb still had limitations. Primarily, the blast effect of the weapon was only enough to destroy a Japanese bunker if detonated inside the structure. The external detonation would only result in superficial damage. Furthermore, as an infantry grenade, it required soldiers to approach the target close enough that the bomb could be reliably thrown through the firing slit into the bunker’s interior. A variation of combining the 2 lb (0.9 kg) ammonal charge with a No.68 rifle grenade was considered to allow for greater range. However, static testing showed that external detonation of the charge resulted in little effect and the rifle grenade was deemed unable to reliably project the bomb through the firing slit. A 25-pounder cartridge case filled with gelignite was also considered, but found to be too bulky for easy manipulation by infantry, while a charge of TNT detonated by a Murphey Switch was deemed too complicated for infantry without specialist training.

In January/February 1943, a series of firing trials was conducted against various simulated bunker targets at the School of Armour, located at Puckapunyal, Victoria, to assess the effectiveness of various tank and infantry weapons against Japanese bunkers. Testing revealed that the low-caliber weapons, such as the 2-pounder and 37 mm guns, were ineffective against bunkers with either High Explosive (HE) or Armor Piercing (AP) ammunition. Larger caliber weapons, such as the 6-pounder or 25-pounder, were considered effective when firing HE. However, these were not practical solutions, as Australia did not possess any self-propelled mountings for the larger guns and moving towed models of the 6-pounder and 25-pounder was extremely difficult in the conditions of the South West Pacific.

Spigot Mortars

In early 1944, a series of requirements were issued by Brigadier Denzel McArthur-Onslow, the commander of the Australian 4th Armoured Brigade Group, to develop a series of specialized armored vehicles for use in the South West Pacific. Included amongst these requirements was an AFV-mounted weapon capable of ‘destroying completely’ a Japanese bunker. For this purpose, the Hedgehog anti-submarine spigot mortar was selected as a readily available weapon with a large explosive payload. The modification of the Hedgehog for use in land combat was designated ‘Projector, Hedgehog, (Aust), No.1, Mk1’ and subsequently developed for mounting on the Matilda II infantry tank. A functioning mock-up was manufactured by the 4th Armoured Brigade Group Workshop and subjected to initial trials in August of 1944.

Men of 2/5 Armoured Regiment, 4th Armoured Brigade Group, in the process of loading the 1944 trials projector. The six spigots and protective cylinders that support the bombs are considerably more exposed than on later versions of the design. Source Australian War Memorial, Regimental Diaries of 2/5 Armoured Regiment

For the test vehicle, six Hedgehog spigots were mounted in line along a 5 in (12.7 cm) diameter Vibrok steel shaft set between a pair of rotary bearings. The bearings were, in turn, mounted to a pair of short girders welded to the tank’s rear track guards. Each spigot was enclosed in a sheet steel cylinder to provide protection and support for the Hedgehog bombs. The cylinders were arranged to bed down on the engine louvers when not in the firing position. The spigots were rotated into the firing position via a hydraulic ram actuated by a hand pump located in the turret. Firing was controlled by an electrical switchboard inside the tank, with elevation interlocks preventing the weapon from firing if the turret would obstruct the path of the projectile or if the spigots were elevated to greater than 75°. The original Hedgehog fuse, being designed for use underwater, was not suitable for the intended use against terrestrial hard targets. Therefore, it was replaced with the No.152 direct action fuse, taken from the 3-inch mortar. This was fitted using an adaptor which screwed into the bomb above a stacked detonation charge.

The standard Naval mounting of the Hedgehog mortar for use as an anti-submarine weapon aboard the River class frigate HMAS Gascoyne. Note the bombs are not fitted with fuses. Australia 1943. Source Australian War Memorial P00444.023

For the tests, twelve inert bombs were fired from a single spigot at an angle of 45º, resulting in a range of 200 ya (180 m) with a longitudinal variation of 5 ya (4.5 m) and a line dispersion of 1 ya (0.9 m). A further three salvos of 6 inert bombs were fired, yielding a range of 200 ya (180 m) with a longitudinal variation of 5 ya (4.5 m) and a line dispersion of 1.5 ya (1.3 m). Reduction of elevation to 35º resulted in a decrease of impact to 190 ya (170 m), although it was noted that inert bombs gave, on average, 10 ya (9 m) less range than live bombs.

Firing live bombs resulted in 2 ft (0.6 m) deep blast craters with a diameter of 7 ft (2.1 m). Vegetation was entirely cleared on a radius of 6 ft (1.8 m) from the blast, while concertina wire was cleared on a radius of 4 ft (1.2 m). A salvo of 6 bombs completely cleared thick vegetation and concertina wire from an area of 35×14 ya (32×13 m). A mock-up bunker was constructed from two layers of 15’ logs covered with sandbags and earth to a depth of 2 ft (0.6 m). The whole target measured 10×8 ft (3×2.4 m). Out of seven bombs fired, three direct hits were obtained. The first hit cleared most of the earth while the remaining two blew away the logs and exposed the interior of the bunker. It was noted that the flash and blast of the bomb was impressive, however, the fragmentation effect was considered unsatisfactory beyond 10 ya (9 m).

The results of the 1944 tests were enough to justify further development of the weapon, and the refined design was subjected to more rigorous testing in March/April 1945. In December 1944, it was also suggested that the Hedgehog could be satisfactorily mounted on the rear deck of an M3 Medium Tank, but this option was ultimately not pursued.

The Matilda Hedgehogs

In addition to the test vehicle, another five tanks would be fitted with Hedgehog projectors, for a total of six vehicles (tanks nos.82136, 88344, 35307, 10194, 6908, 35357), with the fabrication and fitting work being conducted throughout 1945 by the engineering firm of A. & P. Uscinski, based at Corparoo, Queensland. The refined weapon retained the same spigot cylinders and transverse axle mounting, but increased the amount of spigots to seven, now protected within a box of locally produced 11 mm weldable Australian Bullet Proof Plate No.3 (ABP3). An additional armored plate at the front of the mounting covered up the bombs when the weapon was fully depressed, protecting them from damage due to shrapnel or enemy fire. The production examples of the weapon would also feature additional angled plates of 11 mm ABP3 on the sides and front of the projector, as well as mesh anti-bomb screens on the top of the projector and the engine deck of the vehicle.

A series of paired struts, which slotted into the cylinders when the weapon was closed, were added to support the bombs and prevent the fuses from being damaged in transit. The spigots could be elevated and depressed via a hydraulic controller and solenoid switch located on the left-hand side of the driver’s position. The controller and hydraulic pump itself were a repurposed ‘Logan’ Gerotor type from an M3 Medium Tank, driving a pair of hydraulic rams repurposed from aircraft landing gear. The pump, motor, and oil reservoir were contained in the left-hand chain locker at the front of the tank, and power was supplied via the tank’s main batteries.

A simple blade sight was attached to the turret at the twelve o’clock position to allow the commander to provide a rough lay of the weapon on target. Ranging and aiming was controlled entirely from the elevation of the spigots and the direction the vehicle was facing. The driver had a mechanical elevation indicator mounted on the right side of the driver’s position. This was driven by a chain sprocket attached to the spigot shaft and a piano wire linkage. Issues with deviation of line due to tilt of the tank led to a simple hanging tilt indicator being added to production vehicles.

Firing was controlled by an electrical switchboard in the tank turret, located to the left of the gunner’s position. When conducting the firing process, the operator inserted the firing lead into the socket of the corresponding spigot and then pressed the firing switch to close the electrical circuit. Bombs could be fired individually, or, if required, the operator could hold down the firing switch as he switched between sockets to fire the bombs in a ‘ripple’ salvo. Using the latter method, it was determined that the projector could fire seven bombs with ⅓-second intervals and all seven bombs could be in flight at one time. A set of electrical interlocks were included to prevent the bombs from firing when the spigots were elevated below the level of the tank turret, or to an angle greater than 70º. Additionally, in order to prevent potential damage to the tank’s wireless aerials, an extra interlock was installed on the fifth spigot circuit. This prevented the bomb from firing unless the tank turret was turned to the two o’clock position. An additional offset sighting vane was provided to allow for aiming the fifth spigot when the turret was rotated.

Rear view of the 1945 trials projector. The spigots have been raised to full elevation and the mounting girders welded to the rear track guards are clearly visible. Source: National Archives of Australia MP742/1, 215/1/217

looking from the turret into the cylinders of the 1945 trials projector. Source: National Archives of Australia MP742/1, 215/1/217

Rangefinder

Major Alan Milner, head of the 4th Armoured Brigade Group’s mechanical workshop, developed a stereoscopic rangefinder for the Hedgehog. In January 1945, the design was submitted to the Australian Solar Observatory at Mt. Stromlo for manufacture. The design was derived from a Barr & Stroud stereoscopic rangefinder and operated under a fixed coincidence principle, where a prism within the sight would align the two eyepiece images into a single coherent image when the correct range had been achieved. The design was set to a fixed range of 200 ya (180 m) but, based on Army projections that the range of the Hedgehog may be increased up to 500 ya (450 m), it was intended that the central prism be removable to allow for an increased range scale (this was later reduced to 330 ya (300 m). A prototype was produced and tested in a limited capacity alongside the tests of the production Hedgehog in March/June 1945. The rangefinder worked satisfactorily against distinct targets (a 6 in wide pole) in open ground, giving coincidence at 200 yards (180 m) with a ~5 ya (4.5 m) deviation (inexperienced operators increased this deviation by an extra 10 ya(+/- 9 m). When trialed against obscured targets in heavily wooded terrain, results were less satisfactory, as the overlap of dense vegetation prevented the operator from clearly distinguishing the transition to image coincidence of the target. The trials report concluded that the rangefinder was not an Army requirement. However, technical report No.16 from October 1945 states that a coincidence rangefinder would be supplied for tanks fitted with Hedgehog projectors, although it is unclear if any other examples were produced, other than the trial prototype, before work on the Hedgehog was discontinued.

Tank number 35357 ‘Bull Pup’ fitted with the 1945 trials model of the Hedgehog projector. Note the vertical sides and exposed mounting girders that additional armored plates would cover in the production model. Source Australian War Memorial 133687

More Testing, Less War

The 1945 tests yielded very similar results to the prior 1944 tests, with good performance noted in several areas. Firstly, the large blast produced by the bomb was effective at removing foliage from an area, with a noted tendency for the blast to ‘flatten’ foliage within its radius. This task was previously achieved by using the tank’s coaxial 7.92 mm Besa machine gun to ‘strip’ foliage from a target area. While effective, this had been recognised as an inefficient expenditure of ammunition. A salvo of seven Hedgehog bombs, with enough accuracy, could clear jungle foliage in a strip with an estimated area of 135 ya by 27 ya (123×25 m).

Secondly, the bombs were recognised for their potential utility in mine clearing. Testing revealed that, given enough accuracy from the tank crew, a corridor 72 ya long by 6 ya wide (66×5.5 m) could be cleared through an anti-personnel minefield. Conversely, it was recognised that the utility of the Hedgehog would be greatly reduced against anti-tank mines due to the much higher tolerance to blast effect in these types of mines. It was further noted that scarce data was available about Japanese anti-tank mines. Lastly, it was considered that such a large blast effect, combined with the fact that the firing vehicle outwardly appeared identical to a regular gun tank, would have a significant negative effect on enemy infantry morale.

Regarding the weapon’s main objective, the destruction of Japanese bunkers, results were less satisfactory. The major problem identified was that the impact fuse meant that the bombs detonated before achieving enough penetration to demolish the target. Attempts to delay detonation by firing with the fuse cap on resulted in bombs burying into the ground without detonation, and it was identified that a delayed action fuse would be needed to provide suitable results. The 1945 report does not specify if a delayed fuse was obtained during the trials. However, the provisional tactical notes from March 1945 suggest a penetration value of 4 ft(1.2 m) of earth with a delayed action fuse, although it is unclear if this is a confirmed value or an estimate.

Furthermore, concerns were raised regarding the accuracy of the weapon. With only 7 bombs available, it was considered impractical for ranging shots to be made. Without a suitable rangefinder available during trials, it was found to be difficult to accurately judge the distance to the target to achieve a first-round hit. In addition to this, the bombs were observed to wobble in flight, which led to inconsistency in accuracy between individual shots. The blunt nose and cylinder-type tail vanes of the bomb were judged to be the main cause of this issue, and it was recommended that a more aerodynamic nose cone and larger fin-type vane on the bomb would reduce this. However, there is no evidence that either modification entered production, nor are they mentioned in any subsequent documentation. Aside from the standing requirement for a delayed action fuse to be obtained at the nearest opportunity, the major conclusions to the accuracy issues primarily focused on emphasizing crew training and proper ranging of the weapon, with the accuracy being otherwise regarded as ‘serviceable’.

An area of Lantana scrub prior to test firing of the Hedgehog projector. This level of foliage was analogous to that encountered in the jungles of the South West Pacific. The standing soldier would be difficult to spot, a low profile bunker almost impossible. Source National Archives of Australia MP742/1, 215/1/217

The same area of Lantana scrub after the Hedgehog projector was fired. What was once dense foliage has now been stripped away, exposing any concealed obstacles or defensive positions. Source National Australian Archives MP742/1, 215/1/217

A series of survivability trials were also conducted to assess the weapon’s vulnerability and the outcome of a possible detonation of one or more bombs on the tank. For this purpose, a mock-up bomb rack was produced from armored plate and attached to the rear of a spare Matilda tank. Multiple weapons were fired against the mock-up projector assembly, including .30 caliber rifle ammunition, rifle grenades, 20 mm AP shells, 37 mm AP shells, 75 mm HE shells and a simulated Type 99 magnetic mine. Against .30 caliber ball and AP ammunition, the projector was deemed completely immune while closed, and only vulnerable at the opening of the cylinders when these were open. The bombs showed favorably low volatility, with a tendency to burn rather than explode when hit. Direct hits from the 75 mm HE and Type 99 charge resulted in the bomb rack being blown off the back of the tank, while the bombs remained safely undetonated. The M9A1 rifle grenade and 37 mm AP round both penetrated the armor of the projector but again the bombs burned rather than detonating. When a simulated rack of 7 bombs was detonated, the turret of the tank was lifted and turned. However, readings of blast pressure showed that, discounting mechanical injury to the crew, there was a greater than 50% chance for a crewman to survive the blast effect of the detonation of the bomb payload.

Further testing was conducted in mid-1945 to determine if alternative propellants could be used to reliably increase the range of the Hedgehog. Information from the UK had indicated that a charge of FNH025 propellant could increase the range of the Hedgehog bomb by an additional 100 ya (90 m) without risk of bursting the bomb tails. FNH025 was not available in Australia, hence approval was given by the Director of Armaments for testing to be conducted using NH025 propellant instead. The tests revealed that a propellant charge of 500 grains NH025 cordite would provide an increase in accurate range to approximately 330 ya (301m) vs the 200-ya (182m) range of the standard charge of 260 gr HSCT. Inspection of the projector and hydraulic systems showed that the weapon could handle the increased force from the new propellant, and it was noted that the vehicle moved off under its own power in good order after the test firing was completed. However, the increased pressure gradient of the new propellant resulted in potential damage to the electrical contacts in the spigot, with the spring being compressed out of alignment, such that the contacts would not reliably fire subsequent bombs. Hence, it was recommended that, if NH025 propellant was to be adopted, the cartridge case in the bomb should be modified to alleviate undue pressure on the electrical contacts, although this was noted to be difficult due to the bombs not being in production locally.

‘He Loves Me, He Loves Me Not’

The exact outcome of the Hedgehog trials is something of a confusing matter, and a confounding quirk of documentation does not help this. Memorandum No.49 of the Operational Research Section reported rather favorably on the Hedgehog. However, in memorandum No.50, the opinion appears reversed and several criticisms are raised. Firstly, the accuracy of the weapon was called into question, with the estimated hit probability of only 1 bomb in 5-6 being deemed inefficient for a weapon with only 7 shots, something that the uncertainties of a combat situation would further exacerbate.

Secondly, the lack of penetration and poor fragmentation of the bomb was noted as insufficient for anti-bunker or anti-infantry work, although it was noted that the bombs could be suitable for delivering white phosphorus as an anti-infantry incendiary weapon. Thirdly, the vulnerability of the weapon was questioned, and while noted as being largely resistant to detonation from rifle fire, it was noted that the weapon was still vulnerable to anti-tank grenades and other armor piercing weapons whilst it would likely draw significant enemy fire in the raised position. Finally, it was considered that 7 bombs with ammunition cases, at a total weight of 490 pounds (220 kg), would present a logistical difficulty to supply, as well as adding an increased physical burden on the crew when loading the weapon. As a final postscript to the memorandum, the Director of Mechanical Vehicles appended the following comment.

‘It is considered that the “Hedgehog” equipment is NOT suitable for mounting on a tank unless designed so as to provide arrangements for traversing the equipment independent of the tank.

However, this would require considerable design and, from the report on the potentialities of this weapon, it requires thorough investigation before being accepted as an Army requirement.’

To clarify matters, it is worth noting that Memorandum No.50 was published in March 1945 and its criticisms are in reference to the 1944 trials, while Memorandum No.49 was published in June 1945 and refers directly to the 1945 trials. The overall conclusion that can be drawn is that, despite its recognised faults, the tank mounting of the Hedgehog projector was deemed acceptably useful for further experimentation and adoption by the Army.

Tank number 35357 ‘Bull Pup’ fitted with the 1945 production model of the Hedgehog projector and mesh anti-bomb screens. A 4th Armoured Brigade Group member is demonstrating the loading of a Hedgehog bomb into the third spigot cylinder. Source Australian War Memorial AWM 54, 759/1/3

Tank number 35357 ‘Bull Pup’ fitted with the 1945 production model of the Hedgehog projector with the spigots raised, showing the attachment of the mesh anti-bomb screens. A Hedgehog bomb with the modified No.152 fuse is visible on the ground behind the tank. Source Australian War Memorial AWM 54, 759/1/3

Preparing for Combat

By March 1945, it had been decided that the six Hedgehog tanks scheduled for production would be issued to 2/9 Armoured Regiment to develop doctrine for the use of the weapon in cooperative actions between armor and infantry. The provisional doctrine for the Hedgehog outlines the weapon as:

‘A Matilda tank equipped with a Hedgehog retains all the armament and characteristics of the regular Matilda tank and is primarily used as such. The fighting qualities are unimpaired. The addition of the Hedgehog gives it extra armament – “Something for nothing”’

Tactically, the Hedgehog was considered a specialist weapon which would operate in a standard troop of 3 Hedgehog equipped tanks. They could, if needed, be attached to infantry forces or integrated within a tank troop on a singular basis, however, it was considered that deployment as a unified troop would be normal. When operating in conjunction with other armored units, the Hedgehog tanks would deploy and operate in the same way as an ordinary tank, with the Hedgehog projector being employed when suitable targets of opportunity were presented. Crews were encouraged to consider the weapon in the same way as a mortar, but with the added advantage of mobility and a greater blast effect, and the disadvantage of limited shots. Hedgehog tanks could be assigned to engage specific targets if prior reconnaissance had identified a need for such action. However, it was specified that the tanks were to remain in situ and fight as standard gun tanks once their payload of bombs had been expended.

Suitable targets were identified as

Enemy troops in the open defiladed from direct fire
Enemy troops in foxholes
Suspected anti-tank weapons and machine gun positions
Neutralisation of enemy defensive areas, including bunkers
Clearance of scrub around restricted enemy locations
Clearance of enemy wire and anti-tank obstacles

When operating in direct support of attacking infantry, it was advised that the tank crew be assigned a specific and direct task for their Hedgehog to engage and that the main tank armament should be treated as secondary armament until this task was accomplished. Considering the limited ammunition supply, crew commanders were instructed to conduct thorough reconnaissance to select suitable firing locations and avoid overhead obstructions which would block the flight path of the bombs. It was further noted that arrangements should be made prior to battle to allow the tanks to withdraw and replenish their bomb loads, unless it was intended for them to remain in the role of standard gun tanks. The close support radius of the weapon was specified as a 100-ya (91m) safe area from the point of impact, and it was noted that the Hedgehogs should be incorporated into mortar/artillery fire plans, with prearranged fire being coordinated through the tank troop commander. Close communication between the commander of the Hedgehog troop and infantry commanders was identified as crucial, either via wireless or through the external telephone mounted on the rear of the tanks.

End of War, End of the Weapon

Testing of the Hedgehog would continue throughout 1945 until the end of the war. Although the exact date that work on the weapon was discontinued is unclear, the available documentation ends around September or October 1945. Some published sources claim that the six Matilda Hedgehog tanks were sent to Bougainville Island (Solomon Islands) for field trials in mid-1945. However, considering that archival evidence shows that only three tanks had been delivered by July 1945 and that the six tanks produced were held by 4th Armoured Brigade Group (based at Southport, Queensland) pending instructions for disposal in September 1945, it is clear the vehicles never left Australia. Of the six vehicles produced, only one surviving example, tank No. 35357, remains at the Australian Army Tank Museum, Puckapunyal, Victoria.

Matilda Hedgehog, ilustration by Pavel Alexe.

Sources

Bingham, James Australian Sentinel and Matildas. Profile Pub, Windsor, [England], 1972.

Hopkins, Ronald Nicholas Lamond and Australian War Memorial Australian armour : a history of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, 1927-1972. Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1978.

National Archives of Australia

NAA: MP76/1, 18447. [Inventor/Submitter -] M Miller – Range finder for use in armoured fighting vehicles in connection with hedgehog [plans included]

NAA: MP742/1, 215/1/217. Investigation of the Hedgehog mounted on the Matilda tank [contains 12 photographs]

NAA: B3138, 43/Z/112 Trial No 125/2 OQF 2 – pounder Mk X v. Japanese “bunker” [contains 7 photos]

NAA: MP385/7, 52/101/153. Army – tank trials against log weapon pits

Australian War Memorial

AWM 54, 115/6/1 PART 1. [Bombs and Grenades – New:] Provisional tactical doctrine for Matilda Tanks, fitted with Hedgehogs, Characteristics, Drawings of, Method of filling projectile, 1-3/4 inch Hedgehog or Porcupine. Typical arrangement of stencilling, sealing and labeling, Method of filling, Primer, Electric QF cartridges No. 13 MRS I and II, steel body with tail – Box, projectile, 1-3/4″ Hedgehog P68, Mark I and III – wood to hold one, Mark II projectile – Details of tail for Mark I and II Body plus sealing, tail tube, 1-3/4″ Hedgehog, Mark III

AWM 54, 115/6/1 PART 2. [Bombs and Grenades – New:] Provisional tactical doctrine for Matilda Tanks, fitted with Hedgehogs, Characteristics, Drawings of, Method of filling projectile, 1-3/4 inch Hedgehog or Porcupine. Typical arrangement of stencilling, sealing and labeling, Method of filling, Primer, Electric QF cartridges No. 13 MRS I and II, steel body with tail – Box, projectile, 1-3/4″ Hedgehog P68, Mark I and III – wood to hold one, Mark II projectile – Details of tail for Mark I and II Body plus sealing, tail tube, 1-3/4″ Hedgehog, Mark III

AWM 54, 115/6/2. [Bombs and Grenades – New:] Papers giving details and description of Projector Hedgehog, No 1 MKL, Test Instructions, June 1945

AWM 54, 905/23/6. [Stores and Equipment – User Trials:] Copies of User Trials Reports, Extracts from Ordnance Board proceedings on Spigot Mortar’s (Blacker Bombard). Trials of QF 25-Pr Gun (light); Trials of Self propelled, 40MM AA Gun. Demonstration projector Infantry Tank Attack, Spigot Mortar for destruction of Japanese fixed defences, Lists of Rocket Kites, Summary of reports on trials of PITA

AWM 54, 925/5/4. [Tanks – Types:] Provisional Tactical Doctrine for Flame Throwers Tanks (Frog) – Appendix A to 1 Australian Corps G/6925/SD of 14 March, 45 Provisional Tactical Doctrine for Flame Thrower Tanks (Frogs) Appendix B for Matilda Tanks fitted with Hedgehogs (C) Bridge Layer Tank (Covenanter Mark II) (d) for Tank Dozer, Australian No I MK I. A paper by DTI on policy for use of Mobile Flame Throwers; Instructions concerning the Organisation and Employment of the Flame Thrower Tank Battalion points of known types of Japanese Tanks vulnerable to Flame Throwers, Matilda Tank Maintenance

AWM 54, 115/9/1. [Bombs and Grenades – Inventions:] Blast Bombs, Sketch of Grenade initiated ammonal charge, January 1943

AWM 54, 937/3/36. [Training General – Tropical Warfare:] HQ 4 Australian Armoured Brigade Training Instruction No 7 – Employment of tanks in jungle warfare, New Guinea

AWM 54, 925/7/5. [Tanks – Reports on:] Armoured Fighting Vehicles Bulletins Nos 4 to 10, 4th Australian Armoured Brigade (n.d.)

AWM 54, 423/13/24. [Intelligence – Technical Summaries:] 4 Australian Armoured Brigade AIF, AFV [Armoured Fighting Vehicle] Bulletins Nos 1 to 14, Equipment, Organisation and General Information

AWM 54, 759/1/3. [Photography – General:] File of photographs showing various types of jeeps – engineers trucks – tank dozers – matilda tanks – stuart tanks – grant diesels – machinery lorries – ambulance – covenanter bridge layers – photos of vehicles on charge – 4th Australian Armoured Brigade

Has Own Video WW2 Soviet Armored Cars

D-8 and D-12

D-12 Armored Car. Illustrations by the illustrious Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.

Soviet Union (1931)
Armored Car – Around 60 Built

During the 1930s, the Soviet Army was rather poorly armed and equipped. The process of introducing new domestic military designs was slow and tedious and was lacking in all regards. Armored cars were in huge demand, and the existing pool of vehicles consisted of obsolete and worn-out vehicles. In 1931, engineer N.I. Dyrenkov proposed his design for a cheap and lightweight armored car to be used purely for reconnaissance operations. Despite some flaws, two similar designs known as D-8 and D-12 would be introduced into service with the Soviet Army, albeit in small numbers.

N.I. Dyrenkov’s cheap and lightweight D-8 armored car. Source: https://modelist-konstruktor.com/bronekollekcziya/broneavtomobili-dyrenkova

A Brief History of the Use of Armored Cars by the Soviet Union

Following the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917, most of its territories were engulfed in a civil war between the Communist Red Army and the Royalist White Army (with several other active “color” armies and outside forces in the mix). Given the vast spaces of Russia, the use of mobile formations that were able to quickly respond to changes in the frontlines became a necessity of great importance. Railways and armored trains saw extensive action. Similarly, armored cars were also put to good use. It must be remembered that these were mostly modified civilian vehicles, and thus their mobility was limited depending on terrain and road conditions. If they were in a good state, armored cars could cross great distances relatively quickly. In addition, their armor and firepower also greatly benefited the units that they supported.

The concept of armored cars was not new to the Russians. In the early 1900s, the Imperial Russian Army showed interest in the potential use of armored cars. Given the underdeveloped local industry, their evolution was limited. Nevertheless, during the First World War, Russia employed some 300 armored cars of various designs and origins. While the use of several completely different designs caused huge logistical issues, their performance was deemed acceptable.

One of the more common domestic designs was the large Garford-Putilov Armored Car. This vehicle was armed with 3 machine guns and one 76.2 mm gun, placed in a rear-positioned turret. Source: Wikipedia

Another common design was the so-called Russo-Balt M. This vehicle was armed with three machine guns, but was very slow, with a maximum speed of only 20 km/h. Source: https://www.reddit.com/r/shittytechnicals/comments/s96u4x/a_russian_russobalt_type_c_armored_car_of_the_1st/

Following the Red Army’s victory, the lessons of this Civil War were not forgotten. Their armored carpool was greatly depleted and the remaining vehicles were in disrepair. Due to their age and different origins (some of these were either supplied or built by the Entente), the acquisition of spare parts was almost impossible. Domestic production was seen as a solution to this issue, but in the 1920s, this was not possible on a large scale due to the underdeveloped Soviet industry, which was incapable of producing such vehicles.

After Stalin came to power, he initiated a series of reforms with the aim of introducing rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union. While the success of these reforms is questionable, they achieved their aim of starting the limited production of military armored vehicles, such as tanks and armored cars.

The first post-war design developed by the Soviets was the BA-27 in the late 1920s. It was a 4×2 armored car that, due to its weight of 4.1 tonnes, had rather limited mobility, being able to reach only 35 km/h on good roads. This vehicle was armed with a 37 mm gun located in a turret mounted on top. Given the general heavy weight, the overall drive performance of the BA-27 was rather poor. A new vehicle that was cheap, easy to build, and offered improved performance was needed.

The first proper post-World War I armored car that entered service with the Red Army was the BA-27. Source: https://www.pinterest.com/pin/708261478871816646/

Dyrenkov’s First Armored Car

A huge boost for Soviet armored car development was an agreement signed with the American Ford company for the license production of the Ford Model A and AA trucks. Ford’s support was vital in opening new production facilities, such as Gorkovskiy Avtomobilniy Zavod GAZ (English: Gorky Automobile Plant) and Zavod imeni Kommunisticheskogo Internatsionala Molodezhi KIM (English: Communist Youth International) in the early 1930s.

The licensed-produced Ford A civilian car was known in the Soviet Union as the GAZ-A. Source: Wiki

At that time, GAZ engineer N.I. Dyrenkov, an armored car enthusiast, began working on his own project. He was particularly interested in the license-built Ford A/AA chassis, which he deemed adequate to be used as a base for a new armored car. Dyrenkov wanted to design his vehicle completely differently to the existing BA-27, starting by removing any unnecessary weight and installing only light armament. This vehicle was to be used purely for reconnaissance, thus the armament was to be used only for self-defense. After some time spent drafting the first drawings and calculations, Dyrenkov approached the engineers at KIM with his proposal, to which they agreed.

By mid-1930, the project was going at a good pace and the work on the design of this vehicle was finished rather quickly. It was to be based on the Ford A 4×2 chassis and, in contrast to the BA-27, no turret nor gun armament would be used. The new vehicle was designated simply as D-8 (D stood for Dyrenkov) and was finally ready in 1931, when it was presented to the Soviet Army to be tested. During these trials, several problems with the D-8 were noted. The 4×2 drive was insufficient and provided poor off-road drive, crew visibility was limited, and the four machine gun ports were rather cumbersome and difficult to use. Despite all of these, the production order was given. The decision to put it into production probably lay in the fact that the D-8 had a very simple design and was cheap to build.

The D-8 prototype had some features that would be discarded in the later production versions, such as the use of two side machine gun ports located just behind the two large hatches. Source: Wiki

Design

Chassis

The D-8’s hull consisted of a front-mounted engine and a central crew compartment. It was built using the chassis of the Ford A civilian car. Before it could be adopted for military use, some changes were necessary. These included reinforcing the axles and suspension in order to cope with the extra weight. Each of the axles was suspended using semi-elliptic springs. The D-8 had a wheelbase of 2.63 m and used 5.50 x 19 size tires. Mechanical brakes were provided on all four wheels.

Engine

The D-8 was powered by a four-cylinder Ford A engine, delivering 40 hp @ 2,200 rpm. With an empty weight of 1.58 tonnes (full combat weight was 2 tonnes), the D-8 was capable of achieving maximum road speeds of up to 85 km/h. As it did not have all-wheel drive, its off-road performance was quite limited. In this case, its maximum speed dropped to only 30 km/h. Fuel capacity was 40 litters and this provided a maximum operational range of 22 km and a 120 to 180 km off-road.

The D-8 was powered by a 40 hp strong Ford engine. With this engine, the D-8, on good roads, was able to reach a speed of 80 km/h. Source: https://en.topwar.ru/147670-rasskazy-ob-oruzhii-broneavtomobil-d-8.html

To overcome the overheating problems due to the additional extra weight, Dyrenkov added an armored cowl positioned under the engine compartment. Essentially, it provided a steady flow of air to the engine, despite the front armored louvers being shut.

Despite having a solid performance when driving over good roads, the off-road drive was more problematic. This was mostly due to the fact that the D-8 did not have an all-wheel drive. Source: http://denisovets.ru/brone/bronepages/d8.html

Superstructure

The D-8’s superstructure was made using angled armored plates which were welded together. One noticeable feature of this design was the highly angled rear part of the vehicle. On the front part of the engine compartment, a protective louvered grill was placed. On the engine sides, two two-part hatches were installed. These were used by the crew to gain access to the engine for necessary repairs. The enclosed crew compartment was provided with two doors, one located on each side of the vehicle. These opened to the front to provide the crew with some level of protection when they exited the vehicle’s interior. Each of them had a small vision port.

Originally, there were four machine gun ports, each placed on one of the four sides. Their purpose was to provide the crew with an all-around firing arc. In reality, the gunner had trouble removing the machine gun and traversing it to another firing position. For this reason, the side machine gun ports were removed. Instead of them, simple round shaped (or in some cases square) armored covers were placed. The front machine gun port was protected by a folding armored plate. The rear-positioned port was protected with two round-shaped folding armor plates. A driver-folding vision port was located on the left vehicle side. Lastly, on top of the crew compartment, a hatch was placed. A spare wheel was held on the left side of the superstructure.

The D-8’s superstructure used many angled armor plates. This was most obviously apparent for the rear-positioned armor plates. Source: https://en.topwar.ru/147670-rasskazy-ob-oruzhii-broneavtomobil-d-8.html

The front part of the engine compartment was protected with a louvered grill. On the sides of the engine compartment, two two-part hatches were installed. Notice the round-shaped covering for the D-8 side machine gun ports (just behind the Swastika markings). This particular vehicle was captured and put to use by the Finnish soldiers. Source: http://military-angar.ru/hists/view/40

Armament

From the start, engineer Dyrenkov decided to ditch the idea of using a gun-armed turret. He designed his vehicle primarily to fulfill the role of reconnaissance. It was not to engage in offensive actions, instead, its purpose was to gather intelligence on the enemy. If the D-8 had to be used in combat, for the vehicle and crew’s defense, a 7.62 mm DT machine gun was to be used. Given the lack of a turret, in order to have the best possible firing arc, Dyrenkov decided to use four firing ports placed on each side of the D-8. In theory, this solved the issue of lacking a turret. In reality, during testing, the use of the side machine gun ports proved difficult. The use of the side-firing ports was quickly abandoned.

When the prototype was presented to the Soviet Army, Marshal Kliment Voroshilov insisted that a second machine gun be placed facing the rear of the vehicle. The use of two machine guns inside the cramped interior caused more problems than it was worth. The commander had trouble operating these two, as he had to often change his position, which was not easy to do. The ammunition load consisted of 4,158 rounds of ammunition. Around a third of this ammunition consisted of armor-piercing rounds.

A close-up view of the rear-positioned machine gun port. Source: https://en.topwar.ru/147670-rasskazy-ob-oruzhii-broneavtomobil-d-8.html

Armor

Given its lightweight and small size, the D-8 was only lightly protected. The front and side armor plates were 7 mm thick. The top and rear armor were 6 mm and the bottom was only 3 mm thick. The use of angled armor plates provided an additional level of protection. Despite the angled armor, the D-8 was only fully protected against small caliber rounds and fragments. Any kind of dedicated anti-tank weapon could easily take out this vehicle. Another major defensive factor was the vehicle’s relatively small size. It had a length of 3.54 m, a width of 1.7 m, and a height of only 1.68 m.

Crew

The crew consisted of only two: the commander, who was also the machine gun operator; and the driver. The driver’s position was on the left and the commander was on the other side. The commander was quite overburdened with the different tasks that he had to perform. Besides his commanding role, he also had to act as a spotter and take care of the machine gun (firing, changing positions, and loading). This greatly limited his effectiveness in combat situations. Due to the vehicle’s small size, adding one more crew member was not possible. The commander was not provided with a command cupola, instead, he would have to use the top hatch to observe the surroundings. This made him somewhat exposed to potential enemy fire. Despite its basic design being meant for reconnaissance operations, the D-8 was not provided with radio equipment.

Airborne Operations

Thanks to its low combat weight, the Soviets decided to use the D-8 to test the idea of transporting armored vehicles by air. For this purpose, a TB-3 heavy bomber was modified by adding a specially designed connecting frame (just beneath the aircraft’s fuselage) that would hold two D-8s (facing each other).

This contraption was successfully tested during a military airborne training exercise held in Ukraine in 1934. The modified TB-3 bomber easily transported these two armored cars. The dismounting of the D-8 was reported to be quite simple too. This modification proved to be successful, and, in 1936, the Soviets changed the organizational structure of airborne brigades to include nine D-8 armored cars. Nevertheless, it appears that little was done to achieve this, as by 1937, only one brigade actually received these vehicles. Even this one unit received only 6 D-8 armored cars. Eventually, after only one year, the whole D-8 airborne concept was canceled.

The large TB-3 bomber received a modified fuselage in order to transport two D-8 armored cars. Thanks to their small size and low weight, this was achieved without any major problems. Source: http://denisovets.ru/brone/bronepages/d8.html

Close-up side-view of the D-8 when it was connected to the TB-3 fuselage. Source: https://war-book.ru/d-8-broneavtomobil-2/

A rear view of the same installation. The whole concept appears to have been a success but, eventually, the whole concept was canceled. Source: http://denisovets.ru/brone/bronepages/d8.html

Further Development of the D-8

A few D-8s would be used to test the installation of a fully protected turret in 1932. The installation proved to be promising and its further development led to the introduction of the FAI armored car.

Futher development lead to the introduction of the FAI armored car. Source: https://soldat.pro/en/2018/09/28/rasskazy-o-vooryjenii-broneavtomobil-fai-m-jd/

Another proposal included adapting the D-8 to be able to drive over rail tracks. The modification was more or less simple and involved adding four new steel wheel frames. These were actually placed around the original D-8’s wheels. While one vehicle was tested, the project was abandoned. The likely reason for this was the limited firing arc of the D-8 machine gun port. When on railway tracks, the D-8 was unable to engage targets that were approaching it from the slides.

One D-8 was modified to be used as a railroad scout car. Note the added round metal wheels. Source: https://вездеход-снегоболотоход

A close-up view of the modified D-8. Source: https://en.topwar.ru/147670-rasskazy-ob-oruzhii-broneavtomobil-d-8.html

The Improved D-12

Once the D-8 entered service, engineer Dyrenkov already set himself a new task of developing a slightly improved version. The lack of a turret greatly limited the combat effectiveness of the D-8. As installing a fully armored turret would likely add more weight and thus reduce the drive performance, Dyrenkov decided on another approach. The D-8’s top was left open and a small machine gun mount was placed there. This vehicle was designated as D-12. Its purpose was to provide firing support and to act as an auxiliary anti-aircraft vehicle.

The new armament consisted of one hull-positioned DT machine gun and one 7.62 mm 1910 Maxim water-cooled machine gun placed on this new mount, although some vehicles were armed with two DT machine guns instead. The ammunition load for the Maxim was 2,090 rounds and 2,079 rounds of ammunition for the DT. The commander of the D-12 was also the operator of the hull and the top-mounted machine guns. Given that no protection was provided, the gunner would be completely exposed to enemy return fire, making use of this machine gun very dangerous.

More changes also included simplifying the rear superstructure armor plate’s design. With this modification, the vehicle’s combat weight was increased by 280 kg. In addition, the height of the vehicle rose to 2.52 m.

A side view of the D-8. Dyrenkov wanted to further increase the offensive performance of his vehicle, so he added a fully traversable machine gun mount on top of the superstructure. The development leads to the introduction of the later D-12 model. Source: https://360carmuseum.com/en/museum/56/exhibit/2957

In comparison, the side of view of the later D-12. Notice the added machine gun mount on top of its superstructure. Furthermore, the D-12 received simplified rear armor plates. Other than these, the two vehicles were basically the same. Source: https://war-book.ru/d-12-broneavtomobil/

The top machine gun mount offered the gunner a 360º firing angle. Given the lack of any kind of armor, the gunner was completely exposed to enemy return fire. Source: https://war-book.ru/d-12-broneavtomobil/

As the D-8, the later D-12 was initially provided with the side machine gun ports. These would be abandoned on production vehicles. Source: https://war-book.ru/d-12-broneavtomobil/

The primary armament of the D-12 consisted of a top-mounted Maxim machine gun. Not all vehicles were equipped with this machine gun. Smaller numbers were instead equipped with a DT machine gun. Source: https://war-book.ru/d-12-broneavtomobil/

Production

While KIM was involved in designing the D-8 and the later D-12, production of these was carried out by the Izhorskiy plant. How many were actually produced is not quite clear in the sources, as these only mention that they were built in small numbers. Some sources, such as J. Prenatt, (Soviet Armored Cars 1936-45) suggest 60 vehicles were built.

In Service

The D-8 and D-12’s service life was quite brief. They were mostly used on military parades but also saw some limited combat action. After 1932, these two models were mostly replaced with the FAI armored car. By 1938, most if not all were allocated for training purposes.

Some sources claim that the D-8 and D-12 saw combat in the Spanish Civil War and during the Soviet invasion of Poland. In either case, there is no actual proof to confirm this. They did see service during the Winter War of 1940 between the Soviet Union and Finland. At least 3 D-8s from the 9th Army were lost around Karelia. The Finnish forces even managed to capture at least one D-8, which they reused, but its use was likely quite limited due to a lack of spare parts.

The Finns captured at least one D-8. It was put to use by the Finns but it did not stay long in active service. Source: https://jamesbond.fandom.com/wiki/D-8_armoured_car

By the time of the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, there were some 45 D-8 and 12 vehicles distributed to various military districts. For example, Moscow’s Military Districts had 8, Leningrad 3, Orel 1, and Krakow as many as 14. Nearly all were out of service awaiting repairs. If they were used against the Germans is unknown, but generally unlikely given their poor state of repair and low numbers.

Some of the D-8s and D-12s were allocated to Mongolia, a Soviet ally. The last such vehicle was seen during a victory parade held in Mongolia in September 1945.

The D-8 was often seen in various Soviet-held military parades. Source: http://denisovets.ru/brone/bronepages/d8.html

A D-8 and D-12 on a military parade held in Mongolia in September 1945. Source: J. Kinnear Russian Armored Cars 1930-2000

Surviving Vehicles

Given the limited numbers built, it is somewhat surprising that a D-8 has survived to this day. One vehicle is part of the Slawa Lehn Collection in Moscow.
In addition, there are a few reproductions that can be seen at the Central Museum of the Second World War in Moscow or at the Battle Glory of the Urals Museum in Verkhnyaya Pyshma.

A D-8 from the Central Museum of the Second World War, Poklonnaya Gora. Source: https://360carmuseum.com/en/museum/56/exhibit/2957

Conclusion

The D-8 was a simple and cheap design, had satisfactory driving performance when used on good roads, and possessed angled armor. On the other hand, it also had a number of flaws in its design. The armament, which consisted of two machine guns, was awkward to use in the D-8’s cramped interior. The commander was simply overburdened with the many tasks that he had to perform. The off-road performance was quite poor. Nevertheless, it provided Soviet engineers and soldiers with experience in designing or operating such armored cars.

D-8 Armored Car. Illustrations by the illustrious Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.

D-12 Armored Car. Illustrations by the illustrious Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.

D-8 Technical specification
Crew	Commander/Gunner, and Driver.
Weight	2 tonnes
Dimensions	Length 2.65 m, Width 1.83 m, Height 1.47 m
Engine	40 hp
Speed	80 km/h (road), 30 (cross-country)
Operational range	225 km/h (road), 150 (cross-country)
Primary Armament	Two 7.62 mm DT machine guns
Armor	3 to 7 mm

Sources

J. Prenatt (2020) Soviet Armored Cars 1936-45, Osprey Publishing
J. Kinnear (2000) Russian Armored Cars 1930-2000, Darlington Production
J. F. Milson (1973) Russian Armored Cars (to 1945), AFV Weapons Profile
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-SSSR, Beograd
S. J. Zaloga and J. Grandsen (1984) Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicle of World War Two, Lionel Leventhal
A.G. Solyankin (2002) Отечественные бронированные машины. XX век Том 1, Цейхгауз

United States of America/Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1970) Movie Prop Tank – 3 Tanks Modified For The Role

“A Sherman Can Give You a Very Nice…Edge”

“Nobody Said Nothing About Locking Horns with no Tigers…”

Oddball’s M4s in Detail

Armament

Loudspeaker

Engine

Stowage

Prop Tigers

Conclusion

Sources

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Main Battle Tank – ~650 Built

Introduction

Birth of a Tank Army

Sitting on Two Chairs

Program “Kapela”

Soviet Backbone

Foreign Assistance

The Cost of Doing Business

Design of the M-84

SUV-M-84

Soviet Pot, Yugoslav Kettle

Main Armament

Secondary Armament

Ammunition

Protection

Engine and Transmission

Suspension

Crew and Training

Yugoslavian Variants

T-72MJ Prototype Series

Zero Series Tanks

First Series

Second, Third, and Fourth Series

M-84A

M-84AB

M-84K and M-84AK

Production Numbers

M-84AI

Service during the Yugoslav Wars

Slovenian Territorial Defense and the Ten Day War

Croatian Army and the Civil War in Croatia

JNA in Yugoslav Wars

Republic of Serbian Krajina

Republika Srpska

Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Yugoslavian Army

Service Outside of Yugoslavia

Kuwait Army

Iraqi Republican Guard

Combat Performance Assessment

Damage Assessment and Repairs

Foreign Interest and Testing

Soviet Union

State of Libya

Republic of India

Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Islamic Republic of Iran

Current Operators and Modernization Programs

Republic of Serbia

M-84AB1

M-84M

M-84AS1/AS2

Hibridni Artiljerijsko Raketni ProtivAvionski Sistem

Republic of Croatia

M-84A4 Sniper

M-95 Degman

M-95 Cobra ATGM Carrier

Republic of Slovenia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

State of Kuwait

Conclusion

M-84/M-84A Specifications

Sources

German Reich (10th Panzer-Division, Infanterie-Regiment Großdeutschland, 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”) vs France (25th Senegalese Tirailleurs Regiment)

Le Vol Noir des Corbeaux: German Forces March Through France

On the Backline of Alpine Troops

Defenders Thrown Away in a Collapsing France

United States of America/Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1970)
Movie Prop Tank – 3 Tanks Modified For The Role

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Main Battle Tank – ~650 Built

France/Federal Republic of Germany (1955?-1961)
Anti-Tank Reconnaissance Vehicle – 1 to 2 Prototypes Built

German Reich (1939)
Heavy Tank – 4 Built + Components For 4 Additional Vehicles