Category: WW2 Italian Tactics

Italian Armored Units During the Italian Invasion of Albania

Post author By Daniele Notaro
Post date November 29, 2023
3 Comments on Italian Armored Units During the Italian Invasion of Albania

Kingdom of Italy (1939)

On 7th April 1939, the armed forces of the Kingdom of Italy invaded the small Albanian Kingdom. Among the attacking forces, there were armored units that took part in the few clashes that occurred during the three-day invasion.

All units were equipped with Carri Armati L3/35 (English: 3 ton Light Tanks Model 1935), which formed the core of the Italian armored forces until 1940. They were able to hold to reign supreme solely due to the Albanian forces’ lack of anti-tank weapons.

Carri Armati L3/35 of the Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’ (English: Tank Assault Group) after having just landed in Durrës.
Source: Wikipedia

Relations between Albania and Italy before 1939

The relationship between the Kingdom of Italy and Albania was close during most of the early Twentieth century. During World War I, Italian forces were deployed in Albania to combat the Central Powers, and the Treaty of London signed between Italy and the Allies in 1915 included a provision for Italian sovereignty over the territory of Vlora. However, in 1920, an Albanian uprising expelled the Italians from Vlora. In 1928, the President of the Albanian Republic, Ahmet Zogu, proclaimed himself King of Albania under the name Zog I, establishing the Albanian Kingdom.

King Zog I.
Source: Wikipedia

From 1933 onwards, King Zog began distancing himself from collaboration with Italy and started leaning towards Greece and Yugoslavia.

This displeased Mussolini, the Head of the Italian Government and Duce, as he had expansionist aspirations in the region.

Starting in 1937 with the various trips of Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, a study of the Albanian territory began in anticipation of annexation. The following year, an “economic colonization” of the country began and, in 1939, a plan for invasion was devised.

The Invasion

On 25th March 1939, Italy sent a proposal of annexation to King Zog, who refused it. On 2nd April, an ultimatum was issued, which was once again rejected by the Albanian king. However, King Zog chose to flee to Greece, leaving the Ushtria Mbretërore Shqiptare (English: Royal Albanian Army) in disarray and unprepared to counter the Italian invasion.

The Albanian Armed Forces

The Albanian armed forces were poorly equipped and lacked motivation. The Italians estimated a force of 45,000 men, but in reality, there were only 15,000, of which 8,000 were considered effective.

The Ushtria Mbretërore Shqiptare was trained and equipped by the Italians while the Xhandarmërisë was trained by the British.

Albanian soldiers during a parade. Note the Italian armament.
Source: Pinterest

The Ushtria Mbretërore Shqiptare was under the command of the Chief of the General Staff, General Xhemal Aranitasi, and was organized into four territorial sectors.

Albanian forces in April 1939
Sector	Command Headquarters	Commander	Forces
First	Milot	Lieutenant Colonel Bega	Three infantry battalions Two batteries One engineering company
Second	Milot	Lieutenant Colonel Vulagaj	Two infantry battalions One Xhandarmërisë battalion Two mountain artillery batteries
Third	Vlora	Lieutenant Colonel Kuku	Two infantry battalions One Xhandarmërisë battalion Two artillery sections One engineering platoon
Fourth	Saranda	Lieutenant Colonel Topalli	Two Border Guard battalions One Xhandarmërisë battalion
Durrës garrison	Durres	Major Abaz Kupi	One Border Guard battalion One Xhandarmërisë battalion One engineering company One platoon of sailors Six cannons

The Albanian defense plan aimed to hold out for at least ten days, awaiting Yugoslav intervention, and its objective was to defend the capital city of Tirana for as long as possible. The defense of Tirana was organized into four defensive lines, with the final line positioned in strong positions along the Dajti mountain range.

Albanian defensive lines meant to protect the capital Tirana.
Source: Le truppe italiane in Albania

The Ushtria Mbretërore Shqiptare, however, quickly disintegrated, while the main resistance came from the Xhandarmërisë, which had approximately 4,000 men, especially around Durrës, where the Albanian Navy Sergeant Mujo Ulqinaku died heroically. Alongside other sailors and armed with only a machine gun, he fought until he was killed by a grenade, inflicting casualties on the Italians.

A group of xhandar (English: gendarmes) photographed in the 1930s.
Source: bunkart.al

Italian Forces

For the occupation of Albania, the Italians had a force of 22,000 men, 64 cannons, 125 Carri Armati L3/35, 860 other vehicles, 1,200 motorcycles, 5,500 bicycles, and 2,500 pack animals included in the Corpo di Spedizione Oltre-Mare Tirana (English: Overseas Expeditionary Corps Tirana) under the command of General Alfredo Guzzoni.

General Alfredo Guzzoni
Source: generals.dk

To transport the troops, the Italian Regia Marina (English: Royal Navy) provided 22 steamers, the seaplane carrier Miraglia (which carried the tanks), and five tanker ships, supported by two battleships, seven cruisers, 16 destroyers, 14 torpedo boats, and other smaller vessels.

The Italian Regia Aeronautica (English: Royal Air Force) had an observation squadron, two bomber wings, and three air transport wings. However, no aerial bombardment was carried out.

Bersaglieri enter an Albanian town.
Source: eastjournal.net

For the invasion, the Italian forces were divided into three waves, but only the first wave actually took part in the invasion, while the others landed after the country was occupied.
The I Scaglione (English: First Wave) was under the command of Colonel Arturo Scattini and was supposed to land simultaneously at Durrës, Vlora, Shëngjin, and Saranda. The wave was divided into four columns, listed below:

I Scaglione
Name	Commander	Objectives	Forces
Colonna Durazzo	General Giovanni Messe	Tirana	Reggimento di formazione ‘Mannerini’ Five Bersaglieri battalions Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’ 65 mm battery of the 3° Reggimento Granatieri di Sardegna’ 20 mm anti-aircraft battery of the 14° Reggimento Artiglieria ‘Murge’
Colonna Valona	Colonel Tullio Bernardi	Shkodra and Lezhe	Two Bersaglieri battalions Two Camicie Nere battalions
Colonna San Giovanni di Medua	Colonel Arturo Scattini	Devoll and Valona	Three Bersaglieri battalions Two companies of marine infantry battalion San Marco
Colonna Santi Quaranta	Colonel Mario Carasi	Delvinë and Gjirokastër	Two Bersaglieri battalions III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci ‘San Giorgio’ Two companies of marine infantry battalion San Marco

The II Scaglione (English: Second Wave) had an infantry battalion of the 47° Reggimento di Fanteria ‘Ferrara’ (English: 47th Infantry Regiment), a machine gun battalion, three artillery groups, a garrison infantry company, two engineer companies, and two light tanks squadrons. The III Scaglione (English: Third Wave) had two infantry battalions and the 14° Reggimento di Artiglieria ‘Murge’ (English: 14th Artillery Regiment) of the 23a Divisione di Fanteria ‘Murge’ (English: 23rd Infantry Division) and the Gruppo Battaglioni Camicie Nere ‘Peano’ (English: Blackshirt Battalion Group).

Italian invasion plan.
Source: albanianstudies.weebly.com

The Italian attack began on 7th April 1939, and within three days, the entire country was occupied, though the Italian command made various mistakes and the organization of the invasion was poor.

The Albanian resistance was modest, except for the clashes in Durrës, and the Italian losses were 12 dead and 81 wounded. In Bernd Fischer’s book, Albania at War 1939-1945, the author estimates Italian losses of 200 dead in Durrës alone, for a total of 700 casualties overall.

The Carro Armato L3

The Carro Armato L3 was the only tank used by Italian forces during the invasion of Albania because it was the only armored vehicle produced in large enough numbers by the Italian arms industry. It also equipped all Italian armored units in 1939. The development of these light tanks began in 1928, and the following year, the Carro Veloce 29 (English: Fast Tank 1929), an Italian version of the British Carden Loyd, was adopted.

Carro Veloce 29 pulling a trailer during the Giornata dell’Arma Chimica (English: Chemical Corps Day) in 1935.
Source: Pinterest via ww2photo.se

In 1933, the Carro Veloce 33 (English: Fast Tank 1933) was adopted, which was quite different from the older model and served as the basis for subsequent developments.

A Carro Veloce 33, armed with two Breda Modello 1938 machine guns, captured by British soldiers during Operation Compass in 1941.
Source: Wikipedia

The Carro Veloce 35 (English: Fast Tank 1935), developed and introduced in 1935, was based on the Carro Veloce 1933. It differed from the previous model in terms of its armament, which consisted of two 8 mm Fiat Modello 1914/1935 machine guns (replaced in 1938 by two Breda Modello 1938), and the armor, which was bolted and not welded to the sides.

A Carro Veloce 35 driving onto a truck to be transported
Source: gli autoveicoli da combattimento dell’esercito italiano

The Carro Veloce, then Carro Leggero (English: Light Tank) since 1939, was developed for mountain combat, as Italian commanders believed that a new war would be fought in the Alps.

Consequently, it was a small, light, and fast vehicle armed only with machine guns, making it already obsolete by the mid-1930s, especially for the lack of a turret.

Its use in Ethiopia in 1935 and 1936 and in Spain from 1936 to 1939 highlighted its significant deficiencies when facing other tanks or armored vehicles and its vulnerability to anti-tank weapons or even heavy machine guns.

The Italian Tank Units during the Invasion

Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’

The Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’ (English: Tank Assault Group) of Colonel Giovanni D’Antoni was part of the first landing wave. It was included in the Colonna Durazzo (English: Durrës Column) under the command of General Giovanni Messe that was supposed to land in the corresponding location and to advance all the way to Tirana, the capital of the Albanian Kingdom.

The Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto was formed from the VIII and X Battaglione Carri (English: 8th and 10th Tank Battalions), belonging to the 4° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista (English: 4th Tank Crew Infantry Regiment), which had a total of 31 Carri Armati L3

The invasion began on 7th April and the two battalions were transported to Albania by the seaplane carrier Miraglia. However, they were unable to immediately disembark the tanks because the assigned docking pier had been occupied by the Italian steamship Aquitania, which took 12 hours to unload 30 trucks.

At 1:00 p.m., the tank landing began, by which time the resistance of the Albanians in Durrës had been suppressed.

Carro Armato L3/35 while disembarking from the seaplane carrier Miraglia in the port of Durrës.
Source: Istituto Luce

The following day, a mechanized group was formed, which started advancing rapidly towards Tirana at 8:45 a.m. The Albanian forces defending the capital were mainly composed of xhandar, who were caught off guard by the Italian attack, and almost all of them surrendered without a fight. By 9:30 a.m, the Italian column entered the city.

Immediately after the occupation of Tirana, Colonel Giovanni D’Antoni was ordered to advance towards Elbasan.

A new column was formed, consisting of the XVIII Battaglione (English: 19th Battalion) of the 2° Reggimento Bersaglieri (English: 2nd Bersaglieri Regiment), the XIV Battaglione (English: 14th Battalion) of the 5° Reggimento Bersaglieri (English: 5th Bersaglieri Regiment), and the X Battaglione Carri.

A column of Carri Armati L3/35 of the Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto passes by a truckload of Bersaglieri.
Source: British Pathé

The column departed from Tirana at 4:00 p.m., and after two and a half hours, it reached Qafa Krrabes, where the Albanian defenders, under the command of Prince Hjssein Dolshisti, surrendered without a fight. The Italians captured a significant amount of equipment and two artillery batteries.

The advance resumed, and by 8:30 p.m, they reached Elbasan, covering a distance of 54 km in four and a half hours. The VIII Battaglione Carri remained in Tirana, while one of its platoons was left in Durrës to defend the vital port.

Advance of the Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’.
It occupied Tirana and Elbasan.
Source: albanianews.al modified by author

Colonel Giovanni d’Antoni was awarded the Bronze Medal for Military Valor for his actions during the invasion.

Sailors of the seaplane carrier Miraglia disembark an Carro Armato L3/35 with a crane.
Source: British Pathé

III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci ‘San Giorgio’

The III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci ‘San Giorgio’ (English: 3rd Squadron Group of Fast Tanks) was created in 1934 by the Reggimento Scuola Carri Veloci (English: Fast Tank Training Regiment) and was organized into four squadrons, totaling 61 Carri Armati L3.

In January 1935, it was placed under the command of the IIIa Brigata Celere ‘Principe Amedeo Duca d’Aosta’ (English: 3rd Fast Brigade) and, later, the 3a Divisione Celere ‘Principe Amedeo Duca d’Aosta’ (English: 3rd Cavalry Division).

During the invasion of Albania, the III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci was part of the Colonna Santi Quaranta (English: Saranda Column), under the command of Colonel Mario Carasi. Its objective was the occupation of Delvinë and Gjirokastër.

On the morning of 7th April, Italian troops landed in Saranda, quickly eliminating the limited resistance from the Xhandarmërisë. They then began to advance towards Delvinë, which was occupied later that evening, and reached Gjirokastër the following day.

Advance of the III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci ‘San Giorgio’.
It occupied Delvinë and Gjirokastër.
Source: albanianews.al modified by author

The advance was swift and no enemy resistance was encountered, although the poor condition of the roads posed a significant challenge.

Carro Armato L3/35 of the III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci ‘San Giorgio’ during the Second World War.
Source: unitalianoinrussia.it

Reggimento Provvisorio di Cavalleria

The Reggimento Provvisorio di Cavalleria (English: Provisional Cavalry Regiment), commanded by Colonel Raffaele Pelligra, consisted of the I Gruppo Squadroni (English: 1st Squadron Group) of the Reggimento ‘Lancieri di Aosta’ (English: Lancers Regiment), the II Gruppo Squadroni (English: 2nd Squadron Group) of the Reggimento ‘Genova Cavalleria’ (English: Cavalry Regiment), a machine gun platoon of the Reggimento ‘Genova Cavalleria’ and a command unit.

The Reggimento Provvisorio di Cavalleria landed in Durrës as part of the III Scaglione on 14th April and deployed near Devoll and Fier before being divided into two columns with the objective of reaching Peshkopi.

The I Gruppo Squadroni passed through Tirana, Lezhe, and Shkodra, and finally arrived in Peshkopi.

The II Gruppo Squadroni, initially descended towards southern Albania, reaching Berat and Permet, and then headed north, skirting the border with Greece and Yugoslavia, and finally arrived in Peshkopi.

Advance of the Reggimento Provvisorio di Cavalleria. In blue the I Gruppo Squadroni, in black the II Gruppo Squadroni.
Source: albanianews.al modified by author

Considerations on the Use of the Carro Armato L3 in Albania

The Carro Armato L3 had been specifically designed for combat in mountainous terrain, and during the invasion of Albania, it performed relatively well, despite facing some difficulties due to the poor condition of the roads.

Additionally, the lack of anti-tank weapons in the Albanian forces and their limited resistance meant that the Carri Armati L3 faced minimal challenges during their few encounters with the Xhandarmërisë and the small number of Albanian soldiers who fought back.

Due to the poor organization of the operation and the absence of significant challenges, the invasion of Albania did not lead to any improvements in the use of Italian tanks, nor did it make Italian commanders fully realize the obsolescence of the Carro Armato L3.

When the Kingdom of Italy entered the war on the side of Germany on 10th June 1940, the Carri Armati L3 was still the backbone of the Italian armored forces but by then it was virtually useless for modern warfare.

During the early fighting in the Alps or in the Libyan desert, the old Carri Armati L3 still demonstrated its imitated warfare capabilities and was slowly (but never completely) replaced by the new medium tanks.

Carri Armati L3/35 of the Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’ during the advance towards Tirana
Source: Gli autoveicoli da combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano

Aftermath

After the Italian invasion, the Kingdom of Albania was annexed by Italy as the Protettorato Italiano del Regno d’Albania (English: Italian Protectorate of Albania), and on 16th April, King Vittorio Emanuele III was crowned as the King of Albania.

Italian rule over the country lasted until 8th September 1943, when, due to the Armistice between the Kingdom of Italy and the Allied forces, Germany occupied Albania and installed some collaborationist leaders, with Balli Kombëtar at the forefront.

German control was short-lived, and by October 1944, the country transformed into the Qeveria Demokratike e Shqipërisë (English: Democratic Government of Albania), which in 1945 became the Republika Popullore Socialiste e Shqipërisë (English: People’s Socialist Republic of Albania).

Conclusion

The contribution of the Italian armored forces to the invasion of Albania was very limited.

With the exception of the Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’, which had some clashes with the Xhandarmërisë, the rest of the units were able to reach their objectives without major combat and mostly unmolested.

Sources

Ufficio Storico dello SME Le truppe italiane in Albania (Anni 1914-20 e 1939) Roma 1978
Niccolò Lucarelli Italiani in Albania 1939-1945 Parma 2021
Bernd Jürgen Fischer Albania at war 1939-1945 West Lafayette 1999
Antonello Biagini and Fernando Frattolino Diario Storico del Comando Supremo Volume I Tomo II Roma 1986
Rodolfo Puletti, Dante Saccomandi and Dario Cerbo I Lancieri di Aosta dal 1774 al 1970 Out-of-print edition 1971
Rodolfo Puletti Genova Cavalleria 1683 1983 Padova 1985

Has Own Video WW2 Italian Tactics

Italian Medium Tank Crew Training During the Second World War

Post author By Arturo Giusti
Post date November 11, 2023
No Comments on Italian Medium Tank Crew Training During the Second World War

Kingdom of Italy/Italian Social Republic (1940-1945)

When speaking of Italian armor during the Second World War, it is important to analyze the training that Italian tank crew members received before being assigned to frontline units.

Although the Italian war industry was unable to keep up with the production capabilities of the Allied nations, it could have matched Nazi Germany in the experience gained by its crews due to the large number and variation of operations it was involved in. Unfortunately, training was completely ignored by the Italian Regio Esercito (English: Royal Army) High Command during the war, leading to catastrophic results.

Italian Training Before Second World War

Before joining the bloodiest war of the 20th Century, the Kingdom of Italy relied on a large and heterogeneous fleet of light and obsolete tanks for training.

In order to train crew members in driving light tanks, many Carri Veloci 33 and CV35 vehicles were employed together with older FIAT 3000s. In order to train medium tank crew members, the only Schneider CA at the Departmental Headquarters for the Tank School in Bologna was available. The vehicle remained in service as a training vehicle until 1936, two decades after it was first introduced.

The French Schneider CA WWI era tank at the Bologna Training School in 1937. Source: Nicola Pignato

Surprisingly, the High Command of the Italian Regio Esercito (English: Royal Army) did not consider the lack of training a notable issue, instead blaming the defeats suffered during the Spanish Civil War on the obsolescence of the vehicles used. A prime example of this is the absence of any change in the training of the Regio Esercito infantry or tank drivers during and after the Spanish Civil War.

The Regio Esercito focused on developing new fighting vehicles to deal with more modern threats, such as the Soviet armored fighting vehicles encountered in Spain.

Despite the development of new vehicles, such as the Autoblinda AB40 and the M11/39 tank, the Regio Esercito remained anchored on the concept of mountain trench warfare that had seen it victorious in the Great War, but in which armored fighting vehicles were not considered a priority.

One of the most serious problems that would be faced by the Italian Regio Esercito (English: Royal Army) during the Second World War was not the enemy, but the effectiveness of its armored vehicles. On many occasions in North Africa, entire Italian armored units failed to adequately confront similarly sized Commonwealth units because of the Italian crews’ poor training.

The Italian 3 tonnes Carri Armati L3 light tanks had been delivered to cavalry schools to replace horses with tracks. Medium tanks, on the other hand, were delivered to tank schools where prospective crews had already completed infantry courses and then received tank crew members training. In fact, in Italy, the tank units were called fanteria carrista (English: tank crew infantry), meaning that they were infantry and tank crew members at the same time.

Miscellaneous Training during World War II

Training on armored cars and light tanks is barely reported in the relevant sources. The armored car training courses were held, for the duration of the war, at the Scuola Militare di Cavalleria (English: Military School of Cavalry) in Pinerolo, Piemonte.

The old Scuola Militare di Cavalleria, now the Museo Storico dell’Arma di Cavalleria, Italian Cavalry Museum. Source: tripadvisor.com

Armored car crew members were recruited from soldiers that had already been trained as cavalrymen or from the Italian assault light infantry, also known as Bersaglieri.

The only difference between the two types of recruits was their nomenclatures: Bersaglieri units were composed of coppia (English: couples) consisting of 2 armored cars, plotone (English: platoons) composed of 2 couples, compagnie (English: companies) composed of one command platoon (one command car) and four platoons, for a total of 17 armored cars. Battaglioni (English: battalions) consistedof one command company and two to four companies, for a total of 35 or 69 armored cars. The cavalry units used squadrone (English: squadrons) instead of compagnie and gruppi (English: groups) instead of battaglione in the nomenclature.

The cavalry crew of an Autoblinda AB41 with desert tires in the Pinerolo countryside. Source: facebook.com @Curzio Cobetti

Interestingly enough, some armored car training units were deployed on Italian coastal patrols after completing basic driving training in Piemonte.

The war diary of the VIII Battaglione Bersaglieri Blindato Autonomo (English: 8th Armored Bersaglieri Autonomous Battalion) shows that the crew training lasted from mid-August 1941 (the unit was established on 10th August) and ended in October 1941. Some of the companies of the battalion were shortly after sent to North Africa, with less than 3 months of training.

Bersaglieri crew members of an Autoblinda AB41. Despite the desert environment, Italian crew members usually wore heavy leather coats to protect themselves from shock and flammable liquids inside the vehicle. Source: Archivio Centrale dello Stato

On 14th December 1941, the Ispettorato delle Truppe Motorizzate e Corazzate (English: Inspectorate of Motorized and Armored Troops) issued the rules for the training of the first three squadrons of Carri Armati L6/40.

Carro Armato L6/40 number 13 crossing a river during training. Due to the lack of spare 20 mm automatic cannons and small amounts of ammunition, crew members usually trained without main guns. Pinerolo countryside. Source: italie1935-45.com

Training lasted a few days and consisted of firing exercises up to 700 m. Also included were driving over varied terrain and practical and theoretical instruction for the unit personnel assigned to drive heavy trucks. Each Carro Armato L6/40 had at its disposal, during training: 42 rounds for the 20 mm main armament, 250 rounds for the coaxial 8 mm machine gun, 8 tonnes of gasoline. For the logistic truck drivers, there was 1 tonne of diesel fuel for training.

A concentration of Carri Armati L6/40 in a depot near Bologna during crew training in 1941. Source: italie1935-45.com

The Italian training on armored vehicles was very poor. Because of the lack of availability of equipment, Italian tank crews had few opportunities to train to shoot in addition to substandard mechanical training.

Medium Tank Training during World War II

Italian medium tank crew members were recruited from soldiers who had first completed their training as infantry. They were then selected by commanders from those with a minimum knowledge of engines or those who had a driver’s license. An elementary school diploma was compulsory for all participants in the tank crew course.

Carri Armati M13/40 commanders. The man on the right with his arms folded is a second lieutenant. All of them are wearing different overalls of different military origin, but are all armed with Beretta Modello 1934 pistols in leather holsters. Behind them is a Carro Armato L3/35 Lanciafiamme. All the crew members are wearing the standard cork-bodied leather-covered Modello 1932 tanker helmet with protective glasses. Source: Italian Soldiers in North Africa

In many cases, the officers and NCOs were replacements and had barely finished the officer academy, being sent to war before they had a chance to even finish their courses.

Production of the Carro Armato M13/40 (English: M13/40 Tank) started in January 1940 and the first training courses were started for 12 officers, 12 non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and 30 soldiers at the Corso Carrista (English: Tank Crew Course) in the Centro Addestramento Carristi (English: Tank Crew Training Center) of Bracciano near Rome, under the guidance of Colonel Scalabrino.

A Carro Armato M14/41 scale model produced by Ansaldo, used to train new crew members. Photo taken in March 1942. Source: fondazioneansaldo.it

The crew members first trained on a Carro Armato M11/39, 5 Carri Armati L3/35 light tanks and, surprisingly, also on the Carro Armato M13/40 prototype.

Each soldier was trained to perform multiple tasks, not just one. For example, almost all crew members were taught how to use radios, which were nonetheless almost absent in the first produced Carri Armati M13/40.

Unfortunately, there were few practical lessons. Each tank commander fired only 5 rounds with the 47 mm gun and a magazine of machine gun ammunition, while drivers and machine gunners/radio operators fired 3 47 mm rounds and a magazine with the Breda. The loaders probably followed a mechanical course to be able to maintain and repair the tank.

Unfortunately, due to the demands of war, the Carri Armati M13/40 training course was interrupted on 4th February 1940, by which time the 54 crew members had not yet fully completed their training on the new medium tanks.

Some courses also started at Ansaldo-Fossati of Genoa on 15th July 1940. The first of these lasted only 19 days, weekends included. The crew members trained on a single Carro Armato M13/40 and on the new vehicles that were tested after production on the Ansaldo testing ground. The first 15 Carri Armati M13/40 produced by Ansaldo were delivered to the Bracciano Tank Training School in mid-July 1940 to train the new crews.

However, only on 29th August did the courses restart at the Bracciano training school. The number of students greatly increased to about a battalion, but with very limited numbers of vehicles available for training: one Carro Armato M11/39, 5 Carri Armati L3/35, and 8 Carri Armati M13/40. Nothing is known about the other 7 Carri Armati M13/40 delivered a few weeks earlier.

A total of 14 crew members were trained as general mechanics and engine mechanics during a 10-day course at the Centri Addestramento Carristi (English: Tank Crew Training Centers). Of these 14 soldiers, 7 carried out the course at Ansaldo-Fossati of Genoa, while the other 7 carried out the course at Società Piemontese Automobili plant in Corso Ferrucci, in Turin.

Carri Armati M13/40 and a Carro Armato L3 light tank crews lined up near their vehicles. These belong to the 31° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista of the 131ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Centauro’. This photo was taken when the unit arrived in Greece, in late 1940.
The crew members are wearing green gray uniforms under black leather jackets and Modello 1932 helmets. The two officers on the left, near the light tank’s tracks, are a Captain and a Lieutenant. Source: Archivio Storico dello Stato

On 27th October 1940, General Mario Roatta complained in the Foglio N.9,722 (English: Paper Number 9,722) about the scarcity of trained personnel at the tank crew infantry regiments. Out of 3,905 soldiers, only 1,166 were specialists.

The Italian Army High Command was convinced that, in 3 months, the tank school could adequately train a driver or a tank commander, while, in the other Axis and Allied countries, the tank training courses were longer.

Another serious problem was the lack of instructors. The few officers and NCOs that were trained to operate the medium tanks were all deployed to North Africa and, to a lesser extent, also to the Balkans. In some cases, the drivers trained with the tanks, but they did not fully know the machinery at their disposal.

The theoretical courses were full of superfluous details and failed to teach the crews important tactical considerations, such as which terrain was best for an ambush or how to overcome obstacles.

These serious learning gaps were signaled by Ansaldo and FIAT, first to Gen. Caracciolo of the Ispettorato Superiore Servizi Tecnici ed alla Direzione Generale della Motorizzazione (English: Superior Inspectorate of Technical Services) and then to General Augusto de Pignier of the Ispettorato delle Truppe Motorizzate e Corazzate (English: Motorized and Armored Troops Inspectorate). The two inspectors slightly modified the training.

With the start of 1941 and the need to form new tank units, the courses intensified. In January and February, the fourth and fifth courses took place, while on 5th February, the first course for NCOs arriving from infantry and cavalry units began. They trained on the Carro Armato M13/40, but also on Carri Armati L6/40 light reconnaissance tanks and Autoblinde AB41 medium armored cars.

On 6th April, a course for Carri Armati M13/40 officers began and, on 1st March 1941, the fourth Carri Armati M13/40 course for an entire tank battalion began. On 13th April, a course on Carri Armati M13/40 for self-propelled gun crews began, as the Carro Armato M13/40 and Semovente M40 da 75/18 shared the same chassis and similar internal layout. The Ispettorato delle Truppe Motorizzate e Corazzate also had a first advanced course for Carri Armati M13/40 tanks for tank officers lasting 25 days, which began on 1st December 1941.

The crews were trained to shoot only while the tank was stationary, so it was common during the North African Campaign for the crews to stop for a few seconds, permitting the gunner to aim and shoot while advancing against British positions or fighting against British tanks.

On 29th December 1941, the Italian High Command created the rules for the training of the battaglioni esploranti corazzati (English: armored reconnaissance battalions), which were equipped with Autoblinde AB41 armored cars and Semoventi M40 da 75/18.

On 12th March 1942, Centri di Istruzione (English: Instruction Centers) for tank crews were established in North Africa. These centers were created with the goal of facilitating the acclimatization of crews to the hot and arid North African environment.

The same 31° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista crew members in Greece in the same period and same uniforms. Source: facebook.com

The

Mixed training sessions were also organized. In 1941, one was held south of Bologna from 10th to 12th June by the IX Battaglione Carri M13/40 with 5 light tanks, 41 Carri Armati M13/40, and a Renault R35 light tank. During that training, all the Carri Armati M13/40 suffered mechanical failures, while the use of radios by the crews was judged to be good.

General Roatta, who had become Chief of Staff of the Regio Esercito on 24th March 1941, sent the results of the training to the Ispettorato Superiore Servizi Tecnici ed alla Direzione Generale della Motorizzazione on 15th June 1941, highlighting the problems of the Carri Armati M13/40.

He suggested increasing the training courses to 12 days, permitting the crews to train for 2 days in the Brughiera di Sequals near Udine, which had a similar terrain to the Marmarica region in Libya, and to carry out experiments on similar terrain with a Carro Armato M13/40 with a powerful engine and to compare the results with results of the Somua S35 and Skoda T22 tanks. In the same letter, he required a 15 day training course for units equipped with Renault and Somua tanks directly in Libya.

Tank crew members during training in Sardinia. All are wearing black leather jackets over Modello 1926 suits and Modello 1932 helmets. All the soldiers (apart from the officer on the right) are equipped with bandoliers and holsters for Beretta Modello 1934 pistols. Source: ferreamole.it

In general, the units equipped with semoventi were better trained. Light tanks were crewed by cavalrymen and medium tanks by infantrymen, while the semoventi were employed by artillery units.

These vehicles, based on the same Carro Armato M13/40 (and then Carro Armato M14/41) chassis, broke down significantly less often. This was not because of a change in weight, as semoventi weighed roughly as much as medium tanks and were equipped with the same engines. The reason seems to have been that the drivers and crew members had been previously trained to repair military heavy trucks or prime movers to tow their artillery pieces.

As can be seen, the training on Italian armored vehicles was scarce and suboptimal. Due to the limited availability of vehicles, the Italian tank crew members had few opportunities to conduct live fire training, which led to lower rates of fire and poorer precision in combat. Mechanical training was likewise scarce, increasing the time needed for repairs of the tanks and lowering availability.

Some crew members take cover from sunlight behind a Carro Armato M13/40 during a break. Source: Bundesarchiv

In order to train the soldiers to operate and repair the tanks, from the start of the war, on 10th June 1940, up to 1st July 1942, FIAT deployed a total of 120 workers and technicians. The project, completely financed by FIAT, provided FIAT workers to training schools on the Italian mainland and on the battlefront. Of these 120 workers, one died during fighting against Allied troops, another died due to other causes, and 19 were taken prisoner.

In the book Carro M, Volume I, a document from Engineer Lieutenant Picciafuoco is mentioned, which states that in the training school of Bologna, some tank commanders and officers were instructed in the use of radios.

One tank was called a stazione (English: station), multiple tanks were called a maglia (English: network), and many maglie with a command stazione were called nodo (English: knot, node).

The communications were never meant to be stated in the clear, in usual language. The voice mode on the radio was only used between the tank commander and radio operator. The radio operator repeated orders received in Morse code to the commander or repeated unclear messages.

Crews were urged to use voice mode only with short messages and, if possible, in dialect. There are 20 regions in Italy, each with different dialects that, in some cases, vary significantly even within the same region. This was a great method of disguising communications because, even if enemy troops could listen to Italian communications, it was improbable that any one enemy soldier could understand all the different Italian dialects. On the other hand, this difficulty also applied to the Italians themselves.

Each company of a battalion was usually nicknamed using an Italian city in radio messages, such as: Bologna, Ferrara, Genoa, or Turin. Each platoon was given a number along with the company’s city name: Primo (English: First), Secondo (English: Second), Terzo (English: Third), or Quarto (English: Forth). So the first platoon of the company would have been Bologna Primo. Each platoon commander was distinguished with numbers from 1 to 9, while each tank distinguished itself with two-digit numbers, the first one being the number of its platoon and the second was the number of the tank in the platoon (from 2 to 5). It could be, for example: Torino Secondo 5 or Torino 2-5 meaning that it was the 5th tank of the second platoon of the 2nd Company. In some other cases, the names of platoon commanders were used instead of the numbers primo, secondo, etc.

Italian tank commander posing for a propaganda image on top of his Carro Armato M in North Africa. Source: pinterest.com

Crew members sometimes used the voice mode to send messages on the frontline. Commonwealth tanks were called Elefanti (English: Elephants), armored cars Gazelle, and armored trucks, reconnaissance vehicles, and jeeps were called Volpi (English: Foxes). Colonels were referred to as il papà (English: the father) and generals il padrone (English: the boss).

Crews were instructed to destroy their radio equipment to avoid the enemy capturing them and using them to intercept Italian radio communications.

Post-Armistice Training

Due to the desperate situation after the Italian Armistice of 8th September 1943, the problem of trained crew members became even more serious.

After the Armistice, many military leaders, ignoring the disbanding of the Regio Esercito, remained loyal to Fascism and to Dictator Benito Mussolini.

Soldiers regrouped, in some cases in their dozens, in some other cases, even entire battalions, under their command and operated quite independently from the Italian High Command. There was also a confusing difference between training units, and different examples of well documented training courses that Italian soldiers received after the Armistice are illustrative.

In this desperate situation, Italian Defense Minister Marshal Rodolfo Graziani met Adolf Hitler on 13th October 1943 in Germany to speak about reorganization of the Italian army with divisions trained in Germany by German instructors and partially equipped with German equipment.

A Carro Armato M15/42 of the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leoncello’ during crew training. Source: pinterest.com

In other meetings between Italian and German commands, 8 infantry divisions and a single armored division were programmed to form up in Germany with Italian personnel.

At the same time, in October 1943, the German Panzer-Ausbildungs-Abteilung Süd (English: Tank Training Unit South) was created to train German soldiers to operate on Italian captured vehicles. The training unit was located in Montorio Veronese, near Verona.

In November 1943 a total of 120 Italian officers, NCOs and crew members were gathered in Montorio Veronese and went to create the 1a Compagnia Addestramento Italiana (English: 1st Italian Training Company) with German trainers.

The 120 Italian soldiers were former Italian veterans or fresh young volunteers. It was commanded by Lieutenant Alberto Santurro and was divided into 10 to 15 men squads under a German instructor’s command.

In the book Come il Diamante! I Carristi Italiani 1943-35 written by Sergio Corbatti and Marco Nava, an Italian veteran’s recounting of training is given. Each Italian volunteer was trained in practical courses of tank driving, operating radio apparatus, maintaining and lubricating guns and repairing engines and electrical systems on the tanks.

The Germans meant to train each crew member in as many tasks as possible to prepare them for any threats and be capable of substituting a wounded comrade. The theoretical courses were harder due to the language differences. In these cases some German soldiers from Sudtirol were helpful. This is the northernmost region of Italy which is still, to this day, majoritarily German in ethnicity.

Beautiful image of two Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ crew members discussing with the rest of the crew inside this Autoblinda AB41. Source: Archivio Centrale dello Stato

Everyday life started at 6 am, with an hour a day dedicated to the vehicle’s refueling and engine starting. The Italian veteran explained that starting the Italian tracked vehicle engines by means of the electrical starter was forbidden by the German instructors due to frequent failures which necessitated consequent electrical system repairs. The crew had to start their tanks manually with cranks.

Driving and shooting lessons were made north-east of the Panzer-Ausbildungs-Abteilung Süd base, at the Montorio castle area. The fields around the castle were used to train the crews to cooperate during the fights and shoot at concrete targets located at various distances.

The Montorio Veronese castle and surrounding area nowadays. Source: verona-in.it

After months of trainings, in June 1944, the 1a Compagnia Addestramento Italiana was disbanded. The 120 Italian soldiers that had trained for over 6 months were reassigned back to the original units from which they came over or to other Italian units. With the skills they earned in the training, the majority of the soldiers were assigned to frontline and rear line units. Sadly, some were assigned to units that did not have any armored vehicles, making their training useless.

The Italian veteran reported that he (together with 3 comrades of the company) were assigned to the 29. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (italienische Nr. 1) (English: 29th SS Mechanized Division (Italian No. 1)) that was not equipped with armored vehicles. They later asked to be assigned to the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ (English: Armored Group).

The soldiers of the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ had trained in Montichiari near Brescia. A few officers and soldiers of the disbanded 1a Divisione Corazzata Legionaria ‘M’ (English: 1st Legionnaire Armored Division) had refused to obey the Armistice, recovered as many vehicles as they could in Rome (were they were previously located) and reached Montichiari on 29th September 1943.

The unit only had a few armored vehicles so, until December 1943, the soldiers did not train but departed throughout northern Italy to find armored vehicles. During this time, freshly enlisted volunteers joined the unit and awaited training. Among the crew members who joined the unit in that period were 5 officers that were part of the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ (English: 132nd Armored Division) before the Armistice. Two of them had already been decorated with medals for bravery.

A crew member of the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ poses near his Carro Armato M13/40. Source: …Come il Diamante

Between early December 1943 and February 1944, the unit trained in the hilly area near Montichiari, even if its training regimen is not detailed in the sources. In March 1944, the unit reached Turin.

In December 1944, the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’, which in the meantime had become the biggest armored unit of the Fascist Italian forces after the Armistice, established a supply and workshop unit in Milan.

The unit, known as the Distaccamento di Milano (English: Milan Detachment) was moved from Turin and received the tasks of resupplying Italian troops in the Piacenza area and sending spare parts to Turin to repair some damaged tanks. Another important task of the unit was to train the young militiamen in the training company. The training unit was located in the former barracks of a cavalry regiment, with some nearby fields for exercises.

The commander of the Distaccamento di Milano received the task of creating an armored battalion for the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ under dependencies of Milan command. The training company in Milan then received the order of training the new companies.

The training company created a workshop and a driving class in two enormous depots of the barracks. The training courses were divided into engine maintenance, driving courses, shooting courses and radio operator courses. Each recruit received driving lessons on armored cars and tanks and, at the end of the training, they received their tank driving license.

The armored car driving lessons were undertaken in the deserted streets of Milan, after curfew. This allowed the drivers to improve their skills in urban terrain.

The tank driving lessons were given in the fields near the barracks. From veteran testimonies, during the war, these fields were erroneously bombarded by the Allies. Italian training officers then created an off-road route along the bomb craters in order to train the drivers.

A Carro Armato M13/40 of the Raggruppamento Anti Partigiani (RAP) being transported on a trailer back to Turin after an anti-partisan operation in the Turin countryside. The man in the photo is a ‘Leonessa’ officer that was reassigned to the RAP to train the crew members. Source: I Mezzi Corazzati Italiani della Guerra Civile 1943-1945

The instructors were former combat-experienced Regio Esercito crew members. They had at their disposal a pair of L3 light tanks, 2 medium tanks, and a Semovente L40 da 47/32 self-propelled gun. Unfortunately, the exact number of Italian crew members that finished the tank courses in Milan is unknown.

After their training, the soldiers were not deployed to form new armored companies as planned. They were instead assigned to various Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ garrisons around northern Italy.

Conclusion

During the Second World War, the Italian armored vehicle crews received poor training that usually led, together with the vulnerability of the Italian vehicles, to the total defeat of numerous Italian units in all theaters of war.

From 10th June 1940, the day when Italy joined the war, to 2nd May 1945, the training of Italian crews lacked resources, time, vehicles, men, and instructors.

With the continuation of the war, ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and even armament were rarely delivered to training schools, which were forced to buy equipment from private individuals and use obsolete tanks instead of modern vehicles.

As repeatedly seen in the century-long history of the tank, one need not necessarily have the best vehicle on the battlefield, well-trained crews are sufficient in some cases. The Regio Esercito, unfortunately, had neither effective tanks nor trained crews.

Sources

La Meccanizzazione dell’Esercito Italiano fino al 1943 Volume I Parte I – Lucio Ceva and Andrea Curami – Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 1994

La Meccanizzazione dell’Esercito Italiano fino al 1943 Volume I Parte II – Lucio Ceva and Andrea Curami – Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 1994

Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano Volume II Tomo I – Nicola Pignato and Filippo Cappellano – Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 2002

Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano Volume III Tomo I – Nicola Pignato and Filippo Cappellano – Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio Storico, 2002

Italian Soldiers in North Africa 1941-1943 – Piero Crociani and Pier Paolo Battistelli – Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013

Carro M – Carri Medi M11/39, M13/40, M14/41, M15/42, Semoventi ed Altri Derivati Volume Primo and Secondo – Antonio Tallillo, Andrea Tallillo and Daniele Guglielmi – Gruppo Modellistico Trentino di Studio e Ricerca Storica, 2012

Andrea Viotti Uniformi e Distintivi dell’Esercito Italiano nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale 1940-1945 Roma 1988

Andrea Viotti Uniformi e Distintivi dell’Esercito Italiano fra le Due Guerre 1918-1935 Roma 2009

Andrea Viotti e Stefano Ales Le Uniformi e i Distintivi del Corpo Truppe Volontarie in Spagna 1936-1939 Roma 2004

Ruggero Belogi Regio Esercito Italiano. Uniformi 1919-1933 Pubblicazione dell’autore 1989

Sergio Coccia e Nicola Pignato Le Uniformi Metropolitane del Regio Esercito dalla Riforma Baistrocchi all’Inizio della Seconda Guerra Mondiale 1933-1940 Roma 2005

Uniformi e Armi magazine, number 163, Parma 2009 – Roberto Manno, Rudy A. D’Angelo e Marco Ghedini article title: Segni di distinzione. Medaglie e distintivi della seconda guerra mondiale – Page 132

Nicola Pignato e Filippo Cappellano Le Armi della Fanteria Italiana (1919-1945) Parma 2008

Ministero Forze Armate Istruzione provvisoria sull’uniforme dell’Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano(1944 – XXII)

Paolo Crippa Storia dei Reparti Corazzati della Repubblica Sociale Italiana 1943-1945 Marvia 2022

https://www.zimmerit.com/zimmeritpedia/italia_rsi/ITALIA_RSI_UNIFORMI.html

WW2 British Tactics WW2 German Tactics WW2 Italian Tactics

Esigenza C3 – The Italian Invasion of Malta

Post author By Andrew Hills
Post date March 26, 2019
6 Comments on Esigenza C3 – The Italian Invasion of Malta

“Without Malta the Axis will end by losing control of North Africa…”

– Field Marshal Erwin Rommel quoted in ‘A History of WW2 by A. J. P. Taylor and S. L. Mayer

You can learn more about the naval part of the planned invasion of Malta on our sister website, Naval Encyclopedia!

A simple glance at a map of the Mediterranean immediately reveals why the tiny island nation of Malta has such a high strategic value. Lying roughly halfway between Sicily and North Africa, the island has, for millennia, been an important trading port and safe harbor in the often treacherous Mediterranean. The island would be no less important in World War 2. The British were in control of Malta (it had been a Crown Colony since 1813) and, as of June 1940, the island sat directly between the Axis power of Italy to the north, and the Italian possessions in North Africa (Libya) below it. All Italian, and later, German supply planes, transports, and shipping had to travel well away from Malta or risk being intercepted by ships or ground-based aircraft from the island. This tiny archipelago of Malta, Gozo, and Comino was just 56 miles from the Italian island of Sicily and 225 miles from Tunisia, and was one of the key British strategic locations in WW2 and the setting for what may have been the only example of coordinated Axis planning of the war.

The strategic position of the Island of Malta. Source: Vivarelli
Allied planes and vessels could, in contrast, stage there or put into port for repairs, refueling or replenishing ammunition. This small island was a huge thorn in the side of the Axis, and with the War in North Africa in full swing, control of Malta was more important than ever. The plan to wrestle control from Britain was consequently hatched. The Italians had long wanted to remove Malta from British control, planning such an attack as early as 1938, but lacked the men, equipment, planes, and ships to do it on their own.
The Italians had launched a naval attack on Malta on 26th July 1941 under the guns at Fort Elmo guarding the entrance to the Grand Harbor at Valletta. The Italian X Flottiglia MAS Naval squadron was trying to attack the ships in the harbor but was seen by radar on the island and consequently repulsed by the Bofors guns (another source states ‘twin 6-pounders’) manned by the 3rd Light Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment, Royal Malta Artillery and men of the Cheshire Regiment. Total casualties are unknown but at least 16 men were killed and at least one motor launch sank. Half-hearted efforts to just sail into Malta and attack the fleet or land troops were not going to work. Any successful attack would need more planning, more resources, and German help.

Savoia-Marchetti SM.81 pictured over the capital city of Malta, Valletta, during a raid on the city and Grand Harbour. Source: Public domain

Genesis

The origin of the combined plan for this operation came from the Italians who convinced, on 17th January 1942, Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring of the value of the idea. He had been appointed as the Commander in Chief of the South (German: Oberbefehlshaber Sud) and was aware of the dysfunctional command structure of the Axis, but could also see the value of Malta. He now sought the support of the Führer for this plan of a combined Italo-German operation. He was not alone in this, the Italians advocated for it, and both Field Marshal Erwin Rommel (German Commander in North Africa) and Admiral Erich Raeder (German Commander in Chief of the Kriegsmarine) were also in favor of this idea.
Bombing alone was not working on Malta. It had started in December 1941, but neither Germany nor Italy had sufficient heavy bombers to neutralize the airfields and air defences on the island. Despite this, the harbor at Valletta and the various facilities on the island were bombed extensively by both German (Luftwaffe) and Italian (Regia Aeronautica) aircraft for more than two years, with thousands of bomb sorties killing thousands of people. The people of Malta refused to give up and the attempts to blockade the island to starve it of supplies failed too. If the Axis wanted to remove Malta from British control, it was going to take more than bombs and blockade.
Despite being well positioned at the outbreak of the War and having large land forces, the Italians had not fared well in their ventures in Yugoslavia and Greece and then North Africa. The Germans had come to prop up the Italians in those theatres, and the Italians quickly became dependent on German help.
In terms of the plan to strike Malta, it was no different. German and Italian bombs could not break the spirit of the defenders, and those Italian plans for invasion were now potentially supported with actual material assistance from the Germans. Kesselring was being very supportive of the work of the Italian Chief of Staff, Marshal Ugo Cavallero, to seize the island.
After Kesselring had visited Hitler at the Berchtesgaden in February 1942, things changed. Hitler supported the operation and, therefore, planning for a combined Italo-German amphibious assault could begin properly under the codename ‘Esigenza C3’ (for reference, Esigenza C2 had been the occupation of the island of Corsica) for the Italians and Operation ‘Herkules’ for the Germans. The operational plans were, however, not the same. The Italians favored a joint air and sea assault, whereas the Germans were only planning for a seaborne invasion, making a coordinated planning effort overly complex.

Risky Business

After the losses in the German invasion of Crete in April 1941 (around 6,000 casualties), Hitler was not in favor of airborne operations, as these had shown that airborne attacks by paratroopers could go very badly wrong and lead to large losses. On top of this concern, the campaign in the East (Operation Barbarossa) against the Soviet Union was going to require a huge amount of logistical support, men, and equipment.
Nonetheless, training was undertaken. The elite Italian Folgore and La Spezia Airborne Divisions (elite Italian paratroopers) would train alongside the Germans as part of the 10,000 strong airborne invasion force.

Field Marshal Kesselring (left) and Marshall Ugo Cavallero (right). Source: German Federal Archive and Wikimedia Commons

Planning

The acceptance of the combined invasion plan was on 17th January 1942. On 8th February, Admiral Arturo Riccardi and Marshal Cavallero met with Kesselring to discuss the actual requirements for ships, landing craft, and supplies needed for the invasion, as well as to set a timetable of operations (Esigenza C3 planning was in the hands of General Vittorio Ambrosio, Chief of Staff for the Italian Army). Kesselring, for his part, advocated on behalf of the Italians to Hitler, trying to obtain German equipment for the Italians to use and, on 17th February 1942, the German Army High Command (German: Oberkommando der Heeres) ordered for arrangements to be made.
The pressure to strike as soon as possible did not come from the Italians, who wanted more time to prepare, but from Kesselring. As early as 17th March, he proposed a raid in force by paratroops against the island. Italian and German air raids on Malta reached their peak between March and April that year and the momentum of attack was on the Axis’ side. A surprise raid by paratroopers was seen as capitalizing on the damage these raids were causing. Despite this disagreement, Kesselring had actually ironed out some of the command problems within the Axis and, along with Cavallero, had reached a general agreement on a strategy for the Mediterranean theatre.
Despite pressure from Admiral Raeder on behalf of Operation Herkules/Esigenza C3, in April 1942, the project was postponed. Hitler’s strategy was to focus on capturing Tobruk and push the Allies back to the borders of Egypt before striking Malta and, eventually, Gibraltar. Despite Hitler’s plan though, the idea was not dead, and joint planning work continued until August 1942.

Esigenza C3/Operation Herkules

The plan called for up to 100,000 men, hundreds of aircraft for ground attack, air cover, and transportation, as well as the bulk of the available Axis surface ships and submarines in the Mediterranean. Italian planning was, despite the best efforts of Cavellero, disjointed. The Army made its own plans, often in conjunction with the Navy, but sometimes independently, and likewise so did the Navy. Neither the Army nor the Navy cooperated with the Air force, with both seeing it as a supporting organization to their own roles – such was the nature of Axis interservice rivalry.
Despite these problems, however, both the King and Mussolini approved of Esigenza C3 and, on 14th October 1941, Cavelero instructed the various members of the senior staff with responsibility for the Army, Navy, and Air Force to examine the plans, a process led by Army General Antonio Gandin. This then developed into a formal joint staff known as Ufficio C3 under the command of General Gandin and resolved the Italian part of the rivalry, as all three services were now under a unified command. Planning then entered five phases. Phase I, which was to last from then until 10th March 1942, was general planning and wargaming and involved input from the Japanese Naval Mission to Italy. Phase II followed straight after until the end of March defining what sort of support the Germans might offer them and the creation of an expeditionary command. April 1942 was Phase III which was for the expeditionary command to organize and plan the operation, with Phase IV reserved for refinement and the preparation of logically support for all of May, June, and July 1942. Phase V was the invasion, with a date for Esigenza C3 set for 1st August 1942.

Japanese Experts

The Italians were especially keen on the advice from the Japanese, who had a lot more experience with this sort of island assault operations compared to themselves and, also, from the middle of February 1942, help from the Germans too. On 21st February 1942, the Italians convened the first tripartite conference on the amphibious operation against Malta. Under Italian organization, the attendees included General Gandin and Admiral Tur (Italy), Admiral Katsuo Abe, Navy Captain Mitunobu, and Colonel Shimizu (Japan) from the military mission to Rome. As a result of the in-depth information and insights from the Japanese, Cavellero understood them to be the experts in this field and asked them for their own study into attacking Malta.
The Japanese study was prepared very quickly, with a plan ready by 5th March 1942, and over two days was compared to the Italian study and war-games took place. The plans, whilst different in some regards, agreed on general principles, but the Italians were impressed with the level of detail in the logistical planning of the attack, although they did not agree with the Japanese assessment of the defenses, which they felt were significantly underestimated.
There was continued cooperation with the Japanese on this endeavor, and further information was gained by studying various other European amphibious attacks from German and Allied raids, including Dieppe. The expertise from the Japanese, refined with training and exercise, later formed the Italian doctrine on such matters, known as the Norme di impiego per Grandi Unita’ di Assalto e Sbarco (English: Employment of large assault and landing formations), with a focus on landing assault storming parties to secure the beachhead ahead of the main landing force.

The Germans

Having obtained extremely valuable insight from the Japanese, the Italians then sought to work with the Germans, using their experiences, in particular from Crete, but also from raids they made in the Baltic. Primarily, the Italians were looking for the German expertise in parachute operations, and Major General Bernhard Ramcke, a veteran of the Crete assault, was selected to be the leading German expert.

Generals Bernhard Ramcke (left) and Kurt Student (right) – German airborne operations masterminds for the Operation Herkules part of Esigenza C3. Source: German Federal Archives
Work with Maj. Gen. Ramcke began on 11th April 1942, and he was later joined by General Kurt Student, Commander of Fliegerkorps XI and an expert in airborne operations. Interference by Kesselring in the planning, though, was to disjoint this smooth planning process when on 13th April 1942 he demanded the creation of a ‘German Office’ within the planning staff, adding another layer of complexity to the command and control. Despite this, a comprehensive plan of attack was developed with agreement on the key strategic points to capture and the timing and coordination of the attack.

The Italo-German Invasion Plan

Airborne attacks on the Southern Heights had the mission of establishing a secure site for a landing and attack the airfields south of Valletta, followed by the seizure of the airfields at Luqa, Takali, and Hal Far, which would allow more troops and supplies to be brought in by air.
Underwater, demolition teams and commandos would be instructed to seize the cliff at the landing site and securing the beachhead for the first wave of landings. That first wave, once ashore, would then seize Marsaxlokk and the port. The second wave would then attack north and west through Marsaxlokk, and the island of Gozo to the north would be seized to form a logistical hub.
A small amphibious assault would be undertaken on Marsaxlokk Bay along with feints directed along the on the northwest coastline of the island, where the defenses were strongest and backed by the Victoria Line. The Victoria Line ran across the northwestern corner of the island from the Bigemma Hills to Maddalena Bay, constituting the main defensive line with machine guns and artillery positions. Crucially, Italian intelligence showed this line could not face south, so was vulnerable to an attack from this direction.

Italian troops from the San Marco Division during a training exercise for the invasion. Note the rather crude landing barges. Source: digilander

CONOPS

With a combined plan to focus on, the Italian High Command (Comando Supremo) developed its own Concept of Operations (CONOPS) by 22nd May (with a modification added on 27th May) for this complex operation, which was to be in two phases. It is also worth bearing in mind that Hitler had authorized the use of German paratroopers too, a matter confirmed by Kesselring in a meeting with Cavallero on 21st April 1942.

Operational Phases for Exigenza C3
Phase I	28th June 1942 17th July 1942
Intensification of the naval and air blockade on Malta with bombing of enemy airfields, defenses, command and control facilities, and water distribution facilities.
Phase II	D-Day 1st August 1942 +
Fake paratrooper landings in the north conducted by means of dropping dummy parachutists whilst real paratroopers were being dropped to the south. [Added 27th May]. Isolation of Valletta and prevention of a British counterattack by deploying two paratrooper divisions to the Dingli/Zurrieq area and glider landings at Kalafrana and Fort Benghisa. The main attack consisting of landing two divisions to seize Marsaxlokk from the rear. Occupation of the island of Gozo by the Superga Division to serve as a logistics base. Deception operations by means of small amphibious landings along the north and east. (Added 27th May) The first naval landing wave would consist of 24,000 men, 32 guns and 30 tanks. A second amphibious attack to be undertaken by navy special forces and light infantry against Fort Benghisa and Fort Delimara to divert enemy forces from Marsaxlokk Bay. (Added 27th May) A division held as a reserve to be sent wherever it was needed, but two reserve divisions landed at Marsaxlokk to attack the Victoria Line from the south and complete the occupation of the island. The remainder of the men, tanks, guns, and support troops to follow successively.

Italian CV3 light tank disembarking from a landing barge during a training exercise. Source: digilander

The plan of attack for Operation Esigenza C3. Source: Taken from Vivarelli

Assumptions

This bold CONOPS was dependent on several factors though. Firstly, that the Germans had sufficient air transportation capability for the airborne troops and the dropping of supplies. This meant the use of 500 Ju 52 aircraft, 300 DFS 230 gliders, 12 Me 323 transport aircraft, and 200 Gotha 242 gliders.
Second, that there were enough fuel reserves available to move the entire Italian fleet to Maltese waters to support the attack and, finally, and perhaps most crucially, the ability to transport all the ground forces. Over 70,000 men, trucks, tanks, and artillery needed to be moved and unloaded, some of which would have to be done under enemy fire.
The Italians, for their part, had the ability (by the end of June 1942) to transport 29,000 men, along with tanks, artillery, and supplies by sea. The rest of the transportation would have to come from the Germans, as the Italians rushed production of the 100 Motolance (ML-Class) motor launches and Motozattere (MZ-Class) motor barges (copies of the German Marinefahrorahm) it needed. By July 1942, the 100 Motolance and 65 Motozattere were ready along with an assortment of small craft, steamers, motor-sail boats and tankers already set aside. The Italian Navy (RM) modified some large civilian craft for the operation too, including two former ferries to off-load heavy tanks.

Italian Motozattera motor barge. Source: Vivarelli via German Federal Archives
As a result of this production, the Italians could supply a lot of their own sea capability but, nonetheless, they required German help in the form of 27 Marinefahrprahm, 10 Siebel catamaran barges, 6 Type 39 Pionierlandunsboote (engineer boats), 6 Type 40 Pionierlandunsboote (engineer boats), 281 Sturmboote (assault boats – of which 81 would be crewed by the Germans and the remainder would be crewed by the Italians), and 300 smaller inflatable boats.

Motolance’ motor launch seen during training at Livorno, October 1942. Photo:Betasom.it
The airborne landings of both the German and Italian forces would fall under the direction and control of the Germans (General Student), which was logical considering they were supplying the majority of the assets to deliver the troops and supplies, but also from a political point of view, considering the reticence about the German use of airborne forces since the carnage in Crete. Marshall Cavallero would, however, remain supreme commander for the overall operation operating via the Italian and German service heads. No German troops, therefore, would fall under Italian control or vice versa. Once ashore and landed, all ground forces during the operation would be commanded by General Armando Vecchiarelli as leader of the Expeditionary Corps as it would be known (Italian: Corpo di Spedizione), although it is unlikely he would have been able to direct any German troops to move without agreement from their commander.

Italian Folgore Division during training. Source: digilander

Axis Forces (June 1942)
Fliegerkorps XI (Student)
Folgore Parachute Division (Frattini) 7,500 men	9 x Infantry, 3 x Artillery, and 1 x Saboteur Battalions as well as various Engineers and support troops.
La Spezia Air Land Division (Pizzolato) 10,500 men	6 x Infantry, 3 x Artillery, 1 x Saboteur Battalion, and 1 x Mortar Battalions, 1 x Reconnaissance Team, as well as various Engineers and support troops.
7th Flieger Division (Petersen) 11,000 men
Forza Navale Speciale (Tur)
San Marco Marine Infantry Regiment (2,000 men) Navy-Parachute Swimmers (nuotatori) Battalion (300 men) 4 x Camicie Nere Fascist Militia Landing Battalions (~1000 men each)
Corps di Spedizione (Vecchiarelli – Comando Superiore Tattico)
Livorno Infantry Division (9,850 men) Superga Infantry Division (9,200 men) Friuli Infantry Division (10,000 men) – added to plan 6th May 1942 Napoli Infantry Division (~9,000 men)- added to plan 6th May 1942 Assietta Infantry Division (9,000 men) – added to plan 6th May 1942 10th Tank Group with over 100 tanks* Artillery troops (~3,000 men) [Troops supplied with additional special equipment, climbing teams, as well as heavy weapons including anti-tank guns and anti-aircraft weapons]
Various Italian and German naval transport, escort and landing vessels as well as air transport and interdiction forces.

* What tanks were going to be used by Italy has been speculated on for some time. The authors Massagiani and Green in ‘The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943’ clarify that the plan had originally considered German tank support to consist of supplying 20 Panzer III’s and that, although on the 30th April 1942, Hitler, in a meeting with Mussolini, had suggested using captured Soviet heavy tanks in the assault, this plan was abandoned. Instead, the Italian plan for tanks was to make use of eight 75 mm armed Semovente (likely the M13/40 based Semovente M40), and a further 19 Semovente armed with 47 mm guns, which would indicate the L6/40 based L40 da 47/32 all in the first wave, as well as a number of Medium tanks (likely the M13/40). Further tanks coming ashore in the second wave would include at least 50 CV3 light tanks and the bulk of the heavy artillery, including 90 mm and 75 mm anti-tank guns as well as 147 mm and 105 mm field guns towed by 170 tractors.
It is known that the Comando Supremo did indeed request 10-12 heavy tanks from the Germans, presumably to support the first wave assault and it is possible that the unit Panzer-Abteilung zbV 66 (formed 30th May 1942) was formed for exactly this reason, following Hitler’s suggestion of 30th April. That unit consisted of captured Soviet equipment, including heavy tanks, as well as German equipment. Had this fanciful idea come to fruition, it would have seen the Germans either supplying Soviet tanks, like the KV-2, to the Italians or operating them directly during the invasion. Regardless of such ideas though, the idea was dumped, and German involvement was to be restricted to parachutists and logistical and air support. The tanks for the invasion would be Italian.

Captured Soviet KV-2 and T-34 tanks belonging to Panzer-Abteilung zbV66. Source: beutepanzer.ru

Italian assault boats practice their attack (left) and the FF.SS. Aspromonte with modification to her bows for use as a landing ship for amphibious operations (right). Source: digilander

Allied Forces (July 1942)

The Allied forces on Malta were certainly prepared for a possible attack with 16 battalions of infantry, a wide assortment of artillery, and about two-dozen armored vehicles the most formidable of which for any potential invader was the A.12 Matilda II. Four of these tanks belonging to 7th Battalion Royal Tank Regiment were stationed on the island. However, given the significant tank forces set aside for the invasion by the Germans and Italians even these very well armored tanks would be unlikely to be decisive in any defence.

Allied Forces (July 1942)
Infantry
Northern Command	4 x Infantry Battalions
Southern Command	4 x Infantry Battalions
Central Command	4 x Infantry Battalions
Western Command	4 x Infantry Battalions including a machine gun battalion with 4 x 4.2” mortars, 1 x Military Police Company
Miscellaneous small independent units of engineers, logistics, some Royal Navy personnel, possibly some local irregular forces.
Artillery
4 x Regiments of Anti-Aircraft, 2 x Field Artillery, and 2 x Coastal
64 searchlights 12 x 4.5” AA guns 84 x 3.7” AA guns 16 x 3” 20cwt. AA guns At least 8 x Bofors AA guns (possibly up to 36) 7 x 9.2” BL Mk.X guns (1 at Fort Bingemma and 2 at Fort Madalena on the East Coast, 2 at Fort San Leonardo and 2 at Fort Benghisa on the West Coast) 10 x 6” BL Mk.VII (2 at Fort Delimara and 2 at Fort San Rocco on the East Coast, 3 at Fort Tigne and 2 at Fort Campbell on the West Coast. 24 x 25 pounder field guns 18 x 6 pdr. 10cwt. QF Mk.I (12 at Fort St. Elmo and 6 at Fort Ricasoli) Approximately 30 x QF 18 pdr.
Whatever armed ships in harbor may also have been able to provide fire support too, as well as some obsolete/decommissioned Victorian era guns
Tanks
7th Royal Tank Regiment	4 x A.12 Matilda tanks
3rd (King’s Own) Hussars	2 x Vickers VIc Light tanks
Malta Tank Squadron Royal Tank Regiment (formed from 1st Independent Troop and X Squadron 6 RTR)	2 x Valentine Mk.II Infantry tanks 2 x Valentine Mk.III Infantry tanks
A Squadron 6th Royal Tank Regiment	8 tanks formed from an unknown mix of A.9 Cruiser Mk.I and A.13 Cruiser Mk.IV or III
Unknown number of light armor in the form of ‘Bren carriers’

Cruiser Tanks of 6 RTR being unloaded and seen during training on Malta 1942 – not yet painted in the distinctive ‘Malta’ pattern camouflage. Source: IWM

British A.12 Matilda tank (left) and Vickers Mk.VIc (right) painted in the distinctive ‘Malta’ pattern camouflage. Source: IWM

Vickers Mk.VIc (right) painted in the distinctive ‘Malta’ pattern camouflage. The pattern here is less random and slightly more uniform to match a wall or building. Each vehicle was unique. Source: IWM

British A.12 Matilda with a variation of the Malta pattern camouflage with an additional ‘shadow’ around each of the squares adding depth to the pattern. Source: IWM

British Valentine Mk.III Infantry Tank ‘Adonis’ in Malta.

A note on the ‘Malta Pattern’

The camouflage pattern seen on the tanks and also on some other armored vehicles, soft skin vehicles such as staff cars and trucks as well as field guns, generators, radar, and even helmets is unique to the forces on the island. The pattern is specifically intended to closely match the rocky nature of the island, from the open barren highlands to the rocky stone walls and buildings. It consists of random shapes on a light stone color with the lines between dark green or dark brown. A variation on the pattern added a third color as a ‘shadow’ within these blotches and at least one vehicle was even painted in the scheme to match stone courses used in buildings. To apply it on the entire vehicle involved simply painting first the background color and then the dark lines were painted over, being careful that neither layer obscured the census mark on the vehicle.

Two examples of the color scheme used including the regular stonework pattern. Source: maltacommand.com

Conclusion

The relationship between the Italians and the Germans was never a full-hearted one. The Germans tended to be overbearing, authoritarian and dismissive of the Italians. The Italians, for their part, were overly grand in their ideas and underwhelming in their ability to actually deliver results on the ground. They failed to plan for the invasion of Malta in a fully coordinated manner and instead made independent plans for a joint operation which was guaranteed to either sideline one plan over the other, or simply never happen. Whilst both parties agreed on the need to remove Malta from British hands, their inability to work together ensured that it could not happen. The Italians did not have the resources to ‘go it alone’, and the Germans had conflicting political and strategic objectives. For Italy, the Mediterranean was their theater, and Malta was their back door. For the Germans, it was a side campaign likely diverting precious resources from the fighting on the Eastern Front. Germany, with the preponderance of the military forces in the relationship, made the final decision, and the invasion was canceled at the end of July 1942, just one month after the fall of British held Tobruk to the combined Italian-German forces in North Africa.
Had Esigenza C3 been ordered to take place, there is little doubt that all of the planning, training, and exercising would have proved vital. For once during the war, the Axis powers had planned, trained and worked together on a single definable goal with a clear objective. The Italians, in particular, and contrary to popular misconceptions, were, for once, very well prepared. A fact reiterated by Japanese Admiral Abe who, upon witnessing the practice night-time landing of 4,500 men under the dangerous cliffs at Livorno (Italy) remarked to Admiral Tur:

“I came back to Rome convinced that you can accomplish brilliantly, having observed your tenacious exercises, conducted with indomitable spirit and severe discipline”

Esigenza C3 was not to be, however. Hitler had recalled Student to Berlin, kneecapping one of the most complex parts of the whole plan, and with Rommel’s success at Tobruk, there was the excuse to cancel the entire plan in the vain hope of victory in the desert. The Italians too had accepted the dream of taking Malta was over. with Rommel’s failure at El Alamein, the Italians were compelled to send many of the troops for the operation over to North Africa to help, which, regardless of Hitler, doomed the plan. The plan was officially dead on 27th July 1942, but it was effectively over the month before.
With the plan canceled, Malta remained a bastion of British power right in the heart of Axis Mediterranean planning, although from the end of 1941, the actual importance of Malta for hampering Axis supply efforts had waned and in some regards, the bombing alone had crippled the island anyway. Nonetheless, the inability to remove this British hub and turn it to Axis use to support operations in North Africa remains a critical failing of Axis strategy.
Malta had resisted the bombardment of the Axis forces for years and was one of the heaviest bombed places during WW2. The will of the people remained unbroken and the stalwart defense of the island resulted in it being awarded the George Cross on 25th April 1942 – the highest civilian award. This cross remains proudly on the Maltese flag to this day.

Sources

Vivarelli, A. (2014). The Axis and the Intended Invasion of Malta in 1942: A Combined Planning Endeavor. School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Kavanagh, S. (2006). Comparison of the Invasion of Crete and the Proposed Invasion of Malta. US Army Command and General Staff College. (PDF)
David Pastore at forum.axishistory.com
The Times of Malta (LINK) (LINK)
Operatione C3 Malta at digilander.libero.it
De Ninno, F. (2017). The Italian Navy and Japan: Strategy and Hopes 1937-1942. (LINK)
maltacommand.com
Panzer-Abteilung zbV 66
Greene, J., Massignani, A. (1998). The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943.

An Italian Carro Veloce CV3, 50 of which would have participated in the second wave of landings.
Semovente da 75/18, eight of which would have landed on Malta in the first wave and help take on British field fortifications and armor.
L40 da 47/32 self propelled gun, 19 of which would have gone along their bigger 75 mm armed brothers in the first wave.
Carro Armato M13/40, a number of which would have formed the tank component of the Italian invasion force.
German Panzer III Ausf.G, 20 of which were at some point proposed to be used.
Captured Soviet KV-2 tank of Panzer-Abteilung zbV 66, which might have been proposed for use in the invasion.

Light Tank Mk.VIc in the famous Malta patern, two of which were present with the 3rd (King’s Own) Hussars.

Infantry Tank Mk.II Matilda in the famous Malta patern. 4 of these were present on the island with the 7th Royal Tank Regiment and would have proven tough nuts to crack for the Italian armor.

A small number of the outdated Cruiser Mk.I were also present on Malta with A Squadron, 6th Royal Tank Regiment.
A few Cruiser Mk.IVs (pictured here) or Cruiser Mk.IIIs were also present with the 6th Royal Tank Regiment.
Infantry Tank Mk.III Valentine Mk.V in the famous Malta patern, four of which were present with the Malta Tank Squadron. These would have also proven tricky for the feebly-armed Italian tanks.

An unknown number of Bren Carriers were also part of the Maltese garrison.

WW2 British Tactics WW2 French Tactics WW2 Italian Tactics

Campaigns and Battles in East Africa – The North, British and French Somaliland

Post author By Andrew Hills
Post date August 16, 2018
3 Comments on Campaigns and Battles in East Africa – The North, British and French Somaliland

British Somaliland and indications of the Italian assault August 1940. Source: Stewart

Map of the invasion. Source: Mockler

Introduction and background to AOI

Following the Italian declaration of war against Great Britain and France on the 10th June 1940, the British perceptions of the Italians in Africa changed. The British had misunderstood the unique position Italy held and, although it had previously been unhappy with the Italian invasion and occupation of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), they had not carried out any action to stop them. Following the declaration of war, however, the gloves were off and the British and French possessions in the region, as well as access through the vital Suez canal, were potentially threatened. The Italian high command had expected a short war which would give them territorial gains while Italian East Africa (AOI: Africa Orientale Italiana), surrounded and cut off, merely had to hold out until Great Britain sued for peace.

First Strike

Unlike the large sedentary Italian force languishing in North Africa, the force in AOI under the command of the Duke of Aosta (Amedeo di Savoia-Aosta) took the initiative. Rather than sit and wait to be attacked by the British and to try and get some breathing space to ensure the survival of the colony, the Duke quickly launched attacks on British border posts in Kenya and Sudan. Small towns inside the Sudan border, such as Kassala and Gallabat, were taken before he turned his attention North to the territories of British and French Somaliland. He also launched raids over the borders attacking Berbera, Hargeisa, and Zeila but did not formally invade the French and British territories until sufficient forces had been gathered together. The Aubarre area was the formation point and, by the end of June 1940, the Italians had occupied Borama four miles over the border into British Somaliland in preparation for either an invasion or as a vanguard against a British counterattack.
In general, the strength of British and French forces in the North was massively overestimated, with an estimate of as many as 11,000 British and native forces when, in reality, it was less than half that number. However, the presence of two easily resupplied ports so close to Ethiopia was a major strategic concern for the protection of AOI. Therefore, the ports in Djibouti (French Somaliland) and Berbera (British Somaliland) had to be eliminated for the AOI to stand any chance of holding out.
As of the 1st June 1940, the Italian forces in the whole of AOI (encompassing modern-day Ethiopia, Eritrea, and most of Somalia together forming an area larger than France),, numbered just over a quarter of a million men comprising a mix of regulars (Regio Esercito – Royal Army of Italy), MVSN (Italian: Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale – Voluntary Militia for National Security) commonly known as the ‘Blackshirts’, and colonial forces.

Italian forces in AOI by region, 1st June 1940. Source: Orpen

Renault FT’s in French Somaliland, 1938. Source: Public Domain
The first target of the Italian assault was the French colony and port of Djibouti. French forces defending the territory were commanded by Major General Paul Legentilhomme. The garrison there had been quadrupled since September 1939. At his disposal, he had a substantial infantry force consisting of seven battalions of Senegalese and Somali infantry, four companies of militia troops and two platoons of camel-mounted troops, and an assortment of aircraft. General Legentilhomme also possessed a small stock of 3 batteries of field guns, 4 batteries of anti-aircraft guns, and at least 4 Renault FT light tanks armed with the short 37mm gun, constituting one light tank company. This constituted a significant force of men and tanks, intended to not just dissuade the Italian forces from attacking but, according to Allied plans, it was to be the strike force against Addis Ababa. The much weaker British forces in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Kenya, and British Somaliland were supposed to remain defensive and let the French attack up the rail line to Addis. Whether the Italians knew that this was the plan or not, the peril was obvious.
Regardless, General Nasi, commanding Italian forces, attacked French Somaliland on 18th June 1940 with 9,000 men starting with the forts of Ali-Sabieh (~90 km south of the capital) and Dadd’to in the south and north respectively and skirmishes around Lakes Abbe and Ally in the South West. Despite the enormous advantages of the French forces, the Italians managed to occupy a series of border fortifications on the AOI/French Somaliland border by the end of June but got no further. Italian planes bombed Djibouti harbour, and on the 24th June, the Franco-Italian Armistice came into effect, requiring the demilitarisation of French Somaliland for the period of war between Italy and Great Britain, ceding effective control to the Italians.
The armistice also required all arms and ammunition, which would have included those tanks and guns, to be surrendered to Italy but General Legentilhomme stubbornly refused to cooperate insisting he would fight on, refusing to comply with orders to surrender until 28th July when President Petain replaced him with General Germain. General Germain though, refused to demilitarise, instead adopting a non-belligerent posture, fully cooperating with the Vichy Government but taking no offensive action and thus denying the stock of tanks and equipment to the Italians. The battalion of French troops blocking the Jirreh pass (considered a ‘back door’ into British Somaliland) was withdrawn per the armistice agreement but was replaced with a detachment of the Somaliland Camel Corps instead to guard the 45-mile border.
The armistice had effectively neutralized French Somaliland and permitted the Italians to make use of the port of Djibouti and the railway line unhindered by the French forces, although British control of the sea meant that the harbour received no useful supplies to help AOI. With the conclusion of operations in French Somaliland by the end of the July, the attention was turned to eliminate the British next door. The British later seized the French colony from Vichy hands in October 1941 following a naval blockade.

Italian troops march in columns during the invasion of British Somaliland.

The assault on British Somaliland

With French Somaliland neutralized, the threat from the British had to be eliminated as well and, although the French had not surrendered their tanks and guns, the Italians had sufficient men to do the job. General Guglielmo Nasi, commanding the Italian forces, over-estimated British strength in the colony, assessing that, on top of more men, they also had 24 guns and 8 anti-tank guns as well as 50 anti-aircraft guns which would complicate his invasion plans. Italian forces did occupy the station at Buramo on the 24th June. This lead to the despatch of a camel troop by the British to scout and raid them, which (in company with some local Somali tribesmen) they did on the night of the 29th/30th June. A further raid against Italian forces by this Camel troop was carried out at Dumuk but, these raids did little to deter the General and may only have served to reinforce the need to remove this British presence. The invasion started on the 3rd August 1940, with Italian troops crossing the border.

A column of Italian M11/39 Medium tanks advancing into British Somaliland, August 1940.

Defences

The defence of British Somaliland was commanded by Brigadier Arthur Chater when on the 15th May 1940, the official defence shifted from ambivalence to ‘scuttle’ with actual soldiers started to be used rather than irregular light troops and the Somaliland Camel Corps. After this, some active defence was being considered, but it was too little too late. Forces did start arriving so that, by the time of the invasion, Brigadier Chater had at his disposal about 5,000 men consisting of:

Somaliland Camel Corps (SCC) (~630 men including reservists) comprising a total of one motorised machine gun company, one camel-mounted rifle company, one pony-mounted rifle company, and one company of dismounted rifles. 400 Askaris with 14 British Officers with reinforcements from the Southern Rhodesia Regiment of 17 Officers and 20 Other Ranks which formed a second dismounted company.
2nd Battalion Black Watch standing by at Aden
1st Battalion Northern Rhodesia Regiment (1st NRR)
2nd (Nyasaland) Battalion King’s African Rifles (KAR) (about 875 men of whom just 9 of the 40 officers were regulars) arrived 12th July 1940
1st East African Light Battery (4 x 3.7″ howitzers) (from Kenya) arrived 12th July 1940
1st Battalion 2nd Punjab Regiment (1st/2nd Punjab Reg.) arrived 1st July 1940
3rd Battalion 15th Punjab Regiment (3rd/15th Punjab Reg.) arrived 1st July 1940
some Police units
Six Italian 20mm cannons stripped from an interned Italian ship

Troops of the Somaliland Camel Corps
Brigadier Chater chose the best defensive line open to him, about 50 miles inland from Berbera on the high ground. Back in 1939, GB£900 had been spent on the construction of concrete machine-gun nests at Tug Argan and Sheikh Pass to constitute the entirety of the defences for the protectorate. This position at Tug Argan would block the only road route to Berbera, leaving the invading Italians with three options. Either attack the Jirreh pass to the north and advance down a poor track to Berbera; attacking down the main road from Hargeisa to the pass at Tug Argan where the British forces were; or going around the south via Burao and over the Sheikh pass.
This was the first time any real practical consideration had been given to defending the protectorate at all. As Millman (British Somaliland: An administrative history) puts it “there had been no time to put the defence of the Protectorate on any sort of satisfactory footing before the Italian invasion began. Only in the process of attempting to defend the place did it become clear that it was indefensible” (p.118). But held, it had to be. The British Prime Minister had decreed it, against the objections of Brigadier Chater, who was more in favour of simply abandoning the province. As a defence of the entire 700 or so miles of the border (not including the 45 miles bordering French Somaliland) was not possible, the only other option was to seize access routes and high ground.
Brigadier Chater deployed his forces, with the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment held in reserve at Berbera, some of the Camel Corps with some Punjabi troops guarding the northern pass at Jirreh, the 1st/2nd Punjab Regiment guarding the Sheikh Pass, and the Northern Rhodesians and KAR at Tug Argan. The remainder of the Camel Corps, Police and irregular units were used to provide scouts and screening of enemy movements at border crossings.
With his forces deployed like this, regardless of which way the Italian forces would attack, they would have to cross one of the three passes, and only one had a decent road, the route through Tug Argan.

British Dispositions 1st August 1940
Area		Troops
Dobo		1 x Company SCC less one troop
Hargeisa		1 x Motor company SCC less one troop 1 x Troop SCC 1 x Company NRR, KAR
Burao		1 x Company and one Troop SCC
Zeila to Berbera Road		1 x Officer’s Patrol with wireless
Forward (Border) areas		Illalos (native irregulars)
Tug Argan	Main Position	NRR less one Company Machine-Gun Company B Company SCC 1st East African Light Battery
Tug Argan	Left Flank	2nd KAR with HQ at Mandera*
Tug Argan	Laferug (Force Reserve)	3rd/15th Punjab Regiment (until the 7th August when replaced by 2nd Black Watch)
Tug Argan	Sawr Hills	3rd/15th Punjab Regiment (after 7th August)
Sheikh Pass		Elements of 1st/2nd Punjab Regiment
Shell Gap (road from Zeilah)		Elements of 1st/2nd Punjab Regiment
Bihendi Gap (East of Berbera)		Elements of 1st/2nd Punjab Regiment
Berbera (base)		Elements of 1st/2nd Punjab Regiment

*Haile Selassie’s War by Anthony Mockler puts the HQ location at Barkasan Hill rather than at Madera although it likely moved during the defence.

The Italians are coming

Invading British Somaliland was the substantial force under General Nasi consisting of about 25,000 men of whom just 4800 were Italian, with the bulk being native Ascari troops. As well as this infantry force, General Nasi also had half a company of M11/39 medium tanks and a squadron of CV3 light tanks, as well as some armored cars.
Dividing his force, General Nasi sent the main portion, including the tanks, Eastwards along the Jigga to Hargeisa road. Commanding this column was General Carlo De Simeone leading the XIII Colonial Brigade under General Nam, the XIV Colonial Brigade under General Tosti, and the XV Colonial Brigade under Colonel Graziosi. A total of 11 infantry battalions with 14 batteries of artillery, the half company of the M11/39 medium tanks, the squadron of the CV3 light tanks, and some armored cars. Following, and acting as a reserve, was the II Colonial Brigade commanded by Colonel Lorenzini consisting of 4 battalions of infantry and two battalions of artillery.

Italian troops carried in trucks during the invasion of British Somaliland. Source: waridaad.blogspot.com
The second, lighter force was heading northwards to the sea at Zeila, sealing off any escape or support from French Somaliland. Commanded by General Bertoldi who had at his disposal 8 infantry battalions including 2 CCNN Blackshirts of which one was the machine gun battalion of the Granatieri di Savoia (the Savoia Grenadiers); an elite unit of the regular Italian army, as opposed to the mainly colonial forces. General Bertoldi was supported by four batteries of artillery split between LXX Colonial brigade and XVII colonial brigade. Alongside this northern column was an ‘exploitation’ unit led by General Passerone with just two battalions of infantry and a battery of artillery with the plan being, then upon the fall of Zeila, this small unit could attack Berbera from along the coast.
The third and final column consisting of a single infantry battalion, two groups of irregular troops and a single battery of artillery was led by General Bertello. They were to circle around the right flank. This force was sent to attack Sheikh Pass and then onto Berbera. If all three columns were successful, General Nasi would not only seal off any possible escape or reinforcements by land but also converge on Berbera from three directions.
The attack began on the 3rd August 1940, with the border crossed by the north and south columns with the main column moving toward Hargeisa. Here, on the 4th August, it met lead elements of the Camel Corps and Rhodesians and the Italians deployed their 12 light tanks (CV3) abreast in a line of attack. The Camel Corps troops and Rhodesians reported knocking out or disabling three of these light tanks with anti-tank rifles before retreating as these tanks assaulted their position and overran it allowing the Italian column to resume its advance. Noteworthy here is that the official London Gazette report on the campaign states that Italian losses were a single armored car set on fire and two others damaged by rifle fire and not any tanks. Although the column advanced once more, it was harassed by British planes as it moved along the road but having taken Hargeisa allowed the Italians to move their air support up to assist in the attack on Berbera. This is presumably why the attack halted at Hargeisa on the 6th and 7th, to consolidate the advance.
The north column under General Bertoldi with the Savoia Grenadiers set the pace though, crossing the border and reaching their objective ahead of expectations, capturing Zeila. General Passerone’s exploitation force was then free to march on Berbera from the north unopposed.
On the 6th, the southern column under General Bertello reached Odweina and found the Sheikh Pass blocked by a battalion of the 1st/2nd Punjab Regiment. General Bertello chose to engage these troops only lightly with irregular troops while sending the main force he had north to attack the flank of the British at Tug Argan instead.
The main column resumed its advance on 8th August and, at 12:30 hours 9th August, ran into a delaying force comprising one company of the NRR with a machine-gun section of the SCC. The delaying tactic was a failure, however, as the first Italian tanks (M11’s) were led around the hastily placed minefield ambush and overan the machine-guns. Unable to stop these tanks with anti-tank rifles or machine guns, the British, again, withdrew. With no weapons available to penetrate the Italian armor, a request for a gun capable of knocking them out was sent. The call was answered by the Australian Light Cruiser HMAS Hobart which sent a 3-pounder Naval gun along with 3 crew to Tog Argan where it was deployed on Observation Hill. Although not ideal, the gun could adequately deal with any of the Italian tanks although as a result of the mounting which had to be fabricated for it, the contraption had to be partially dismantled for reloading each time, with a resulting rate of fire of just 1 round every 5 minutes.
The British Home Command was aware that an invasion had begun and on the 10th was sending reinforcements and a change of command. Brigadier Chater was replaced with Major-General A.R. Godwin-Austen because the size of the forces coming would need a higher ranking commander. These reinforcements were another battalion of infantry, an artillery battery, a field artillery regiment, two 2-pounder anti-tank guns, a unit of Indian sappers, and the mechanized cavalry regiment taken from the 4th Indian Division. However, they never arrived, leaving General Godwin-Austen to command the original and much smaller force. The only reinforcements he had at his disposal were two 3″ anti-aircraft guns from the 23rd battery Hong Kong and Singapore brigade of the Royal Artillery.

Deployment of British forces at Tug Argan, 10th/11th August 1940. Source: Moyse-Bartlett

Map of the action at Tug Argan. August 1940. Source: unknown
The Italians reached Tug Argan on the 10th but did not attack until the 11th as they deployed ready for attack. The column had been led by the M11/39 Medium tanks followed by CV3 Light tanks and then the troops carried by a lorry. The British position was arranged with three companies of the 3rd/15th Punjab Regiment dispersed over the hilltops covering the right flank (north) at the Sawr Hills. The left flank (south) was a 5 mile long position covered by the Rhodesians and Camel Corps on a series of hills (Black Hill, Knobbly Hill, Mill Hill, Castle Hill, and Observation Hill) with the four 3.7” guns divided into pairs of two on the hills (Knobbly and Mill). With them, in this spread-out line of defended hilltops with the Indians troops on ‘Punjab Ridge’ followed by half of the 2nd KAR on Block Hill, covering the Mirgo Pass. This over-extended defensive line was weakened by a gap of 5 miles before another defended position covering the Jerato Pass, held by the other half of the 2nd KAR. Behind all of this was the newly arrived 2nd Black Watch held in reserve at Laferug. This was a poor arrangement with troops unable to cover each other with supporting fire due to the distances between positions and enough room for the Italian forces to manoeuvre between them or pick them off one at a time.

French colonial Renault FT-31 in 1940.

M11/39 in Eastern Africa, British Somaliland invasion, September 1940.

Italian Carro Veloce CV35 serie II, Ariete division, serving in Africa, but on the Lybian front. The same vehicle formed the stapple of Italian armored forces in East Africa.

A Universal Carrier in British used in North Africa. This trustworthy vehicle was present on all fronts the British Army operated, including East Africa.

The Italians attack

The attack from the road required De Simone’s force to cross very rugged terrain made more complex by the inaccurate maps they were using (copied from inaccurate British maps from 1926) but was preceded by a bombardment from the Italian guns falling on Mill Hill, which was defended by two platoons of the Camel Corps along with two howitzers. The bombardment then shifted to other forward positions and was then followed up by air attacks from Italian bombers and ground attacks by fighters. Mill Hill, in particular, was heavily damaged by this shelling and bombardment. In the history of the King’s African Rifles, Lt.Col. Moyse-Bartlett reports that 8 Italian tanks which had been moving along the Tug towards Observation Hill were fired upon by the 3.7” howitzers on the hill which appears to have caused them to leave.
The XIV brigade took the centre and attacked the Rhodesians over the dry stream bed for which Tug Argan is named (a ‘Tug’ is a dry stream bed). To their left was Lorenzini with II Brigade working its way around the British positions making excellent use of cover through the dry stream. On the right flank was XV Brigade facing Punjab Ridge with the armored vehicles held back in reserve. The right flank attacked by XV brigade was supported by the arriving troops from Bertello’s column heading north. Thus, the British positions were too spread out and were attacked in force from more than one direction.
The initial Italian attacks from the centre and north were repulsed, but the gaps between the positions were exploited by XV Brigade splitting the KAR from the Rhodesians along Mirgo Pass. The Italians ambushed a supply column and the Black Watch, having penetrated past the British lines.
XV Brigade though had suffered casualties during the main attacks and was replaced with XIII Brigade from the reserve for a fresh attack. Italian aircraft bombed the British positions, particularly Castle Hill which had been well defended by the Rhodesians against XV Brigade. The initial attacks had failed as the stalwart defenders were not for budging and the two flanking columns had not progressed well either. Despite no enemy forces blocking his troops, Passerone’s column towards Berbera had been stalled by a combination of terrible roads, constant British air attacks, and shelling from British warships. The southern column had engaged the Punjabi’s at Sheikh Pass but had made no real attempt to shift them, preferring instead to hold the troops there to prevent them being used at Tug Argan.
Mill Hill was abandoned by the afternoon of the 12th due to heavy losses caused by Italian attacks, with the defenders leaving behind the two howitzers, spiked and abandoned. The other two guns, based on Knobbly Hill were overrun by the Italians meaning that the British were effectively without artillery support.
Black Hill fared no better. Defended by just the machine gun company of the Camel Corps supported by the Rhodesians they quickly became isolated and cut off as the Italians infiltrated through their lines. So cut-off they were that, with the loss of communications, the British commander believed the hill had fallen to enemy attacks on the 13th and sent a patrol from the 3rd/15th Punjabi’s to check, finding the beleaguered defenders short of water and ammunition. In the peak of the dry season in that part of the world with temperatures of 48 C (120 F) commonplace, a lack of water was as much of a danger as enemy fire. No additional troops arrived at Tug Argan to support the British but with enemy tanks moving around more guns had been found in the form of a pair of Bofors cannons on the 13th.
On the 14th August, Observation Hill came under fierce bombardment. The naval 3-pounder which had been placed there was causing great disruption in the hands of the skilled naval gunners who, along with the Camel Corps machine gun detachment, were a serious hindrance to Italian movement. As a result, the Italians moved guns through the British lines and started a bombardment of the hill from behind in a very confused engagement. During the night of 13th/14th August, the Black Watch brought up two Bren Carriers laden with water supplies to the defenders on Castle and Knobbly Hills as well as additional ammunition. The Italians ambushed this supply convoy causing the loss of one carrier which fell into a ravine and was abandoned. Three trucks were also abandoned by their Somali drivers but, by daylight on the 14th, a lot of confidence in the viability of the defences had been lost.
Daybreak on the 14th also brought a renewed and intense barrage on Castle and Observation Hills with over 500 shells landing on Castle Hill alone smashing several areas of defence but the Italian attack at 16:00 hours was still fought off. With much of the defence works smashed and the Italians growing more confident the outcome was in no doubt.
A new attack on Tug Argan was ordered on the 15th August by General De Simone, and General Godwin-Austen already believed his position to be untenable. The ambush of the Black Watch by XV Brigade getting through the gaps in his defences convinced him he was going to be surrounded and destroyed and he began his plans to withdraw to Berbera.
When the Italians attacked on the 15th, they quickly got artillery behind Black Hill but were dispersed by British fire. The hill was heavily shelled though but the main attack was on Observation Hill where, after a two hours intense bombardment, they forced the Rhodesians off it scattering them by 17:00 hours. The Naval 3-pounder and its gallant naval crew, Petty Officer Hugh Jones, and Able Seamen Sweeny and Hurren were lost defending the position believed killed although they were later reported to have been captured (all three of them were released as POW’s in April 1941, and Petty Officer Hugh Jones returned to Australia in June 1941). Captain Wilson (East Surrey Regiment) commanding elements of the Somaliland Camel Corps received a posthumous Victoria Cross for his actions on Observation Hill.
The Italians then set to work on the Punjabi positions. Lorenzini’s flanking force penetrated into the Punjabi’s positions as they were withdrawing causing chaos and the 3rd/15th Punjabi Regiment withdrew in disorder. The entire defensive system of positions was abandoned with forces pulling back to Berbera with the retreat covered by the Black Watch and KAR. Black Hill too was abandoned on the 15th and the remaining Camel Corps and Rhodesians retreated.
Suspecting a feint withdrawal, De Simeone did not capitalise on the enemy rout with his forces still in position for further attacks and to defend what they had won. II Brigade was moving towards the positions formerly held by the Black Watch at Laferung with XIII moving along the road to support them. XV Brigade was still on the high ground they had won, LXX Brigade was still coming back to the main force to, and XIV was still in reserve with no progress made in pursuit until the 17th.
Finally, at 10:50 hours on the 17th, realising the British were retreating, De Simeone ordered the attack on the covering position at Laferug held by the Black Watch and the two companies of the 2nd KAR who were covering the British withdrawal and found them to be a most stubborn opponent. Despite attacking with a brigade strength (LXX Brigade) force supported by artillery and tanks, the attack was poorly organised and it did not go well for the Italians.
The attack on the left flank was repelled and then there was a battalion strength attack by “hordes of Italian troops, many of them black and being driven forward by shambock (a type of whip) wielding white officers” on the British centre defended by a single company which was being subjected to heavy casualties but was progressively creeping over the advanced British positions.
“We opened fire and they all ran into each other and the troops scattering for cover and more trucks came up behind. Now everyone was firing….[some members of the Battalion started to withdraw]… this was absolutely not allowed with express orders. I got very angry and jumped out of my trench, waving my pistol I shouted to them to turn around and get back to their trenches, fix their bayonets and then come with me”
Account of Captain D. Rose (Black Watch)
Captain Rose brought up three Bren carriers and the company forced the Italian battalion back about 500 metres at the point of the bayonet, restoring the position to British control. During this time, Captain Rose was shot in the shoulder bowling him “arse-over-tip like a shot-rabbit” before he got back to his trench.
“[The Italian attack]… was pushed forward on the left with great spirit until fifty Highlanders upped and charged wildly yelling, bayonets out, for six hundred yards, a terrifying sight that sent ‘the enemy rising and running like hares in their hundreds”
Haile Selassie’s War. p.248
The next attack by the Italians sought to regain this ground, attacking along the left and centre with infantry supported by eight to ten light and medium tanks working together where they ran into the fire of the two Bofors gun which had been brought up. The destruction of one medium (M11) and two light (CV3) tanks by these guns under the command of Sergeant Major Sandy (Black Watch) fought off this renewed attack. Of note here is that in ‘Haile Selassie’s War’, Anthony Mockler states this was, in fact, just a single Bofors gun and one captured Italian Breda cannon with 5 rounds and ‘The Black Watch’ by Victoria Schofield confirms just a single Bofors gun with just a dozen shells.
The stubbornness of the Black Watch and the audacity of the bayonet attack had stunned the Italian forces, but the defence was not without a price. Captain Rose had been wounded, the Battalion piper Henry MacDonald had been shot as he started piping for the charge and a further 7 of the Black Watch had been killed during the campaign with 6 of them during this action.* Italian losses are not known but it was the Italians who had the upper hand.
*The Roll of Honour for 2nd Battalion Black Watch records just 6 names with 5 recorded as being killed on the 17th and a sixth dying on the 19th at Hargeisa, suggesting he died of his wounds in captivity.
Unable to go through the British, the Italians instead moved around to their right flank with about 20 tanks circling the British positions. Unable to protect themselves from that direction, and with a front-line about two miles long straddling the main road, the British were very thinly spread and vulnerable to being flanked. To avoid being cut-off, and having achieved their delaying mission, the British withdrew back towards Berbera. Nursing his bloodied nose at Laferug, De Simeone had failed to capitalise on the confused retreat and breakthrough of the British defences two days day before-hand.

Abandoned British trucks, British Somaliland 1940. Source:coconuttimes.com
The British delaying action had been a success but with risk. The troops were nearly overwhelmed and destroyed and could just as easily have been cut off. As a result a plan for a second delaying action at Nasiye was abandoned. The first action had been so successful it was not needed anyway. Enough time had been bought for the evacuation of troops and all of the bridges along the road had been blown up to slow down the Italian advance. Ships including HMAS Hobart at Berbera were loaded up with troops and some civilians and evacuated to Aden.
Unfortunately, the Black Watch, which had been assumed lost to enemy action was cut off by the blowing up of the bridges, meaning they had to abandon most of their vehicles. Additional lorries then had to be brought back from Berbera to evacuate the men. Even so, two men were left behind and missed the trucks having to swim to the evacuation boat wearing only their rifles.
Regardless of the rather chaotic retreat, it had been carried out in mostly good order and overnight on the 17th/18th August the entire force, save for a couple of hundred strong rearguards at the outskirts of Berbera made up mainly of the SCC, was evacuated. The locally recruited SCC then disbanded to the local population.

Two triumphant Italian soldiers are holding an upside Union Flag taken as a trophy in British Somaliland.
De Simeone got to Berbera on the 19th, finding that the last British troops had gone. All the Italians got for this victory was a bombing raid by RAF Blenheims instead. There were spoils though. The Somaliland Camel Corps was effectively disbanded (reformed 1941, and disbanded again in 1943) and the Italians captured a large quantity of material, including 30 ‘anti-tank machine-guns’ (sometimes incorrectly described as 2-pounder guns), 5 mortars, 5 pieces of artillery, 3 Bren gun carriers, large quantities of machine guns, small arms, and ammunition, as well as over 100 much needed trucks to add to the Italian inventory.
The invasion had taken the territory and pushed the British out, but was not the decisive victory needed. The British withdrawal had been orderly, and the cost for Italy had been high.
British reported losses for the entire invasion of British Somaliland were 38 killed, 102 wounded, and 120 captured or missing, although it is not known if this includes the irregular Somali forces estimated to have lost around 1000 men. Italian reported losses for the conquest of British Somaliland were 465 killed, 1530 wounded and 34 missing, out of which 161 of the killed or wounded were Italian, the rest being native troops. An estimated 2000 Somali tribesmen fighting against the British may have died. Other figures quote 260 British and 2,052 Italian casualties showing just how complicated such figures are to determine especially with irregular troops.

The captured Governor’s residence in Berbera with the Italian flag flying over it in triumph.
Nonetheless, this was seen and portrayed as a great victory in Italy and, for the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, another bitter early loss. The loss was not a severe military one but a loss of face, a political victory. The port had been so poorly developed by the British it was barely usable for delivering supplies anyway and was just a berth. It was the damage to British prestige which stung Churchill more than anything. A report published in 1946 concluded that the loss of British Somaliland was attributable to 4 causes:

The insistence on defending colonies on the cheap
Inadequate preparations for War against Italy by the War Office.
The collapse of the French resistance in French Somaliland
The unsuitability of Berbera as a port slowing down the delivery of supplies and reinforcements.

Despite this early success though, the Duke of Aosta made a critical mistake. He stopped further advances out of AOI and instead tried to consolidate his position. In doing so, he yielded the initiative to the British and was never to regain it. De Simeone and General Godwin-Austen would meet again in Africa, with the invasion of Italian Somaliland, and General Godwin-Austen was not going to repeat the earlier mistakes and excess caution he had shown in defending British Somaliland. Had the defence of the Protectorate been considered and planned earlier or the forces better organised at Tug Argun, it is conceivable that the entire Italian invasion could have been halted, giving Italy an early taste of defeat rather than the misleading belief that the campaign in East Africa was a meeting of equals.

Sources

The invasion of British Somaliland. (1998). Bill Stone
Haile Selassie’s War. (2002). Anthony Mockler, Interlink Pub. Group Inc.
Italy through the looking glass: Aspects of British policy and intelligence concerning Italy 1939-1941. (1997). Dawn Miller, PhD Thesis, University of Toronto
South African Force: East African and Abyssinian Campaigns. (1968). Commandant Neil Orpen
Somaliland Camel Corps, https://www.kaiserscross.com/188001/492443.html
How Italy was defeated in East Africa in 1941, Ian Carter, IWM
History of the Second World War: Mediterranean and Middle East Vol.1. (1956). Sir James Butler
British Somaliland: An administrative history, 1920-1960. (2014). Brock Milman, Routledge Press
The King’s African Rifles: A study in the Military History of East and Central Africa 1890-1945, Vol.2. (2012). Lt.Col. H. Moyse-Bartlett. Naval and Military Press Ltd. (2012 reprint)
The First Victory: The Second World War and the East Africa Campaign. (2016). Andrew Stewart, Yale University Press
Operations in the Somaliland Protectorate 1939-1940, Supplement to the London Gazette, 5th June 1946, 2719-2727
The Black Watch: Fighting in Front Line 1899-2006. (2017). Victoria Schofield. Head of Zeus Pub.
The Mercury, 5th December 1940. Evacuation of Berbera: Gallant Australians
The Swan Express, 12th June 1941. Municipal Welcome Home to Petty Officer Hugh Jones
The Daily News, 17th April 1941. WA War Prisoner Released.
Sunday Times. 13th October 1940. Serving his gun to a Heroic Death.

Italian Armored Units During the Italian Invasion of Albania

Italian Medium Tank Crew Training During the Second World War

Esigenza C3 – The Italian Invasion of Malta

Campaigns and Battles in East Africa – The North, British and French Somaliland

Kingdom of Italy (1939)

Relations between Albania and Italy before 1939

The Invasion

The Albanian Armed Forces

Italian Forces

The Carro Armato L3

The Italian Tank Units during the Invasion

Raggruppamento Carri d’Assalto ‘D’Antoni’

III Gruppo Squadroni Carri Veloci ‘San Giorgio’

Reggimento Provvisorio di Cavalleria

Considerations on the Use of the Carro Armato L3 in Albania

Aftermath

Conclusion

Sources

Kingdom of Italy/Italian Social Republic (1940-1945)

Italian Training Before Second World War

Miscellaneous Training during World War II

Medium Tank Training during World War II

Post-Armistice Training

Conclusion

Sources

Genesis

Risky Business

Planning

Esigenza C3/Operation Herkules

Japanese Experts

The Germans

The Italo-German Invasion Plan

CONOPS

Operational Phases for Exigenza C3

Assumptions

Axis Forces (June 1942)

Allied Forces (July 1942)

Allied Forces (July 1942)

A note on the ‘Malta Pattern’

Conclusion

Sources

Introduction and background to AOI

First Strike

The assault on British Somaliland

Defences

British Dispositions 1st August 1940

The Italians are coming

The Italians attack

Sources