Wan Cheng 2/萬乘二. Illustration done by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha, funded by our Patreon campaign.
Republic of China (Taiwan) (1975)
Fire Support Vehicle – 1 Prototype Built
The Republic of China (中華民國), exiled in Taiwan, was a key US ally in East Asia during the Cold War. Following the defeat in mainland China and Hainan during the Chinese Civil War, the Kuomintang political party and Republic of China were able to hold out in Taiwan. With mainland China now part of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国), the preservation of this strategic ally in the region meant that the Republic of China would receive large deliveries of American surplus equipment to build up the ROCA (中華民國陸軍/ Republic of China Army) and prevent a potential invasion attempt by the PLA (中国人民解放军/ People’s Liberation Army). Despite international setbacks, such as the international recognition of the PRC and exclusion of the ROC from the UN in October 1971, the republic remained a staunch US ally. From the mid-1970s onward, serious attempts at creating armored fighting vehicles would be started within Taiwan, likely due to the fear of weapons becoming more difficult to import due to the warming up of PRC-US relations. These attempts generally started by combining parts of different American vehicles. One of these would be the Wan Cheng 2 (萬乘二), combining a modified M113A1 hull with an M24 turret.
The ROC’s Imports of American Vehicles
Prior to the defeat and conclusion of most of the Chinese Civil War with the fall of mainland China and Hainan in 1949-1950, the Republic of China had already taken large deliveries of US equipment, notably due to the Second World War.
The first deliveries of American tanks to the now exiled ROC appear to have started with a batch of 25 second-hand M24 Chaffees in 1951, which marked the start of the light tank’s career in Taiwan. In the following years, the Republic of China Army would receive large numbers of M41 light tanks, with 550 second-hand vehicles ordered in 1953, which would be delivered from 1955 to 1959, and later be joined with a further 150 vehicles delivered in the late 1960s. Despite these deliveries of more modern light tanks, the ROCA also received more deliveries of light US armor dated from the Second World War, with a further 275 M24 Chaffees delivered in 1957-1959, as well as 400 M18 Hellcats.
Republic of China Army crews are trained on operation of the M24 Chaffee by an American officer, 1954. Source: https://zi.media/
As for armored personnel carriers, the ROCA would be within the large numbers of operators of the ubiquitous American M113 armored personnel carrier, purchasing 146 M113A1s in the late 1960s (which would be joined by 267 vehicles of the M113A2 variant in the 1980s, years after the Wan Cheng program was finished). In terms of heavier armor, the ROCA would only receive the first M48A1s in 1973, meaning it had to largely rely on lighter US Armor. After they were received, the M48A1s would form the base of heavier armored fighting vehicles developed in Taiwan in the same way lighter vehicles development would start with the M18, M24, M41 and M113.
The Wan Cheng Program
Though local field conversions had existed in the past, including prior to the Republic of China’s exile to Taiwan, local armored fighting development was kickstarted in 1975 by the Republic of China Joint Logistics Command (聯合後勤司令部). This department was in charge of engineering projects since the military engineering bureau of the ROC Ministry of National Defence (中華民國國防部) had been re-attached to it in 1968. This kickstart in activity was likely caused by the appointment of a new commander of the Joint Logistics Command, general Lu Youlun (羅友倫), on April 4th, 1975. Another general of the ROCA, You Shieshi (游傑士), is known to have been involved in military vehicle projects of the era, such as the Wan Cheng. He appears to have been Major Director of the Army Ordnance Development Center (陸軍兵工整備發展中心). This service includes the Armored Vehicles Development Center (戰甲車發展中心), which is the main organisation creating the ROCA’s armored vehicles. As such, You Shieshi was likely more hands-on with the project in comparison to Youlun.
ROCA General You Shieshi, Major Director of the Army Ordnance Development Center. Source: https://blog.xuite.net/ROCA General Lu Youlun, commander of the Republic of China Joint Logistics Command from April 4 1975 to March 31 1977. Source: https://blog.xuite.net/
The local development which would be undertaken from 1975 onward largely started with programs to overhaul or combine elements of American armored fighting vehicles to provide more useful platforms. The most well-known example of a vehicle from this era likely is the Type 64 light tank, combining the turret of an M18 Hellcat, of which the hull was likely very worn out and used up by this point, with the hull of an M42 Duster. Other early forms of indigenous armored fighting vehicle developments within Taiwan include the Type 65 light tank, an attempt to locally produce a copy of the M41 Walker Bulldog, and the diverse Wan Cheng program.
Wan Cheng (萬乘) is an old fashioned literary term which refers to the “Army of Ten Thousand Chariots’. This was a reference to the massive army and power of the Chinese Emperor in comparison to neighboring rulers in ancient China, who were said to rather have “Armies of a Thousand Chariots”. This type of references to old Chinese literature is quite common in the Republic of China.
The program consisted in armored fighting vehicles designs which were created on the base of American armored fighting vehicles, modified in order to improve their capacities or make them able to fulfill different roles on the battlefield. Wan Cheng 1 was an M113 modified to be a 120 mm mortar carrier; Wan Cheng 3 was an M113 modified to carry the indigenous Kung Feng IV (Bee Sting) 126 mm rocket (工蜂四型多管火箭), with two launchers of 20 tubes. Wan Cheng 4 was an attempt at modifying an M48A1 to M48A5 standard, with a 105 mm gun and a variety of other upgrades, though it was far from identical to the American-made M48A5 which the ROCA also operates.
The Wan Cheng 2: The ROCA’s M113 Fire-Support Vehicle
The Wan Cheng 2 was another M113A1-based vehicle.
A view of the Wan Cheng 2 being exhibited; the vehicle to its left appears to be a Wan Cheng 1. Source: War thunder forums
The vehicle can be summarily described as a modified M113A1 hull which was given the turret of an M24 light tank. This may appear an unlikely combination at first sight, but looking further, there are several reasons why such an upgrade may have interested the ROCA. The M24 Chaffee was, by this point, an aging tank, and the hulls in service with the ROCA were likely increasingly worn out and thus harder to maintain, but the turrets may still have been fully functional, and their armament, while obviously not up to the comparison with that of a modern tank, could still provide useful fire-support. Providing fire support on the widely-used M113 hull could be an useful tool to add means of mobile fire-support for M113-based units. Conversions created due to somewhat similar situations or needs have existed in other nations. During the Algerian War, France did fit turrets of mechanically worn out M24s to new AMX-13 hulls to retain their fire-support utility, creating the AMX-US light tank, while Australia would create the M113 Fire Support Vehicle (FSV) by combining the 76 mm-armed turret of the Saladin armored car to the M113A1 hull in the mid-1960s, with the vehicle being used in Vietnam. In the 1970s, at the same time as the ROCA was studying the Wan Cheng vehicles, Australia would double down with the M113A1 Medium Reconnaissance Vehicle (MRV), which used the more modern but similarly-armed turret of the Scorpion light tank on the M113A1 hull. The Australian vehicles are only some of the more professional M113 conversions, and over the years and continents, many different proposals and conversions have popped up to make the M113 hull able to perform fire support duties.
The M113A1 Hull and Modifications
The base M113A1 vehicle is an American armored personnel carrier which is best described as a welded aluminum box, with the shape designed to allow amphibious capacities, with movement in water assured by the movements of the track and no propeller or hydrojet system being present. The engine is installed on the front-right. The original M113 had a gasoline engine, but this had been supplanted by a diesel engine on the M113A1. This was the Detroit-Diesel 6V-53, producing 215 hp at 2,800 rotations per minute. The vehicle had a crew of two, a driver and a commander, who could operate a pintle-mounted M2HB .50 caliber machine gun, and the rear infantry compartment had space for 11 dismounts. Weight of the vehicle could differ from about 10 to 14 tonnes from the entirely empty to the maximum weight, with the standard combat weight being of about 12.3 tonnes.
The Wan Cheng 2’s hull was far from unmodified, with the ROCA’s engineers undertaking significant efforts to make the hull more adapted for a fire support vehicle.
The turret was to be mounted centrally on the vehicle. As such, the front-right mounting of the engine could not be retained, as the engine block would be directly below part of the turret ring. Therefore, the engine was moved to the rear of the Wan Cheng 2’s hull. Following this change in configuration, all the center and front of the hull was lowered, with only the rear of the Wan Cheng 2 hull, around where the engine was located, retaining the original height. The length of 4.86 m and width of 2.68 m were kept. This lowering, as well as the removal of the elements from the dismount compartment likely led to the Wan Cheng 2 hull being lightened by a non-negligible amount in comparison to a base M113A1. This would obviously be more than compensated once the turret was fitted. The armor layout was, in all likelihood, identical to the M113A1 for the hull. It was constructed using H32 rolled aluminum armor, with a thickness of 38 mm angled to 45° (upper front plate) or 30° (lower front plate) from the vertical at the front, 38 mm at the roof, 38 mm at 8 to 9° at the rear, 44.5 mm on the upper sides, 31.8 mm on the lower sides, and 28.6 mm on the floor.
A front view of the Wan Cheng 2. This photo shows the driver’s hatch is retained, how the front of the hull is lowered, and the red sign indicating the vehicle’s prototype status on the front glacis. Source: war thunder forums
With the engine being placed to the rear, the rear ramp was obviously no longer usable to exit or enter the vehicle, and the Wan Cheng 2 would have to be exited through different means. The hatch of the driver, to the front left, was retained, while the turret crew would likely enter and exit through the turret hatches already present on the M24 turret. The front removable cover for access of the engine was still present on the Wan Cheng 2, being pretty much a structural element of the M113A1’s hull construction, but it is unlikely that it would ever be used in anything but maintenance. On this cover, a rectangular sign was placed, with the characters 車試 (Che shi) written in white on red background. On this sign, they were likely to be read from right to left, where they describe an experimental, test or prototype vehicle.
The M24 Turret
On this modified M113A1 hull, the Wan Cheng 2 vehicle mounted a turret taken straight from an M24 light tank.
This turret used a 1,500 mm turret ring, which fit handily on the wide hull of the M113A1 armored personnel carrier. The turret was mounted centrally so as to allow for the driver’s hatch to be retained, while the turret would still sit in front of the higher rear part of the hull. The turret and its gun appear to still have been high enough that the turret could be able to rotate 360°, though there would be little to no gun depression over the rear arc.
The M24 Chaffee turret featured a three-men crew, with the gunner sitting to the left front, the commander behind him, and the loader to the right. The turret featured a large cupola for the commander to the left, and just to its right, a fairly large turret door/hatch. The gunner had no dedicated hatch to exit the turret.
Armor protection for this turret was 38 mm of cast armor to the front, with the cast mantlet also being 38 mm thick. The sides were 25 mm thick, angled at 25° on the right side and 20° on the left. The rear was 25 mm thick, with no angle from the vertical. The roof was 13 mm thick. These figures may seem deceptively similar or even thinner than the hull armor, but this was homogenous steel, which had heavier resistance in comparison to H32 aluminum – though it would also be considerably heavier for the same area and thickness. The turret was electrically rotated, with a turret motor installed towards the front of the turret basket.
The main armament of this turret was the 75 mm M6 gun, which was a lightened version of the M3 used in the M4 Sherman, with about identical performances. This gun could fire the M48 high-explosive round, containing an explosive charge of 680 grams of TNT, at a muzzle velocity of 625 m/s. This was still a quite capable weapon in the fire-support role, which would have deadly potential against recently landed troops which had not yet had the time to dig in deeply. Against armored targets, the gun could fire the M61 and M72 armor-piercing rounds. Both were fired at 618 m/s. Against rolled homogeneous armor, the M72 would penetrate 102 mm at 100 m, 99 mm at 250 m, 95 mm at 500 m and still 86 mm at 1,000 m, at 0° from the vertical. At the same ranges, the M72 could penetrate 190, 102, 92 and 76 mm, being more effective at close range but less at medium ranges and further. These values may seem very low for the 1970s – and if compared to a modern main battle tank, they certainly were – but it should be taken into account that, in case of a landing attempt by the PRC against Taiwan in the 1970s, the first waves’ armored vehicle fleets would overwhelmingly consist of lightly armored amphibious vehicles, such as the Type 63 light tank and Type 63A armored personnel carriers. The PRC was yet to have means to easily send over any significant quantity of heavier armored fighting vehicles in the first waves of an assault, and even the old 75 mm M6 would go through the armor of light amphibious vehicles without difficulty at any combat range.
The Wan Cheng 2 prototype in front of army officials during its trials. On this photo, both the .50 cal that was brought forward, and the .30 cal that replaced it in the turret basket mount can be observed. Source: war thunder forums
The ROCA did not appear to undertake any deep internal modification on the M24 turret, but did modify the external machine gun mount. On the original M24 turret, an M2HB .50 cal machine gun could be installed on the turret basket. It was meant to be used by a crewman standing on the engine deck for anti-air purposes. This configuration did not allow for the commander or loader to use it from his hatch, which was generally disliked by crews. On the Wan Cheng 2, the .50 cal machine gun mount was brought forward, in front of the cupola, which would highly improve the machine gun versatility and its ability to be used upon short notice, particularly against ground targets. It appears that the basket mount was not eliminated, but instead, curiously enough, appears to have been recycled to mount a 30-06 M1919A4 rifle-caliber machine gun. These machine guns were not systematically installed, and indeed, most photos of the Wan Cheng 2 show the vehicle without any.
Performances and Trials
Though many points can be guessed by the features of the M113A1 and M24, the exact specifics of the Wan Cheng 2 are not known, and for example the weight or maximum speed of the vehicle are anyone’s guess. The vehicle very likely had a crew of 4, with a driver in the hull, and a commander, a gunner, and a loader in the turret. Some considerable space would likely still be available inside the hull. The vehicle’s ammunition stowage is unknown but likely had the potential to be significant if the ROCA desired so.
Servicemen observe the Wan Cheng 2 during trials. Source: war thunder forums
The vehicle underwent some mobility and firing trials. During these, it was found that the vehicle could no longer be expected to be fully amphibious. This was likely a consequence of the vehicle being made heavier by the M24 turret – guessing the exact weight of the Wan Cheng 2 is not possible due to the changes which were made to the hull as well as the addition of the turret, but a weight of at least around 14-15 tonnes should likely be expected – as well as the changes in the center of buoyancy.
The Wan Cheng 2 was never adopted by the ROCA. A reason behind this lack of adoption could be that, by the 1970s, the number of M113A1s present in Taiwan was still moderate. As such, consuming part of the fleet in such a conversion, which unlike simpler conversions such as installing mortar or rocket armament, implied some extensive transformations of the hull that in all probability could not be reverted, was viewed as an uncertain venture. This was likely supported by the idea that the combat value of such a vehicle going into the future would be increasingly uncertain.
Conclusion – An Interesting Piece in the Start of Armored Vehicles Production in Taiwan
The Wan Cheng 2 is likely the instance of the Wan Cheng program that has been seen the most by Western armored vehicles enthusiasts, though many do not even know its name and merely consider the vehicle to be an odd M113-M24 Frankenstein’s monster from the Republic of China. In practice, the vehicle was integrated in a whole series of early armored vehicles development starting in the mid-1970s.
An M113A1 with Kung Feng IV rockets, likely considered to be a Wan Cheng 3. Chinese 126 mm rockets were mounted in this fashion on several M113s, though it is unknown if that was in the exact Wan Cheng 3 configuration. Source: https://www.bilibili.com/
These 1970s developments were far from entirely irrelevant. The similarly-dated Type 64 has entered service. Within the Wan Cheng program,the Wan Cheng 1 mortar carrier would evolve into the CM-22, which is still used operationally to this day, and work performed on the Wan Cheng 3 at least led to similar rocket launchers being mounted on some M113s. More significantly, the experience gained on these first attempts to modify American-designed M113s, but also M48s with the Wan Cheng 4, allowed for ROCA engineers to begin gaining experience, which they are known to have used further. The M113-based but modified CM-21 armored personnel carrier reached the prototype stage in 1979, and more than a thousand have been pressed into service since 1982. In the field of tanks, the CM-11 and CM-12, based on American technology from the M48s, M60s and even from the M1 Abrams, have been in ROCA service since around 1990.
Wan Cheng 2/萬乘二. Illustration done by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha, funded by our Patreon campaign.
Wan Cheng 2/萬乘二 Specifications
Length
4.86 m
Width
2.68 m
Weight
Likely around ~15 tonnes
Engine
Detroit-Diesel 6V-53 six-cylinders engine producing 215 hp at 2,800 rpm
Suspension
Torsion bars
Maximum speed (road)
Likely around 60 km/h
Crew
Likely 4 (Driver, commander, loader, gunner)
Main gun
75 mm M6
Secondary armament
Pintle-mounted (front of commander cupola) M2HB .50 cal machine gun
Pintle-mounted (turret basket) .30 cal M1919A4 machine gun
Coaxial .30 cal M1919A4 machine gun
Hull armor
H32 rolled aluminum armor
38 mm at 45° (upper front plate)
38 mm at 30° (lower front plate)
38 mm at 0° (roof)
38° at 8/9° (rear)
44.5 mm (upper sides)
31.8 mm (lower sides)
28.6 mm
Turret armor
Cast and welded steel homogeneous armor
38 mm (front and mantlet)
25 mm (sides and rear)
13 mm (roof)
Panzer IV Ausf.C “320”. Illustrations by Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.
German Reich (10th Panzer-Division, Infanterie-Regiment Großdeutschland, 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”) vs France (25th Senegalese Tirailleurs Regiment)
The crimes committed by German forces during the Second World War are a topic which has received a large amount of attention in the post-WW2 historiography. However, while much has been written, misconceptions still exist, perhaps most notably about which armed forces committed crimes, the Waffen SS, of course, but often also the Wehrmacht, and when and where. While the largest scale crimes took place in the East from 1941 onward, there were already significant atrocities performed earlier in the war, in 1939 and 1940, not just in Poland, but also in France. The Chasselay massacre is a particularly interesting, if very grim, case. An atrocity initially and for decades attributed to either the SS 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf” or the Wehrmacht’s highly politicized Infantry Regiment Großdeutschland. However, the uncovering of previously unknown pictures in 2019 demonstrated the real culprit was the Wehrmacht’s 10th Panzer Division, a unit previously viewed as a much more “regular” formation.
Le Vol Noir des Corbeaux: German Forces March Through France
The Second World War escalated when, beginning on May 10th 1940, German forces advanced through northeastern France and the previously neutral Netherlands and Belgium. The exact details of the early campaign, how German troops were able to encircle the British BEF, Belgian and Dutch armies, and much of the French Army, particularly the French cavalry divisions and much of the best equipped infantry ones, are very well known. However, after the pocket containing these units was closed at Dunkerque, the campaign did not immediately end. While the Allies had suffered a major loss that almost certainly doomed France’s ability to hold its mainland, there were efforts made from mid-May onward to re-establish a defensive line, mostly along the Somme. General Maxime Weygand, who had been the second-in-command to Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied forces on the Western Front in 1918, replaced Maurice Gamelin as the commander of French forces organizing this defense.
A 1940 railway map of France for French schools. Note the location of Dijon and Lyon, as well as the wide-line going through them, marking the Paris to Marseille railway line. This was a major communication axis linking the French capital to the country’s largest Mediterranean port, going through Dijon and Lyon, meaning it visited the three largest French cities. It also was, and remains, a major transit axis by road as well. Source: Piclick FR
On June 5th 1940, after the Dunkerque pocket had been taken, German forces began Operation Fall Rot (Case Red), meant to pierce through the remaining French defensive line and occupy the rest of France. The earliest phases of Fall Rot caused heavy losses to German troops, which have often been forgotten in modern historiography. However, significantly outnumbered by German troops and having lost much of their best equipment at the Dunkerque pocket, French troops soon started to be overrun and encircled, as a lightning-fast German advance through France began. The Normand city of Rouen, and with it the Seine, the next large potential river obstacle after the Somme, were reached on June 9th. As the French government fled Paris, under pressure from municipal authorities, the city was declared open on June 11th to avoid fighting and destruction within the French capital. The German troops seized it on June 14th. German troops also spread to the southeast from the Somme area to the rear of the now useless Maginot Line. On June 16th, the Burgundian capital of Dijon was bombed, before being seized the next day. The troops advancing through Burgundy were those of Panzergruppe von Kleist (Kleist Armored Group), which comprised 4 German corps. At the forefront of German advance south were the Infanterie-Regiment “Großdeutschland” (a Wehrmacht unit, though a highly politicized one, being created from Berlin’s ceremonial guard by National-Socialist authorities following Hitler’s takeover and generally considered to be one of the Wehrmacht units most indoctrinated in National-Socialist ideology), the 10th Panzer Division, and the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”. At a glance, it seemed that within a couple days, German forces could hope to reach Lyon, about 200 km south of Dijon, unopposed, with a direct road (Nationale 6) linking the two cities. Lyon was (and still is) near the position of second largest French agglomeration, having historically competed with the Mediterranean city of Marseille for this position. The city and particularly its agglomeration counted a large amount of industrial, but also academic and cultural facilities.
On the Backline of Alpine Troops
On June 10th 1940, Italy declared war on France and Great Britain, evidently due to the imminent collapse of France, and began an offensive attempt on the French border. However, unlike in the northeast, French troops held Italian troops at bay, due to a combination of easily defensible terrain, significant defensive works already present (the Alpine Line), and good training of French alpine troops. However, the quick advance of German troops in eastern France, evident notably with the fall of Dijon, threatened to smash through the backlines and logistics that enabled the army of the Alps’s resistance against the Italians.
It is largely for this reason that the French High Command decided to attempt to organize a defensive line on River Rhone, with reconnaissance of potentially defensible areas beginning around June 15th. This defensive group was to be commanded by General Jean Tiburce de Mesmay, a veteran of the French cavalry who had served within the French High Command during the First World War. The objective was to establish a 32 km-long defensive line from Crépieux-La-Pape, on the northeast of Lyon’s urban area, to the more rural Tarare, more than a dozen kilometers from the Lyon urban area to the northwest.
A map of the area to the northwest of Lyon, where French troops attempted to establish a defensive line. Note Tarare, the western edge of this defensive line, far to the west on the Nationale 7 road, and Chasselay, near where the 1st Battalion of the 25th RTS is indicated on the map. Source: General François Lescel via the FARAC website.
To defend this frontline, Mesmay had a meager force under his orders: the “Lyon subdivision” as well as troops from a variety of units retreating before the German tide. It was composed of a number of old, retreating soldiers from northern France, conscripts from Lyon and the relatively close city of Saint-Etienne, some undertrained Foreign Legionnaires, and logistic and artillery troops from the Lyon area disorganized without a clear unit structure. Troops from one particular logistical depot which were called into the defensive forces, men of Saint-Etienne’s Depot 131, were reported to be armed with Modèle 1916 rifles (Berthier rifles with extended 5-round magazine), “old machine guns” (likely Hotchkiss model 1914s, still standard within the French Army), but quite shockingly, did not have any protective helmets. An officer of Clermont-Ferrand’s Depot 132, also called into the defensive line, described the state of his men as having “Very little armament, equipment almost nonexistent, apparel lacking”.
Artillery equipment included 10 anti-aircraft 75 mm pieces which had been taken out of their defensive mounts in Lyon and placed on improvised wooden carriages, and which had to be moved by hand without motorized tractors or seemingly even horses. The exact 75 mm gun model is unclear. These could have been modern pieces, such as the Schneider model 1930, 1932, 1933 or 1936, but they could also, and perhaps more likely, be older pieces, such as the model 1915, directly based on the 75 mm model 1897 field gun.
A Model 1932 Schneider 75mm anti-aircraft gun. The 1930s Schneider AA guns generally shared ballistic characteristics and differed in mounts; they were fairly modern, high rate of fire pieces with a muzzle velocity of around 700 m/s. Source: https://www.quartermastersection.com/A 75mm model 1915 anti-aircraft gun; this was a ballistically identical anti-aircraft adaptation of the ubiquitous French 75mm mle 1897 field gun. This older type was still very common by 1940. While definitely outdated against planes, it remains a medium-velocity, high rate of fire gun that could still be of decent use as an impromptu field gun, including against tanks fielded by German forces in 1940 if armor-piercing shells were available. Source: https://www.militaer-wissen.de/
More positively, 8 modern 47 mm SA 37 anti-tank guns were present, recently delivered to the Lyon train station. These were very potent pieces, though also very few when it came to defending a 32 km-long front against multiple armored units. They were delivered without any training, meaning the crews would have to familiarize themselves with the guns as they first used them.
Beyond these disorganized forces, two better organized ones were present. Elements (though evidently not the entire unit, as it was dispersed between varied locations in France, some elements having already fought Germans in Belgium a month prior) of the 405th Anti-Aircraft Artillery regiment (405th RADCA), and, likely the centerpiece of the French defense, the 25ème Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais (ENG: 25th Senegalese Tirailleurs Regiment)/ 25e RTS.
De Mesmay described this regiment as “un bon régiment colonial, intact, frais, et bien armé” (ENG: a good colonial regiment, intact, fresh and well-armed). The unit had been formed in mid-April 1940 near Bordeaux, with battalions that had been shipped to France in late 1939. The regiment comprised three battalions
the 1st had been formed in Thiaroye, 30 km north of Dakar
the 2nd had been formed in Ouakam, in Dakar’s suburbs
the 3rd had been formed in Bamako, the capital of French Sudan, modern-day Mali
The regiment was about 3,000 strong, divided between 71% “indigenous” (black) troops, with the rest being European men in various positions of command, logistics, and organization. The unit was organized within the “Nord-Est” French regimental table. In short, this meant it had 3 fighting battalions, each comprising 3 companies of riflemen and a support company including a machine gun section, a mortar section outfitted with two 81 mm mortars, and an anti-tank section outfitted with two 25 mm SA 34 pieces. In total, and including some additional regimental assets part of three specialized companies (a command, a logistical “hors-rang”, and a heavy assets company) not part of the battalions themselves, the regiment’s noteworthy equipment included 48 heavy machine guns (typically 8 mm Hotchkiss model 1914s), 113 automatic rifles/light machine-guns (FM 24/29s), 9 60 mm mortars, 8 81 mm mortars, 12 25 mm anti-tank guns (SA 34 or SA-L 37), 146 rifles equipped with rifle-grenades, and 6 Renault UE logistical tankettes/tractors.
A likely Interwar era map of French colonial holdings in Western and Equatorial Africa. Note the border of French Occidental and French Equatorial Africa, near the current Niger-Chad border, as well as a number of modern-day borders not being in existence or not being identical, such as the Niger-Chad border or the Saharan borders of Mali and Mauritania. Source: senegal-online.com
It is worth noting here that the name of “Senegalese Tirailleurs” may be slightly misleading. While many of the men were indeed from Senegal, where French colonial authorities were most thoroughly implanted, with Dakar being one of, if not the largest center of French colonial authority in Sub Saharan Africa, recruitment was not limited to this specific subdivision. It extended to all of the AOF (Afrique Occidentale Française – ENG: French Occidental Africa), meaning modern-day Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. In total, by April 1940, about 180,000 Senegalese Tirailleurs were reported to be serving, which would likely have been far too much for Senegal alone to support.
The 25th RTS had been moved to the reserves of the Army of the Alps during spring 1940, being based in Montélimar, south of Lyon. On June 14th, the 3rd Battalion of the Regiment was separated to be given other orders, with the core of the unit given the order to move towards Lyon to take part in its defense, reaching Lyon on June 16th and taking defensive positions from June 17th to 19th. The unit commander was 50-years old WW1 veteran Colonel Bouriand, who had been gravely injured and captured in August 1914. During the Interwar, he had been deployed in Niger, but also Morocco and Syria, where fighting to “pacify” the French protectorates was still taking place.
Defenders Thrown Away in a Collapsing France
The establishment of the defensive line to the north of Lyon took place in particular circumstances, even by the standards of a France in nationwide collapse facing Fall Rot. The 25th RTS had not yet reached its defensive position as French Président du Conseil (ENG: Council President – A position roughly equivalent to a British prime minister, the French 3rd Republic being a parliamentary system where the President mostly had ceremonial power) Paul Reynaud resigned and was replaced by WW1 figure Philippe Pétain. The next day, on June 17th, Pétain transmitted to German authorities that he was seeking an agreement to ceasefire, and pronounced a speech heard on French radios nationwide in which he called for an armistice with words that would remain famous:
“C’est le cœur serré que je vous dis aujourd’hui qu’il faut cesser le combat.”
ENG: It is with the heart clenched that I tell you today that we must stop fighting.
Pétain’s speech hastened an already ongoing process of French troops mass surrendering or ceasing to fight, with the numbers of prisoners taken by German troops increasing dramatically from June 17th onward. In the case of the 25th RTS, this nationwide context of abandonment of fighting was supplemented by local efforts by the municipality of Lyon. On June 18th, Pétain approved a request from Edouard Herriot (the very popular mayor of Lyon, who had been leading the city since 1905, and would resume his role post-war from 1945 to 1957) to declare Lyon an open city, in a move similar to Paris, in order to avoid fighting and destruction within the agglomeration. General Weygang, current commander of French forces, gave the order not to destroy bridges on the Saône and Rhône, the two rivers which meet at Lyon. In practice, the troops preparing the defense of the line to the northwest of Lyon saw the city they were supposed to defend give up on its defense just behind them. There were also efforts by the mayors or officials of some of the smaller localities French troops were preparing to defend north of Lyon, for example in Tarare, to convince commanding French officers to surrender.
The Desperate Defense of Lyon’s Approaches
Despite Pétain’s speech and Lyon being declared an open city on June 18th, defensive preparations did not cease. It had become evident that the meager forces available to General Mesmay, essentially two thirds of a colonial regiment supplemented by a number of disparate soldiers from various sources, could never hope to defend the entire stretch of the 32 km-long frontline. It was instead decided to organize a limited number of defensive positions reinforced as much as possible within the short timeframe the defenders had to prepare, concentrated on the two nationale roads that linked Lyon to the north and west. Straight to the north, the 1st Battalion of the 25th RTS was to hold positions near Nationale Road 6, coming from the Dijon direction, within the localities of Chasselay, les Chères, Lessieu, Crépieu-La-Pape, Neuville-sur-Saône, and Montluzin. The 2nd Battalion was to hold positions along Nationale Road 7, coming from Orléans, to the northwest, notably including locaties such as Lentilly, L’Arbresle, Bully, Tarare, and Fleurieux-sur-l’Arbresle. Crossroads were blocked and fortified, individual foxholes were dug, and a few select bridges were mined. Notably, in Montluzin, around a hundred soldiers took positions within a convent.
Information began to spread on the morning of June 19th that the arrival of German troops was imminent. With defensive positions located on the nationale roads, a constant stream of refugees and soldiers who had lost their units passed through them.
The Nationale 6 Front on June 19th
A rough map of the Nationale 6 area defended by the 1st Battalion of the 25th RTS. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
The first fighting of the 25th RTS happened on positions on the Nationale 6 (1st Battalion, commanded by Commandant Alaury) at around 8 am on June 19th. At that moment, a German column of the Großdeutschland entered Villefranche-sur-Saône, a locality just slightly beyond the French defensive line. Alaury reports that a French motorcyclist arrived at the forefront of the French defensive line at 9:15 am, warning of the impending arrival of German forces. Minutes later, the first German reconnaissance troops arrived. At first a small number of soldiers progressed with a white flag and tried to convince the French that an armistice had been signed and that the fighting was over. French troops followed their orders and began firing on the German scouts, near Montluzin. A French adjutant reported that German troops that had reached the barrage immediately retaliated with submachine guns. The leading German car had been followed by armored cars and trucks loaded with infantry. These were first fired upon by the French, and quickly fired back. This specific location, Montluzin and its convent, included two of the 405th RADCA’s anti-aircraft 75 mm pieces, placed in the convent courtyard. French reports state their fire was very effective, though a piece was swiftly destroyed by opposing fire. Telephone communications with defensive positions on the Nationale 6 were reported as ruptured at around 1 pm. German progression continued, with increased infantry presence in the afternoon. French troops claimed to have destroyed several German armored vehicles. In the early afternoon, French troops were forced out of external positions and into the convent itself. At some locations, Commandant Alaury reported bayonet fighting.
The convent of Montluzin, hosting Sisters of Nevers, an important location of fighting on June 19th. Source: ebay
The Montluzin convent was overrun around 4pm, the vast majority of its defenders having been wounded during the fighting. After the position was overran and French troops surrendered, Senegalese wounded were “finished off” by German troops, the first of many executions on the Nationale 6 front. Casualties on the French side are reported to have been of 50 military and one civilian killed for the French, who claimed to have caused around 40 German casualties.
As the Montluzin convent offered significant resistance, German troops had attempted to circumvent it through the locality of Lissieu, on the other side of the Nationale 6, only to meet another French point of resistance in the small village and on neighboring hill 272. This defending location also sported two 75 mm guns. Fighting took place in Lissieu until the late afternoon of June 19th, when German troops overran French defensive positions around 5 pm, after having destroyed the two 75 mm guns. Executions of Senegalese prisoners were also reported there.
On another crossroad slightly further, German troops were again stopped, this time by the 47 mm anti-tank guns, though these were destroyed after some resistance. However, while progression around the Nationale 6 was slow, German troops managed to circumvent the French defenses by going eastward, where they were able to breakthrough in locations such as Neuville-sur-Saône and Fontaine-Sur-Saône, which were defended by disparate, poorly-trained and equipped Foreign Legion elements. German troops broke through at Neuville around 11 am. By mid-afternoon, German scouting elements were entering Lyon from the east, unopposed, and by 4 pm, they seized the Lyon prefecture in the city center. No resistance was met within the city of Lyon itself.
A Panzer III leading a column of Panzer II Ausf.A within the streets of Lyon, likely in 1940. Source: Le Progrès
However, somewhat paradoxically, while Lyon had fallen, the Nationale 6 segment in front of it was still partially held by the troops of the 25th RTS. Some positions, such as the one in front of Limosnet, encountered German troops but held. Crucially, a single fortified point, Chasselay, was not reached by German troops.
The Nationale 7 Front on June 19th and June 20th
The defensive sector on Route Nationale 7, to the west of Lyon, held by the 2nd Battalion of the 25th RTS, and surviving element of the 131st RI. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
Fighting on the Nationale 7, to the west of Nationale 6, also began on June 19th, but later during the day. In this area, the leading German formation was the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”, which had been following the Nationale 7 road from Nevers, taken on June 16th. The leading elements of Totenkopf reached the western edge of the northern Lyon defensive perimeter in the mid-afternoon at Tarare. The French positions there were held by remnants of the 131e Régiment D’Infanterie (ENG: 131st Infantry Regiment – a standard, European unit). Resistance there was unexpected and the SS troops took some losses, but were able to rapidly re-organize and use support from light armored vehicles and artillery to overrun 131st RI positions first in Tarare, and later in Pontcharra, forcing the remaining elements of the 131st RI to flee south.
Totenkopf troops reached the next major point of resistance at Arbresle. This position was held by the 2nd Battalion of the 25th RTS. The Tirailleurs did not occupy the town due to fears of causing civilian casualties, perhaps due to pressure from municipal authorities, but instead took position at a major crossroad located near the town. At around 6 pm on June 19th, Totenkopf troops entered Arbresle and found it empty, before coming under fire from French positions at the eastern exit of the town. Intense combat took place on the evening of June 19th and continued at a lowered intensity, but never completely stopped, during the night, seeing German troops stuck in Arbresle against the French position at the neighboring crossroad. French positions were subject to significant artillery fire which also spread into the town.
Orders to retreat were given to the entire 25th RTS from 4:32 pm onward, with more following during the evening and night, from June 19th to June 20th. However, with the unit already engaged, a complete retreat was found to be barely possible, and at best, the troops retreated to the next position still held within the defensive line.
Fighting resumed at high-intensity on the morning of June 20th, with SS troops having to finish taking the French positions at the Arbresle crossroad, then onto the directly neighboring villages of Fleurieux and Eveux, which had a commandeering position on the south of the Nationale 7 road. In the late morning, German troops faced the final resistance of two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 25th RTS at the entrance of Lentilly, on a plateau to the west of Lyon. Anecdotally, a French commander wrote that German troops assaulted the French marching and chanting, seemingly not expecting intense fighting this late in the campaign and perhaps having been informed of the fall of Lyon, and that losses were heavy for both sides. The last French troops there were overrun around 2 pm. The prisoners taken were grouped into three categories and treated accordingly. European officers were taken aboard trucks towards Tarare to be taken into custody. European men of the rank and NCOs were taken towards Tarare on foot. Lastly, the African prisoners, numbering 28, according to General François Lescel, were immediately shot.
The Nationale 6 Front on June 20th: The Battle of Castle Plantin
A historic postcard of Chasselay’s castle, more akin to a manor than a fortification. It still exists to this day. Source: PicClick FR
Back to the Nationale 6 front, to the east of the Nationale 7 and more directly north of Lyon, during the late afternoon and evening of June 19th, remaining elements of the 1st Battalion were regrouped under Captain Gouzy. Having taken very high losses during the day, with several defensive points overrun outright, Capt. Gouzy decided to regroup his troops within one last defensive point, rather than several dispersed ones, in order to resist for as long as possible. While the defensive line always had more of a delaying than a stopping role, with the fall of Lyon behind the defending troops, it was evident that the best they could do now was hold German units attacking them in place for as long as possible, and evidently this would be best done with a single, as strong as possible position, rather than a number of dispersed ones that would be too undermanned to hold for long.
French troops gathered in Chasselay. More precisely, they did not occupy the town of Chasselay, but rather the small castle of Plantin, within the municipal area of Chasselay but not within the town itself. The castle was hastily fortified as best as could be done by remaining troops during the night.
Fighting resumed in the mid-morning of June 20th, as a German reconnaissance patrol was spotted and fired upon by Tirailleurs. It appears German troops were once again not expecting resistance this late into the campaign and with Lyon having fallen behind the French defensive line. The main German assault on the castle of Plantin began around 1:30 pm, from the two localities of La Chère and Montluzin taken the previous day. German troops meticulously searched the town of Chasselay, unoccupied by French troops, before launching an infantry assault supported by armor on the castle of Plantin around 3 pm. The small position held for an hour. Around 4 pm, with most men out of ammunition, Capt. Gouzy ordered his last defenders to surrender. German troops entered the castle, and captured a total of three officers (including Gouzy), two European NCOs, three European men of the rank, and 51 African Tirailleurs.
A few remaining elements of the 25th RTS were able to escape the battles around the northern Lyon defensive line, and were located far to the south, in Ardèche, when the armistice signed on June 22nd entered in application on June 25th.
The Chasselay Massacre: Prisoners Executed by Tanks
(Warning: this section is by default collapsed due to photos in it, as their content can be very grim and graphic. Click to open.)
The most well known massacre of the Lyon region was undertaken on a road between Chasselay and Les Chères on June 20th. It was this well known in large part because it had French surviving witnesses, in the form of European prisoners. French Adjutant Rauquier wrote the following statement, which was kept in French military archives. This statement is here coupled with a number of photographs from the event.
“The next day, the 20th, around noon thirty, all personnel of the defensive position grouped themselves in the castle, German reconnaissance having entered Chasselay in the morning. Around 1:30pm, fighting began in Chasselay, lasting around two hours; then, faced with the number of German troops and the arrival of tanks; the captain gave orders to cease fire. The Germans gathered us on the small road next to the castle; at this moment, a German fired multiple shots, and Captain Gouzy was hit in the thigh [Note: it has been claimed that this was because Gouzy protested rough treatment of his men; it has been claimed at times that Gouzy was shot in the knee rather than the thigh, he in any case survived]. The three officers [Captain Gouzy, Lieutenant Bigois, and sous-lieutenant Paguer, the last of whom was wounded in the fighting] were separated from us and we departed, the blacks first, towards Les Chères. There were 16 European NCOs and men of the rank, and 57 or 58 indigenous men, who walked between two tanks.
German soldiers advancing and giving orders as the Tirailleurs walk by the side of a Panzer IV tank. Note German soldiers have bayonets fixed. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinAfrican Tirailleurs walking. In his conference, historian Julien. Fargettas noted the visible anguish, discomfort, and fear in their faces. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
Around 800 m away from Chasselay, on the road to Les Chères, the column was stopped and the indigenous (black) men led to a pasture that bordered the road, their backs towards said road.
The Tirailleurs are taken to a pasture bordering the road they were marching on. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
At this moment, a German, of whom I couldn’t make out the rank, gave the Tirailleurs a sign to flee into the countryside; The first few men had barely started moving when the machine guns of the tanks, still on the road, began to crackle and bring down our tirailleurs with no mercy.
One of the German tanks, a Panzer IV Ausf.C, opens fire into the pasture. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinTwo Germans tanks around the moment they opened fire into the pasture. Note the clearly identifiable Panzer IV Ausf.C “320”. Fargettas noted the apparent calm of the German men, with the tank’s commander and a crewmember seeming to converse with a soldier outside the tank. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinIn this exceptionally tragic photograph, African Tirailleurs are seen running while under fire from German tank machine guns. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
Along them, a few Germans fired with rifles on fleeing tirailleurs.
The pile of bodies left in the pasture after the execution. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinOne of the tanks pursues fleeing Tirailleurs. It has sometimes been claimed that it went over the pile of bodies, possibly crushing some, which does not seem improbable seeing its trajectory. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinA last, more focused picture showing some of the massacre’s victims. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
Finally, the tanks fired with their main gun into the pile of lying corpses. One of the tanks then left the road, pursuing the men who had managed to escape the massacre. I think only a few escaped. Some of the Germans also took photographs. Then, they took us to Les Chères, and on the way, I saw bodies that were still twitching”
For decades, this testimony of an European adjutant was the most detailed breakdown of the events that took place at Chasselay. His testimony provides some precious details, but tragically, does not clearly identify the unit which committed the crime. The crime was typically assumed to have either been committed by the SS Totenkopf Division, or the highly politicized Wehrmacht Großdeutschland Regiment. With no clear indicator, this was where most writing on this particular massacre ended, until 2019.
A Breakthrough Uncovering a Wehrmacht Crime
More information about the Chasselay massacre would emerge from a totally unexpected source in 2019. That year, a photograph enthusiast from Troyes, in Champagne, hundreds of kilometers from Chasselay or Lyon, purchased a photo album that had belonged to a German soldier, seeking pictures of Troyes from the occupation era. He ended up surprised to find previously unknown pictures that showed, in detail, the execution of a massacre. This would soon be linked to the Chasselay massacre, with a terrain feature being identified as a large hill that commandeers the town of Chasselay.
This photo, likely taken before the massacre, shows Panzer IV Ausf.C 320, present on later photos, entering the town of Chasselay. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinA following Panzer IV Ausf.D, as evident by the fenders not being bent in the same way, from almost the same position. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinA Panzer III Ausf.E or Ausf.F, part of the same series of photographs and likely taken within the town of Chasselay. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
Beyond just being identified as showing the Chasselay massacre, the pictures actually allowed for something that previously could not be done, identifying the German unit which committed the massacre. The markings of a particular German tank, Panzer IV Ausf.C 320, allowed it to be identified as a tank of the 2nd Section of the 3rd Company of Panzer-Regiment 8, part of the 10th Panzer-Division, a Wehrmacht unit, arguably the least overtly political of the three units known to have fought against the French defensive line.
The finding of these pictures made a lot of news, notably being on a front cover of Le Monde, one of the most read French newspapers. From what is known, the photographer was not actually part of the 10th Panzer-Division, but of a German rearguard, logistical unit. How exactly he found himself at the location of the massacre, or why precisely he decided to document it, is unknown, but his photographs have undoubtedly proved extremely valuable to historians studying the events of Chasselay.
Amidst a Nightmare of Crime: Attempting to List the Executions
In a 2022 conference on the fighting and executions in the Lyon area, French historian Julien Fargettas, who has long worked on the topic, attempted to establish a list of known executions:
“The first executions took place as early as the fall of the Montluzin defensive position on June 19th. One of the Sisters of Nevers, still there, describes a “furor” animating the German soldiers seizing the convent. All the buildings were searched, with wounded Tirailleurs being “finished off” on the convent’s terrace. The next day, several bodies with entry and exit holes through the skull were found in the convent. The corpses of four artillerymen (European men of the 405th RADCA, who manned the anti-aircraft guns) were found near the convent, by the side of a pond.
Progressively, the furor is replaced by “colder” crimes. Eight soldiers of French origins from the 25th RTS, including two officers, captured at the convent, were taken more than 400 m from the convent and shot against the wall of a garage, where their bodies were found days later. Executions followed on Nationale Road 6, towards Lyon where prisoners were to be taken. Two Tirailleurs were executed at Champagne-au-Mont-D’Or, at the meeting point of Louis Tourte Street and Lanessan Avenue. Five other Tirailleurs are executed at 2, Avenue Lanessan, in the same municipality. When exhumed, their bodies had their hands and feets impeded by iron wire. A bit further, towards Vaise, 27 Tirailleurs were shot against the wall of an orphanage on a small street. The next day, June 20th, summary executions followed on the other part of the front, near the Arbresle heights [the Nationale 7 front manned by the 2nd Battalion]. In Eveux, where tirailleurs resisted, three were found on a pile of manure. The civilian owner of the neighboring house was found dead, shot in the head. Fourteen corpses of Tirailleurs were found in the municipality of Eveux, without the circumstances of their death being clear. Five more tirailleurs were executed at Florieut, on the Arbresle. On the same day, 13 others were captured at a property in Lentilly; they were forced to stay lying on the town square until the late afternoon, and were then taken outside the town and shot in the unincorporated locality called La Rivoire. Three other Tirailleurs were shot within the town. In Lozanne, eight Tirailleurs were captured and immediately shot according to correspondence from the mayor of the time. Prisoners taken in this sector [Nationale 7] were taken towards Tarare. Other executions took place along this road. Two Tirailleurs in Bully; two others in Saint-Romain de Popey; four Tirailleurs at Pontcharra-sur-Turdine; a Tirailleur at the exit of Arbresle; finally, the same day, a Tirailleur is shot at Marcy-Les-Toiles
After describing these initial events, Fargettas switched to the northern front/Nationale 6, and described the previously mentioned massacre, for which he mentions around 50 victims, noting that 48 bodies can be counted in the field.
Three days later, three other Tirailleurs are executed in plains in the neighboring department of Loire. From 24th to 26th, a column of prisoners marched towards Dijon. On June 24th, six Tirailleurs of this column were shot in Fleurieu-sur-Saône. On the same day, a Tirailleur is executed in Guéreins. Finally, on June 26th, two Moroccan soldiers were shot.
This grim panorama couldn’t be complete without the mention of three civilians, two of whom were Algerians and the other a Black African, shot in the basement of the Rhone prefecture [in Lyon]. No one knows why they were arrested; they were taken to the basement on June 20th and shot under the eyes of French policemen who would later testify to the event.
Between June 19th and June 26th, at least 170 soldiers were executed by German troops in the Lyon region and neighboring departments; around 80% were African Tirailleurs. It is worth noting not all captured Tirailleurs were executed; some were taken to the German prisoner camps, the Frontstalags, within occupied France, as African prisoners were not to be taken into Germany proper. How many prisoners were taken into these camps is unknown, as the archives of the regiment [the 25th RTS] accidentally burned in 1944”
A memorial to the Tirailleurs shot by German troops in Lentilly. Notably, this memorial mentions 18 victims, while Fargettas only lists 16 in Lentilly. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinThe Rhone departmental prefecture in Lyon, in the basement of which three civilians were shot by German troops after the city was occupied. 1901-1902 photo. Source: Wikimedia Commons
Fargettas notes that the deaths of Tirailleurs of the 25th RTS did not entirely stop after June 1940, as a small number of Tirailleurs died in German captivity or transit. He mentions that the last Tirailleurs of the 25th RTS to die in mainland France passed away on March 12th 1946. This Tirailleur, by the name of Guimelly Sené, died in a psychiatric hospital of the Lyon region, of pulmonary tuberculosis and “mental troubles”. His death was recognized as linked to his military service in 1953. This Tirailleur had been taken in 1940 to the German prisoner camps in Châlon-sur-Marne and Saumur, and was then transferred from one hospital to another, notably reported as in the mental hygiene center of Marseille in February 1944, before being taken to Brons, near Lyon, in March 1944. He was said to “show signs of divagation and persecution, and have attempted suicide several times”. His death was only found out by the French Army in January 1953, with the family informed in March, 13 years after Senné had left French Occidental Africa to fight in mainland France.
Known Numbers of the Chasselay Massacre
It is hard to have exact numbers with the victims of Chasselay and other executions and fighting around the Lyon area, especially as some executions might still remain unreported. In a 2022 presentation, Fargettas counted:
61 men executed on July 19th
61 men executed on July 19th
98 on July 20th
3 on July 23rd
7 on June 24th
2 on June 26th
In the same presentation, Fargettas presents an attempt at statistics with the victims of known executions. He established that:
84% of the victims were Senegalese Tirailleurs
8% were European troops
5% were North-African troops
3% were civilians.
Fargettas also attempted to differentiate between different types of executions. Notably, between immediate executions committed in the minutes or very few hours following the capture of a location, typically immediately at said location, out of “frustration” or anger (typically after having encountered unexpected resistance) and more organized executions, which took place in the hours to few days following the capture of prisoner and typically involved taking the prisoners to a secondary location where they were eliminated. He establishes that:
12% of executions were of the type committed immediately after the capture of a position
12% were undertaken between the capture and the transfer of prisoner to another location
72% were undertaken during the transfer of prisoners to another location
The last 4% were “marauders executions” committed on found stragglers or prisoners out of opportunity.
Interestingly, he also attempts to establish statistics on which branches of German forces committed the atrocities. He found that only 29% of executions were committed by troops of the SS (the Totenkopf Division, as well as some detached troops of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler). A total of 71% could be blamed on the Wehrmacht, either in the form of the Großdeutschland or, as in the case of the Chasselay-Les Chères massacre, by the 10th Panzer-Division. At last, 70% of the bodies could be identified with the French equivalent of a military “dog tag”, with 30% staying unidentified.
French Historian Julien Fargettas promoting his book on Senegalese Tirailleurs. Julien Fargettas is considered the leading expert on the topic and has been instrumental in bringing new information to light on the massacre. Source: Booknode
The Reasons for Such a Massacre
Identifying why exactly German troops massacred Senegalese Tirailleurs in the numbers and with the regularity that they did in 1940 would be a complex task that would belong as much to sociology as history. Nonetheless, a number of key factors can be identified.
A first one is, quite obviously, widespread racism against Africans within German media and propaganda, arguably going earlier than even the National-Socialist regime itself. While its focus on Jews has been more thoroughly remembered, Blacks were also discriminated against in 1930s Germany, with elements of Black culture, such as Jazz or the works of black artists being labeled as “degenerate”, and Nazi race theory placing Africans, among others, near the bottom.
Beyond this general anti-black racism was a more focused hate specifically against French colonial troops. German propaganda during WW1 had already underlined the use of African troops by the French and assimilated them to barbarians. This was further extended upon during the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr by French troops, where the involvement of colonial troops in an occupation of Germany raised strong racial anger in the German press, with French African soldiers compared to savages pillaging Germany. The birth of about a hundred mixed German-African babies following this occupation did not ease things. While more than 15 years old by 1940, these episodes were still within German memory and had been widely used by German propaganda.
A German postcard, dated January 1923, showing an African and a Czech soldier of the French Army with the banner “Brutalité, Bestalité, Egalité!” (ENG: Brutality – Bestiality – Equality). Source: Wikimedia Commons
These elements of racial hatred were likely brought to a breaking point by the surprise of facing significant resistance after having made virtually unopposed progress for hundreds of kilometers. A number of executions are reported to have been committed by frustrated or outright angry German soldiers, before more calculated and planned out massacres could be carried out. While the number of European troops from colonial regiments killed was lesser, it is interesting to note that a particular disdain of German troops was sometimes noted against Europeans who fought by the side of Africans or commanded them within the same unit.
There were no orders from German command to massacre colonial troops, unlike massacres which would later be committed by Germans in the East. However, there were also no efforts ever made to punish the perpetrators of atrocities against colonial troops within the German army.
An African Grave in French Lands: the Chasselay Tata
In the days that followed the executions, German troops issued repeated warnings to the population not to touch or bury the dead. Despite this, most bodies would be buried by the local population, within a disparate amount of collective or individual graves in the various localities where executions were committed.
A necropolis would quickly be built, despite the peculiar political situation of occupation France. A WW1 veteran and leader of the departamental branch of the National Office for Veterans and Victims of War, Jen Marchiani, lobbied officials to allow the construction of a memorial site in the months that followed the massacre. When Vichy officials refused to fund the construction, he launched a funding campaign himself, resulting in the construction of the Chasselay tata which was inaugurated on November 8th 1942, days before German troops would occupy Lyon again on November 11th. The cemetery was built in a style inspired by the graveyards of French Sudan (modern-day Mali), with earth from Dakar being brought to Chasselay for the inauguration of the tata. The necropolis was built as close as possible to the location of the massacre on the road from Chasselay to Les Chères.
Surprisingly, the Chasselay Tata was able to be constructed under Vichy, and survived the war. After the liberation of France, the tata was visited on September 24th 1944 by Free French Senegalese Tirailleurs that had fought during the liberation of France. To this day, two yearly ceremonies are organized at the Chasselay Tata, one held by the French Army, and another by French-African students of the Lyon University alongside the families of victims.
A total of 196 soldiers are buried within the Chasselay tata. Of these, 188 belong to African Tirailleurs, six to colonial soldiers from North Africa, and the final two to Foreign Legionnaires, one Albanian and one Russian.
The ceremony in the Chasselay Tata on September 24th 1944. The Tirailleurs wield Enfield 1917 rifles, typical of American-equipped Free French troops. Source: La Tribune de Lyon.The entrance of the Chasselay Tata in recent times. It is interesting to note that, as early as its construction, the tata included not just a Cross and Christian graves, but also Muslim ones, as well as eight fetishist funerary masks sculpted on oak, on the entrance portal. Source: https://www.lesmotsjustes.org/
An Unprosecuted Massacre
For a long time, the exact perpetrators of the Chasselay massacre were not known. It appears that, as a whole, the large number of executions committed around Chasselay from June 19th to 26th were not committed solely by one unit, but rather by soldiers of the Totenkopf Division, Großdeutschland Regiment, and 10th Panzer-Division. Nonetheless, in the case of the execution of around 50 Tirailleurs on June 20th near Chasselay, the 10th Panzer-Division and its Panzer-Regiment 8 are clearly identified.
It is worth noting that the city of Lyon, close to Chasselay, has a very significant history in terms of war crimes trials in France. Most famous is likely the trial of Klaus Barbie, the leader of the Sido-SD’s 4th section – the “Gestapo” – of Lyon during the war. Arrested in Bolivia in 1983, Klaus Barbie was brought for trial in Lyon, where he was the first person to be found guilty of crimes against humanity in France in 1987, being condemned to life in prison and dying in 1991. Perhaps not as famous, but still very significant, was the trial of Paul Touvier, who had been the leader of the Vichy regime’s militia in Lyon. Touvier was found in 1989, after having been in hiding with his family within French evangelical circles, always in relative proximity to Lyon, for 44 years. Touvier was found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to life in prison in 1994, a sentence he served until his death in 1996. Touvier was the first Frenchman found guilty of crimes against humanity.
No individual from either the Totenkopf, Großdeutschland, or 10th Panzer-Division was ever prosecuted, even less convicted, for the war crimes committed around Chasselay. The commander of the 10th Panzer-Division during the campaign of France, Ferdinand Friedrich Schaal, is mostly remembered for taking part in the failed military coup of August 20th 1944. He was not, however, executed. After the war and in the following decades, participation in this event has become the aspect of his life most covered by historiography. Schaal died in Baden on October 9th 1962, aged 73. To this day, he is mostly known as a figure of German resistance, and not as the commander of a unit that committed a massacre.
The commander of Panzer-Regiment 8, Botho Henning Elster, has also mostly been portrayed in a positive light by historiography, after, in September 1944, in command of a significant contingent of German troops attempting to flee southern France and avoid encirclement, he refused orders to apply a scorched earth policy, and negotiated a surrender “with honor” of more than 20,000 German troops that took place at Beaugency, on the Loire, on September 14th 1944. In American captivity, an honorary council of other German officers found him clear of any “dishonorable conduct” after some ardent National-Socialist officers had criticized his surrender. Returning to Germany in 1947, Elster was later offered to help in the creation of the Bundesgrenzschtz (Federal Border Guard of the Federal German Republic), but declined. He is reported to have spent many efforts to rehabilitate his image during the denazification process, until he passed away on June 24th 1952, aged 58, due to a heart attack. As with Schaal, Elster’s image has been untarnished by the Chasselay massacre.
German General Ferdinand Schaal. Source: Mémoires de guerreBotho Henning Elster, by the end of the war, a general. Source: armedconflicts.com
Tragically, the Chasselay massacre would not be the only massacre of Senegalese Tirailleurs during the Second World War. First, executions of prisoners are known for every African unit which fought during the campaign of France. While the 25th RTS suffered the most documented atrocities, some estimations have gone as high as possibly up to 3,000 French colonial troops being executed during the campaign of France. Tragically, even the fall of France would not mean the end of massacres against African Tirailleurs. On December 1st 1944, at Thiaroye, in Senegal, recently repatriated Senegalese prisoners of war that had been liberated by the French staged a protest after they had remained unpaid, with signs the French were trying to underpay them. The protest was repressed by French gendarmerie and colonial troops. French estimates of the time claimed either 35 or 70 were killed, with more modern estimates by Senegalese historians ranging from 191 to several hundreds killed.
Conclusion
The Chasselay massacre, the defense of the northern Lyon defensive line and following executions as a whole, are some of the most tragic and horrifying episodes of the 1940 Battle of France. They saw the almost systematic murder of prisoners of after a town was taken. While some efforts to keep the memory of massacred Tirailleurs were seen just months after the war, the bloodbath has nonetheless been somewhat obscured by history, in the context of German troops committing more atrocities in the East, and in the context of Lyon, where later crimes would be more widely reported on and could be more easily prosecuted, such as the no less horrifying crimes of Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier.
Nonetheless, despite having been obscured for decades, the Chasselay massacre is also an example of how renewed historical interest and finds can still have an impact decades later. Obviously, it is almost certain the perpetrators of the massacre are now dead, with hopes of prosecuting them long gone. Nonetheless, French historian Julien Fargettas has reported how, after the renewed attention the massacre got following the finding of photos in 2019, he was able to identify a previously unknown victim, bringing closure to his daughter, who was born after the Tirailleur had departed for France and never got to know her father. Beyond this specific but noteworthy example, the identification of the perpetrators from photographs also showcases how new historical finds can shake previously assumed knowledge, in this case the massacre not being carried out by SS or highly politicized Großdeutschland troops, but rather by much more “regular” men of the 10th Panzer-Division. One could argue this demonstrates how the myth of a “clean Wehrmacht” had little relation to reality, not just after the invasion of the USSR, but starting from some of the first campaigns of the war.
Panzer IV Ausf.C “320”. Illustrations by Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.
Presentation by Julien Fargettas (Directeur du service départemental de la Loire de l’Office National des Anciens Combattants et victimes de guerre – ENG: Director of the Loire departemental service of the National Office of Veterans and Victims of War) and Baptise Garin (co-author of several works alongside Fargettas) via the CHRD (Centre d’histoire de la résistance et de la déportation – ENG: Center for the History of the Resistance and Deportation): https://www.chrd.lyon.fr/sites/chrd/files/content/medias/documents/2021-06/CHRDLyon_Conference_1940-MassacresRegionLyonnaise.pdf
Series of photographs from an unnamed German soldier
Collection of documents of the Rhone prefecture’s fund, prefect’s office, General department’s archives 1935-1964, made available by the departmental archives of the Rhone and Lyon métropole: https://archives.rhone.fr/document/le-tata-senegalais
William Robin-Detraz. Le Tata sénégalais de Chasselay : ancrage spatial et appropriations de la mémoire des tirailleurs sénégalais. Géographie. 2019: https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-02898135/document
Juin 1940: Combats et Massacres en Lyonnais, Julien Fargettas, Editions du putin, 2020
Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1947 with interleaved suspension. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.
France (1947-1951)
Light Tank – 1 Prototype Built
France was, in the 1930s, a major tank-producing nation in Europe, second only to the Soviet Union and Germany in output. This productive industry, which, while designing tanks that often followed archaic requirements, used modern technology, saw its abilities to continue evolving and producing new vehicles mutilated by the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940. As part of the Compiègne armistice imposed on France, production and design of new tanks was strictly forbidden, and only a few designs, some covert and some designed for potential use by Axis nations, would prop up in the following years – most based on pre-existing technology and hulls which could not match newer vehicles developed by other countries.
France was liberated in 1944, with the new government, at this point under De Gaulle, adamant in its goal to recover French independence and self-sufficiency. Getting the military industry back up was one of several aspects of this policy. It was in this context that, in 1947, the French army would establish requirements for an airborne, 12-tonne light tank armed with a high-velocity 75 mm anti-tank gun with anti-armor capacities; a fairly ambitious prospect. Three manufacturers were approached to design such a vehicle, or at least its chassis: the state workshop of AMX, the old Mediterranean shipyard of FCM, and lastly, the locomotive-turned-tanks manufacturer Batignolle-Châtillons.
A Resurgent Tank Industry
Before the outbreak of the Second World War, France was one of the largest tank manufacturers on the European continent and in the world, second only to two nations which far outmatched France’s population and industrial potential, Germany and the Soviet Union. The defeat of France in 1940, of which inadequate tank designs and use is one of many culprits, led to the country being occupied all the way to the summer of 1944. Outside of a few covert projects undertaken by a secretive organisation of the Vichy regime, the CDM (Camouflage du Matériel/Equipment Camouflage), new developments were practically stopped. The few new designs considered, such as the SARL 42, largely took the basis of elements existing or already being studied in 1940. France was wholefully unable to keep up with the technological advancements that countries with intact or at least functioning tank industries were developing and fielding during the war.
The first ‘new’ French armored fighting vehicle to enter production following the liberation of France, the Panhard 178B, was, in practice, the combination of a hull and gun already in existence in 1940 with a new turret. Source: char-français
Following France’s liberation by the Western Allies and FFI (Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur – English: French Forces of the Interior) uprisings in the summer of 1944, the new French leadership, still under Charles de Gaulle, was very keen on ensuring France’s independence to the best of their capacities. This included resuming work on indigenous armaments projects as swiftly as possible. The first of the post-war designs would be worked on as early as 1944, largely based on pre-war designs and concepts or salvaged German equipment, adapted as best as possible to still be suitable for use in a postwar context. The two best examples of these first attempts at kicking a tank industry back on its feet, the ARL 44 and Panhard 178B, were neither revolutionary nor even truly modern vehicles, yet one could hardly say they were not successful in their roles. The ARL heavy tank was the first true French tank manufactured post-war, helping the industrials get back into shape, while the Panhard 178B not only did the same for France’s most important wheeled armored fighting vehicles manufacturer, Panhard, but also provided an indigenous vehicle to supplement the plethora of American and British types used to maintain a French colonial empire now at the brink of collapse, particularly in Indochina.
Work on these vehicles was well underway by the summer of 1946. The Panhard 178B had entered mass-production, while the ARL 44 at least had a functional vehicle completed, though it would eventually be a far fetch from the production standard. Following this, more ambitious and truly new vehicles could begin to be considered.
It is in this context that, in September 1946, the French EMA (Etat Major des Armées – English: Army General Staff) requested DEFA (Direction des études et fabrications d’armement – English: Armament Studies and Manufacturing Direction), the organism in charge of managing the production of French military equipment, to oversee the creation of an air-transportable reconnaissance vehicle which would weigh 12 tonnes at most. Within the French Army’s technical services, there was a preference for a light tank which would feature heavy armament for its weight, making it able to engage enemy armor, rather than be a more passive, lightly-armed reconnaissance vehicle. Mobility was also an important factor to compensate for the necessarily weak armor such a vehicle would possess. As such, one could describe the vehicle which was envisioned as the combination of a reconnaissance vehicle, a light tank and a tank destroyer. Furthermore, as early as January 1947, additional variants, in the shape of an anti-aircraft vehicle and a self-propelled artillery piece, which were to share a common chassis with the light tank, were being considered.
At this point, DEFA offered the STA (Service Technique des Armées – English: Technical Service of the Armies) the outline of three concepts. All would share an oscillating turret, a concept previously given only minimal attention, but which was viewed as potentially a good option to save weight. The concepts varied in the muzzle velocity of their 75 mm main guns, the goals being 600, 878, and 920 m/s. STA expressed interest in an oscillating turret fitted with the higher muzzle velocity main gun, a concept it accepted on 10th February 1947. By late February, the concept had been passed on to EMA, which set requirements for a 12 tonnes vehicle with a 75 mm gun that could reach at least 850 m/s, and optimally 1,100 m/s. At least 40 rounds were to be stowed within the vehicle. Fuel capacity was to be at least 300 l.
After these few months of back and forth and development of the concept by French Army structures, the requirements were eventually passed on to three manufacturers on 24th April 1947. These were the Atelier Mécaniques d’issy-Les-Moulineaux (AMX, English: Issy-Les-Moulineaux Mechanical Workshop), the Compagnie générale de Construction de locomotives Batignolles-Châtillon (English: Batignolles-Châtillon general locomotives Construction Company) and the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (English: Forges and Shipyards of the Mediterranean). All three had designed armored vehicles pre-war, though Batignolles-Châtillon did not have any production vehicles to its name. AMX had designed the R40, an evolution of the R35, and taken part in manufacturing the B1 Bis, while FCM had also had its own B1 Bis manufacturing chain as well as its own FCM 36 and FCM 2C designs.
The manufacturers were only requested to design the hull, as well as eventually the casemate for the self-propelled artillery version. The turrets for the light tank as well as anti-aircraft vehicles were to be procured from separate manufacturers.
A French Tank on a German-Style Suspension
The first known plans of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t are dated from 31st October 1947. These show a light tank with a more centrally-mounted turret, rather than the rear-mounted turret that was present on both the FCM 12t and the AMX-12t.
A side profile view of the interleaved-suspension 12t proposal. This variant differed very significantly from all other proposals of the program, not only because of its interleaved road wheels, but also because of its use of a centrally-mounted turret and rear engine. Source: char-françaisA top view of the 1947 design. With a driver to the front left and an engine to the rear, this was arguably the closest to classic tank architecture out of all the 12t proposals, but it also looked significantly larger than the other vehicles. Source: char-françaisAn approximately 1.80 m tall crewman standing aside the interleaved version of the 12t. In height at least, the vehicle was fairly low. Source: char-français.
The vehicle had a quite long hull for a light tank, with 5.050 m from the front to the rear of the track run. The height of the hull was of 1.240 m, and the width of the hull itself was 1.630 m, to which each 385 mm-wide set of track should be added, making the vehicle 2.4 m wide in total.
The vehicle’s suspension appears to have used, in this shape, a front-mounted sprocket and a rear-mounted idler. The most peculiar aspect of the suspension, though, would likely have been the road wheels. This early design used a set of seven interleaving road wheels on each side, a suspension-type typically present in late-war German designs, from which the French took heavy inspiration. The four outward wheels, each separated by a middle one, were doubled with another wheel on the inner side of the vehicle, while the middle wheels were single, but noticeably thicker. There was 2.8 m between the center of the first and last road wheel. The center of the first roadwheel was 1.140 m from the front of the track run, and the center of the last roadwheel 1.110 m from the rear of the track run.
Three unfortunately very blurry views of the schematics of the interleaved Batignolles-Châtillon 12T with the SAMM anti-aircraft turret. This turret was integrated into the design work from the very start. Source: Châtellerault archivesSet of plans of the artillery version of the interleaved road wheels Batignolles-Châtillon 12t. Source: Châtellerault archives, provided by Colasix
This 1947 set of plans show both the oscillating 75 mm-armed turret, still retaining the shorter gun that likely would have been the one with a 850 m/s velocity, and the anti-aircraft turret armed with a set of four MG 151/20 20 mm autocannons. The schematics of the 75 mm-armed vehicle, in particular, are very detailed when it comes to the internal arrangement of the hull. There were also schematics for an artillery version, which retained the centrally mounted armament; this vehicle used a casemate, with a small turret, likely some sort of commander’s cupola, armed with a 20mm autocannon.
The driver of the vehicle would have been seated at the front left, with seemingly the gearbox to his right and the transmission to his front. The combat compartment was to his immediate rear, with the commander sitting to the left of the gun and the gunner to its right. Hull ammunition stowage would be present immediately in front of them, at the front of the combat compartment and turret, where 26 rounds would be located. A further 8 rounds were present at the front left of the turret basket, and seemingly 4 rounds to the rear of the turret, in front of the engine compartment, giving a total of 38 rounds of ammunition stowage in addition to the 12 rounds already present in the two revolver-type magazines of the turret.
This detailed planview of the interleaved 12t’s arrangement shows, in great detail, the interior of the vehicle and features such as the ammunition stowage, but also the interleaving of the road wheels, doubled outward wheels and double-thickness inward wheels. Source: char-françaisA profile cutaway view of the same proposal showing the driver with the head out of his hatch, as expected when driving outside of a combat zone. Source: char-françaisThis cutaway view of the interleaved 12t, looking towards the rear, shows not only the engine block in great detail, but also the interleaved roadwheel and how the central roadwheel is two times thicker than the outward ones. Source: char-françaisThis cutaway view of the front of the vehicle, looking towards the front, shows the position of the driver and transmission. Source: char-français
Though this version of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t project is the first to be known, and appears in a quite detailed set of plans, the vehicle which would move further and reach prototype stage was vastly different from this one. It appears that the interleaved road wheels configuration was dropped early on and that the vehicle was deeply redesigned, with the overall dimensions of the hulls and tracks, for example, being changed as well. This was likely in an effort to reduce weight, seeing as the Batignolles-Châtillon project appeared, at this time, to have a larger volume than the FCM and AMX projects, in addition to interleaving road wheels which would typically add quite a lot of additional weight. Whether or not the vehicle would be able to remain below 12 tonnes was quite questionable.
Continuing Evolutions toward a Prototype
The set of projects from all three companies was approved by the STA on 24th May 1948 and cleared to continue. It appears that mock-ups were constructed by all manufacturers in the following months. However, the Batignolles-Châtillon project appears to have, around this point, started to accumulate delays. A formal order for a prototype appears to only have been passed on 14th February 1949, as order 18.211 – the same month the FCM prototype was completed. By December 1949, the FCM and AMX prototypes were compared to each other for a pre-production order of five vehicles. The AMX won and was picked for a pre-production run of five vehicles – basically setting it on the road to becoming the adopted vehicle. The Batignolles-Châtillon project did not take part in this comparison as a prototype was not yet completed.
Batignolles-Châtillon would only formally present the 12t vehicle in its facilities of Nantes on 13th June 1950. This was a very late date, and while AMX’s project would only formally be adopted in early 1951, it was clear at this point that it was picked in all but name – the Batignolles-Châtillon arrived too late to realistically have a chance to be picked. Trials were nonetheless run with the vehicle.
Design
Hull
The design of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t light tank in its final form is known mostly thanks to a set of plans dated from June of 1950. It appears that general ideas of the tank’s design had existed since about two years – we already know of schematics of a Batignolles-Châtillon 12t artillery vehicle dated from March 1948, which featured a similar suspension.
The March 1948 artillery Bat-Chat 12t schematics. This design already features the large individual road wheels and rear casemate/turret of the later design. Source: Châtellerault archives, provided by ColasixJune 1950 side profile of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t light tank. The vehicle’s arrangement has little to nothing in common with the previous interleaved design. Source: Châtellerault archives
As the two other proposals born out of the same program, the Batignolles-Châtillon vehicle had opted for a rear-mounted turret, an entire change of configuration in comparison to the earlier interleaving road wheels design. The hull had a length of 4.38 m, and a height of 1.280 m at the top of the driver’s position. With the gun, the length would reach a higher 6.472 m, and the height 2.170 m.
The 12t’s hull had been designed to be as thin and compact as possible, with the track width being, in comparison, designed to be fairly large. The idea was that the hull would be as thin as the turret ring diameter, powertrain and driver’s post would realistically fit in, and these mechanical organs would be designed to be as compact as possible. In practice, the turret even had some moderate extrusions, as it would otherwise have had overhang from the side of the hull. The Batignolles-Châtillon’s vehicle hull was 1.46 m wide, with 100 mm separating this hull from the 370 mm-wide pair of tracks. Overall, the vehicle would have a width of 2.4 m, at this point identical to the earlier design. Ground clearance was 31.5 cm.
A front view of the vehicle from the same set of plans; the overhang of the turret ring is noticeable. Source: char-françaisA plan view from the same set of plans. Source: Châtellerault archives
The hull was made of laminated steel plates assembled together by welding. The frontal protection of the hull was to be equivalent to 40 mm at a flat angle. In practice, this translated into the upper front plates being 25 mm thick angled at 15° and 27° degrees from the vertical. The lower front plate was 25 mm thick as well, angled 75° from the vertical. The front bottom was 15 mm thick, angled at 20°, while the rest of the vehicle appeared to have had a 10 mm-thick bottom. All three rear plates were 19 mm-thick, angled at 25°, 50° and 80° respectively. The roof was 10 mm thick, and the sides 20 mm. These values are taken from the trials report from 1951. The 1950 schematics are different in this regard, with the front reported to be 31 mm at its thickest point.
The armor layout of the 12t, from the October of 1951 trials report. It appears that, in June 1950, it was still planned to have a 31 mm thick frontal hull, though other aspects of the hull armor appear to have been identical between both documents. Source: Châtellerault archives
The driver of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t was installed to the front left of the vehicle. He sat on a seat with two positions: an upper position would have the driver’s head stick out from the driver’s post, when driving outside of combat. In combat, the seat would be lowered. The driver would then observe the outside from a periscope. To his front, the commands at his disposal would be, from left to right, a direction lever for the left track, a handbrake, hand-controlled clutch, followed by foot pedals in the same order as in a civilian car: the brakes, the clutch pedal and the accelerator. The gear-selecting lever, direction lever for the right track, and a reverser lever for the transmission were located towards the driver’s front right. The gear-selective lever was preselective, as would be found in a typical car, with the driving elements of the vehicle had been designed to be as similar as a classic road vehicle. The hand-clutch command would only be used when starting up the vehicle, with the foot clutch pedal taking its place when the vehicle was running. The instrument panel would be located just right of the driver’s head. The oil circuit for the gearbox was installed over the foot pedals, with the oil filter to their right, behind the gear selector from the driver’s point of view. Brakes, gear and direction were all hydraulic Lockheed controls.
A top view of the driver’s post on the prototype, looking towards the right. The driver’s seat, gear selector, direction lever, and inversor toggle can all be seen. Source: Châtellerault archivesThe 12t driver post’s dashboard, to the right of the lever. The gear selector on the bottom left can be seen. Source: Châtellerault archivesA photo of the driver’s post taken from the rear towards the front, showing the handbrake, clutch, and pedals. Source: Châtellerault archivesA view of the same driver’s post from slightly higher. The various pedals, and above them the gearbox oil circuits, with the oil filter to the right can be seen. Source: Châtellerault archives
Ammunition stowage within the hull at this point would have been of 22 rounds, a considerable reduction in comparison to the previous model.
Power train
The power train of the vehicle was located to the right of the driver, separated by a bulkhead. It was put together in a block which was designed so that the armor plating protecting it could easily be disassembled, in order to hasten maintenance or replacement work. This engine block sat on four mounts designed to prevent vibrations.
A view of the ventilation within the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t’s engine block. Source: Châtellerault archives
The vehicle appears to have been planned and tested with different engines. The first engine used in the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t was a Mathis 18 GZ 00 petrol aviation engine. This was a 4-stroke, 7-cylinders arranged in a ‘V’ , 6,827 litre engine. The vehicle later received a Mathis Type 8 GZ, which was an 8-cylinder engine. In order to reduce weight, it was decided that the vehicle would use air cooling. Air would enter from grills at the front of the engine block, go through two oil radiators (one for the engine and one for the gearbox), the cylinders, and be exhausted by a fan through another grill. The first engine and clutch mechanism had a weight of 365 kg together, including 20 l of oil. Later, the 8-cylinder engine had a weight of 327 kg, but it is unclear whether that was just the engine itself or also included the clutch mechanism and oil.
A front view of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype, showing the large air entry for the engine block. Source: Châtellerault archives
Clutch was assured by a singular disc. The Batignolles-Châtillon 12t used a gearbox with six gears. The first gear would multiply engine rotations by 22.5; the second by 6.23, third by 3.79, fourth by 2.38, fifth by 1.53, with the sixth rotating at the same rate as the engine. Direction was assured by a triple differential going through the gearbox. The gearbox was also relatively light, with merely 300 kg, including oiling systems.
The vehicle’s fuel tanks had a capacity of 300 litres and were located towards the rear of the vehicle, behind the turret ring.
A rear view of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype. The exhaust can be seen to the right; the port on the lower left is likely to fill the rear fuel tank. Source: Châtellerault archives
In general, the powertrain of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t was remarkable in the compactness and lightweight it offered. When breaking down how the volume was shared inside the vehicle, the engine block, including the transmission, comprised 30% of the internal space; the driver’s position comprised 20%, the fuel tanks 10%, and the combat compartment behind and around the turret ring the remaining 40%.
Suspension
This finalized version of the 12t had completely changed the whole suspension and mechanical arrangement of the vehicle, which no longer had anything in common with the previous interleaving road wheels.
A profile view of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype. The vehicle features two fairly large return rollers and two large shock absorbers. Source: Châtellerault archivesA close-up on two roadwheels of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype. Source: Châtellerault archives
The vehicle had now moved to using a torsion bar suspension with four large road wheels, with a diameter of 600 mm. Two large pneumatic shock absorbers were present on each side of the suspension, one at the front and one at the rear, each linked to two road wheels and guaranteeing a very smooth ride. These road wheels were not evenly spaced; the front one’s center was 830 mm from the second’s, which was 750 mm from the third’s, itself 690 mm from the fourth’s. The vehicle featured a large raised front sprocket, its center 778 mm from the first roadwheel’s, and a much smaller rear idler, its center 670 mm from the last roadwheel’s. Overall, the length between the centers of the first and last roadwheel was of 2,270 mm.
A photo of the 12t’s two-part track link. Source: Châtellerault Archives The same track link and the track pin. Source: Châtellerault archives
The vehicle’s tracks were 370 mm wide with a 135 mm pitch. The ground pressure they would apply was 0.685 kg/cm² on soft soil, and 10.2 kg/cm² on hard soil.
Turrets
The Batignolles-Châtillon 12t hull was designed to interchangeably mount two different turrets.
The first was the Fives-Lilles FL 4. This was an oscillating turret, the first known French post-war development in the field. It had been designed to mount a high-velocity 75 mm anti-tank gun. On the FCM 12t, it first appeared with a ‘short gun’ that was likely the projected weapon firing at 850 m/s, but the weapon that appears to have been durably retained would instead be the ‘1,000 m/s’ 75 mm gun, which would eventually be standardized as the 75 mm SA 50. The FL 4 oscillating turret allowed for an elevation of 13° and a depression of -6°.
This 75 mm SA 50 featured two armor-piercing shells. Both weighed 21 kg, with the projectile being 6.4 kg, and had a muzzle velocity of 1,000 m/s. The first, the POT modèle 1951/POT-51A (Perforant Ogive Traceur – English: Armor-Piercing Capped Tracer/ APC-T), would penetrate 110 mm at 90° and 60 mm at 30°, at a range of a kilometer. The second, PCOT modèle 1951/PCOT-51P (Perforant Coiffé Ogive Traceur – English: Armor-Piercing Capped Ballistic Cap Tracer / APCBC-T), would penetrate 170 mm at 90° and 40 mm at 30° at the same range of a kilometer. Lastly, a high-explosive shell existed, which had the same velocity but was slightly lighter (20.6 kg), with a projectile weight of 6.2 kg and an unknown explosive charge.
An AMX pre-production vehicle with the longer-barrelled 1,000 m/s 75 mm gun. The FL 4 turret which would have been mounted on the FCM 12t would have been closer to this one, rather than the one present in the September 1948 schematics. Source: flickr
The FL 4 was a two-man turret, with the commander to the left of the gun and the gunner to the right. The reason for this reduced crew was that the turret used a bustle autoloader system, with two 6-round revolver magazines located in the rear bustle of the turret. This solution took less space than a manual loader and, as such, helped lighten the vehicle, which was necessary for the air-transportability requirement. A total of 40 75 mm rounds would be stowed within the vehicle. The turret had a coaxial MAC 31 7.5 mm machine gun, with 1,050 rounds of ammunition stored. Frontal protection for the turret would be equivalent to 40 mm, while the sides and presumably rear were 16 mm thick and the roof 10 mm.
Observation devices included seven periscopes in the observation cupola for the commander, while the gunner could use an observation and targeting periscope as well as a gun sight. The turret featured an American SCR-508 radio, which would be shared by all versions of the vehicle. With the FL 4 turret, the vehicle was to be 2.170 m high.
The other turret which was to be featured in the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t was the SAMM S232 anti-aircraft turret. It was designed by the Société d’Application des Machines Motrices (English: Motor Machines Application Society) and was designed to be mounted on each of the three 12t light tanks projects. The first prototype was completed in May 1949.
A close-up of a SAMM S232 turret, this particular example mounted on an AMX-13 pre-production hull. Source: Les véhicules blindés Français 1944-1977
This turret’s armament consisted of four MG 151/20 20 mm autocannons of German origin. It was the standard 20 mm autocannon for Luftwaffe aircraft for most of the war. It fired 20×82 mm cartridges at a rate of up to 750 rounds per minute, with a muzzle velocity of up to 785 m/s. MG 151s, both in the 15 and 20 mm versions, were fairly widely used in post-war France, including in armored vehicles designs.
The S232 turret was 1.020 m high. As it was designed for anti-aircraft use, it had a high maximum elevation of 80°, with a more moderate depression of -5°. The turret used cast construction and was fully enclosed. The front had the same 40 mm of effective thickness as the FL 4, as did the sides at 16 mm. Likely in order to improve resistance to strafing, the roof armor was quite significantly thicker at 30 mm.
Weight Distribution and Expected Performances
The distribution of the weight in the 12t was to consist in:
2,180 kg of hull armor
3,630 kg from the suspension and wheels
365 kg from the engine, clutch, liaison between these, and 20 litre oil tank
300 kg for the gearbox and transmission including a 20 litre oil tank
70 kg for the radiator
55 kg for the controls
240 kg for the batteries
380 kg for miscellaneous elements such as the separations between the compartments, electric group and wiring, stowage, etc.
4,200 kg for the turret, including the two crewmen and 18 rounds of ammunition
80 kg from the driver
260 kg of fuel
300 kg from the 22 rounds of ammunition stored inside the hull
This would result in a vehicle weighing in at 12,060 kg, and as such almost perfectly equal to the expected 12 tonnes. When subtracting the two turret crewmen, all fuel and all ammunition, the weight would be of 11,340 kg; without the driver, it would logically be reduced to an empty weight of 11,260 kg.
The expected performances from this vehicle were to be a maximum speed of 3 km/h on the first gear, 12 on the second, 19 on the third, 31 on the fourth, 48 on the fifth, and finally, an impressive 73 km/h on the sixth gear. The average cruise speed on road was expected to be 40 km/h. Considering the reverse speed was assured by a gear inversor, the tank would be expected to reach the same speeds in reverse.
It was expected that, at ⅗ of the maximum engine power, the 300 litres fuel tanks would allow for 6 hours of continuous running, or a practical range of about 240 km. The vehicle was expected to climb a 70% slope, and be able to go down a slope of a similar degree while remaining controllable.
Artillery Version
In addition to the hull which would be used in the tank and anti-aircraft versions of the vehicle, Batignolles-Châtillon also designed an artillery version armed with a 105 mm in a fixed casemate. This version is known from a set of plans dated from June 1950, and it is not known if a version using the interleaved suspension design of the hull has ever been worked on.
A profile view of the artillery version; the hull was largely the same, but the turret was entirely replaced by a new fixed casemate. Source: Châtellerault archives
The casemate featured a sloped frontal plate and square sides; the front plate would have been 26 mm thick, with the sides and rear 20 mm thick. The casemate expanded beyond the rest of the hull and over the tracks, with a total width equal to the vehicle with tracks at 2.4 m, in order to increase the internal space allocated to the crew. At 2.175 m high, the vehicle would be only 5 mm higher than the tank version.
A front view of the artillery vehicle, showing the considerable overhang of the casemate over the tracks, necessary in order to increase internal space. Source: Châtellerault archivesA top view of the artillery version. The gun extended very little beyond the hull. Source: Châtellerault archives
The reason for a quite large casemate being needed was both the size of the 105 mm AU 50 gun and of the crew needed to operate it. The gun had a length of 3.096 m from the end of the muzzle brake to the breech. As such, it only had a very limited overhang in front of the hull, reducing the length of the vehicle to a mere 4.663 m. To operate it at a sufficient rate of fire, seeing as there was no autoloader, the casemate crew would be of four – a commander, a gunner, and two loaders – in comparison to the two-man crew of the tank version’s turret. Forty 105 mm rounds would be stowed within this casemate. Depression was reduced to a mere -3°, but elevation was a lot higher, at +67°, to allow for indirect fire.
Impressively, the additional weight was kept to a minimum in comparison to the tank. The vehicle’s weight without casemate crew, fuel and ammunition was noticeably lighter, at 10,730 kg, and even with the full crew, fuel and ammunition load, weight was expected to only reach 12,230 kg – in other words, only 170 kg more than the tank configuration. The engine, transmission and suspension were left unmodified, and the mobility was expected to largely be the same. Ground pressure was to be raised by a mere 10 grams per cm² on soft soil, reaching 0.695 kg/cm².
Prototype and Trials
The Batignolles-Châtillon light tank prototype was formally presented in June of 1950 in Nantes. Trials began at Satory in January of 1951. The vehicle was transferred to the STA in May 1951, with trials continuing until they were stopped in September.
A top view of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype without the turret test-weight present, with the turret ring empty and fully visible. A fueling port can also be seen on the rear right, as well as the ventilator on the front right. Source: Châtellerault archivesA side view of the same prototype, this time with the large, more than 3.5 tonne weight which was used to simulate a turret. Source: Châtellerault archives
In comparison to the vehicle on the plans, the prototype received another engine, a Mathis Type 8 GZ 8-cylinders aviation engine with 6,927 l. Its horsepower output is not known. The hull was not fitted with a turret, and instead received a 3,539 kg weight. The hull, without crew, ammunition or fuel, was weighed at 8,119 kg, giving the trial vehicle a total weight of 11,658 kg. It had a ground pressure of 0.640 kg/cm² on soft soil. The prototype also featured two return rollers, which were perhaps considered but not present on previous schematics.
The experimentation of the prototype was conducted by AMX, with a trials report produced in October of 1951. Sadly, only parts of this report have surfaced, and how exactly the Batignolles-Châtillon vehicle fared is unknown. The vehicle would, in all likelihood, have been the fastest out of all the 12t prototypes, and it appears it may have retained a fairly moderate weight even with the turret and full fuel and ammunition load. However, by this point, the AMX vehicle, which was highly satisfactory, was already adopted and entering production, and so it was highly unlikely the Batignolles-Châtillon vehicle would be ordered even if very high performing.
Conclusion – Too Late to the Party
The Batignolles-Châtillon 12t is notable in that it basically had two vastly different configurations during its life as a design, starting as a relatively large light tank with a centrally-mounted turret that was deeply modified, or likely even redesigned from the ground up, as a smaller and likely lighter vehicle with a turret mounted to the rear. The specifics of the design appeared to grant it an impressive maximum speed for the era, as well as a likely smooth drive. However, the vehicle was at least a year late, if not more, in comparison to the AMX and FCM vehicles, and with the AMX-12t already being a clear favorite by the time the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t was even completed, it had pretty much no chance of being adopted.
In recent years, the fairly obscure 12t has seen a regain of popularity in online circles, likely due to the popularity of the ‘Batignolles-Châtillon’ name due to the inclusion of first the 25t, and later some 12t-type vehicles in Wargaming’s popular online game ‘World of Tanks’. Two 12t-based vehicles exist in World of Tanks, the base Batignolles-Châtillon 12t and the ‘Bourrasque’ premium. Both are based on the interleaved road wheels, central-turret design, but while the 12t vehicle itself appears to at least somewhat try to replicate a realistic version of that configuration, the ‘Bourrasque’ is a fictional design combining this hull dated from 1947 to a modified version of the late 1970s TS 90 turret – one of the most egregious example of fake tanks present in Wargaming’s game.
Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1947 with interleaved suspension. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1947 with the SAMM anti-aircraft turret and interleaved suspension. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1950. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1950 with the SAMM anti-aircraft turret. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1950 artillery version. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.
75 mm gun (future 75 mm SA 50)/ 4x MG 151/20 autocannons (AA variant)
Ammunition stowage
12 already loaded + 38 rounds
Elevation & depression
+13° to -6°
Loading mechanism
2 x revolving automatic loading system with 6 rounds each
Secondary Armament
Coaxial 7.5 mm MAC 31 machine gun
7.5mm ammunition stowage
1,050 rounds
Hull Armor
40 mm equivalent (front), 20 mm (sides and rear), 10 mm (floor), uncertain but likely 10 mm (roof)
Turret Armor
40 mm equivalent (front), 16 mm (sides and rear), 10 mm (roof)
Produced
0
Finalized design (1950) Specifications
Dimensions (L x w x h)
6.472 x 2.40 x 2.17 m
Empty weight
11,26 0kg
Loaded weight
12,060 kg
Engine
Mathis 18 GZ 00 aviation engine
Fuel
Cylinders
V7, 7-cylinder 6,827 L
Horsepower output
210 hp
Power-to-weight ratio in hp/tonne
17.5
Gearbox
6 forward speed with inversor
Maximum speed
73 km/h
Cruise speed
40 km/h
Fuel tanks
300 L
Range
240 km
Autonomy at ⅗ of maximum engine power
6 hours of continuous operations
Transmission
Front
Suspension
Torsion bars
Road wheels
4
Track width
370mm
Track pitch
135mm
Ground pressure
0.685 kg/cm² (soft soil)
10.2 kg/cm² (hard soil)
Crew
Main Armament
75 mm gun (future 75 mm SA 50)
Ammunition stowage
40 rounds
Elevation & depression
+13° to -6°
Loading mechanism
2 x revolving automatic loading system with 6 rounds each
Muzzle velocity
1,000 m/s
Maximum armor penetration at 1,000m
170 mm at 90°
Secondary Armament
Coaxial 7.5 mm MAC 31 machine gun
7.5mm ammunition stowage
1,050 rounds
Hull Armor
25 mm at 27° and 15° (upper front plate)
25 mm at 75° (mid-lower front plate)
15 mm at 20° (lower front plate)
15 mm (front floor)
10 mm (most of the floor)
19 mm at 25, 50, and 80° (lower, mid, and higher rear plates)
20 mm (sides)
10 mm (roof)
Turret Armor
40 mm equivalent (front), 16 mm (sides and rear), 10 mm (roof)
Produced
0
Artillery version (1950) Specifications
Dimensions (L x w x h)
4.663 m x 2.40 x 2.175 m
Empty weight
10,650 kg
Loaded weight
12,230 kg
Engine
Mathis 18 GZ 00 aviation engine
Fuel
Petrol
Cylinders
V7, 7-cylinder, 6,827 L
Horsepower output
210 hp
Power-to-weight ratio in hp/tonne
17.2
Gearbox
6 forward speed with inversor
Maximum speed
73 km/h
Cruise speed
40 km/h
Fuel tanks
300 L
Range
240 km
Autonomy at ⅗ of maximum engine power
6 hours of continuous operations
Transmission
Front
Suspension
Torsion bars
Road wheels
4
Track width
370 mm
Track pitch
135 mm
Ground pressure
0.695 kg/cm² (soft soil)
10.2 kg/cm² (hard soil)
Crew
5 (Driver, Gunner, Commander/Radioman, two loaders)
Main Armament
105 mm AU 50
Ammunition stowage
40 rounds
Elevation & depression
-3° to +67°
Muzzle velocity
570 m/s
Hull Armor
25 mm at 27° and 15° (upper front plate)
25 mm at 75° (mid-lower front plate)
15 mm at 20° (lower front plate)
15 mm (front floor)
10 mm (most of the floor)
19 mm at 25, 50, and 80° (lower, mid, and higher rear plates)
10 mm (roof)
Casemate armor
26 mm sloped (front)
20 mm (sides and rear)
Likely 10 mm (roof)
Produced
0
Test vehicle (1950-1951) Specifications
Dimensions (L x w x h)
6.472 x 2.40 x 2.17 m
Empty hull weight
8,119 kg
Additional weight
3,539 kg
Total weight without driver or fuel
11,658 kg
Engine
Type 8 GZ aviation engine
Cylinders
8-cylinder 6,927 L engine
Gearbox
6 forward speed with inversor
Fuel tanks
300 L
Transmission
Front
Suspension
Torsion bars
Road wheels
4
Track width
370 mm
Track pitch
135 mm
Ground pressure
0.640 kg/cm²
Crew
1 (driver)
Hull Armor
25 mm at 27° and 15° (upper front plate)
25 mm at 75° (mid-lower front plate)
15 mm at 20° (lower front plate)
15 mm (front floor)
10 mm (most of the floor)
19 mm at 25, 50 and 80° (lower, mid, and higher rear plates)
10 mm (roof)
Produced
1
Sources
Les véhicules blindés français 1945-1977, Pierre Touzin, éditions EPA, 1978
Char-français: http://www.chars-francais.net/2015/index.php/2-archives/engins/2642-1947-batignolles-12
French military archives of Châtellerault, made available by Colasix: Service Historique de la Défense, Châtellerault 503 3H1 27 Service Historique de la Défense, Châtellerault 326 3H1 23 Service Historique de la Défense, Châtellerault 343 3H1 41
The Second World War left France’s tank industry in an uncertain state. One of Europe’s largest and most sophisticated tank manufacturers prior to the four year German occupation which mutilated France’s military industry while simultaneously very severely limiting design work on not only new tanks, but also engines and armaments. Whether France could recover and become a military-industrial powerhouse, or at least major player, was still uncertain.
It is in this context that, in 1947, the French Army would establish requirements for an airborne, 12-tonnes light tank armed with a high-velocity 75 mm anti-tank gun with anti-armor capacities, a fairly ambitious prospect. Three manufacturers were approached to design such a vehicle, or at least its chassis: the state workshop of AMX, the locomotive-turned-tank manufacturer Batignolle-Châtillon, and lastly, the old Mediterranean shipyard of Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (FCM).
Ambitions from Ashes
Before the outbreak of the Second World War, France was one of the largest tank manufacturers on the European continent and in the world, second only to two nations which far outmatched France’s population and industrial potential, Germany and the Soviet Union. The defeat of France in 1940, of which inadequate tank designs and use is one of many culprits, led to the country being occupied all the way to the summer of 1944. Outside of a few covert projects undertaken by a secretive organisation of the Vichy regime, the CDM, new developments were practically stopped. The few new designs considered, such as the SARL 42, largely took the basis of elements existing or already being studied in 1940. France was wholefully unable to keep up with the technological advancements that countries with intact or at least functioning tank industries were developing and fielding during the war.
The first ‘new’ French armored fighting vehicle to enter production following the liberation of France, the Panhard 178B, was in practice the combination of a hull and gun already in existence in 1940 with a new turret. Source: char-français
Following France’s liberation by the Western Allies and FFI (Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur – ENG: French Forces of the Interior) uprisings in the summer of 1944, the new French leadership, still under Charles de Gaulle, was very keen on ensuring France’s independence to the best of their capacities. This included resuming work on indigenous armaments projects as swiftly as possible. The first of the post-war designs would be worked on as early as 1944, largely based on pre-war designs and concepts or salvaged German equipment, adapted as best as possible to still be suitable for use in a postwar context. The two best examples of these first attempts at kicking a tank industry back on its feet, the ARL 44 and Panhard 178B, were neither revolutionary nor even truly modern vehicles, yet one could hardly say they were not successful in their roles. The ARL heavy tank was the first true French tank manufactured post-war, helping the industrials get back into shape, while the Panhard 178B not only did the same for France’s most important wheeled armored fighting vehicles manufacturer, Panhard, but also provided an indigenous vehicle to supplement the plethora of American and British types used to maintain a French colonial empire now at the brink of collapse, particularly in Indochina.
Work on these vehicles was well underway by the summer of 1946. The Panhard 178B had entered mass-production, while the ARL 44 at least had a functional vehicle completed, though it would eventually be a far fetch from the production standard. Following this, more ambitious and truly new vehicles could begin to be considered.
It is in this context that, in September 1946, the French EMA (Etat Major des Armées – ENG: Army General Staff) requested DEFA (Direction des Études et Fabrications d’Armement – ENG: Armament Studies and Manufacturing Direction), the organism in charge of managing the production of French military equipment, to oversee the creation of an air-transportable reconnaissance vehicle which would weigh 12 tonnes at most. Within the French Army’s technical services, there was a preference for a light tank which would feature heavy armament for its weight, making it able to engage enemy armor, rather than be a more passive, lightly-armed reconnaissance vehicle. Mobility was also an important factor to compensate for the necessarily weak armor such a vehicle would possess. As such, one could describe the vehicle which was envisioned as the combination of a reconnaissance vehicle, a light tank and a tank destroyer. Furthermore, as early as January 1947, additional variants, in the shape of an anti-aircraft vehicle and a self-propelled artillery piece which were to share a common chassis with the light tank, were being considered.
At this point, DEFA offered the STA (Service Technique des Armées – ENG: Armies Technical Service) the outline of three concepts. All would share an oscillating turret, a concept previously given only minimal attention, but which was viewed as potentially a good option to save weight. The concepts varied in the muzzle velocity of their 75 mm main guns, the goals being 600, 878 and 920 m/s. The STA expressed interest in an oscillating turret fitted with the higher muzzle velocity main gun, a concept it accepted on 10th February 1947. By late February, the concept had been passed on to the EMA, which set requirements for a 12 tonnes vehicle with a 75 mm gun that could reach at least 850 m/s, and optimally 1,100 m/s. At least 40 rounds were to be stowed within the vehicle. Fuel capacity was to be at least 300 l.
Schematics of the FCM 12t dated from September 1948. The vehicle featured a 75 mm gun shorter than the high-velocity 75 mm SA 50 which would eventually be adopted, likely a representation of a gun with a muzzle velocity of about 850 m/s. Source: French military archives
After these few months of back and forth and development of the concept by French Army structures, the requirements were eventually passed on to three manufacturers on 24th April 1947. These were the Atelier Mécaniques d’issy-Les-Moulineaux (AMX, ENG: Issy-Les-Moulineaux Mechanical Workshop), the Compagnie générale de Construction de locomotives Batignolles-Châtillon (ENG: Batignolles-Châtillon general locomotives Construction Company) and the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (ENG: Forges and Shipyards of the Mediterranean). All three had designed armored vehicles pre-war, though Batignolles-Châtillon did not have any production vehicles to its name. AMX had designed the R40, an evolution of the R35, and taken part in manufacturing the B1 Bis, while FCM had also had its own B1 Bis manufacturing chain as well as its own FCM 36 and FCM 2C designs.
The manufacturers were only requested to design the hull, as well as eventually the casemate for the self-propelled artillery version. The turrets for the light tank as well as anti-aircraft vehicles were to be procured from separate manufacturers.
The set of projects from all three companies were approved by the STA on 24th May 1948 and cleared to continue. It appears that mock-ups were constructed by all manufacturers in the following months, though no views of the FCM mock-up appear to have survived. The known set of plans of the vehicle is dated from 4th September 1948 and is indicated as “revised after inspection of the mock-up”. It features a shorter version of the gun that would eventually be used within the FL 4 turret, the future 75 mm SA 50. By this point, the FCM project was estimated to weigh 11,360 kg in combat conditions, still a fair bit under the 12 tonnes limit. In the meantime, in July 1948, the industrial company of Fives-Lilles presented its mock-up of the FL 4 oscillating turret which was to be fitted into the 12 tonnes light tank vehicles.
The FCM project progressed further and a prototype hull was completed in February 1949. After trials in Toulon in March, it was presented to the French Army’s technical services in July, the same month as its competitor from AMX, and a whole 11 months before Batignolles-Châtillon would submit their own.
Design
The FCM 12t’s Hull
The hull designed by FCM used a rear turret and placed the driver and powertrain at the front, as did the other two 12t proposals. The total length of the hull was to be 4.485 m. Including the gun mounted in the FL 4 turret, the tank would be 6.570 m long. 3.875 m separated the center of the sprocket from the center of the idler. The tank was 2.080 m tall with the FL 4 turret, with the hull itself being 1.130 m tall. The vehicle was 2.4 m wide, though this could be raised to 2.5 m with a different set of tracks. The hull itself was 1.7 m wide, while the ground clearance was 30 cm.
The FCM hull used welded construction. This had been a staple of FCM back in the 1930s, when this was very much a novelty in French tank design, the FCM 36 light tank being the only French mass-produced welded tank. By the late 1940s however, the Second World War had demonstrated the advantages of welding over casting and particularly bolting or riveting, and what was once an FCM specialty was now pretty standard. An interesting feature of the FCM design was that the frontal section of the hull was designed to be easily removable. This included most of the major mechanical components save for the engine itself: the preselective gearbox, transmission, and drive sprockets could be swiftly taken out for maintenance or even to be quickly replaced in this fashion.
Front schematic view of the FCM 12t dated from September 1948. The front section of the hull containing all major mechanical components outside of the engine was designed for swift removal and replacement or repairs. Source: French military archives
The driver sat to the left of the hull front, while the engine was installed to the right. The FCM 12t used a front transmission and a rear idler. The driver would maneuver the vehicle using either a steering wheel or a unique lever. The drive sprockets were linked to hydraulic brakes the driver would operate using pedals. Each sprocket could be braked independently, which would allow rotating the tank by using the movement of a single track. The cutch was also assured by a pedal while the gearbox was operated by a lever. Acceleration was also assured by a pedal, which was also associated with a hand-operated command. Overall, the FCM 12t was noted to be practically identical to a car in how it was driven. The driver had a periscope for vision.
A top view of the FCM 12t. The front-right of the hull was taken by the large radiator grills, while the driver’s post slightly stuck out of the hull on the front right. Source: French military archives
The armor was “30 mm equivalent” on the frontal arc, apparently differing in actual thickness depending on each exact section to match with 30 mm of effective thickness. The sides were 20 mm thick while the floor was 10 mm. The roof was of unknown thickness, but likely 10 mm as well, seeing as that thickness was also the one of the roof of the FL 4 turret.
Powerplant and Suspension
The FCM 12t’s engine was a Mathis 8 G X 00 8-cylinders 6,560L gasoline engine. At the nominal rotation rate of 3,000 rounds per minute, it would provide 210 hp. The engine was water-cooled. 415 l of gasoline could be stored within the FCM 12t’s fuel tanks. The radiator’s tanks contained 35 l of water. The brakes had a total of 10 l of oil in their fuel tanks, while the gearbox had 8, the engine 12 and the gearbox 40. The gearbox had four forward and a backward gear, but was coupled with a reduction system which increased the total of forward gears to eight.
The FCM 12t’s suspension has often been described as a ‘Christie-type’, and shared features present in vehicles using this type of suspension. Thanks to the use of large road wheels, it could be towed without its tracks, or in emergency situations, chains could even be put up linking the drive sprockets with the front road wheels, and the vehicle could then move at moderate speeds under its own power in such a configuration.
A close-up of the suspension from the September 1948 schematics. The front sprocket was somewhat raised in comparison to the rear idler, and the puncture-proof tires of the wheels are prominent, despite the prototype seemingly not featuring them in its first configuration. Source: French military archives
The FCM 12t used four large road wheels mounted on pneumatic springs. Both the 1948 schematics and the configuration the prototype adopted in 1950 used wheels with puncture-proof pneumatic rims. However, the initial configuration of the prototype’s road wheels differ from the schematics and this later configuration. Instead, it used fully metallic wheels. Even more curiously, the front road wheel appears to have been an entirely different design from the three to its rear. The reasoning behind such a configuration is unknown, however chances are it was just due to the adequate road wheels not being ready for one reason or another. The center of each roadwheel was separated by 81.5 cm. The vehicle lacked any return rollers. It used a front sprocket and a rear idler.
83 track links per side appear to be present on the schematics. The initial tracks of the FCM 12t were 30 cm wide, but provisions were made for 35 cm wide tracks which would increase the width of the tank by 10 cm, reaching 2.5 m. The tracks featured fairly prominent guide horns.
Turrets
The FCM 12t hull was designed to interchangeably mount two different turrets.
The first was the Fives-Lilles FL 4. This was an oscillating turret, the first known French post-war development in the field. It had been designed to mount a high-velocity 75 mm anti-tank gun. On the FCM 12t, it first appeared with a ‘short gun’ that was likely the projected weapon firing at 850 m/s, but the weapon that appears to have been durably retained would instead be the “1,000 m/s” 75 mm gun, which would eventually be standardized as the 75 mm SA 50. The FL 4 oscillating turret allowed for an elevation of 13° and a depression of -6°.
This 75 mm SA 50 featured two armor-piercing shells. Both weighed 21 kg, with the projectile being 6.4 kg, and had a muzzle velocity of 1,000 m/s. The first, the POT modèle 1951/POT-51A (Perforant Ogive Traceur – ENG: Armor-Piercing Capped Tracer/ APC-T), would penetrate 110 mm at 90° and 60 mm at 30°, at a range of a kilometer. The second, PCOT modèle 1951/PCOT-51P (Perforant Coiffé Ogive Traceur – ENG: Armor-Piercing Capped Ballistic Cap Tracer / APCBC-T), would penetrate 170 mm at 90° and 40 mm at 30° at the same range of a kilometer. Lastly, a high-explosive shell existed, which had the same velocity but was slightly lighter (20.6 kg), with a projectile weight of 6.2 kg and an unknown explosive charge.
An AMX pre-production vehicle with the longer-barrelled 1,000 m/s 75 mm gun. The FL 4 turret which would have been mounted on the FCM 12t would have been closer to this one, rather than the one present in the September 1948 schematics. Source: flickr
The FL 4 was a two-man turret, with the commander to the left of the gun and the gunner to the right. The reason for this reduced crew was that the turret used a bustle autoloader system, with two 6-round revolver magazines located in the rear bustle of the turret. This solution took less space than a manual loader and, as such, helped lighten the vehicle, which was necessary for the air-transportability requirement. A total of 45 75 mm rounds would be stowed within the vehicle. The turret had a coaxial MAC 31 7.5 mm machine gun, with 1,050 rounds of ammunition stored. Frontal protection for the turret would be equivalent to 40 mm, while the sides and presumably rear were 16 mm thick and the roof 10 mm.
Observation devices included seven periscopes in the observation cupola for the commander, while the gunner could use an observation and targeting periscope as well as a gun sight. The turret featured an American SCR-508 radio, which would be shared by all versions of the vehicle. With the FL 4 turret, the vehicle was to weigh around 12.5 tonnes and be 2.080 m high.
The other turret which was to be featured in the FCM 12t was the SAMM S232 anti-aircraft turret. It was designed by the Société d’Application des Machines Motrices (ENG: Motor Machines Application Society) and was designed to be mounted on each of the three 12t light tanks projects. The first prototype was completed in May 1949.
A close-up of a SAMM S232 turret, this particular example mounted on an AMX-13 pre-production hull. Source: Les véhicules blindés Français 1944-1977Top and side views of the interleaved road wheels version of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t fitted with the SAMM S232 turret. Source: French military archives
This turret’s armament consisted of four MG 151/20 20 mm autocannons of German origin. It was the standard 20 mm autocannon for Luftwaffe aircraft for most of the war. It fired 20×82 mm cartridges at a rate of up to 750 rounds per minute, with a muzzle velocity of up to 785 m/s. MG 151s, both in the 15 and 20 mm versions, were fairly widely used in post-war France, including in armored vehicles designs. Ammunition stowage in the FCM 12t with the anti-aircraft turret was to be of 2,000 rounds.
The S232 turret was 1.020 m high. As it was designed for anti-aircraft use, it had a high maximum elevation of 80°, with a more moderate depression of -5°. The turret used cast construction and was fully enclosed. The front had the same 40 mm of effective thickness as the FL 4, as did the sides at 16 mm. Likely in order to improve resistance to strafing, the roof armor was quite significantly thicker at 30 mm.
Interestingly enough, the FL 4 turret appears to never actually have been mounted on the FCM 12t. The only known views of the prototype show it either without a turret, or with the S232 anti-aircraft turret, and the mobility trials were likely undertaken under these two configurations.
Artillery Version
As with the Bat-Chat and AMX, FCM designed a casemate artillery vehicle based on its 12t tank hull.
A side view of the artillery version of the FCM 12t, giving a view of the general silhouette of the vehicle, as well as the elevation and depression of the 105 mm artillery piece. Source: French military archives
This vehicle replaced the turret by a rear-mounted casemate which featured a centrally-mounted 105 mm modèle 1950 gun. The vehicle was meant for artillery use and, as such, elevation could go up to 67°, while depression went to -5°. The arc of fire was 40° forward.
A top view of the FCM 12t artillery vehicle, showing the lateral traverse of the main gun as well as the 10 rounds stowed within the rear compartment. Source: French military archives
The vehicle was to be 2.1 m high and 4.69 m long. Armor protection was of 30 mm frontally and 20 mm on the sides and roof. The weight was to be 12.5 tonnes.
The vehicle likely would have had a crew of five, as the 105 mm artillery piece on the AMX chassis eventually did, two loaders, a gunner, a commander and the driver. Ammunition stowage indicated on the schematics show 30 rounds stored towards the front of the vehicle, 15 on each side of the main fuel tank, while ten rounds were stored in the rear sides of the casemate, seven on the left and three on the right. The artillery model never reached prototype stage.
A front view of the FCM 12t artillery vehicle, showing the location of the fuel tanks and 30 frontally-stowed 105 mm rounds. Source: French military archives
Trials and Performances
The FCM 12t prototype was completed and first run by FCM in February 1949. The first preliminary trials were held in Toulon, on the Mediterranean coast, on 8th and 9th March 1949. In June 1949, a first trial concluded the vehicle provided a maximum speed of 60 km/h on-road, with a range of about 300 km. Ground pressure was of 750 g/cm² and the turning radius was of 5 meters. The tank could climb a 75% slope.
The FCM 12t in what was very likely its first configuration, with a weight taking the space of the turret, lacking pneumatic rims on its road wheels as well as having one different from the others. Source: char-français
The vehicle was transferred to the French Army’s trial center of Satory in November 1949, which led to more extensive trials being performed. On 17th November 1949, a 39 km trip was conducted between Satory and Raimbouillet to establish the performance of the vehicle. This trip began at 2:47 pm and was concluded by 5:40 pm. At 3:32 pm, after 28 km had been crossed, the vehicle stopped to assert the temperature of oil and water, which was at an adequate level. At 3:51 pm, a second stop was conducted, as a small leak of the radiator’s water tank was seen. Finally, a third stop was conducted at 4:26 pm as the water leak had, at this point, become very important.
During this trip, the FCM 12t was able to cross 1 km in 56 seconds, giving an average speed of 64 km/h. The quickest 2 km to be crossed by the vehicle were crossed in 2.15 minutes, giving an average speed of 53.5 km/h. 28 km were crossed in 45 minutes, giving an average cruise speed of 37 km/h. The vehicle was noted to be easy to pilot, with very good direction controls. The suspension was also noted to be highly satisfactory. The only real issue with the chassis were the water leaks within the radiator.
Modifications
The vehicle was handed back to FCM in early 1950 for modifications. It appears that it was at this point the vehicle received the pneumatic wheels rims and S232 anti-aircraft turret, though this cannot be certain.
French military officials observe the FCM 12t prototype, fitted with the S232 turret and four identical road wheels with pneumatics rims, during mobility trials. Source: French military archives
The vehicle was returned to the French Army for further experimentation in late 1950. However, by this point, the AMX vehicle had been picked for mass-production in December 1949. As such, while experimentation on the FCM hull continued to an extent, it was very unlikely this would result in any sort of production for the vehicle.
An accident of unknown nature interrupted the trials of the FCM 12t again in July 1951. This would practically be the end of the experimental career of the prototype. It was nonetheless restored to operational conditions by FCM and returned to the Army in 1952, but to no avail. Trials did not resume and the FCM 12t was de facto rejected. The prototype was likely scrapped in the following years, seeing as no trace of its existence appears to remain.
A side view of the FCM 12t in what was likely its final configuration. By late 1949, with the adoption of the future AMX-13, hope for the FCM vehicle to reach production was gone, but experimentation nonetheless continued in the following years. Source: Les véhicules blindés Français 1944-1977
Conclusion – One of the last FCMs
The FCM 12t was, in most regards, a decent light tank, quite comparable to its AMX or Batignolles-Châtillon competitors. While FCM only really developed the chassis, it appears to have been mostly satisfactory. Trials seem to report the vehicle provided an easy and smooth drive while the suspension was deemed very satisfactory. The only major issue with the vehicle appears to have been a leaking radiator. Nonetheless, AMX’s offering was solid as well, and would eventually be picked for mass-production, becoming what would be one of the most successful light tanks as well as French AFVs from the Cold War, the AMX-13.
For FCM, the 12t was one of the last forays into armored vehicles design, alongside a vehicle designed for the much heavier 50 tonnes tank program, the FCM 50t. The shipyard would fail to secure any orders for its first post-war designs, which was not too different from a death sentence, at least in the field of armored fighting vehicles manufacturing, seeing as the manufacturers had already been weakened by years of war. While the 12t tank program would play a major role into AMX becoming the de facto main producer of tracked armored fighting vehicles for the French Army, this was at the expense of the older FCM, of which the involvement in tank design had started all the way back in 1916 with the FCM 1A.
Side, top, front and rear views of the FCM 12t light tank
Sides, front and top views of the FCM 12t artillery vehicle
Sides, top, front and back view of the FCM 12t with the anti-aircraft turret. All illustrations created by Phanthom_25_Sniper and funded by our Patreon campaign
FCM 12t specifications (configuration with the FL 4 turret)
Dimensions (L x w x h)
6.57 x 2.40 (2.50 with wider tracks) x 2.08 m
Weight
12.5 metric tonnes
Engine
Mathis 8 G X 00
Cylinders
8 (6.560 L)
Standard rotation rate
3,000rpm
Horsepower output
210 hp
Power-to-weight ratio in hp/tonne
16.8
Gearbox
4 forward (8 with reductor) / 1 reverse
Maximum speed
64 km/h
Cruise speed
37 km/h
Fuel tanks
410 L
Range
300 km
Transmission
Front
Suspension
‘Christie-type’ with pneumatic springs
Road wheels
4
Track links
83 per side
Track width
30 cm or 35 cm depending on tracks
Crew
3 (Driver, Gunner,Commander)
Main armament
75 mm gun (future 75 mm SA 50)
Ammunition stowage
45 rounds
Elevation and depression
+13° to -6°
Loading mechanism
2x revolving automatic loading system with 6 rounds each /td>
Muzzle velocity
1,000 m/s
Maximum armor penetration at 1,000m
170 mm at 90°
Secondary armament
Coaxial 7.5 mm MAC 31 machine gun
Secondary armament
Coaxial 7.5 mm MAC 31 machine gun
7.5mm ammunition stowage
1,050 rounds
Hull armor
30 mm equivalent (front), 20 mm (sides and rear), 10 mm (floor), uncertain but likely 10 mm (roof)
Turret armor
40 mm equivalent (front), 16 mm (sides and rear), 10 mm (roof)
Number produced
1
Sources:
French military archives of Châtellerault, made available by Colasix:
Service Historique de la Défense, Châtellerault 326 3H1 27
Service Historique de la Défense, Châtellerault 326 3H1 23
Les véhicules blindés français 1945-1977, Pierre Touzin, éditions EPA, 1978 Char-français
Standard Pbv 501 in Swedish army camouflage, late 1990/early 2000s
Kingdom of Sweden (1994-2008)
Infantry Fighting Vehicle – 5 BMP-1s Purchased For Trials, 350 Purchased For Service And Modernized, 83 Purchased For Spare Parts (438 Total)
The Soviet BMP-1 was and remains a ubiquitous infantry fighting vehicle. The most produced vehicle of its type to this day, with almost 40,000 assembled by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia during the Cold War, the vehicle was, with a few exceptions, fielded by pretty much all of the Soviet Union’s allies.
With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, several of these Soviet allies and BMP-1 became much closer to the former Western bloc. The newly reunified Germany inherited the large weapons and armored vehicles stocks of East Germany, including a fleet of more than a thousand BMP-1s. Though a local upgrade program was carried out, in the form of the BMP-1A1 Ost, Germany quickly sold the vast majority of its BMP-1 fleet to European customers interested in acquiring large quantities of surplus infantry fighting vehicles, pretty much off-the-shelf. One of these buyers would be Sweden, which would run its own refit program for the BMP-1. The vehicle was designated Pbv 501 in Swedish Army service.
The Swedish Army and Mechanization in the Early 1990s
At the conclusion of the Cold War, the Swedish Army (Svenska Armén) had a relatively limited fleet of armored vehicles able to carry infantry sections. The only type in any significant service was the Pbv 302, with about 650 vehicles produced. Even then, the vehicle’s production stopped in 1971, and it really was only sufficient to outfit the infantry complement of some armored units.
A Swedish Army Pbv 302. The type would remain in service with the Swedish Army until 2014, being entirely replaced by the CV90 as of today. The Pbv 302 notably served in UN operations in Bosnia and in Kosovo (KFOR). Source: https://www.theworldwars.net/
In practice, the standard transport vehicles in Swedish infantry units were the Tgb 20 (Terrängbil 20) truck and the Bv 206 (Bandvagn 206) tracked articulated all-terrain carrier. In spite of the Bv 206’s positive features, which have resulted in the vehicle continuing in service and having had a successful export record, simply put, it could not fulfil the role of an infantry fighting vehicle The Tgb 20 was a simple truck, and the Bv 206, while tracked and able to mount a machine gun if need be, was not armored.
The Bv 206. It is a potent and capable vehicle able to carry up to 14 infantrymen, far more than the BMP-1’s 8, but it is in no way an infantry fighting vehicle or even an armored personnel carrier. Source: Wikimedia commons
At that time, there was ambition within the Swedish Army to mechanize more of its armored forces. The development of the Strf 9040/CV90 was underway, and the vehicle appeared as a promising future infantry fighting vehicle. However, back then, it had still not entered service, and the possibility of training crew and mechanics to the operation of infantry fighting vehicles before receiving this advanced new vehicle appeared attractive to the Swedish Army.
The German BMPs
A possibility for Sweden to purchase foreign infantry fighting vehicles at an incredibly cheap cost soon emerged from Germany.
NVA Schützenpanzer BMP-1s crossing a river during an exercise. Amphibious capacity was a major aspect of the BMP-1’s design. Source: Pinterest
When first pushed into service in the late 1960s, the BMP-1 was a major addition to the Soviet Red Army’s arsenal, and despite the existence of some previous vehicles, such as the West German HS.30, it is often considered to be the first truly modern Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) to be adopted in massive numbers, at least for the Eastern Bloc. The vehicle could be used to support armored assault in all types of terrains, thanks to its amphibious capacities, and was notably able to carry a section of infantry even in heavily contaminated terrain which would typically be expected after the use of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) weapons. Support for accompanying tanks as well as dismounting infantry would be provided by a 73 mm Grom infantry support gun and a Malyutka missile launcher, with four missiles stored in the vehicle.
More than 1,100 BMP-1s (of which a very significant part, or perhaps all, were Czechoslovakian-built) were acquired by the East German NVA (Nationale Volksarmee Eng. National People’s Army), and eventually ended up in the Western-aligned Federal Republic of Germany following German reunification.
Year
BMP-1
Version
1984
878
Sp 2
1986
58
Of them 12 K2 version
1987
85
BMP-1P of them 6 command version K1 and three K2
1988
92
BMP-1P including 12 command K1, three K2, and three K3
Total
1113
Source – https://bmpvsu.ru/gdr.php#1
In December 1990, the decision was taken to maintain a number of these in service, and to this end, the BMP-1 would be ‘westernized’. This resulted in the BMP-1A1 Ost, a BMP-1 which forfeited the missiles, removed toxic asbestos from the vehicle, added German-standard headlights, rear lights, wing mirrors and Leitkreuz low-light identification markers, locked the 5th gear, and added an additional handbrake. Around 580 vehicles werebe converted from 1991 to 1993. The majority of these modernized vehicles, around 500, were sold to Greece in 1994, but around 80 modernized vehicles as well as hundreds of unmodernized ones remained in Germany’s stocks.
BMP-1A1 Osts at the conclusion of their upgrade in the Neubrandenburg repair facility where it was performed. Source: bmpsvu.ru
Sweden Tests the BMP-1
With Sweden eager to purchase infantry fighting vehicles at a cheap cost, and Germany providing just that in the form of hundreds of BMP-1 offered at a bargain price, interest soon arose. In early 1994, interested in the German BMPs, Sweden purchased five vehicles to run trials of the type and see if it would meet the requirements for what the Swedish Army was looking for.
Out of the five trial vehicles, one was used in ballistic trials to estimate the protection of the vehicle. The other four were given Swedish registration plates and named after famous commanders from the Second World War: 204992 ‘Patton’, 204994 ‘Monty’, 204997 ‘Rommel’, and 204998 ‘Guderian’.
“Monty”, one of the four BMP-1s which were used in trials in early 1994. The vehicle sports an unusual infrared spotlight. Source: www.sphf.se
The trials were run pretty quickly. The BMP-1 was, in many ways, not a vehicle which could beadapted to western standards, as the Germans themselves had taken notice and attempted to correct with the BMP-1A1 Ost. If Sweden was interested in purchasing large numbers of vehicles, which would necessarily include some which had not been modernized, a new upgrade programme would have to be devised for the vehicle to be compliant with Swedish army regulations.
Nonetheless, the BMP-1 had some interesting qualities. It was thought to be highly mobile, notably thanks to its amphibious capacities, and as such was considered to outfit the Norrland brigades, infantry brigades operating in northern Sweden specialized in sub-arctic warfare, for which mechanization was desired. Sweden also took interest in German surplus MT-LB multipurpose lightly armored auxiliary vehicles, which would, on the other hand, be given to units operating in southern Sweden.
“Rommel”, another one of the BMP-1s which were trialed by Sweden before adoption of the type. Source: www.sphf.se
In June 1994, convinced that the BMP-1 was a worthwhile addition to the Swedish arsenal, Sweden decided to formally acquire 350 BMP-1s to enter service. A further 83 were also purchased for spare parts. These 433 BMP-1s comprised 81 BMP-1A1 Osts, all the leftovers which had not been purchased by Greece save for one or two examples kept by Germany, 60 BMP-1s which had been through the BMP-1P upgrade during the Cold War (which included a new ATGM and smoke launchers), and 292 BMP-1s which had not gone through the BMP-1P upgrade.
The cost of these BMPs was reportedly extremely cheap, at 33,000 Deutschmarks (or roughly €17,000, or US$19,000) a piece, or one tenth of the price of purchasing a new Bv 206, of which the Swedish Army had thousands. The reason for such a cheap price was that Germany was eager to rid itself of these BMP-1s because of newly put in place military restrictions and to recoup the financial cost of the BMP-1A1 Ost refit program.
*Two photos of a Pbv 501 during exercises of trials. The vehicle bears a Tank Gunnery Simulator System on the barrel and turret top, meant to simulate firing and hits during military exercises. Source: www.sphf.se
Turning BMPs Into Pbvs
As said, the BMP-1, as it was, would not satisfy Swedish standards and would have to go through a modernization process to be operated by the Swedish Army. This, however, would not be conducted in Sweden or by a Swedish company.
While 11 BMP-1s, seemingly of the modernized BMP-1A1 type, would be sent to Sweden to continue trials and experimentations, all others, which were to be modernized, would instead be sent to the Czech Republic. There, the Swedish Army contracted the VOP-026 repair workshop to conduct the modernization which the Swedish Army had decided to carry out.
The 83 IFVs bought for spare parts were also delivered to the Czech company, to cannibalize them if there was a need to replace damaged parts in vehicles which were to enter service. Contracting a Czech workshop was a logical decision. Czechoslovakia had been, by far, the second largest manufacturer of the BMP-1, locally designated as BVP-1. Around 18,000 had been manufactured, and as such, there was a large infrastructure and workforce which had good knowledge of the vehicle. At the same time, Czech companies offered their services at a very affordable cost. The deliveries of these modernized BMP-1s would start in 1996, at a rate of twelve vehicles a month. Once modernized and pressed into service with the Swedish Army, the vehicles would become known as the Pbv 501 (Pansarbandvagn 501).
The paint scheme given to Pbv 501s was either a unicolor green scheme or a bicolor green-and black scheme. The registration number would typically be inscribed on the rear right infantry door. Previously, when in German service, the vehicles had a typical Soviet khaki green paint scheme.
Bringing the Vehicle to Western Standards
The core of the Pbv 501 refit consisted of a large number of small upgrades which focused on bringing aspects of the Pbv 501’s ergonomics and safety to standards expected of Swedish Army vehicles.
A future Pbv 501 in VOP-026. The vehicle has received the side light but has yet to be fitted with the protective cap for the ventilation inlet and outlet. Source: https://bmpvsu.ru/
First would be the removal of asbestos. Some of this toxic element was found inside the BMP-1, notably brake and clutch linings, but it was found to be dangerous for humans after too much exposure, and was banned in most Western countries. Asbestos elements were purged from the vehicle and replaced by harmless materials. The Germans had done the same with their BMP-1A1 Ost refit.
On the outside, the vehicle received new external lighting which would conform to NATO standards. It notably received indicators to be able to pursue safer driving on roads. Two rectangular lights were also present on the side of the vehicle’s hull. Outlets were also added to start up the Pbv 501 from outside of the vehicle.
A rear view of Pbv 501 Nr501089 during exercises, with dismounts sticking out of the deck hatches. This photo provides a good view of the new rear lights and indicators which were present on the vehicle, as well as the black and green camouflage scheme used by the Swedish Army for the type. The crewmember appears to carry a Soviet communication helmet. Source: www.sphf.se
The exhaust pipe of the vehicle was improved, while a number of changes were made to the hull’s exterior so it could be easier to move around for soldiers. A number of patches of anti-slip coating were added. These were notably present around the hull sides and the center of the large hatches present on the deck.
The external change which allows for the easiest external identification of the Pbv 501, however, is likely a rectangular box present to the left of the turret. This is a protective cap over the outlet and inlet of the ventilation.
Internally, a number of changes were carried out to make the vehicle more comfortable for the crew. An autonomous heater was added to ease the life of crews and dismounts during the winter months. A fire detection and extinction system with possibility of automatic operation was installed inside to allow for the quick extinction of fires. The batteries were moved from their original place and isolated from the ventilated crew compartment inside the sealed box. Protective covers were added around the observation devices so the dismounts would not hurt themselves on the sharp corners, something the Germans had previously adopted on the BMP-1A1 Ost. The weapon holders were changed to be able to hold Swedish weapons, with the Ak 5 assault rifle also being able to be fired from the vehicle’s firing ports.
An internal view of a Pbv 501. The vehicle features a number of improvements in the dismount compartment, such as adding covers on the vision devices to prevent injuries. However the small size of the compartment could never have been fixed without a deep transformation of the vehicle. Source: www.sphf.se
Safety Features Limiting the Vehicle’s Armament
A few further modifications concerned the Pbv 501’s armament. Some of them significantly reduced the combat capability of the IFV, however it was a necessary evil needed to lower the operational risks.
First, the autoloading mechanism was removed outright, meaning the gunner present in the turret would have to manually load rounds into the breech. Additionally, the rail for the Malyutka ATGM and all control devices for the missile were removed as well. At last, a new safety mechanism was installed so that the 73 mm Grom and coaxial 7.62 mm PKT machine gun could not be fired when any of the vehicle’s hatches were open.
As such, when taking into account the combat capacities of the Pbv 501, it was likely one of the least capable BMP-1 models ever fielded. This was not an issue for the Swedish Army though. The Pbv 501 had not been purchased with the idea to field a large number of ex-Warsaw Pact infantry fighting vehicles as frontline combattants of the Swedish Army. Rather, the type was to form crews and mechanics around the operation of an infantry fighting vehicle, preparing for the entry of service of the infinitely more capable Strf 0940.
Stripbv 5011 Command Vehicles
Fifteen of the BMP-1s were not converted to be Pbv 501s, but rather Stripbv 5011 command vehicles. These went through the same upgrades as the Pbv 501, with the only changes being the addition of three Swedish radios: a single Ra 420 and two Ra 480, instead of the single Soviet R-123M which was retained in the Pbv 501. This heavier radio equipment took more space and meant the number of dismounts would be reduced from eight to six. Externally, the vehicle could be differentiated by the presence of three large radio antennas, in comparison to just one on the Pbv 501.
A Stripbv 5011. One can observe the three radio antennas on the vehicle. The open door and crewman inside also give an idea of the small size of these vehicles for the average Swedish soldier. Source: www.sphf.se
Deliveries and Disappointments
After deliveries of the Pbv 501s began in 1996, a number of plans the Swedish Army had to be modified because the vehicle had not lived up to all the expectations of the Army.
A Pbv 501 camouflaged with foliage during its short service in the Swedish Army. Source: www.sphf.se
First, the vehicle’s mobility, while generally being considered satisfactory in most conditions, actually struggled quite considerably in the snow, to the point where the vehicle was actually judged not sufficiently mobile to be fielded to the Norrland brigades. As such, the plans to outfit these with the Pbv 501 and brigades from the south with the MT-LB, now designated Pbv 401, were reversed, with the Pbv 501 instead being delivered to southern brigades, more precisely the 2nd, 4th, and 12th infantry brigades of the Swedish Army.
In service, the Pbv 501 proved to have a rather satisfying mobility in the south, but a significant number of issues, some of which could not be removed easily, were found with the vehicle. The first was with the ammunition, and was one which the vehicles shared in German service.
It was discovered that a certain amount of the nitrocellulose had been discharged into the air when firing the 73 mm Grom cannon. It was found potentially harmful to the health of the crew. Swedish trials seemingly found that this was an issue mostly with the PG-15V HEAT round, with the OG-15V high-explosive shell seeming safe in comparison, though the firing of all 73 mm shells appear to have been prohibited in peacetime. In the German Army, the issue of potential nitrocellulose poisoning was solved by restriction, meaning the crews were not allowed to fire the gun, at least not with potentially toxic rounds, in peacetime.
Sweden went even further though. No large stockpile of PG-15V was acquired, meaning even if the need was ever to arise, the Pbv 501 in Swedish service practically had no meansto deal with enemy armor. It appears a small amount of rounds was purchased for conversion into safe training rounds, but it is unclear if this ever took place. In addition to the problem of lack of anti-armor round, the Pbv 501 had removed the autoloader for the sake of safety. This made gunners overtasked, as they had to observe the outside of the vehicle to spot targets, aim and fire, and then reload the gun, a configuration one may cynically relate to be similar to pre-1940 French tanks. Furthermore, as found by the majority of Grom users, the gun was considered to be very inaccurate beyond practically very short range.
A Pbv 501 during maintenance, with the rear road wheel removed. The vehicle’s reliability was generally not too much of an issue, but if it was to break down, replacing the engine would be. Source: www.sphf.se
The vehicle was found to be rather reliable, however, if a mechanical issue was to arise, the removal and replacement of the engine block was found to be a long process, about 10 times longer than in the more modern Strf 9040 in fact. The radios were also a considerable disappointment; in comparison to Swedish models, as they were found to have a poor transmission quality and reduced range, and would require preheating for up to half an hour before functioning.
The limited internal space was found to be an issue for the majority of BMP-1 users. However, Swedish dismounts had probably the worst issues with the Pbv 501’s cramped interior, as Swedish males have an average height of 1.797 m, one of the tallest in the word. This is largely considered to already be in the range where sitting in the vehicle’s dismount compartment would be quite the uncomfortable experience, and finding servicemen who could comfortably operate inside a Pbv 501 was likely even harder for Swedish Army units in comparison to other BMP-1 operators.
Crewmembers and dismounts observe outside of a Pbv 501 during training exercises. Source: www.sphf.se
In and Out
All these issues with the Pbv, alongside the entry into service of the Strf 0940 and the reduction in size of European armies following the end of the Cold War and its tensions, played a large part in the vehicle being retired from active service. As such, it would appear that the Swedish Army took the decision to place the Pbv 501 into storage and stop operating vehicles of this type as early as 2000. This was before deliveries were even completed, which would continue into 2001. Some vehicles were placed directly into storage, without even being issued to Swedish Army units.
Pbv 501s in Swedish Army storage facilities in Hammar, southern Sweden. This photo is particularly useful to have a look at the disposition of anti-slip coated parts of the hull roof. Source: bmpvsu.ru
It appears that, in 2005, the decision was taken to phase the Pbv 501 from service and never issue them again. In practice, the vehicles remained in Swedish Army storage in the following years. In December of 2008, they found a buyer. This was actually the owner of the VOP-026 workshop which had carried the Pbv 501 modernization. The company, by that point known as EXCALIBUR, acquired the vast majority of the Pbv 501 fleet which Sweden had in its hands, with the vehicles being moved to its facilities in Czechia. The purchase price was 30 million Swedish Kronor (or roughly US$6 million) for the entire fleet.
It ought to be noted that apparently, the purchase was done under the cover of the Czech state, claiming that the vehicles would be used for the Czech Army, which still actively operates the BMP/BVP-1, and not purchased by a private company within Czechia. Jan Villaume, spokesperson of the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (Swedish: Försvarets materielverk, abbreviated as FMV), the state company tasked with weapon exports, said that when approached by EXCALIBUR:
“We were [at first] informed by them too that they were interested, and we told them that we cannot sell to them, since they are a private company”
When the Czech Republic later expressed interest, Jan Villaume described the position of FMV as:
“They were exchanging parts of their own fleet and were going to use the rest for spare parts […] They seemed serious. We had no reason not to believe them.”
Pieter Wiezeman, spokesperson for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), described Sweden’s side of the deal and the assumption that the vehicles would end up in Czech service after having first been approached by EXCALIBUR as naive:
“Realistically, I think that they should have known that these tanks probably were not meant for the Czech Republic. They should have investigated this more carefully, that would have been very easy to do.”
Iraq Unsheathes the EXCALIBUR Pbv 501s
The Czech company of EXCALIBUR Army continued storing of the Pbv 501s in its facilities at Přelouč, Czechia, waiting for a potential buyer. The vehicles were stored in particularly packed storage presumably in a climate-controlled environment, and seem to have been pretty regularly maintained, with some vehicles being rolled out quite regularly to show the Pbv 501 were still functional and ready for a buyer to take up the offer.
An EXCALIBUR Pbv 501 is driven around for a demonstration and photoshoot in 2012-2013. Other vehicles of the same type can be seen in the background. Source: bmpvsu.ruTightly-packed Pbv 501s in an EXCALIBUR warehouse, 2012-2013. Source: bmpvsu.ru Pbv 501s being refurbished at EXCALIBUR Army facilities, 2015-2016. Source: bmpvsu.ru
A buyer was finally found in the shape of Iraq, which in 2015 acquired a number of the Pbv 501s stored by EXCALIBUR. Several estimates for the number of Pbv 501s delivered to Iraq have varied between 45 and 70 depending on the source. A convoy was spotted heading to Iraq with at least 52 Pbv 501s. It appears a higher number of vehicles could have been purchased too, perhaps as many as 250. Not all EXCALIBUR Army Pbv 501s were sold to Iraq, as the company has continued to showcase some of the vehicles since.
Pbv 501s on trucks in Iraq, circa late 2015. Source: bmpvsu.ruA convoy of at least 52 Pbv 501s on trucks in Iraq.
This purchase was far from uncontroversial. The main issue was that the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration maintains a pretty strict list of countries which are embargoed from Swedish military sales for a number of reasons, notably regarding human rights or the possibility of the sold equipment to fall into the hands of terrorist groups. Iraq is one of the countries that feature on this list. But the purchase of the Pbv 501 by EXCALIBUR, and EXCALIBUR then selling the vehicles to the Iraqi government, circumvented the Swedish export regulations, which highly displeased some in Sweden. Former Swedish Army weapon systems ending in areas of the world where they did not want them, was exactly what the Swedish Defence Material Administration wanted to prevent.
An EXCALIBUR Pbv 501 is demonstrated in front of civilians in 2017, showing the sale to Iraq did not cover all vehicles and that the Pbv 501 is still on EXCALIBUR’s catalog. Source: bmpvsu.ru
Nonetheless, there was nothing in Sweden’s power to do about Pbv 501s being exported to Iraq. The vehicles ending up in EXCALIBUR’s hands was a shady process to begin with, with FMV and Sweden seemingly not entirely aware that they were selling their vehicles to a private company. Once the vehicles were in the hands and ownership of EXCALIBUR, Sweden had no means at its disposal to prevent the sale except complaints which had little to no hope of being received. Jan Villaume of FMV commented that: “We clearly wouldn’t have made the deal directly with Iraq, so it is now an indirect deal. It seems legal, but is not so good.” It is likely the deal somewhat soured Czech-Swedish relations at least in military matters, but it does not appear any measures or reforms were applied to Swedish export laws. Considering that the vehicles ended up in Iraq as a result of an under-handed process in which Sweden was misguided into selling the vehicles to what they believed to be a legitimate state actor, there may not be too much to even be done except enforcing already existing restrictions.
Into the Iraqi Army
The Pbv 501s were pressed into service into the 34th Mechanized Brigade of the 9th Armored Division of the Iraqi Army (الجيش العراقي). They joined a fleet of ex-Greek BMP-1A1 Ost which had been delivered to Iraq almost a decade prior.
A Pbv 501 in front of modified Humvees during the campaign for Mosul, November 2016. Source: bmpvsu.ru
The Pbv 501 were very heavily engaged in the Iraqi offensive to retake the city of Mosul from the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), and suffered considerable losses during this phase of the conflict. During the 2014 to 2017 period, out of 85 Iraqi BMP-1s spotted as destroyed, 35 were Pbv 501s, despite the vehicle most likely was introduced only in early 2016. It is possible that the Iraqis, while they may have appreciated the comfort upgrades brought by the modernization, were more displeased with the significant reductions in combat capacities it introduced, for example removing the autoloader and missile capacity.
A Pbv 501 destroyed during the battle for Mosul, 6th December 2016. Source: bmpvsu.ru
After the fall of Mosul, the Pbv 501s were engaged in further operations against ISIS, such as the reduction of the last ISIS stronghold in central Iraq, Hawija, in October 2017. The vehicles have notably been seen deployed near the Syrian border in November 2018, and remain in service of the Iraqi Army up to this day, and potentially for the foreseeable future.
Conclusion – The Convoluted Fate of German BMPs
The Pbv 501, alongside its MT-LB cousin, the Pbv 401, can appear as an anomaly in Swedish armored vehicles history, a Soviet vehicle operated by the army that has historically almost exclusively used western and indigenous designs.
When looking at the vehicle’s service life in Sweden, one may be tempted to say the purchase of BMP-1s from Germany was a total failure, with no proper use of the vehicle ever being found in Sweden. While that could be argued not to be far from the truth, at the same time, it ought to be remembered that Sweden was able to purchase ex-East German surplus BMP-1s at an incredibly cheap price, to the point where the investment that had to be placed to purchase 350 BMP-1s was in practice much less than what would be expected for such a large fleet of even outdated infantry fighting vehicles. Despite their very short service, therefore, it is not too far-fetched to say the Pbv 501s may, in the end, very well have been worth their price in the experience they gave to crews and mechanics who would later operate on the Strf 9040.
BMP-1/Pbv 501 as seen during the conversion process in a Czech factoryBMP-1A1 204997 ‘Rommel’ seen during trials in Sweden prior to the bulk purchase of former German BMP-1s, 1994Standard Pbv 501 in Swedish army camouflage, late 1990/early 2000s
Pansarbandvagn 501 Specifications
Dimensions ( L x w x h)
6.735 x 2.94 x 1.881 m
Weight
~13.5 tonnes
Engine
UTD-20 6-cylinders 300 hp diesel engine
Suspension
Torsion bars
Forward gears
5 (likely just 4 on BMP-1A1 Ost-based Pbv 501s)
Fuel capacity
462 L (perhaps just 330 L on BMP-1A1 Ost based vehicles due to rear door fuel tanks not being used)
Maximum speed (road)
65 (likely 40 km/h on BMP-1A1 Ost based vehicles)
Maximum speed (water)
7-8 km/h
Crew
3 (commander, driver, gunner/loader)
Dismounts
8
Radios
1 R-123M (Pbv 501), 1 Ra 420 & 2 Ra 480 (Stripbv 5011)
France (1931-1940)
Anti-tank Gun – Multiple Prototypes and 15 Pre-production Guns Built
The French Army started to experiment with armor-piercing weapons as early as the Great War. During the German offensive of 1914, a vastly overestimated armored car scare led to the French army mobilizing naval 47 mm guns for anti-armor work, notably creating the Autocanon de 47mm Renault. The entrenchment of both sides as 1914 morphed into 1915 put an end to this armored car scare. Later in the war, as tanks became an actively used weapon, countering them became a source of worry again. The vehicles were first employed by France’s ally, Britain, and then by the French themselves, before the Germans would be able to produce and employ their own. But the possibility remained there, and the German Army would also widely use captured British tanks. As such, a number of options were studied as early as 1917 or 1918. This included some infantry support guns which were hoped to also fulfil an anti-armor role, such as the ill-fated American-made 37 mm Bethlehem Steel gun, or the mounting of the ubiquitous 75 mm modèle 1897 gun on a wooden platform which guaranteed wide traverse. In the last weeks of the conflict, the French tested what appeared to be a more mature and potent solution to the problem of enemy tank, the 17 mm Filloux. This was a high-velocity (1,000 m/s) anti-tank gun firing a small caliber, 17×209 mm semi-rimmed cartridge, mounted on the carriage of the very common 37 mm TR modèle 1916 infantry support gun.
The conclusion of the Great War would result in the threat of enemy armored fighting vehicles being vastly less urgent, and likely due to less interest from a scaling-down military, the 17 mm Filloux would not go anywhere. Nonetheless, studies on the matter of anti-tank guns continued in France. While a curious Delaunay-Belleville DB20 20 mm weapon, seemingly sometimes called an “anti-tank machine gun”, was offered in a similar timeframe or soon after the Filloux, it was not adopted either.
In 1921, France launched a program which envisioned both a 10 to 15 mm dual-purpose anti-tank and anti-aircraft machine gun, as well as a dedicated high-velocity anti-tank gun of a caliber smaller than 37 mm. This program would fail to result in the adoption of an anti-tank gun. The machine gun requirement would result in a 13.5 mm MAC dual-purpose prototype and later the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss, which was used strictly in an anti-aircraft role. Meanwhile, in 1927, the state workshop of Atelier de Construction de Puteaux (APX) (Eng: Puteaux Construction Workshops, also known as Puteaux) offered a 20 mm anti-tank gun; but the caliber was found to be too small to result in sufficient armor-piercing capacities. New specifications were issued in 1928, this time clearly requesting a 25 mm semi-automatic gun.
Puteaux and the French Army’s Small-Caliber Anti-Tank Gun
As the requirements of the French army evolved, APX was heavily involved in attempting to design the anti-tank gun that was requested. The Atelier de Construction de Puteaux (Eng: Puteaux Construction Workshops) was set up in the second half of the 19th century and had, by the conclusion of the First World War, become a major artillery manufacturer for the French Army, housing the designers of many different types of artillery pieces.
In 1928, following the failure to adopt a workable dual anti-tank and anti-air machine gun, and the perceived lack of power of Puteaux’s 20 mm anti-tank gun prototype (of which no views have emerged, unfortunately), new requirements were issued by the French Army. Under the new program, the army now wanted a 25 mm anti-tank gun with a semi-automatic breech, firing a 350 gram projectile at a muzzle velocity of at least 700 m/s, and able to penetrate a 25 mm armor plate at an incidence of 20° and at a range of 600 m. The army notably placed very strict weight requirements on the gun, which should be no heavier than 180 kg. It was desired to have a gun that could be separated into four different parts for the sake of easy transportation. These weights and dismounting requirements would eventually be dropped as it became evident the designers could not design a gun that both met with the armor-piercing performances requested and have such light construction and good mobility.
APX was likely put to work on designing a 25 mm anti-tank gun as early as these new requirements were placed. The private company Hotchkiss also followed suit. Both manufacturers were able to present their first prototypes in 1931. These first designs are regrettably nebulous, and no views of them have emerged to this day. Neither were considered to have sufficiently adequate performances to be adopted. It is known, however, that the Puteaux gun’s general design was noted to follow the requirements, which was not the case of the Hotchkiss. The private manufacturer’s gun used wheels with a mixed iron and wooden construction, which was not judged as satisfactory by the evaluating commission.
The 1933 Prototype
Following the 1931 prototype’s rejection, engineers at APX went back to work and eventually submitted a new prototype in September 1933. This prototype is somewhat less obscure than the first, although no photos attributable to it are known to exist.
A prototype 25 mm APX anti-tank gun attached to a Renault UE armored tractor. Exactly what model of 25 mm APX gun this is is uncertain. It does not exactly match the known configurations of the later 1935 prototype and 1936 pre-production guns, and as such could perhaps be the 1933 prototype. This, however, should not be taken as a certainty, as this could also simply be either a 1935 or 1936 gun using different wheels. Source: CAAPC (Centre des Archives de l’Armement et du personnel)
The Puteaux gun fired a 25 mm armor-piercing projectile at a muzzle velocity of 950 m/s. This was not the same shell as the 25 mm Hotchkiss. Both guns used ammunition designed in-house. At 330 grams, the weight of the Puteaux projectile was 10 grams heavier than the Hotchkiss one. The APX prototype had a more archaic breech. Whereas the Hotchkiss design used a true semi-automatic action, the APX one is better described as a partial semi-automatic. When inserting a new shell into the breech, it would begin to close, but not all the way through; the loader would have to finish moving the breech into position with his thumb. Once fired, the action would eject the cartridge and put itself back into battery, breech open and ready for a new shell to be inserted.
Otherwise, the APX gun used a fairly classic split-trail design. Its wheels used a stamped sheet metal construction with filled out ribs. The gun weighed 398 kg and the barrel was reportedly 1.86 m long, making the gun an L/74. When adding a flash hider, the length of the barrel would be extended to 2.23 m.
The Puteaux and Hotchkiss designs were subjected to comparative trials in early 1934. According to an internal note of the French Ministry of War dated from January 1st, 1934, 20 of each design were to be experimented on. It is unclear if this batch of 20 APX gun was ever manufactured, Comparative trials between the two guns began in the Etablissement Techniques de Bourges (Eng: Bourges Technical Establishment, Bourges also being the location of another state artillery manufacturer, ABS) in March of 1934. They ended up very unfavorable for the APX design. Not only was the not fully semi-automatic action judged inferior to the Hotchkiss one, but the security of triggers, locking of the elevation and traverse control when in travel mode, and suspension of the carriage were all judged to require significant revisions on the APX design. Pretty much the only advantage it is known to have had over the Hotchkiss gun was being 80 kg lighter.
These trials led to an unsurprising conclusion. The Hotchkiss design was approved by the Minister of War on June 16th, 1934, and by decision of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre (Eng: Superior Council of War), was adopted by the French Army as the canon de 25 mm SA modèle 1934 (Eng: 25mm SA (semi-automatic) gun pattern 1934) on September 3rd.
An abandoned Hotchkiss 25 mm SA 34 during the campaign of France. The type was by far the most common anti-tank gun of the French Army by 1940. Source: http://www.materielsterrestres39-45.fr/
1935 Revision
One may have expected the adoption of the Hotchkiss gun to lead to development being concluded on the Puteaux design, seeing as its niche was now fulfilled within the French army. This was not, however, the case. Likely as soon as the trials proved to go south for the APX design, work began on an improved model of the Puteaux gun, with a reworked prototype being once again presented in January of 1935. This prototype is the first of which there exist clearly identified photos.
A front view of the 1935 prototype, likely at the APX factory. Source: GBM 101
Significant work had been performed in order to make the APX design competitive with the Hotchkiss. The gun abandoned its proprietary cartridge and was redesigned to fire the same 25 mm projectile as the Hotchkiss. Its action was also improved to now be truly semi-automatic, without a need for further movement of the breech by the loader after inserting a round. The barrel featured a large muzzle shroud. The gun used a one-piece shield, with an opening for the sight (likely the L.711) present on the top right of the barrel. The protection of the shield was actually supplemented by the carriage’s wheels. The wheels on this APX prototype were designed to move alongside the split trail, so that when the gun would be deployed, the wheels would be angled towards the front of the gun. Furthermore, they were likely to be made of armor quality steel. The consequence of that was a direct improvement of the gun’s frontal protection, as well as an increase in the space allocated to the crew operating the gun. Such a design had already been adopted for some other artillery pieces in the 1930s: notably, the 1933 carriage designed under such principles was adopted for some 75 mm model 1897 guns as well as eventually the model 1935 short 105 mm gun. Owing to their armor-quality steel construction, the wheels lacked any pneumatics or pneumatic rim, and due to their dual function as additional protection did not feature prominent ribs or openings. While this feature would typically make a gun heavier, at 400 kg, the revised 1935 prototype was still 80 kg lighter than the Hotchkiss gun adopted the year prior. The full length of the gun and carriage was 3.50 m.
A side view of the APX 25 mm SA prototype. The link between the movement of the wheels and split-trail can be observed here. Source: GBM 101
It is likely that this 1935 prototype presented a considerable improvement over the previous design, notably thanks to its truly semi-automatic action. By this point, however, a gun exactly in the same category as the 25 mm SA 34 was not what the French army was looking for. While satisfactory in terms of armor-piercing performances, the Hotchkiss gun proved too heavy, and a lighter gun which would prove more mobile on the field was desired. At only 80 kg lighter, this APX prototype was not judged as interesting to fulfill that role, and as such APX was requested to begin work on a lightened 25 mm gun. This design would take some inspiration from previous APX 25 mm anti-tank gun designs, but with deep changes in order to accommodate a lighter construction. A first prototype would be offered in 1936, and the lightened gun would be adopted as the APX SA-L 37 in 1937.
The 1936 prototype of the APX lightened 25 mm anti-tank gun. Though experience gained while working on the heavier type of 25 mm anti-tank gun was certainly re-used while designing the lighter model, it was a major departure from this previous type. Source: GBM 101The production model of the APX lightened 25 mm gun, designated as Canon de 25 mm SA-L 37 APX, seen in France’s Saumur Tank Museum. About a fifth of the French Army’s 25 mm anti-tank guns were of this type during the campaign of France, the others being the classic 25 mm SA 34 type. In comparison to the 480 kg SA 34, the SA-L 37 weighed in at 310 kg, but proved unable of motorized traction due to a much more fragile carriage. Source: flickr
Pre-Production of the “Heavy” APX Gun
One would once again expect the army’s request for APX to design a lightened 25 mm anti-tank gun to bury the heavier design. But once again, it somehow lingered on.
The French Direction de l’Infanterie (Eng: Infantry Directorate) formally decided to place an order for a small amount of the heavy 25 mm APX design for experimental use on March 13th 1936. The order was for 15 guns, which would each be delivered alongside 30 ordinary armor-piercing shells, 20 blank shells and 100 reduced range training shells. These guns were meant to be delivered in April, with the goal of conducting further comparative tests against the 25 mm SA 34, on a wider scale. They would be delivered to a varied set of units. It appears five infantry regiments received APX guns, these being the 60th, 67th and 95th infantry regiments, alongside the 8th Zouaves and the 21st African Tirailleurs regiments. Reportedly, eight cavalry units were also to be included in the list of units set to receive these guns.
While the guns were delivered for trials at first, they would be kept within the inventory of their units. They did not replace the 25 mm SA 34 guns, which were apparently present in their normal complement within these regiments, but instead served to supplement them. In effect, this meant the regiments experimenting the guns would have one or two additional pieces, which were not of the same model as their standard anti-tank gun but fired the same projectile. The guns were still known to be in service in May of 1938. At this date, the French Direction of Infantry suggested to make use of the guns within fortified positions in the 1st and 7th military regions (these being, respectively, centered around Lille and Besançon – both on France’s eastern border, but in the periphery of the area directly bordering Germany rather than on this part of the front). This was not necessarily a bad idea; the guns would likely see far less wear in forts than in the field, which would ease supply, as spare parts would be far harder to obtain for such a small complement of guns in comparison to the widespread 25 mm anti-tank projectile. However, it appears this suggestion was never carried out, or in any case it certainly did not include all the manufactured pieces.
Still Around by 1940
Despite their small production numbers, there is photographic evidence the pre-production 25 mm APX anti-tank guns were still in use by the Fall of France in 1940. Two known photos show a park of 25 mm anti-tank guns captured and gathered by German forces during or after the Fall of France. Most of these are 25 mm SA 34, as would be expected, but two 25 mm APX guns can be seen within the park, as well as some SA-L 37s.
A photo of the park in which the Puteaux guns were found: the gun circled in left and the one to its right are pre-production APX guns. Most of the other guns are Hotchkiss 25 mm SA 34, but some, such as the third gun in the row closest to the camera, are the 25 mm APX SA-L 37 lightened gun. Source: ebay via ATF 40 forumThe same captured guns storage park seen from another angle. The large barrel shroud of the Puteaux gun is easy to compare with the much thinner barrel of the SA 34 on this image. Source: ebay via ATF 40 forum
Unfortunately, the context and location behind these photographies remains unknown, but it confirms the guns were still around in 1940, and very likely in the field – German troops rarely if ever took the effort to move pieces from French fortifications. As such, it is even likely the APX gun may have seen some action during the campaign of France.
Conclusion – The Unlucky Competitor to the Hotchkiss Anti-Tank Gun
The original, full-weight model of APX 25 mm anti-tank gun remains an obscure curiosity in the arsenal of weapons developed and even used by the French army in the interwar era. Though apparently better suited to the requirements than the Hotchkiss at first, the design quickly failed to impress as the Hotchkiss gun swiftly improved and proved to offer better features. Nonetheless, the APX gun somewhat lingered on, likely due to some bias against private companies which was known to exist in pre-1940 France and resulted in the opportunity of a gun designed by a state-owned designer not being discarded even as an alternative was adopted. APX would eventually go on to design a lightened 25 mm anti-tank gun which was very loosely based on their previous design, and would finally see adoption. But even as this lightened gun was actively being developed, the heavier design curiously managed to secure a small pre-production order, which would result in a tiny amount of pieces being in service in 1940. Even for the unit operating them, this likely did not mean anything – the gun would likely offer similar performances to the 25 mm SA 34 overall, being perhaps easier to move around somewhat and better protected, but likely less ergonomic in their controls. They, however, remain an interesting curiosity and an extremely obscure part of France’s 1940 arsenal of anti-tank weaponry.
25mm SA APX. An illustration by AMX-13.
Specifications
Weight (Deployed)
398 kg (1933 prototype), 400 kg (1935 prototype)
Length (With Carriage)
3.50 m (1935 prototype)
Caliber
Unique 25 mm 330 grams cartridge fired at 950 m/s (1933 prototype)
25×193.5mmR Hotchkiss (1935 prototype)
Sight
Likely L.711
Numbers produced
Several prototypes, 15 pre-production guns
Sources
GBM n°97, Juillet-Août-Septembre 2011, “Les canons semi-automatiques antichars de 25 mm Première Partie: Le canon de 25 mm SA modèle 1934”, Eric Denis et François Vauvillier, pp 86-95
GBM n°101, Juillet-Août-Septembre 2012, “Le canon de 25 SA léger modèle 1937, le petit de Puteaux”, Eric Denis, pp 75-83
Renault VM concept as illustrated by Pavel Alexe, funded by our Patreon campaign.
France (1931)
Light Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle – Design Only
During the interwar years, the French Army’s cavalry service was a force actively seeking new types of vehicle to introduce to its forces, generally more so than the better-funded infantry. There were active doctrinal developments within the Cavalry which led to new roles being created, for which various manufacturers would offer designs. In the early 1930s, the concept of a very light vehicle tasked with reconnaissance duties and armed with a machine gun was gaining popularity within the Cavalry. The Citroën P28 was the first vehicle adopted, in 1931. Renault, the largest vehicle manufacturer in France, did not want to allow its competitor Citroën to gain the lead and be able to sell vehicles to the French Army uncontested. As Citroën had done, it began the design process based on a logistical armored vehicle it had recently designed. A turreted light tank/tankette model designed in this manner was already in existence by late 1931.
Reconnaissance Vehicles and Citroën’s Successes
The French Cavalry ended the First World War with a varied fleet of armored cars of various weights, sizes and armaments. In the interwar years, the need for new, more modern vehicles was apparent, including vehicles which could fulfil a reconnaissance role.
In July 1930, the French Army approved an ambitious program which was to lead to the creation of vehicles to fulfill a large variety of roles. This was the general motorisation program. It called for two types of vehicles which would fulfil a reconnaissance role: a voiture de reconnaissance tout terrain blindée (Eng: all-terrain reconnaissance armored car) and a Automitrailleuse légère tout terrain (Eng: all-terrain light armored car). “Automitrailleuse” is a term that, although often translated as armored car, when used in the context of interwar French Cavalry, is used to designate all armored combat vehicles, regardless of means of motion. In other words, a program that, in English, would be translated as an armored car program, could in fact refer to a half-track or fully tracked
The first requirement would eventually evolve into the Type L armored car specification, for which Renault would produce the ill-fated Renault URL armored car.
The armed Renault UE prototype. This was an experimental prototype created shortly after the early VM for demonstration purposes, with the only change from the original UE being a raised compartment for the co-driver, who was tasked with operating the machine gun. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
In comparison, the second set of requirements would quickly fall under the influence of a specification for a vehicle which would be ordered in much higher numbers – the Type N. The Type N was envisioned as a lightweight all-terrain, lightly armored infantry tractor and cargo vehicle. Three companies produced vehicles for this program: Latil offered a licence-built Carden-Loyd Mk.VI; Citroën offered the Citroën P28 chenillette, a half-tracked vehicle; and Renault offered a tankette, inspired by the general design features of the influential Carden-Loyd but by all means its own design. This was the Renault UE, a light (2.64 tonnes) and tiny (2.8 m long, 1.74 m wide, and 1.25 m high) tankette with a crew of two and protected by thin, bulletproof armor. It had a leaf spring suspension with three bogies containing two road wheels each, using a front sprocket and rear idler and supported by two return rollers.
Creating a Reconnaissance Vehicle Using the Renault UE as the Basis
The specifications of the Type N, which called for a lightweight, fairly mobile, bulletproof vehicle, co-incidentally proved to create designs which would provide a good basis for the kind of light reconnaissance vehicles the French Cavalry was seeking. Both Citroën and Renault would offer vehicles to fulfill such a role based on their logistical tankettes. Citroën offered a modified version of its P28, which was ordered in October 1931.
The Renault design was created around the same timeframe as the Citroën, in autumn 1931. The design would retain the same very short length of 2.8 m as the UE, and perhaps the same or at least a similar width of 1.74 m. However, there were major structural changes to the vehicle. Renault gave this modified design the internal code “Renault VM”.
Instead of retaining the front crew compartment, centrally-placed engine, and rear-mounted stowage area of the original UE, the VM’s crew compartment would instead be placed towards the left and rear of the vehicle, with an engine to the front and right.
A side schematic view of the early Renault VM, showing the similar drivetrain in comparison to the UE, as well as the turret and crew positions. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The largest difference in the vehicle design was the presence of a turreted armament. The early VM design featured a turret which was mounted on the left of the vehicle, behind the driver’s position, which was positioned in the same way as on an UE. The turret featured on the schematics of the vehicle was a fairly simplistic design. It would be armed with the new machine gun available for fortifications and armored vehicle designs, the 7.5 mm MAC 31. The MAC 31 Type E had a weight of 11.18 kg empty and 18.48 kg with a fully loaded 150-round drum magazine. The machine gun was gas-fed, and had a maximum cyclic rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute. It had a muzzle velocity of 775 m/s. The ammunition stowage present on the early Renault VM design is unknown. The turret would have housed a single crewmember, the gunner/commander. It appears that a small cupola would have been placed towards the rear of the turret, and would likely have had some sort of vision device, such as a panoramic periscope. From the design, the turret appears to have been very small overall, to the point it would have been quite cramped. It also appears that no reloads for the machine gun would be present in the turret, with all the magazines (the MAC 31 using 150-rounds drum magazines) having to be stowed inside the hull instead.
The other major structural change of the early VM design in comparison to the UE was the engine, with the early VM being designed to have a more powerful engine. Its potential horsepower output is unknown, as Renault used an alternative means of power measurement for it, CV. It would have been a 15 CV engine. In comparison, the original UE’s Renault 75 was a 10 CV engine producing 30 hp, while the AMR 33’s 24 CV engine would produce 84 hp. Unlike the centrally-mounted position on the UE, the engine was shifted to the right on the early VM design. This would have been a fairly uncommon feature at the time. As lateral space was quite limited, the radiator and ventilator would have had to be shifted at 90° and be installed to the rear of the engine, in a fairly distinct manner which would have also been quite rare at the time. The radiator, in particular, would have been installed as far to the back as the turret would have been, and the gunner would have effectively been sandwiched between the radiator on his right and the hull’s wall to the left.
A top view of the early VM design’s structural arrangement, showing the position of the crew as well as the engine block, which extended over the whole short 2.7 m length of the vehicle. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The suspension of the vehicle would have used the same components as the Renault UE, with three leaf springs bogies on which two small road wheels were mounted, a front sprocket and a rear idler. However, unlike on the UE, the sprocket and idler would have been placed higher. Though the return rollers are not seen on the schematics, they would very likely have been present.
Armor protection at this point in time would also very likely have been the same as the UE, with 9 mm on vertical surfaces and 6 mm on all other plates.
Rejection
Renault’s early VM design was submitted to the technical services of the French Cavalry at some point in autumn 1931. The vehicle was formally rejected by the French Cavalry on November 12th 1931.
A first review of the design by the French Cavalry was fairly negative. Several design choices of the vehicle were deemed subpar and proved unpopular, as some of the design features were quite unconventional for the time. Among which was the rear-turreted configuration, which the French Army would continue to object to on future evolutions of Renault’s light armored vehicle proposals. Another source of discontent was the engine’s offset mounting to the right. Furthemore, the engine was not thought to be powerful enough to allow for the vehicle to reach a high enough speed. This was further worsened by the use of a suspension almost identical to the UE, with six small road wheels mounted on leaf springs, which would generally favor cross-country mobility but make reaching higher maximum speeds harder. There were also issues with the proposed placement of the radiator all the way to the right, with the position of the commander, cramped between the radiator and the left wall of the vehicle.
During the same period, the French Cavalry had been somewhat pleased with the design of Citroën’s offer, the P28, and had ordered 50 vehicles of a modified version of the half-track tractor, now fulfilling a light reconnaissance vehicle role. As such, there was no immediate need for a swift replacement at this point in time, though the P28 was not viewed as a viable long-term solution but only as a stopgap.
Conclusion – A Failure which would Lead to Many Successes
The rejection of the early Renault VM in November 1931 would not be the end of Renault’s light reconnaissance vehicle designs, far from it. The P28 was considered to only be viable as a stopgap solution, and there was still a need for a more capable vehicle to offer a more durable reconnaissance platform. Formal specifications for such a vehicle would be formulated by the French Army on January 16th 1932.
One of the five Renault VM prototypes, n°79 756, is seen during the large French Army maneuvers of summer 1932. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Renault would provide a modified version of its existing VM design, which would undergo many changes, most notably, a lengthened hull allowing for less tight and cramped spacing, a more powerful engine, and a new suspension and turret designs. Five prototypes of this design would be ordered in April 1932 and, in a true industrial feat at the time, completed in time to participate in large French Army maneuvers in the summer of 1932. These would eventually lead to the AMR 33, of which 118 new production vehicles would be manufactured in addition to the five prototypes. After this the even more produced AMR 35, a further evolution of the VM design, came. These were two success stories for Renault’s 1930s armored fighting vehicles design, despite the failure of the original VM design.
Renault VM concept as illustrated by Pavel Alexe, funded by our Patreon campaign.
AMR 35, equipped with the AVIS-1 turret (Batignolles-Châtillon) and the 7.5 mm (0.295 in) Reibel Châtellerault MAC31 machine gun. Illustration: Hadrien Barthélemy.
France (1933-1940)
Reconnaissance Vehicle (Light Tank/Tracked Armored Car) – 2 Converted, 1 Prototype, and 167 Production Vehicles Built
The AMR 35 was a tracked reconnaissance vehicle designed by Renault in the mid-1930s. Designed as a follow-up to issues the French Cavalry had with the AMR 33, it lengthened the vehicle and adopted a more standard configuration with a rear engine. Although it improved on its predecessor in some ways, the AMR 35 would prove particularly hard to get in proper working order once vehicles started rolling off the production line, the scale of delays and issues being a major cause between the whole class of AMR vehicles being basically discontinued.
An AMR 35 ZT-1 of the 3rd GAM in early 1937. The vehicle is here in its more recognizable form, sporting the Avis n°2 turret. Source: EPCA-D via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François Vauvillier
The French Cavalry’s Search for a Vehicle
In the decade that followed the end of the Great War, the French Cavalry found itself in a dire position when it came to acquiring new vehicles. Sidelined by the Infantry and Artillery branches during trench warfare, the Cavalry branch did see the potential armored vehicles offered for exploitation and considered mechanized formations to be an interesting prospect to study. However, without the funds necessary to acquire vehicles for such experiments, it largely had to rely on WW1 relics and ad hoc vehicles for most tasks, including close reconnaissance. Throughout the 1920s, purchases of armored fighting vehicles were few and far between. The purchase of 16 Citroën-Kégresse P4T-based half-track armored cars in 1923 and 96 Schneider P16 half-track later in the decade, though delivered in 1930-1931, was the most significant purchase throughout the decade. These vehicles were far from fast, agile armored reconnaissance vehicles one would imagine a cavalry force operating.
The beginning of the 1930s finally saw additional funding that allowed the Cavalry to look into vehicles to fulfill more roles. Following the spread of the concept of tiny tracked armored vehicles into France and the adoption by the Infantry of the Renault UE armed tractor, the Cavalry would look into a vehicle of this size to provide a small, close-reconnaissance vehicle.
First, 50 Citroën P28 were adopted. These half-tracked vehicles, based on a rejected armored tractor prototype, were constructed of mild steel and only considered as training vehicles. Renault would soon offer a design derived from its own Renault UE, though it would differ very significantly from the tractor design. Given the internal designation code VM, work on this vehicle would begin as early as late 1931. After a remarkably fast assembly, five prototypes would be experimented with during large scale maneuvers in September 1932. The VM was not a perfect design, but it had some notable advantages. Its speed was, at the time, unrivaled in a fully tracked armored vehicle, particularly in France. The vehicle’s weight remained limited, at around 5 tonnes, and it was also fairly low-profile. The use of a fully tracked configuration gave it superior cross-country performances in comparison to half-track or wheeled vehicles.
A Citroën P28 in the final configuration of the vehicle. Source: char-françaisVM prototype N°79756 is seen during the September 1932 maneuvers. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillie
After some aspects of the VM which had left to be desired at first, notably the suspension, were improved upon, the first order for what would now be designated the AMR 33 was placed on March 8th 1933. However, the French Army was majorly unhappy with the AMR 33’s engine configuration, and Renault could not easily fix it. The vehicle used an engine mounted to the right side, with the fighting compartment on the left side, instead of using a separate rear or even front engine compartment. As a result, the AMR 33 proved to be front-heavy. Beyond that, this somewhat unorthodox configuration was disliked by both crews and by fairly traditionalist officers within the Vincennes trials commission and procurement services.
Though criticism of the AMR 33’s engine placement appeared very soon in the design’s life, they would become particularly loud near the vehicle’s adoption in spring 1933. These reached the point where it appeared clear to Renault that designing a modified vehicle with a rear engine configuration was unavoidable if the company wanted to continue seeing its design adopted for the role of AMR, which other manufacturers, notably Citroën, could be interested in trying to fulfill. The new rear-engined design received the two-letter code of ZT, and work on designing it and modifying VM prototypes to prove the concept quickly started.
From VM To ZT
Though criticism of the configuration had been formulated before, requests for a rear-engined Renault AMR intensified in early 1933, as adoption of the VM neared and was finally carried out.
AMR 33s of the 2nd GAM in 1937. One can observe the asymmetrical configuration of the vehicle, with the engine to the right and the turret to the left. Source: Photo taken by Chaillan, Soyer Collection, via R.Potié, via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
At an unclear date, in quite early 1933, Renault received a request to design a rear-engined AMR from the STMAC (Section Technique du Matériel Automobile – ENG: Technical Section of Automotive Material). STMAC’s request reportedly included some basic schematics of how such a vehicle could be arranged, with the ambitious prospect of keeping the same overall dimensions. Renault responded by analyzing these schematics, and found that keeping the same dimensions was unrealistic. This was a quite reasonable conclusion. Having the separate crew and engine compartments not side-by-side would naturally lengthen the vehicle, even if each would be shorter on its own. On April 21st 1933, Renault’s technical services responded to STMAC by offering to slightly lengthen the AMR design (by that point, the VM had been adopted as the AMR 33 the previous month), but Renault appeared quite skeptical of the prospect. Evidently, the manufacturer was not enthusiastic about a deep redesign of its AMR, and this manifested in the wording of its answer to the STMAC:
“En résumé, si vos services le jugent utile, nous sommes disposés à étudier un véhicule avec un moteur à l’arrière, sans toutefois nous rendre compte des avantages de ce véhicule sur celui existant”
“To sum up, if your services judge it useful, we are ready to study a rear-engined vehicle, though however we do not realize how this vehicle would have advantages over the existing one [the AMR 33]” .
Nonetheless, as keeping with the VM design would evidently risk jeopardizing further orders, Renault started working on a rear-engined AMR in the following months. Renault’s work was two-fold, working both on the drawing board, but also trying to produce a prototype as soon as possible. This would not be an entirely newly-built vehicle. Back in 1932, Renault had produced five VM prototypes, in an effort to allow experimentation on the AMR on more of a platoon level instead of a single vehicle. As the VM had been adopted and experimentations were, overall, finalized, these VM prototypes became available for new projects. This included trying various accessories and suspensions, converting two of them to production standard in 1935, and even converting some to a rear-engined configuration. This new design would be given the internal two-letter code “ZT”, and as such, a VM prototype would actually also become the first ZT prototype.
The first prototype of the ZT was originally a VM. Notice the coil spring suspension, which on the ZT would only be found on the converted VM prototypes. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François Vauvillier
Work of the first VM-ZT conversion likely began in late 1933. Modifications were performed on prototype n°79 759, the second-to-last VM prototype in the registration order, though it ought to be noted all VM prototypes were identical when first made and produced in the same timeframe, and would only feature different configurations later, as different subsystems were tried on them. This conversion was reportedly quite ad hoc, as would be expected of a prototype modified to a largely different configuration.
Significantly modifying prototypes was quite common in 1930s France. Perhaps the most radical example was B1 n°101, the first prototype of the B1 tank, which would become an experimental ‘mule’, used initially for turret experiments, then as a weight testing vehicle for studies for what would become the B1 Bis, and eventually, deeply transformed into a sort of mock-up/proof-of-concept prototype for the B1 Ter.
A rear view of the first prototype, unique in many ways. Note the grille to the left and the one-part hatch to the right. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierA front view of the vehicle, which removed the radiator grille on the right. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François Vauvillier
The vehicle was lengthened, seemingly by the addition of a 20 cm-long section bolted on between the front and rear of the hull, around the level of the fourth road wheel. As requested, a transversely-mounted engine was fitted in a rear compartment. This was a new powerplant, the most powerful ever mounted on an AMR. It was an 8-cylinder Nerva Stella engine producing 28 CV (a French unit of measurement). It was likely still a design closely linked to the Reinestella 24 CV eight-cylinder engine of production AMR 33s, which, comparatively, produced 85 hp. The configuration of the rear glacis of the vehicle was switched around. A larger aeration grill was mounted to the left, and a smaller access door, a one-piece plate with a handle mounted on two hinges, on the right. The exhaust was mounted below the grille and door.
From the front, the vehicle was easy to differentiate from a standard VM due to the radiator grill being removed. At this point, the vehicle kept the coil spring suspension of the standard AMR 33, though a rubber block suspension had already been at prototype stage on VMs for about a year at this point. Though, when a prototype, the vehicle had mounted the ill-fated Renault turret, it received the standard Avis n°1 when serving as a ZT prototype. Oddly enough, at some point after it was experimented with, it would be refitted with its original turret, presumably to use its Avis n°1 turret on another vehicle. The vehicle was given a new provisional registration number of 5292W1.
This first deeply modified VM was completed by Renault and showcased in February 1934. A technical evaluation was first performed in Renault’s facilities, after which the vehicle was sent to the Vincennes trials commission in mid-February. The prototype would obviously be quite different from a newly-built rear-engined version of the AMR, and was mostly meant to act as a proof-of-concept to test out ergonomic aspects.
Soon after this prototype was presented, on February 27th, General Flavigny, the director of France’s Cavalry branch, addressed a letter to Renault higher-up François Lehideux. He expressed interest in the prototype, which he said would match with the Army’s goal to adopt a vehicle less tiring for its operators to crew in comparison to the AMR 33. Flavigny would go on to say a sort of official, privileged partnership between Renault and the French state would be beneficial, quoting the relationship between Vickers and the British government as a comparison. He later went on to mention technical characteristics which could prove interesting in the future. He notably expressed interest in a vehicle which would be less “blind”, and, curiously, in a cast steel version of the AMR in a few years from then, as the technology was being developed in France. The advantages he quoted for a cast vehicle were that it would be better sealed and require less maintenance in comparison to riveted or bolted construction. This hypothetical cast AMR would seemingly never go beyond this letter. It is interesting to note, however, that the elements inspired by the AMRs, notably in terms of suspension, would be mounted on a number of cast vehicles designed by Renault, namely the R35 light tank.
Another side view of the first ZT prototype, showing the irregularity of the bolting on the side. The vehicle was by no means comparable to a newly-made prototype. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierThe Renault R35 would receive the same suspension as the AMR 35, but its qualities would largely evaporate on a 10.6 tonnes infantry tank. The suspension is generally remembered as one of the many weaknesses of the R35. Source: char-français
Second Prototype
Results from the trials of the first ZT prototype were particularly interesting. The vehicle was experimented on by officers of the 3rd GAM (Groupement d’Automitrailleuses – Armored Car Group). The main goals of the ZT, improving the vehicle’s ergonomics and placating the French Army by pushing the engine to the rear, appear to have been met. But the prototype also proved able to reach even higher speeds than before thanks to the more powerful 28CV engine. On February 21st, it peaked at 72 km/h, the fastest French tracked AFV by far and one of the fastest in the world as well. The vehicle would be equalled by the M1 Combat Car, a vehicle which would be slightly under 3 tonnes heavier than the ZT, at 9.1 tonnes, but feature a much more powerful 250 hp engine, while the AMR 35’s 28CV would likely have been somewhere in the 90-100 hp range.
However, while the maximum speed the vehicle reached was certainly impressive, officers who experimented with the vehicle doubted the 28CV 8-cylinder engine truly was a good idea. Though indeed very powerful, it would also require extensive maintenance as well as careful and skilled operation. At this point, the idea of giving the ZT a 4-cylinder bus engine was brought up by officers. It was thought that an engine of this type would still be powerful enough to provide the ZT with a great mobility, while proving much more sturdy and easier to operate and to maintain.
This feedback was immediately taken by Renault. In March, the company worked on converting a second Renault VM prototype, n°79 760 (last in the registration order) to a ZT. This prototype, redesignated 5282W1, was showcased in early April 1934, being experimented on by the trials commissions from April 3rd to 11th. Though the vehicle had been lengthened in the same way as the first prototype, a number of changes had been brought in. Most significantly, as had been requested, it featured a 4-cylinder engine. It was indeed based on a bus engine, the Renault 408, but had been somewhat craft-modified to offer better performance, and was thus redesignated as the Renault 432. It produced 22CV. In trials, this second prototype was able to reach 64 km/h. This was still a very desirable maximum speed for a tracked vehicle at the time. To compensate for the small loss of maximum speed, the prototype proved not only much easier to operate and sturdier, but also less fuel-hungry, giving it a more extensive range.
Some smaller changes were also incorporated into this second prototype. The first prototype featured a stowage sponson to the left, but not to the right. The second incorporated a second one to the right, in order to increase internal space. It also featured significant changes to the rear. The one-part door was replaced by a two-part one, each part featuring a handle and mounted on two hinges. The exhaust was also modified, from a single-housing exhaust below the grille and door, to an exhaust housed in two distinct parts, on top of the grille and door.
A rear view of the second prototype. Note the new exhaust, on top of the grille and hatch, and the rear two-part hatch with handles around the center, instead of one part with the handle to the side. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierA front view of the second vehicle with all the driver’s hatches opened, this part still being identical on the AMR 33. Note the lack of fenders. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierA side view of the second conversion, presumably after some trials. The suspension, still identical to the VM besides being lengthened, has its coil springs covered in dirt. Note the hollow wheels, sprocket and idler. These will not be retained on the production model of the Renault ZT. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François Vauvillier
Overall, this second ZT prototype, despite still being a converted VM, proved promising for the French military, to the point where it managed to secure adoption and an order for 100 vehicles on May 15th 1934. It ought to be noted that this was by all means a quick adoption. No ZT prototype had yet been built from scratch, despite some components of the VM prototypes, the coil spring suspension, for example, being intended to be replaced by very different systems in the final ZT. As a caveat, the desired rubber block suspension was already at experimental stage on VM prototype n°79758. This fast adoption also largely hurt competition, notably Citroën, which had not yet had the time to present prototypes trying to outdo Renault at a fully tracked AMR. Citroën’s attempt, the P103, would only be presented in 1935, after the struggling company had filed for bankruptcy.
Citroën’s P103 prototype in the company’s facilities. This prototype marked a serious attempt by Citroën to retake the lead in the AMR field that it had gained with the P28 but later lost to Renault and its VM. Only being presented in 1935, it came too late. Source: char-français
The First ‘New’ ZT Prototype
Though Renault had managed to get its ZT design adopted before manufacturing an entirely new prototype, the production of one was still viewed as necessary. It was required in order to experiment on many components which would be featured on production vehicles but could not be fitted on the conversions. The pre-prototypes notably used the old coil spring suspension, and elements such as the gearbox and differentials, or even details of the internal arrangement, were far from complete.
Therefore, Renault produced a mild steel prototype of the ZT, which was completed in September 1934. By that point, there had been some evolutions in the desired engine for the ZT. Renault had put out a new bus engine, the 441, to replace the older 408. Therefore, it was decided to modify that new engine to create the AMR 35’s engine. This modified 441 would be designated 447, and replaced the 432. However, the Renault 447 engine was still on the drawing board by September 1934. Production would only be launched in November with the first 447 engine completed in April 1935. Therefore, the newly-built ZT prototype received the same Renault 432 engine as the previous converted vehicles.
A very good front photo of the new ZT prototype. The turret has received the machine gun mount, but no MAC 31. Also give the suspension a look. This is the first ZT to receive the rubber block suspension, though it was already experimentally mounted on some VMs and the newly built ZT prototype still used some VM suspension elements which would be replaced on the production vehicles. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierA front view of the newly-built ZT prototype. Note the return of a ventilation grill to the front, which would be retained on the production ZT, but also the widespread use of bolting in place of riveting, which would not be carried on in the production vehicles. Also note how the turret is unicolor while the hull is camouflaged. The turret was taken from one of the VM conversions while the hull itself was newly built. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François Vauvillier
Interesting elements of this ZT prototype include the use of bolting, rather than riveting, for the front hull, which was not kept on production ZTs, a revised gearbox and differential, and a new suspension. This suspension was the rubber-block type which had been at prototype stage on the VM since 1933. Like the AMR 33, it had four road wheels, two independent ones at the front and rear and two in a bogie in the middle, but these were mounted on rubber blocks (one for each independent wheel and one for the bogie) which could compress in order to allow movement and reduce shock. In comparison to previous coil springs, this suspension was thought of as more robust, and, once refined, offering a more comfortable ride. It should be noted that the suspension was not entirely finalized on the ZT prototype. It notably kept the same sprocket as the VM, while a revised though broadly similar one would be used on the production vehicle. The prototype received the Avis n°1 turret mounted on the first conversion, which explains why this converted vehicle would revert to the old and rejected Renault turret when it was put to other uses.
Overall, this final ZT prototype was much closer to the final production vehicle, which allowed for tests to make sure there were no major issues to offer more certainty. This does not mean it would be identical, however. Unsurprisingly enough for a mild steel developpemental prototype, it would be noted to be almost entirely different in terms of precise parts in November 1937. The ZT prototype was first showcased in Satory in October 1934 and then later tested by the Vincennes trial commission and the Cavalry’s study center in 1935. It proved to be satisfactory and confirmed the adoption which was made from the experiences of the converted VM prototypes was a good one.
Fate of the Prototypes
The three ZT prototypes would have three different fates.
The first converted VM prototype, n°79759, was refitted with the older Renault turret in order to give its standard Avis n°1 turret to the all-new ZT. Markings show that the vehicle was pressed into the service with the Saumur Cavalry School for driver’s training. Photos show that in 1940, the vehicle, disarmed, was used in the desperate defense of the city of Orléans, on the Loire River. Exactly how the vehicle ended there is quite a mystery, as Orléans is located 180 km from Saumur and the personnel and equipment from the Cavalry school was used to defend the city itself, also located further down the Loire River.
Prototype 79759, the first ZT, and likely one of the last AMRs to be knocked out. The vehicle’s configuration is an odd mish-mash. Its hull is closer to the AMR 35 in construction by this point, though by virtue of being a hastily-converted first prototype, it is still quite different to the final successor of the AMR 33. In the meantime, it has, for some reason, been refitted with the old Renault turret, which had been ditched for any kind of mass-production. Source: Marc Couillet collection via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierAnother photo of the same vehicle in the ruins of Orléans, a sad fate for what had been the fastest tracked French vehicle up to this point, going up to 72 km/h in its ZT prototype configuration. Source: Bundesarchiv via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The fate of the second VM conversion is, unfortunately, unknown.
The newly produced ZT prototype, was stored in Docks de Rueil (the facility which would become ARL) and engineers of the Puteau workshop (Atelier de Construction de Puteaux – APX) were allowed to use it as a basis for studies on mounting a 25 mm anti-tank gun on the ZT chassis, which would result in the ZT-2 and ZT-3 tank destroyers. The vehicle was returned to Renault in November 1937, but the vehicle was reportedly found to barely have been maintained by the crew of the French state workshops. ARL sent a plea to use the vehicle as a prototype for the ZT-3 (a tank destroyer mounting a 25 mm anti-tank gun in a casemate), but Renault refused under the argument that the vehicle differed significantly from production ZTs, making its use as a prototype for the ZT3 questionable. Renault proceeded to dismantle the vehicle for parts in February 1938.
The First Order
The first contract, signed on May 17th 1934, was for 100 vehicles, though only 92 would be of the ZT-1 standard type, the other 8 being ADF1 ZT-1-based command vehicles.
The French state once again pushed for an extremely ambitious delivery schedule that called for the first vehicles to be given to the Army in December 1934 and the last in March 1935. The vehicle was designated AMR Renault Modèle 1935 under the assumption that it would largely become operational in 1935. In reality, the delivery schedule encountered massive delays, as once again, the French state’s expectations far exceeded Renault’s capacities. The French state agreed to change the schedule for end of deliveries to August 1935, but that was once again overly ambitious. In early 1935, Renault was still finishing up the last five AMR 33s (two of which were rebuilt VM prototypes), and even though the AMR 35s would immediately follow them on the production line, they would still be far from being delivered to the French Army. Though the first would be complete in March 1935, due to the rushed adoption of the ZT design, a number of tests and trials would still have to be carried out, meaning it would be a long time before vehicles would become operational.
Turret development and production was largely managed separately from Renault’s production of the hulls, and by this point, it had already been decided that the ZT-1 would be divided into vehicles fitted with different fittings. Vehicles could be fitted either with the existing Avis n°1 turret or with a new Avis n°2, which followed a similar line of design but was larger in order to accommodate a Hotchkiss model 1930 13.2 mm machine gun.
Vehicles with either turret could be given an ER 29 radio. It was planned that out of 92 vehicles, only 12 would at this point mount the Avis n°1 turret, all fitted with radios, while the 80 others would all mount the better armed Avis n°2 turret. Of these, 31 would have radios, and 49 would not. In practice, the number of vehicles fitted with each turret matched the plans, but this was not the case for fittings for radio. This feature was dropped from all Avis n°2-equipped vehicles in February 1937. Vehicles with the smaller Avis n°1 turret would exist both with and without fittings for radio. It ought to be noted that the vehicles being given fittings for radios did not necessarily receive the radio post itself immediately. Though the vehicle would have elements such as an antenna cover and electrical fittings to eventually receive the system, it appears quite certain pretty much no AMR 35 was given a radio at first. The ER 29 radio, which was to be used, was to begin production in 1936, but in practice, serial production could only begin in earnest in 1939. Even by 1940, many vehicles, which one may imagine to have had radios due to their fittings, never did.
Delays, Hotchkiss, and Skeptical Officers: The Harduous Year of 1935
Before production AMR 35s were even delivered, the fate of the vehicle in the French Army appeared very uncertain during 1935. These were largely influenced by the leading figure of the French Cavalry at that time, General Flavigny, the director of the French Cavalry from 1931 to 1936.
In early 1935, the French Army formally decided to adopt the Hotchkiss H35 light infantry tank. However, the vehicle’s place in the French Army appeared uncertain despite this adoption. The Infantry appeared to have already settled for the R35. Army Chief of Staff, General Gamelin, then offered Flavigny to take the light tanks in. Flavigny was less than enthusiastic about the prospect. Writing on comparative trials between the Somua AC3 (which would become the S35) and the H35 he attended in 1935, he described the H35 as “slowly and barely following, shaken by every irregularity in the terrain”.
Hotchkiss H35 in service of the 2nd GAM, a cavalry unit which likely would have received AMR 35s had the deliveries of these not suffered from massive delays. Source: char-français
Flavigny, however, also wrote that he was in no way able to refuse such an offer. The H35 was in no way suited to be a proper cavalry tank. Designed for the Infantry, its maximum speed of 36 km/h was moderate. Much worse was its atrocious vision and terrible ergonomics and division of labor, making operations of the tank very sluggish, and overall, meaning the Hotchkiss would very much struggle to operate with any kind of autonomy. This was already less than good for an infantry tank, but could be said to be even worse for a cavalry force which could be expected to have to exploit breakthroughs. However, Flavigny was, in early 1935, very much confronted between a choice of no AFVs or Hotchkisses. There were, as mentioned previously, massive delays with the Renault ZT, in part due to complications with subcontractors. Schneider was the manufacturer of the armored hulls, while Batignolles-Châtillon would produce the new model of Avis turret, the Avis n°2.
These delays were a massive issue for the French Cavalry. It was at this point attempting a large reform to create a new type of division, the DLM (Division Légère Mécanique – Light Mechanized Division), and schedules of deliveries of equipment being met was an imperative to the proper formation of units. The issues caused by these delays came to their highest point in September 1935, for the Champagne manoeuvers, the same yearly exercises where the five VM prototypes had been used three years prior. There were no ZTs to be found, and cavalry detachments were found unable to operate properly due to a lack of vehicles, linked to the delays in deliveries. As a result, the issues came all the way up to the Minister of War, Jean Fabry. With renewed skepticism on cavalry mechanized units, any potential orders which could have been made were slashed, with orders to focus on ordering more equipment which could be delivered more quickly and reliably, such as firearms and artillery.
Jean Flavigny, director of the French Cavalry and a major architect of its mechanization. Source: actu.frJean Fabry in his uniform of 23rd Alpine Chasseurs Battalion colonel. He would be Minister of War from June 1935 to January 1936, a timespan which may seem short but was nothing unusual in the unstable and parliamentarian French Third Republic. Source: Wikimedia Commons
In late 1935, some progress was made. Renault received an informal request to deliver a further 30 vehicles after the current order for 100, though this would have to be confirmed at a later date. This contract would be formalized on April 20th 1936 as contract 60 179 D/P.. It included 30 vehicles, though only 15 were ZT-1 AMRs. These were all to be vehicles fitted with the Avis n°1 turret and radios. The other 15 were split between 5 ADF1 command vehicles and 5 of both the ZT-2 and ZT-3 tank destroyers. The delivery schedule would once again be overly ambitious, as the contract was to be completed by December 15th 1936.
Finally, a last contract was signed on October 9th 1936, adding 70 vehicles of the ZT family, of which 60 were ZT-1s. These were evenly split in 30 vehicles with and 30 without radio fittings, all to be fitted with the Avis n°1 turret. The 10 other vehicles were 5 of both the ZT-2 and ZT-3. Overall, an even 200 vehicles of the ZT family would be ordered by the French Ministry of War, though only 167 were ZT-1s armored cars. The others were split between 13 ADF1 command vehicles and 10 of both the ZT-2 and ZT-3 tank destroyers.
Of the 167 ZT-1s, 80 from the first order, had the Avis n°2 13.2 mm-armed turret, while 87 had the Avis n°1 7.5 mm-armed turret. In theory, 31 of the vehicles with the Avis n°2 were to be fitted with a radio, while 49 were not planned to have one. In practice, a decision was taken to abandon radios on Avis n°2 vehicles in February 1937, and it appears none ever received one. For the vehicles fitted with Avis n°1 turrets, 57 were to have radios, while 30 were not to have any. Though it is certain some vehicles would receive fittings for radios but never receive the post itself, it is more believable that the number of vehicles which were to be given fittings for radios was respected. If not, the number at least comprised a significant part of the fleet of Avis n°1-equipped vehicles.
The AMR 35 : Light Tank or Armored Car ?
The Renault ZT was adopted as an Automitrailleuse de Reconnaissance (AMR), or in English, Reconnaissance Armored Car. The term automitrailleuse deserves a little more attention to be understood in the context in which it was used in interwar France. In common French language, automitrailleuse is practically identical to the English word for armored car. However, in the interwar era, an automitrailleuse referred to any armed vehicle of the Cavalry, sometimes not even armored. Indeed, the French “automitrailleuse” comes from “automobile” and “mitrailleuse” (machine gun), with no part of the word implying the vehicle is armored.
In practice, the vast majority of automitrailleuse were armored vehicles, but a few unarmored cars armed with machine rifles used for patrol in the colonies were sometimes called automitrailleuse too. The term did not particularly come with an associated running gear when used in the context of the French military. Vehicles called automitrailleuse were wheeled, half-tracked, or even fully tracked, as long as they were operated by the Cavalry.
This may seem somewhat archaic from a modern point of view, especially as designations such as “cavalry tank” now exist, however, these were not necessarily widespread at that time. The idea that the tank (or “char” in French) was a weapon of the infantry, not of the cavalry, was not entirely French, and indeed there are other examples of fully tracked, turreted armored vehicles not been referred to as tanks when serving in the cavalry branch of other armies. Two notable examples are the American M1 “Combat Car” and the Japanese Type 92 “Heavy Armored Car”.
The Japanese Type 92 Heavy Armored Car (left) and American M1 Combat Car (right) are two other notable examples of fully tracked vehicles which were formally referred to as a form of “car” due to their cavalry use. Source: Reddit (Type 92), Warspot (M1)
When it comes to technical characteristics, there is nothing that would make the AMR 35, especially when armed with a 13.2 mm machine gun, a world away from vehicles systematically called light tanks, such as the Vickers Light Tank or Panzer I, both fairly similar in size and capacities. As such, colloquially calling it a light tank is not necessarily wrong. It remained classified as an automitrailleuse, and for this reason this article has and will keep referring to it as an AMR or an armored car.
The Panzer I (Ausf.A pictured here), Renault’s AMRs (here an AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°2 turret), and Vickers Light Tank (Here a Mark VIC in the magnificent Malta pattern) were families of vehicles developed within a similar timeframe and with reasonably equivalent capabilities. What makes only two of these three light tanks, and the other an armored car, is a question of semantics and doctrine much more than technical characteristics. Source: pinterest (Panzer I & Mark VIC), char-français (AMR 35).
Technical Characteristics of the AMR 35
The AMR 35 had followed in its AMR 33 predecessor’s tracks in terms of broad characteristics and role. While developpement had started on the basis of AMR 33 prototypes, the evolution they would undertake in comparison to the original AMR 33 was radical. This was brought even further when a new prototype was manufactured, and continued when the production vehicles differed even from that prototype in significant ways. In other words, the AMR 35 was by all means a new design and is not to be understood as a variant of the AMR 33. There is very little in common between the two vehicles in terms of actual identical parts and elements.
Though the new prototype had experimented with bolting, the AMR 35 ended up being constructed using riveting. Dimensions are generally reported to be a height of 1.88 m, a width of 1.64 m (the armored hull itself being 1.42 m wide), and a length of 3.84 m. Weight was 6 tonnes empty, and 6.5 tonnes with crew and ammunition. It is important to note that these characteristics very likely describe vehicles fitted with the Avis n°1 turret, without radio. Vehicles with the Avis n°2 turret would likely be higher by a few centimeters and a couple hundred kilos heavier, while vehicles fitted with a radio would be a couple dozen kilos heavier. These changes would have been too small to have a significant impact on the mobility of the vehicles.
Hull & Hull Construction
The general hull construction of the AMR 35 took cues from the AMR 33, but also differed significantly in several ways due to significant changes in configuration.
The AMR 35 went away from the AMR 33’s side-mounted engine block, where the radiator would be to the front right of the hull, while the driver would be to the front left. However, it did keep an asymmetrical design. The driver still sat to the left, with a driver’s post extending from the rest of the crew compartment. The front formed an openable hatch so more vision could be at the driver’s disposal when outside of combat. When closed, it still featured an episcope to improve vision. Just below, on the angled glacis of the vehicle, there was a two-part door/hatch, with handles so it could be opened from the outside. The driver would typically enter or exit the vehicle by opening both of these hatches. The glacis in front of the driver’s post had been made to be as low as possible in order not to impede on his vision, being in this way very similar to the AMR 33.
The headlight would be mounted on the glacis. At first, the AMR 35s used a Restor armored headlight mounted at the center. In 1937-1938, these were replaced by Guichet headlights mounted to the left, just right and below the left fender. A rounded rearview mirror was often mounted on this left fender. The front glacis was also used as stowage space, with mounting points for tools such as shovels to be mounted transversally.
A towing cable could be mounted on the front left. The middle front plate featured the vehicle’s registration number in the center and the Renault manufacturer’s plate on the left. Just behind the middle front plate and below the front part of the glacis would be the transmission, still mounted to the front, with the armor plates protecting it being made easier to remove for maintenance.
To the driver’s right, even though the radiator was no longer to the front right of the vehicle, there was still a large ventilation grill, as on the AMR 33, despite this element having originally been removed on the ZT prototypes. This grill was in two parts, one on the angled glacis and one on the upper hull.
Overall, the front of the AMR 35 hull was fairly similar to the 33. This was generally also true for the sides, with ‘sponsons’ extending over the tracks to increase internal space on both sides of the vehicle. The turret of the AMR 35 was still off-centered to the left, placed behind the driver’s post.
A good side view of an AMR 35. Note the open’s driver hatch, and the riveting of the side plate, with horizontal lines of rivets on the top and bottom of the side plate and a vertical line of rivets front of the plate’s center. Source: char-français
The configuration of the AMR 33’s rear, with a large two-part openable hatch on the left and a radiator grill on the right, could obviously no longer be used with a transversely-mounted rear engine. The configuration of the hull also changed in comparison to the prototypes, where there was a radiator grill following the hull’s shape to the left and an access hatch to the right. Instead, the AMR 35’s rear hull featured a significant protrusion to the left. The roof of this protrusion actually housed another ventilation grill for the engine, while the rear plate had mounting points for a spare road wheel, which was a standard accessory for AMRs.
A crate fixed to the vehicle but not part of the armored body used for storage was placed to the right of the rear. There was also a two-part openable access hatch entirely hidden behind the removable storage box. The exhaust pipe was on top and front of this crate and protrusion, on the rear of the vehicle’s main armored body. There was a central towing hook and two mounting points if the vehicle itself had to be towed, one on each side, below this protrusion and crate.
This photo of an AMR 35 with Avis n°2 turret of the 1st RDP at Bouy, Marne, in 1938, gives an excellent view of the AMR 35’s cluttered rear. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultAn abandoned AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°1 turret. Interesting features of this photo include the track removed on one side, but not the other, the turret machine gun having been removed, and perhaps most significantly, the access hatch, not just visible, but also open. Due to the storage box almost always being there, that is a very rare sight. Source: char-françaisThis photo of an abandoned AMR 35 ZT-1 (with an Avis n°2 turret that had the machine gun removed) gives an excellent view of both the engine compartment access hatch, the storage box having been removed, and of an ace of clubs tactical marking, indicating the vehicle’s platoon (4th) and squadron (unknown, as it was determined by color). Source: char-français
Armor Protection
The AMR 35 kept the same armor scheme as the AMR 33. All vertical or near-vertical plates up to 30° (most of the front plates, the sides, and the rear) were 13 mm thick. Plates at an angle higher than 30°, but still potentially vulnerable to most enemy fire, parts of the front glacis for example, were 9 mm thick. The roof was 6 mm and the floor 5 mm. Grills were meant to be bulletproof, by making it so there would be not one but two plates in the way of any bullet trying to go through. Both turrets which would be mounted on the AMR 35 would follow the same armor scheme as the hull. As with the AMR 33, this armor scheme was light, but not at all abnormal for a light, reconnaissance vehicle. It ought to be noted that, to an extent, it could still be said to be comparatively less useful, as dedicated armor-piercing weapons were becoming more and more common during the 1930s, and as tracked light tanks with armor trying to protect against .50 caliber projectiles, for example, were also becoming more widespread.
Anti-tank rifles, such as this 7.92×94 mm Patronen Panzerbüchse 39 widely used by Wehrmacht troops, were already largely able to pierce the AMR 35’s armor protection. Source: armedconflicts.com
Engine Block
In contrast to the AMR 33’s eight-cylinders, the AMR 35 used a 4-cylinders, 120×130 mm, 5,881 cm3 engine. This was the Renault 447, based on the Renault 441 city bus engine. It produced 82 hp at 2,200 rpm. The engine was fitted with an internal electric starting-up device, and alternatively could manually be started with a crank from the outside. It used a Zénith carburetor which was designed to allow a cold start. The front-mounted transmission had four forward and one reverse gear, with a “Cleveland” differential. This differential would prove to be an extremely difficult element to get in working order on the AMR 35. There was a two-part radiator, with a large ventilator placed to the rear of the engine block.
Overall, the AMR 35’s engine was actually slightly less powerful than the AMR 33, while the vehicle was heavier. This was a sacrifice that was agreed upon by Renault and the military in order to have a more reliable and easier to operate engine. Overall, a 4-cylinders, 82 hp engine would give the AMR 35 a power-to-weight ratio of about 12.6 hp/tonne. This was powerful enough to give the vehicle a maximum speed of 55 km/h on a good road and 40 km/h on a damaged road.
The AMR 35 had a 130 liter gasoline fuel tank, located to the rear right, in front of the access hatch located behind the removable crate.
Suspension and Tracks
The AMR 35 adopted, from the get go, the rubber suspension design which had been experimented on on VM prototypes.
Renault VM prototype 79758, with the first version of the rubber block suspension. Source: Renault documentation via Pierre Touzin via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThe rubber block suspensions would be fitted on the last five AMR 33s, two of which were modified prototypes, before AMR 35 production began. This picture is also great to compare the AMR 33 and AMR 35 sprocket, idler and road wheels. Source: warspot.ru
The vehicle used four steel, rubber-rimmed road wheels: independent ones to the front and the rear and two in a central bogie. The wheels themselves had a heavier construction than those of the AMR 33, being full and not spoked hollow designs. This was likely a consequence of the AMR 33’s suspension elements being found to be too fragile. The central bogie, as well as each independent wheel, was linked to a rubber-block, an arrangement of five rubber cylinders for the center block and four for the front/rear ones, mounted on a central metallic bar. These rubber blocks would compress in order to absorb shocks. Overall, they made for a fairly smooth ride and were found to be much sturdier in comparison to the coil springs and oil shock absorbers of the AMR 33.
This photo shows one of the earliest AMR 35s in the final stage of production, still without armament and in the hands of Renault. Though the tracks are poorly tensioned, the view on the suspension is nonetheless very good. Though their construction is still light, the roadwheels, idler and sprocket are no longer hollow, as they were on the AMR 33, making them significantly sturdier. Source: Renault archives via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultThis completely destroyed AMR 35 gives a pretty good example of the suspension being sturdier than on the AMR 33. Despite the vehicle’s front being blown away, the front rubber block, roadwheel, suspension arm, and sprocket wheel still appear to be in a decent state. Source: char-françaisAn abandoned AMR 35 left in a ditch, with the track removed, giving a good view of elements of its suspension, and particularly the sprocket. Source: char-français
The AMR 35 featured four return rollers, a front mounted drive sprocket and a rear mounted idler wheel. The sprocket and idler had spoked designs, but unlike the AMR 33, were not completely hollow. There was metal between the spokes, though it was a lot thinner than the spokes. The tracks were still narrow, at 20 cm, and thin, with a large number of individual track links per side. The track had one central gripping point of the sprocket’s teeths.
This AMR 35 ZT-1, which has had its 7.5 mm machine gun removed, is not in the hands of the French, or even the Germans, but Czech resistance forces who captured it from the Germans during the Prague uprising of May 1945, this specific picture apparently being dated 10th May. While not of French origin, it is very interesting to give an idea of the construction of the AMR 35’s tracks, as the large amount of spare track links show both their small individual size and the central hole for the sprocket teeths to grip in. Source: www.praha12.cz
This suspension design allowed the AMR 35 to ford 60 cm, cross a 1.70 m trench with straight vertical sides, or climb a 50% slope.
Turrets and Armament
Avis n°1 Turret & 7.5 mm MAC 31 Machine Gun
Of the 167 AMR 35s, 87 featured the Avis n°1 turret, as mounted on the AMR 33.
An Avis n°1-equipped AMR 35 of the 1st RDP during the Bastille Day (July 14th) parade of 1939. There is a very interesting element in this picture. Looking at the side of the turret, one can see an hastily erased tricolor cockade, a marking that was previously present but was erased in late June or early July of the same year. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultTwo AMR 35s, one with each turret type, side by side in service of the 2nd GAM. Source: Chaillan/Soyer collection via Régis Potié via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
These turrets were manufactured by the state-owned workshop AVIS (Atelier de Construction de Vincennes – ENG: Vincennes Construction Workshop). Despite their name, they were not technically located within the municipality of Vincennes, just east of the city of Paris’s borders, but inside the Vincennes woods, technically within the territory of the municipality of Paris. In comparison, Renault facilities of Billancourt were located west of Paris, along the Seine and still within the urban area of the French capital. Though the design was carried out at Vincennes, production of the turrets took place in the Renault factory itself.
The small turret had the same riveted construction as the hull, and used a hexagonal design, with a front and rear plate, and three plates on the sides. The turret was higher at its rear. The turret in itself did not feature a seat. The vehicle, overall, was low enough that a seat located in the hull, even quite low in it, was high enough for the commander to be at eye level with vision devices. The vision devices included in the turret were, to the front, an episcope to the right, a vision slot to the left, and the machine gun sight. There was an additional vision port on each side, and to the rear.
The turret included a large semi-circle shaped hatch opening forward, allowing the commander to reach out from it. There was also an anti-aircraft mount for a MAC 31 7.5 mm machine gun present to the right-rear of the turret. Small handles were also present on the front sides to ease climbing into or out of the turret from the hatch.
In vehicles fitted with Avis n°1 turrets, armament was provided in the form of a MAC31 Type E machine gun, the shorter, tank version of the MAC 31 which had been designed for use in fortification. It used the new standard French cartridge, the 7.5×54 mm. The MAC31 Type E had a weight of 11.18 kg empty and 18.48 kg with a fully loaded 150-round drum magazine, fed to the right of the machine gun. The machine gun was gas-fed, and had a maximum cyclic rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute. It had a muzzle velocity of 775 m/s.
The MAC31E, the standard model of the MAC31 in armored fighting vehicles. Though there were some infantry/pintle mount versions and prototypes of the MAC31 which could accept some box magazines, the MAC31E could only use the drums. A distinctive element of the MAC31E was its short, 48 cm barrel. There was another tank machine gun version of the MAC31, the MAC31C, with the standard 60 cm-long barrel. Source: Mitrailleuses de 7,5mm modèle 1951, Guide Technique Sommaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale (Ministry of National Defense), France, 1953Views of the MAC 31’s 150 rounds drum magazine, disassembled on top and complete at the bottom. Drum magazines were complex, but had the advantage of being way more compact than a belt. Source: Mitrailleuses de 7,5mm modèle 1951, Guide Technique Sommaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale (Ministry of National Defense), France, 1953A fully loaded 150 rounds drum magazine with the cover removed. Source: Mitrailleuses de 7,5mm modèle 1951, Guide Technique Sommaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale (Ministry of National Defense), France, 1953A MAC31E machine gun with the drum magazine attached. Source: tircollection.com
Within AMR 35s with Avis n°1 turret, a spare machine gun was carried. It was either to be used to replace the mounted one in case of malfunction or overheating, or to be mounted on an anti-aircraft mount present on the turret roof. As for ammunition, 15 150-round drums were stowed, for a total of 2,250 rounds of 7.5 mm ammunition.
This photo is perhaps the best one known to exist in demonstrating the use of the anti-air mount on the Avis n°1 turret, with the commander aiming the machine gun from his open hatch. This vehicle was a 4th RDP AMR 35 which had been detached to the 4th Cuirassiers regiment to serve as internal liaison vehicles for this unit. The vehicles were detached on May 5th 1940, with this picture being taken on May 12th. Source: Lucien Bertonneau Collection, via Régis Potié, via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Avis n°2 Turret & 13.2 mm Hotchkiss Machine Gun
A significant change of the AMR 35 in comparison to the AMR 33 was that a large part of the fleet would receive a new turret fitted with a more powerful machine gun. This would comprise 80 of the 167 AMR 35 ZT-1s.
An AMR 35 of the 1st RDP in 1938. With its larger gun and higher silhouette, the Avis n°2 is easy to distinguish from the Avis n°1. The vehicles in the background are Laffly S20 TL six-wheels trucks used by the RDP’s motorized infantry. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultA front view of an Avis n°2 equipped AMR 35 ZT-1, taken after the end of the campaign of France, likely by German troops having just captured the vehicle. Source: Bovington Tank Museum Collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
These vehicles received the Avis n°2 turret. It had been designated by the same Vincennes workshop as the Avis n°1. The turrets were manufactured by railcar manufacturer Batignolles-Châtillon in Nantes, western France.
The Avis n°2 followed similar design principles as its predecessor. It also had a riveted construction and an overall hexagonal shape, but was noticeably taller, in order to accommodate its machine gun being fed by a magazine attached to the top, and not the side. The machine gun was offset to the right of the turret, with a sight just by its side, and further left an episcope with an openable armored cover. As with the Avis n°1, there was an openable vision port on each side and one on the rear of the turret.
German soldiers stand on an abandoned AMR 35 equipped with an Avis n°2 turret, with the turret turned towards the rear, showing one of the vision ports. Source: char-français
The armament of the Avis n°2 was the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss model 1929 machine gun. As most, if not all .50 or near .50 heavy machine guns of the interwar, this model of Hotchkiss machine gun was developed as a response, and inspired by, the German 13.2×92 mm TuF cartridge. Initially, this German projectile was intended to be used mainly from a dual anti-air and anti-tank machine gun. Nevertheless, only the Tankgewehr anti-tank rifle would see action with this caliber. The ammunition and weapon were developed together in the second half of the 1920s, with the design finalized for adoption in 1929.
At first, the Hotchkiss machine gun used a 13.2×99 mm cartridge, and it was under this caliber that it was most widely exported. The Hotchkiss 13.2 mm machine gun will be most familiar to many as the standard Italian and Japanese 13.2 mm machine gun, produced under license in Italy as the Breda Model 31 and in Japan as the Type 93. In France, the barrels were found to wear out too quickly, with the blame pinned on the cartridge.
In 1935, a new cartridge was adopted, with French guns modified to fire it. This was a 13.2×96 mm, with the very small modifications centering on shortening the neck of the cartridge. Since the adoption of the shorter cartridge, the names of “13.2 Hotchkiss long” and “13.2 Hotchkiss short” have generally been used to differentiate them. When the AMR 35s armed with Hotchkiss 13.2 machine guns came out of their factories would all fire 13.2×96 mm Hotchkiss short.
From top to bottom: 13.2×99 mm Hotchkiss Long, 13.2×96 mm Hotchkiss Short, and the German Mauser 13×92 mmSR TuF cartridge which inspired them (as well as, notably, US 12.7×99 mm and Soviet 12.7×108 mm .50cal cartridges). Source: Costas-1963 on Wikimedia CommonsSchematics of the 1935 pattern 13.2×96 mm Hotchkiss “short” cartridge. Source: Wikimaginot
This 13.2 mm cartridge was fired by a machine gun operating under the Hotchkiss gas operated mechanism, designed in the late 1800s and most notably used by the French Model 1914 8×50 mm Lebel machine gun. The new heavy machine gun remained an air-cooled design, with large cooling rings surrounding the barrel in order to increase the surface in contact with the air. The machine gun, however, differed from previous Hotchkiss designs in that it was fed from the top, instead of from the side. The ability to be fed from feed strips remained, as a 15-rounds feed strip was available for the machine gun, but the design was also compatible with a more modern feeding solution, a 30-round box magazine, which in practice was by far the most common way of feeding ammunition to the gun. The cyclic rate of fire of the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss was of 450 rounds per minute, with a muzzle velocity of 800 m/s.
A Hotchkiss 13.2 mm machine gun on an infantry tripod, with anti-aircraft sights and a pistol grip, as was tested in the UK around 1930. Source: modernfirearms.netCutaway view of the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss machine gun. Source: Wikimaginot
The 30-round magazines were, however, fairly tall and curvy, and as a result, using them in enclosed armored vehicles would be impossible without designing an impracticable high turret. However, feed strips were a more fiddly solution, by no means desirable inside an AFV. In the end, the solution was to create a lower capacity, 20-round box magazine, which would stick out on top of the gun less, and therefore require less overhead space. As can be easily seen from the design of the Avis n°2, they obviously still required more than a side-fed machine gun like the 7.5 mm MAC 31. These 20 round box magazines are unfortunately extremely obscure, with no clearly identified view of them. In comparison to the curved 30-rounders, they likely were either straight or with a much less pronounced curve.
The 13.2×96 mm Hotchkiss had, as most .50 cal cartridges, non-negligible armor-piercing performances in the 1930s. With the standard model 1935 armor-piercing ammunition, it was found that the weapon could penetrate 20 mm of perpendicular armor at 500 m, and still 15 mm at 1,000 m. Against a plate angled at 20°, the machine gun would pierce 20 mm of armor at 200 m. At 30°, it was found the projectiles would penetrate 18 mm at 500 m and still 12 mm at 2,000 m. In addition to these piercing capabilities against steel, 13.2 mm caliber bullets would also obviously offer more penetration against various forms of cover, such as brick walls, armored shields, accumulated sandbags, etc., meaning they could also be used more effectively against infantry behind cover.
These capabilities made the weapon an interesting solution for armored vehicles which could not mount larger weapons, such as the 25 mm anti-tank gun. Even so, the 13.2 mm machine gun was more effective against infantry than the semi-automatic 25 mm gun, which did not have high-explosive shells. It should be noted, however, that the weapon was very rare in the French Army outside of armored fighting vehicles. The air force adopted the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss machine gun for airfield defense, and the navy used it as an anti-aircraft weapon too, but the Army opted to reject the heavy machine gun. The reason given was that it was feared projectiles fired against aircraft could end up falling into friendly lines and be dangerous in this fashion.
Therefore, 13.2 mm machine guns were very rare in the French Army. Outside of armored vehicles, around a hundred were found on the Maginot Line. A large number were deployed in casemates overlooking the Rhine, as it was thought their armor-piercing capacities would be useful in a hypothetical German attempt at an amphibious crossing with small boats or landing barges. Some would also be used for static air defense far behind the frontlines.
A 13.2 mm Hotchkiss machine gun in an ESCH double infantry casemate of the Maginot Line. Note the tall 30-round box magazine. Already a constraint in fortifications, it was totally impractical within armored fighting vehicles. Source: Photo by Julien Boulanger, from Wikimaginot
Within AMR 35s fitted with the Avis n°2 turret, 37 20-rounds box magazines would be carried, comprising 740 rounds. A further 480 13.2 mm rounds would be available, but these would be carried in cardboard boxes. The crew would have to refill magazines with them once they were out of full magazines, which is definitely not a task that could be reasonably performed in action. The assumption was most likely that the crew could refill their emptied magazines out of combat even if there was no immediately available supply of 13.2 mm ammunition, but the equal amount of space being used to store additional full box magazines would likely have been far more useful, even if it somewhat reduced the total number of 13.2 mm rounds stored inside the vehicle.
Unlike the vehicles fitted with the 7.5 mm machine gun, those using the 13.2 mm did not have a spare machine gun at their disposal, despite the contrary sometimes being stated. Accordingly, there was no mount for an anti-aircraft machine gun on the roof of the Avis n°2 turret.
Radios
Unlike the previous AMR 33, a portion of the AMR 35 fleet was intended to receive radios. Though, at first, it was planned that there would be radio-equipped vehicles with both turrets, in the end, only vehicles fitted with the Avis n°1 would receive the fittings for them.
Fifty-seven AMR 35 ZT-1s with Avis n°1 turrets were to receive radios, and were likely given the fittings for them. These evolved over the years, including a massive antenna at first, later replaced by a smaller housing, all on the right fender, just in front of the crew compartment. There were also some changes in the electrical wiring inside the vehicle in order to accommodate the radio posts.
Two radio-equipped AMR 35s of the 4th RDP, part of the first small batch of 12, at the Mailly camp in June 1937. This massive antenna would quickly be changed for smaller ones. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
These radio posts were to be the ER 29 (Emetteur Recepteur – ENG: transmitter receiver). Production was to begin in 1936, but only truly began in 1939. How many AMR 35 actually received their radios is not known, but many which were planned to have one never received it, making them no better than AMR 33s communication wise, and reducing their ways to communicate with hatches closed to flags.
When installed, the 50 kg ER 29 had a frequency of 14-23 m, and a range of 5 km. They were meant for communications between the vehicles of platoon leaders and the commander of their squadron. Unfortunately, French radios were not only rarely found, but also of poor quality. Their transmissions were easily stopped by obstacles such as trees. Nonetheless, even if poor, they were still a significant addition.
An AMR 35 with Avis n°1 turret leads two vehicles with Avis n°2s. The front vehicle had fittings for radios, but lacked the radio itself. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Towards the last months before the German invasion of France, there was also an ambitious plan to fit all AMR 35s, platoon/squadron commander vehicles or not, with a small (15 kg) short-range (2 km) ER 28 10-15 m radio. These would have been used for communications between vehicles of the same platoons, which would likely have been greatly appreciated, as French Army doctrine on the AMRs did include the possibility of vehicles of a same platoon separating beyond a range where voice communication or even flag communication is at all practical. Though this plan would have been a great upgrade to the AMR 35s, it was never carried out, and not a single AMR 35 received the ER 28 radio.
Camouflage
AMR 35s left their factories with one general pattern of camouflage, but with significant variations on how the colors were applied.
This was a three or four-tone camouflage. It was generally brush-painted in fairly large rounded shapes, which were separated by a blurry edge painted in black. The four colors used were olive green and Terre de Sienne (brown) for the darker colors, and ochre (in practice yellow) and vert d’eau”(watery green, imagined to be a lighter green color) for lighter colors. Black and white photos have generally left the lighter colors fairly distinct, but the olive green and Terre de Sienne’ can often be hard to differentiate.
This retouched photo of an AMR 35 with Avis n°1 turret gives a particularly great view of the camouflage scheme. Source: Renault documentation via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultThis side photo of an AMR 35 with Avis n°2 colors gives a good view of the camouflage, with a particularly visible edge between swathes of colors. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultA German color photo of two abandoned AMR 35s from the 1st RDP, showcasing the coloration of the vehicles’ camouflages. Source: Pierre Touzin collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Common Markings
A few different markings can sometimes be seen on AMR 35s.
One, of which the use varied significantly, was the tricolor cockade, or roundel. During most of the 1930s, it was not a standard to apply it on Cavalry vehicles, but in March 1938, its use was standardized. Vehicles completed after this date received one painted on the turret side and roof by Renault during production, while vehicles already in service had one painted by their crews. The standard size was a diameter of 40 cm.
AMR 35s of the 1st RDP parade in Versailles on June 25th 1939. The vehicles feature cockades painted on the sides of the turret. Radio fittings without antennas can also be seen on the two Avis n°1-equipped AMR 35s on the left. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
There were some non-standard cockades sometimes used. Some tiny ones can be seen on vehicles of the 1st RDP. A few months before the outbreak of the war, many vehicles had their turret side cockades removed, although the roof ones were often retained. Sometimes, some received cockades on places such as the turret rear prior to the Campaign of France.
Around 1938, the 1st RDP is known to have made use of very small diameter cockades. The vast majority were painted over and replaced with the standard, 40 cm -diameter cockades following the outbreak of the war, but some nonetheless remained, such as on this most likely abandoned vehicle (with Avis n°2 turret) of the 1st RDP. Also note the open stowage box on the rear-right of the hull. Source: char-français
There could also be unit insignias, both at the divisional and regimental level. The only unit known to have made widespread use of these is the 1st RDP of the 2nd DLM. The unit adopted a lozenge-shaped blue insignia adorned with two red and white flags.
This photo of German soldiers posing around an abandoned AMR 35 of the 1st RDP, gives a great view of its insignia, on the hull sides. The two little flags that adorned the blue lozenge’s top were coloured in white (bottom stripe) and red (top stripe). Source: char-français
An army-wide symbol, to be applied to all automotive vehicles, was chosen in 1940. It was in a white square with 20 cm sides. For the Cavalry, it was further refined by the addition of a blue lozenge, 15 cm high and 10 cm wide. Within the 2nd DLM, a small Cross of Lorraine was added within this lozenge as a divisional insignia.
An abandoned radio-equipped AMR 35 of the 1st RDP in the Dunkirk pocket. It gives a very good example of a marking that could be found on some AMR 35s. The standard army white square, adorned by the standard cavalry blue lozenge, itself completed by the 2nd DLM’s Cross of Lorraine. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
There was also a numbering system, though it only appears to have been in systematic use within the 1st RDP. Each squadron’s operational vehicles would be divided between tranches of 20. The 1st squadron would be vehicles 1 to 20, 2nd vehicles 20 to 40, and 3rd, if there was one, vehicles 40 to 60. Within the squadrons, a platoon’s five vehicles are assigned tranches of 1 to 5. For example, the 2nd squadron’s 3rd platoon would include vehicles 30 to 35.
A parade of 1st RDP AMR 35s. Here, the vehicles sport roof cockades and numbering. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
The use of playing-card game symbols to denote a vehicle’s squadron and platoon was also common. The practice was widely generalized within the whole of the French Army at the time. This could be manifested with each squadron having an assigned color, and each platoon having an assigned symbol. For example, the 1st squadron would use red, the 2nd blue, and the 3rd green. The 1st platoon would use an ace of spades, the 2nd an ace of hearts, the 3rd an ace of diamonds, and the 4th an ace of clubs. This way, by combining the color and symbol, one could determine what platoon of what squadron a vehicle belonged to.
AMR 35s of the 4th RDP parading in Verdun for Bastille Day July 14th 1939. The vehicles sport a rear-side turret cockade, an identifying number painted on the rear, and an ace of hearts on the hull side. This way, they can be identified as the 3rd and 5th vehicle of the 2nd Squadron’s 2nd Platoon. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultThis photo is very interesting for a number of reasons. It shows an AMR 35 ZT-1 abandoned next to an AMR 35 ZT-3 casemate tank destroyer, which happened rarely, as the ZT-2s and ZT-3s ended up deployed in units without any ZT-1s. An abundance of markings are displayed: what looks like a “38” tactical number; a non-standard “3”, perhaps indicating the vehicle being the third of its platoon; and a cockade that appears both irregular and placed in a non-standard place on the hull front. The ZT-3 also features cockades of various sizes, including in places, such as the engine deck and rear casemate, and in sizes that would not be expected. Source: char-français
Doctrinal Use of the AMRs
The AMRs were intended to be issued to Cavalry units. Their main role was close reconnaissance. For longer-range, more independent operations, another class of automitrailleuse existed, the AMD (Automitrailleuse de Découverte – ENG: ‘Discovery’ Armored Car), which would typically have more extensive range and more powerful armament than an AMR, in order to more effectively operate on their own for longer periods of time.
The Panhard 178/AMD 35, the vehicle which was to assume the role of AMD within cavalry units. Well armed for its size and better arranged than the large majority of French armored vehicles ergonomically, it is generally considered to be one of the better French AFVs of 1940. Source: Erik Barbanson Collection via Les Editions du Barbotin
On their own, the AMRs were meant to search within a selected, limited area for enemy contact. Their small size was viewed as a benefit in this, and it was specified that they had to use terrain to their advantage to the best of their abilities. Combat was to be engaged at close range only. The vehicles were to take contact with the enemy, but not stay in combat distance for long, as, with their thin armor, it was clear they would not last under armor-piercing or artillery fire. It was also specified that the vehicles would operate in close cooperation with other types of troops, either motorcycle-mounted reconnaissance troops, AMC (Automitrailleuse de Combat – ENG: Combat Armored Car) cavalry tanks, and/or traditional cavalry.
The AMRs were to operate in platoons of five. In operations, each platoon would be further divided into two small sections of two vehicles, with the fifth, independent vehicle, being the platoon leader. When operating on the AMR 35 type, the leader of each section was to use a 13.2 mm-armed vehicle. Platoons were to be followed by motorcyclists, which would typically be used to communicate with other parts of the unit.
The standard procedure was for a platoon of five vehicles to be tasked to investigate an area 1 to 1.5 km wide. Each section of the platoon was to operate at a distance sufficiently small that they would still be in visual contact with the other. Platoon leaders were not to stay behind, but to follow the first section, though under some circumstances, they could decide to stay to observe further back. The vehicle of the section leader was to lead, with the second vehicle slightly behind, so that if the first vehicle came under fire, the second could assist with its own armament.
Progression within an area to investigate was to be made in ‘hops’. Vehicles would go from one zone to observe the area from another, with the zones to stop at preferably offering decent cover. The next position would be observed with binoculars before being taken. In case of uncertainty in regards to a position, the second patrol could go to investigate closer while the first would remain in observation with binoculars.
When going from one cover to another, the AMRs were to progress, if possible, in non-linear ways, and if suspect positions were encountered on the way, they were cleared to fire at them in order either to reveal the position of enemy troops or find it clear of enemy presence. This would typically be done while stopping. It was noted that fire of the move was generally inaccurate and wasteful of ammunition, and it was to be used only in emergencies. The manual specified, for example, that shooting on the move would be used if an automatic weapon or anti-tank gun was suddenly revealed and the vehicle was under threat. The platoon leader was to organize and correct each ‘hop’, which as a rule, implied he had to follow vehicles rather swiftly, as they did not have radio to communicate with one another.
When encountering a village or wood, each patrol was to go around it on its outer border, observing if anything could be seen inside. Once that was done, one of the patrols would stay at the opposite side of the area to the one they came from and where the platoon leader would still be located. The other would go through the village or wood to the commander, and once they regrouped, progression would start again.
If the wood or urban area was particularly large, another procedure was in place. A patrol would stay with the platoon commander, while the other would quickly go to the opposite exit of the wood or urban area. It would then divide in two, with a vehicle staying to defend the opposite exit while the other would quickly drive through the area, reach the other patrol and platoon commander, and the group would then rejoin with the lone armored car on the other side of the area.
When one or a couple of vehicles fell under fire, they were to simultaneously fire back and find cover as quickly as possible, while other vehicles of the platoons were to flank in order to delimitate the area held by the enemy, and if the resistance was limited, try to push the enemy back from this flanking maneuver. If flanking was not a possibility, the vehicles were to cooperate progressively on a point at a time. If pushing the enemy back was not a possibility due to the resistance being too strong, the vehicles were to stop behind the nearest cover and retain binocular observation of the enemy, with one of the vehicles periodically going on a short patrol to confirm enemy positions were still occupied.
When operating alongside troops mounted on motorcycles, these were noted to be a very helpful asset in reconnaissance. They were said to, in practice, prove more reliable than the armored cars at providing vision when no enemy fire was encountered, notably when moving, as the AMR crews were said to have lacked vision when in movement. Once contact with the enemy was taken, they were to observe and note the firing points firing at the armored cars and retain observation even once the armored cars were no longer under fire.
It was generally hoped the armored cars would operate in conjunction with a motorcyclist platoon, forming a détachement mixte (ENG:mixed group). It would be led by the most senior officer between the AMR and the motorcyclist platoon. The motorcycles were generally to follow in the armored car’s stead, due to the latter’s greater protection against enemy fire. When under enemy fire, the motorcyclists were to engage in a more skirmish-like action, pushing the enemy flanks and making sure to keep contact with the enemy even if the armored cars no longer had line of sight. Against an enemy line, it was even, quite optimistically, said that the motorcyclists could attempt to infiltrate weaker points of the line, and be rescued by the AMRs if in trouble.
There were also different principles for when the AMRs were operating alongside AMCs, which, de facto, were cavalry tanks. The AMRs would take the lead of progress, with AMCs at a slight distance behind them to be able to observe the reactions triggered by the AMR’s presence and provide supporting fire. The AMRs would also be tasked with reaching the edge of cover to check for enemy presence, as well as to cover the flanks if they offered good firing positions for the enemy.
The Somua S35 would operate as the AMC within the DLMs in which AMR 35s were to serve. The S35, though still flawed in several ways, was arguably the most potent tanks in French service during the campaign of France. Source: char-français
Once resistance was uncovered, the AMRs would put it under fire and stop advancing, letting the AMCs catch up and take the lead for the time needed to reduce the enemy point. If the resistance was sporadic, once an enemy point was reduced, advance would continue as normal. If the group encountered the main enemy line of resistance, the AMRs would switch to a secondary role, operating in the intervals between AMC groups to provide supporting fire as well as screening the flanks for enemy presence.
The AMRs were also given the role of cleaning up minor resistance points which may have escaped the AMCs. In such a role, a platoon would cover areas 1 to 1.2 km-wide. These cleanup groups were to follow closely behind the AMCs in order to profit from the chaos caused by their heavier firepower, making sure each point was cleared of enemy presence as the Cavalry unit progressed.
The AMRs were also used in another offensive role, in what was called the “occupation echelon”. This would be the part of the unit which would follow after the offensive echelon, itself consisting of the AMCs and AMRs previously mentioned. This occupation echelon would lack AMCs and instead include traditional cavalry and motorcyclists, with the AMRs being, typically, their heaviest elements. The AMRs were to screen forward of this group in order to spot remaining enemy elements. The role of the AMRs of the occupation echelon was to relieve those of the cleanup group of the attack echelon. It was generally hoped that by this stage, all significant enemy resistance would be gone.
One could generally see these offensive doctrines as a three to four-layered attack. A first offensive layer, the largest, including AMRs and AMCs, itself constituted of the AMRs first closely followed by the AMCs. Then, following up, the cleanup platoons operating AMRs, the head of the occupation echelon operating AMRs, itself then followed by cavalry and infantry elements. At the very rear, there was to be a reserve squadron as part of the occupation echelon, meant to be used during emergencies.
These were, overall, the operating principles in offensive actions. They can be said to be very enthusiastic about the capacities of a group of five lightly armored and armed vehicles.
There were also principles given for defensive use of the AMRs. It was clearly mentioned that the vehicles had to be used for delaying actions, and not in a static defense. They would then be placed at the edge of cover, such as a forest or village’s edge, and fire upon enemy forces they spotted at greater ranges. It is then said they would keep this contact all the way to close range, if possible counter attack, and if not, swiftly retreat to the next cover in a sort of defensive reversal of the ‘hopping’ method of advance. If enemy forces were noted to be on the smaller and less equipped side, it was suggested to hold fire until closer ranges, in order to create ambushes. During these defensive operations, the platoon leader was given responsibility to ensure the flanks were well guarded.
Variants: A Whole Cavalry Vehicles Family ?
The previous AMR 33 had a quite limited number of derivatives due to its unorthodox engine placement, which was disliked and found unsuited for many hypothetical variants. As the AMR 35 used a more classic engine configuration, it would come to have more variants being built on its hull.
Renault YS and YS 2
The first variant is the Renault YS, which can be considered to be somehow a variant of both the AMR 33 and AMR 35. The concept of this vehicle was first mentioned in December 1932. The idea was to create a command vehicle with a larger superstructure that could house more men and the equipment needed for them to assume command functions.
Two YS prototypes would eventually be manufactured, the first in 1933, on the Renault VM’s suspension. They had a larger, boxier armored superstructure which could house six men, and had no armament, though they featured a firing port/hatch where an FM 24/29 machine rifle could be placed.
After the two VM-based prototypes, it was decided to order ten production Renault YS in January 1934, with the order formalized by contract 218 D/P on April 10th 1934. By the time they were being manufactured, it was decided to produce them on the chassis of the AMR 35, as its suspension was preferred and this was the type of vehicle being manufactured by Renault at the time.
These 10 production vehicles would be fitted with a number of different radio configurations and would be distributed within army units, within not just the Cavalry, but also the Infantry and Artillery branches, for experimental use. They were still in service by 1940.
In autumn 1936, one of the two prototypes was experimentally converted into an artillery observation vehicle, which was called the “YS 2”.
A production YS in service with the 507ème RCC, an Infantry tank unit, in Metz. This vehicle used an ER 51 receiver-transmitter and an additional R15 receiver radio. Three different radio configurations existed within the ten production YS vehicles. Source: L.Baccini collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultThe YS2 artillery observation conversion of one of the two YS prototypes. It should be noted that it sports the rubber block type suspension, but is nonetheless mentioned to have been built as a VM-based vehicle. It may simply have been refitted with the suspension at some point, perhaps as part of the conversion process into an artillery observation vehicle. Source: armedconflicts.com
ADF 1
The ADF 1 was, alongside the ZT-2 and ZT-3, part of the same contracts as the standard ZT-1 armored cars, with the total number of vehicles of the contracts being around 200 vehiclesThis variant was designed to serve as a command vehicle for AMR squadrons.
The requirements of the vehicle called for an enlarged crew compartment, with a casemate instead of a turret, to accommodate a three-man crew with a large ER 26 radio set. To increase the size of the crew compartment, Renault put the vehicle’s gearbox to the front instead of rear. The vehicle received an armored casemate, similar at first glance to a turret, but completely non-rotating. There was no permanent armament, but a firing port with a gun mask that could accommodate an FM 24/29 machine rifle. All vehicles except one ended up with two radios, an ER 26ter and an ER 29 (the only exception instead having two ER 29s). The ER 26 had a maximum range of 60 km, while the ER 29 was the same radio as already used by platoon commander vehicles.
Thirteen ADF 1s were ordered in total, and were manufactured in the second half of 1938. By 1940, six ADF 1s were in standard use within the RDP units that operated the AMR 35s. Six others were seemingly unemployed and within the reserves of Cavalry units, and a last one was at the Saumur Cavalry School.
A German photo of a captured Renault ADF1. Source: Bovington Tank Museum collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
ZT-2 and ZT-3
The AMR 35 ZT-2 and ZT-3 were the variants which followed and took different approaches to the same problem, adding additional firepower to AMR 35-equipped units.
The ZT-2 solved this issue in a very straightforward way, replacing the Avis turrets with an APX 5, a one-man turret armed with the 25 mm SA 35 vehicle-mounted anti-tank gun. It can be noted that the APX 5 also had a coaxial MAC31E, meaning the ZT-2 de facto had the combined firepower of an AMR 35 armed with an Avis n°1 and of a 25 mm anti-tank gun.
The AMR 35 ZT-2s were seemingly the last military-contract AMR 35s to be completed. Source: Renault documentation via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
The ZT-3, instead of mounting a turret, applied more intense modifications to the hull, being a casemate vehicle instead of a turreted one. The gun was mounted to the right, and was actually the non-shortened version of the 25 mm anti-tank gun, the SA 34.
The AMR 35 ZT-3 was a low profile casemate tank destroyer, though this profile was somewhat hindered by the large cupola. Source: Renault documentation via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Ten of each type were ordered, and were the last military contract Renault ZT-derived vehicles to be completed, with the ZT-3 being completed in early 1939, and the ZT-2s seemingly only receiving their turrets after the breakout of the war itself. The two types were present in some small AMR-equipped reconnaissance groups and were used during the campaign of France.
ZT-4
There was one last major variant of the AMR 35, but it was not actually ordered by a branch of the Ministry of War. Instead, it was ordered by the Ministry of the Colonies. This was the ZT-4, which differed from other AMRs in that it was actually called a char, or tank, by its users.
The ZT-4 was modified to be more usable in tropical terrain. It was specifically meant for use in South-East Asia, most significantly, in French Indochina, but also potentially in French holdings in China. The easiest way to differentiate the ZT-4 from other types is a large air intake grill on the left side of the hull.
The first ZT-4s were ordered as early as 1936, but production would be massively delayed, as the vehicles were lower priority than Army vehicles, and the colonial administration kept experiencing delays of its own. The first order was for 21 vehicles, of which 18 were actually to be made turretless, while the three others would have Avis n°1. It was planned that the 18 turretless vehicles would actually be given turrets from Renault FT light tanks already in service in Indochina, 12 of which would have 37 mm SA 18 guns, and 6 8 mm Hotchkiss machine guns. All of these vehicles were planned to have radios, but Renault was not to fit these into the vehicles. Fitting them to the vehicles was also to be carried out by the users in the colonies.
A further order for 3 Avis n°1-equipped vehicles was signed in 1937, and another order for 31 vehicles fitted with Avis n°1 turret, with no mention of radio fittings, in 1938. In practice, the ZT-4s were actually being manufactured in spring 1940, and a number were pressed into service in early June 1940. Contrary to their initial destination, they were used in mainland France to counter the German invasion. As none had turrets at this point, they were to be used with machine rifles fired from the empty turret ring. After the armistice, some vehicles would be completed with Avis n°1 turrets under German supervision and pressed into German security service.
A turretless ZT-4 being used in mainland France in 1940. Source:Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultAn abandoned German AMR 35 ZT-4 outside of Prague, May 1945. Source: Reddit
Trying to Get the AMR 35 Into Service: The Disaster Years
The adoption of the AMR 35 could be said to have been very premature, and the delivery schedules overly ambitious, to an almost absurd degree. Even once AMR 33 production was complete in early 1935, Renault would face constant issues with the AMR 35.
The first complete armored hull was completed by Schneider in March 1935. The vehicle was mostly completed by Renault in April-May, though a number of minor components were still missing, and the vehicle left the factory on May 20th 1935. The vehicle was sent to Satory for trials, and actually passed them satisfactorily.
On July 3rd, the 3rd production ZT hull, almost fully complete, was showcased to the French Cavalry’s technical services. From August 3rd to 7th, the vehicle, fitted with a turret, was evaluated at Satory. There were some minor issues, but at first, these remained mostly details. The vehicle was turning a little less well than prototypes, but otherwise appeared functional. This was until it was asked to climb a 40° slope with a number of moderately sized bumps. This would still have been very reasonable within the vehicle’s capacities, and another vehicle which was considered as a prototype AMR, the Gendron, successfully managed to climb it while being an all-wheeled vehicle. However, the AMR 35 attempted to climb twice and failed each time.
Likely a Renault factory photo of a freshly completed AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°2 turret. The start of production on these proved way slower than hoped by the French Army. Source: char-français
The French Army was dissatisfied by this performance, despite Renault’s objections that the vehicle managed to climb a 30°/50% slope at its facilities, and that this was what was specified. The French Army requested a change of gear ratios so the vehicle could climb the slope. Despite significant internal reservations, Renault was forced to undertake changes to the gear ratios.
These modifications to the gear ratios would prove disastrous for the AMR 35. The improvement at first seemed successful. The French Army refused 12 new vehicles which were fitted with the new gear ratios in September 1935. Renault would complete the first completed vehicle with the new gear ratios in October. By January 1936, 11 were complete, and by February 22nd, 30 ZT-1s with new gear ratios were complete and another 20 were on the assembly lines.
Finally, about a year and a half after the French Army’s expectations, the first AMR 35s were delivered to units in April 1936. These first units to receive them were mostly the 1st and 4st RDP, which were motorized infantry regiments which were part of the DLMs, though some would be delivered to various GAM armored cars groups, most of which would later be pressed into service within the same two RDPs.
Work on fixing the vehicles and continuing production was almost certainly slowed down by the massive strikes which took place in all of France’s industry in 1936. In this photo, striking workers in front of Renault’s Billancourt factory during the May-June 1936 general strike. Source: Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF).The AMR 35 was not the only cavalry vehicle produced by Renault to be going through arduous times in the 1936 to 1939 era. The heavier AMC 35/Renault AGC (the first prototype of which is pictured here) was also proving to be a disastrous program, plagued with massive delays and utter unreliability, further contributing to ruining Renault’s standing with the Cavalry. Source: tank archives
At the point at which AMR 35s were delivered to units, a disastrous series of incidents started. Final drives of the AMR 35s kept breaking at an alarming rate, with the vehicles becoming practically inoperable and extremely unpopular with the crews. The problem was so significant that the French Army inspection service took the radical decision to cease AMR 35 assembly and have the vehicles be stored and stop operation while Renault found a solution. After Renault considered a number of solutions, the modification of a batch of 20 was accepted on October 13th 1936. Seventeen of these vehicles would be delivered to the 1st RDP on December 23rd and 24th 1936, while another one was taken through very extensive trials in Satory.
The situation seems to, at this point, have improved somewhat, and the French state cleared Renault to modify all 92 ZT-1 armored cars of the first contract with the new reinforced gear ratios, with already delivered vehicles returning to Renault’s factory and vehicles in production receiving the modifications before completion. The production inspection services asked for two vehicles, one with each turret, to be presented to them as prototypes, which was done on April 8th 1937, with the two vehicles being accepted.
An AMR 35 ZT-1 of the 3rd GAM in early 1937, during the vehicle’s constant cycles of returning from the units to the factory, and from the factory to the units. Source: Imperial War Museum collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Slowly, production and deliveries resumed. By August 1937, 70 of the 92 vehicles of the first contract were completed. The vehicles were returned to active use within the units using them. Nonetheless, major issues and breakdowns of differentials would resume, particularly from October 1937 onward. The administration of the Ministry of War sent a very outraged letter to Renault on November 16th 1937, reporting that the AMRs had been through 5 major modifications since the first deliveries, and that despite that, out of 43 fixed AMR 35s that had been delivered to the 1st and 4th RDP, six already had their differentials break. The next day, it was reported that 84 out of the 92 vehicles of the first contract were completed, with the 8 others on the production lines. Renault was finally starting to work on the vehicles of the second and third orders.
The last vehicles of the first contract were delivered on February 16th 1938. The situation seemed to have improved from 1936, but still by no means acceptable. In a new letter on March 14th 1938, the administration complained that many out of at this point 85 vehicles delivered had suffered major breakdowns of the differentials. Renault was asked to produce new differentials to refit vehicles that had suffered a major breakdown, as well as send specialist teams to the 1st and 4th RDP to help with the very troubled operations of the vehicles. By autumn, 18 vehicles had to be returned to Renault’s factories for major repairs.
Production of the vehicles from the second contract had started in August 1937. Renault modified the vehicles a little by strengthening the front hull and used a modified gearbox. The first five vehicles from this contract were delivered from May 23rd to 25th 1938. Ten others were delivered on June 2nd-3rd, and by July 27th, 56 were complete, with 34 having been received by units. The last recorded deliveries were made on November 21st 1938, and overall it appears that the last of the 167 AMR 35 ZT-1s were delivered in the last weeks of 1938.
AMR 35 ZT-1s with Avis n°2 turrets of the 1st RDP in its barracks of Pontoise, 1938. Though the unit received the type two years earlier, the vehicle could not be said to have become acceptable for everyday use until 1938. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Overall, the production and delivery process of the AMR 35s proved an unmitigated disaster for Renault. By November 1938, the company was reduced to pleading to be freed from the delay penalties, which could prove massive. The constant return of vehicles to the factory to be fixed up had made the production less than lucrative, in fact, almost ruinous. Not only was the vehicle less of a financial success than hoped, but it also had a major role in ruining the trust of the French military, and particularly the Cavalry branch, in Renault. This was made even worse by another Renault vehicle, the AMC 35/Renault AGC, also facing production and operational issues, perhaps even worse than the AMR. Though the AMR 35 would seem to reach a workable and somewhat reliable state by 1939, this would never truly be the case for the AMC.
The AMR 35s are Delivered to Units
The AMR 35s had been procured with the main goal of equipping a new type of division of the French Cavalry, the DLM (Division Légère Mécanique – Light Mechanized Division). Meant as a division combining motorized infantry, armored cars, and cavalry tanks, the first DLM was created in July of 1935, but the concept had been years in the making. By the time the first AMR 35s were delivered in 1936, this division was still the only one in existence, but there were plans to convert more cavalry divisions in the future.
There were, at first, plans for a large number of AMR 35s to be assigned to each DLM. The fighting core of each DLM was to be a strengthened brigade composed of two reconnaissance-combat regiment, each comprising two squadrons of AMRs and two squadrons of AMCs. As such, a French cavalry squadron had a strength of 20 vehicles. Furthermore, there would be a three battalion-strong regiment of dragons portés, a type of motorized infantry, and each of these battalions would have a squadron of AMRs. In other words, it was planned a DLM would feature 7 squadrons, or a whopping 140 AMRs.
However, these plans were ditched long before the first AMR 35 was delivered, in large part due to the massive delays in deliveries. When the Cavalry adopted the Hotchkiss H35, it was to replace the AMRs within the four squadrons that would have used them in the combat brigade. It was also decided to reduce the number of AMR squadrons within the dragons portés regiment to two, in other words meaning there would be just two squadrons, or 40 vehicles, of AMRs in a DLM.
As the first AMR 35s were delivered, they were typically delivered to the 1st RDP, part of the 1st DLM. In early 1937, the 2nd DLM was created, and new AMR 35s started being delivered to its regiment, the 4th RDP. The 3rd DLM would only be created after AMR 35 production ceased, but there were already plans for an armored car group to be reformed into the AMR squadrons of its future RDP. The last AMR 35s were thus delivered to the 1st GAM (Groupements d’Automitrailleuses – Armored Car Group), at this point part of the 1st Cavalry Division, which was to become the 3rd DLM.
The AMR 35s at the Outbreak of the War
Plans for the AMR 35 were somewhat shifted in 1939. The 1st and 2nd DLM were raised back from two to three squadrons of AMR 35s, or 60 vehicles per unit. Plans to transform the 1st Cavalry Division into the 3rd DLM were canceled, with the 3rd DLM instead being created from the ground up. It would not receive any AMR, instead only using S35s, Hotchkiss light tanks, and AMD 35s. A single squadron of AMR 35s was kept within the 1st Cavalry Division, part of the unit’s 5th RDP.
In other words, there were seven squadrons of 20 AMRs in service by 1940: three within the 1st RDP of the 2nd DLM, three within the 4th RDP of the 1st DLM, and one within the 5th RDP of the 1st Cavalry Division. Each squadron would have two vehicles in reserve, for 22 vehicles each in total. An additional five AMR 35s were used by the Saumur Cavalry School and eight were in general reserve.
AMR 35s within the 1st RDP
The 1st RDP was the first unit to receive the AMR 35, starting in 1936. In pre-war times, it was based in Pontoise, a north-west suburb of Paris.
The unit used a lozenge-shape insignia, with small bicolor flags (a red stripe on top and a white stripe on the bottom) on the top sides. The insignia could be further detailed with numbering depending on the squadron operating the AMR. Before the outbreak of the campaign of France, the unit would also adopt a set of bicolor lozenge-shape tactical markings. The 1st Squadron used a full blue lozenge, the 2nd Squadron a red top and blue bottom half, and the 3rd Squadron a green top and blue bottom half.
As it received its AMR 35s earlier than any other unit, the 1st RDP was by far the one which suffered with the major teething issues of the vehicle the most. This was further made worse by the fact the unit had not previously received AMR 33s to fall back on, with the AMR 35 being the only fully tracked AMRs available to it. It operated its AMRs in two mixed squadrons, which both included four platoons of five AMRs, and two platoons of 13 motorcycles with side-cars.
The unit extensively took part in exercises during the late 1930s, and was also often employed for parades. In 1939, it notably paraded in Versailles in June before taking part in the Bastille Day parade in Paris.
1st RDP AMR 35s during exercises in the 1939-1940 winter. The support for an anti-air machine gun can be seen mounted on the Avis n°1 turrets. Source: EPCA-D via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
When the campaign of France broke out, the 2nd DLM operated alongside the 3rd DLM, being part of the French spearhead heading into Belgium to attempt to counter the expected German push there. The two DLMs formed the main French force during the Battle of Hannut from May 12th to May 14th and then in the battle of Gembloux on May 15th. These are generally considered the largest tank battles of the campaign of France and the Low Countries.
Unfortunately, the 66 AMR 35s of the 1st RDP were quite the minority within more than 500 French AFVs, with the heavier Somua S35s and Hotchkiss tanks both featuring better performances and leaving much more of an impression. Though the battles were not a disaster for the French, photographic evidence does show that a large amount of AMR 35s were lost on roads of eastern Belgium, and later, as French forces realized they were surrounded, in French roads closing towards the sea to the Dunkirk pocket. In one notable instance, on May 29th, four AMR 35s of the RDP’s 3rd Battalion were lost in the Belgian town of Furnes. All AMR 35s of the unit were left destroyed or abandoned in the pocket.
A German soldier in front of a particularly odd abandoned AMR 35 ZT-1 of the 1st RDP, which has had its rear wheel and suspension block removed. Source: char-françaisA flipped over AMR 35 of the 1st RDP, likely a victim of either artillery or air bombardment. Source: char-françaisA completely destroyed AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°2 turret in Belgium or northern France, May/June 1940. A vehicle being destroyed to such an absurd degree would be unusual, as 13.2 mm ammunition would not cause such an explosion. It is possible the vehicle could either have been sabotaged by its crew or have been used as a range target after it was first either abandoned or knocked out. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultAn abandoned AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°1 turret in the Belgian town of Furnes. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultGerman soldiers examine an abandoned 1st RDP AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°2 turret in Furnes, Belgium. This vehicle sports a number of rifle-caliber non-penetrating impacts. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultGerman soldiers pose in front of an AMR 35 of the 1st RDP abandoned in a Belgian town, with hardly legible German graffiti on the side. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Vehicles of the 4th RDP
While still at battalion level, the 4th BDP started receiving AMR 35s in spring 1936. The unit already had AMR 33s at this point. It was reclassified into a regiment in October 1936, and completely replaced AMR 33s with AMR 35s in 1937. The unit was based in Verdun.
A motorcyclist poses in front of one of the 4th RDP’s AMR 35s. Source: char-françaisA soldier poses in front of an AMR 35 with Avis n°2 turret of the 4th RDP. This photo is particularly interesting as it shows the appearance of the 13.2 mm’s gun jacket when the machine gun is not inserted in it. Source: char-françaisAn AMR 35 of the 4th RDP in front of what is likely a truckload of grain sacks, and a garage. Note an excellent view of the anti-aircraft support on the Avis n°1 turret, as well as a seemingly quite poorly tensioned track. Source: char-français
The unit lacked a clear insignia, though a simple blue losenze in a white square was often painted on the vehicle’s fenders for recognition.
As part of the move into the Low Countries, the 1st DLM was the tip of the French spear. It was meant to cross Belgium and head towards the southern Netherlands in order to link up with the Dutch Army, which it did remarkably quickly, already engaging with German troops near Maastricht on May 11th 1940. On that day, the 4th RDP already suffered from seemingly uncontested air strikes, which did not cause major losses.
It is reported that on May 12th, elements of the RDP, including a squadron of AMR 35s, were used to hold the village of Diessen in the afternoon, but had to retreat to protect a canal in the evening. Several AMR 35s were probably lost in the engagement, with at least one confirmed to have been destroyed in Diessen.
AMR 35s of the 4th RDP in some of the first days of the campaign, in Belgium. The regiment was noticeably hit by German air strikes on the first two days of the campaign, and as such, it is not surprising to see this column of AMRs sport their spare machine guns mounted in the anti-air positions. Source: George Baudin collection, via Régis Potié, via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
The RDP held the canal the next day and retreated further on the night from the 13th to the 14th. At this point, the Regiment entered back into Belgium, and actually faced difficulties, as the unit’s officers had to negotiate with Belgians troops that wanted to blow up bridges before the 3rd Battalion could cross them. No battalion ended up stranded, but losses were still reported.
On May 15th, the unit continued its retreat, entering back into France. However, just like the others, the 1st DLM still ended up stranded north of the German breakthrough to the sea. In the early afternoon of the 18th, positions of parts of the Battalion were forced to retreat under the advance of German tanks. A counter-attack had to be hastily canceled, and overall heavy losses of AMRs appear to have been taken on that day and the next.
It is reported that the AMRs managed to fend off light elements, including small numbers of light tanks or armored cars alongside trucks and infantry, in the morning of the 19th, but in the afternoon, German troops managed to infiltrate French positions, forcing another retreat. By the 20th, already suffering from the cut of supply lines, it is reported AMRs were starting to lack fuel and ammunition, and that some vehicles were particularly used and in a bad state. Heavy losses continued in the next days, as the RDP fought a fighting retreat, orienting itself towards the sea and Dunkirk in the hope of getting out of the pocket.
In the last few days of May, some of the last still operational AMRs were often abandoned and sabotaged to avoid capture, as men of the RDP started evacuating from Dunkirk and Zuydcoote on March 30th. Though many would get away, all their fleet of 66 AMR 35s would be left behind, either destroyed or abandoned.
Two out of action AMR 35s of the 4th RDP in a ditch. These vehicles were likely abandoned in the very last days before the Regiment’s men embarked from the Dunkirk pocket. On the forefront vehicle, there is no machine gun to be seen, not just on the anti-air mount but also in the turret mount itself, suggesting the crew may have taken both with them. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultAMR 35s were generally meant to operate in mixed squadrons alongside motorcyclists. It is ironically a German one that is examining this abandoned AMR 35 with Avis n°2 turret of the 4th RDP, that seems to lack not just the machine gun, but also the gun jacket. Source: char-français
The Lone Squadrons of the 5th RDP
By the start of the campaign, the 5th RDP had a somewhat odd organization. There were two mixed squadrons equipped with AMR 35s, but they were both at half-strength with only two platoons, meaning overall, the RDP had the same 22 vehicles as one of the three squadrons of the 1st or 4th RDP .
The 1st Cavalry Division was reorganized as the first DLC (Division Légère de Cavalerie – ENG: Light Cavalry Division) in March 1940, and it was as part of this unit that the 5th RDP fought.
The various DLCs were generally placed on the flank of the French maneuver into Belgium, covering the Ardennes from expected German advances. In other words, they found themselves straight in the path of the German breakthrough. The 1st DLC experienced this quickly, encountering German troops on its flank as early as May 11th, with the unit forced to take to the left bank of the Meuse River in an attempt to create a defensive line on the river.
The unit suffered heavy losses, in large part on May 13th, when an order that was supposed to be sent to the 1st DcR (Division Cuirassée – ENG: Armored Division) was in fact sent to the 1st DLC due to the two names being mistaken, and the unit was ordered to attack German lines. It appears the attack did not take place, but heavy losses would nonetheless be taken.
It is known two AMR 35s were knocked out by air strike on May 14th. By the next day, the first of the RDP’s two squadrons had already lost an entire platoon, half its strength, while other AMRs were being abandoned due to mechanical issues or lack of fuel. Even the surviving platoon lost an AMR knocked out by a German anti-tank weapon on the evening of May 15th.
The 1st Squadron lost the last of its 11 AMRs on May 17th. Meanwhile, the 2nd Squadron suffered a major breakdown in the supply system that left nine AMR 35s abandoned by the side of the road in Villers-le Gambon, southern Belgium, on May 15th. In less than ten days of fighting, the 5th RDP had lost its entire fleet of AMR 35s.
A German soldier poses in front of an AMR 35 formerly in service of the 5th RDP, abandoned in woods near the town of Dinant, France, presumably on May 15th 1940. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Late in the campaign, in June 1940, it appears the last few remaining reserve AMR 35 ZT-1s were pressed into service with the 4th Armored Cars Regiment, part of an ill-fated attempt at creating another DLM, the 7th, in desperate attempts to resist the German advance. No more than 10 AMRs total, including some AMR 33s, were part of this unit.
A destroyed AMR 35 ZT-1 from an unknown unit Source: char-français
Evaluating the AMR 35
The AMR 35 can be somewhat of a hard vehicle to judge in comparison to some other armored fighting vehicles of the French Army.
It can not be argued that the vehicle did not have some major flaws, and poor performances during the Battle of France demonstrated them. The vehicle’s teething phase had been particularly long and horrendous, with the vehicles becoming unpopular and crews frustrated as AMR 35s were constantly returning to Renault factories to have parts, in particular their differentials, changed.
The AMR 35 ended up as a disaster for Renault. The vehicle was, in many ways, an improvement over the previous AMR 33. It offered a better chassis for modifications, had a sturdier suspension, a more reliable engine, the ability to mount a more powerful armament, and the fittings of radios intended from the start. However, the massive delays and issues experienced from 1935 to 1938 meant that orders of the type remained moderate. At the same time, it proved not at all lucrative, and heavily damaged the relationship between Renault and the French Cavalry.
This photo, one of the AMR 35’s most well-known, does well to showcase the often forgotten bloodbath the campaign of France was. The French Army, while often mocked, suffered casualties with an intensity rarely found on the Western Front of the Second World War. Among many others, the casualties of armored vehicles crewmen were very high. In this aspect, the AMR 35s would do little to protect their crews. Source: char-français
By the point they were fighting in the campaign of France, the AMRs were distributed within motorized infantry regiments, and no matter how much the crews would be taught to perform reconnaissance action, it was to be expected that AMRs would end up used for infantry support as part of such an unit. They were woefully unsuited for that task, being lightly armed and armored, and the situation of the campaign was not kind to them, as AMR 35s were largely in parts of the front where German armor was the most common.
The AMR 35s also suffered from issues that plagued almost all French tanks, notably a one-man turret. However, it can still be argued that the vehicle was not comparable to some of the almost unsalvageable disasters the French industry put out in the 1930s, Renault’s R35 light infantry tank being a notable example.
Though significant flaws would always have remained, there were indeed some actual, planned improvements or features of the AMR 35 that could have made it better suited for mobile warfare. The use of radios is a notable one. Ultimately, due to the fittings of radios being canceled on many vehicles, and the production of radio posts being slow even for the others, only few AMR 35s were ever fitted with radios.The ER 29 and eventually ER 28 they were meant to be fitted with were rather small radios, by no means making a vehicle bearing them into a command machine unable of fighting. Had more attention been placed on these, a fleet of AMR 35s all equipped with both an ER 29 and an ER 28 would have started to have real qualities of reconnaissance.
The introduction of the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss was also significant. It would allow the AMR to fight off enemy armored reconnaissance elements armed with armored cars such as the Sd.Kfz.221, 222 or 231, or Panzer I light tanks.
The capabilities of the AMR 35 were in several ways quite similar to the Panzer I (pictured here, an Ausf.B during Operation Barbarossa). The Wehrmacht was able to make good use of a flawed but not entirely worthless design, while the French Army was not. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault (AMR 35), Ebay, courtesy of Armin Freitag’s digital collection (Panzer I)
The comparison with the Panzer I actually gives a good example of what the AMR 35 could have been, had more attention been put into it. The Panzer I is obviously not remembered by many as the greatest tank of its time. However, at the same time, it was able to function in a highly-mobile offensive warfare thanks to the use of radio and good mobility. The flaws the Panzer I had in common with the AMR 35, such a thin armor and one-man turret, did not prevent it from proving to be an asset. The AMR 35, however, never had that chance, due to the French Army’s neglect of radios, and in general, the Cavalry’s efforts to introduce mechanized warfare largely struggling against the traditionalism of headquarter higher-ups. As a result, the Cavalry’s light AMR 35s were little more than cannon fodder, and even the well armored and armed S35s could do little more than try to slow the German advance.
Under the Balkenkreuz
As with the vast majority of French armored fighting vehicles, German troops were able to capture a number of AMR 35s, and press them back into some form of service.
A German soldier poses in front of train wagons loaded with abandoned French vehicles, including two AMR 35s of the 4th RDP. Source: char-français
The German designation for the AMR 35 was Panzerspähwagen ZT 702 (f), indicating it as a reconnaissance vehicle of French origin. This designation did not only apply to the ZT-1, but all AMR 35s.
These vehicles were put back in service for security use, but it actually appears that, despite higher production numbers, the ZT-1 was not the most common type in German use and has rarely ever been photographed. During the Fall of France, the Germans had captured a number of ZT-4 vehicles during the production process, still on the assembly chain, and had many of them pressed into service, some completed with Avis n°1 turrets, while at least one would be turned into an 81 mm mortar carrier. Pictures of ZT-4 in German use appear much more common than ZT-1s.
Nonetheless, it is likely a few ZT-1s soldiered on alongside ZT-4s in German use. The vehicles were used for security in two different areas, the majority in mainland France, but a significant part in Czechia. It would be in Prague that the vehicles would get their largest share of action, as they were used by German security forces during the Prague Uprising from May 5th to 8th 1945, and were subsequently captured by the Czech Resistance and swiftly pressed into service for a few days. However, in this instance, the ZT-4 again appears to have been the more commonly used type.
Conclusion – The Failure of the Perfected AMR
The AMR 35’s story is somewhat tragic. The vehicle had been designed to perfect the issues of the AMR 33, and at a glance, it appears to have done so by adopting a robust suspension, a better armed turret, fittings for a radio, and a more rugged and reliable engine. When showcased, the schematics and theoretical capacities of such a vehicle in 1935, one could reasonably see it as in the higher-end of light cavalry tanks.
However, this was not to be, as massive production delays, in large part caused by overly ambitious expectations from the French state, were followed by teething issues the scale of which were seemingly not yet experienced in the French Army. By the time the AMR 35s were truly operational, the overall picture was way less rosy. It was 1938 and the vehicles mostly did not have radios, more than half were completed with the 7.5 mm machine gun instead of the 13.2 mm, and the crew had little trust in a machine that had spent the better part of two years breaking down and being sent back to its factory. Even by 1940, radios were still rare, and the vehicle had de facto been relegated to an ad-hoc infantry support role, while squadrons originally meant for reconnaissance went into battle with Hotchkiss H35 or H39 light tanks utterly unsuitable for this role. Production of more AMR 35s had been discontinued due to the massive difficulties and delays encountered.
Though a few French armored fighting vehicles, including the AMR 35’s unlikely replacement, the Hotchkiss light tank (in the form of the H39), were pressed in service of the reformed French Army in 1944-1945, the AMR 35 was not one of them. By the end of the liberation of France, there were very few, if any, AMR 35s left in running order.
Regrettably, it appears no AMR 35 has survived to this day. Not one vehicle exists in a museum collection, and not even a still visible wreck is known, neither in France nor in Czechia. The type disappeared without leaving a trace in such a fashion, which is an unfortunate turn of fate, as a good number of rarer French vehicles of the interwar have survived to this day, such as the FCM 36, AMR 33, AMC 35, and even the “M23” Citroën half-track armored car, one of 16 known to have been made having turned up in Kabul during the Coalition invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
AMR 35, equipped with the AVIS-1 turret (Batignolles-Châtillon) and the 7.5 mm (0.295 in) Reibel Châtellerault MAC31 machine gun. Illustration: Hadrien Barthélemy.AMR 35 ZT-1 fitted with the AVIS-2 turret. Illustration: Hadrien Barthélemy.Regular AMR 35, equipped with the AVIS-1 turret (Batignolles-Châtillon) and the 7.5 mm (0.295 in) Reibel Châtellerault MAC31 machine gun.AMR 35 ZT-1 equipped with a heavy 13 mm (0.51 in) Hotchkiss machine gun with 1250 rounds. Fitted with the AVIS-2 turret.
AMR 35 / Renault ZT-1 Specifications
Dimensions (L x w x h)
3.84 x 1.64 x 1.88 m
Ground clearance
0.39 m
Weight
6,000 kg empty, 6,500 kg fully loaded
Engine
Renault 447 22CV 4-cylinders 120×130 mm 5,881 cm3 engine producing 82 hp at 2,200 rpm
Transmission
4 forward + 1 reverse, front
Suspension
Rubber blocks
Power-to-weight ratio
12.6 hp/tonne
Maximum speed
55 km/h
Speed on damaged road
40 km/h
Track width
20 cm
Trench crossing
1.70 m
Fording
60 cm
Maximum slope crossing
50%
Crew
2 (Driver, Commander/gunner)
Driver vision’s devices
Front episcopes
Commander’s vision devices
Front-right episcope, front-left, sides and rear vision slots
Armament
7.5 mm MAC31E machine gun with 2,250 rounds & 1 spare/anti-aircraft machine gun (Avis n°1 turret)
OR
13.2 mm Model 1930 Hotchkiss machine gun with 1,220 rounds (37 20-rounds box magazines + 480 rounds in cardboard crates) (Avis n°2 turret)
Hull Armor
13 mm (vertical/slightly angled surfaces)
9 mm (significantly angled surfaces, notably frontal glacis)
6 mm (roof)
5 mm (floor)
Turret armor
13 mm (sides)
6 mm (roof)
Radio
None on most vehicles
Few fitted with ER 29s
Planned to fit the entire fleet with ER 28s, never carried out
The camouflage scheme and configuration of Malian Type 62s illustrated based on available photographs. Illustration by Godzilla, based on work by David Bocquelet
Republic of Mali (1981-Present, No Longer in Active Use)
Light Tank – 18 Purchased
The Republic of Mali has been a traditional customer of Soviet hardware ever since its independence in 1960. Over its history, in total, the country has purchased four different types of tanks. Of these, one stands out as somewhat of an anomaly compared to the three others. It is the only non-Soviet tank Mali has ever purchased, as well as the only one where evidence of active use has never been seen. This is the Type 62, from the People’s Republic of China.
China’s First Lightweight Tank, the Type 62
Though very similar to a downscaled Type 59 (a locally-produced Soviet T-54A tank), the Type 62 was actually the result of a complicated development process which includes a number of largely different and sometimes very obscure series of prototypes, such as the 59-16 light tank, the WZ-131, and the WZ-132. The tank which the PLA finally adopted and pressed into service in the 1960s, the Type 62, was a 21-tonne light tank armed with an 85 mm Type 62-85TC main gun, directly based on and firing the same ammunition as the T-34-85’s ZiS-S-53 gun. Smaller and lighter than a medium tank, the Type 62 was mostly meant for use in southern China, which includes numerous regions with mountains as well as poor roads, bridges and infrastructure in general, making heavier tanks hard to operate properly.
A People’s Liberation Army Type 62 during the ill-fated Chinese invasion of Vietnam, 1979. Source: Pinterest
China soon found itself exporting armored fighting vehicles as an additional means of both revenue and diplomacy, and the Type 62 was fairly well-suited for the role. China had somewhat of a “third-worldist” policy, attempting to develop ties with nations that were often decolonized by the West, but not clearly aligned to the Soviet Union. Many of these were located in either Africa or South and South East Asia, areas which at the time had not necessarily been left with high-end infrastructure after decolonization, and therefore lighter vehicles better suited for these country’s roads and bridges were attractive.
Mali Buys the Type 62
The Republic of Mali was a country that maintained good relations with the Soviet Union, its army largely operating on Soviet gear, but it was neither involved enough in the Socialist ideology nor the Eastern Bloc to truly be impacted by the Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960s. Therefore, Mali also had no qualms purchasing armament from China. In 1980, the country placed an order for 18 Type 62s.
These vehicles were, for a very long time, the only Chinese AFVs bought by Mali, with the next purchase, three Tiger armored patrol vehicles, only following in 2017, and another one, for six VN-2C armored personnel carriers, in 2020. This is not to say, however, that Mali did not purchase Chinese equipment during the Cold War. Likely in a similar timeframe to the Type 62, Mali purchased quantities of both Chinese rifles known as the Type 56, one being a copy of the AKM and another of the SKS. With the two original Soviet rifles already in Malian service, operating them was easy, and the price of Chinese-made guns was generally unbeatable outside of armament supplied from the Soviet Union as aid.
An AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) militant in Northern Mali armed with a Chinese Type 56 rifle in 2012. Chinese-made rifles are commonplace in Mali, likely both because of direct deliveries but also due to rifles delivered in neighboring countries ending up in Mali due to the country’s often unenforceable desert borders. Source: Wikimedia Commons
Mali’s Most Elusive Tanks
Ever since their delivery, Mali’s Type 62 have barely ever been seen. This is not particularly surprising pre-1991, but even in post-Cold War Mali, while footage of PT-76s and T-54Bs emerged, this was not the case for the Chinese-made tank.
In 2012, in an attempt at establishing the inventory of the Malian Army, French Military historian and terrorism expert Laurent Touchard qualified the Type 62s, alongside T-34-85s, BTR-40s, and BTR-152s, as “swallowed up by the sands or quietly rotting in Malian army barracks”.
The only known photos of Malian Type 62s are more recent. On March 19th 2019, Malian politician Karim Keïta, a parliamentary deputy of Bamako’s 2nd district, posted photos of a visit to Camp Tieba in Sikasso, one of Mali’s largest military bases that has also become the main storage location for Malian tanks. During the visit, the deputy was shown at least three Type 62 light tanks, which appear on two photographs.
Karim Keïta being shown at least three Type 62s at Camp Tieba. This is by far the best picture of Malian Type 62s in existence. Source: Karim Keïta on Facebook & Oryx Blog
These photos are, as of now, the only known view of Type 62s in Mali, and are quite interesting. The vehicles are not in a particularly bad state. Their camouflage has the same four colors, dark green, brown, beige, and black, as seen on other Malian AFVs in recent years. However, their application is slightly different. The vehicles do not feature the somewhat odd lines of one color inside of another. Instead, one color, black, appears to be consistently used to create lines, sometimes used as the edge between two different colors, and sometimes within a large swathe of one color to separate it in smaller sections. Green appears to be the color used the most, with beige also being quite common on the vehicles, and brown being limited to a few smaller swathes, often somewhat fading into the black edges. If anything, this camouflage pattern appears more professional than the one found on Mali’s PT-76 and T-54, where all four colors appear to be used in a fairly similar way.
This other photo does not focus on the Type 62 at all, however they can still be seen in the background. Source: Karim Keïta on Facebook
Other aspects to notice include the turret hatches seemingly being open on the vehicles. This may have been done for the presentation, but if not, it is a very questionable way of storing a vehicle in the open air, as sand may get inside. The photos show a heavy machine gun mount, though no machine gun is mounted, as well as a Malian armed forces registration number, something which even in recent years PT-76s and T-54B seem not to have had. There is comparatively quite little damage to elements such fenders in comparison to what has sometimes been seen on other Malian tanks, which does suggest the vehicles are, as expected, barely or not at all used. However, it does appear that at least a minimal amount of maintenance is carried out on them.
Conclusion – An Exercise in Vanity?
Out of all types of armored fighting vehicles used by Mali, the Type 62s are some of the least known, though they do have some competition in the form of vehicles of whom the service in Mali is also very obscure, such as the Fahd or the BMP-1.
In a way, the recent views of the vehicles raise almost as many questions as they answer. Many would have previously assumed the Type 62 to have been de facto abandoned, not so different from some completely obsolete types that are no longer in service in Mali, such as the T-34-85. Yet the recent photos seem to show the vehicles in a very recent camouflage scheme, and even featuring registration numbers, something not often seen on Malian tanks, but much more often found on Malian wheeled vehicles, and especially technicals, which have seen widespread use in the conflict in Northern Mali.
Despite this, the tanks seem to have never been seen outside of their storage space in Sikasso, and certainly not in use in the Northern Mali conflict, nor even in parades of exercises. It is not surprising not to see the vehicles in use in the war. Although perhaps more suited for Saharan warfare than T-54Bs, which Mali also operates, being about 15 tonnes lighter, they still are likely nowhere near as practical as a technical, and Mali may very well not have any spare parts to keep them running. However, not having seen them in any form of ceremonial or training use is curious. It is possible that the vehicles are not in running order. The fact that they are still being painted in a modern camouflage would be little more than play pretend. It is also possible that the Malian Army, already stretched thin with the conflict in Northern Mali, does not have the resources to crew them, yet still want a modicum of maintenance carried out on them, as if being saved for a rainy day when they may somehow be of use, as unlikely as that sounds.
The camouflage scheme and configuration of Malian Type 62s illustrated based on available photographs. Illustration by Godzilla, based on work by David Bocquelet
Republic of Mali (Likely 1970s-Present)
Main Battle Tank – 12 Operated
The Republic of Mali is one of a myriad of African states which broke free from France at the turn of the 1950s to 1960s. Soon after independence, it became one of the most Soviet-aligned states in West Africa. This logically led to the Malian Army being largely equipped with Soviet hardware, particularly when it came to heavy equipment, for example, tracked vehicles. The heaviest of these tracked vehicles in Malian service are a small number of T-54Bs, delivered at an unknown date, but in any case, having been in Malian service for decades now. Despite that, they seemingly never saw any action despite Mali being a deeply troubled state for about a decade.
Malian T-54B “Konna” on a tank-transporting trailer in Bamako. Source: maliweb.net
The T-54, Workhorse of the Eastern Bloc
The T-54 is a tank that requires little introduction. Pushed into mass production and service in 1947, it proved a massively successful vehicle. While an evolutionary design from previous Soviet vehicles, its hull directly based on the T-44 and its 100 mm D-10T gun almost identical to the SU-100’s D-10S (though the V-55 12-cylinder 580 hp diesel engine was new), it was an extremely potent vehicle at the time. From its introduction in the late 1940s to arguably the late 1950s, the T-54’s combination of armament, protection and mobility in a mass-producible package can be said to have been unmatched in the West.
Variants and upgrades obviously followed suit. After the three early 1946/47, 1949, and 1951 models, a first major upgrade/new model was introduced in 1955. This was the T-54A, which included a vertical stabilizer for the 100 mm gun, a new radio, infrared driver’s periscope and headlights, new telescopic gun sights, and a new radio, among others.
In 1956, the T-54B was adopted into service, adding a number of new improvements, including a TPN-1-22-11 active infrared imaging sight, the L-2 “Luna” infrared spotlight which could be quite common on late 1950s Soviet AFVs, an infrared commander’s searchlight, and 2-plane stabilization (from 1957 onward). This night fighting equipment was fairly exceptional for the time, more comprehensive than on tanks such as the M48A2/A3, Centurion Mark 3, or the myriad of older tanks, notably M47 Pattons, which formed the backbone of NATO’s tank force in Western Europe.
A Soviet T-54B. The type was a late 1950s/1960s workhorse of the Soviet Army. Source: krasnayazvezda.com
Not only were newly manufactured T-54Bs entering service, but the majority of previously in-service Soviet T-54s would be refitted to T-54B standard in the late 1950s, making the type a very common tank. By the late 1960s and especially the 1970s, however, though the T-54B definitely had not become a worthless combattant, the introduction of more modern tanks in the Soviet arsenal, the T-62, T-64, and soon enough, the T-72, as well as more advanced models of the T-55, meant the T-54 was no longer in its prime.
The vehicle was, however, an excellent hand-me-down to Soviet allies, being available in large numbers, and its armor and armament still being very significant in areas of the world where the most common armored fighting vehicles were armored cars. At the same time, its fairly light weight of 36 tonnes, about as light as a modern medium tank/main battle tank was, lighter than pretty much all NATO tanks of the class except the French AMX-30B, also made it a good option for countries with infrastructure not developed for exceedingly heavy vehicles.
The Unclear Export to Mali
Cold War Mali was almost exclusively a customer of Soviet armored fighting vehicles, being an openly Socialist dictatorship from 1960 to 1968 under Modibo Keïta, and a less clearly ideological, but still pro-Soviet military regime under General Moussa Traoré from 1968 to 1991.
There are three known major packages of armored fighting vehicles delivered to Mali. The date when T-54s were delivered, and as such, to which of these packages they belonged to, is not known for certain. The first package, including BTR-40s and T-34-85s, was delivered in 1960-1961, just after the country’s independence, and likely far too early for the USSR to deliver the still fairly new T-54B to an African state that had just become independent. This leaves two other known packages, the one delivered around 1975, which is known to have included BTR-152s, BRDM-2s, and PT-76s, and the one delivered around 1981, which included BTR-60PBs and perhaps some further T-34-85s, though these are sometimes quoted as delivered from another African state.
The 1975 package seems perhaps the most fitting, as it included the widest variety of vehicles and was overall larger in size, but the T-54 having been delivered in the early 1980s cannot be excluded for certain. It is also possible the vehicles were delivered at another date, outside of these major known deliveries. The vehicles are, after all, not the only Soviet AFVs where the exact date of delivery is not known, that also being the case of a number of ZSU-23-4 Shilkas and some extremely elusive BMP-1s the Sahelian country received.
As for the number of vehicles delivered, an attempt at establishing the inventory of the Malian Army by French military historian and terrorism expert Laurent Touchard from 2012 placed the number of T-54s in Malian service at twelve. It should be noted that this inventory was of vehicles still in existence, not of vehicles delivered. The same inventory established Mali had 18 PT-76 operational, while 20 are known to have been delivered, and therefore it cannot be confirmed Mali only ever received 12 T-54s.
However, as the vehicles appear to have seen less intense service than the PT-76s, it is more likely none were ever worn out to the point of being out of service in comparison to the amphibious light tanks, so 12 remains the most probable number of vehicles delivered. It should also be noted that the same report stated Malian T-54s were not in the best state. Their radios were reported to either be used and damaged, or sometimes entirely unoperational.
Operational Service
In December 1985, Mali waged a short 5-day war against its neighbor, Burkina Faso, over the Agacher Strip, but this was a small-scale conflict and it is not known if the T-54s were used as part of it. If so, they would likely have been a force to reckon with, as Burkina Faso did not (and still does not) field tanks. At the time, Burkina Faso’s most heavily armed armored vehicles were AML-90s and the recently delivered EE-9 Cascavels. The Agacher Strip War, however, likely did not see any armor engagements.
As of 2022, footage of Malian T-54Bs is known to have originated from three different places: Sikasso, capital of the eponymous Sikasso province; the capital, Bamako; and the city of Kati, 15 km from Bamako.
Sikasso is the main storage facility of Malian tracked armor. The vehicles are stored in the military Camp Tieba, which also hosts a military school/training facility. The vehicles appear to generally be stored in roofed, but open-air hangars, with no flooring on the sand or dirt ground, protecting the vehicles from some, but not all of the elements. Most Malian tanks appear to be in Sikasso almost all the time. This includes the T-54Bs, but also the PT-76s, and Mali’s most obscure tanks, a fleet of Chinese-made Type 62s that have seemingly never been seen outside of Sikasso’s Camp Tieba.
T-54Bs and PT-76s stored in Camp Tieba, Sikasso. Note that recent photos of T-54s seem to show them with no heavy machine gun mount at all, while photos of the vehicles in the 2010-2012 era show them with an unused heavy machine gun support. Source: Oryx Blog
The T-54s have otherwise been seen a number of times in Bamako, the Malian capital, during occasional military parades, often not moving under their own power but on a tank-transporting truck.
The location where T-54Bs have typically been seen moving under their own power is the city of Kati, 15 km from Bamako, where some Malian T-54s were seen on exercise in 2011.
Camouflage, Commemorative Name, and Their Evolution
The earliest known footage of Malian T-54s, starting in 2010, shows the vehicle in a uniform green camouflage, similar to the Soviet green color which the vehicles would have sported in Soviet service. This camouflage seems to have persisted until at least 2012-2013, and potentially several years later.
A number of commemorative names were seen on T-54Bs spotted in this period. They have been seen referring to a number of things, including settlements and cities, folktales, historical leaders or figures of Mali, and more recently, in reference to Malian Army servicemen killed in the conflict in the North.
On September 22nd 2010, a parade to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of Malian Independence was carried out in Bamako. It included three T-54Bs on tank transporters. One was named “Soni Ali Ber”, after a 15th-century leader of the Songhai Empire, a large medieval African state of which the capital was Gao, located in present-day Mali. A BTR-60PB has also been seen sporting the same name.
Another was named “Bakari Dian”, a half-man half-beast creature from a folktale from the Ségou region of Southern Mali, east of Bamako. The last is known from photographs which only allow part of the name to be identified, reading “Monzon Diarra”, a warrior king which ruled the Bambara Empire, an empire centered on the Bambara peoples (the most common group of ethnicities in Mali), at the turn of the 18th to the 19th century.
Two Malian T-54Bs on trailers during the 50th Anniversary of Malian Independence Parade in Bamako. Source: Esoteric ArmourA photo of T-54B “Bakari Dian”. Note the empty machine gun mount. Source: Esoteric ArmourA very similar shot of T-54B “Soni Ali Ber”. Source: Esoteric ArmourThe name of this third T-54B present in the 2010 parade is not entirely readable, but “Monzon Diarra” can be identified. Also note the white-painted rims on the vehicle’s road wheels, a classic parade scheme for Eastern Bloc-aligned militaries. Source: Oryx Blog
On January 20th 2011, Malian T-54Bs took part in a military exercise and demonstration, including live firing, in the town of Kati, 15 km from Bamako. Two vehicles were spotted, “Soni Ali Ber” and “Bakari Dian”, still sporting their names seen in the previous parade.
T-54B “Bakari Dian” during the January 20th 2011 exercise/demonstration. Source: Esoteric ArmourT-54B “Soni Ali Ber” during the January 20th 2011 exercise/demonstration. Source: Esoteric Armour
Two additional named T-54Bs were seen at later dates. One was named “Konna”, after a city in central Mali (which would be about the edge of terrorist group Ansar Dine’s advance into central Mali in January 2013, before the Franco-African intervention pushed it back), and another was named “Cne Sekou Traore”. This later name is particularly interesting, as it refers to a much more recent individual than usual. Captain Sekou Traore commanded a company, the 713ème Compagnie Nomade (ENG: 713rd Nomad Company) in the Battle of Aguel’hoc, one of the first major battles during which the Malian Army faced off against the Tuareg MNLA and islamist Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) during the 2012 Tuareg Insurgency. After their victory in the battle, AQIM insurgents executed 97 Malian prisoners. The Malian state, in the following months, attempted to make the men that fought in Aguel’hoc into heroes and highlight the barbaric executions in an effort to try and bolster the country against the growing insurgency, which would see Mali lose control of the northern half of the country.
T-54B “Cne Sekou Traore” seen on a tank-carrying trailer, likely in 2012 or 2013. Note, this time, the red painted road wheel hub caps. Source: Oryx Blog
In recent years (one photograph being dated from 2018), Malian T-54s have been seen sporting a new camouflage, which has also been observed on PT-76s and Type 62s. This camouflage is a multicolor scheme including dark green, brown, beige, and black. Large swathes of each color are painted on the tanks, and smaller irregular lines are then present inside the larger swathes.
A Malian tank crew poses in front of a T-54B in the new camouflage scheme in Kati, May 4th 2018. Source: voaafrique.com
Vehicles painted in this new camouflage scheme have been seen both in Kati as well as in Sikasso. The most recent known view of a Malian T-54 actually seems to be from a location from where no views of the vehicles had emerged previously, a military camp in Sevare, one of the largest cities in Central Mali. Within a number of photos documenting training of Malian crewmen on a 122 mm D-30 howitzer by the European Training Mission in Mali, one sports a T-54 in the background.
In this photo published in March 2021 by the European Training Mission in Mali, part of an article on training Malian crews using a 122 mm D-30 howitzers, a T-54B can be seen in the background. The vehicle appears to not have been moved for a while, and its fenders are noticeably damaged. Source: European Training Mission in Mali digital journal, March 2021 issue
Absence of the T-54s in the Current Malian Conflict and their Role in the Malian Army
Mali’s T-54s have not seen use in the current Malian conflict, despite war in the country having been raging for over a decade at this point. Though the vehicles not being used may be surprising at first, there are actually very reasonable motives for it.
The Malian conflict, outside of the ill-fated attempt by terrorist groups to progress into Central and Southern Mali that triggered foreign intervention in January 2013, has mostly remained confined to Northern Mali, an environment marked by the Sahara Desert, with settlements separated by sometimes hundreds of kilometers of desert with very poor roads. For an army to make proper use of tanks there, it would need a very strong logistical organization and wide availability of spare parts, something the Malian Army does not have. Vehicles such as Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs), and perhaps even more widely technicals (often based not only on the Toyota Land Cruiser, but also the Korean Kia KM450 truck in Mali) make much more sense.
In the modern Malian environment, the technical has proved a much more useful asset than the tank. This example is a Kia KM450 fitted with a 14.5 mm ZPU-1 heavy machine gun. It is here seen on guard duty in Gao on January 13th 2017, during the visit of French President François Hollande to French troops stationed in the city. Source:d Stéphane de Sakutin, AFP.
The vehicles have been retained in some service capacity though, and this can also appear reasonable at first. If Mali came to heads with one of its neighbors in a peer-to-peer military conflict, rather than counter-insurgency warfare, its T-54s would actually not be any worse than their opponents in most cases. Three of Mali’s neighbors, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal, do not field any tanks, though all three have 90 mm-armed armored cars. Three others are in the same state as Mali, with a variant of T-54/T-55 as their heaviest tank. There is of course one exception to this, Algeria, one of the African continent’s military powerhouses. However, the border between Algeria and Mali is located in the middle of the Sahara, an impractical environment for tanks, and the impoverished Mali could never realistically hope to afford equipment to rival the Algerian military.
However, in practice, it is unlikely Mali’s T-54s would account to much in a conventional war. The vehicles themselves may not be worse than their opposition, but it appears they have only seen minimal service and maintenance, meaning they would both be susceptible to breakdowns, and be crewed by inexperienced personnel, who would both struggle to repair the vehicles and to operate them properly. When adding these factors to the small number of vehicles in service, even against other unstable and divided countries, such as Burkina Faso, Malian T-54s likely would only have a minimal impact. The widespread availability of anti-tank armament across West Africa capable of knocking out T-54s further diminishes the tank’s usefulness. This is true more so in the last few decades due to the breakdown of order in Libya and previously massive deliveries of ex-Soviet surplus largely expanding the number of anti-armor weapons being traded around in the region.
T-54B “Konna” likely in Bamako. Ever since 1991, there appears to have been little use for Mali’s T-54s outside of occasional parades in Bamako and exercises in Kati. Source: Oryx Blog
Conclusion – Mali’s Agonizing Giants
To a foreign observer, seeing T-54s in Sub-Saharan Africa may seem like an unnoticeable, common occurrence, and to an extent it is. However, T-54Bs likely brought a significant asset to their army back when the country suffered from less internal instability. Fielding actual tanks is not a given in the Sahel, with three of Mali’s neighbors being content with armored cars, including Burkina Faso, with whom Mali fought a very short war in 1985. In case a conflict like the Agacher Strip War was to escalate, the T-54s, despite their small number, would likely have been a significant help for the Touré regime of Mali to emerge victorious over its adversaries.
However, unfortunately for Mali, since the end of the Touré regime, the conflicts the Malian Army faces are no longer border wars with its neighbors, but rather much bloodier and, as of 2022, seemingly endless internal conflict. Whereas T-54s may have been useful assets fighting in the somewhat better infrastructure of the Niger river basin and the border areas of Southern Mali in general, their superior armament and armor is worthless when the conflict Mali faces takes places in the Sahara, where using tracked main battle tanks without a logistical train Mali cannot afford would be a fool’s errand. As such, Malian T-54s have largely remained in the southern half of the country, far from action, and likely progressively seen less and less as useful assets for the government. In the last few years, it appears the vehicles are appearing less and less in parades, with few photos of them rather showing them in the background, sitting still and likely unused, or in storage. While still notionally in service of the Malian Army, the country’s T-54Bs are likely dying a slow death under poor maintenance as there is, simply put, no use for them anymore.
T-54B “Cne Sekou Traore”T-54B in the late 2010s camouflage scheme. Both illustrations by Godzilla based on work by David Bocquelet
A Production AMR 33 with the spare machine gun mounted on the anti-aircraft mount
France (1931-1940)
Reconnaissance Vehicle (Light Tank/Tracked Armored Car) – 5 Prototypes and 118 Production Vehicles Built
The AMR 33 was a tracked reconnaissance vehicle designed by Renault in the early 1930s. Though it may seem unimpressive at first glance, it had a complex developmental history, and would be one of the faster armored fighting vehicles of its time. Though not extremely successful on its own, and eventually plagued with a number of issues, it would nonetheless launch a series of moderate successes achieved by Renault in the 1930s.
The French Cavalry after The Great War
World War One saw armored vehicles breakthrough into mainstream military use. Though there were some armored vehicles manufactured during the Belle Epoque (“Beautiful Time”, a name given in France to the pre-WW1 part of the 20th century) in France, these were all armored car that stayed as prototypes or small production runs, such as the Charron 1902, Hotchkiss 1908, and others.
As for the war itself, the Infantry branch got the lion’s share of armored fighting vehicles, with their tanks, particularly the FT, seeing mass-scale production and use. In comparison, the Cavalry was relegated to using wheeled vehicles. There were small production runs of various armored cars, such as the Archer, Renault ED or Jeffery de Fabry, and many prototypes, but these could never be decisive during the course of the war. Towards the end of the conflict, a more modern and standardized type, the White TBC, was settled upon, but while it had higher production than other French armored cars of the era with 230 built, this number still paled in comparison to more than 4,000 of Renault’s FT light infantry tank.
In order to see all of its armament, the White TBC is best viewed from the side. The White TBC was based on an American truck chassis, and out of the entire 230 vehicles production run, only 55 used newly-made chassis as opposed to already used ones. Though it was already somewhat of a more durable option than previous ad-hoc or small-scale production armored cars, few would have imagined, when it first reached the frontlines in October 1918, that the White TBC would remain in service of the French military for two decades, owing to the lack of funding for replacements in the Interwar. Source: char-français
During the 1920s, the Cavalry branch of the French Army proved a lot more willing than the Infantry to innovate in terms of new concepts, and this also extended to armored vehicles. Perhaps the most significant example of this in terms of program would be the two AMC programs, the n°1 launched in April of 1923 and n°2 launched in August of 1924.
Both called for an AMC (Automitrailleuse de Combat – Combat Armored Car), but were largely different. The first program requested a 4 tonnes vehicle able to reach 55 km/h on road and with a gearbox allowing for inverted motion. The second program called for a 7.5 tonnes vehicle, with a crew of 3, and, at that point, a decent 20 mm of armor, high off-road capacity and maximum speed of just 30 km/h, with the configuration of the running gear left to the manufacturer’s discretion.
The second program de facto called for a cavalry tank. Leaving running gears to the manufacturer’s discretion and being willing to experiment with other options than just wheeled vehicles was also a significant aspect of the interwar French cavalry procurement. For example, in 1923, the French Cavalry would adopt the Citroën 10CV P4T armored car, often called just the “M23”. This was a half-track Kégresse armored car which, while it had its own turret, copied the FT’s configuration of being armed with either a 37 mm SA 18 or an 8 mm Hotchkiss model 1914 machine gun. Only 16 of these would end up being purchased however.
A purchase of 16 Citroën-Kégresse P4T-based armored cars would likely end up being the most significant purchase of armored fighting vehicles by the French Cavalry in the early 1920s. Note that these are incredibly easy to confuse with the Polish wz.28, built on the same chassis, using the same turret configuration of either a 37 mm gun or a 8 mm machine gun, and with perhaps some inspiration from the Citroën design, though they were by all means locally-designed. Source: char-français
Reconnaissance was a major role which armored cars could potentially fulfill, but despite the Cavalry’s ambitions, the 1920s were also a period of particularly dry funding, especially for this branch which was viewed as having had much less of a role in France’s WW1 victory than the artillery or infantry. Reconnaissance groups of French cavalry units had to make do with, at best, civilians cars which had been summarily armored and given a machine gun, and at worst unarmored cars or half-tracks where the crew may have been expected to fire their weapon, often a CRSG 1915 Chauchat machine rifle, from their seats.
A Citroën P1T Kégresse half-track armed with a CRSG 1915 Chauchat 8 mm machine rifle, forced to serve as an ad-hoc reconnaissance vehicle within an armored car squadron of the French Army of the Rhine, during the 1925 maneuvers. Source: François Vauvillier’s collection from Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault
The First Purpose-Built Reconnaissance Vehicles
With the lack of cavalry funding preventing a large armored reconnaissance armored car program, there were not many dedicated reconnaissance vehicles manufactured in France in the 1920s. The more significant efforts invested into combat armored cars had resulted in a fair number of prototypes as early as around 1924, eventually resulting in a fairly large-scale adoption of the Schneider P16 half-track. The adoption of the future design was expected as early as 1925, though eventually the production of 4 pre-production vehicles would have to wait until 1928, with 96 production vehicles then being delivered in 1930-1931., With less obvious military interest, designing reconnaissance vehicles would be a much riskier affair for private manufacturers, with greater risk of financial loss.
To someone with modern sensibilities looking at it, there is no doubt the Schneider P16 is archaic, but at its time it brought some considerable innovations, being notably one of the first vehicles to combine a 37 mm gun and a coaxial machine gun in the French Army, as opposed to having just one of these armament options. It was also perhaps the first new French AFV to mount the 7.5 mm MAC 31 from the start of production. Source: War Thunder forums
Nonetheless, in the late 1920s, the Lyon-based manufacturer Berliet would start offering a whole range of wheeled armored vehicles to the French military. In 1928, it showcased two prototypes of the VUR, a four-wheeled light armored liaison vehicle, and the next year, in 1929, a new vehicle branched out of this offering, the VUDB. This was far from a classic, turreted armored car, being instead more of a simple open-topped four-wheeled car with an armored body, with a number of firing ports and two machine rifles for the crew of three to use. This light (4.9 tonnes fully loaded), at this point mobile (55 km/h on road) armored car was already a significant step forward in terms of armored reconnaissance in comparison to a summarily armored civilian car.
The French Cavalry classified the VUDB as a voiture de prise de contact (ENG: contact-taking car) and ordered 50 which were delivered in 1930. These vehicles’ service would overwhelmingly be in the colonies, but they set a significant precedent in being the first considerable effort towards creating a reconnaissance armored car in interwar France.
More of a car or small truck with an armored body and firing ports than a true, traditional combat armored car, the VUDB was nonetheless an important stepping stone in the production of armored reconnaissance vehicles at any scale by the French military, and would be a staple of the French Army in southern Morocco all the way to WW2. Source: www.wargaming3d.com
The 1930 Motorization Program
The year 1930 was key for the armored vehicle fleet of the French Army. Despite the Cavalry’s best efforts, adoptions of new vehicles had remained limited in the 1920s. Besides the half-track Schneider armored car and the VUDB at the tail’s end of the decade, many vehicles, such as the White TBC, still dated as far back as WW1, and roles where a purpose-built vehicle would be preferred had to be fulfilled ad-hoc.
It is a fair assessment to say that the Infantry was not that better off either, though it suffered from doctrinal conservatism in the high-command much more. In the Infantry’s case, the only large-scale adoption prior to 1930 had been the D1 in 1929, and that tank was still in the production process by 1930 (it would have to wait until 1936 to be truly operational in its final configuration). In both the cases of the D1 and P16, the new armored vehicles were neither numerous or polyvalent enough to replace all the fleet of WW1 vehicles. While the FT and White had been sufficient through much of the 1920s, they were truly becoming dated by the turn of the 1930s.
It is therefore not surprising that significant programs were initiated by both the Cavalry and Infantry in 1930. On July 4th, the French Army Minister signed an ambitious program, which comprised, for the Cavalry, transforming an entire cavalry division into what would become a Division Légère Mécanique (DLM, ENG: Light Mechanized Division), as well as motorize a brigade of each other cavalry division within five years.
Alongside this organizational change, requirements for new vehicle types were to be formulated and issued to manufacturers. Two sets of requirements for armored reconnaissance vehicles were issued. Both shared similar requirements of a 50 km/h maximum speed, 3,600 kg empty weight and 600 kg load capacity, but one was to be a 1.80 m tall turretless vehicle carrying six personnel (including the driver) with an openable roof. The other would be a 2 m tall three-men armored car armed with a turreted machine gun, with another machine gun stored as a backup and a firing port in the hull from which a crewmembers could fire a machine rifle.
Though firing a machine rifle through firing ports is hardly anywhere as good as a turreted machine gun, at least by the 1930s, the crew could be expected to use a 7.5 mm FM 24/29, a much better weapon than the previous 8 mm FM 1915 Chauchat. Source: armesfrancaises.free.fr
These two distinct sets of requirements were merged together in January 1931. The resulting vehicle mostly took the characteristics of the turreted armored car, such as a three-man crew, but was to ditch having a complete turret, instead using a shielded machine gun on a rotatable mount. A new classification system had been introduced at this point in time, with different roles being indicated by a letter. The reconnaissance cavalry vehicle would be called Type L.
Two companies, Renault and Berliet, offered vehicles for the Type L. Likely due to the constant shift in requirements as well as overly ambitious expectations on how light the vehicle could be made to be, neither fulfilled the last set of requirements. Renault’s vehicle, the UR type L or URL, was a six-wheeled armored car with a fully rotatable, fully armored turret, weighing upward of 6 tonnes. Berliet’s VUC type L or VUCL was a similarly heavy vehicle weighing in the 5.3 tonnes range empty and up to 5.9 tonnes at maximum load, though it was a 4×4 armed with a shielded machine gun instead of a turreted one (as well as ports doubling as vision and firing ports on the front and sides of the vehicle, for the crew to fire a machine rifle from). Both the URL and VUCL appear to have been present at the 1931 army maneuvers, but do not appear to have made a lasting impression.
The Renault URL prototype as showcased in August 1931. This was a turreted vehicle, and Renault envisioned potentially putting the two rear wheels on tracks in order to improve cross-country capacities. This would not materialize, not even when a revised prototype was offered in 1933, at a point where there was barely any interest in it left. Source: Renault collection from Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 RenaultThe first VUCL prototype at the trials commission in Vincennes, December 1931. Two VUCL prototypes were manufactured. They had a somewhat unique fate in that, despite not being adopted, they were reportedly sent to Morocco and pressed into service alongside the more numerous Berliet VUDBs. Source: Wikimedia Commons
A Page from the Infantry’s Book: Interest in the Type N
The Type L program initiated by the Cavalry could not be said to have been a success. With shifting requirements and overly ambitious expectations, the two offerings from private companies did not end up fulfilling the requirements at all, nor did they look promising. As medium-sized wheeled options proved, at this point, disappointing, the French Cavalry would soon take interest in the results of a program initiated by the Infantry, the Type N.
The Type N program was initiated after the French Army’s trial commission at Vincennes got to experiment on two Carden-Loyds of British origins in June-July 1930. These vehicles immediately brought interest in the still infantry-focused French Army. The Carden-Loyd had originally been thought as a way to mechanize the infantry, but when the French Army tried the vehicles, it compared them to unarmored Citroën-Kégresse half-tracked tractors, with the Carden-Loyd allegedly performing admirably against them. It was quickly imagined that a small vehicle of this size could operate as an excellent tractor/supply vehicle, able to tow either an anti-tank gun or light artillery piece, or a trailer loaded with ammunition for infantry companies, or potentially, even both.
As early as October 1930, the French Infantry issued specifications for a véhicule blindé de ravitaillement de l’infanterie (ENG: Infantry Armored Supply Vehicle). This would soon be given the designation of Type N.
The requirements for the Type N requested a tiny vehicle not higher than 1.10 m, able to take a load of 950 kg, crewed by two men, and able to reach a maximum speed of 35 km/h on road, while having good off-road capacities. There was not a strict requirement of a running gear type, so in theory the vehicle could very well have been wheeled, tracked, or half-track. In practice, there were three major competitors for the Type N, none of which was fully wheeled. There was one half-track, the Citroën P28 chenillette, and two fully-tracked vehicles, the Latil N, a mere copy of the Carden-Loyd, and the Renault UE.
Schematics of the Renault UE, showing the general design of the vehicle and the placement of its powertrain. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThe driver’s hood on the first of the two Citroën P28 chenillette prototypes. Source: char-français
Though initiated by the Infantry, it is not, from the requirements, surprising that the Type N would soon garner interest from the Cavalry. Since the late 1920s, British engineers and salesmen had done much work abroad to sell the idea of very light tracked vehicles, which could be used for a variety of purposes, from reconnaissance to a light tank substitute or a tractor. When looking at the requirements of the Type N, the vehicle was far from being as slow as tracked vehicles of previous years often were, at 35 km/h, while its tiny size would surely prove useful for reconnaissance.
The Time of the P28
Prototypes of the Type N vehicles were showcased from the spring to summer 1931, with Renault being the first to present a prototype in April 1931, while Latil and Citroën would present theirs in July 1931. It appears that interest of the Cavalry into the vehicles of the Type N program blossomed starting in the summer, likely after the presentation of the Citroën vehicle.
The Infantry picked Renault’s fully tracked vehicle, the Renault UE, in October 1931. However, at around the same time, the Cavalry showed intense interest in the Citroën vehicle. The P28 chenillette proved 10 km/h faster than the Renault, reaching 39.5 km/h, and while the Cavalry was generally fairly open to vehicles with new types of running gear, it still had a lot more experience with half-tracks in comparison to fully tracked vehicles which traditionally were more of an infantry affair.
A Citroën P28 in the final configuration of the vehicle. Ironically enough, the prototype of this configuration would not be ready until July 1932, at which point the Renault vehicle which would de facto replace it was also undergoing trials. Source: char-français
This was, at this point, a major success for Citroën, which was one of Renault’s most important rivals within the French automotive industry, both on the civilian and military markets. Citroën managing to achieve such a success was not well viewed by the rival company. Around the same timeframe, likely very shortly before the adoption of the Citroën P28, Renault offered a first design for a tracked reconnaissance vehicle. It would receive the “VM” two-letter code (in the same sequence as the FT, UE, and countless other Renault vehicles).
The Early Design of the Renault VM
The first Renault VM design was created around the same timeframe as the Citroën P28, in autumn 1931. The design would retain the same very short length of 2.8 m as the UE, and perhaps the same or at least a similar width of 1.74 m. However, there were major structural changes to the vehicle. Renault gave this modified design the internal code “Renault VM”.
Instead of retaining the front crew compartment, centrally-placed engine, and rear-mounted stowage area of the original UE, the VM’s crew compartment would instead be placed towards the left and rear of the vehicle, with an engine to the front and right.
A side schematic view of the early Renault VM, showing the similar drivetrain in comparison to the UE, as well as the turret and crew positions. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The largest difference in the vehicle design was the presence of a turreted armament. The early VM design featured a turret which was mounted on the left of the vehicle, behind the driver’s position, which was positioned in the same way as on an UE. The turret featured on the schematics of the vehicle was a fairly simplistic design. It would be armed with the new machine gun available for fortifications and armored vehicle designs, the 7.5 mm MAC 31. The turret would have housed a single crewmember, the gunner/commander. It appears that a small cupola would have been placed towards the rear of the turret, and would likely have had some sort of vision device, such as a panoramic periscope. From the design, the turret appears to have been very small overall, to the point it would have been quite cramped. It also appears that no reloads for the machine gun would be present in the turret, with all the magazines having to be stowed inside the hull instead.
The other major structural change of the early VM design in comparison to the UE was the engine, with the early VM being designed to have a more powerful engine. Its potential horsepower output is unknown, as Renault used an alternative means of power measurement for it, CV. It would have been a 15 CV engine. In comparison, the original UE’s Renault 75 was a 10 CV engine producing 30 hp, while the AMR 33’s 24 CV engine would produce 84 hp. Unlike the centrally-mounted position on the UE, the engine was shifted to the right on the early VM design. This would have been a fairly uncommon feature at the time. As lateral space was quite limited, the radiator and ventilator would have had to be shifted at 90° and be installed to the rear of the engine, in a fairly distinct manner which would have also been quite rare at the time. The radiator, in particular, would have been installed as far to the back as the turret would have been, and the gunner would have effectively been sandwiched between the radiator on his right and the hull’s wall to the left.
A top view of the early VM design’s structural arrangement, showing the position of the crew as well as the engine block, which extended over the whole short 2.7 m length of the vehicle. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The suspension of the vehicle would have used the same components as the Renault UE, with three leaf springs bogies on which two small road wheels were mounted, a front sprocket and a rear idler. However, unlike on the UE, the sprocket and idler would have been placed higher. Though the return rollers are not seen on the schematics, they would very likely have been present. Armor protection at this point in time would also very likely have been the same as the UE, with 9 mm on vertical surfaces and 6 mm on all other plates.
Renault’s early VM design was submitted to the technical services of the French Cavalry at some point in autumn 1931. The vehicle was formally rejected by the French Cavalry on November 12th 1931.
A first review of the design by the French Cavalry was fairly negative. Several design choices of the vehicle were deemed subpar and proved unpopular, as some of the design features were quite unconventional for the time. Among these was the rear-turreted configuration. Another source of discontent was the engine’s offset mounting to the right. Furthemore, the engine was not thought to be powerful enough to allow for the vehicle to reach a high enough speed. This was further worsened by the use of a suspension almost identical to the UE, with six small road wheels mounted on leaf springs, which would generally favor cross-country mobility but make reaching higher maximum speeds harder. There were also issues with the proposed placement of the radiator all the way to the right, with the position of the commander cramped between the radiator and the left wall of the vehicle.
The Armed UE Interval
Somewhat paradoxically, just days after the early Renault VM design was rejected, interest was expressed into a much more basic armed Renault UE vehicle. On November 21st 1931, the STC (Service Technique de la Cavalerie – Cavalry Technical Service) required Renault to provide two Renault UEs for a presentation to a Dragons Portés (Eng: mechanized dragoons) unit. Crucially, the STC requested one of the two vehicles to be armed. This request was made for a presentation which was to take place only nine days later, and this timeframe was considered too short to reasonably modify a UE to feature an armament.
However, while Renault could not produce a conversion for this specific presentation, the request from the STC made it very clear to Renault that there would be official interest in an armed version of the UE from the French Cavalry. Work quickly began on realizing such a conversion. By late 1931, the 6 Renault UE prototypes were still undergoing trials for the French military, and the first production vehicles would only be delivered in 1932. As such, creating such a vehicle on such a short notice would be accomplished by modifying an existing prototype.
The modified vehicle would be the prototype registered as “n°77 982”. The modifications made to the vehicle were very simple. The roof of the co-driver’s compartment was raised by a small extent, using the same riveted construction as the rest of the vehicle. The dome-shaped cupola was retained. This raised compartment allowed for enough internal space for a machine gun to be added. This was, as on the VM design, a 7.5 mm MAC 31.
A front view of the modified Renault UE. The simplistic nature of the conversion can be seen. Source: char-françaisThe vehicle is seen during its trials, towing the Renault UK trailer. Source: loutan.net
The modified prototype was presented to the French Cavalry at an unspecified date in early 1932. The 1st BDP (Bataillon de Dragons Portés) carried out operational testing. These trials generally underlined shortcomings of the vehicle when it came to fulfilling the light armored car role which was desired from the conversion. Besides the machine gun, the modified Renault UE had been kept almost completely untouched. The vehicle retained the Renault 75 four-cylinder gasoline engine mounted in the center of the vehicle, and producing a mere 30 hp. The original suspension was retained as well, meaning the vehicle was not particularly fast, nor did it have a particularly good autonomy at around 100 km.
The Birth of the AMR Concept
By the end of 1931, the French Cavalry and Renault stood in somewhat of an odd position. The French Cavalry had just rejected the VM reconnaissance vehicle design from Renault, but while it had ordered a very simple modified UE that would soon be delivered, there was realistically little potential in such a vehicle. With the P28 still not at the finalized prototype stage and unlikely to offer a good reconnaissance armored car, something had to be done if the Army was to acquire such a vehicle.
This would come on January 16th 1932. At this point in time, the French Cavalry put up detailed specifications of what would be required from a reconnaissance vehicle. It is at this moment that the Automitrailleuse de Reconnaissance (AMR; ENG: Reconnaissance Armored Car) designation was born.
The term automitrailleuse deserves a little more attention to be understood in the context in which it was used in interwar France. In common French language, ‘automitrailleuse’ is practically identical to the English ‘armored car’ term. However, in the Interwar era, an ‘automitrailleuse’ referred to any armed vehicle of the Cavalry, sometimes not even armored. Indeed, the French “automitrailleuse” comes from “automobile” and “mitrailleuse” (machine gun), with no part of the word implying the vehicle is armored. In practice, the vast majority of automitrailleuse were armored vehicles, but a few unarmored cars armed with automatic machine rifles used for patrol in the colonies were sometimes called automitrailleuse as well.
The term did not particularly come with an associated running gear when used in the context of the French military either. Vehicles called automitrailleuse could be wheeled, half-tracked, or even fully tracked, as long as they were operated by the Cavalry. This may seem somewhat archaic from a modern point of view, especially as designations such as “cavalry tank” now exist, however, these were not necessarily widespread at that time. The idea that the tank (or “char” in French) was a weapon of the Infantry, not of the Cavalry, was not entirely French, and indeed there are other examples of fully tracked, turreted armored vehicles not been referred to as tanks when serving in the cavalry branch of other armies. Two notable examples are the American M1 “Combat Car” and the Japanese Type 92 “Heavy Armored Car”.
The Japanese Type 92 Heavy Armored Car (left) and American M1 Combat Car (right) are two other notable examples of fully tracked vehicles which were formally referred to as a form of “car” due to their cavalry use. Source: FireArmsCentralWiki (Type 92), Wikimedia Commons (M1)
The requirements of the AMR, as formulated in January 1932, indeed did not call for a specific running gear. The idea with the AMR was to create a small, contact-reconnaissance armored car, whereas another larger type (what would become the AMD) would assume longer-ranged missions. Because of this, the vehicle being able to fight independently or even having huge range was secondary in comparison to a good mobility and small size, allowing for an overall discrete vehicle.
The AMR was to be crewed by two men, a commander in a turret and a driver in the hull. The turret was to be armed with a MAC 31 machine gun, with a spare being stored inside the vehicle, and 2,250 rounds of ammunition (nine drums) being available inside the vehicle. A very light weight of 3 tonnes was required, with a load-taking capacity of 500 kg. Mobility-wise, the maximum speed requirement was reasonable at 35 km/h. The vehicle would have to be able to negotiate a 50% slope and remain stable on a 60% one. Height was to be limited to 1.80 m and width even further, to 1.60 m. Range was to be of 200 km.
The VM is Reborn
With these new requirements, life was breathed into the VM program again, with work resuming on the vehicle, still retaining the same two-letter code.
Some major design changes were soon applied to the VM. When Renault offered a presentation mock-up in March 1932, the design had changed very significantly. The most important change was likely to lengthen the vehicle by 80 cm and change the suspension. The new suspension design featured four road wheels, on two bogies, with each road wheel being put on leaf springs and having a fairly large range of independent movement. A new 24CV eight-cylinder engine was adopted instead of the previous 15CV of the early VM. With more space, the new design was also able to ditch the odd choice of putting the radiator and ventilator way to the rear of the engine, instead placing them on the side of it. This would significantly improve the commander’s position, as he was otherwise very close to these elements.
The revised VM design. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierA cutaway view of the same vehicle. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierA top view of the internal arrangement of the revised VM, which was at this point a lot more efficient. Behind the commander, on the left side of the rear hull, a two-part door would allow the commander to exit or enter the vehicle, while the other side would be taken by the radiator grille. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The vehicle adopted a new turret design, which was not a product of Renault, but Schneider. At this point, there was significant collaboration between the two firms, and a similar turret would also be placed on the Renault URL prototype that was still being worked on. The general layout of the vehicle was somewhat similar to the previous VM, but much more spacious, with the commander not being almost on top of the driver, who had a much more distinct compartment. The turret was pushed all the way to the rear of the hull.
The Renault URL with a Schneider riveted hexagonal turret, as seen in Vincennes in August 1933. A similar turret design was featured on the plans of the revised VM, but never made it ‘in the flesh’. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
This new design of the VM overall appeared a lot more mature than the previous plans, and was judged promising enough for not just one, but five prototypes to be ordered on April 20th 1932, for a sum of 856,250 Francs (roughly equivalent to €55 millions), with deliveries requested no later than September, so the five vehicles could take part in large maneuvers that would be undertaken around this time. One last major change was found between the revised design and the prototypes. The Schneider turret was ditched, with Renault instead using a riveted design of its own.
The VM Reaches the Prototype Stage
After receiving the order for prototypes in April, Renault quickly put itself into gear. Long delays had not been rare in the company’s manufacture in the past, and as not just one, but five prototypes had been ordered, it could have been feared this may have plagued the VM. However, the company ended up able to produce five prototypes before September, with the assembly seemingly being completed as early as July.
Manufacturing was probably eased by the Renault UE being in mass-production by 1932. Though the VM had evolved to be very different from the UE, Renault would still at this point have extensive experience and facilities able to manufacture small tracked armored vehicles of riveted construction. The five vehicles were given registrations from 79756 to 79760. They were protected by 6 and 9 mm armor plates and given a Renault 24CV “Reinastella” engine producing 85 hp.
The five prototypes were at first all identical. In a way, they formed more of a pre-production run than a true proof of concept or prototype. The reason behind five identical prototypes being ordered was likely to make their use in the 1932 maneuvers more relevant, with the opportunities brought by a platoon of vehicles being better showcased with five than one, while a single failure preventing any test was ruled out. This would also allow the vehicles to be later modified for experimental purposes.
A photo of prototype n°79756, the first in the registration order, in the configuration of the 1932 maneuvers. Interesting aspects of this configuration are the suspension as well as the stowage mounting point on the hull sponson, both of which would eventually be modified or disappear. Source: armedconflicts.comA photo of the rear of prototype n°79756 during the September 1932 maneuvers. This angle gives a very good view as to how far the turret was pushed to the rear. Source: war-book.ruFront and rear views of n°79756 in the 1932 configuration. Note the Renault seal to the right of the registration number on the front view. Source: Renault documentation via Pierre Touzin via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
There are a number of features of the five prototypes which differ from both the previous VM plans and the future mass-produced vehicles, and therefore deserve to be highlighted in more detail. The first is a Renault turret. Though the plans from early 1932 show the VM with a Schneider turret, for one reason or another (perhaps due to quick manufacture of a Schneider turret not being possible or due to a perceived superiority), the prototypes received a turret designed in-house by Renault. This was a fairly high hexagonal turret of riveted construction, quite similar in general appearance to the turret designed by Citroën for their P28. The turret appears to have featured vision devices on each of the two side plates, the rear plate, and to the front, to the left of the gun (which was the fairly new 7.5 mm MAC 31 machine gun). The turret was pushed all the way to the rear of the hull, offset to the left, as on previous plans. It is reported that the Renault turret was found quite unsatisfactory during testing. Not only was its fairly unorthodox rear placement not at all liked, but the internal arrangement was found to be lacking, and compared negatively to the turret of Renault’s competitor Citroën.
The other notable feature of the prototypes is their suspension. It was, by this point, fairly basic. The vehicles featured four wheels, mounted on two bogies of which the leaf spring acted as the suspension unit, rather than being the point on which finer springs which acted as the suspension were mounted. As a result of both, an overly large range of motion and the points of movements being concentrated in two areas, this suspension was reported to offer a very bumpy and uncomfortable ride. It is very easy to differentiate from future suspension types due to the lack of any vertical springs. The vehicle already featured three return rollers, with a front sprocket and rear idler wheels (which, outside of the sprocket featuring teeth, were very similar). Wheels had an open spoked design in order to reduce weight to a minimum.
A number of stowage points were also unique to these prototypes, most significantly rings on which a canvas cover could be attached on the left sponsons of the vehicles. These would later be moved, as the canvas cover, stowed to the side of the vehicle, would potentially be removed by any lateral obstacle.
The French Army’s First Look at the VMs: A Good Concept, To Be Refined
With five vehicles delivered, the Renault VMs were able to form an experimental platoon which actively took part in the September 1932 maneuvers. These maneuvers were on their own fairly historic, as their goal was to experiment on fairly large scale cavalry mechanized units (“groupements méchaniques” or, in English, “mechanized groups”).
Overall, some aspects of the VMs left a very positive impression. The vehicles did exceed the required weight, going over 4 tonnes, however, this was not particularly a surprise, as all major 1920s and 1930s projects ended up going over the requirement weight, largely due to overly ambitious requirements. However, the vehicles were mobile, reaching over 55 km/h on road, while their tracked configuration offered superior off-road performances in comparison to wheeled or half-tracked armored cars. This alone was enough to show the considerable qualities a tracked AMR may offer for close reconnaissance.
N°79756 is seen during the September 1932 maneuvers, with the side mounting of the canvas cover being apparent here. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
However, these general qualities of the vehicles and their class are to be balanced by a variety of issues which were found on the vehicles. As mentioned previously, the Renault designed turrets were found to be lacking. The suspension was even more of a problem, due to its overly large range of movement making for a very uncomfortable ride with sudden harsh movements of the wheels being a common occurrence. Despite their small sizes, the VMs were also found to be loud, which would be a major drawback for their role. In terms of range, they failed to achieve the 200 km requested of them and were instead closer to merely 100 km. The vehicles were found to be at times poorly balanced, and at last the rear-turreted configuration was very much disliked.
After these drawbacks were noted, the vehicles were returned to Renault in order for improvements to be designed immediately. The manufacturer quickly responded, and by November sent three of the vehicles back to the Vincennes commission for testing.
Towards the Production Standard
The prototypes which were returned to Vincennes were the three last ones in the registration order, 79758 to 79760. The main round of improvements which Renault had worked on focused on the suspension. In order for the commission to determine which potential type they found superior, each of the three vehicles was delivered with a different suspension.
The vehicle registered 79758 featured the same suspension type as all five prototypes had been fitted with at first. The vehicle registered 79759 featured a modified version of this same suspension.) Iit had the same general design but featured friction-operating dampeners fixed to the armored hull of the vehicle and to the road wheels in order to reduce sudden strong movements. Unfortunately, no photos of this vehicle in this configuration have emerged as of today
The last vehicle, registered as 79760, featured a new suspension type. Though it had four road wheels as well, this suspension moved away from two bogies of two wheels. Instead, the front and rear wheels were individually mounted, while the two central wheels were part of a bogie. Both the front and rear wheels were mounted on a horizontally-placed coil spring. The two wheels part of a bogie were placed on small leaf springs linked by the bogie’s body to a large central coil springs/hydraulic shock absorbers on the bottom of the hull side further smoothened the movement of the central road wheels. The number of return rollers was also increased to four.
The 79760 Renault VM prototype in the configuration it was showcased in late 1932. Source: Renault archives via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierA side view of the same prototype. Outside of the changes to the suspension, this side view also shows the absence of the stowage points on the sponson. Source: Renault archives via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
It is known the vehicle registered as 79759 was tested from November 17th to December 13th 1932, while 79760 was tested from November 30th to December 14th. The conclusion of these new trials was clear. The vehicle fitted with the coil spring suspension turned out to offer a much more comfortable ride than the one with the large leaf springs, and overall turned out to be a much better technical solution. The trials commission published a report on December 22nd which concluded that the Renault VM, despite perhaps not fulfilling every single requirement put forward back in January 1932, was a satisfactory vehicle and would be ready for adoption. Earlier the same month, on December 9th, a small update had been made to the requirements, with the armor thickness required being raised from 9 to 13 mm.
Orders… and Continued Evolutions of the Prototypes
Following this positive evaluation from the trials commission, the first order for serial production of the Renault VM was placed on March 8th 1933. This formal adoption of the vehicle gave it the full designation of AMR Renault Modèle 1933, commonly known as AMR 33.
This first order was for 45 vehicles. The full order would be placed on June 22nd 1933, and would eventually be for 118 examples of the mass-produced vehicle. At first, an extremely ambitious delivery calendar was requested by the French military, with the first AMR 33 being requested to be delivered as early as July 1933. This would not be the case, in large part because, as the contracts were being signed, prototypes were still being experimented on, particularly in terms of suspension.
In April 1933, Renault returned two of its VM prototypes to the trial commission in Vincennes in order for them to be experimented on. The main changes were, again, that each of the two prototypes featured a modified suspension.
The first, the vehicle registered 79757, had received a modified version of the suspension which had been successfully tried on 79760 a few months prior. Though it kept the central bogie with two wheels, as well as one front and one rear independent wheels mounted on coil springs, it ditched all leaf springs left on the central bogie, with the bogie’s wheels instead being linked to the front and rear horizontally-mounted coil spring already used by the front and rear wheel. Oil-operated shock absorbers were also added and the body of the bogie received a number of changes. In order to respond to the unpopularity of the rear-mounted turret, the turret of this vehicle was also brought forward by 30 cm, and the vehicle had received a weight in order to simulate the effect of the up-armoring to 13 mm on performances. This updated suspension type was found to continue to improve on the vehicle’s driving and was formally adopted on June 6th 1933. Overall, this 79757 prototype would be the closest to the production standard.
Prototype 79757 with the final suspension type. Between this evolution and the turret brought further forward, this is as close as the prototypes got to the production standard before some were retrofitted to that standard in 1935. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThe same prototype, photographed at the Vincennes trials commission on the exhaust side. Also note the stowed canvas cover at the rear of the hull. Source: Vincennes archives via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThe same prototype drives up a slope during trials. Source: Renault documentation via Pierre Touzin via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
However, on the same occasion, Renault also sent the vehicle registered 79758. The vehicle did receive the weight to simulate up-armoring, though the placement of its turret was not modified. The vehicle, however, received a new suspension. It shared the similar design of the other suspension type being experimented on, with a central bogie with two wheels, and an independent front and rear wheel. However, it ditched coil springs.
Instead, the wheels were mounted on rubber blocks fitted on sliding mounts. A large central rubber block was used for the central bogie, while both the rear and front wheel had their own rubber blocks, placed at the same location as the coil springs of the other suspension type. The advantage of this suspension was that rubber blocks were found to be more sturdy and resilient than coil springs. In theory, a suspension on rubber blocks would also have the potential to be very smooth. This was not yet the case, as this suspension was new for Renault and some teething issues were still to be fixed, with the suspension at this point being found to cause too sudden movements at times. Because of this, it was not adopted at the start of the production run of the AMR 33. However, after Renault was able to refine it, this suspension would be used on some of the very last AMR 33s, and most significantly, on all of the vehicle’s successor, the Renault ZT/AMR 35.
Prototype 79758 showcases the flexibility of its new suspension during cross-country driving. Source: Renault documentation via Pierre Touzin via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThe same prototype and suspension, seen from the rear, with notable signs of compression on the central rubber block. Source: Renault documentation via Pierre Touzin via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierAnother view of prototype 79758 in a less taxing situation. Source: Renault documentation via Pierre Touzin via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Even as the mass-produced vehicles were being manufactured, experimentations on the VM prototypes did not stop. The tracked AMR were a new class of vehicles after all, and the French Army would run a number of trials to see if some accessories could be added to the vehicles. With five prototypes in existence, these were now readily available to be experimented on.
It was eventually decided that two of the VM prototypes would be employed in work on the future generation of Renault AMR. These would be n°79759 and 79760, which would be extensively modified to function as Renault ZT prototypes in early 1934. The two first VM prototypes, n°79756 and 79757, would be modified to production standard and delivered to the 7th Chasseurs Regiment operating in Evreux in spring 1935, being the only AMR 33s operated by this unit until they disappeared from it in 1937.
Finally, prototype n°79758 was kept around for experimentation. In 1933, it received a new track tensioning device using a pulley, located on top of the rear right fender. This would be adopted for the mass produced vehicles. It was reported that in 1934, the vehicle received a “five wheels” suspension similar to that of the Renault ZB, a vehicle similar in overall design to an AMR but offered for export, which would imply a second bogie replacing one of the wheels. No photo of this conversion has emerged and pictures of the vehicle in 1935 show it with the same rubber block suspension it sported in 1933. In 1934, it is also reported it received a “suspended tensioning pulley”.
Experimental Accessories
One of the accessories which was tried on a VM prototype was one designed by the British-Hungarian engineer Nicholas Straussler, who would be responsible for, within others, the Duplex Drive amphibious kit for Sherman tanks, the Hungarian 39M Csaba armored car as well as V-3 and V-4 tank prototypes, and eventually even a post-WW2 main battle tank design.
Straussler’s accessory was a trench crossing device, consisting of two two-part extending mechanical “arms”, one which would be placed on the vehicle’s front and another to the rear. When a vehicle would go into a trench, the front “arm” would be used to set into the ground in front of the trench to be crossed, preventing the hull itself from diving front first into the trench. As the vehicle then advanced forward, the rear arm would plant itself into the rear of the trench being crossed and in turn prevent the rear from falling into the trench and getting the vehicle stuck.
Straussler offered the design to the French Army in 1933, and one of these systems was subsequently manufactured by Ateliers et Chantier de la Loire (ACL, ENG: Loire Workshops and Shipyards). Mounted on the prototype registered as 79758, it would be trialed in April 1935, March to May 1936, and March 1938. The system was reportedly able to allow an AMR 33 to cross a 2 m-wide trench with vertical sides. However, it is easy to see how the system may, in exchange, have been overly cumbersome, and it was not retained on any scale beyond these trials.
A 1930s French schematic of how the “Straussler device” would work to help a vehicle to cross a trench. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The rear part of the Straussler trench crossing device. The track tensioning system can also be seen, as well as the rubber blocks of the vehicle’s suspension. Source: Vincennes archives via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThe front of the Straussler trench crossing device. Source: Vincennes archives via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The AMR 33 into Production
Renault’s factories of Billancourt started working on the AMR 33 production run soon after the first orders were registered. However, the overly ambitious calendar the French Army hoped for, which would see the first AMR 33 delivered in July 1933, could obviously not be met.
The first order for the AMR 33, designated 754 D/P, included two batches. The first, of 45 vehicles, was formally ordered on March 8th 1933, and the second, of an additional 20, was placed on June 22nd 1933. Finally, the contract also included in its clause the modification of three prototypes to production standard, and later the manufacturing of three additional vehicles to replace the prototypes. In the end, the three replacement vehicles as well as two prototypes would be produced/modified to a slightly different standard from the rest of the AMR 33s, and would be the last vehicles produced, coming after the vehicles from the second contract.
The second contract, for 50 vehicles, was signed soon after, under the designation of 996 D/P. The original calendar requested by the military was that the first batch of the first contract would begin to be delivered by July 1st 1933 and the second batch of the first contract by March 1st 1934. By early August, Renault’s calendar was that the first batch would begin to be delivered by August 31st 1933 and the second batch still by the date required by the government.
In practice, however, the first fully complete production AMR 33 would only be delivered in June 1934. Production on such a scale on a short timeframe proved way too hard to achieve for Renault. Still, the vast majority of vehicles, 115, were able to be completed during 1934. Only the last five vehicles would be delivered in 1935, these being two of the VM prototypes having been modified and three new vehicles, all five of them receiving a different suspension.
Technical Characteristics of the AMR 33
The AMR 33 was, overall, a small tracked vehicle. It largely used riveted construction, with large conical rivets being used to hold the armored plates in place. The vehicle had a length of 3.50 m and a width of 1.60 m, while the height, including the turret, was 1.78 m. The ground clearance was 30 cm.
In terms of weight, the VM weighed around 4.5 tonnes when empty of fuel, crew and ammunition. Loaded with these, it would weigh around 5 tonnes. This would place it in the higher weight range of the small, turreted reconnaissance tanks of the 1930s, slightly heavier than vehicles such as the Japanese Type 92 or 94, Czechoslovak AH-IV, and Soviet T-37 or T-38, owing to ever-so-slightly higher dimensions and armor thickness. The most similar vehicles in terms of weight, size and protection would generally be the German Panzer I and British Vickers Light Tanks, though in comparison to these, the AMR 33 doctrinally remained more focused on a reconnaissance role.
Hull & Hull Construction
Manufacturer’s view of the AMR 33 hull: on the left, with the rear roof but without the front glacis or tracks. On the right, without the roof at all, with tracks. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The hull of the AMR 33 had been forged by intensive evolution originating all the way back to the Renault UE, through a series of designs and later prototypes. In its final form, one would hardly recognize any feature of the small logistical tractor in the AMR 33, with the hull having largely evolved beyond being a mere derivative.
Likely the most unconventional aspect of the AMR 33 at the time was the organization of the hull, with the engine block placed to the right and the driver to the left, instead of a more standard and derivative configuration with an engine at the rear, as the French Army was already largely used to.
The vehicle used a front-mounted transmission. This was reflected in the hull front by a grill for aeration of the transmission’s differential which was found to the right and below the driver’s post. There was also an openable cover, largely for maintenance purposes. The vehicle’s batteries were also located towards the front and featured an openable cover for maintenance or removal.
The driver’s position only slightly projected out from the hull. The front formed an openable hatch, so that drivers could have a more ample field of vision when outside of combat. When closed, it still featured an episcope to improve vision. Considering the small size of the driver’s block sides, they seemingly could not mount vision ports. There was an entry hatch located just below the openable episcope cover, which was typically where the driver would enter and exit the vehicle. A rearview mirror was installed on the left mudguard. Otherwise, the hull in front of the driver’s post had been made to be as low as possible in order not to impede on his vision.
This frontal glacis was largely used as stowage space. A shovel and a pickaxe handle were installed translaterally on the fully flat part of the hull. To the left, in front of them and the driver’s post, was a towing cable. A spare road wheel was sometimes also present there, under the cable or with the cable wrapped around it. Just in front of this cable was the vehicle’s singular headlight, a Restor armored model. Sometimes, later in their service life, AMR 33s were given the new Guicherd armored headlight, recognizable by its cover extending far in front of the headlight itself. This new headlight was, among others, issued to the AMR 35, and would likely be refitted to AMR 33s that had broken headlights for the sake of logistical simplicity. Just below this light was the middle front plate, which featured, on the right, the Renault manufacturer’s plate, while the registration number would be painted on the middle.
This 1940 picture of a destroyed AMR 33 shows all the hatches and covers of the front hull opened, most notably the cover of the batteries, rarely seen in such a way. Source: char-françaisNote the headlight at the front of the hull of the AMR 33, and compare it with the ones found on most other pictures in this article. This AMR 33 was operated by the 1st GAM in 1938, at a point where it had started receiving new AMR 35s but had yet to phase out the older AMR 33. It received a Guicherd headlight. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThe AMR 33’s peculiar engine configuration is best seen from the front or the right side. This photo of a vehicle in operation is also interesting, as it showcases the driver’s entry/exit hatch opened, which is not extremely common. Also note there is about no stowage on the front of the vehicle. AMR 33s are often seen without all the theoretical stowage they could carry. Source: char-françaisThis photo of an AMR 33 of the 18ème Dragons in 1934-1935 shows both the driver’s hatch and episcope cover opened, the greatest extent through which the driver could enter or exit the vehicle. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Because of the engine’s placement to the right of the hull, there were significant differences in construction between each side. On the crew compartment side, to the left, there was a form of sponson which extended from behind the driver’s post all the way to the rear of the vehicle, in order to accommodate in large part the turret ring. The space on the other side would be taken by the exhaust. Two hatches were present on the right of the vehicle’s roof in order to access the engine.
The turret was mounted about as far forward as possible with this construction, 30 cm forward to how it was on the first VM prototypes. The rear of the hull was gently angled. To the left was a two-part hatch/door which would typically be the commander/gunner’s point of entry or exit from the vehicle, and offered the best emergency exit overall. On the engine side of the vehicle, the radiator was installed to the rear, and as such, the right of the vehicle rear glacis was taken by the grill of the radiator. The canvas cover for the vehicle would typically be stowed over the radiator grille.
In terms of crew position, drivers would be seated on what was in practice pretty much a cushion seat on the floor, bringing their eyes to the level of the episcope and their feet in contact with the pedals. Commanders had a seat that appears to have been somewhat adjustable and would have them at eye level with the episcope or machine gun sight within the turret. For drivers, outside of usual clutch, acceleration, and brake pedals, turning appears to have been achieved by two tillers.
This photo of an AMR 33 being towed by an FCM 36, in addition to its originality, also shows the vehicle’s rear well. On the left, the door, where the registration number is indicated. On the right, the radiator’s grill, with on top the empty stowage hardpoints for the canvas cover. Source: char-français
Armor Protection
The armor protection of the hull followed a pretty simple scheme. All vertical or near-vertical plates up to 30° (most of the front plates, the sides, and the rear) were 13 mm thick. Plates at an angle higher than 30° but still potentially vulnerable to most enemy fire (parts of the front glacis) were 9 mm thick. The roof was 6 mm and the floor 5 mm. The turret followed the same armor scheme as the hull. This was a fairly thin armor scheme, about as light as one could find in 1930s French vehicles, but it was within the norms for light reconnaissance vehicles.
To an extent, having 13 mm of armor protection on the sides would even be slightly above average in comparison to other light tracked reconnaissance vehicles, which would more often than not have between 6 and 9 mm. The difference may not seem significant, and truthfully it was not against any kind of dedicated armor-piercing weapon, but it may sometimes have been the difference between being truly impervious to rifle-caliber fire or still being vulnerable to it at close ranges.
The armored hull consisted of a rigid body, with some removable plates (the roof as well as upper front and rear plates). There were six articulated openings in the hull, largely described before: the rear doors, openable covers for the batteries and differential grille, openable hatches for access to the engine, driver’s entry hatch, and driver’s episcopes hatch.
Engine Block
The AMR 33 used an eight-cylinder engine of Renault design, nicknamed the “Reinastella”. This was a 75×120 mm 4,241 cm3 engine that was also used in racing cars. At the standard cyclic rate of 2,800 rpm, it would produce 24CV, a French unit of measurement for power, or 85 hp. The engine was fitted with an internal electric starting-up device, and alternatively could manually be started with a crank from the outside. It used a Zénith carburetor which was designed to allow a cold start. The front-mounted transmission had four forward and one reverse gear, with a “Cleveland” differential.
The radiator was mounted to the rear. The fan used to eject hot air included ten blades, 580 mm in diameter.
Overall, the power-to-weight ratio of the vehicle was high for the time. At a full load of 5 tonnes, it reached 17 hp/tonne. This manifested very positively on the vehicle’s performance. On a good road, the vehicle could peak at 60 km/h, which was definitely on the higher end even for tracked vehicles. Even on a lower quality road, an average cruise speed of 45 km/h was typically to be maintained. The vehicle’s fuel tank contained 128 liters of gasoline, which would provide the AMR 33 with a range of 200 km on roads.
An AMR 33 of the 18ème Dragons in movement. The speed of the vehicle was, for the time, admirable. The vehicles feature a black boar on a white and blue rectangle, a symbol of the 4th DC. Photo colorized and provided by Smargd123
Suspension and Tracks
As described previously, the suspension of the AMR 33 went through considerable evolutions at the prototype stage.
The vehicle used a front drive sprocket, with the teeth on the sprocket’s center, and a rear idler. There were four road wheels, with the front and rear wheels being mounted independently, and the two central road wheels being mounted on a bogie. Four return rollers were present. The road wheels as well as the sprocket and idler had a very light construction, designed to optimize their weight as much as possible. They all used an open-spoked design with large holes. Furthermore, while the construction of the wheels themselves was made of steel, the road wheels received a rubber rim instead of a metallic one.
This manufacturer’s photo of a production AMR 33 gives a good view of the suspension of an AMR 33. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The suspension itself relied on a front and a rear coil spring, directly linked to the front and rear wheels by a suspension arm. The central bogie was also linked to these springs, though the central wheels would typically have somewhat less movement than the front and rear ones. Oil-operated shock absorbers were also present to make the ride smoother.
The vehicle used thin, 20 cm wide tracks with a central guide horn, largely based on the UE design. These were very small, thin and light, once again a requirement in order to maximize the speed of the vehicle.
In terms of crossing performances, the AMR 33 was able to cross a 1.70 m wide trench with vertical sides, ford 60 cm of water, or climb a 50% slope. It would retain lateral stability while moving on sloped terrain at a slope of up to 60%.
It ought to be noted that the last five production AMR 33 to be completed (three new vehicles and the rebuilt 79756 and 79757 prototypes), delivered in 1935, received a new suspension type. This was, in fact, the same rubber-block-based suspension as tested back in 1933, having been refined and now found superior to the coil-spring-based suspension. It had the same wheel placement, but differed by the use of three rubber blocks, including one nested between the two covers of the central bogie. The cover elements linking the rubber blocks to the wheels were also different. This new suspension type would be mounted on the AMR 33’s successor, the Renault ZT or AMR 35.
Its use on the AMR 33 would also be extended somewhat. Between 1938 to 1940, when vehicles were returned to maintenance facilities for large-scale repairs, a number received the new suspension type. These refits were moderate enough to only concern a minority of the fleet, however, and most AMR 33s still kept the original suspension going into the Battle of France.
This photo of AMR 88936, one of the three last newly-built AMRs which received the new suspension type, shows the new rubber block suspension. It was taken in a park of vehicles captured by German forces in 1940. Source: Bundesarchiv via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThis photo shows perhaps the best view known to be in existence of the rubber suspension on an AMR 33. Source: warspot.ruA photo of another one of the uncommon rubber-suspension AMR 33s abandoned in a town, being examined by a German soldier. Source: char-français
Turret
The AMR 33 used an AVIS (Atelier de Construction de Vincennes – ENG: Vincennes Construction Workshop) n°1 turret. These turrets were designed by a state-owned workshop. Despite their name, they were not technically located within the municipality of Vincennes, just east of the city of Paris’s borders, but inside the Vincennes woods, technically within the territory of the municipality of Paris. Renault’s facilities of Billancourt were located west of Paris, along the Seine and still within the urban area of the French capital. Though the design was carried out at Vincennes, production of the turrets took place in the Renault factory itself.
The small turret had the same riveted construction as the hull, and used a hexagonal design, with a front and rear plate, and three plates on the sides. The turret was higher at its rear. The turret in itself did not feature a seat. The vehicle overall was low enough that a seat located in the hull, even quite low in it, was high enough for commanders to be at eye level with vision devices. The vision devices included in the turret were, to the front, an episcope to the right, a vision slot to the left, and the machine gun sight. There was an additional vision port on each side, and to the rear.
This photo of one of the rubber-block suspension vehicles also gives good angles on the side and rear vision ports of the Avis n°1 turret. Source: char-françaisThe same vehicle seen from another angle. Source: char-français
The turret included a large semi-circle shaped hatch opening forward, allowing the commander to reach out from it. There was also an anti-aircraft mount for a MAC 31 7.5 mm machine gun present to the right-rear of the turret. Small handles were also present on the front sides to ease climbing into or out of the turret from the hatch, though the preferred mode of entry into the vehicle remained the rear doors.
This photo of an AMR 33 in 1940 had a good enough quality to discern the inside handles of the open hatch as well as the handles of the turret sides well. Source: char-françaisA destroyed AMR 33 where the sides and rear panel of the AVIS turret have been blown away, but the front and front roof have survived. Source: char-françaisThe same vehicle seen from the front. Source: char-français
Armament
Armament was provided in the form of a MAC31 Type E machine gun, the shorter, tank version of the MAC 31 which had been designed for fortification use. It used the new standard French cartridge, the 7.5×54 mm. The MAC31 Type E had a weight of 11.18 kg empty and 18.48 kg with a fully loaded 150-round drum magazine, fed to the right of the machine gun. The machine gun was gas-fed, and had a maximum cyclic rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute. It had a muzzle velocity of 775 m/s. It ought to be noted that peacetime photos of AMR 33s often show the vehicles with no machine gun mounted inside the gun mount.
In the AMR 33, the 150-round drums were stowed on the left side of the hull. The position where they were stowed can actually be conveniently identified from the exterior of the vehicle. A line of rivets run along the upper hull sides at the same level as the mount for the drums. A total of 15 drum magazines were stored inside the vehicle, providing for a total of 2,250 rounds of 7.5 mm ammunition.
The stowage rack for MAC 31 drum magazines can be seen inside this AMR 33, abandoned in 1940. Source: char-françaisTwo 7.5 mm drum magazines are placed just behind the turret on this abandoned AMR 33, 1940. Source: char-français
A feature of the AMR 33, shared by many armored vehicles of the French Cavalry, was the presence of a spare machine gun stowed inside the vehicle, at the rear of the hull. There were two purposes for this. The spare could either be used to replace the machine gun mounted in the turret in case of damage or a major malfunction, or be mounted on the AVIS n°1 turret’s anti-aircraft mount.
Photos of AMR 33s displaying the machine gun actually mounted in its anti-aircraft position are exceedingly rare, though there are a few more showing the mount without an attached machine gun. Several reasons are to be found behind this. The anti-aircraft machine gun was not mounted for parade or peacetime operations, when most photos of the AMR 33s were taken, and in fact, they were typically only mounted in case of evident enemy air threat. If an AMR 33 was abandoned, the spare machine gun, especially if mounted on the anti-aircraft mount, would be one of the first things to be taken if it was functional, either by the crew if the vehicle was not abandoned in a hurry or by enemy troops upon encountering the vehicle.
This burnt-out AMR 33, part of a larger photo of a destroyed column in 1940, is interesting in that it shows the vehicle with the spare machine gun mounted in the anti-aircraft mount, an exceedingly rare sight on AMR 33s. Source: Jean-Yves Mary collection via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThis abandoned AMR 33 being examined by a German soldier gives a good view of the anti-aircraft mount without a machine gun. Also notable is the hefty canvas cover stowed on this vehicle. Source: char-françaisThe MAC31E, the standard model of the MAC31 in armored fighting vehicles. Though there were some infantry/pintle mount versions and prototypes of the MAC31 which could accept some box magazines, the MAC31E could only use the drums. A distinctive element of the MAC31E was its short, 48 cm barrel. There was another tank machine gun version of the MAC31, the MAC31C, with the standard 60 cm long barrel. Source: Mitrailleuses de 7,5mm modèle 1951, Guide Technique Sommaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale (Ministry of National Defence), France, 1953Views of the MAC 31’s 150 rounds drum magazine, disassembled on top and complete at the bottom. Drum magazines were complex, but had the advantage of being way more compact than a belt. Source: Mitrailleuses de 7,5mm modèle 1951, Guide Technique Sommaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale (Ministry of National Defense), France, 1953A fully loaded 150 rounds drum magazine with the cover removed. Source: Mitrailleuses de 7,5mm modèle 1951, Guide Technique Sommaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale (Ministry of National Defense), France, 1953A MAC31E machine gun with the drum magazine attached. Source: tircollection.com
Camouflage Schemes
AMR 33s left their factory with two different camouflage schemes.
The first Renault camouflage scheme used three or four different colors. It was generally brush-painted in irregular rounded shapes. The four colors used were olive green and “Terre de Sienne” (brown) for the darker colors, and “ocre” (in practice yellow) and “vert d’eau” (watery green, imagined to be a lighter green color) for lighter colors. Black and white photos have generally left the lighter colors fairly distinct, but the olive green and “Terre de Sienne” can often be hard to differentiate. This camouflage scheme was almost universal on the AMR 33s. It varied significantly from vehicle to vehicle and was at times chaotic. On some vehicles, the lighter shades appeared dominant, while the dark ones were more pronounced on others.
This photo of an AMR 33 of the 3ème GAM parading on Paris’s Champs-Elysées on November 11th 1936 is interesting in a number of ways. It shows a commander reaching out from the turret, the narrowness of the tracks, and a vehicle where the lighter shades are somewhat dominant. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierPaint is not the only way to camouflage a vehicle. In this photo taken on September 4th 1935, a crew from the 18th Dragons takes a rest. Their camouflaged vehicle bears the unit number 15. Its registration number is 83918. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierAnother AMR 33 hidden under foliage, unit unknown. Source: char-françaisThese three AMR 33s of the 3ème GAM, on parade in Paris on July 14th 1938, are very interesting in showcasing the differences that could exist between the camouflages of AMR 33s. With chaotic patterns and varying levels of dominance between colors, two AMR 33 could appear very different in terms of paint. Source: R.Potié collection via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The exception was a camouflage scheme that was particularly common on the vehicle’s successor, the AMR 35, but, on the AMR 33s, appears to have been limited to the five vehicles completed to a slightly different standard in 1935. This was once again a three or four-tone camouflage with the same base colors as the previous, however, the shapes were generally a lot less chaotic, larger, and more uniform, though still rounded in shape with irregularities. However, there was a blurry edge painted in black between spots of different colors.
This close-up on the turret of n°79756, the first prototype, after it was refitted to production standard, shows the new type camouflage with a blurry black border. Source: P. Taghon collection, via R.Potié, via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Communications
At the point at which the AMR 33 was designed, radio was still not a standard feature really considered on most combat vehicles of the French Army. It was not a standard element present on AMR 33s. As a result, communications between vehicles would have to be assured by flags. Vehicles of leaders of platoons or squadrons would have a small special flag to distinguish them from the vehicles they led.
AMR 33s of the 2nd GAM in 1937. The front vehicle, 83959, has a small flag indicating it is a platoon leader vehicle. Source: Photo taken by Chaillan, Soyer Collection, via R.Potié, via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
There was a distinct exception to this rule. French Army maintenance services in Reims converted a number of AMR 33s into “TSF” (Transmission Sans Fil – Wireless Transmission) radio vehicles as early as 1934. While the vehicle retained their armament, the conversion was more extensive than merely adding the radio. It appears the radio, of which the model is unknown, at least partly took the space of the ammunition stowage in the hull. As a result, some of this ammunition stowage was moved to the inside of the rear door, which required some modifications. Additional rivets had to be installed to hold the ammunition stowage points, and, as a result, the handles were moved slightly and were no longer at the same height.
Only very few AMR 33s were ever converted in such a fashion, and they were only likely present in the two units operating AMR 33s that were at some point based in Reims, the 4ème GAM and 18ème Dragons.
An AMR 33 converted into a TSF vehicle at Reims in September 1934. The massive radio antenna was distinctive in this very rare conversion. Though hard to see, there is a symbol inside the heart that identifies this vehicle to the 18th Dragons, a white hippogriff. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Doctrinal Use of the AMRs
The AMRs were intended to be issued to cavalry units. Their main role was close reconnaissance. For longer-range, more independent operations, another class of automitrailleuse existed, the AMD (Automitrailleuse de Découverte – ENG: literally “Discovery Armored Car”), which would typically feature higher range and armament in comparison to the AMR to be better suited to operate on their own for longer periods of time.
On their own, the AMRs were meant to search within a selected, limited area, for enemy contact. Their small size was viewed as a benefit in this, and it was specified that they had to use terrain to their advantage to the best of the crew’s abilities. Combat was to be engaged at close range only. The vehicles were to take contact with the enemy, but not stay in combat distance for long, as, with their thin armor, it was clear they would not last under armor-piercing or artillery fire. It was also specified that the vehicles would operate in close cooperation with other types of troops, either motorcycle-mounted reconnaissance, or AMC (Automitrailleuse de Combat – ENG: Combat Armored Car) cavalry tanks and/or cavalry.
The AMRs were to operate in platoons of five. In operations, each platoon would be further divided into two small sections of two vehicles, with the fifth, independent vehicle, being that of the platoon leader. When operating on the AMR 35 successor type, the leader of each section was to use a 13.2 mm-armed vehicle, but this was obviously not possible for units operating on the strictly 7.5 mm-armed AMR 33. Platoons were to be followed by motorcyclists, which would typically be used to communicate with other parts of the unit.
The standard procedure was for a platoon of five vehicles to be tasked to investigate an area 1 to 1.5 km wide. Each section of the platoon was to operate at a distance so they would still be in visual contact with the other. Platoon leaders were not to stay behind, but to follow with the first section, though under some circumstances, they could decide to stay in observation further back. The vehicle of a section leader was to lead, with the second vehicle slightly behind, so that if the first vehicle came under fire, the second could assist with its own armament.
Progression within an area to investigate was to be made in ‘hops’. Vehicles would go from one zone to observe the area from another, with the zones to stop at preferably offering decent cover. The next position would be observed with binoculars before being taken. In case of uncertainty in regards to a position, the second patrol could go to investigate closer while the first would remain in observation with binoculars.
When going from one cover to another, the AMRs were to progress if possible in non-linear ways, and if suspect positions were encountered on the way, they were cleared to fire at them in order either to reveal the position of enemy troops or find it clear of enemy presence. This would typically be done while stopping. It was noted that fire on the move was generally inaccurate and wasteful of ammunition, and it was to be used only in emergencies. The manual specified, for example, that shooting on the move would be used if an automatic weapon or anti-tank gun was suddenly revealed and the vehicle was under threat. The platoon leader was to organize and correct each ‘hop’, which as a rule implied he had to follow vehicles rather swiftly as they did not have radio to communicate with one another.
When encountering a village or wood, each patrol was to go around it on its outer border, observing if anything could be seen inside. Once that was done, one of the patrols would stay at the opposite side of the area to the one they came from and where the platoon leader would still be located. The other would go through the village or wood to the commander, and once they regrouped, progression would start again.
If the wood or urban area was particularly large, another procedure was in place. A patrol would stay with the platoon commander, while the other would quickly go to the opposite exit of the wood or urban area. It would then divide in two, with a vehicle staying to defend the opposite exit while the other would quickly run through the area, reach the other patrol and platoon commander, and the group would then rejoin with the lone armored car on the other side of the area.
When one or a couple of vehicles fell under fire, they were to simultaneously fire back and find cover as quickly as possible, while other vehicles of the platoons were to flank in order to delimitate the area held by the enemy, and if the resistance was limited, try to push the enemy back from this flanking maneuver. If flanking was not a possibility, the vehicles were to cooperate progressively on a point at a time. If pushing the enemy back was not a possibility due to the resistance being too strong, the vehicles were to stop behind the nearest cover and retain binocular observation of the enemy, with one of the vehicles periodically going on a short patrol to confirm enemy positions were still occupied.
When operating alongside troops mounted on motorcycles, they were noted to be a very helpful asset in reconnaissance. They were said to, in practice, prove more reliable than the armored cars at providing vision when no enemy fire was encountered, notably when moving, as the AMR crews were said to have lacked vision when in movement. Once contact with the enemy was taken, they were to observe and note the firing points firing at the armored cars and retain observation even once the armored cars were no longer under fire.
It was generally hoped the armored car would operate in conjunction with a motorcyclist platoon, forming a détachement mixte (ENG: mixed group). It would be led by the most senior officer between the AMR and the motorcyclist platoon. The motorcycles were generally to follow in the armored car’s stead, due to the latter’s greater protection against enemy fire. When under enemy fire, the motorcyclists were to engage in a more skirmish-like action, pushing the enemy flanks and making sure to keep contact with the enemy even if the armored cars no longer had line of sight. Against an enemy line, it was even, quite optimistically, said that the motorcyclists could attempt to infiltrate weaker points of the line, and be rescued by the AMRs if they fell into trouble.
There were also different principles for when the AMRs were operating alongside AMCs (which, de facto, were cavalry tanks). The AMRs would take the lead of progress, with AMCs at a slight distance behind them to be able to observe the reactions triggered by the AMR’s presence and provide supporting fire. The AMRs would also be tasked with reaching the edge of cover to check for enemy presence as well as to cover the flanks if they offered good firing positions for the enemy.
AMR 33s of the 3ème GAM operating alongside Schneider P16 in 1935. The Schneider P16 was classified as an AMC in the early-to-mid 1930s. When the AMRs were delivered inside the GAMs of cavalry divisions, they were to form the AMR part of the AMR-AMC couple alongside P16s. In 1937, P16s were judged too dated to operate as AMCs and declassified as AMRs. Source: Collection Pierre Touzin via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierAMR 33s of the 4th GAM during the Champagne maneuvers of September 1935. In the background, on the crest, a 1st DLM Schneider P16. The photo also shows a rudimentary field telephone line and cavalrymen. The front vehicle is actually one of the rare AMR 33 TSF radio-fitted field conversions. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Once resistance was uncovered, the AMRs would put it under fire and stop advancing, letting the AMCs catch up and take the lead for the time needed to reduce the enemy point. If the resistance was sporadic, once an enemy point was reduced, advance would continue as normal. If the group encountered the main enemy line of resistance, the AMRs would switch to a secondary role, operating in the intervals between AMC groups to provide supporting fire as well as screening the flanks for enemy presence.
The AMRs were also given the role of cleaning up minor resistance points which may have escaped the AMCs. In such a role, a platoon would cover areas 1 to 1.2 km wide. These ‘cleanup’ groups were to follow closely behind the AMCs in order to profit from the chaos caused by their heavier firepower, making sure each point was cleared of enemy presence as the cavalry unit progressed.
There was one last offensive role of the AMRs, in what was called the ‘occupation echelon’. This would be the part of the unit which would follow after the ‘offensive echelon’, itself consisting of the AMCs and AMRs previously mentioned. This occupation echelon would lack AMCs and instead include traditional cavalry and motorcyclists, with the AMRs being, typically, their heaviest elements. The AMRs were to screen forward of this group in order to spot remaining enemy elements. The role of the AMRs of the occupation echelon was to relieve those of the cleanup group of the attack echelon. It was generally hoped that by this stage, all significant enemy resistance would be gone. One could generally see these offensive doctrines as a three to four-layered attack: a first offensive layer, the largest, including AMRs and AMCs, itself constituted of the AMRs first closely followed by the AMCs; followed by the ‘cleanup’ platoons operating AMRs, the head of the occupation echelon operating AMRs; itself followed by soft-skinned cavalry and infantry elements. At the rear, there was to be a reserve squadron as part of the occupation echelon, meant to be used during emergencies.
A sample of the armored fleet of the 1st GAM, including AMR 33s, P16s, and motorcycles. In theory, it was hoped that the AMR could be used in conjunction with both for optimal effect. In practice, this was easier said than done. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
These were, overall, the operating principles in offensive actions. They can be said to be very enthusiastic about the capacities of a group of five lightly armored and armed vehicles.
There were also principles given for defensive use of the AMRs. It was clearly mentioned that the vehicles had to be used for delaying actions, and not in static defense. They would then be placed at the edge of cover, such as a forest or village’s edge, and fire upon enemy forces they spotted at greater ranges. It is then said they would keep this contact all the way to close range, and, if possible, counter attack, and if not possible, swiftly retreat to the next cover in a sort of defensive reversal of the ‘hopping’ method of advance. If enemy forces were noted to be on the smaller and less equipped side, it was suggested to hold fire until closer ranges in order to create ambushes. During these defensive operations, the platoon leader was given responsibility to ensure the flanks were well guarded.
Qualities and Issues of the AMR 33
Considering the number of prerogatives given to the AMR 33, it is important to truly understand the vehicle, to analyze how it fared, and the qualities and drawbacks that one would have to take into account to evaluate its potential.
It first has to be noted that the AMR 33, by the time it came out, did not lag behind designs fulfilling a similar role in the rest of the world, quite the contrary. By the time it reached prototype stage in 1932 or entered service in 1934, the standard of much of the world when it came to light tracked reconnaissance vehicles was still turretless vehicles very similar to or straight up copied from the Carden-Loyd Mark VI. The first turreted types, often smaller and with less powerful engines than the AMR 33, for example, the T-37A or Type 92, were contemporary to the AMR 33.
The AMR 33 could compare positively to many vehicles of its era. Its turreted design already put it in the higher bracket in terms of capacities, and its powerful 85 hp engine, at a time when the slightly lighter reconnaissance vehicles mostly had to contend with engines in a 40 hp range, was significant. Indeed, when looking at its 8-cylinders engine, at a time when many similar vehicles had 6 or 4-cylinders powertrains, the AMR 33 could seem almost like a race car. With its maximum speed of 60 km/h, it outperformed most Carden-Loyd-derived designs, which neared 40 km/h (though Vickers’ light tanks would also exceed 50 km/h).
Even armor-wise, while all the light reconnaissance vehicles of the time had light armor, the AMR 33 was still in the upper bracket and one at least safe from rifle-caliber fire under all or nearly all circumstances, if little more than that.
However, these qualities over vehicles fulfilling a similar role did not necessarily mean the AMR 33 was, outside of this context, a good vehicle. The race car comparison may be fitting in other ways than the powerful engine and high speed too. As mentioned previously, the vehicle’s suspension had been designed to be as light as possible. The wheels were largely covered by holes to reduce the material used, and this thin construction could also be seen in the tracks, which were also thin, narrow, and light. These features helped the AMR 33 be as light and as speedy as possible, but, consequently, they were not the sturdiest, and definitely not when going at high speeds for the time. The drivetrain of the AMR 33 was notoriously unreliable. The vehicles would often suffer from thrown tracks or damaged wheels. They required significantly higher maintenance than many other vehicles of the French Army.
A detracked AMR 33 of the 2nd GAM during exercises in 1935-1936. Outside of the thrown track, this photo also showcases a vehicle with a spare road wheel, which could be quite uncommon. This vehicle features one of the symbols which the 2nd GAM used during its history, a Cross of Lorraine with a superimposed storch on a red and green background. Source: Photo by Chaillan, Soyer collection, via R.Potié, via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThe rubber block suspension, like the one on this destroyed vehicle, would typically be somewhat more durable than the coil springs, but issues like the frail road wheels and tracks being fragile at high speeds could not be resolved by it. Source: char-français
Issues did not stop at the unreliability of the drivetrain, though other problems of the AMR 33 are perhaps less specific. The vehicle, as so many other French interwar designs, retained a small, two-man crew, with the commander in the turret taking up not only his role of spotting and leading the vehicle, rendered even more important by the vehicle’s reconnaissance role, but also that of gunner and loader of the vehicle. Even though this may have been less strenuous with a machine gun with 150 rounds magazines than on a vehicle armed with a cannon or a machine gun with lower capacity rigid clips, such as the Hotchkiss model 1914, it was still less than desirable.
This issue of overtasking was coupled with poor vision from the vehicle. Commanders did have an episcope towards the front, but otherwise, their vision was limited to very thin vision slots on the turret sides and rear, where they would be hard-pressed to see enough to draw any reliable conclusions on their surroundings. Opening the hatch could be an option, but the way it folded parallel to the turret roof granted no cover. Similarly, it appears there were no side driving slots for the driver, only the front episcope. Once again, this issue was not necessarily specific to the AMR 33 and was also shared by many reconnaissance vehicles of the era, but this did not mean it was not a considerable or even crippling issue.
Another major drawback of the AMR 33 in its reconnaissance role was the utter lack of means of communication with the outside world. Besides the few vehicles which were converted to fit radios, a non-standard conversion, the vast majority of AMR 33s, including platoon commander vehicles, did not have radios, or any other means of communications besides small flags. This issue was once again shared by many French 1930s armored vehicles. However, it can be said to be a lot worse on a reconnaissance vehicle, in comparison to, for example, a light infantry tank.
As explained previously, a platoon of AMRs could be expected to do maneuvers a lot more complex than a light infantry tank, potentially involving a lot of movement, moving from cover to cover, and flanking. Without radio to allow communication between the vehicles, the vehicles would have to follow pre-given orders or to stop at a point under cover to be given new orders by a commander, neither of which were ideal in comparison to having the commander communicate orders via radio.
The lack of a radio was equally a liability when it came to reporting the fighting of the vehicles on a reconnaissance mission to the rest of an unit. To do that, an AMR would either have to rely on a motorcyclist to manually travel to a point with a radio or the rest of the unit, or do that itself. It is indeed mentioned in the AMR’s prerogatives that the vehicles could act as ad-hoc liaison vehicles. However, when the vehicles were forced to act in this role to report their very findings, the situation could be said to have been worrying.
However, it is important to note that other similar vehicles of the time also lacked radios, including the T-37A, Type 92, Sd.Kfz.221, and British Vickers Light Tanks.
Last and perhaps least important, even if the armor protection of the AMR 33 was on the upper end of reconnaissance light tanks, it was still essentially only making the vehicle bulletproof, little more. While an AMR 33 was well protected from rifle-caliber ammunition, with a maximum of 13 mm of all-round armor, any kind of armor-piercing weaponry was potent against the AMR 33, as well as direct hits from light artillery pieces, even with High-Explosive shells, or near-enough hits from heavier artillery. A notable example of the AMR 33’s higher vulnerability was illustrated by German anti-tank rifles, the most common being the 7.92×94 mm Panzerbüchse 39 or the captured Polish 7.92×107 mm PzB 35 (p). These could commonly pierce its armor, but would typically struggle against most French tanks.
Derivatives and Variants
The AMR 33 had a fairly short list of variants and derivatives, as its place in time alongside other contemporary designs and size did not really align well with creating a whole family of derivatives.
Firstly, the AMR 33 came soon after, and was, in a way, still a derivative of the Renault UE. The UE was meant as a polyvalent tractor/supply vehicle, and as such, many non-combat roles for which a variant would sometimes be created from an armored vehicle were not based on the AMR 33 due to the very existence of the UE.
Secondly, the configuration of the AMR 33, with a side-mounted engine, was not appreciated by the French Army. While the vehicle was adopted nonetheless, the French Army would soon require Renault to work on an improved design with a rear-mounted engine as the more definitive AMR. It also made sense that auxiliary vehicles would mostly be created from a vehicle with this more standard configuration.
There were still a few vehicles based on the hull of the AMR 33.
Renault VE
The Renault VE was the first AMR 33 variant, a vehicle designed to follow the Type P requirements, which called for, basically, a mobile anti-tank gun. The Renault VE is best described less as a derivative of the VM, and more as a parallel development with the same automotive and suspension elements. Renault also began work on the VE as early as 1931, with construction of the prototype seemingly undertaken in 1932. It would only receive its armament in 1935, however, a variant of the 37 mm APX SA 34 anti-tank gun usually mounted on the Maginot Line. As such, it actually likely received the most powerful armament ever mounted on a vehicle of the AMR series. By 1935, new vehicles on the AMR 33 hull were out of consideration, and the VE was never adopted.
The Renault VE would be developed on the same hull and drivetrain as the Renault VM, largely in parallel. Its 37 mm high-velocity anti-tank gun was powerful for the time, but other aspects of the vehicle, notably its casemate, were a lot more archaic or basic. Source: armedconflicts.com
Renault YI
A less combat-suited derivative of the AMR 33 was the Renault YI. Around 1932-1933, Renault offered a series of unarmored tracked tractors, of which the 2 tonnes YI was the lightest. Meant to be used to tow the standard French 75 mm mle 1897 field gun, the YI used the drivetrain of the AMR 33, identical to production vehicles except for the drive sprocket, which was full without holes and with a more rounded shape. Only 2 YI would ever be ordered by the French Army and thus manufactured.
The Renault YI 2-tonnes tractor. Outside of the drive sprocket, its suspension was identical to the AMR 33. Source: armedconflicts.com
Renault YS and YS 2
Seemingly, the last Renault VM/AMR 33 derivative to be conceived would be the Renault YS. The concept of this vehicle was first mentioned in December 1932. The idea was to create a command vehicle with a larger superstructure that could house more crew members and the equipment needed for them to assume command functions.
Two YS prototypes would eventually be manufactured, the first in 1933, using the Renault VM’s suspension. They had a larger, boxier armored superstructure which could house six crew members, and had no armament, though they featured a firing port/hatch where an FM 24/29 machine rifle could be placed.
An order for 10 production Renault YS was made in January 1934, but these are best described as derivatives of the Renault ZT/AMR 35, as they would be built using this vehicle’s drivetrain rather than the VM/AMR 33’s one.
Nonetheless, the two VM-based prototypes saw continued use. In autumn 1936, one was even experimentally converted into an artillery observation vehicle, which was called the “YS 2”. Despite their small number, the YS, including the two VM-based prototypes, were still in service in some Cavalry units by 1940.
The initial Renault YS prototype. Though it used the VM suspension, it had a slightly weaker engine in comparison to the AMR 33, pushed all the way to the front, not to the side of the vehicle, to make space for a more spacious crew compartment. Source: armedconflicts.comThe YS2 artillery observation conversion of one of the two YS prototypes. It should be noted that it sports the rubber block type suspension, but is nonetheless mentioned to have been built as a VM-based vehicle. It may simply have been refitted with the suspension at some point, perhaps as part of the conversion process into an artillery observation vehicle. Source: armedconflicts.com
A Successor: the Renault ZT/AMR 35
As mentioned previously, the French Army did not appreciate the overall configuration of the AMR 33, with the engine pushed to the side. While this configuration that Renault used had helped minimize the size of the vehicle, the French Army desired a design that used a more standard configuration, with the engine at the rear of the vehicle. It is because of these reservations that orders for the AMR 33 would remain at a quite moderate 120 vehicles, quite far below the number of AMRs which would be needed to fully equip the French Cavalry branch that was in the process of expanding its mechanized forces in the 1930s.
As early as early 1933, there were drafts and plans for a version of the AMR 33 with the engine pushed back to the rear. Renault would start working on a prototype of the AMR 33’s successor in late 1933. In fact, the first prototype to be presented, in February 1934, was the deeply reworked 79759, the fourth VM prototype. The internal two-letter designation code of this new vehicle was ZT.
There are some interesting details to highlight about the ZT’s development. In the first prototype, the speed was raised all the way to a very impressive 72 km/h thanks to an 8-cylinders 28CV engine, though this would not be retained all the way to the production standard. Eventually, another Renault VM, 79760, would be converted into a ZT prototype in March 1934. These two first makeshift ZT prototypes made from old prototypes of the AMR 33 were somehow satisfying enough to achieve the first order for the ZT on May 15th 1934, before a new prototype, the first purpose-built ZT, would be ready by September.
The first prototype of the ZT… was born a VM. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François Vauvillier
With the ZT on the way, further development on the AMR 33 stopped, with its successor being standardized as the AMR 35. It was meant to become the true standard AMR, though eventually, due to the High command of the French Army being skeptical of this kind of lightly armored reconnaissance tank, production would be limited to 167 of the standard ZT-1 type. The AMR 35 would nonetheless prove to be a more popular platform for variants. Vehicles accepted into service on the AMR 35 hull include the ZT-2 and ZT-3 tank destroyers, the ZT-4 colonial light tank, and the ADF1 command vehicle.
Interestingly enough, one of the two VM prototypes converted into ZT showed up during the 1940 campaign. This was 79759. Despite having used the AVIS n°1 turret when operating as a ZT prototype in 1934, it was seen refitted with the older and worse Renault turret of its early days, being used during the desperate defense of the city of Orléans, on the Loire river, where it was abandoned. Photos show the vehicle’s turret disarmed, and markings indicate it was at that point used as a driver’s training vehicle in a training facility. It is, in fact, known it was issued to the Saumur Cavalry School, but with this facility being 180 km away from Orléans and its cadets having been heavily engaged in the defense of their own crossings on the Loire river, it remains unclear why the prototype ended up there.
Prototype 79759, the first ZT, and likely one of the last AMRs to be knocked out. The vehicle’s configuration is an odd mish-mash. Its hull is closer to the AMR 35 in construction by this point, though by virtue of being a hastily-converted first prototype, it is still quite different to the final successor of the AMR 33. In the meantime, it was, for some reason, refitted with the old Renault turret, which had been ditched for any kind of mass-production. Source: Marc Couillet collection via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierAnother photo of the same vehicle in the ruins of Orléans, a sad fate for what had been the fastest tracked French vehicle up to this point, going up to 72 km/h in its ZT prototype configuration. Source: Bundesarchiv via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Issuing the AMR 33 to Units
By the time they came out, the AMR 33s were to serve within one particular type of unit.
During the first half of the 1930s, the French Army had five DCs (Divisions de Cavalerie – ENG: Cavalry Divisions). The AMRs were to be delivered within the GAM (Groupements d’Automitrailleuses – ENG: Armored Car Group) within each cavalry division. A GAM was to be issued 15 AMR 33s, allowing for the formation of three platoons. Three platoons were considered to form a squadron. There were also nine cavalry regiments in mainland France, some of which were to be motorized or mechanized, including with some armored cars, and turned into reconnaissance groups.
However, in practice, deliveries of AMR 33s were not that uniform. It was decided before the first AMR 33 was even delivered that the 4th DC would be turned into an experimental unit of a new type, a DLM (Division Légère Mécanique – ENG: Light Mechanized Division). The objective was to create what was basically a light cavalry armored division with motorized infantry, and because of this particular status, the units of the 4th DC would get priority for deliveries when AMR 33 came out of production.
Out of the 65 AMR 33s of the first batch, 40 went to units of the 4th DC. The unit’s GAM (4th GAM) received the standard dotation of 15, but two other components of the 4th DC were issued with AMR 33s; the 18ème Régiment de Dragons (ENG: 18th Dragons Regiment), a cavalry regiment, received 15, and the 4ème Bataillon de Dragons Portés (ENG: 4th ‘Carried’ Dragons Battalion/BDP), a motorized infantry regiment, received the last 10. The 4th GAM and 18th Dragons both operated in Reims, which became somewhat of a center for the 4th DC/1st DLM and for the operation of AMR 33s ( the few TSF conversions were run there). The 4th BPD, in contrast, operated in Verdun.
This photo from the 2nd GAM, dated from 1937, shows the equipment French cavalry armored car units could be expected to have when the AMR 33s entered service. The Renault vehicle took the role of AMR, the Schneider P16 half-track the role of AMC, and the very much antiquated White-Laffly still served as AMDs. These vehicles would all later be replaced in first-rate units by more modern vehicles that followed the AMR 33. Source: Photo by Chaillan, Soyer Collection, via R.Potié, via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The remaining AMR 33s were distributed between the GAMs of the other cavalry divisions, which were not envisioned to become DLMs. The 1st (Orléans), 2nd (Strasbourg), and 3rd (Paris) GAM (part of the similarly-numbered cavalry divisions) each received 5 AMR 33s with the first batch and another 10 in the second batch, each receiving their allocated lot of 15. The 5th (Melun) GAM got the short end of the stick, receiving only 2 AMR 33s within the first batch and another 8 in the second batch, and later the three newly completed AMR 33s of the later standard.
Finally, three regiments not part of a larger division received some AMR 33s. The 9th Dragons regiment in Epernay received 8 AMR 33s as part of the first batch, the 11th Chasseurs in Vesoul 12 vehicles of the second batch, and, finally, the 17th Chasseurs operating in Evreux received the 2 prototypes converted to the late production standard in 1935.
Prototype 79756, the first VM to be manufactured, converted to production standard and in service with the 17th Chasseurs. Source: char-français
Within the GAMs
There are some unique aspects to the service of the AMR 33s within the GAMs.
The 4th GAM and 18th Dragons, both located in Reims and part of the 4th DC/1st DLM, were uniquely quite forward-thinking in the use of their vehicles. At that time, it had been decided that Cavalry units in Reims would operate as a somewhat experimental mechanical brigade, a way to test out the armored tactics on a larger scale than regimental, which was planned to be extended to more of the cavalry in the following years. This is why the Dragons Regiment, despite not being a GAM, received AMR 33s. Schneider P16 AMCs were also issued to units located in Reims. The use of the mechanical brigade was to test the AMC-AMR couple which was identified in French Army doctrine.
As for the 10 AMR 33s issued to the 4th BDP in Verdun, while the mechanical brigade of the 4th DC was located in Reims, the ‘discovery’ regiment was based in Verdun. This part of the unit mostly used AMDs, longer-range wheeled reconnaissance armored cars, but 10 AMR 33s were nonetheless issued there largely to experiment as well.
Besides the AMR 33s issued to sub-units of the 4th DC/1st DLM, the 1st GAM, operating in Orléans, had an interesting aspect in that its AMR 33s operated in tandem with AMCs (once again Schneider P16s) inside a mixed AMC-AMR squadron, though the number of AMRs issued (15) matched a full AMR-only squadron. The 1st GAM also had another squadron operating AMDs.
The 2nd GAM, based in Strasbourg, Alsace, was notable in that it was, alongside other units of the 2nd DC based in Strasbourg, the unit of the French Cavalry located the furthest to the east in mainland France, in a city located on the River Rhine that formed the border with Germany. Before being delivered AMR 33s, it already had two squadrons, an AMC and an AMD squadron. Once the 15 allocated AMR 33s were delivered, it formed a third squadron with these.
The 3rd GAM is likely the unit in which the AMR 33s were the most photographed. Part of the 3rd DC, it was also included within the garrison of Paris, and as such took part in parades on the Champs Elysées for Bastille and Armistice days By 1934, the unit actually had an odd three-squadron composition, with two squadrons of AMD and a single mixed squadron of AMR/AMCs, though the unit received a full complement of 15 AMR 33s. These were further divided. Eleven were part of the unit’s main garrison in Paris’ central military school, while 4 were branched out in Versailles.
A colored photo of AMR 33s of the 3rd GAM parading near the Arc de Triomphe, Champs Elysées, November 11th 1934. Photo colorized and provided by Smargd123
The 5th GAM, operating in Melun, at first only received 10 AMR 33s, and had to operate them in a mixed squadron alongside AMCs. In 1935, it also received the last three newly-manufactured AMR 33s that featured the rubber block suspension. This unit was the one in which AMR 33s had the shortest service life, as this GAM was reorganized into the 8th Cuirassiers Regiment in October 1936, as the 5th DC was being, like the 4th DC, converted into a DLM, the 2nd DLM. At this moment, the AMR 33 were delivered back into storage.
An AMR 33 of the Melun-based 5th GAM. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The 6th and 7th GAM are the most elusive, created in Compiègne in 1935 and Saint-Omer in 1936 respectively. Despite seemingly not being associated with a cavalry division, they received a small number of AMR 33s taken from other units, likely in large part from the 5th GAM. Unlike other units, when exactly they stopped operating the type is unknown, though at the time when they were converted into GRDI reconnaissance groups in 1939, they did not feature any AMR 33.
Lastly, for the few non-GAM units not part of any division, the reason why they were issued AMR 33s is even more unclear than with the last two GAMs. The 17th Chasseurs, which operated only two AMR 33s, both converted prototypes, stands as the oddest of them all.
A serviceman poses in front of one of the 11th Chasseurs’ AMR 33s, 1934-1937 era. Source: char-français.A flipped over AMR 33 from the 11th Chasseurs. Source: Pierre Touzin via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Markings of the GAMs
Each GAM had a symbol, which was typically inscribed on the side of the AMR 33s’ turrets.
The 1st GAM’s symbol evolved from the early to the late service of the vehicles within the unit. The early symbol was a front-facing knight with white feathers on his helmet on a red background, surrounded by a green border embellished by yellow squares. The second design had the same green border, but embellished with red squares instead, and given white wings with black borders. Inside the green border, the background was yellow instead of red, and while at the center, the image of a knight with white feathers on the helmet was retained, but he now faced to the side.
While their unit’s insignias are not visible, these AMR 33s of the 1st GAM are nonetheless likely at their greatest splendor, parading on Orléans’ Joan of Arc plaza, with their suspension elements painted white, in 1936. Curiously, both rear AMRs are given the number “13”. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The 2nd GAM symbol was a Cross of Lorraine. In its simplest form, it was a yellow cross on a red background, inside a white roundel. In a later more complex form, the circle was diagonally divided between a red half to the bottom left and a green half to the top right, still sporting the same yellow Cross of Lorraine on top, with a storch superimposed in front of the cross. A third symbol also existed from 1936 onward. It had more of a coat of arms form, with a central red shield containing three yellow scorpios. On top, the common figure of a knight with white feathers to the sides and a sort of yellow/golden hat on top. The golden top hat formed, alongside the bottom, an anchor placed behind the shield.
This AMR 33 from the 2nd GAM, despite being quite newly delivered, already sports the unit’s insignia with the iconic Cross of Lorraine, which did not yet have its association with the Free French, Summer 1934. Source: char-françaisThis AMR 33 from the 2nd GAM’s 2nd Squadron 1st Platoon shows the newer unit insignia inside the vehicle’s ace of spade tactical marking. Photo colorized and provided by Smargd123
The symbol of the 3rd GAM is in a way even more esoteric, showing a white cog, with a central red circle. Superimposed on top of these was a sort of yellow hippogriff and a blue shield containing a golden anchor.
Taken in the winter of 1939-1940, after the 3rd GAM was reformed into another unit, this photo still shows a vehicle sporting the unit’s insignia on the side. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The symbol of the 4th GAM was a red circle with a white border. In the middle was a knight painted in white. On a yellow legend at the bottom of the circle, “Jeanne d’Arc” (Joan of Arc) was written in black. Reims is the city where, famously, Joan of Arc got French King Charles VII crowned, explaining the reference.
There were also symbols more commonly associated with the whole 4th DC/1st DLM which appeared on vehicles of the 4th GAM, but also sometimes the 18th Dragons and 4th BPD. An early one (1934-1935), found only on vehicles of the 4th GAM, was a red rectangle with a white boar in the middle. Later, the pattern of a black boar on a diagonally divided white and blue background became a common pattern in the 4th DC. Lastly, the 18th Dragons also had its own unique symbol sometimes present, a red hippogriff inside a yellow circle with a blue border. On occasion, a simpler symbol of a white hippogriff with red borders, often superimposed on tactical markings, was also used.
An early 4th DC insignia is featured on this AMR 33, which had the armament and mount removed. Source: 4th Cavalry Regiment collection via R.Potié via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierAn 18th Dragons AMR 33 with the unit’s insignia, mid-1930s. Source: French Army Photographic Service via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Common Tactical Markings
Common French tactical markings based on card games were seldom found on AMR 33s in comparison to other vehicles, but could sometimes be seen nonetheless. This marking scheme relied on two methods of identification, the color and the shape. The color indicated which squadron a vehicle was part of. Blue was used for the 1st Squadron, Red for the 2nd, and White for the 3rd.
Within squadrons, a single shape would be used for each platoon. Typically, this was an ace of spades for the 1st platoon, an ace of hearts for the 2nd platoon, an ace of diamonds for the 3rd platoon, and some later unit compositions would allow for four platoons, in which case, the 4th platoon used an ace of clubs. Unfortunately, as these markings were not systematically used, and as the color can sometimes be hard to identify in black and white photos, this way of identifying which exact part of a unit a vehicle belonged to is not dependable, but it can sometimes be useful.
AMR 33s of the 2nd Platoon of the 2nd GAM’s 2nd Squadron parading in Strasbourg, Summer 1938. These vehicles’ markings consist of an ace of hearts painted in red. The unit’s insignia is painted within the ace itself. Source: Strasbourg municipal archives via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Another unit marking that appeared from 1938 onward was the French tricolor cockades. Upon the introduction of this new tactical marking, one was often painted on each side, with a third on the rear of the turret. By 1940, the presence of this very obvious marking had most of the time been reduced to just one on the rear of the turret. Sometimes, one was also painted on the roof in order to ease identification from the air.
These 3rd GAM vehicles, parading down Rivoli street in Paris on May 8th 1938, at the time, Joan of Arc day, show the large cockades which were added in 1938. Most vehicles would see the turret side markings removed before the breakout of the war. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThis abandoned AMR 33, around which German soldiers are passing by, showcases both the rear turret cockade and the anti-aircraft mount. Source: char-françaisAn unarmed AMR 33 with a roof-painted cockade as well as partially erased cockade on parts of the turret, likely an abandoned vehicle. Source: char-français
Vehicles were sometimes, though again far from systematically, given a one or two digit number on the side or rear of the turret, indicating their number within a squadron.
Restructuring and Reforms of 1936-1937
A couple years into the service of the AMR 33s, the French Cavalry saw considerable organizational reforms which changed the structure of units operating the AMR 33.
Following the successes of experiments on units combining various types of armored cars, it was decided to change the structure of the armored car groups of most DCs. Previously, the standard complement had been one squadron of 15 AMR 33s, as well as one squadron of 15 AMDs and, typically, two squadrons of 15 AMCs.
In 1936, it was concluded that a different configuration should be adopted, notably following experimentation with the mechanical brigade in Reims. It was found that a more AMR-heavy organization was desirable, as the AMRs proved to be the vehicles that cooperated the most closely with the infantry in general, while the AMCs would generally end up being more specialized in an anti-armor role.
As part of this reform, each GAM was to be reformed into a RAM (Régiment d’Automitrailleuse – ENG: Armored Car Regiment). The name change only happened at the mobilization in September 1939, though the actual organizational change was carried out as part of the reforms taken in from 1936 to 1938. The RAM ditched one of the AMC squadrons, leaving it with a single squadron of 15 AMCs, and retained the squadron of 15 AMDs. However, it was increased to have two squadrons of AMRs, and each squadron was to be boosted from 15 to 23 AMRs. In other words, the standard complement of each DC would rise from 15 to 46 AMRs. This was somewhat compensated by the 5th DC following the 4th in transitioning to a DLM, and it was decided the AMR complement of the higher-priority DLMs would all be AMR 35s.
However, with three DCs, there was still a need for 138 AMRs, exceeding the production run of 118 AMR 33s. It was therefore decided that the 1st RAM, operating within the 1st DC, would be outfitted with AMR 35s, leaving the two other DCs, the 2nd and 3rd, operating with AMR 33s, and even leaving a respectable surplus, as AMR 33s were also phased out of non-divisional units operating them to be solely concentrated into the four squadrons of the 2nd and 3rd RAMs. AMR 33s of all other units were sent back to storage, with the 1st RAM abandoning its last AMR 33 in 1938, to be redistributed to the few units using them. The 2nd and 3rd RAM generally kept the traditions and imagery of the 2nd and 3rd GAMs that came before them, and the same symbols can often be spotted on their armored cars even after the reform.
At the outbreak of the war, each of the RAMs had their standard complement of 46 AMR 33s. A total of 18 vehicles were in various maintenance facilities or training schools. At least, quite mysteriously, 10 vehicles were reported as having been sent overseas. There has never been any evidence of an AMR 33 leaving the French mainland, and this is likely some sort of accounting mistake, with 10 AMR 33s perhaps instead undergoing significant general maintenance.
Outbreak of the War: The Mobilization Reforms
As France joined the Second World War after Germany launched an invasion of Poland, reforms were once again carried out within the French Cavalry. In September 1939, there were no major changes outside of the units formally being reclassified from GAMs to RAMs, with the actual changes to their organization having been carried out long ago.
However, larger plans were soon put in place. With the DLMs having proven to be a successful experiment, able to replace the DC as the frontline fighting force of the Cavalry, the DCs were now seen as secondary units, and it was decided to reform them into Divisions Légère (DLC – ENG: Light Divisions), a name received in February 1940 and which would be changed in March to Divisions Légère de Cavalerie (DLC – ENG: Light Cavalry Divisions). The reform itself was theorized in November 1939 and carried out in February 1940
These were smaller divisions, with slightly more of an emphasis on armored vehicles, though typically lighter ones in comparison to the DLMs, where Somua S35 and Hotchkiss H35/H39 tanks were the main armored fighting force, with AMR 35 and Panhard 178 as armored reconnaissance vehicles. In comparison, the smaller DLCs would have more of a focus on various armored cars with no vehicles typically considered as cavalry tanks. The core of each DLC would be a previous cavalry brigade, and as the previous DC each had two brigades, they were typically divided into two. In cases relevant to the AMR 33s, the 2nd DC was divided into the 2nd and 4th DLCs, while the 3rd DC was divided into the 3rd and 5th DLCs.
As part of the organization of the DLCs, the AMRs were removed from the RAMs, which now exclusively operated AMDs, AMCs, and motorcycles. AMRs were instead issued to the Dragons Portés, which became a two-battalion regiment instead of a single battalion inside a DLC. Each battalion of a Dragons Portés regiment was to be supported by two platoons of AMR 33s. In total, each of the four DLCs which was to be issued AMR 33 had a nominal complement of 26 vehicles. In practice, the AMR complement of a DLC was always or almost always sourced from a single squadron keeping the same personnel, meaning the same traditions and symbols were often retained despite the vehicles being assigned to a different unit.
With the total number of required vehicles of active divisions operating AMR 33s rising from 92 to 104 vehicles, the fleet was actually stretched thin to fulfill requirements. Only one unit, the 15th RDP of the 5th DLC, received the full complement of 26 vehicles. The 14th RDP of the 4th DLC appears to have had 23 vehicles, the 2nd RDP of the 3rd DLC had 20 and the 3rd RDP of the 2nd DLC had 22. A total of 19 vehicles were still issued to school or maintenance facilities and 10 were still in the mysterious overseas category, which was likely a classification error for vehicles undergoing some form of general maintenance.
Unfortunately for the AMR 33s, as armies sprung into action following the German attack of May 10th 1940, fate was not kind to the DLCs they were deployed in. The French Dyle-Breda Plan saw the most potent armored divisions of the French Army, the Cavalry’s DLMs and Infantry’s DcRs, rush into Belgium in order to relieve the country, and hopefully even the Dutch Army in the southernmost parts of the Netherlands. As the heavier units rushed into Belgium, the lighter, smaller DLCs were tasked with covering the flank of the French advance, This largely saw them deployed in or near the Ardennes, where the fist of more numerous and better equipped German Panzer-divisions would strike straight into them. In mere days, the vast majority of the AMR 33 fleet would be mauled to the point where this model would be exceedingly rare after the first week of combat.
Details on the operational service of the AMR 33s are unfortunately a lot more scarce than for other French vehicles, such as the B1 Bis or Somua S35, for a number of reasons. The less sensational AMRs have received significantly less attention from historiography in the past 80 years. Their affiliation to the smaller DLCs, which have largely failed to attract the same mythos and reputation as the larger DLM and DCR, also contributed to their unit’s history having received less attention than larger divisions. The marching journals of the RDP operating AMR 33s are also often more confusing and less clear. A clear reason can be found behind this element was the fact that, while meant largely for second-line duty, the DLCs ended up being a first line of defense they were never intended to be, and were mauled or almost disintegrated very quickly. Generally, it is considered that a week into the campaign of France, about ¾ of the AMR 33 fleet had been destroyed, damaged, or abandoned.
Disaster in Luxemburg: The 2nd RDP, of the 3rd DLC
The first unit operating AMR 33s in numerical order, the 2ème Régiment de Dragons Portés, was part of the 3rd DLC. As the other DLCs, it was included in the covering of the flanks of Dyle-Breda. Prior to the campaign breaking out, the division was located just south of the border with Luxembourg. Its given task was to head into the small country should it be invaded, and to set up checkpoints and hold defensible positions. It should be noted that, at the start of the campaign, this unit had the smallest complement of AMR 33s, with only 20 vehicles.
The 3rd DLC headed into Luxemburg as soon as hostilities broke out on May 10th 1940. It soon faced considerable German opposition. At first, this consisted of small airborne groups that had been deposited by Fieseler Fi 156 Storch liaison aircraft, but soon, two whole infantry divisions, the 17th of and 76th, joined in. Despite their lack of armored vehicles, these German formations generally offered much more firepower and ability to conduct set-piece head-to-head combat than the DLC and its meager supporting units, two GRDI reconnaissance groups and parts of a Spahi North African cavalry brigade.
On the second day of the campaign, the DLC had already retreated into France, having recorded its first AMR losses, which were lost trying to cover troops from GRDIs. The small division was further involved in combat against the German 17th Infantry Division in support of the French 58th Infantry Division in the town of Longwy, on an affluent of the River Meuse.
An AMR 33 abandoned on the side of the road in Tetange, Luxemburg, lost during an attempt to support soldiers from the 31st GRDI on May 10th 1940. Source: R.Potié collection via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
A few days later, the 3rd DLC, having likely lost a considerable portion of its AMR fleet by this point, was a supporting element of the first engagement of De Gaulle’s 4th DcR at Moncornet on May 17th, and was moved west towards the Somme and Amiens around May 23rd, taking part in an attack as part of the Battle of Abbeville on May 26th.
The AMR 33 83932, lost by the 2nd RDP in May 1940. Source: R.Potié collection via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThe same vehicle some time later, its markings having started to degrade. Source: Jean-François Antoina via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
By June 5th, the likely largely depleted division was surprised by German offensive operations being resumed with Operation Fall Rot following the Dunkerque pocket being successfully reduced. The unit continued to fight a desperate fighting retreat, its elements fighting on the Seine on June 9th and 10th 1940, and then on the smaller Eure on the 11th. As French lines completely collapsed, the retreat of the division hastened. When the 2nd RDP stopped to reorganize on June 15th, only four AMR 33s were still present, with a single platoon of three AMRs surviving within the first battalion, and only a single AMR being left within the second battalion. On June 25th, when the armistice came into effect, the unit was all the way between Bordeaux and Perigueux, in southwestern France.
The First French AFV Lost in The Campaign of France: the 3rd RDP of the 2nd DLC
The 3rd RDP, part of the 2nd DLC, had a complement of 22 AMR 33s as it headed into the campaign of France.
The 2nd DLC, as the 3rd DLC, was part of the Dyle-Breda maneuver. It was tasked with heading into the easternmost part of Belgium, into the country’s Luxembourg province, within the Ardennes forest. This coincidentally was the first part of the Low Countries and France German troops started progressing in.
On the morning of May 10th 1940, as the 2nd DLC headed into Belgium, it was immediately engaged by German troops in a number of Belgian localities such as Arlon, Vance, Etalle, Landin, and Poncel. Divided elements of the division were confronted by the 10th Panzer Division and the Grossdeutschland Motorized Infantry Regiment. As early as 10 am, near the entry of Vance, AMR 83950, part of the 2nd Platoon of the 1st Battalion, had its two crew members killed by German armor-piercing fire. This appears to have been the first recorded armored fighting vehicle lost by the French Army during the campaign of France.
German soldiers examine AMR 33 83950, which may have been the first French AFV to be lost during the Battle of France. Source: Bundesarchiv via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Already mauled on the first two days of combat, the unit retreated further on May 12th, leaving the town of Jamoigne, on the Belgian side of the French border, to the 36th German Infantry Division. The next day, even more German armored forces broke through the French lines and crossed the Meuse river at Sedan. The 2nd DLC was then engaged in the first phases of the Battle of Stonne in order to try and cut the German spearhead around the 16th of May. As French forces in the north ended up encircled, with the Panzer-divisions reaching the sea on May 20th, the 2nd DLC found itself moving towards the west, and was part of the disparate forces accumulated by the French and British during the Battle of Abbeville, taking parts in attempts to break through the German lines to relieve the Dunkerque pocket from May 25th to early June, without success.
As with the 3rd DLC, the 2nd was heavily hit by the new German offensive of Fall Rot, facing the 5th Panzer Division and the 2nd Motorized Infantry Division. These inflicted heavy losses on the French cavalry division and pushed it to retreat. On June 8th, it received orders to retreat towards the Seine, but was outsped by the 5th and 7th German Panzer Divisions, which took Rouen, the main crossing over the Seine in Normandy, and reached the coast at Fecamp respectively, trapping the 2nd DLC alongside a few other units, including the 5th DLC, two French infantry divisions (the 31st and 40th), and a British infantry division (The 51th Highlands). This ensemble, encircled on the 10th, surrendered on the 12th, after the general commanding the 2nd DLC had been killed in action the previous day.
The 15th RDP of the 5th DLC: a Chilling Figure
The history of the 5th and 4th DLCs is somewhat less documented than the 2nd and 3rd. It is nonetheless known that the 15th RDP, part of the 5th DLC, was actually the most well equipped of all, with the full complement of 26 AMR 33s.
The 5th DLC’s rearguard actions appear to have been concentrated on the French side of the Ardennes, rather than in Belgium or Luxembourg. The unit was notably engaged in heavy fighting on the River Semoy on May 12th, in the locality of Vendresse, where at least two vehicles were abandoned. Overall, and likely as the other DLCs, most of the AMR fleet was likely lost within the first days. Two vehicles were notably seen alongside destroyed trucks in a column that appears to have been entirely taken out.
Two destroyed AMR 33s of the 15th RDP photographed in Vendresse on May 14th, but likely destroyed two days prior. Notice the rear vehicle actually sports the rubber block suspension. Source: R.Potié collection via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierA German soldier poses on an abandoned AMR 33 part of a destroyed convoy, with another one burnt out and featuring the mounted anti-aircraft machine gun further back. Source: Jean-Yves Mary collection via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
As with several other DLCs, the 5th’s remains were engaged during the Battle of Abbeville. A single figure is known from this engagement. On May 29th, slightly over two weeks into the campaign, the unit only had one AMR 33 left out of 26, an extremely high attrition rate. After the Battle of Abbeville, there were plans to transform the mauled 5th DLC into a new DLM, which would have been the 8th DLM. However, as with the other DLCs, the division was surprised by Operation Fall Rot before any significant efforts could be undertaken to re-organize it. The remnants of the unit were encircled and destroyed in Normandy alongside the 2nd DLC.
The 4th DLC/7th DLM and its 14th BDP/4th RAM
The 4th DLC, as the 5th DLC, is generally less well documented in the early parts of the campaign, but actually appears to have been the DLC deployed the furthest to the north on the flanks of the Dyle-Breda maneuver, fighting at the south-east of the Belgian city of Namur. An example of how the tactics present in the AMR’s doctrine could turn out badly was demonstrated on May 12th 1940, when 2 of the unit’s 23 AMR 33s were lost. A squadron of AMR 33s had been left to defend the village of Crupet in the afternoon, as the horse cavalry retreated. Left to their own, the vehicles proved largely unable to resist. Two patrols of presumably two AMRs each were placed on the entry and exit of the village. Two vehicles of a patrol were then lost meters from each other, having been encircled by German troops, for which the higher number allowed for higher flexibility.
The two AMR 33s of a patrol that was encircled and lost in Crupet, Belgium, on May 12th 1940. Source: Bundesarchiv via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThis photo appears to show the same scene from another angle. Source: historine.blogspot.com
After its first defeats in Belgium, the unit presumably retreated into France and took part in operations near Abbeville. Its fate, in June of 1940, was quite interesting. On June 5th, the unit was officially turned into the 7th DLM, and adopted an ad-hoc organization. The DLM was to feature a Dragons Portés brigade with two reinforced battalions. It was hoped that each would be able to sustain a mixed squadron of AMRs and motorcycles. The 14th RDP was to operate as one of those squadrons, while another would have been the 31st RDP. However, shortages of AMRs meant the 14th RDP was instead equipped with old White-Laffly armored cars, pressed into service under the role of AMD.
The AMRs were instead pressed into service into a new regiment, the 4th RAM, once again taking the shape of an armored car regiment. This regiment was to focus on reconnaissance tasks, and it was hoped it could sustain four mixed squadrons, two with AMDs and motorcycles, and two with AMRs and motorcycles. In practice, the unit received AMRs from wherever some could be found, training schools, maintenance facilities, etc. The two mixed AMR squadrons were extremely reduced, with a three-vehicle platoon and an additional two-vehicle patrol each in theory. A slightly higher compliment of 14 AMRs total, 7 per squadron, was eventually gathered. This total included both AMR 35s and AMR 33s, the majority likely being of the older type taken from inventory and repair depots. As with the other units still in existence, the 7th DLM fought a bloody fighting retreat on the Seine and then further south. Though poorly documented, it is known that all of its AMRs had been knocked out by the end of the campaign.
The AMR 33’s Performances during the Battle of France
Overall, the AMR 33’s service during the campaign of France was particularly unfortunate. The few units which still operated the type basically found themselves right in the path of some of the most potently armed German units, which easily made short work of these vehicles.
The AMR themselves are not to be entirely exonerated of their poor service, of course. The design’s thin armor made it vulnerable to a variety of German weapons which were not always deadly to French tanks, such as anti-tank rifles or 20 mm autocannons found on Panzer II or in anti-aircraft use.
However, even with better vehicles, considering the small quantities found within the DLCs, far too small to operate as frontline divisions, it is unlikely the vehicles could have performed well even had they been the most advanced reconnaissance tank design of their era. They were in large part in the wrong place at the wrong time. Instead of being used as reconnaissance vehicles, they were also largely used as cavalry infantry support tanks fighting alongside motorized infantry, which was often not well coordinated with them. In this role, there were almost no positives for the AMR 33, its high mobility being negated while its light armament and armor were exacerbated.
German Use after the Campaign of France
Due to very high rates of abandoned vehicles in the losses suffered by the French Army, German troops were able to capture working examples of the vast majority of armored fighting vehicles types in service with the French Army.
A German soldier stands from the hatch of a captured AMR 33 81686, taken in seemingly operable conditions during the campaign of France. Source: S.Bonnard collection via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The AMR 33 does not technically appear to have been an exception to this, however, German use of the type appears to have been extremely limited. There are several reasons behind this. First, considering both how the AMR 33s were located right on the frontline, in areas that saw intense combat, and were thinly armored, they were probably, proportionally, many fewer vehicles abandoned due to minor breakdowns and more vehicles which were lost after being penetrated in combat, which could make repair impossible or very complicated. In addition to this, the fleet of AMR 33s, even before this destruction, was small, and the type was long out of production. In comparison to more modern types, such as the S35, B1 Bis, or even H39, there was comparatively little the AMR 33 brought that was not present already in German equivalents, while repair and maintenance of the vehicle would be comparatively hard.
Because of this, photos of the AMR 33 in German service are extremely rare, almost unheard of in fact. The vehicle is nonetheless known to have been given a German designation, Panzerspähwagen VM 701 (f), indicating an armored reconnaissance vehicle of French origin. However, the vast majority of photos of AMRs in German service show AMR 35s, due to more favorable circumstances which lead to more of these falling into German hands.
Conclusion – The First Modern Renault AFV
The AMR 33’s German service is very poorly documented and likely largely insignificant, and there are no known reports or anecdotes of vehicles being recovered and used during the liberation of France. By and large, the story of the AMR 33 can be considered to have ended alongside the campaign of France, and overall fairly early during its course too.
To this day, a single AMR 33 has survived, and is unsurprisingly hosted by the Saumur Tank Museum, which has the largest collection of French AFVs in the world. The vehicle’s interior is sadly not in good condition, but from the exterior, it still looks just as the AMR 33 did back in the 1930s.
The Saumur Tank Museum’s AMR 33, which is the last of its kind. Source: Ian Tong on flickr
When looking back at the AMR 33 today, the vehicle can appear somewhat irrelevant and forgotten. After all, it was one of many vehicles which, in the whole world, came out in the wake of the Carden-Loyd, though the British vehicle was more of a distant ancestor rather than a close parent for the AMR 33. Indeed, when looking at armored fighting vehicles fielded by 1940, there is little that makes the AMR 33 remarkable, outside of perhaps its speed.
The vehicle nonetheless holds an important role in the history of French armored fighting vehicles. The AMR 33 was the first of a new generation of vehicles Renault produced during the 1930s. While it is easy to see how the AMR 33 pioneered the AMR 35, the vehicle’s influence did spread beyond. The AMC 34 and later 35 largely followed in its wake, though they were significantly larger. Even the R35 light infantry tank, which may seem almost the opposite of the AMR 33 with its cast construction, thick armor, infantry role, and slow speed, actually took inspiration from the AMR 33 in the sense that its suspension was based on similar principles. This is not necessarily to take as a point of pride for the AMR 33. The suspension was definitely not a strongpoint of the R35, if there ever was one, and none of the riveted cavalry vehicles offered by Renault in the 1930s would turn out to be huge successes, despite some interesting characteristics, with the AMR 35 being the closest to a good and well-appreciated vehicle. Nonetheless, the influence of the AMR 33 on the armored fighting vehicles created by the most famous French automotive company in the 1930s is undeniable, and the vehicle itself, despite its tragic service history, had a fascinating developmental history.
Early Renault VM configuration in which the prototypes were first completedPrototype n°79760 with the early version of the coil spring suspensionPrototype n°79758 with the first experimental version of the rubber blocks suspensionA Production AMR 33 with the spare machine gun mounted on the anti-aircraft mountOne of the rare AMR 33s that were fitted with radiosOne of the five production AMR 33s with rubber block suspension. Illustrations by David Bocquelet and Godzilla
AMR 33 Specifications
Crew
2 (Driver, Commander/gunner)
Driver vision’s devices
Front episcopes
Commander’s vision devices
Front-right episcope, front-left, sides and rear vision slots
Armament
1 MAC31E machine-gun with 2,250 rounds & 1 spare/anti-aircraft machine-gun
Hull Armor
13 mm (vertical/slightly angled surfaces)
9 mm (significantly angled surfaces, notably frontal glacis)
6 mm (roof)
5 mm (floor)
Turret armor
13 mm (sides)
6 mm (roof)
Radio
None on most vehicles, few fitted with unknown TSF
Later configuration with the country flag for parades
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Late 2000s-Present)
Armored Personnel Carrier – Unknown Number Built
North Korea has, since the 1960s, developed and expanded its military vehicles industry quite considerably. Starting out by locally assembling Soviet vehicles, the country progressively moved onto creating and manufacturing its own vehicles, more and more distinct from original Russian or Chinese inspirations. A key stepstone in this direction was the Cold War-era M1981 light tank, which, while it took inspiration from several Chinese and Soviet designs, was a clear copy or even derivative of none. Though several decades old by this point, a development on the hull of this light tank was first observed by the American Department of Defence in 2009 and given the designation of M2009. Also known as the Chunma-D, this is an armored personnel carrier development of the old light tank – a fairly ironic turn of the affair, as the M1981 itself was based on the chassis of the 323 APC.
M2009s during a parade at Kim-Il Sung Square. The type is the most recently known tracked armored personnel carrier of the Korean People’s Army, though its capacities in a modern war remain more than questionable. Source: m.blog naver
Designation
The M2009 designation follows the standard naming scheme of the US Department of Defence for North Korean vehicles, referring to the year in which the vehicle was first observed in service. In North Korea, the vehicle appears to be known as the “Chunma-D” or, in other transliterations, “Junma-Lee”, with the meaning being the same. Chunma/Junma stands for racehorse, with Lee or D is a transliteration of the fourth letter of the Korean alphabet.
Supposed Origins
As pretty much systematic with North Korean vehicles, the development process of the M2009 is a mystery, with awareness of the vehicle coinciding with its appearance in service of the Korean People’s Army during military parades. Nonetheless, one can at least theorize the potential origins of such a vehicle.
The M2009 is a derivative of the M1981 light tank. Though already not state-of-the-art by the late 1970s/early 1980s when it was first introduced, this light tank has become progressively more obsolete over the decades. As the Republic of Korea Army supplemented its M48 Pattons tank with more and more of the K1, outclassing anything fielded by North Korea, the range of targets that could be engaged with hopes of destruction from the M1981’s 85 mm gun decreased accordingly. As such, it has been theorized the M2009 may have been introduced as a way to repurpose the M1981 assembly chain in order to produce a vehicle, in this case an armored personnel carrier, that would remain relevant – at least to an extent, as the M2009 is still far from a reasonably modern vehicle – and be less hopelessly outdated.
General Characteristics
The M2009 in the configuration it was first observed in. This vehicle bears the flag of the Korean Worker’s Party. The Igla missile is not mounted. The vehicle features some spare track links installed at various places of the hull, as well as the usual shovels and additional equipment. Source: massimotessitori.altervista.orgM1981s light tanks seen in 1985 at Kim-Il Sung square, for comparison. The link between these and the M2009 is obvious, though the APC appears to have a slightly raised up forward compartment. Source: massimotessi.altervista.org
The M2009 is directly based upon the hull of the M1981, and maintains many of its components with little to no apparent changes. This is notably the case of the suspension and engine deck. The hull was originally inspired by the one used in the 323 APC, but lengthened. It uses a six road wheels design, with these road wheels being fairly similar in design to those used on the Soviet PT-76, and generally, Eastern Block amphibious tracked vehicles. The tank uses torsion bars suspension. As for the powerplant, its exact model is unknown, with both 320 and 240 hp engines of various origins having been mentioned. The vehicle notably features a couple of hydrojets, similar in design to the PT-76’s, in order to provide improved amphibious capacities. This feature goes all the way back to the 323, which introduced this to a hull based on the Chinese YW531A that moved on water thanks to the motion of its tracks. The only noticeable changes to the engine deck are the introduction of what appears to be a box – stowage of the Igla anti-air missile has been theorized – and changes to the engine cooling, with a single central grille instead of separate ones. The dimensions of the hull are likely about the same as the M1981, however, the new turret likely changes the height and overall length of the vehicle, and as such only the width can be estimated at about 3.10 m.
Where the vehicle differs from the M1981 is in terms of turret and combat compartment, these having been modified to transform the light tank into an armored personnel carrier. That being said, one may question whether these modifications were enough to create a viable vehicle of this type due to several questionable features.
A fairly low view of two M2009 on the parade, likely at Kim-Il Sung Square. The lower part of the hull is largely identical between the M2009 and the M1981. Source: m.blog naver
Combat Compartment
In comparison to the M1981, the M2009 appears to have a slightly heightened combat compartment. This modification was likely introduced to give more space inside for the dismounts. The hull roof, notably, appears to continue to rise slightly upward, with the turret at its highest point, and not be perfectly flat.
The combat and crew compartment of the M2009 are located to the front. The rear engine configuration of the M1981 was retained on the APC, likely due to the additional costs and delays which would be caused by a deeper transformation of the hull. As a result, the infantry compartment appears to be located just under the turret of the M2009. Two firing ports are present on each side of the vehicle, under the turret. Behind these are what appear to be the main point where the dismounts enter and leave the vehicle, a square-shaped side door of fairly diminutive size. The engine compartment is located just behind, suggesting a limited infantry-carrying capacity, likely not exceeding four to six crew members. In front of the turret, hatches for the driver and either another crew member or perhaps a dismount are present.
The infantry accommodations on the M2009 can be described as fairly questionable at best. The vehicle does not feature rear doors, which is already a fairly archaic feature in modern personnel carriers. Rear doors allow for much easier and less risky evacuation of the vehicle, particularly under fire. In comparison, the side doors of the M1981 would typically provide significantly less protection, and exiting the vehicle under fire, in case of an ambush, for example, would be even riskier than on most other APCs. Not only that, but the diminutive size of the doors would also make the evacuation of the vehicle by soldiers in full gear much harder than on a vehicle with large opening rear doors.
M2009s on the parade at Kim-Il Sung Square, Pyongyang, 2013. As this photo shows, the vehicle retains moderate dimensions and a rear engine deck, with the turret installed right on top of the dismount compartment. As such, it is of limited size and capacity. Source massimotessitori.altervista.orgA rear view of a 323, giving a good view onto the rear door. While fairly small, it remains a far better means of exiting the vehicle in comparison to the even more diminutive, and badly placed side doors of the M2009. Source: war thunder forums
The small space allocated for dismounts means the vehicle almost certainly has a lower infantry carrying capacity than the older 323, which also has the advantage of featuring rear doors. In short, in its primary role of carrying infantry, the 2000s Chunma-D proves inferior to the early 1970s 323. The latter has space for ten (according to North Korean sources even twelve) dismounts that can exit the vehicle from the rear, even though the rear door on the 323 has a fairly small size that can already be considered a fairly lackluster feature.
Turret
An M2009 on parade somewhere in Pyongyang. This gives a good view of the headlights, present to the sides of the top hull hatches, as well as the coaxial machine gun on the right of the dual 14.5 mm KPVs. Source: m.blog naver
The other obvious change the M2009 has in comparison to the M1981 is the replacement of the 85 mm armed turret by another design. The M2009 features a cylindrical turret with two 14.5 mm KPV machine guns as main armament, as with the 323. However, the turret is of a different design. Though some inspiration was likely taken from the old APC’s turret, the M2009 ones introduces a variety of new features.
Though conical, the turret of the M2009 is of a wider type. It appears to retain a single crewmember, with a command cupola located to the rear of the turret. A large boxy bustle, likely for stowage, is also present.
Though the main armament of the turret remains the same two 14.5 mm KPV machine guns of the 323 – an armament which was quite heavy for an APC in the early 1970s, but of which the power is now more moderate, as more heavily protected armored personnel carriers tend to become the norm – the design also introduces a coaxial 7.62 mm. While it may seem a little redundant, this may allow for fire on less important and lighter targets to consume less ammunition. Another addition in comparison to the 323 turret is an external infrared searchlight, likely linked to the main armament by braces, as is often the case on North Korean vehicles. Also included are smoke dischargers, three on each side of the turret, a feature that started being observed on M1981s from 2015 onward.
Similar, though not identical turret designs to the M2009 have been observed on the M2010, a series of 8×8 and 6×6 wheeled armored personnel carriers based on the BTR-80 and introduced around the same time in the Korean People’s Army.
A 6×6 M2010 APC on the parade. Source: pinterest
North Korean Classic: The Igla
A side view of a M2009 Chunma-D in 2013, showing the Igla missile as well as the commander cupola, fairly similar to the one already present on the M1981 in its cylindrical shape, sticking out of the rest of the turret. Source: massimotessitori.altervista.org
North Korean vehicles, for a long time, but especially in recent years, have very often been observed with man-portable anti-aircraft defense systems (MANPADS) stuck onto the vehicles, from the turret of tanks and APCs to even the fixed superstructure of closed or even open-topped self-propelled artillery pieces. Though some of these have been speculated to be only for show, for example, the large Igla battery present on some 323s during a 1992 parade, some may be functional. It ought to be noted that footage of North Korean armored vehicles in training, outside of parade, often shows the vehicles with the missiles omitted.
The M2009 was first seen without an Igla. However, the vehicle always had some sort of rectangular box just rear of the turret, which has been theorized to actually be storage for the Igla missile launcher. The vehicle quickly appeared with an Igla mounted, as early as 2013 and perhaps even earlier. The missile is fixed to the rear of the turret bustle, which raises questions as to its operation, as it likely is hard to access it from the commander cupola, which is located further forward. A single photo tends to suggest a more forward mount is possible though.
M2009s on the parade at Kim-Il Sung square. This photo gives a good view of the position of the Igla towards the rear of the turret, but also of the standard North Korean parading procedure, with vehicles parading in three columns, the leading vehicle bearing the flags of the DPRK, the Korean Worker’s Party, and the Korean People’s Armed Forces. Source: massimotessitori.altervista.orgA rear view of M2009s on the parade. Here, the Igla appears to be, to the author’s eyes at least, placed closer to the commander cupola, a more reasonable installation for the proper operation of the missile. Source: imbcdb.
Conclusion – A Questionable Armored Personnel Carrier
The M2009 is, as of today, the most recent tracked armored personnel carrier which has been spotted in the ranks of the KPA. However, it could easily be described as a fairly questionable design.
Though the turret of the vehicle is likely more advanced than the old 323, the vehicle itself appears to be a far worse platform when it comes to carrying infantry. With a dismount compartment located just under the turret, the infantry complement of the vehicle is likely very moderate. With the engine to the rear being retained, the only option to exit the vehicle for the infantry appears to be small side doors – a very inefficient exit means, and one which is likely very dangerous if the vehicle were ever to fall victim to an ambush. Though the numbers of M2009 produced are obviously unknown, the vehicle has little chance of ever coming close to replacing the ubiquitous 323 armored personnel carrier – which is likely for the better. While it may fare better than the 323 if given, for example, purely reconnaissance or infantry support tasks, the M2009 appears far worse as an infantry carrying platform, with the improved combat capacities likely far too little to justify the vehicle’s defects, particularly as South Korean infantry fighting vehicles such as the K21 and the small fleet of BMP-3 provide massively superior combat features.
The M2009 in plain, standard green camouflageParade configuration with the national flagParade configuration with the Korean Worker’s Party flagLater configuration with a two-tone camouflage, and Igla missile mountedLater configuration with the country flag for paradesLater configuration with the party flag for parades. Illustrations by Godzilla
M2009 Chunma-D specifications (estimations)
Width
3.10 m (estimation)
Weight
Between the 323 (~15 tonnes) and the M1981 (~20 tonnes)
Engine
Unknown (Perhaps a 320 hp 8-cylinders air-cooled diesel engine or a 6-cylinders water-cooled 240 hp diesel engine)
Suspension
Torsion bars
Maximum speed (road)
~60 km/h (estimation from M1981)
Maximum speed (water)
~10 km/h (estimation from M1981)
Range
500 km (estimation from M1981)
Crew
Observation suggests 3 (commander, driver, co-driver), perhaps 2 if co-driver is in fact just a dismount
FIAT 6616 in Somaliland service, illustrated by Ardhya 'Vesp' Anargha, funded by our Patreon campaign.
Republic of Somaliland (1991-Present)
Armored Car – At Least 2 in Service
Somaliland is one of several unrecognized sovereign states in existence in the world. This means that it is an organization that exercises control over a definite area of land with the usual apparatus a recognized nation would have, including a military, but is not internationally recognized as a country by most other states. In the case of Somaliland, no other countries recognize it as a sovereign state, though official relations nonetheless exist with a number of countries, notably neighbouring Ethiopia
Somaliland broke away from Somalia in 1991 as, following the overthrow of dictator Siad Barre, the country fell into a civil war. Comprising the north-west of Somalia, the part of the country that had previously been colonized not by Italy but by the British Empire, the equipment of Somaliland’s military would largely come from the equipment which was operated by the Somali military in the region. Hargeisa, the capital and largest city of Somaliland had previously hosted a significant military presence. This included a number of FIAT 6616 armored cars of Italian origin which Somalia had acquired in the late 1970s. These have seen continued use in the Somaliland military and even an odd field conversion in the form of mounting a UB-16 57 mm rocket pod on top of the turret.
One of Somaliland’s FIAT 6616s, with the masked-crew showing this photo was taken during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic (as of September 2021). Source: Hammer of War on twitter
FIATs in the Horn of Africa
Somalia achieved independence in 1960, when the trust territories of Italian and British Somaliland were united into the independent Somali Republic. The country would operate as a democratic republic until 1969, when a coup saw the rise of the Supreme Revolutionary Council under General Siad Barre. He would, for a time, align Somalia with the Eastern Block and see the country receive considerable amounts of Soviet equipment, notably to face-off against neighboring Ethiopia, by this point still an empire under Haile Selassie. This alignment with the Soviet Union would change during the second half of the 1970s though. 1974 saw a coup by the Derg, a communist junta, in Ethiopia. When tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia over the Ogaden region, located in Ethiopia but housing a large Somali population, boiled over into a war in 1977, the USSR stopped all support of Barre to instead side with the Derg. Barre then abandoned the front of Socialism; his regime had to seek support from the West.
In this context, Somalia passed a large order to Italy for wheeled armored fighting vehicles. This mostly concerned the FIAT 6614 armored personnel carrier, of which 270 were purchased, but 30 of the closely-linked FIAT 6616 armored cars were also acquired by Somalia. These would only arrive in 1978-1979, largely after the conclusion of the Ogaden War with an Ethiopian victory, seeing Barre’s expansionist dreams squashed.
The FIAT 6616 is a light, 4×4 armored car based on the hull of the FIAT 6614 armored personnel carrier. It is crewed by a driver in the hull, and a commander and gunner in the turret. The main armament of the armored car is a Mk 20 Rh202 20 mm autocannon supplemented by a coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun. The armored car runs on a 160 hp FIAT turbo-diesel engine, which, with a combat weight of 8,000 kg, gives it a high power-to-weight ratio of 20.20 hp/tonne and a high maximum speed of 100 km/h. It is also fully amphibious, though slow on water, at just 5 km/h. At 6 to 8 mm, the vehicle’s armor is minimal, only protecting against small-caliber bullets and artillery shells splinters. In general, the FIAT 6616 is geared towards reconnaissance duties, though in the context of a country subject to internal disorder, it can also couple as a decent patrol vehicle thanks to its high speed and long-range of 700 km on road with a speed of 70 km/h.
The Birth of an Independent Somaliland
After the failure of the Ogaden War, Siad Barre remained in power through the 1980s, but internal tensions were progressively rising through the years. Especially after a failed coup against Barre in 1978, the regime’s dictatorial and oppressive policies intensified. Abandoning Socialism, the Somali regime became more and more embroiled in tribal politics, supporting friendly clans while becoming increasingly repressive against the ones seen as opposed to the Barre regime. In the north, repression was extreme against the Somali National Movement (SNM), founded in 1981 and operating mostly in former British Somaliland. Communities of the northern Isaaq clan, viewed as friendly to the SNM, were notably subjected to genocidal policies by the Somali military from 1987 onward, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths (from 50,000 to 200,000 according to some estimates).
The situation eventually became untenable for Barre, who was ousted from power and fled abroad in 1991. Following this, the formerly Italian part of Somalia became embroiled in internal conflicts, becoming the Somali Civil War, which is still ongoing as of September 2021. In the formerly British Somaliland though, the SNM managed to seize power with relatively little opposition, the region having been very hostile to the Barre regime and made independently-minded by the years of repression. On 18th May 1991, the independence of Somaliland was declared by the SNM and northern clans, with the newly-formed state exercising control over all of former British Somaliland outside of some contested areas held by the Puntland state of Somalia in the east.
A map of Somalia showing Somaliland as well as the region of Puntland, and the border area contested between the two. Source: BBC
The FIAT 6616s in Somaliland
The repressive policies held in the north of Somalia during the Barre regime had resulted in a large military presence in the region, notably in the city of Hargeisa, the second largest city of Somalia and the largest of Somaliland, which saw enormous destruction during the Isaaq genocide. With the collapse of the Barre regime, the equipment used by the Somalian Army in the region fell into the hands of the newly established Somaliland, which used it to equip its own armed forces.
The most common armored vehicles of Somaliland’s military were several dozens of T-54/T-55 tanks of Soviet origins (though many were also delivered by Egypt during the years of the Barre regime), but a number of FIAT wheeled vehicles also fell into the hands of the newly established military. Most were FIAT 6614s, but a number of FIAT 6616s fell into the hands of the regime as well. The precise number is pretty much impossible to establish. There are at least two, simply due to the fact that two at most were spotted simultaneously, but the presence of a couple more vehicles is not outside the realms of possibility. The number likely remains very low though, as only 30 FIAT 6616s were purchased for the whole of Somalia.
A side view of a Somaliland FIAT 6616 on parade before the vehicles were refitted with UB-16 rocket pods. Notice the wheels that are poorly painted in white. Source: facebook
Sadly, the Somaliland National Army (SNA) is not a very well-documented topic, and as such, there does not appear to be any available information on which units operate the FIAT 6616. What is known is that a large portion of the military is based around the capital Hargeisa, perhaps encompassing the FIATs. The large parts commonality with the FIAT 6614 likely means the vehicles are operated together, which is reinforced by footage of the vehicles together in training and exercises. As Somaliland’s main wheeled armored fighting vehicles, the types likely form some sort of rapid motorized force.
Somaliland National Army vehicles parading in Hargeisa. The two lead vehicles are FIAT 6614s, followed by a 6616. Source: Wikimedia commons
Refitting with UB-16s
Around the early 2010s, footage of the FIAT 6616s having been modified from their original configuration started appearing. Seemingly in 2013, a FIAT 6616 was paraded with its main armament, the 20 mm Rh 202, removed. The last photo of a Somaliland FIAT 6616 without the UB-16 rocket pod appears to be dated from 2014, and as such, the refit was likely conducted at some point in the mid-2010s.
The UB-16 rocket pod is originally intended for Soviet planes and helicopters. Its appearance in Somalia likely dates from the country acquiring the compatible MiG-21 from the Soviet Union during the 1970s, a squadron of 24 of these being operated by Somalia during the Ogaden War. The UB-16 fires the S-5 57 mm rocket. A number of different models, either HE-FRAG (High Explosive Fragmentation) or HEAT-FRAG (High Explosive Anti-Tank Fragmentation) exist. The S-5M, the standard HE rocket, has a launch weight of 3.86 kg and a warhead of 860 grams of explosives. The HEAT S-5K weighs 3.64 kg, with a 1.1 kg warhead that grants armor-piercing properties against up to 130 mm of armor. More modern models of both HE and HEAT rockets exist, with the latter rated against up to 250 mm of armor. They are not likely to be found in Somaliland due to the supply of Soviet armament being cut short in the mid-1970s.
The UB-16 rocket pod features 16 of these S-5 rockets. It is a 1,678 mm long pod with a diameter of 321 mm, and weighs 138 kg when fully loaded with rockets. The added weight to the FIAT 6616 likely is slightly superior due to the need for a mount that holds the weight of the rocket pod.
On the FIAT 6616, the UB-16 is mounted towards the rear of the turret, on its central axis. It appears to be mounted using a very simple mount that likely does not feature any means of elevating or depressing the rocket pods, meaning that they can only be aimed horizontally by rotating the turret, reducing the angles at which they may be fired.
A side view of a Somaliland FIAT 6616 fitted with the UB-16 rocket pod during a parade in Hargeisa. The mounting of the rocket pod is quite simple. Source: Hammer of War on twitter
The addition of a rocket pod was likely meant to give the FIAT 6616 better firepower against fortified positions and structures which may not be structurally threatened by the 20 mm gun. In this sense, despite their ad-hoc nature, they add some non-negligible high-explosive firepower to a swift and nimble armored car like the FIAT 6616.
Conclusion – A Likely Long Service Ahead
In recent years, all FIAT 6616s of Somaliland that have been seen have featured the UB-16 rocket pods, comprising at least two vehicles refitted. These have regularly featured in military parades of the Somaliland National Army in Hargeisa, alongside the FIAT 6614s.
Somaliland, considering its unrecognized status, has a hard time acquiring any military equipment abroad, especially armored fighting vehicles. As such, it is likely the country’s current fleet of armored vehicles will be maintained for the coming decades without many changes. Due to the instability in neighboring Somalia and tensions around the border with the Puntland region, the need to maintain a decently large armed force for Somaliland is likely to stay. As such, despite the small number of vehicles in service, the FIAT 6616s will most certainly be in service for many years. Whether they will be subjected to any changes other than the fitting of the rocket pod remains to be seen.
Two FIAT 6616s along with technicals during exercises of the Somaliland National Army. As the country likely struggles to acquire an armed vehicle heavier than a technical, the AFVs acquired during the birth of Somaliland are likely very precious to the country. Source: Hammer of War on twitterFIAT 6616 in Somaliland service, illustrated by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha, funded by our Patreon campaign.
107 mm MRL on Sungri-61NA armed with Igla MANPADS. Illustration by Pavel Alexe, funded through our Patreon campaign.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (1993-Present)
Multiple Rocket Launcher System (MRLS) – Unknown Number Produced
A major facet of the Korean People’s Army arsenal is the large quantity and variety of Multiple Rocket Launcher Systems (MLRS) it operates. Ever since the 1970s, and increasingly so in the next decades, a vast program was carried out to create a large and diverse fleet of vehicles. Starting from systems purchased from the Soviet Union and China, North Korea has increasingly introduced its own systems, some of which are actually mostly indigenous and somewhat competitive, notably the 240 mm systems first seen in the 1980s. In recent years, the even larger 300 mm KN-09, with seemingly very long-range, high accuracy, and large warheads, has been introduced.
However, these larger and longer-range systems sometimes obscure the large quantities of much simpler but still important systems. These provide the Korean People’s Army with the close-range firepower saturation it needs to hope to deliver large quantities of suppression to enemy forces. They are largely needed as North Korea is vastly unable to deliver suppressive firepower through other means considering the general obsolescence of the Korean People’s Army Air Force. Perhaps the most common light mobile Multiple Rocket Launcher System in service in the Korean People’s Army is the 107 mm Type 63 MLRS mounted on the Sungri-61NA truck, both of which are very common equipment of the KPA on their own.
The Sungri-61NA
The Sungri Motor Plant is a major automotive manufacturer within North Korea. It is based in the city of Tokchon, north of Pyongyang. Although founded in 1950, the factory would only begin producing vehicles in 1958. Until recently, when Pyeonghwa Motors superseded it, Sungri Motor Plant was the largest automotive manufacturer in the country. Nonetheless, the Sungri Motor Plant remains the largest truck manufacturer to this day. ‘Sungri’ means “Victory” in Korean.
A Sungri-61NA truck with square headlights and single rear wheels, seen in 2013. Source: https://www.chinesecars.net/content/sungri-61na-square-headlights-4×2
The most common Sungri trucks are based on the Soviet GAZ-51 family of trucks. The GAZ-51 was a truck with an empty weight of 2.7 tonnes and with a load weight of 2.5 tonnes. The first Sungri truck, the Sungri-58, was a crude copy of the GAZ-51, which was overall very similar to the original 1946 GAZ-51, but was generally of lower production quality. Sungri-58 production would continue in the following decades and improved types would even be introduced in the 1970s, but the Sungri Motor Plant also began production of the Sungri-61 in 1961. This was a copy of the GAZ-63 truck, which was in itself merely a 4×4 version of the GAZ-51. Later, in 1971, the Sungri Motor Plants introduced a model with some significant modifications, the Sungri-61NA. It featured a redesigned cabin and engine hood, identifiable by the headlights being closer together and more integrated in the shape of the hood, as well as an increased payload.
The Sungri-61NA likely retains the same 6-cylinders engine as the GAZ-51. This is a GAZ-11 petrol engine, with a volume of 3,485 cm3, and a horsepower output of 70 hp at 2,800 rpm. It has a maximum torque of 201 Nm at 1,500 rpm. It ought to be noted that the engine is likely a North Korean copy, and quality issues are not entirely excluded. Some sources seem to claim the Sungri-61NA is a 4×2 truck, which seems odd, seeing as it is an evolution of the 4×4 Sungri-61. The payload is reported to be maintained at around 2.5 tonnes, despite opposing claims that the payload capacity was increased. Several different configurations have been seen. The truck exists both with rounded or square headlights, and can also feature either a doubled rear wheel, or a single wider rear wheel per side.
Overall, the Sungri trucks have been massively produced in North Korea, likely being the most produced trucks in the country.
The Type 63 107mm MRL
The Type 63 is a simple 107 mm rocket launcher that was designed and produced in the People’s Republic of China from the early 1960s. The standard launcher uses three rows of four launchers mounted on a split-trail carriage with two wheels fitted with pneumatics, which allows for considerable elevation of up to +57°.
A North Korean Type 63 MRL during coastal defense exercises. Source: Oryx Blog
The system has a limited maximum range of 8 km, and uses an 18.8 kg solid-fuel rocket with a fairly small warhead containing 1.3 kg of TNT. On the upside, it is an incredibly cheap platform that proved easy to produce in massive numbers, and could easily be operated in large numbers, be mounted on all kinds of platforms or even be carried around by infantry thanks to its lightweight.
With its cheap cost and non-negligible saturation potential, it is not surprising that the Type 63 proved to be a major success with the Korean People’s Army. Large-scale production of the type has been ongoing for decades, with the designation of “Type 75” sometimes being used for North Korean-produced 107 mm MRLs. The system has been widely used in various branches of the KPA. It has been in a frontline fire-support role since its introduction, but was also seen in coastal defense exercises, with its intended role presumably to target enemy forces as they land on a beach, and not naval assets.
The Truck-Borne MLRS
Seeing as the Sungri-61NA is the most commonly-produced North Korean light truck, and the 107 mm Type 63 an extremely common light multiple rocket launcher, it is not surprising that a combination of the two would eventually emerge. The 107 mm Type 63 is indeed widely mounted on North Korean vehicles. It has been spotted on non-turreted 323 armored personnel carriers – the “Sonyon” – as well as on other trucks.
A battery of Sungri-61NA MLRS firing. The front vehicle bears the flag of the Korean People’s Armed Forces. Source: Oryx Blog A close-up on a vehicle with female crew members during a parade. Source: topwar.ru
The combination of the Sungri-61NA and Type 63 dates back to 1993 at the latest. This date also marked the beginning of one of North Korea’s periods of most hardship, often known as the “arduous march”, with the collapse of the Soviet Union causing a period of tremendous economic downturn and outright famine in the DPRK. The massive difficulties in acquiring materials and putting people to work led to a colossal reduction of productivity in this era, with only 150 trucks being produced by Sungri in its worst year, 1996. It appears many of these 150, and in general a significant proportion of Sungri-61NA trucks produced in this era, would be turned into MLRS vehicles. All Sungri-61NA used to create MLRS vehicles seen so far feature doubled rear wheels and rounded headlights.
The Sungri-61NA MLRS vehicles mount the 107 mm Type 63 to the rear of the vehicle. The open rear area of the vehicle features collapsable fenders. Thanks to the limited size of the Type 63 MLRS, it is actually far from completely occupying the rear bay of the Sungri-61NA. This free space was put to good use in the MLRS version. The space just behind the cabin was used to place ammunition boxes which presumably allow for the stowage of rockets for a second salvo after the first is fired.
The 107 mm Type 63 is able to fire an entire salvo in 7 to 9 seconds. Though its range, accuracy and explosive powers are fairly limited, it can reload quickly. The ability of a small truck mounting an MRL to stow one reload without relying on a secondary vehicle is quite impressive, and in theory, the ability of a Sungri-61NA battery to fire two salvoes of 107 mm rockets before promptly leaving to avoid counter-battery can be quite valuable militarily.
Sungri-61NA MLRS trucks in a recent parade. These only feature a crew of four it would seem. Source: read01.com
The photos we have of Sungri-61NA MRLS on parades appear to show a crew of six. Two crew members are in the cabin and four in the rear area, alongside the MRL. Considering the Type 63 is typically operated with a crew of five, though operation remains possible with a crew of four, it is likely the passenger of the cabin exits it to help with the firing and reloading. The vehicle’s crew can likely be divided into a driver, a commander, and four rocket launcher operators. Sometimes, only two crew members are present at the rear instead.
The KPA’s Most Common MLRS ?
While the Sungri-61NA MLRS was introduced at an unfortunate time for the KPA, the type appears to, over the years, have been produced in large numbers. Considering it combines likely the cheapest truck and MRL in North Korea, it is not surprising that the Sungri-61NA may very well have become the most commonly used MLRS in service in North Korea, though this cannot be confirmed for certain. It appears the system is typically operated at a regimental level.
Sungri-61NA MLRS trucks armed with Igla MANPADS in a recent parade. Source: Oryx Blog A close-up on the rear area of a similarly outfitted vehicle. Source: topwar.ru
In recent years, there have been some significant upgrades and evolution in North Korean MLRS. While more modern types, notably the 300 mm KN-09, have been introduced, large upgrades have also been applied to older 240 or 122 mm systems, such as, notably, GPS-guided rockets. However, because of the simplicity and limited evolutionary potential of the 107 mm rockets, it is likely that these upgrades appear to have largely not been implemented on the Sungri-61NA MLRS.
Nevertheless, one modification has been spotted in recent years, but does not concern the rocket-launcher itself. In recent parades, Sungri-61NA MLRS trucks were seen with two added Igla MANPADS (Man-portable air-defense system), one on each side of the rear area, located behind the ammunition boxes. Such an addition is not surprising, as fitting Iglas to all kinds of vehicles is a very common practice in the KPA. Though one may question the reasoning in fitting such missiles on an artillery vehicle, considering their potential is very limited against anything but helicopters and low-flying planes, an argument could be made that the limited range of 107 mm rockets would mean the vehicles would be quite close to the frontline and may end up confronted with an enemy helicopter. Still, mounting not one but two missiles appears a questionable decision. A more reasonable explanation for it is that mounting MANPADS on vehicles in parades does not appear to systematically equal these MANPADS being mounted in the field. There has indeed been a lot of footage of North Korean vehicles typically equipped with MANPADS in parades not featuring any during more operational exercises.
Conclusion – An Unsung Workhorse
When it comes to the Korean People’s Army, many of the more peculiar, quirky, and impressive designs created by North Korean engineers tend to attract major public attention. These may be the Songun-Ho or recent M2020, overshadowing the workhorses that are the older Chonma-Ho tanks and 323 APCs when it comes to armored fighting vehicles, and the 300 mm KN-09 or 240 mm systems such as the M1985 or M1991 eclipsing the very numerous 122 and 107 mm systems of the KPA. Though a variety of 107 mm-armed platforms exist, the Sungri-61NA is very likely the most commonly-used one. As such, it is a very important part of the lower echelons of North Korean rocket artillery. By itself, it may appear, and indeed is, an unimpressive system, merely being a 1960s MRL mounted on a truck-based on 1940s technology. But while it is certain Sungri-61NA MRLS would be destroyed in the dozens as soon as a conflict involving North and South Korea ignites, the large quantity of vehicles of the type in service is an important part of the overwhelming barrage of artillery that comprises perhaps the greatest threat posed by North Korea outside of nuclear warheads.
107 mm MRL on Sungri-61NA. Illustration by Pavel Alexe, funded through our Patreon campaign.107 mm MRL on Sungri-61NA armed with Igla MANPADS. Illustration by Pavel Alexe, funded through our Patreon campaign.
107 mm MRL on Sungri-61NA Specifications
Length
Around 5.7 m
Width
Around 2.3 m
Engine
Likely GAZ-11 6-cylinders petrol engine producing 70 hp at 2,800 rpm
Canon de 25mm SA modèle 1934 M.39 in its late configuration, mounting a muzzle brake, illustrated by Ardhya 'Vesp' Anargha, funded by our Patreon campaign.
France (1938-1940)
Anti-Tank Gun – Unknown Number Built
The French Army started to experiment with armor-piercing weapons as early as the Great War. During the German offensive of 1914, a vastly overestimated armored car scare led to the French army mobilizing naval 47 mm guns for anti-armor work, notably creating the Autocanon de 47mm Renault. The entrenchment of both sides as 1914 morphed into 1915 put an end to this armored car scare. Later in the war, as tanks became an actively used weapon, countering them became a source of worry again. The vehicles were first employed by France’s ally, Britain, and then by the French themselves, before the Germans would be able to produce and employ their own. But the possibility remained there, and the German Army would also widely use captured British tanks. As such, a number of options were studied as early as 1917 or 1918. This included some infantry support guns which were hoped to also fulfil an anti-armor role, such as the ill-fated American-made 37 mm Bethlehem Steel gun, or the mounting of the ubiquitous 75 mm modèle 1897 gun on a wooden platform which guaranteed high lateral traverse. In the last weeks of the conflict, the French tested what appeared to be a more mature and potent solution to the problem of enemy tank, the 17 mm Filloux, a high-velocity (1,000 m/s) anti-tank gun firing a small caliber, 17×209 mm semi-rimmed cartridge, mounted on the carriage of the very common 37 mm TR modèle 1916 infantry support gun.
The conclusion of the Great War would result in the threat of enemy armored fighting vehicles being vastly less urgent, and likely due to less interest from a scaling-down military, the 17 mm Filloux would not go anywhere. Nonetheless, studies on the matter of anti-tank guns continued in France. While a curious Delaunay-Belleville DB20 20 mm weapon, seemingly sometimes called an “anti-tank machine gun”, was offered in a similar timeframe or soon after the Filloux, it was not adopted either.
In 1921, France launched a program that envisioned both a 10 to 15 mm dual-purpose anti-tank and anti-aircraft machine gun, as well as a dedicated high-velocity anti-tank gun of a caliber smaller than 37 mm. This program would fail to result in the adoption of an anti-tank gun. The machine gun requirement would result in a 13.5 mm MAC dual-purpose prototype and later the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss, which was used strictly in an anti-aircraft role. Meanwhile, in 1927, the state workshop of APX (Atelier de Constructions de Puteaux – Puteaux construction workshop) offered a 20 mm anti-tank gun. The caliber was found to be too small to result in sufficient armor-piercing capacities. New specifications requesting a 25 mm semi-automatic gun were issued in 1928. Prototypes from both APX and Hotchkiss would be pursued. The Hotchkiss design would finally be adopted in 1934. One can lament how the French Army had the conceptual requirements for an anti-tank gun as early as 1921, but would only be able to start issuing one in the middle of the 1930s.
The 25 mm Hotchkiss
The 25 mm anti-tank gun the French army adopted in 1934 was a potent gun. While small in diameter, its long, 72 caliber barrel granted a high 950 m/s muzzle velocity to its 25×193.5 mm rimmed tungsten core projectiles. Able to penetrate a 40 mm plate at a perpendicular angle and a range of 400 m, or a 32 mm plate at an angle of 35° and a range of 200 m, the gun would have had little issue dealing with most tanks used in the mid-1930s.
Abandoned Hotchkiss anti-tank guns still attached to their Renault UK Trailers during the Battle of France. Source: pinterest
Nonetheless, some aspects of the Hotchkiss gun, especially those concerning the shield and carriage, betrayed its 1920s conception. Despite its small caliber, the 25 mm SA 34 was still a fairly heavy piece, at 480 kg in battery. This would prove an issue when manoeuvring the gun around. During traction, it also meant that towing the gun with a single horse would be quite slow and tiring for the animal. On the topic of traction, the gun also suffered as it had no suspension. As a result, it could only be towed at slow to moderate speeds. When adopted, the French Army regulations stated the gun could be towed only at a maximum of 15 km/h on a good road, 10 km/h on an average road, and 6 km/h on cross-country. After a little under 2,000 guns had been produced, modifications allowed the traction speed to rise to 35, 20, and 10 km/h respectively, which was better, but still not particularly fast. In other words, while it offered a modern and potent weapon in terms of ballistics, the carriage of the 25 mm Hotchkiss could still be improved in order to make the operation of the gun easier.
APX Works on Hotchkiss’ Gun
Upon adoption of Hotchkiss’ gun, the issues of weight and traction were not entirely out of the French Army’s consideration. As early as the adoption of the gun, APX’s engineers were asked to try and come up with a lightened design which would be easier to move around.
French troops by the side of a camouflaged APX 25 mm SA-L 37 anti-tank gun, 1940. Source: supper-hobby.com
APX, having taken part in the competition that resulted in the adoption of the Hotchkiss gun with their own prototype, quickly came up with a modified version of the 25 mm anti-tank gun. The APX-modified Hotchkiss design offered a first prototype in 1936, though it differed significantly from the definitive model adopted in 1937. Compared to the original gun, the APX SA-L 1937 managed to massively lower the weight from 480 to 310 kg while keeping identical armor-piercing performances. The adoption of a new, simpler shield design contributed to the weight loss. However, the main reduction was with the use of a 193 kg carriage instead of the 386 kg on the Hotchkiss 25 mm SA 34. As a result, the gun was more fragile, and was strictly prohibited from motorized traction. Strict orders were given for it to only be transported under by horses, at maximum speeds of 15 km/h on a good road, and 10 km/h cross-country. Nonetheless, the weight losses were still significant, and the APX-modified gun was adopted as the 25 mm SA-L 37 (25 mm Semi-Automatique Allégé modèle 1937 – Eng: 25mm, semi-automatic, lightened, 1937 pattern) and entered production alongside the Hotchkiss gun.
Putting the Same Men at Work, Under a New Employer
While the French Army put APX’s engineers to work on a lightened version of the Hotchkiss gun, this did not mean that the original Hotchkiss designers were not put to work on improving their design either.
In 1936, the new left-wing government of France, known as the Popular Front, led massive nationalization of the French armament industry, with the desire to put this critical sector under the control of the state rather than private companies. In this context, the armament factories of Hotchkiss, in Levallois-Perret, were nationalized in August 1936.
The engineers at Levallois likely started to work on an improved version of their anti-tank gun at an earlier point. Unlike APX, they opted for a different solution on how to improve the 25 mm anti-tank gun. While still aiming to lighten the gun to an extent, another equally important goal was to enable high-speed traction on the new design. The first clear trace of an improved 25 mm gun from Levallois is dated from February 24th 1937, when the factory confirmed the improved anti-tank gun it was working on would be finished soon. In practice, however, it would be another year and a half before a prototype of the improved 25 mm anti-tank gun from Levallois would be put to trial. The improved gun would begin experimentation on July 12th 1938.
Design of the Levallois 25 mm Lightened Anti-Tank Gun
The prototype appears to have been, by this point, known as the Canon de 25 SA allégé (Eng: Lightened 25 SA gun, SA standing for Semi-Automatic) or Canon de 25 mm SA Hotchkiss adapté à la traction rapide (Eng: Hotchkiss 25 mm SA gun modified for rapid traction).
The 25 mm Levallois prototype in its original configuration, still sporting a muzzle brake. The wavy top of the gun shield was intended to break the silhouette of the anti-tank gun and make it more difficult to identify as a man-made object when camouflaged and at range. Source: GBM 98
Some very significant modifications had to be undertaken around the carriage in order both to lighten the gun and allow high-speed traction. Likely, the most significant was the addition of a suspension. The gun used wheels fairly similar to those used on the APX SA-L 37. These were aluminum wheels with 14 ribs and holes separating each of these in order to lose weight, with pneumatic 67 cm in diameter tires. These wheels were mounted on a deformable axle mounted on springs. The carriage retained a split-trail, which would automatically lock the suspension when deployed.
A number of additional changes were made to the gun in order to lighten it. Most of these involved using thinner construction for elements, such as the split-trail, as well as lighter steel. This lighter construction material was notably used in the elevation and rotation wheels as well as sight holder. The complex multiple-piece shield of the 25 mm SA 34 was ditched and replaced by a much simpler and thinner one-plate shield, with an opening to the top right of the barrel through which the sight would be placed. The thinner thickness of the shield was compensated by it being angled further back, with an incidence of 30° in comparison to 15° on the SA 34. The shield offered less protection to the gun’s crew in comparison to the 25 mm SA 34, but this was deemed an acceptable loss.
There were also some modifications unrelated to the weight of the gun itself. The traverse and elevation mechanisms of the gun were now locked when in travel mode. However, the gun was also modified so that it could be aimed, traversed and elevated without deploying the split-trail if need be. The four contact points of the gun with the ground, aka the end of the split-trail and the wheels, were revised in order to ensure greater stability. The modified gun also removed the pistol grip featuring a trigger present on the original gun. Instead, the trigger-lever was found under the carriage. A firing mechanism was also added to the traverse wheel.
Front view of a 25 mm SA 34 (left) and the Levallois lightened 25 mm prototype (right). The much simpler gun shield is obvious. By this point, the Levallois gun has been revised and now sports a muzzle brake. Source: GBM 98
Dimensions wise, the gun was fairly similar to the 25 mm SA 34, with slight differences. It had a width of 1.13 m, a total length of 3.46 m in travel mode, and a height of 1.08 m. The lateral traverse was identical to the 25 mm SA 34, with 30° to either side, giving a forward 60º field of fire. The elevation and depression were -5° to +15°. In terms of weight, the gun was 110 kg lighter in battery, at 370 kg. The gun itself was barely lighter, at 89 kg in comparison to the SA 34’s 90 kg. The weight reduction had largely been carried out with the carriage, which went from 386 to 281 kg, and the shield, which went from 75 to 38 kg. There were little to no modifications in the design of the gun itself. It retained the same 25×193.5 mmR cartridges, the same L.711 sight, and a similar semi-automatic breech granting a theoretical rate of fire of around 30 rounds per minute, and a more practical one of 15 to 20.
Trials and Modifications
Trials began in July 1938 at the Etablissement d’expériences techniques de Versailles or EETVS (Eng: Versailles Technical Experience Establishment). These trials included the firing of 500 projectiles, and being towed by motor vehicles for 500 km in varied terrain and then 3,000 km on roads.
Mobility-wise, the gun performed very well. The said distances were crossed at an average speed of 55 km/h, and sometimes peaking at up to 85 km/h. The suspension was found to perform very well and make the gun easy to move around across all types of terrain and by all types of vehicles, including Renault UE tracked tractors, lorries, horses, and likely half-tracks. The only issue found was light damage on one of the wheels, which was not particularly out of the ordinary after such distances were crossed. The mobility of the gun, when moved around by its crew in the field, was also tested. The gun was subjected to comparative trials against the 25 mm SA 34. Both guns were carried around by a five-man team through 200 m of varied, cross-country terrain. The team moving the Levallois lightened gun around were found to cross this distance in 3.25 minutes and still be in good shape at the end of it, whereas the team moving the 25 mm SA 34 around needed 6.05 minutes to cross the same distance and were exhausted by the end. These good performances would result in it being rated for 70 km/h on a good road, 40 km/h on an average road, and 15 km/h cross-country. Seeing as the gun was towed around at 85 km/h without issue during trials, it is likely these regulations were conservative to an extent.
While, mobility-wise, the gun was excellent, there were some issues when firing. The lighter construction of the gun led to an increase in recoil. While the movement of the gun backward was the same as on the 25 mm SA 34, at 240 mm, it was felt more strongly. This was found to be a particularly negative issue during the first few shots taken in a new position, when the gun was still ‘anchoring’ itself in the ground. At these moments, a gunner would have to remove their eyes from the sight before firing, taking the risk of light injury around the eye if this was not done. This was obviously not judged as acceptable by the trials commission, which sent the gun back to Levallois for a few days so modifications could be undertaken during the trials. The solution by Levallois’s engineer was to remove the flash hider, similar to the one found on the 25 mm SA 34, and replace it with a circular muzzle brake. This proved sufficient to reduce the recoiling length to 200 mm and solve any issue with the gun potentially injuring its operators during recoil.
The 25 mm Levallois prototype after it received modifications, notably the installation of a muzzle brake. Source: GBM n°98
There were still some minor issues with the gun. The addition of a muzzle brake was found to result in some projections of dust, small rocks, or mud towards the crew, particularly when the barrel was particularly close to the ground, as could be the case in fortifications. The trigger configuration was also found to be inferior to the 25 mm SA 34, of which the pistol grip was dearly missed. However, it was also found to have a number of advantages. Performance-wise, it was very similar to the 25 mm SA 34, but putting the gun in battery, or out of battery, was a much easier and less effort-intensive task for the crew. When maneuvering the gun around, the weight carried by each crewmember was found to be of 17 kg, while it would have been 33 on the 25 mm SA 34. These advantages were judged sufficient by the trials commission tasked with testing the gun to deem it “un bon matériel de guerre” (Eng: A good wartime piece of equipment). On January 10th 1939, the French Direction of Infantry formally adopted the gun as the Canon de 25 mm SA modèle 1934 M.39 (Eng: 25 mm SA gun 1934 pattern M.39, with M.39 standing for modifié 1939 – modified 1939)
Elements similar to the 25 mm SA 34
The exact anti-armor performances of the 25 mm SA 34 M.39 are not known. However, we know they were close enough to the 25 mm SA 34 to the point where the need to report them was not felt. Trials of the Balle P anti-armor projectile on the 25 mm SA 34 indicated a penetration of 40 mm on a vertical steel plate at 500 m, and 32 mm on a plate at an angle of 35° and a range of 200 m. German tests performed with captured guns give a more extensive range of values. Against a vertical plate, the shell penetrated 47, 40, and 30 mm of armor at 100, 500, and 1,000 m, respectively. At 30°, the penetration values were 35, 30, and 20 mm. Finally, at 45º, they were 18, 16, and 15 mm.
The view offered by the APX L.711 sights. Extract from the Notice sur le canon semi-automatique “Hotchkiss” de 25mm du 2 Janvier 1935, in its 1937 edition, by the Ecole Militaire & d’Application de la Cavalerie et du TrainFigure showing the various types of projectile, as well as the standard Balle P and its tungsten core. Extract from the Notice d’instruction de l’école des chars de combat, 1937, via the French National Library/Gallica
The sights used on the 25 mm SA 34 and on the M.39 were the lunette L.711 APX modèle 1936, which offered a 4x magnification, 11° field of vision, and markings for firing at up to 3,500 m. It was not fixed to the carriage, and was carried in a separate case. The opening to insert the sight into was found on the top right of the barrel.
The crew of the 25 mm SA 34 and of the M.39 would comprise six: a commander, a gunner placed to the left of the gun, a loader placed on the right, and three additional gun crewmembers. If the gunner was knocked out, their replacement was the loader, and if the loader was knocked out, they were replaced by the second spare crewmember, who otherwise cleaned and handed over the 25 mm cartridges from the crates. In practice, the gun could remain reasonably effective with two crewmembers, and still be operated, albeit with a much lower rate of fire, by a single crewmember.
Production Schedule
The modified gun was adopted in January 1939 and, in long-term planning, was intended to replace the 25 mm SA 34 on the production line, and eventually in the army. However, switching the production lines to the new gun would take some time. – By Spring 1940, production of the 25 mm SA 34 was still in full swing and even increasing.
It does appear that a few pre-production 25 mm SA 34 M.39 pieces may have been completed. According to one report, two guns were in service, likely for experimental purposes, within the 1ère Division d’Infanterie Motorisée (1ère DIM) (Eng: 1st Motorized Infantry Division) on April 1st, 1940. No view of these guns has ever emerged, and as such, their existence remains hypothetical and should be treated as such. The gun was intended to be distributed in priority to motorized unit, such as the BCPs (Bataillon de Chasseur Portés – Eng: Motorized Chasseurs Battalions), CDACs (Compagnie Divisionnaire Antichar – Eng: Divisional Anti-Tank Company) and motorized infantry regiments. In the meantime, the prototype was still being used experimentally, with the last known firing trials being held as late as May 7th, 1940.
Deliveries of the first production examples were to start in June 1940, with the first 50 examples scheduled to be delivered during this month. What eventually befell these is unknown. The facilities of Levallois would have been taken, alongside Paris, on June 14th. In previous decades, there were some rumors that up to 400 may have been completed, but more recent research has disproven such claims. Currently, uncertainty exists as if some may have even been fully completed. If so, they likely saw little to no operational use, or may even have been captured intact before delivery by German troops. If they indeed existed, the two pre-production guns part of the 1ère DIM may very well have fought, seeing as the division was engaged, and later annihilated, in the French manoeuver to safeguard Belgium and the Netherlands, Plan Dyle-Breda, ending in the encirclement of much of the best elements of the French Army, the British Expeditionary Force, and the Belgian Army around Dunkerque.
Conclusion – The Last Evolution of the French 25 mm
The Canon de 25 mm SA modèle 1934 M.39 was the most advanced model of the French 25 mm gun. When comparing it to the standard gun adopted in 1934, its operation would generally be easier due to a suspension and lighter weight which granted the gun a much better mobility, either when being towed behind a horse or vehicle or when being moved around by its crew in the field. Performance-wise, the gun was identical to the standard 25 mm, which proved adequate during the 1940 campaign.
One can still raise questions on how long the new 25 mm would have remained a useful piece of equipment. The issue with such a low-caliber is that, as the war went on, creating more powerful ammunition would likely have proven to be a struggle. As a matter of fact, as early as 1940, studies for Brandt sub-caliber ammunition which would highly improve armor-piercing performances were underway for a number of calibers. These included the French 37 mm or 75 mm, as well as 155 and 203 mm calibers for the navy, but, crucially, none appears to have been considered for the 25 mm. As such, it is likely the gun would slowly fall into obsolescence in the coming years, even if it was actually produced. While some small-caliber armor-piercing weapons, such as Soviet 14.5 mm anti-tank rifles, proved to remain useful for the duration of the war, albeit typically not as much as in the its early phases, these were typically man-portable anti-tank rifles which would be far easier to move around to target the sides and other weak areas of a tank’s armor coverage than a field gun, even a particularly light and mobile one.
Canon de 25mm SA modèle 1934 M.39 in its late configuration, mounting a muzzle brake, illustrated by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha, funded by our Patreon campaign.Canon de 25mm SA modèle 1934 M.39 in its early configuration, illustrated by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha, funded by our Patreon campaign.
Weight (Deployed)
370 kg
Length (With Carriage)
3.46 m
Height
1.08 m
Width
1.13 m
Maximum towing speed
70 km/h (good road)
40 km/h (average road)
15 km/h (cross-country)
Caliber
25 x 193.5 mm
Traverse
60°
Elevation
-5° to +15°
Rate of fire
8 – 20 rpm, up to 25 rpm with a well-trained crew
Sight Range
3,500 m
Effective range
800 m
Sources
GBM n°97, Juillet-Août-Septembre 2011, “Les canons semi-automatiques antichars de 25 mm Première Partie: Le canon de 25 mm SA modèle 1934”, Eric Denis et François Vauvillier, pp 86-95
GBM n°98, Octobre-Novembre-Décembre 2011, “Les canons semi-automatiques antichars de 25 mm Deuxième Partie: Les dérivés du 25 mm SA modèle 1934”, Eric Denis, pp 28-31
Notice sur le canon semi-automatique “Hotchkiss” de 25mm du 2 Janvier 1935, in its 1937 edition, by the Ecole Militaire & d’Application de la Cavalerie et du Train via Wikimaginot
323 fire support vehicle with 76mm F-22. Illustration by Pavel “Carpaticus” Alexe.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Likely 1970s-Present)
Light Self-Propelled Gun/Assault Gun – Unknown Number Built
The KPA (Korean People’s Army), the standing military of North Korea, has a very peculiar selection of equipment, much of which is designed locally with roots in Chinese and Soviet technology. One of many aspects of the KPA is its vast use of self-propelled artillery pieces. A good dozen of various matings of chassis and artillery pieces are known to be in service of the KPA, with dozens to hundreds of vehicles simultaneously spotted in occasional firing exercises.
This artillery component is one of the most impressive elements of the KPA, and features some of the North Korean systems which seem the least outdated and the most capable in comparison to foreign vehicles. The heavy M1978 and M1989 170 mm “Koksan” or the recent M2018 being the most obvious examples. However, these are two of a myriad of systems in operation, the oldest of which can be a lot less impressive. One of the least known and likely the puniest and most obsolete of these is a 76 mm self-propelled gun based on the chassis of the 323 armored personnel carrier.
The 323 chassis and artillery
The North Korean 323 is a vastly modified derivative of the Chinese YW531A. The base North Korean version is an amphibious armored personnel carrier with five road wheels. It is fully amphibious and moves through water through two hydrojets. It features a turret armed with two 14.5 mm KPV machine guns and an infantry compartment for a complement of 10 dismounts, though North Korean sources claim as high as 12.
The 323 was introduced in the early 1970s, being first spotted by Western observers in 1973 and subsequently designated as the M1973 by the US Department of Defence (DoD). Soon after the type was introduced in the KPA, its chassis would start being re-used for other purposes, creating a family of vehicles with high parts commonality.
North Korea, by the 1970s, already had a large park of mostly Soviet-produced artillery pieces as well as local copies and variants of these types. With towed pieces progressively moving out of fashion in comparison to self-propelled ones, which provided far higher mobility, the KPA heavily invested in self-propelled artillery pieces from the 1970s onward.
An M1985 self-propelled gun on the parade. Armed with a 122 mm D-30 gun, it has a more complex superstructure design in comparison to the 76 mm-armed vehicle and overall appears to be a more mature vehicle.
The most famous piece to be mounted on the 323 likely is the 122 mm D-30 gun. A self-propelled gun mounting this piece on the 323 chassis entered production in 1976 and was designated M1977 by the US DoD. It was slightly improved into the M1985 type during the 1980s. Vehicles armed with 100 mm and, according to some claims, an indigenous 103 mm gun would also appear. These types were fairly often shown in consequent numbers during military exercises. However, at least two other types of 323 self-propelled artillery pieces, not accounting for mortars, are also known to exist. One mounts an unknown, likely 57 mm anti-tank gun. Another features the antique 76 mm M1936 F-22 divisional gun.
A North Korean Marder
As with most other North Korean vehicles, the 76 mm 323-based vehicle is known through exercises footage. It is, in this particular case, very scarce, even more so than for usual North Korean vehicles, with only two stills from a KPA firing exercise being available.
The best existing view of the 323 F-22 self-propelled gun, from exercise footage featured on Korean Central TV. Source: reddit
The vehicle consists of the basic hull of the 323 armored personnel carrier, which is best described as a welded steel box with a boat-like shape towards the front in order to improve movement through water.
The self-propelled gun features an open-topped rear compartment where the armament is located, with the turret removed to make space. On the 76 mm vehicle, the front plates are angled with the same angle rearward, with two small plates slightly angled inward. The compartment as a whole also appears fairly low. Some form of travel lock is present on the gun’s axis.
The gun’s mounting is not visible in any photos, but it retains the same gunshield as when used as a field gun. Its field of fire appears to be determined by the simple lack of superstructure towards the front. Overall, the superstructure appears similar to the one adopted on later 323 self-propelled guns, though perhaps less refined; this could be typical of the vehicle being one of the first of these conversions devised.
Though this part of the vehicle is not clear, it appears that the compartment is indeed closed towards the rear. It could feature a form of rear door or hatch, commonly found on 323-based artillery vehicles. The vehicle which has been observed features a log mounted on the side of the hull, but no other equipment or stowage appears visible.
Whether the hydrojets are present or have been removed is unknown as there is no known rear view of the vehicle, which would be needed to assess their presence. Open-topped vehicles are typically more at risk in amphibious operations due to the obvious danger of water entering through the top due to waves, particularly as the 76 mm-armed vehicle has a rather low superstructure. On the other hand, this vehicle appears to be a fairly quick conversion, which raises the question of whether or not removing the hydrojets would have been considered. The vehicle does appear to retain a trim vane, which would support the amphibious capacity being retained, though this may again just not have been worth the hassle to remove.
Armament: an Antique Soviet Field Gun
The armament present on the self-propelled gun is the Soviet 76 mm M1936 F-22 divisional gun. This was an artillery piece produced in moderate numbers during the late 1930s. It had been intended to operate not only as a divisional field gun, but also featured moderate anti-aircraft capacities, though this was not a success.
Soviet troops tow an F-22 gun, likely during the Great Patriotic War. Sources: Armchair generals forums
The gun has an L/51 barrel and is able to fire shells at a velocity varying from 645 m/s (Sh-354T shrapnel shell) to around 705 m/s (most HE shells), with armor-piercing shells, APHE or AP, having a muzzle velocity of 690 m/s. Though North Korea inherited some of these guns from the Soviet Union in the 1940s or 1950s, it makes for a very curious choice to arm a self-propelled gun. The more modern ZiS-3 is true, by all accounts, a much more common piece in the DPRK arsenal, due in large parts to the production of the F-22 already having been completed by the start of the Great Patriotic War in 1941, and stocks of the piece having been largely lost by attrition during the war before some could even be passed on the North Korean. The ZiS-3 is a more modern piece for which more spare parts are available. Furthermore, the KPA already had a large number of SU-76Ms at their disposal, which would permit studying the gun mount on these vehicles to mount into a self-propelled gun. Nonetheless, the vehicle went through with the F-22 gun.
North Korean ZiS-3 76 mm guns during firing exercises. Source: Oryx blog
The crew configuration of the vehicle is not known. Though in field use, the F-22 used a crew of six, it is very likely this cannot be replicated on the 323 vehicle, due to, simply, lack of space. The vehicle’s driver is located towards the front, as on the standard 323. The standard armored personnel carrier features another crew member, the commander, towards the front of the hull, and as such the commander of the self-propelled gun, or one of its servants, may also take a seat there. With the superstructure pushed so much to the rear, it is unclear whether space for one or two additional crew members may still exist in the hull. They would be hard-pressed to find space in the artillery compartment alongside the crew also present there though, as space there appears very limited. As such, it is fairly probable that only two to four crew members operate the gun. Unfortunately, only two crew members are visible on the known photo of the vehicle. Ammunition stowage is also unknown.
An Undated Vehicle, but an Obsolete One Nonetheless
With only limited known footage, dating the F-22-armed vehicle is hard. The known footage appears to date from at least the 1990s, if not the 2000s or even 2010s. However, the self-propelled gun as a whole appears quite a lot less professional than North Korean self-propelled guns introduced as early as the late 1970s. As such, it may have been one off, if not the first 323-based self-propelled gun, with the experience gained designing it being used to improve further vehicles. There is also the possibility that the conversion was not done by a professional institution, such as the Sinhung tank factory that manufactures the 323 and the M1977 and M1985 artillery derivatives, but rather a field workshop.
The only other known view of the 323 76 mm self-propelled gun shows two vehicles of the type as well as their targets during firing exercises (two squares to the left). Along with the 323-based vehicles, 122 mm and 152 mm-armed vehicles of the Tokchon family are also shown. Due to this footage being an extract of a screen being filmed, quality is regrettably very poor, and only the general outline of the 323-based vehicles can be identified. Source: reddit
The role of the vehicle, either in the 1970s or even more so today, is in any case very limited. The 76 mm F-22 is an old and obsolete artillery piece, and it is unknown if the design of the 323 even allows it to make full use of its maximum range of about 14 kilometers. The vehicle may very well have been intended for direct fire-support, similarly to how the SU-76M can be used, though this vehicle also has indirect fire-support capacities. In this case, the vehicle would offer little more than a mobile, but obsolete field gun, in a very lightly armored platform that would be vulnerable to a heavy machine gun and anything larger, or even rifle and pistol caliber ammunition with any form of upward angle. One may cynically note that the vehicle offers little more in terms of operational capacities in comparison to the much older self-propelled guns that were created by the Axis using captured examples of the same F-22 gun during WWII, such as variants of the Marder II and Marder III by Germany or the TACAM T-60 by Romania.
Conclusion – the Poorest and Rarest 323 SPG
The F-22-armed 323 self-propelled gun is certainly one of the least impressive indigenous developments brought forward by North Korea’s military industry ever since it began manufacturing its own armored vehicles in the 1970s. Mounting an obsolete field gun in what appears to be a fairly crude manner, its use on a hypothetical Korean battlefield would have been very limited even if it somehow existed at least 25 to 30 years prior to its inception, in the Korean War. This would be even more so in a conflict at any point from the 1970s to now.
One should note that the vehicle definitely does not appear to be one of the most common 323-based self-propelled guns, only making one known appearance in which only two were spotted, though more may have been present. In comparison to the 100 and 122 mm-armed vehicles, it is a much rarer sight, which suggests far lower numbers were made – the deficiencies of the vehicle in comparison to other 323-based self-propelled guns likely being obvious. Nonetheless, considering the Korean People’s Army’s tendency to rarely if ever retire vehicles from service (and when retiring them, it is often from inability to maintain them rather than because of their poor capacities), it is very likely whatever number of F-22 armed self-propelled guns were manufactured are still in service somewhere in North Korea.
323 fire support vehicle with 76mm F-22. Illustration by Pavel “Carpaticus” Alexe.
323 fire support vehicle with 76mm F-22 Statistics
Length
~ 6.50 m
Width
~ 2.97 m
Engine
Unknown, perhaps Deutz BF8L413F 320 hp diesel engine
Suspension
Torsion bars
Crew
One driver
Likely one commander
Unknown but small number of servants
Russian Federation (1996-1999)
Infantry Fighting Vehicle – At Least 2 Prototypes Built
The Soviet BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle is a historically very significant vehicle, responsible for popularizing the IFV concept on a massive scale worldwide. The vehicle itself remains to this day the most produced infantry fighting vehicle in history, with about 40,000 produced in total in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, not counting various copies which could bring up that number by several thousands.
This ubiquitous status of the BMP-1, as well as the vehicle fairly quickly becoming obsolete, has led to a number of upgrade packages being studied and offered. Post-Soviet collapse Russia, which inherited thousands of BMP-1s, was the source of several of these. Perhaps the most potent to this day was a version of the vehicle fitted with the Kliver TKB-799 turret designed by the KBP Instrument Design Bureau based in Tula, which has historically been the main designer and producer of Soviet aircraft and ground-based autocannons, as well as several anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) or self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG) designs. This BMP-1 fitted with a modern turret was offered in the late 1990s, but would never be adopted by any user.
A BMP-1 fitted with the TKB-799 Kliver turret. Armed with four Kornet missiles as well as a 30 mm autocannon and a coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun, this was an advanced turret to fit onto the old BMP-1 hull. Source: reddit.com
The IFV of the Soviet World: Brief Summary of the BMP-1
Generally considered to be the first modern infantry fighting vehicle, the BMP-1 was designed by the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant in the early 1960s as the Object 765. It was adopted by the Red Army in 1965. Mass-production began under the name of BMP-1 in 1966.
The BMP-1 was a welded hull, amphibious armored fighting vehicle mounting a central one-man turret armed with the 2A28 Grom 73 mm low-pressure smoothbore gun and fed by an autoloader mechanism. The vehicle also featured a coaxial PKT 7.62 mm machine gun and a 9M14 Malyutka missile launcher mounted on top of the Grom’s barrel. To the rear, a troop compartment allowed the vehicle to transport 8 dismounts.
When first pushed into service in the late 1960s, the BMP-1 was a major addition to the Red Army’s arsenal, and despite the existence of some previous vehicles, such as the West German HS.30, it is often considered to be the first truly modern Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) to be adopted in massive numbers. Nevertheless, it was for the Eastern Bloc at least. The vehicle could be used to support armored assaults in all types of terrains thanks to its amphibious capacities, and was notably able to carry a section of infantry even in heavily contaminated terrain, which would typically be expected after the use of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) weapons. Support for accompanying tanks as well as dismounting infantry would be provided by a 73 mm Grom infantry support gun and a Malyutka missile launcher, with four missiles stored inside the vehicle. This was a considerable evolution in comparison to Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), which typically mounted little more than a heavy machine gun. In the Soviet Union, production of the BMP-1 lasted until 1982, with more than 20,000 vehicles produced. Almost equally large quantities were manufactured in Czechoslovakia as the BVP-1, while India produced a number under license, and a number of countries would produce more or less identical copies (Type 86 in China, Boragh in Iran, Khatim in Sudan). Operated in massive numbers by the Soviet Army and widely exported, the BMP-1 became perhaps the most ubiquitous infantry fighting vehicle in the world, despite a more modern type, the BMP-2, entering service in the early 1980s.
Russian BMP-1s in a Post-Soviet World
After years of a decline that the best efforts of various Soviet leaders could not prevent, the Soviet Union finally collapsed in December 1991, after most of its Warsaw Pact allies had gone their own way in 1989 and various Soviet Republics started declaring their independence from 1991 onward.
Russia, the largest, most populated, and most industrialized Republic of the former union, inherited most of the Red Army’s armament. Although the most significant aspect of this would likely be exclusive control of the USSR’s tremendous nuclear arsenal, it would also manifest in tens of thousands of armored fighting vehicles produced and fielded during the Soviet years. This included massive numbers of BMP-1s, perhaps up to ten thousand. The BMP-1 was at this point already fairly obsolete, with its 73 mm Grom main gun notably proving fairly puny and anemic, with a short effective range and only limited armor-piercing or high-explosive potential provided from its small shells. While some Soviet efforts, such as the BMP-1P upgrade (notably replacing the old Malyutka ATGM by a more modern Konkurs or Fagot ATGM and adding Tucha smoke dischargers), had been applied to part of the fleet, it nonetheless remained obvious that the BMP-1 was antiquated. More modern options were already in existence. The BMP-2 was in large-scale service for around a decade by the time of the collapse of the USSR and was armed with a 30 mm autocannon, far more useful than the Grom. The new BMP-3, a recent addition to the Soviet arsenal when the USSR collapsed, provided both a 30 mm autocannon and a 100 mm gun firing high-explosive shells and ATGMs, overall proving to be a very modern option. As such, it would appear the BMP-1 could perhaps entirely have been relegated to reserve use as these new vehicles entered service.
A BMP-1 alongside a T-72, abandoned by Russian forces and captured by the Chechens in Grozny during the first Chechen War, in a similar timeframe to the unveiling of the Kliver turret, August 1996. While groundbreaking in its time, the BMP-1 was very unsuitable for the kind of urban warfare which Russia would face against the Chechens. Source: reddit
The 1990s, however, quickly turned into a dreadful decade of economic collapse, widespread corruption, violence, and chaos for Russia, putting potential plans of a quick modernization of the army into disarray. The production of many high-end vehicles designed towards the later years of the Soviet Union, such as the T-72BU, which would be redesignated into the T-90, or the BMP-3, had to be slowed down or prioritized towards exports instead of domestic use, meaning old vehicles such as the BMP-1 proved to be longer-lived in Russian service. In these economically trying times, potential upgrades for Soviet vehicles used abroad could also potentially be a lucrative prospect for Russian design bureaus to try and exploit.
It was in this context that the KBP Instrument Design Bureau, based in Tula, around 200 km south of Moscow, would begin working on a turret design that could be fitted onto old Soviet armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles in order to bring them to a more modern standard firepower-wise. Tula was in a fairly decent position to study such a design, with the design bureau having extensive experience designing autocannons, ATGMs, and their mounting into armored fighting vehicles. Among Tula’s most famous designs was the turret for the advanced 2K22 Tunguska SPAAG, pretty much all Soviet widely-used autocannons designs, and ATGMs such as the Metis and Konkurs. In the field of ATGMs, Tula was notably working on a new, more modern system, which would become the Kornet. The turret design studied by Tula for older Soviet APC/IFVs would first be unveiled, in a model form, in 1996.
Turret – the TKB-799 “Kliver”
The turret designed by the KBP design bureau would be designated TKB-799 and be given the nickname “Kliver” (cleaver). The turret was first showcased in 1996. By this point, a functional turret had been manufactured but was mounted on a BTR-80. The BMP-1 equipped with the Kliver would first appear at IDEX 97 in Abu Dhabi. It appears at least two vehicles would be fitted with the turret for trials and marketing purposes.
A Kliver TKB-799 turret from the front, with, from left to right, the four Kornet launchers, the 7.62 mm PKTM, the 30 mm 2A72, and the Thermal Imager are visible. Source: mail.ruThe Kliver TKB-799 turret and turret basket. The system was designed with easy integration into Soviet APCs and IFVs in mind, but it was considered that with some work, it could be fitted into any armored vehicle able to sustain a 1.5 to 2.5 tonnes additional load and with enough space, including some Western vehicles, such as the M113 or MOWAG Piranha. No prototypes of such integrations appear to have ever been created. Source: topwar.ru
The Kliver was a weapon station designed with its own turret basket. The BMP-1 appears to have been the main platform intended for the turret, even though the turret was first showcased on the BTR-80. As such, the Kliver was designed for the BMP’s 1,380 mm turret ring diameter and with a light weight of 1,500 kg and could be installed without modifying the hull. The turret was operated by a single crew member, sitting on the left side of the turret, with the armament somewhat offset to the left.
Armament – 30 mm 2A72
The main armament of the Kliver turret was the 30 mm 2A72 autocannon, a modified 2A42 autocannon. The cannon fired 30×165 mm ammunition and had a rate of fire of 350 to 400 rpm. The gun was belt-fed, and overall remarkably light, weighing only 84 kg. The barrel length of 2,416 mm took a significant part of the weapon’s weight, at 36 kg, and was typically thicker and more durable than most barrels for 30 mm autocannons.
A BMP-1 Kliver prototype with its gun slightly elevated. With decent fire control systems, the vehicle would likely not be defenseless against enemy helicopters at close to medium ranges. Source: army-guide
A number of 30×165 mm shells were available for the 2A72. For use against light fortifications, infantry, soft-skinned vehicles, and other unarmored targets, the 2A72 could fire the 3UOF8 High-Explosive Incendiary (HE-I) shells. This shell had an explosive filling of 49 grams of A-IX-2, the standard Soviet explosive autocannon shell formula since 1943. The overall mass of the projectile was 390 g, and that of the whole cartridge 842 g. In high-explosive belts, it was complemented by the 3UOR6. This shell forsook most of the explosive charge, with only 11.5 g remaining, in order to mount a very large tracer. Fired at the same muzzle velocity of 980 m/s, it was used for fire correction purposes, though over large distances, the trajectory of the two shells differed. With a fuse lasting 9 to 14 seconds, the explosive shells would generally detonate after about 4 kilometers away if they did not meet a target, though autocannons were typically used effectively at much closer ranges. The rate of tracer to high-explosive rounds in a 30 mm belt tended to be 1:4.
For armor-piercing duties, two types of 30 mm shells existed. The older 3UBR6 was a fairly classic armor-piercing shell with a core of hardened structural steel. This steel core weighed 375 g, with the entire projectile weighing just 25 grams more, at 400 g, and the entire shell having a weight of 856 g. It featured a tracer that burned for 3.5 seconds after being fired and had a muzzle velocity of 970 m/s. Its penetration values against Rolled Homogeneous Armor (RHA) at an angle of 60° were 29 mm at 700 m, 18 mm at 1,000 m, and 14 mm at 1,500 m. These were fairly mediocre performances, able to defeat little more than light armored vehicles in the vast majority of cases.
A more modern armor-piercing shell existed in the form of the 3UBR8, an Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) shell with a tracer. It featured a lighter 222 g piercing core of tungsten alloy. The projectile as a whole was 304 g and the cartridge 765 g. Fired at a muzzle velocity of 1,120 m/s, this shell seemed to penetrate, against similar RHA armor and at the same angle of 60°, 35 mm at 1,000 m, and 25 mm at 1,500 m. It offered much more promising performances than the older 3UBR6 against modern infantry fighting vehicles.
The TKB-799 offered some, at the time, very modern fire control systems for a Russian IFV, enhancing the capacities of this 2A72 autocannon. The Kliver turret offered an independent two-plane sight stabilization and a day/night sight in the form of a thermal imager, as well as a laser rangefinding device. The turret featured an automatic electromechanical firing system. It would provide sighting and ranging, as well as weapon laying including both lead, elevation, and traverse, which would provide better accuracy, particularly against moving targets. The turret was also designed to allow fairly generous elevation angles of -10º to +60°, which would allow for moderate anti-aircraft capacities, particularly against helicopters. In general, with the FCS provided by the turret, it was hoped the 2A72 would have an effective range of about 2 km in good, flat terrain. It appears 300 rounds of ammunition were provided for the 2A72. The weapon was slightly offset to the right but was still the most centrally mounted of all of Kliver’s weapon systems.
A BMP-1 Kliver during trials in the snow. Source: armedconflicts.com
Secondary armament was provided in the form of a coaxial 7.62×54 mmR PKTM machine gun mounted to the right of the autocannon. This less crucial system is generally less documented in writings on the Kliver. It appears it was only provided with a limited ammunition supply of 200 rounds. Considering the capacities of the 2A72, there would be little reason to use the PKTM outside of enemy infantry in the open or some minimal suppression fire.
An Early Platform for the Kornet
In addition to the 2A72, the Kliver turret featured another crucial weapon system, this being Russia’s new anti-tank guided missile, also designed by the Tula design bureau, the 9M133 Kornet. This was a large caliber (152 mm) system. Work on it began a few years before the fall of the USSR, and it was first unveiled in 1994. In 1996, when it was showcased alongside the Kliver, it was still a new, cutting-edge system, which was yet to enter service in the Russian Army in a large scale.
A low-resolution picture of a Kornet being fired from a BMP-1’s Kliver turret. Source: army-guide
The Kornet used semi-automatic beam-riding guidance, meaning the missile was aimed using a laser beam aimed at the target from the firing vehicle. The previous 9M113 Konkurs offered by Tula was, in comparison, a wire-guided semi-automatic command to line of sight (SACLOS) system, which required the firing vehicle to constantly maintain the target in line-of-sight in order to retain guidance. This more modern guidance system, in addition to the higher maximum speed of Kornet ATGMs (going from 250 to 300 m/s, depending on the missile, whereas Konkurs reached a maximum of around 200 m/s), makes the Kornet a safer and more accurate missile in general.
In addition to its superior guidance system and speed in comparison to older Soviet ATGMs, the Kornet also is of a larger caliber than most (being 152 mm, whereas the older Konkurs is 135 mm). This, in addition to more modern shaped charge designs and components, made it much more effective against armored fighting vehicles. By the time of the Kliver turret’s creation, the 9M133-1 missile was rated for around 1,100 to 1,200 mm Rolled Homogenous Armor (RHA) penetration on average, and the use of a tandem HEAT warhead reduced the protection offered by ERA against it. The large caliber of the Kornet also allowed for other uses than merely anti-tank. This manifested with the 9M133F-1 missile, which instead of an armor-piercing shaped charge, contains a thermobaric warhead, equivalent to 10 kg of TNT and provides significant incendiary effects. Both of these missiles have a maximum flight speed of 250 m/s and an effective range of 100 to 5,500 m.
A schematic of the 9M113-1 armor-piercing missile. The first explosive charge is denoted by the “1” and the second by the “5”. The fenders (6) and control systems (7) are at the rear, while the fuel (4), rudders (3), and drive with inlets (3) are towards the front-middle. Source: https://en.missilery.info/The warhead of a 9M133F-1 thermobaric Kornet, which was found by Ukrainian troops in Donbas in 2015. Source: https://informnapalm.org/A view of a BMP-1 Kliver prototype. The very modern Kornet missiles would be a considerable investment for a BMP-1 modernization. Source: https://thaimilitaryandasianregion.wordpress.com/
On the Kliver, four Kornet pods were mounted, hanging to the right of the main turret body itself. It does not appear any reloads were provided with the vehicle, certainly not in the small turret. The potential of four Kornets was still fairly significant. The possibility to use either HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank) or thermobaric missiles also gave some considerable adaptability for the vehicle, allowing it to mount a complement of HEAT missiles if likely to face high-end enemy armor, or thermobaric missiles if facing an opponent unlikely to use heavy armor, but rather using well-fortified positions.
Marketing the BMP-1 Kliver
In the late 1990s, Tula appears to have embarked on a serious marketing campaign in order to attempt to sell its Kliver turret for either domestic or foreign BMP-1s. BMP-1 with Kliver turret prototypes were showcased on a number of occasions in Russia, but also abroad. Prototypes were notably present in the 1997 and 1999 IDEX (International Defence Exhibition) which took place in Abu Dhabi, in the United Arab Emirates. Designers made some quite bold claims about the capacities of their turret, which they claimed to be superior to not only the turrets used in the BMP-1 and BMP-2 but also to those used in the American Bradley and German Marder. Though they may seem somewhat extravagant, their claims were not necessarily far-off from the truth. The Kornet ATGM featured with the Kliver turret was a more modern system than the TOW or Milan featured on these Western IFVs, and the 30 mm 2A72 was also a fairly high-end autocannon.
A BMP-1 with the TKB-799 at IDEX 97 in Abu Dhabi. Source: topwar.ruA Kliver-armed BMP-1 in Abu Dhabi during a late 1990s IDEX exhibition. Source: topwar.ruhttps://youtu.be/2H67LFZ3UAgA marketing video for the Kliver turret. Notable highlights include a BMP-1 with the turret firing on the move from around 1:55 onward, and Kornet firing from a BMP-1 from around 4:48 onward.
However, this was only part of the picture. Tula remained mostly a weapon designer, not one of military vehicles and it failed to provide an upgrade of the BMP-1 hull alongside its Kliver turret. Tula’s upgraded BMP-1 may very well have provided equal or superior firepower to most modern Western IFVs, but it still had what was essentially a 1960s hull. Problems with the BMP-1 platform had long been identified: it was notoriously cramped, even for soldiers of fairly moderate size, and featured a number of redundant features, such as nearly useless firing ports. The armor was almost symbolic, incapable of providing protection from anything above small arms and shrapnel. And, mechanically, many vehicles, even including Soviet refurbishment programs, would still be used and exhausted after decades of use.
A BMP-1 Kliver in Russia. Despite interesting elements, the Kliver turret was never ordered and faded into obscurity in the 2000s. Source: tumblr
Conclusion – The Future of BMP-1 Upgrades
It should not come as much of a surprise that, despite all its promises, the Kliver TKB-799 turret upgrade for the BMP-1 would never see any adoption. Outside of this obsolete hull, the new turret, while capable, would also likely be too expensive for a still cash-strapped Russia, due to its inclusion of many modern systems. One can see, for example, how, all the way to this day, the Kornet is yet to fully replace the Konkurs or Fagot, and as recently as 2022, most BMP-2s and BMD-2s spotted in the Russian invasion of Ukraine are still equipped with the old ATGMs, with the BMP-2M Berezhok modernization seemingly absent from the frontlines. One may still note how, at the same time as the Kliver turret was still being marketed, many Russian soldiers and conscripts would be faced with the failures of unupgraded BMP-1s to provide meaningful fire support in an urban environment during the bloody episode of the 1999-2000 Second Chechen War. Despite all the drawbacks of the old platform, a BMP-1 with Kliver turret would almost certainly have proved a more useful asset than one still featuring the Grom in this conflict, as well as others Russia has gotten involved in the last two decades.
The Kliver turret would be far from the only upgrade which would be proposed for the BMP-1. In a similar timeframe, another proposal from Russia which reached prototype stage and used already produced components would be to simply fit the turret of the BMD-2, which featured a 2A42 30 mm autocannon and a 9K11 Fagot ATGM, to the BMP-1. Though using less advanced weapon systems than the Kliver, it would still improve the capacities of the BMP-1 and likely be a lot cheaper, but like the Kliver, it was not met with any orders. In the early 2000s, Ukraine offered the BMP-1U, which featured the Shkval turret, fairly similar to the Kliver in design, though it used weapon systems available to Ukraine, such as the 30 mm KBA–2 autocannon and the Konkurs. It would actually prove more successful than the Kliver, with Ukrainian BMP-1Us being sold abroad to Chad, Georgia, where 15 would be captured by Russia in 2008, and Turkmenistan. Ukraine continued to develop their offering of BMP-1s armed with their turret during the 2010s in the form of the BMP-1M and BMP-1UM, the later featuring a major hull redesign, which the TKB-799-equipped BMP-1 lacked so much.
A Ukrainian-upgraded BMP-1U in Chad. While Ukrainian upgraded BMP-1s have hardly met major successes (Chad, for example, only purchased 3 vehicles), they have still been more successful than Russian upgrades and have led to a variety of design using Ukrainian technologies and weapon systems, including the BMP-1U, BMP-1M, BMP-1UM, and BMP-1UMD, or prototypes featuring the Spys remote weapon system. Source: bmpvsu.ru
In more recent years, Russia has finally carried out a BMP-1 modernization project, though it would be on a much more limited scale, with the BMP-1AM, which was revealed in 2018 and saw a small upgrading run, 35 vehicles being operated for units operating the BMP-1 in eastern Russia. The BMP-1AM is in many ways inferior to the Kliver, mounting the BPPU turret of the BTR-80A and BTR-82, which only features the 2A72 30 mm autocannon and a coaxial PKTM. All ATGM capacities in such a vehicle are relegated to a Metis-M launcher not mounted on the vehicle itself, but to be operated by the dismounts, outside of the vehicle, a far cry from the four integrated Kornets of the Kliver turret.
The BMP-1AM seen during the ARMY-2018 military exhibition, with its BPPU turret turned to the side. The vehicle can easily be argued to be inferior to the BMP-1 with Kliver turret, though it is likely a lot cheaper as an upgrade. Source: reddit
While many would have thought the BMP-1 would no longer be an asset in the Russian Army by this point, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, launched on February 24th, 2022, would prove the contrary. Small numbers of Russian BMP-1s were seen turning up abandoned or destroyed, including outside of sectors where Ukrainian separatists operate, albeit in smaller numbers than the BMP-2s and BMD-2s which have been lost in an order of magnitude greater number. While the situation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine certainly is not tied simply to the quality of Russian vehicles, one can imagine how a BMP-1 with a Kliver turret would prove a far more useful asset in a modern conflict in comparison to one still fitted with the antiquated and anemic 73 mm Grom.
BMP-1 with Kliver turret, an illustration by Vesp
BMP-1 with Kliver TKB-799 turret Specifications
Dimensions (l-w), m
6.735 – 3.150
Weight
~ 14 metric tonnes
Road clearance, mm
420
Engine
UTD-20 6-cylinder 4-stroke V-shaped airless-injection water-cooled diesel (300 hp at 2,600 rpm)
Russian Federation (1997)
Infantry Fighting Vehicle – 1 Prototype Built
The Soviet BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle is a historically very significant vehicle, responsible for popularizing the IFV concept on a massive scale worldwide. The vehicle itself remains to this day the most produced infantry fighting vehicle in history, with about 40,000 produced in total in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, not counting various copies which could bring up that number by several thousands.
This ubiquitous status of the BMP-1, as well as the vehicle being long obsolete has led to a number of upgrade packages being studied and offered. Post-Soviet collapse Russia, which inherited thousands of BMP-1s, was the source of several of these. Likely the simplest to undertake, yet a still non-negligible upgrade, was created by mating the BMP-1 hull with a turret from the BMD-2 airborne IFV. The resulting vehicle was the BMP-1-30.
The IFV of the Soviet World: Brief Summary of the BMP-1
Object 765, which would eventually become the BMP-1. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3
Generally considered to be the first modern infantry fighting vehicle, the BMP-1 was designed by the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant in the early 1960s as the Object 765. It was adopted by the Red Army in 1965. Mass-production began under the name of BMP-1 in 1966.
The BMP-1 was a welded hull, amphibious armored fighting vehicle mounting a central one-man turret armed with the 2A28 Grom 73 mm low-pressure smoothbore gun and fed by an autoloader mechanism. The vehicle also featured a coaxial PKT 7.62 mm machine gun and a 9M14 Malyutka missile launcher mounted on top of the Grom’s barrel. To the rear, a troop compartment allowed the vehicle to transport 8 dismounts.
When first pushed into service in the late 1960s, the BMP-1 was a major addition to the Red Army’s arsenal, and despite the existence of some previous vehicles, such as the West German HS.30, it is often considered to be the first truly modern Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) to be adopted in massive numbers. Nevertheless, it was for the Eastern Bloc at least. The vehicle could be used to support armored assaults in all types of terrains thanks to its amphibious capacities, and was notably able to carry a section of infantry even in heavily contaminated terrain, which would typically be expected after the use of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) weapons. Support for accompanying tanks as well as dismounting infantry would be provided by a 73 mm Grom infantry support gun and a Malyutka missile launcher, with four missiles stored inside the vehicle. This was a considerable evolution in comparison to Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), which typically mounted little more than a heavy machine gun. In the Soviet Union, production of the BMP-1 lasted until 1982, with more than 20,000 vehicles produced. Almost equally large quantities were manufactured in Czechoslovakia as the BVP-1, while India produced a number under license, and a number of countries would produce more or less identical copies (Type 86 in China, Boragh in Iran, Khatim in Sudan). Operated in massive numbers by the Soviet Army and widely exported, the BMP-1 became perhaps the most ubiquitous infantry fighting vehicle in the world, despite a more modern type, the BMP-2, entering service in the early 1980s.
Russians BMP-1s in a Post-Soviet World
After years of a decline that the best efforts of various Soviet leaders could not prevent, the Soviet Union finally collapsed in December 1991, after most of its Warsaw Pact allies had gone their own way in 1989 and various Soviet Republics started declaring their independence from 1991 onward.
Russia, the largest, most populated, and most industrialized Republic of the former union, inherited most of the Red Army’s armament. Although the most significant aspect of this would likely be exclusive control of the USSR’s tremendous nuclear arsenal, it would also manifest in tens of thousands of armored fighting vehicles produced and fielded during the Soviet years. This included massive numbers of BMP-1s, perhaps up to ten thousand. The BMP-1 was at this point already fairly obsolete, with its 73 mm Grom main gun notably proving fairly puny and anemic, with a short effective range and only limited armor-piercing or high-explosive potential provided from its small shells. While some Soviet efforts, such as the BMP-1P upgrade (notably replacing the old Malyutka ATGM by a more modern Konkurs or Fagot ATGM and adding Tucha smoke dischargers), had been applied to part of the fleet, it nonetheless remained obvious that the BMP-1 was antiquated. More modern options were already in existence. The BMP-2 was in large-scale service for around a decade by the time of the collapse of the USSR and was armed with a 30 mm autocannon, far more useful than the Grom. The new BMP-3, a recent addition to the Soviet arsenal when the USSR collapsed, provided both a 30 mm autocannon and a 100 mm gun firing high-explosive shells and ATGMs, overall proving to be a very modern option. As such, it would appear the BMP-1 could perhaps entirely have been relegated to reserve use as these new vehicles entered service.
A BMP-1 alongside a T-72, abandoned by Russian forces and captured by the Chechens in Grozny during the First Chechen War, August 1996. While groundbreaking in its time, the BMP-1 was very unsuitable for the kind of urban warfare which Russia would face against the Chechens. Source: reddit
The 1990s, however, quickly turned into a dreadful decade of economic collapse, widespread corruption, violence, and chaos for Russia, putting potential plans of a quick modernization of the army into disarray. The production of many high-end vehicles designed towards the later years of the Soviet Union, such as the T-72BU, which would be redesignated into the T-90, or the BMP-3, had to be slowed down or prioritized towards exports instead of domestic use, meaning old vehicles such as the BMP-1 proved to be longer-lived in Russian service. In these economically trying times, potential upgrades for Soviet vehicles used abroad could also potentially be a lucrative prospect for Russian design bureaus to try and exploit. At the same time, the Russian Army was desperately cash-strapped, so an affordable upgrade could have had some potential.
The BMP-1-30
The BMP-1-30 appears to date from 1997. It is not associated with any single design bureau, and considering how its creation may have been a very easy affair, it is possible it was simply a creation of the Russian Army.
Replacing the Grom main armament has been the focus of many of the more extensive BMP-1 upgrades which have been created. For this, many different solutions have been studied. For example, in the same period as the BMP-1-30 was created, the city of Tula’s KBP Instrument Design Bureau offered a BMP-1 refitted with a new turret, armed with a powerful 30 mm 2A72 autocannon as well as new Kornet ATGMs. However, one would not necessarily need to create a new turret to improve upon the BMP-1.
A BMD-2. Introduced in the 1980s, the vehicle is still widely used by Russia to this day, and a BMD-2M upgrade program in the same vein as the BMP-2M Berezhok has even been initiated, despite more advanced models of BMDs (BMD-3, BMD-4, and BMD-4M) entering service beforehand. Source: Reddit.A side view of the BMP-1-30. As can be observed, the hull is identical to a classic BMP-1. Source: topwar.ru
By the 1990s, a number of new IFVs had appeared. Among them was the BMD-2, the second in the BMD line of airborne infantry fighting vehicles. The first BMD, the BMD-1, featured the same turret and armament as the BMP-1. However, when the USSR moved from Grom-armed to 30 mm-armed IFVs, turret commonality could no longer be achieved between the BMP and BMD, as the new BMP-2 introduced a two-man turret with a larger turret ring. Another turret was thus designed for the BMD-2, which used the same 2A42 autocannon and 9P135 ATGM launcher as the BMP-2 but was smaller, retaining only one crewmember and, crucially, the same 1,380 mm turret ring as the turret of the BMP-1 and BMD-1. In the context of the 1990s, this suddenly made the BMD-2’s turret a really suitable turret in order to upgrade BMP-1s, as it featured superior armament while having the same turret ring diameter, greatly simplifying the refit process.
The B-30 Turret
The B-30 turret which outfitted the BMP-1-30 was a small, one-man turret with a 1,380 mm turret ring.
The cylindrical turret has a higher volume than the BMP-1’s, and as such, the gunner could be said to be slightly less cramped. However, internal space is still limited and the turret can be judged to be very uncomfortable by the standards of Western IFVs. The seat of the gunner is slightly offset to the left of the turret, while the main gun is slightly offset to the right. Two periscopes are present in a bulge on the left side of the turret, while two others are to the right of the hatch, mounted on the main turret body. These periscopes are of the TNPO-160 type, which provide a 78° horizontal and 28° vertical field of view. The gun sights are mounted to the front, and include a main day/night sight and a secondary high-elevation sight mostly used to target aircraft. Overall, visibility is considered to be good for the gunner, typically superior to the BMP-1 turret, making the issues of a one-man turret slightly less pronounced.
A view of the inside of a B-30 turret mounted on a BMD-2. Notice the seat slightly skewed towards the left, the sights in front of it, and the control panel right of it.Source: Tankograd
The 30 mm 2A42
The main armament of the B-30 turret is the 30 mm 2A42 autocannon. This is a widely used gun, also used on the BMP-2, but also modern Soviet combat helicopters, such as the Mi-28 and Kamov Ka-50 and Ka-52.
The 30 mm 2A42 autocannon, which became the USSR’s most common 30 mm autocannon in the 1980s.Source: topwar.ru
The 2A42 fires the Soviet 30×165 mm cartridge. It uses a dual-feed system. There is a digital display showing the number of shells still available in the turret, as well as a switch allowing for a quick change in the type of ammunition fired. The weapon features a 2,416 mm barrel, fitted with a double-baffle muzzle brake. The autocannon has two dedicated fire rates, a slow one at 200 rpm and a quicker one at 550 rpm. During sustained fire, the rate of fire can reach higher values. The turret allows for a very high elevation of +60° which, coupled with a dedicated high-elevation sight, makes the 2A42 a more dangerous threat for helicopters than what would be expected from a ground vehicle.
A number of 30×165 mm shells are available for the 2A42. The total number of shells carried inside the BMD-2 turret is 300. If enough work was put into it, it is likely the larger hull of the BMP could allow for higher ammunition stowage.
For use against light fortifications, infantry, soft-skinned vehicles, and other unarmored targets, the 2A42 can fire the 3UOF8 High-Explosive Incendiary (HE-I) shells. This shell has an explosive filling of 49 grams of A-IX-2, the standard Soviet explosive autocannon shell formula since 1943. The overall mass of the projectile is 390 g, and that of the whole cartridge 842 g. In high-explosive belts, it is complemented by the 3UOR6. This shell forsakes most of the explosive charge, with only 11.5 g remaining, to mount a very large tracer. Fired at the same muzzle velocity of 980 m/s, it is used for fire correction purposes, though over large distances, the trajectory of the two shells may begin to differ. With a fuse lasting 9 to 14 seconds, the explosive shells will generally detonate after about 4 km if they have not met a target, though autocannons are typically used effectively at much closer ranges. The rate of tracer to high-explosive rounds in a 30 mm belt tends to be 1:4.
For armor-piercing duties, two types of 30 mm shells exist. The older 3UBR6 is a fairly classic armor-piercing shell with a core of hardened structural steel. This steel core weighs 375 g, with the entire projectile weighing just 25 g more, at 400 g, and the entire shell weighs 856 g. It features a tracer that burns for 3.5 seconds after being fired, and has a muzzle velocity of 970 m/s. Its penetration values against Rolled Homogeneous Armor (RHA) at an angle of 60° are 29 mm at 700 m, 18 mm at 1,000 m, and 14 mm at 1,500 m. These are fairly mediocre performances, able to defeat little more than light armored vehicles in the vast majority of cases.
A more modern armor-piercing shell exists in the form of the 3UBR8, an Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) shell with a tracer. It features a lighter 222 g piercing core of tungsten alloy. The projectile as a whole is 304 g, and the cartridge 765 g. Fired at a muzzle velocity of 1,120 m/s, this shell seems to penetrate, against similar RHA armor and at the same angle of 60°, 35 mm at 1,000 m and 25 mm at 1,500 m. It offers much more suitable performances than the older 3UBR6 against modern infantry fighting vehicles.
The 2A42 is supplemented by a coaxial 7.62×54 mmR PKTM machine gun. In this particular regard, the B-30 turret is actually worse than the one of the BMD-1 and BMP-1. Both of these use the same machine gun, however, it is fed from a single 2,000 rounds box, making reloading a non-issue for the gunner in most combat situations, a welcome reduction of tasks in a one-man turret. The B-30 turret uses more moderately sized 250 round belts which need to be reloaded a lot more often.
The 9P135 Launcher
The BMD-2 turret is fitted with a 9P135 missile launcher mounted to the right of the turret, fairly high so as not to interfere with the vision from periscopes or sights.
The 9P135 launcher was designed to fire the 135 mm 9K113 Konkurs but is also compatible with the smaller 120 mm 9K111 Fagot, which eases logistical work and adds versatility. The more powerful Konkurs is typically the preferred missile, but in case it cannot be supplied, the smaller Fagot, widely used by infantry, can be used instead. The 9M113 missile is 1.17 m long and has an average speed of slightly above 200 m/s, though it can peak at around 300 m/s. The original missile is fitted with a single 2.7 kg shaped charge warhead which can grant armor penetration of 750 to 800 mm of Rolled Homogenous Armor on average.
In 1991, before the BMP-1-30 was created, a more modern version of the Konkurs, the 9M113M, was unveiled. It focused on improving performances against ERA by adding a secondary charge triggered by a standoff probe, designed to trigger ERA and reduce its effectiveness against the main shaped charge. Besides improved performance against ERA, the 9M113M’s performances are similar to the 9M113. Both missiles have an effective range of about 4km.
A cutaway view of a 9K113 Konkurs missile.Source: https://www.armedconflicts.com/
The 9M111 missile is smaller (120 mm) and shorter (86.3 cm) with a slower average (186 m/s) and maximum (240 m/s) speed. It features a slightly smaller explosive charge than the 9M113, of 2.5 kg, and is rated only for 400 mm of penetration against RHA, and has a shorter effective range of around 2 km.
By the 1990s, two upgraded Fagot missiles were available. The first, the 9M111-2 was longer (910 mm) and rated for a slightly superior armor penetration (460 mm), and also features a more sustained motor allowing for an improved effective range of up to 2.5 km. The last missile, the 9M111M Faktoriya, highly improved on the armor-piercing performances of the Fagot by adding a tandem warhead. Thanks to this feature, the missile could be expected to defeat ERA and still pierce 600 mm of RHA.
A similar cutaway view of a 9K111 Fagot missile. Its design is essentially similar to the 9K113, but smaller. Source: https://en.missilery.info A missile is fired from the 9P135 mounted on the BMP-1-30. As can be seen, firing could only be done with the gunner exposed, putting them at serious risk. The 6 mm thick hatch gave a minimal amount of protection to the front. Source: reddit.
The 9P135 was pintle-mounted on the B-30 turret. The 9P135 sight has a magnification power of 10x, improving on the accuracy of the missile. They are wire-guided semi-automatic command to line of sight (SACLOS) systems, which require the gunner to constantly maintain the target in line-of-sight in order to retain guidance.
One of the main drawbacks of the missile’s mounting into the turret is that it could only be fired by an exposed crew member (the gunner), which would make them much more vulnerable to firearms and shrapnel.
The Malyutka missile first featured in the BMP-1 and BMD-1 could be fired from inside the turret, but the P upgrade, which was applied to both vehicles, replaced these with the 9P135 as well. In this manner, this issue of the B-30 turret was shared by BMP-1Ps with the same armament anyway. There were also some advantages to this mounting. Thanks to being very high, it could fairly easily be made to be the only element of the vehicle reaching over an obstacle when being fired, which would make the BMP-1-30 drastically less vulnerable when firing its missile. This complete external mounting also made the missile easy to remove. Three missiles were stored behind the gunner’s seat in the B-30 turret. It is unknown if more would be stored within the BMP-1 hull.
An Unchanged Hull
While the BMP-1-30 received a new turret, it appears its hull was completely or at least mostly unchanged. This is perhaps not as tragic as for the turret. There are less antiquated features of the BMP-1 hull that can easily be replaced or upgraded. It can still be said that the BMP-1 is a very cramped vehicle, for the crew and even more so for the infantry dismounts it transports. However, solving this issue can only really be achieved by a deep rework of the vehicle, far beyond the scope of most upgrade programs. An example of an attempt at solving this issue is the mid-2010s BMP-1UM offered by Ukraine.
The Capacities of the BMP-1-30
There is little argument that the BMP-1-30 can be considered superior to the average Russian BMP-1. In comparison to the BMP-1P, used by the Russian Army in the 1990s, the BMP-1-30 operated the same ATGM system in the same fashion, and in combat, the real difference would be the 30 mm 2A42 replacing the Grom. There is little argument that the 30 mm is superior. While the Grom technically has higher armor penetration, it is still outdated and highly inferior to the Konkurs in this matter. On the other hand, the anemic system has a far lower effective range than the 2A42, making the 30 mm autocannon generally a far better system against vehicles with moderate armor protection, such as APCs, IFVs, and occasionally, some older tank types. The autocannon is also far better as a weapon to suppress enemy positions.
A BMP-1 fitted with the TKB-799 Kliver turret. Armed with four Kornet missiles as well as a 30 mm autocannon and a coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun, this was an advanced turret to fit onto the old BMP-1 hull. Source: reddit.com
Though the 2A72 autocannon essentially had the same performance as the 2A42 but with a lower maximum rate of fire (due to issues with the recoil of the 2A42 at the quickest rate of fire, the 2A72 used a lowered one as well as a new long-recoil system), the 9M133 Kornet ATGMs were superior in essentially every way to the Konkurs and Fagot. They were faster, carried more explosives, giving them more armor-piercing power, and crucially, used a more advanced beam-riding laser guidance, which allowed the gunner to fire them while remaining inside of the vehicle. The Kornet launcher could also fire missiles with thermobaric warheads, meaning the vehicle could be configured to be more lethal against infantry and fortified position if no armored opposition is expected.
While, armament-wise, the BMP-1 with Kliver could be argued to be cutting edge by the 1990s, the BMP-1-30 was way more average. The vehicle’s capacities could essentially be described as that of a budget BMP-2. Featuring the exact same weapon systems, but slightly less potent in using them due to having a single crew member in the turret instead of two.
However, while the BMP-1-30 was not cutting edge, it had one decisive advantage. It was still a notable improvement over the BMP-1 while using only readily available components and being an incredibly easy upgrade to undertake. There was no costly development, or introduction of any new system not already in supply chains. Everything used in the BMP-1-30 was introduced in the Soviet Army at the lastest in the early 1980s. In a way, it can even be said to be surprising that the idea emerged as late as 1997, when it could have been thought off more than fifteen years earlier already. The only factor in upgrading BMP-1s to BMP-1-30s would have been to produce more BMD-2 turrets essentially.
Conclusion – A Sensible Upgrade, Which Was Never Applied
The BMP-1AM seen during the ARMY-2018 military exhibition, with its BPPU turret turned to the side. Both the BMP-1 with Kliver turret but also arguably the BMP-1-30 were more potent design, though the BMD-2 turret is out of production by now and so the BMP-1-30 upgrade would be harder of an upgrade to perform now. Source: reddit
Despite its general obsolescence, however, the BMP-1 is yet to entirely disappear from the Russian Army, even those still armed with a Grom. As late as the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, alongside large numbers of BMP-2s and BMD-2s, seemingly forming the workhouse of Russian’s IFV fleet and of combat capacities similar to the BMP-1-30, a number of BMP-1s have appeared. These have not just been seen in sectors where separatists operate, but also in parts of Ukraine, like Chernihiv, where only the Russian Army is active. Both BMP-1AMs and, in larger numbers, BMP-1s still using the 73 mm Grom, have been spotted. These are definitely outdated vehicles and while they may not fare particularly well even with the upgrades of the BMP-1-30, it would still be preferable for them to operate on a vehicle with a more modern autocannon, if not one with outright powerful missiles like the BMP-1 with Kliver TKB-99 turret. In a war where even BMD-2s and BMP-2s are being lost in the dozens, and some more advanced BMP-3s and BMD-4Ms are still fairly often knocked out or captured, an antiquated, Grom-armed BMP-1 hardly has a place at all.
A black and white version of a previous photo of the BMP-1-30. While the upgrade would not suddenly have brought the BMP-1 up to date with modern IFVs, like Tula’s Kliver turret claimed it would do, it would still have been a sensible way to update the fleet of vehicles, becoming more and more obsolete as the use of BMP-1s in Chechnya and Ukraine has shown. Source: russiadefence.netThe BMP-1-30. Illustration by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha
BMP-1-30 specifications
Dimensions (l-w), m
6.735 – 3.150
Weight
~14 metric tonnes
Road clearance, mm
420
Engine
UTD-20S1 6-cylinder 4-stroke V-shaped airless-injection water-cooled diesel (300 hp at 2,600 rpm)
Suspension
Torsion bars
Maximum speed, km/h (road)
65
Maximum speed, km/h (water)
~7-8
Operationnal Range
~550 km (road)
Fuel capacity
420 l
Crew
3 (Commander, gunner, driver)
Dismounts
8
Radio
R-123M
Main armament
30 mm 2A42 autocannon
9P1235 ATGM launcher (3 missiles at least)
Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3
73-мм ГЛАДКОСТВОЛЬНОЕ ОРУДИЕ 2A28Техническое описание и инструкция по эксплуатации (73-mm SMOOTHBORE WEAPON 2A28 Technical description and operating instructions)
БОЕВАЯ МАШИНА ПЕХОТЫ БМП-1 ТЕхничЕскоЕ ОПИсаниЕ И ИНСТРУКЦИЯ ПО ЭКСПЛУАТАЦИИ (COMBAT VEHICLE INFANTRY BMP-1 Technical Description AND THE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS)
Object 911 on wheels. Illustration by Pavel "Carpaticus" Alexe
Soviet Union (1963-1964)
Infantry Fighting Vehicle – 1 Prototype Built
The evolution of warfare and technologies in the years following the conclusion of the Second World War had a major impact on the way warfare would be conducted in the future. The appearance and proliferation of nuclear weapons led to the need for protection from nuclear fallout and radiation being a major requirement for combat vehicles meant to operate in a battlefield that could likely be saturated with tactical nuclear strikes. The truck-borne infantry of the past was also increasingly sidelined for infantry in armored personnel carriers, which could keep up with armored formations and allow for highly-mobile infantry protected from small arms fire and shell splinters. Following these conclusions, work began on a vehicle in the Soviet Union which would not only transport infantry while keeping up with tanks, but also provide protection from nuclear fallout and combat capabilities needed to supplement tanks and provide support to infantry. One of the prototypes created in the 1960s to fulfill such a task was Volgograd Automotive Plant’s Object 911.
The Object 911 prototype, showing its most unusual feature: the presence of both wheels and tracks. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3
The Infantry of a Mechanized, Nuclear Age
After years of development, the United States detonated the first nuclear warheads in 1945, first over the New Mexico desert and later over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Soviet Union had laid a keen eye on the development of this new type of weapon, which promised unprecedented levels of destructive powers achieved by a single bomb. On 29th August 1949, the Soviet Union followed suit by detonating its first atomic warhead in the RDS-1 test, years ahead of American and British expectations.
In the following years, the United States and the Soviet Union, soon followed, to a much lower extent, by the United Kingdom, and later France and the People’s Republic of China would pursue massive buildups of their nuclear arsenals. By 1960, the United States’ stockpile had already exceeded 15,000 weapons. The Soviet buildup was, at the time, much slower, but at more than 1,500 warheads, it would already be enough to cause massive destruction.
The explosion of the RDS-1 test. Source: dissolve.com
With the massive buildup of nuclear stockpiles, the perceived roles of nuclear weapons also evolved. The weapons would be used in strategic strikes against enemy cities, production, and logistical centers, as had been originally intended and tested against Japan in 1945, but new potential targets were soon considered. Value was also found in ‘tactical’ nuclear missiles and bombs, which would be used on a much smaller scale, against enemy troop concentrations, supply depots, or ways of communications on the frontline. This newfound purpose of nuclear weapons, coupled with the increasing realization of the major health effects of nuclear radiation, led to the understanding that many aspects of conventional warfare would find themselves struggling to find any purpose on this new, nuclear battlefield.
This was supplemented by the fact that, in the 1950s, the USSR considered a conflict in mainland Europe was a likely occurrence, as demonstrated by the heavy tensions of the late 1940s and early 1950s. At this point in time, and up to the early 1960s, while the Soviet Union did have nuclear weapons, the means of delivery were far less developed than those of the United States. While the United States had a large fleet of strategic bombers that could realistically become a threat to many Soviet cities, the USSR struggled to establish an equivalent force. The Soviets wanted to rely on a submarine fleet to counter this, but it was only starting to build itself up in the late 1950s, and NATO could rely on extensive naval forces. The only aspect where the Soviet Union had a somewhat reliable nuclear force was in its ground forces. Between the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Soviet Army and the otherwise nuclear superiority of NATO, the Soviet Army expected to be forced to fight on a heavily irradiated battlefield. Many of the aspects of the post-WW2 Soviet Army could not be expected to operate in such an environment.
One of the prime examples was that of infantry moved by trucks, largely open vehicles that could hardly be protected from nuclear radiation and fallout. Armored vehicles, in comparison, were already often enclosed, and making them able to protect their crews from nuclear radiation, as well as chemical and biological threats, was a viable option. This suddenly highly increased the value of armored personnel carriers. While already vehicles with significant potential and increasing in popularity since the conclusion of the Second World War, they appeared as perhaps the most viable option to continue to make infantry relevant. Not only would they be able to keep up with armored vehicles and, in this way, considerably ease combined arms operations, but they would also protect infantry from small arms fire, and, perhaps even more importantly, from nuclear radiation. Because of this reason, after the rise of power of Khrushchev in the Soviet Union from 1953 onward, considerable emphasis was put on adapting the Soviet Army for nuclear warfare, and outfitting Soviet infantry with better vehicles for this purpose than mere trucks.
In the Soviet Union, the idea would be pushed further though. Rather than design pure troop carriers which would typically be armed with just a machine gun, the idea of a vehicle that could not only keep up with tanks while transporting infantry but also provide valuable combat support to both arose. The main recipients of this envisioned vehicle were to be motor rifle regiments, though it would in general be widespread through the Soviet Army.
The BMP Concept
The concept of this new type of vehicle was popularized in the late 1950s in the Soviet Union, though some similar concepts were being developed in other countries, notably the West German Schützenpanzer Lang HS.30.
The idea of the BMP ( Боевая Машина Пехоты, which translates to Infantry Fighting Vehicle) was to create a vehicle that would provide CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear) protection to the troops it carried. This was at first the factor separating the BMP from APCs like the BTR series, which at the same time included a significant amount of non-CBRN protected vehicles, such as open-topped BTR-40s, BTR-152s, and BTR-50s.
Beyond this nuclear protection aspect, the BMP was also meant as a vehicle that would have the mobility and armament necessary to offer support to tanks. This meant it should be able to engage many targets, from tanks to various armored fighting vehicles, to infantry and field fortifications. Another aspect that was desired was superior mobility, with the crossing of water obstacles being a major factor. There are many major rivers in Europe, and bridges could not be relied on in a very destructive major conflict on the continent. It was also hoped that the infantry would be able to fight from the inside of the vehicle itself, not necessarily having to dismount, another concept brought forward by the prospect of an irradiated battlefield.
The first task would be accomplished by the presence of firing ports from which the troops could fire their weapons. The idea of bow machine guns operated by the infantry dismounts (dismounts is a term widely used to refer to the infantry carried inside or on top of Soviet vehicles), rather than the crew of the vehicle itself, was also considered. Because of this firing port requirement, the position of the infantry towards the front and center of the vehicle, rather than the rear, was preferred. Enemy targets would typically be found towards the front and sides of the vehicle, rather than the rear.
Firepower-wise, the main purpose envisioned with the BMP was the ability to defeat enemy anti-tank capabilities as well as provide fire support to dismounts. This would translate into the main armament that could take out infantry positions equipped with recoilless rifles or anti-tank guided missiles as well as lightly armored vehicles. A number of armaments of various calibers were considered for this purpose. This included main guns firing 57, 73, or 76 mm shaped charges projectiles, or 30, 37, or 45 mm autocannons. Eventually, the 73 mm 2A28 Grom low-pressure smoothbore gun would be chosen. This main gun was to be supplemented with one or several 7.62 mm machine guns for anti-infantry duties. Since there was a high risk of encountering enemy tanks, while following friendly tanks, an anti-tank missile launcher, with 4 to 6 missiles, was also required and would have to offer the possibility of being fired from inside the vehicle, with hatches closed.
Protection-wise, the vehicle was to provide protection from heavy machine guns, such as the 12.7 mm/.50 cal Browning M2HB, or possibly even 20 or 23 mm autocannons, on the frontal arc. On the sides and rear, protection levels were to allow the vehicle to withstand 7.62 mm rounds, as well as artillery shell splinters. Heavier armor was impractical due to amphibious and air-transportability needs.
A very significant aspect of the protection was the one from NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) threats. The vehicle was to provide an enclosed environment in which the crew and dismounts would be able to operate, even on a highly irradiated battlefield. This would translate into high efforts being taken to seal the vehicle and fit it with an air filtering system as well as an anti-radiation lining. These design requirements would translate into the vehicles being the first troop carrier designs taking into account nuclear radiation protection.
By the late 1950s, Volgograd was already producing a tracked, amphibious armored personnel carrier in the form of the BTR-50. As designed, the BTR-50 was an open-topped vehicle, which would entirely prohibit any kind of radiation protection. By the late 1950s, this had been remedied by the BTR-50PK modification, which incorporated an enclosed roof.
BTR-50P APCs at the Red Square on 7th November 1961. Note their open roof; a closed roof version, the BTR-50PK, would later be introduced Source: Topwar.ruThe BTR-60 also started out as an open-topped vehicle. Source: soldat.pro
Interestingly, whilst the Object 750 prototype had 2 firing ports per side for the dismounts, the serial BTR-50P did not.
One of the requirements for the BMP was to allow the whole infantry squad to engage targets from the inside.
However, it was thought that the IFV would provide far better-fighting capabilities, as well as protection for the infantry in an irradiated environment. Also, the BMP would allow for dismounts to engage from inside the vehicle, while a BTR-50 could really only transport the infantry or cargo through the irradiated terrain, but the troopers could not even exit and fight safely.
In terms of mobility, the vehicle’s main objective was to be more mobile than tanks, which meant a relatively high maximum speed but, most importantly, very good off-road capacities. The vehicle was also required to be amphibious to allow the crossing of rivers and marshes even without bridges. These requirements resulted in weight and size constraints inherent in all types of Soviet and Russian APCs and IFVs.
Lastly, the vehicle was to be small and light enough to be air-transportable, though it was not meant to be dropped from a plane as an airborne vehicle. It was also desirable to create a vehicle that would be as simple and easy to produce as possible. It was hoped it could then be produced in large numbers with relative ease, as well as form the base for a large family of vehicles that would use its components.
A formal call for design proposals following these requirements was issued by the GBTU (The General Armored Directorate, the service in charge of armored vehicles procurement) on 22nd October, 1960. The requirements were finalized in September 1961 and eventually sent to a large number of design bureaus. Initially, the Main Artillery Directorate, which issued the requirements, called for an 11-12 tonnes vehicle that would feature a crew of 2 and transport 6 to 8 dismounts.
At that time, three different views existed on how to design the future IFV. One was to create a new, wheeled vehicle, sometimes using some pre-existing technology. The second was to create the vehicle based on a pre-existing chassis. The third was to create an all-new, tracked vehicle. One of the designers which were issued the requirements was VgTZ (Volgorgadskii Traktornii Zavod, Volgograd Tractor Plant, the former STZ/Stalingrad Tractor Plant). Eventually, this relatively large design bureau would offer two different variants. The first would be based on VgTZ’s PT-76 amphibious tank, the Object 914 (VgTZ was attributed numbers in the 900s for the designation of its prototypes). The other would be a completely new vehicle, which used a tracked configuration, though with a number of unique elements; this would be Object 911.
Volgograd’s Object 911
The pilot projects for vehicles from different manufacturers were first presented at a meeting in November 1960. At this point, some of the characteristics of the future BMP were still uncertain. For example, the possibility of using a 14.5 mm machine gun as main armament was still being considered.
The Volgograd design bureau started elaborating various solutions following the November 1960 meeting. Their attempts at creating a BMP would typically, as had been with the Object 914, use a lot of elements from previous projects, in this case the PT-76 and the Object 906B, two light tank designs. The first was adopted and mass-produced, the second stayed on the drawing board.
Configurations studied by Volgograd generally used a rear engine configuration, though there was a draft project with a front engine and rear transmission, as on the PT-76 and related vehicles. An early set of plans for the Object 911 dated 1962 envision a vehicle featuring a two-man turret and a dismount compartment for six dismounts sitting in three rows of two. This configuration would be entirely changed before the vehicle would enter the prototype stage.
The early configuration of the Object 911, with a six-man dismount complement present in three rows of two and a two-man turret. By the time the vehicle reached prototype, this would be replaced by an eight-man compartment and a one-man turret stage. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3
The draft project of the Object 911 was developed at VgTZ in 1963, and presented to the State Committee for Defense Technology (GKOT, Russian: ГКОТ, Государственный комитет по оборонной технике), which considered it and allowed for the production of a prototype on August 9th, 1963.
The prototype of the Object 911 was built in the same year under the supervision of the head engineer, I.V. Gavalov. The prototype went to the comparative trials in 1964, alongside several other prototypes of the BMP.
The prototypes tested largely varied in terms of configurations, and included the fully tracked Objects 914 and 765, the wheeled Object 1200, and the convertible Object 911. Usually, convertible designs used the wheels as the main means of motion and lowerable tracks for moving off-road. The Object 911 used the opposite configuration using retractable wheels for traveling on roads, a peculiar feature.
The Object 911’s Design
Hull
The overall design of the Object 911’s hull was a rectangular, welded steel box. Like most Soviet amphibious vehicles of the era, it featured a bow-shaped frontal part for the purpose of improving the vehicle’s hydrodynamic characteristics, further perfected by a retractable trim vane at the front of the hull. The whole upper front/roof plate was angled at a very steep angle, highly improving protection over its frontal arc. The Object 911 had a fairly low profile, with a total height of 2,068 mm, including the turret. According to Domestic Armored vehicles vol 3, at some point, the height of the hull was increased to 1,200 mm.
A ¾ view of the Object 911 prototype on its tracks. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3The eventual configuration of the crew and dismounts on the Object 911. Only the driver, to the center-front of the vehicle, and the gunner/loader/commander, in the turret, are crewmembers. The remaining eight are dismounts. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3
Apparently the section commander also acted as a second machine gunner, as the Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3 mention ‘two hatches for the machine gunners’ (page 446)
The Object 911 used a configuration where the crew and dismount compartment were concentrated at the front and center of the vehicle. The vehicle had a crew of two: a driver, who sat in the front center of the hull; and a gunner/commander, who sat behind in the left part of the centrally-mounted turret.
The eight dismounts were present in a symmetric configuration. Two were in front of the turret, one on each of the driver’s sides, and would presumably operate the squad’s machine guns. Six sat just behind the turret. Each dismount had a firing port in the sides of the vehicle, so they could fire their weapons from the inside of the hull. Considering the placement of the firing ports, four on each side of the vehicle, they would be able to create an arc of fire over about the front two thirds of the vehicle.
Each of the dismount positions featured an episcope. The driver’s post appears to have featured three, one to the front and one to each side. The driver would steer the vehicle via a steering wheel. The vehicle featured two headlights, mounted to the front sides of the bow. There was a ventilator just to the rear of the driver’s hatch.
A top view of the Object 911 at Kubinka, showing the front driver’s port as well as the ventilator located right behind it. Source: skylancer7441’s archiveA top front view of the Object 911. Observe the five episcopes present for the dismounts to the sides of the vehicle as well as the two hatches on the front sides of the hull roof. Source: skylancer7441’s archiveA close-up on one of the two dismount’s front-sides hatches. Exiting through these would be highly dangerous when under fire, and the larger hatch located behind the turret would likely be preferred outside of emergency evacuations. Source: skylancer7441’s archive
The vehicle’s engine was mounted at the rear of the vehicle, which would typically make hatch placement harder on an infantry fighting vehicle. The use of a fairly small engine on the Object 911 allowed for a quite peculiar hatch design. The center of the vehicle to the rear of the turret was lowered in comparison to the side ‘flaps’, and a large hatch was located there, opening upward and locking at about a 90° angle. Six of the dismounts were to exit through this hatch. It was hoped that it was wide enough for two dismounts to evacuate at a time. The dismounts would then jump out of the vehicle, which would be a fairly short 0.75 m to 1.10 m drop to the ground. This configuration was far from ideal, as the dismounts would prove very vulnerable if forced to exit when the vehicle was under fire. However, there were not many safer options for a vehicle with a rear engine compartment. Despite these potential considerations, this very configuration would be adopted for the BMD series of vehicles, and eventually even make its way to the BMPs with the BMP-3.
As for the driver and gunner, they each had a dedicated hatch they could exit the vehicle through. Furthermore, there were also two hatches on the front sides of the turret. These would be used for the two front dismounts to exit the vehicle, the squad commander and machine gunner.
The combat weight of the Object 911 was 12.07 tonnes. Length was 6.735 m, width 2.940 m, and height 2.040 m including the turret, presumably at the highest ground clearance. The average ground pressure was 0.46 kg/cm².
The Object 911 had the same level of protection as its main competitor, the Object 765.
A top rear view of the Object 911, with the exit hatch the dismounts would use opened. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3A side view of the Object 911. Four firing ports can be seen towards the front half of the vehicle. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3
The vehicle featured an R-123 high/very high frequency radio transceiver, which at the time was a new introduction in Soviet vehicles, which could assure communications at ranges up to 20 km on two bands. It was coupled with an internal R-124 intercom system for communications between the gunner/commander and driver.
The R-123 radio station. Source: pinterestAn R-124 intercom system dismounted from a vehicle. Source: http://pribor.zp.ua/
Engine and Hydrojets
An UTD-20 engine, which was widely used in Soviet infantry fighting vehicles and light tank prototypes from the 1960s onward. Source: https://geek-tips.imtqy.com/
The engine used in the Object 911 was common to all the vehicles presented in the program. This was the UTD-20 diesel engine. It produced 300 hp at 2,600 rpm and reached its maximum torque output of 981 N.m at 1,500 to 1,600 rpm. Without any fuel or oil, the engine weighed 665 kg, and had a consumption of 175 to 178 grams of fuel per hp an hour.
The UTD-20 engine was fairly limited in size, which was a major positive factor for installation in the various BMP prototypes. On the Object 911, this allowed for the engine block to be placed in the rear of the vehicle despite the large central lowered section where the dismounts would exit from. The transmission and drive sprocket were placed at the rear of the vehicle as well. The mechanical transmission had a two-disc main friction clutch and a two-shaft five-gears gearbox which would be actioned by the driver. The gearbox included two clutches and two coaxial planetary gearboxes.
A rear view of the Object 911. The two hydrojets present on the ‘flaps’ of the vehicle can be seen. One can also spot spare track links on the central hatch. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3
In addition to this engine and transmission, the Object 911 also featured two hydrojets. These were found in the ‘wings’ or ‘flaps’ at the rear of the vehicle. They were taken straight from a previous design of Volgograd Tractor Plant, the PT-76. These hydrojets were powered via a driveshaft with a reducer, linked to the gearbox, and would allow for far quicker movement on water than vehicles using merely tracks or wheels for amphibious crossings.
A view of the propeller of one of the Object 911’s hydrojets, seen thanks to the open hydrojet cover. Source: skylancer7441’s archive
Modern Wheel-Cum-Track?
By far the most uncommon and distinctive features of the Object 911 were to be found in the vehicle’s suspension and drivetrain.
A schematic of Object 911’s drivetrain, showing the locating of the track’s road wheels, idler and sprocket, as well as the four wheels and the steering wheels that commands the movement of the vehicle. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3A front view of the Object 911 at the maximum and minimum ground clearance allowed by the suspension when running on tracks. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3A suspension arm on one of the Object 911’s roadwheels. Source: skylancer7441’s archive
The engineers of Volgograd Tractor Plant experimented heavily with the suspension on Object 911. They settled on a mainly tracked suspension, which was to be used systematically in operational conditions. The vehicle’s tracked suspension used a rear-drive sprocket and a front idler, with five road wheels. The road wheels appear to have been identical to those found on the PT-76, being stamped steel road wheels with reinforcement ribs, and internally hollow to improve buoyancy. Each road wheel was mounted on a suspension arm of which the movement was assured by a pneumatic suspension. The suspension’s height could be adjusted and considerably lowered, with a maximum ground clearance of 426 mm and minimum ground clearance of 96 mm. The tracks themselves were OMSH tracks, made of cast manganese steel and connected by a steel pin, with three connection points. The Object 911 also featured three return rollers: one located towards the front of the second road wheel; the second, or middle one, towards the front of the fourth road wheels; and the last just in front of the drive sprocket. They appear to have been made out of aluminum.
Three photos of the Object 911 on its wheels. These would heighten the silhouette of the vehicle, but seeing as they were meant to be used out of combat, this was not a major issue. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3
The most unusual aspect of the Object 911’s drivetrain was not the pneumatic, adjustable suspension, the same design as on the Object 906B, but rather the dual drive. Indeed, the Object 911 was not just a tracked vehicle, as it had been designed with a set of four wheels mounted on the internal sides of the tracks. They were located at around the same length as the sprockets and idlers. The wheels could be retracted or extended depending on whether the tracks or road wheels were to be used. This could be done from the inside of the vehicle, with no need to exit, and be performed in three minutes. However, even when fully retracted, the bottom of the wheels would still stick out of the hull bottom by a moderate extent.
The wheels were taken from a pre-existing design. This was not a standard road vehicle design, but rather the K 157-300 designated aviation wheels taken from the Ilyushin Il-14 twin-engine transport aircraft. The main advantage was that aviation wheels were lighter than similar-sized ground vehicle ones, though they were also less sturdy. These wheels had a diameter of 840 mm and a width of 300 mm, and used arched tires. The vehicle used a 4×2 configuration, with the front wheels being used to steer the vehicle when on the wheel drive.
The main advantage envisioned behind these retractable wheels was higher maximum speed and reduced fuel consumption when driving on highway, notably for transfers or movement behind frontlines.
A front view of the Object 911 at a high ground clearance, on tracks. As can be seen, the wheels, even when retracted at their highest point, would not entirely be contained within the hull. This would prove a major issue with the cross-country capacities of the Object 911. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3A view of the rear of the Object 911’s suspension. One can see the rearmost return roller, located just in front of the drive sprocket, as well as one of the retractable wheels, located right behind the last road wheel. Source: skylancer7441’s archiveA close-up of one of the Object 911’s retractable wheels, showing the dimensions of the wheel inscribed on the rim. Source: skylancer7441’s archive
Turret and Armament
All the infantry fighting vehicles of the program used a standardized turret design, which was also present in the vehicle which would be adopted as the BMP-1, the Object 765. This standard design had been created by the Tula KBP Design Bureau and had a 1,340 mm turret ring. It used welded construction from rolled homogeneous armor plates. The turret had a frustoconical design. The turret featured a DGN-3 24 V 300 W motor for rotation, which could rotate at speeds from 0.1º to 20° per second. The gun elevation was powered by another electric motor, the DVN-1 24 V producing 65 W. The gun could elevate or depress at any speed from 0.07º to 6° per second, with maximum elevation angles of -4º to +30°.
Two hatches were present on the turret. There was a large top hatch opening frontwards, locking in an upright position, which the gunner could use to reach out of the turret to observe the surroundings, or to exit the vehicle. There was a much smaller hatch, located over the gun breech, which, when the gun was fully elevated, would be used to load a missile into the launching rail featured on top of the gun.
A view of the Object 911. The low profile of the turret is apparent. This was both an advantage, as it reduced the silhouette of the vehicle, but also a drawback, as the turret was quite cramped. Source: Бронетанковая Техника via tech.wikireading.ru
A single crewmember was located in the turret sat in the left half. The turret was typically considered to be quite cramped, even though it did not feature a basket and, as such, the crewmember could extend his legs into the hull when stationary. He sat on an adjustable seat that featured a backrest. He had five vision devices. Towards the front, he could observe the battlefield through the 1PN22 combined day-night sight. This sight had two channels, one for day and one for night, which would be toggled by rotating an internal mirror. The gunner would look through the same eyepiece in any case. Using the day channel, the sight had a magnification of 6x and a field of view of 15°. The night channel had a magnification of 6.7x and a field of view of 6°. It had a three-stage light intensifier system that would amplify light by 50,000 to 75,000 times. It also featured vastly simplified lead and range corrections scales in order to ease night firing. The other vision devices were four TNPO-170 episcopes, two on the flanks of the 1PN22 sight in order to provide vision to its sides, and two others on the side of the main hatch.
General schematics of the 2A28 Grom. Source: Tankograd
The main armament of the turret was a 73 mm 2A28 Grom low-pressure smoothbore gun. This was a fairly short gun, with a 2,117 mm tube and 2,180 mm total length. The design was overall made to be very simple and light. For example, it lacked any bore evacuator, and the gun fumes were instead to be evacuated from the turret, which featured a ventilator for this purpose. The gun overall weighed only 115 kg and had an average barrel life of 1,250 rounds. The recoil mechanism of the Grom was contained in an armored sleeve, wrapped around the base of the barrel. The launching rail for the Malyutka missile was placed on top of this sleeve.
Quantities of PG-15V rounds, here captured by Azerbaijan from Armenia during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. The round was produced in massive quantities, and despite more modern ammunition to fulfill both anti-armor and anti-personnel roles, having been available since the 1970s, it is still widely used. Source: reddit
There was only a single shell available to the 2A28 Grom in the 1960s. This was the PG-15V. It used the PG-9 HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank) anti-tank grenade already used by the SPG-9 73 mm recoilless gun, but swapped the original propellant charge with a more powerful PG-15P, which was meant to ensure a longer effective range. The projectile was fin-stabilized and featured a rocket engine towards the rear, with propellant present towards the middle of the grenade. This allowed it to reach a higher speed than would typically be expected from a gun as short as the Grom, with a maximum velocity of 655 m/s.
The explosive charge of the PG-9 grenade was a 322 g explosive mixture which would be equivalent to 515 g of TNT. An advantage of the PG-9 was that it featured a high standoff distance (i.e distance between the shaped charge and tip of the fuze) of 258 mm. In practice, this meant that, upon hitting a target, the jet of molten metal would have a significant length to take shape into a thin, dense jet. The results were a great armor penetration for the time and small size of the gun. The projectile’s armor penetration was officially rated at 300 mm at all ranges. In practice, this was slightly higher, as the official figure was based on the quantity of armor which would be pierced with the shell then having significant post-penetration effects inside. The maximum penetration achieved could vary between 302 and 346 mm, with an average value of 326 mm. In practice, this meant the Grom could quite reliably penetrate any tank operated by NATO in the 1960s.
The shell was not without issues, however. The downside of HEAT projectiles and a very short barrel were an overall low accuracy and high dispersion. The Grom’s PG-15V projectiles were notably very vulnerable to wind. The nominal maximum range of the Grom was of 800 m, but even at this range, only a 34% hit rate was achieved against a T-55 during trials. Although this tank was quite smaller than most NATO tanks, in practice it can still be said a vehicle wielding a Grom would have to get to close ranges to use this gun effectively against armored targets. Additionally, during the 1960s, the PG-15V was the only available shell for the 2A28 Grom. HEAT shells are not purely anti-tank projectiles, and by nature also have some capacities against other targets. They can notably be effective when used against field fortifications and bunkers. However, due to their design focusing on producing a jet of molten metal in one direction, they offer very limited capacities when attempting to fire at infantry in the open. For the vast majority of vehicles, this would fairly easily be dealt with by simply shifting to a high-explosive fragmentation shell, but no projectile of the type would be available for the Grom until 1973.
The 2A28 Grom was fed by an autoloading mechanism. It used a crescent-shaped conveyor which would occupy the 1 to 7 o’clock perimeter of the turret floor. Because the Grom only fired one shell type when the autoloader was created, its design was simplified, as there was no need to be able to cycle shell type. A total of 40 projectiles would be present within the autoloader. These would be all the projectiles carried within the vehicles of the BMP program. They would be fed into the gun to the right of the gunner. The gun elevation needed to be set to 3° each time it was to be loaded. The loading cycle was 6 seconds long. Though it used an autoloader, the 2A28 Grom could also be shifted to manual loading if need be.
Photos of the 7.62 mm PKT machine gun. Source: weaponsystems.net
This 2A28 Grom was supplemented by a 7.62 mm PKT coaxial machine gun. Mounted to the right of the gun, it would effectively be the only reliable means of dealing with infantry in the open. It fed to the right and ejected to the left. The PKT was fed from 250 rounds ammunition boxes and would fire at a cyclic rate of fire of 700 to 800 rounds per minute, at a muzzle velocity of 855 m/s. It would be able to expend two ammunition boxes in quick succession before the barrel would need to be replaced, or at least the firing interrupted for a bit to prevent overheating.
In addition to these two weapons, the turret featured an ‘ace up its sleeve’ when dealing with armor threats at ranges where the Grom would not be accurate. This was a 9M14 Malyutka missile launcher. The missile was located on a launching rail installed on top of the gun. Inside the turret, the gunner had a control box, which would be kept folded under the seat when not in use and be extended to guide the Malyutka when the need to fire it arose.
A Soviet soldier behind a Malyutka in the field. Source: portal-kultura.ru
The Malyutka was a 860 mm long missile, 125 mm in caliber, and with a ‘wingspan’ of 393 mm with its 4 stabilizing fins. Overall, it weighed 10.9 kg, with a 2.6 kg shaped explosive warhead. The missile had a small rocket engine which would allow for a flight speed of 120 m/s. It was rated for firing ranges of 500 to 3,000 m. Due to the slow speed, the flight time to the longest effective range would reach a particularly long 26 seconds. When impacting a target, the 9M14 could be expected to penetrate 400 mm of armor at a flat angle. Once again, this would typically be sufficient to penetrate all NATO armor of the era with relative ease.
Guidance of the Malyutka was assured by wire, which was common for early missiles but also fairly unreliable. The gunner had a control box that featured a button to launch the missile and then a retractable joystick used to steer it. The missile was manually guided all the way through and, as such, the gunner was supposed to fully concentrate on missile guidance during the whole firing process.
The loading of a 9M14M missile onto the launching rail on a BMP-1. During the trials of the Object 911 and other prototypes in 1964, the missile used would have been the baseline 9M14. By the time the BMP-1, formerly the Object 765, would start entering service from 1966 onward, the missile had been replaced by the upgraded 9M14M. The baseline 9M14 would never be issued with the BMP-1. Source: tech.wikireading.ru
As with the Grom, the Malyutka provided significant armor piercing capacities to the Object 911 if it was to hit, but this was far from a given considering the slow speed and manual guidance of the missile. Hit probability on a static tank-sized target was only 20% to 25%. Two missiles were carried within the turret. The vehicle was not supposed to travel outside of combat zones with a missile mounted, and as such these, alongside potentially missiles stored inside the hull (it is unknown whether the Object 911 would have any) were all the vehicle had to contend with. On the plus size, as with the PG-15V, the explosive nature of the Malyutka’s warhead means it could also be fired with good effects on field fortifications and fixed positions. The process of preparing for the firing of a Malyutka, including taking out the control box and loading the missile onto the firing rail, could take from 40 to 55 seconds depending on the skills of the gunner.
Performances
Trials for the Object 911, alongside Objects 19, 914, 765, and 1200 were held in 1964.
A top-rear view of Object 911 during its trials. Source: Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3
During these, the Object 911 was able to reach a maximum speed of 57 km/h on road when using tracked drive. This was fairly moderate. On water, top speed reached 10.3 km/h thanks to the hydrojets, which is on the higher end of amphibious vehicles of the era.
The use of wheeled drive would highly improve the maximum speed of the Object 911 on roads though. It was recorded at a maximum speed of 108 km/h on a paved road, and had an average cruise speed of 70 km/h on highways using wheeled drive. In addition to the superior maximum speed, the use of wheeled drive also had another major upside. It highly reduced the fuel consumption of the vehicle, to the point where the crossable distance reached a tremendous 1,350 km. In comparison, when driving on tracks on dry, dirt roads, the range would vary from 350 to 500 km. This maximum range advantage could be very significant if large movements had to be undertaken on roads without transporters.
The Object 911 struggling to overcome a slope during its trials. It would eventually succeed in overcoming it, whereas the Object 19 and the Object 1200 failed. Source: Bronya Rossii (Russia’s Armor) Episode 8The Object 911 moving cross-country during its trials. The vehicle was generally considered to have better off-road mobility than Object 19 and 1200, but was outclassed by Object 914 and Object 765 in this regard. Source: Bronya Rossii (Russia’s Armor) Episode 8
In terms of cross-country capacities, Object 911 was able to cross a 30° degree slope. In practice, it provided better slope crossing capacities than the mostly or fully wheeled Object 19 or 1200. However, cross-country mobility was overall found to be inferior to the fully tracked Object 765 and Object 914.
The Flip Side of the Coin: an Overly Complex and Damaging Drive
When considering the improved road speed and range, one may find the dual drive with wheels featured on the Object 911 to be a major improvement in comparison to other vehicles. It is true that, in theory, the improvements gained in speed and range were considerable, but in practice, these were more than offset by a large quantity of issues with the wheels.
The first was that the wheels, located under the belly of the tank, were typically hard to reach and remove for maintenance. This issue was exacerbated by the fact the aviation wheels used in the Object 911 were more vulnerable to wear and tear in comparison to standard ground wheels and, as such, would need to be maintained or replaced more often when in active use. The wheels were also found to overly complicate the production of the vehicle and make it longer and more expensive to produce. This was once again a major issue, as the goal behind the program was to provide an easy and quick-to-produce vehicle which could be introduced in massive numbers.
Object 911 during the process of switching from tracked to wheeled drive. Though the wheels provide the vehicle with some significant advantages in range and maximum speed, these were not judged to be worth the sacrifices undertaken in ease of production, maintenance, and cross-country mobility. Source: Bronya Rossii (Russia’s Armor) Episode 8
Likely the most damning point of the wheels over the fate of the Object 911, however, was their impact on cross-country capacities. As stated previously, the wheels of the Object 911, even when retracted to their fullest extent, would not entirely be contained within the hull and would still stick out of the bottom by several centimeters. In practice, this was found to be a major issue when driving on uneven dirt roads or terrain. The wheels could occasionally touch the ground and get caught on it. The result would be that the track would lose tension and the vehicle would prove unable to negotiate the obstacle. Considering the requirements requested for a highly mobile vehicle that could move through all terrains, this was a major issue.
Another issue that likely arose by this point was the crew configuration. When compared to the favorite, the Object 765, which would eventually be chosen, the placement of dismounts to the center and front of the vehicle would prove unfavorable. While, at first, this had been the preferred solution due to the ability of the dismounts to engage with small arms towards the front of the vehicle, in practice, the rear dismounts compartment of the Object 765 allowed for a far easier and safer exit of the vehicle through dual rear doors. In this configuration, the dismounts would not have to exit from the top of the vehicle, which could be incredibly dangerous when under fire. The buoyancy of the Object 911 was also found to be overall lacking, with the vehicle being fairly unstable in water.
Conclusion – An Original Solution, Quickly Ditched
In practice, it appears the Object 911 was one of the first vehicles to no longer be considered for adoption, alongside the other vehicle which used a mixed tracks and wheels drive, the Object 19. One can fairly easily identify the reason behind the rejection of these vehicles. The dual drive would result in increasing complexity in a vehicle which would typically perform worse than a wheeled vehicle in areas generally favorable to wheeled vehicles, and worse than tracked vehicles in areas generally favorable to tracked vehicles.
A modern view of the Object 911 at Kubinka. Image provided by Pavel Alexe.
Despite this rejection, the Volgograd Tractor Plant was not entirely out of the field of infantry fighting development, largely due to the parallel development of the more conventional Object 914. In comparison to the Object 911, the more standard Object 914 had more satisfying results and appeared to have been seriously considered for longer, though, eventually, the vehicle picked would be the more novel Object 765. Volgograd Tractor Plant would still obtain a notable success in the following years in the form of the Object 915, a small and light infantry fighting vehicle which was adopted as the airborne BMD-1.
As for the Object 911, it was not, for the time, an evolutionary dead-end, as alongside the infantry fighting vehicle, a light tank would be designed using the same chassis. This would be the very low Object 911B, which appears to have ditched the wheels drive entirely and featured a small two-man crew entirely present in the turret. As with the Object 911, it would also not be adopted for service. The Object 911 has been preserved in the Kubinka Armor Museum up to this day.
Object 911 on tracks. Illustration by Pavel “Carpaticus” AlexeObject 911 on wheels. Illustration by Pavel “Carpaticus” Alexe
Object 911 specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
6.735 x 2.940 x 2.040 m (maximum ground clearance)
Ground clearance
96 to 456 mm (adjustable)
Combat weight
12.07 tonnes
Engine
UTD-20 6-cylinders 300 hp diesel engine
Suspension
Adjustable pneumatic springs
Transmission mount
rear
Forward gears
5
Road wheels (tracks)
5 per side
Wheels configuration
4×2
Wheels diameter
840 mm
Steering wheels
Front
Maximum speed (road)
57 km/h on tracks, 108 km/h on wheels
Cruise speed (road)
70 km/h on wheels
Maximum speed (water)
10.3 km/h
Range
350-500 km (dirt roads, tracked drive)
Up to 1,350 km (highways, wheeled drive)
Crew
2 (driver, commander/gunner)
Dismounts
8
Main gun
73 mm 2A28 ‘Grom’ with 40 rounds
Autoloader
Electrically-driven horizontal conveyor belt
Secondary armament
Coaxial 7.62 mm PKT with 2,000 rounds
Missile armament
9M14 Malyutka ATGM with at least 2 missiles, possibly more
Effective armor protection
Heavy machine gun fire (frontal arc), rifle-caliber projectiles and artillery shells splinters (sides and rear)
Numbers produced
1
Sources
Solyankin, Pavlov, Pavlov, Zheltov. Otechestvennye boevye mashiny vol. 3
73-мм ГЛАДКОСТВОЛЬНОЕ ОРУДИЕ 2A28 Техническое описание и инструкция по эксплуатации (73-mm SMOOTHBORE WEAPON 2A28 Technical description and operating instructions)
БОЕВАЯ МАШИНА ПЕХОТЫ БМП-1 ТЕхничЕскоЕ ОПИсаниЕ И ИНСТРУКЦИЯ ПО ЭКСПЛУАТАЦИИ (COMBAT VEHICLE INFANTRY BMP-1 Technical Description AND THE OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS)
Bronya Rossii (Russia’s Armor) Episode 8 BMP-1 field disassembly, Tankograd
skylancer7441’s archive Kubinka tank museum website
With special thanks to Alex Tarasov and Pavel Alexe for their help in researching and writing this article
People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria (1977-Present)
Main Battle Tank – 330 Delivered
Algeria achieved independence from France in 1962 after an 8-year bloody struggle. Since then, the country has built up one of the best equipped militaries on the African continent. The main supplier of military hardware, and particularly armored vehicles, for this regional military power was traditionally the Soviet Union. A supporter of Algerian independence against France, the Soviet Union largely equipped the Algerian Army from the 1960s onward, and some of the hardware delivered in this era has remained in service and seemingly well-appreciated even up to this day, notably the T-55. This does not, however, appear to be the case of its direct successor in Soviet service, the T-62. Delivered to Algeria around 1977, the type has had a troublesome history in the North African country, largely outshadowed by the tanks that came before and after it. However, a recent rebuilding program may give a second life to the T-62 in the largest country of North Africa.
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An ANP T-62 on parade, late 1970s.Source: https://www.forcesdz.com/
An Army Running On Soviet Gear: The Rise of the ANP’s Armored Forces
France’s colonization of the territory of modern day Algeria began in 1830, and despite local opposition, would consolidate later in the century. Generally considered one of the jewels of France’s colonial empire, Algeria was no simple colony. It was the territory where, more than elsewhere, efforts were undertaken to settle Europeans and integrate the territory within the regular French political structures in place. Algeria was, in effect, a part of France.
This did little to prevent the rise of pro-independence feelings in Algeria, which already manifested in a fairly strong popular insurrection that was bloodily repressed by the French Army and Navy in 1945. In October 1954, the FLN (French: Front de Libération Nationale, English: National Liberation Front) was founded as a pro-independence group, which would quickly grow its armed forces, the ALN (French: Armée de Libération Nationale, English: National Liberation Army). This led to the beginning of the Algerian War, a conflict in which the FLN/ALN struggled with the French Army and its local auxiliaries for the independence of Algeria. After years of a long, bloody war, a ceasefire was finally brokered with the Evian Accords of March 1962. In July, Algeria would effectively gain its independence.
France’s colonial war had been widely unpopular, even among Western countries, and while France continued to widely acquire American gear during the Algerian War, there were few countries that openly supported France in the Algerian War. In contrast, the FLN had ample foreign support, both from fellow formerly colonized Arab states and other powers, perhaps most significantly the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. These equipped the ALN with weapons through a variety of channels during their guerilla struggle against the French.
Once in control of the country, the FLN implemented policies generally somewhat comparable with the USSR. The movement-turned-party was by no means Communist, even outlawing and repressing some communist organizations, but supported a form of Arab Socialism that generally clashed with the West. As such, it is not surprising to see that the Algerian Army, the ANP (French: Armée Nationale Populaire, English: National Popular Army), would receive open large-scale deliveries of arms from the Soviet Union and allied states. In terms of tanks, initially, there were a moderate number (seemingly around 110) of T-34-85s received shortly after independence, around 1963. These were quickly followed by a much larger complement of around 290 T-54 and T-55 tanks between 1964 and 1967. A further 50 T-55s may have arrived in the early 1980s. Significant numbers of armored personnel carriers, at first BTR-40s and BTR-152s, were delivered in the 1960s, and later BTR-60PBs, BTR-50s, and eventually BMP-1s in the 1970s as well.
These deliveries would allow the ANP to morph into a fairly large and well-equipped mechanized and armored force, although the exact composition of its units has typically been fairly poorly documented. This force had one clear potential opponent in the form of the neighboring Kingdom of Morocco. Morocco was more closely aligned with the West and had many historical disputes with Algeria, the most significant of these being over Western Sahara. Spain had held this territory, claimed by Morocco, in 1975, and Algeria openly supported and armed a group advocating for the independence of the region, known as the Polisario Front. This led to a divided Western Sahara stuck in a frozen conflict, a situation that persists to this day.
A recent picture of an Algerian T-55AMV. The T-55 has become a workhorse of the ANP, still widely used alongside mechanized infantry, and considerably modernized. As late as 2018, the vehicles were modified in order to be able to use Ukrainian 100 mm Stugna gun-launched anti-tank guided missiles.Source: topwar.ru
The deployment of Algeria’s Army is informed by its historical rivalry with Morocco. Algeria is divided between six military regions:
1st Military Region: located around the capital, Algiers, and does not include any territories on Algeria’s border.
2nd Military Region: located to the north-west, and concentrated around Oran, comprises the most densely populated area, bordering Morocco, and has traditionally seen the heaviest deployment of the ANP, particularly its most well-equipped units.
3rd Military Region: comprises the western part of the Algerian Sahara, including some significant settlements, such as Béchar, a long border with Morocco, and the border Algeria has with the Polisario Front. This strategic region has also seen significant deployments of the ANP.
4th Military Region: comprises the east of the Algerian Sahara, notably the totality of the border with Libya.
5th Military Region: located around Constantine in the north-east, it comprises Algeria’s border with Tunisia.
6th Military Region: the largest of the regions, it comprises most of the Algerian Sahara, including borders with Sahel/Sub-Saharan states, such as Mali and Niger.
A map of Algeria’s military regions.Source: Wikimedia Commons
These last three regions (4, 5, and 6), typically located further away from direct, potential peer-to-peer opponents of the Algerian Army, have typically seen less deployment of modern, heavy assets.
The T-62
The T-62 tank formally entered service in the Soviet Army in 1961, and new vehicles would be produced until 1975. The vehicle had largely been based on the previous T-55 in terms of armor layout and powerplant. The engine used in the T-62, the V-55V, was identical to the T-55’s V-55 in all but the alternator. It was a 12-cylinder, 4-stroke, liquid-cooled diesel engine, producing 580 hp at the nominal rate of 2,000 rpm.
Where the T-62 differed from the T-55 was in terms of turret and armament. The T-62 had adopted a new cast turret, of a similar overall shape but flatter and wider, and most significantly, a new 115 mm U-5TS smoothbore gun. In comparison to the 100 mm D-10T of the T-55, the U-5TS would prove superior both from a purely larger caliber and shell, and a smoothbore rather than rifled barrel, which was typically a better alternative to use for high-pressure shells, particularly in terms of wear. This made the T-62 better able to deal with new NATO tanks introduced in the 1960s which, for some of them, became better protected than their 1950s predecessors, for example the American M60 and the British Chieftain. There were also minor changes to the hull, which was slightly longer, as was the combat compartment. However, the vehicle gained only one tonne of weight from the T-55, reaching 37 tonnes. The improved T-55A was actually even heavier than the T-62, at 37.5 tonnes.
In many other regards, the T-62 was similar to the previous T-55. In terms of armor protection, the vehicle had the same protection on the hull. The main front glacis was 100 mm thick, angled at 60°, while the lower front plate was 100 mm angled at 55°. The hull sides were mostly flat and 80 mm thick, with a 45 mm armored collar for the turret, and a similar thickness of 45 mm at the vehicle’s rear hull. The cast turret had more differences with the old T-55, being flatter and wider overall. The armor was 242 mm at its thickest, on the very sides of the gun (32 mm thicker than on a T-54/T-55). Most of the frontal arc was 214 mm in comparison to 200 mm on the T-55, though the shapes of the T-62 turret meant that impacts would happen at higher angles. The armor progressively declined over the sides, being thicker towards the front, and going down to about 65 mm towards the rear sides. The roof itself was about 30 mm thick, though the front part, more susceptible to being hit, was 60 mm thick at a high angling of 80° just on top of the gun. Overall, the protection of the T-62 was equal to the T-55s over the hull but quite superior around the turret. At the time Algeria acquired the vehicle, this would have been a very good performance, especially as the Moroccan Army still had many tanks, such as 90 mm-armed M48s, which would have struggled to perforate that type of armor.
The suspension was very similar, though there were some differences. The T-62 notably did away with the front roadwheel having more space between it and the second, whereas all others were equally spaced. All road wheels were evenly spaced on the T-62. The type of suspension used is a classic torsion bar suspension. Crew composition was also similar to the T-54/T-55, with a driver, a loader, a commander, and a gunner. Operation would also be similar, though the heavier 115 mm shell could be said to be more tiring for the loader, despite efforts made to make it as light as possible.
The T-62 in Algeria
As a major customer of Soviet hardware, it is not surprising that Algeria ended up acquiring T-62s. Some 330 vehicles were purchased from the Soviet Union in the 1970s. The most commonly accepted date for the start of deliveries seems to be 1977, although 1975 is sometimes claimed. Deliveries ended in 1979. This fairly large delivery ran pretty swiftly, and seems to have almost doubled the Algerian fleet of main battle tanks. Algerian T-62s seem to have sometimes mounted a pintle DShK 12.7mm heavy machine gun.
Algerian T-62s on the parade during their first decades of service.Source: pinterestA color photo of Algerian T-62s, with their DShK raised at a vertical angle. The registration number of the first vehicle can be observed on the front left mudguard, while the vehicle’s number is present on the side of the turret.Source: https://www.forcesdz.com/
In service, the T-62 did not at all replace the T-54/T-55, which remained in service. They instead supplemented them. They were seen taking part in a number of parades in the late 1970s. However, it appears that the tanks failed to make a major impression. Algerian tankers seem to have preferred the older T-54/T-55 over the newer vehicle. It seems there were complaints of the vehicle performing poorly mobility-wise due to an increase in weight, though it being noticeable seems fairly odd, as the vehicle only gained a tonne while keeping the same horsepower output. It is also likely the heavier 115 mm shells, harder to handle for loaders, proved less popular for the crews. In Europe, the increase of firepower could generally be said to be well worth it, but one could see how this was lost on an Algerian Army of which the main rival, Morocco, in large part fielded older or lightly armored Western tanks, such as the M48 or SK-105.
Perhaps more significantly though, it would not be long before Algeria acquired new Soviet tanks, which seem to have been a huge jump forward from the T-62. In 1979, Algeria received its first T-72s, a 100 of seemingly the M variant. In comparison to the recently delivered T-62, the new Soviet tank was superior in almost all categories. It was more mobile, better armored, and better armed with a higher-caliber and autoloaded 125 mm gun. When comparing these two tanks, which, while several years apart in development in the USSR, were delivered closely together in Algeria, it is not hard to see why the T-62 failed to make an impression.
The T-62 Throughout the Years: Myths, Modernizations, and Exports
The unpopularity of the T-62 in Algeria appears to have been such that, in past years, there was a persistent rumor that the vast majority of the fleet was exchanged with the Soviet Union for modernized T-55s of the T-55M and T-55AMV type in the early 1980s. These claims have largely been disproven by confirmation that T-62s were still spotted in service in some numbers occasionally up to this day, and instead the appearance of T-55M and T-55AMV in the ANP from the 1980s onward is due to Algeria modernizing its fleet of T-55s with Soviet support. It remains true, however, that the older T-54/T-55 appear to have received much more attention than their theoretical successor.
Further deliveries of T-72s, and later, in the 2000s, T-90SA have relieved the T-55s from serving with armored regiments as combat tanks, to being used for fire-support with mechanized infantry units. However, the vast majority have seemingly been upgraded to the AMV standard, including ERA, a laser rangefinder, a much better fire control system, and the ability to fire gun-launched anti-tank missiles. In comparison, while upgrades were available for the T-62 from the USSR, such as the T-62M and T-62MV, it appears there were never great efforts to apply them in Algeria.
It also appears that small numbers of T-62s were passed onto the Polisario Front at an unclear date. The group’s equipment is overwhelmingly sourced from Algeria. While its most common tank has always been the T-54/T-55, some T-62s have also been spotted in its service. Inside Algeria, the T-62 has generally been fairly elusive. A regiment of up to around 100 tanks operated in Ain Bessam, 98 km south-east of Algiers, deep into the 1st military region and away from the Moroccan border, in the 1990s, before they relocated in 1997.
It is likely there was some limited involvement of T-62s during the Algerian Civil War, which raged on from 1991 to 2002. This was the consequence of a military coup launched to prevent what seemed like the imminent victory of an Islamist Coalition, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), against the ruling FLN party in the presidential elections. However, the war largely had a counter-insurgency nature, as opposed to a peer-to-peer war, and as such mostly involved lighter vehicles, with the most commonly seen tanks rather being the T-55s Algeria typically relies upon for fire support.
A review of Polisario Front tanks. While most appear to be T-54 or T-55s, the tank in the forefront is a T-62, which was almost certainly supplied by Algeria.Source: https://raids.fr/
One place where Algerian T-62s have typically often been seen is in Algeria’s BCL (French: Base Centrale Logistique, English: Central Logistical Base). Founded in 1975 in Béni Mered (in the Blida Province, within the 1st Military Region, and a few dozen kilometers from Algiers), the BCL was placed under the control of the Ministry of National Defense in 1982. It comprises a number of workshops and has become the largest armored fighting vehicles maintenance, upgrade, and, to an extent, even production plant in Algeria, employing around 2,500 people in 2021. The BCL was extensively modernized between 1987 and 1994 and reached its current status as a publicly-owned, industrial, and commercial company in 2009. T-62s have been fairly consistently spotted within the facilities of the BCL, and it appears that over time, a number of upgrades from the T-55AMV ‘trickled down’ onto some T-62s. A limited number of vehicles were spotted fitted with a similar laser rangefinder, likely the same KTD-2 as on the T-55AMV. T-62s have also been seen with a second infrared spotlight. However, it does not appear Algerian T-62s have ever been seen with the Kontakt 1 reactive armor used by the T-55AMV, nor is it likely that their fire control system has been upgraded to the same extent.
Three Algerian T-62s seen in recent years. They feature a number of new components, such as IR searchlights and what appear to be laser rangefinders, but still are far from featuring the amount of modernizations of Algerian T-55s. As suggested by the red oxide primer that two of them sport, these three vehicles may also just have been experimental conversions done at the BCL, and it appears unlikely most T-62s went through such a range of upgrades.Source: Dr.WatsonFDZ on twitter
Conversion to Fire Support Vehicles
By the 2000s, the T-62 appeared to many as the least active and most out-of-date part of Algerian’s tank fleet. They had failed to go on the same updates as the T-55s, while also vastly outdated in comparison to the T-72s and T-90s of Algeria.
Around the same time, Algeria was still a massive customer of Russian gear. Among notable orders, Algeria was an early adopter of the BMP-2M ‘Berezhok’ modernization for the BMP-2, ordering kits to modernize its vehicles as early as 2006. This adoption would be fairly widespread, extending further than the around 300 BMP-2s scheduled for modernization. A number of BMP-1s seemingly received the same turret, which makes them exceedingly hard to differentiate from BMP-2s.
In the 2010s, Algeria noticeably purchased the BMPT ‘Terminator’ T-72-based fire-support vehicle. Algeria bought a fairly high number (120, though up to 300 is sometimes claimed) of these vehicles, which were delivered in 2020.
An Algerian BMP upgraded with the Berezhok turret seen on the move during exercises.Source: military.africaAn Algerian BMPT Terminator. As of 2022, Algeria is the largest operator of this vehicle in the world. Source: KAD-GHANI on twitter
These purchases (among other purchases of Russian gear by Algeria, such as more T-90s), gave Algeria experience with both the Berezhok turret and the concept of a fire-support vehicle based on the hull of a tank. It appears these concepts were combined with Algeria’s remaining T-62s. It is not necessarily hard to see why this thought process was followed. The 115 mm gun of the T-62 had over the decades been unable to make itself as much of a ubiquitous system as the 100 mm of the T-54/55 or the 125 mm of the T-72 and T-90s. It appears that, as a result, the cost for ammunition and continued ammunition production was much less affordable than for more widely used calibers. Considering the T-62s also appeared to have been poorly valued by the Algerian Army, they were a prime candidate to find another use.
Therefore, at some point in the very late 2010s or in 2020, the decision was made to modernize the T-62 fleet by replacing their turrets with Berezhok turrets. The Algerian Army is traditionally somewhat opaque, which is why the start of the process is hard to place. It appears the conversion was first reported in late August 2021. By that point, however, known pictures of the conversion process were already being shared alongside the news, suggesting the project started months prior at least. The conversion has sometimes been called BMPT-62, though it is unclear if this is in any way official.
There were some changes that needed to be carried out in order to adapt the T-62 hull to mount a Berezhok turret. The most important most likely concerned the turret ring. The T-62 had a 2,245 mm turret ring (largely widened in comparison to the previous T-55 in order to accommodate the 115 mm gun), while the Berezhok is adapted to the 1,740 mm turret ring of the BMP-2. The solution to this problem was to create an armored ‘collar’, of which the reduced diameter would match the one needed. As a consequence though, it would likely make the turret sit higher as well. It is unclear if more changes are meant to be applied to the hull of the T-62s, mainly as, as of April 2022, no pictures of a completed converted vehicle have yet been seen. In order to fulfill a heavy fire-support role similar to a BMPT, some changes, such as the use of Explosive Reactive Armor (with Algeria already using Kontakt 5 fairly widely) would aid in the vehicle being able to adequately perform this role. Some pictures suggest new side skirts are being added to the vehicle, but this is a far cry from a large-scale updating of the tank’s protection, particularly against RPGs, which are likely to be the main threat to an urban fire-support vehicle.
T-62s undergoing the upgrade at the BCL. The forwardmost vehicle can be seen fitted with the armored ‘collar’ for the Berezhok turret. Other red oxide parts, such as what appears to be a basic spaced armor plate around the engine and extended mudguards, indicate new parts being fitted.Source: Dr.WatsonFDZ on twitterAnother picture of the vehicles being worked on in the BCL, showing both the new armored collar as well the extended mudguards and sideskirts.Source: Dr.WatsonFDZ on twitter
The Vehicles Are Unveiled
On July 2nd 2022, footage of completed Berezhok turret conversions appeared for the first time. A number of vehicles, painted in a sand tan color, were spotted in footage shared on the internet. The vehicles were taking part in rehearsals for a military parade to be held on July 5th, celebrating the 60 years of Algeria’s independence, presumably in Algiers. Many other armored or unarmored vehicles of the Algerian military were also seen in the same rehearsal, among which were: T-90SA main battle tanks, 2S3, BM-30 Smerch, TOS-1A Buratino, BM-21 Grad and PLZ-45 artillery systems, ZSU-23-4 Shilka, BUK-M2, Pantsir and S-300PMU2 anti-air systems, BMPT Terminators, and SM4 self-propelled mortars.
The vehicle’s appearance matches what could have been expected from earlier views of the conversion during its assembly. The front of the T-62 hull has evidently received few changes, with the same configuration of the lights and no form of up-armoring whatsoever, be it ERA, appliqué, or other. The same can be said for the Berezhok turret, and confirms that the vehicle’s protection indeed remains very limited.
A completed vehicle during rehearsals for the July 5th 2022 60th anniversary of Algerian independence parade. Source: KAD-GHANI on twitter.com : https://twitter.com/kad_ghaniA rear view of a vehicle from the same group, showing the engine deck. Source: KAD-GHANI on twitter.com : https://twitter.com/kad_ghaniA column of T-62 Berezhok seen from a road bridge. Source: KAD-GHANI on twitter.com : https://twitter.com/kad_ghani
The Berezhok Turret
The turret and components used for this modernization were ordered by Algeria from Kurganmashzavod KPB Tula of Russia.
A dismounted Berezhok turret used as a training aid in Algeria, 2018. Source: Algerian television via Dr.WatsonFDZ on twitter
The Berezhok turret is directly based on the BMP-2’s, of which it is intended as a modernization. However, it appears that new turrets are clearly being manufactured, which is not in itself a surprise, as BMP-2s turrets were still being made and used after the fall of the USSR. The Berezhok turret was first unveiled in 2006, and was a private venture. Russian orders to modernize the BMP-2 fleet would indeed take about a decade to come.
The turret can largely be considered a modern IFV turret. As a result of their BMP-2 lineage, it appears they have kept the same modest armor protection, with 20 mm angled at 36° to 43° to the front and front-sides, and 10 mm angled at 20° to 28º to the rear. The ergonomics are likely broadly similar as well. In comparison to previous Soviet vehicles, and particularly the BMP-1, the BMP-2’s turret is generally considered to have been somewhat more comfortable. The commander notably has a rotating cupola, though it is meagerly fitted with original periscopes.
The Berezhok turret highly improved the sensor suite of the BMP-2 turret. It received a much larger rotating commander’s sight, as well as thermal sights, seemingly for both gunner and commander, a significant improvement from previous models.
The main armament of the turret is still the 30 mm 2A42 autocannon.
The 30 mm 2A42 autocannon, which became the USSR’s most common 30 mm autocannon in the 1980s.Source: topwar.ru
The 2A42 fires the Soviet 30×165 mm cartridge. It uses a dual-feed system. There is a digital display showing the number of shells still available in the turret, as well as a switch allowing for a quick change in the type of ammunition fired. The weapon features a 2,416 mm barrel, fitted with a double-baffle muzzle brake. The autocannon has two dedicated fire rates, a slow one at 200 rpm and a quicker one at 550 rpm. During sustained fire, the rate of fire can reach higher values. The turret allows for a very high elevation of +60° which, coupled with a dedicated high-elevation sight, makes the 2A42 a more dangerous threat to helicopters than what would be expected from a ground vehicle.
A number of 30×165 mm shells are available for the 2A42. The total number of shells carried inside the BMD-2 turret is 300. If enough work was put into it, it is likely the larger hull of the BMP could allow for higher ammunition stowage.
For use against light fortifications, infantry, soft-skinned vehicles, and other unarmored targets, the 2A42 can fire the 3UOF8 High-Explosive Incendiary (HE-I) shells. This shell has an explosive filling of 49 grams of A-IX-2, the standard Soviet explosive autocannon shell formula since 1943. The overall mass of the projectile is 390 g, and that of the whole cartridge 842 g. In high-explosive belts, it is complemented by the 3UOR6. This shell forsakes most of the explosive charge, with only 11.5 g remaining, to mount a very large tracer. Fired at the same muzzle velocity of 980 m/s, it is used for fire correction purposes, though over large distances, the trajectory of the two shells may begin to differ. With a fuse lasting 9 to 14 seconds, the explosive shells will generally detonate after about 4 km if they have not met a target, though autocannons are typically used effectively at much closer ranges. The rate of tracer to high-explosive rounds in a 30 mm belt tends to be 1:4.
For armor-piercing duties, two types of 30 mm shells exist. The older 3UBR6 is a fairly classic armor-piercing shell with a core of hardened structural steel. This steel core weighs 375 g, with the entire projectile weighing just 25 g more, at 400 g, and the entire shell weighs 856 g. It features a tracer that burns for 3.5 seconds after being fired, and has a muzzle velocity of 970 m/s. Its penetration values against Rolled Homogeneous Armor (RHA) at an angle of 60° are 29 mm at 700 m, 18 mm at 1,000 m, and 14 mm at 1,500 m. These are fairly mediocre performances, able to defeat little more than light armored vehicles in the vast majority of cases.
A more modern armor-piercing shell exists in the form of the 3UBR8, an Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) shell with a tracer. It features a lighter 222 g piercing core of tungsten alloy. The projectile as a whole is 304 g, and the cartridge 765 g. Fired at a muzzle velocity of 1,120 m/s, this shell seems to penetrate, against similar RHA armor and at the same angle of 60°, 35 mm at 1,000 m, and 25 mm at 1,500 m. It offers much more suitable performance than the older 3UBR6 against modern infantry fighting vehicles. The 2A42 is supplemented by a coaxial 7.62×54 mmR PKTM machine gun. It appears it is fed by a single 2,000 round belt, as on the standard BMP-2.
This 2A42 autocannon is fitted with much more comprehensive fire control systems inside the Berezhok. The turret features a ballistic computer and automatic target tracker, making acquisition and precise targeting much easier. It also provides thermal sights and a two-axis stabilizer. The gunner’s sight, in particular, comprises 4 different channels: a classic optical mode, a thermal mode, a laser rangefinding mode, and a fourth integrated missile-control mode for the turret’s Kornet ATGMs. Independent commander and gunner’s sights allow the turret to be used in ‘hunter-killer’ operations.
In addition to the PKTM, another anti-infantry secondary weapon is fitted in the form of the AGS-30M automatic grenade launcher. It is mounted to the rear of the turret, firing over the roof, and is centrally mounted. This automatic grenade launcher is fed by 29-round belts, with the projectiles used being 30×29 mm grenades. A number of projectiles are available. The oldest is the VOG-17A and improved VOG-17M, introduced with the 1970s AGS-17, a simple high-explosive fragmentation grenade. The later VOG-30 and, since 2013, VOG-30D retain the same general role of HE-FRAG, but with enhanced explosive filling and fragmentation potential. The last type of HE projectile available, IO-30, is fitted with a fuze to detonate it after 1,700 m, which is generally considered to be the maximum effective range of the AGS-30. The grenade launcher is automatic, firing rounds at arounds 400 rounds/minute with a muzzle velocity of about 185 m/s. It is a remarkably light system at only 16 kg unloaded, adding some non-negligible firepower to the vehicle at very little additional weight. Additionally, it can also be loaded with VUS-30 smoke projectiles, allowing it to be used to deploy smoke screens.
An ammunition belt of 30 mm VOG-17A high-explosive fragmentation grenades.Source: armedconflicts.comA rear view of a BMP-2M Berezhok at a Russian military exhibition. This angle is particularly good for viewing the AGS-30M as well as Kornet missile tubes.Source: topwar.ru
The last weapon system of the Berezhok is its complement of 9M113 Kornet missiles. The turret features four launchers, two on each side of the turret. It ought to be noted that while this is not the case on the BMP-2M, considering the large space available for ammunition storage inside the T-62 hull, storage of a reload of these missiles may perhaps be a possibility.
The Kornet uses semi-automatic beam-riding guidance, meaning the missile is aimed using a laser beam aimed at the target from the firing vehicle. The previous 9M113 Konkurs offered by Tula was, in comparison, a wire-guided semi-automatic command to line of sight (S.A.C.L.O.S.) system, which required the firing vehicle to constantly maintain the target in line-of-sight in order to retain guidance. This more modern guidance system, in addition to the higher maximum speed of Kornet ATGMs (going from 250 to 300 m/s, depending on the missile, whereas Konkurs reaches a maximum of around 200 m/s), makes the Kornet a safer and more accurate missile in general.
In addition to its superior guidance system and speed in comparison to older Soviet ATGMs, the Kornet is also of a larger caliber than most being 152 mm, whereas the older Konkurs is 135 mm. This, in addition to more modern shaped charge designs and components, make it much more effective against armored fighting vehicles. The original 9M133-1 missile was rated for around 1,100 to 1,200 mm Rolled Homogenous Armor (RHA) penetration on average, and the use of a tandem HEAT warhead reduced the protection offered by ERA against it. Since then, the newer 9M133-2 (or ‘Kornet-EM’) has a stated armor penetration of 1,100 to 1,300 mm and a longer effective range of up to 8,000 m. The large caliber of the Kornet also allowed for other uses than merely anti-tank. This manifested with the 9M133F-1 missile, which instead of an armor-piercing shaped charge, contains a thermobaric warhead, equivalent to 10 kg of TNT and providing significant incendiary effects. Both the original 9M133-1 and thermobaric 9M133-F missiles have a maximum flight speed of 250 m/s and an effective range of 100 to 5,500 m.
A schematic of the 9M113-1 armor-piercing missile. The first explosive charge is denoted by the ‘1’ and the second by the ‘5’. The fenders (6) and control systems (7) are at the rear, while the fuel (4), rudders (3), and drive with intlets (3) are towards the front-middle.Source: https://en.missilery.info/The warhead of a 9M133F-1 thermobaric Kornet, which was found by Ukrainian troops in Donbas in 2015.Source: https://informnapalm.org/
Still, in some ways, the turret may be somewhat of an imperfect fit. As previously stated, without an effort to up-armor it, it has much lighter armor protection than the hull, though it could be said that even without additional armor, the base hull of a T-62 is not protected against many modern anti-tank weapons. The vehicle would have a crew reduced to three due to the Berezhok turret only having two crewmembers, which would change aspects of the vehicle’s maintenance.
Conclusion – A Potentially Potent Modernization, Yet to Enter Service
Overall, the reasoning behind the modernization of the T-62 with the Berezhok turret by Algeria is a fairly reasonable process. With somewhat uncommon ammunition, the T-62’s original armament would have been harder to maintain. While the armament on 100 mm-armed tanks was modernized (in 2018, Algerian T-55s received the ability to fire Ukrainian 100 mm Stugna gun-launched anti-tank missiles), it does not appear there were efforts to offer the same capacities to T-62s, despite gun-launched 115 mm-missiles also being available.
The Berezhok modernization does give the vehicle a considerable amount of firepower which can be used for fire-support roles. The 2A42, AGS-30M, and thermobaric warheads for the Kornet are all potent weapon systems for such roles. It is likely Algeria can very easily see use for this type of vehicle. In its history, the country has at times been the victim of heavily-armed terrorists, a consequence of the almost unpatrollable borders in the Sahara, alongside unstable countries. A prominent example in the last decade was the In Amenas hostage crisis of January 2013. Al-Qaeda terrorists took over a gas facility in the Sahara, on Algeria’s border with Libya, taking hundreds of Algerian workers and dozens of foreigners hostage. This forced the Algerian Army to conduct an assault. Historically, fighting in urban areas against terrorists has been a major concern for the ANP. The potency of a vehicle such as the modernized T-62 in such a role is not to be underestimated, particularly if the vehicle is to receive explosive-reactive armor (ERA), although tas of July 2022, the vehicle has only been seen without such protection.
Algerian T-62. Illustration by David Bocquelet.Algerian T-62, red primer. Illustration by David Bocquelet.T-62 with Berezhok turret. Illustration by David Bocquelet, modified by Pavel “Carpaticus” Alexe, funded by our Patreon campaign.T-62 with Berezhok turret, modified parts still in red primer. Illustration by David Bocquelet, modified by Pavel “Carpaticus” Alexe, funded by our Patreon campaign.
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