German Reich (1944)
Tank Destroyer – 930 to 940 Built
The further development of the StuG series led to the introduction of the Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyer. The Jagdpanzer IV was initially meant to be armed with the long 7.5 cm L/70 gun. As this gun was not available in sufficient numbers, as a temporary solution, the vehicle was armed with the shorter L/48 gun instead. In early 1944, the production of the long gun was finally increased and it could be used for this purpose. This would lead to the introduction of a slightly modified Jagdpanzer IV which was renamed Panzer IV/70(V). Production started in August 1944 and, by March 1945, some 930 to 940 vehicles were built.
Panzer IV/70 (V). Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag
The Development
The introduction of the Jagdpanzer IV into service provided the German Army with an effective anti-tank vehicle that had a small silhouette, was well-protected, and had a good gun. Work on such a vehicle was initiated by Waffenamt (Eng. Army Weapon’s Office) in September 1942. Initially designated Sturmgeschütze Neue Art (Eng. New Type Assault Gun), the new vehicle was to be armed with the 7.5 cm KwK L/70 gun and protected with 100 mm frontal and 40 to 50 mm of side armor. It was intended to have the lowest possible height, a top speed of 25 km/h, 500 mm ground clearance, and a weight of up to 26 tonnes. It is somewhat ironic that this vehicle, initially intended as a replacement for the StuG III, ended up being hijacked by the Panzer branch.
However, the initial plans to use the 7.5 cm L/70 gun could not be fulfilled, as its production was limited and reserved for the Panther tank program. While the short-barrelled Jagdpanzer IV was slowly entering production in January 1944, a meeting was held to discuss the use of the larger gun. For this reason, one prototype was to be built and tested to establish the feasibility of the concept once enough guns were available.
The prototype of this new vehicle was completed in early April 1944. It was, in essence, just a modified Jagdpanzer IV (chassis number 320162) armed with the long gun. Of course, some internal structural changes had to be made in order to fit the larger gun. The new vehicle was presented to Hitler on 20th April 1944. Hitler was impressed and insisted on a monthly production order of 800 such vehicles. The Waffenamt was slightly more realistic and issued a production quota of 2020 vehicles (both the L/48 and L/70 versions) to be completed by the end of April 1945, closer to 160 vehicles per month.
Throughout its development and service life, the new tank hunter received several different designations. This was nothing unusual by German standards. The initial designation for it was Sturmgeschütz auf Pz.Kpfw.IV. This name derived from its original purpose as a replacement vehicle for the StuG III. On Hitler’s own personal insistence, this vehicle was to be renamed to Panzer IV lang (V). The V stood for the manufacturer, Vogtlandische Maschinenfabrik AG (Vomag), while the word lang (Eng. Long) referred to the L/70 gun. This order was issued on 18th July 1944.
In October 1944, this designation was slightly changed to Panzer IV lang (V) mit 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70. Starting from November 1944, it was referred to as Panzer IV/70(V) – Panzerwagen 604/10 (V) mit 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70. Lastly, in January 1945, the term Jagdpanzer was once again used. The full designation was Jagdpanzer IV lang (V) (Sd.Kfz.162). To avoid confusion with the previous model and to be consistent with most sources, this article will refer to the vehicle as the Panzer IV/70(V).
This vehicle is also known by the nickname ‘Guderian Ente’ (Eng. Guderian’s Duck) given to it by its crews. This is often described as being related to its slower speed and reduced mobility in the sources. According to W. J. Spielberger (Military Vehicle Prints), this nickname was translated as ‘Guderian’s Hoax’ and is related to his refusal to accept this project. The word Ente in German (and in some other languages) can refer to as false news, hence Spielberger’s interpretation of this term.
Production
Given that Vomag was already involved in the Jagdpanzer IV’s production, it was logical that this company would produce the new Panzer IV/70 (V). Production plans were quite ambitious, especially taking into account that this occurred in late 1944, when the Allied bombing campaign had slowly grinded down the German industry to literal dust. The lack of resources and a logistical collapse were also notorious during this late part of the war. Many newly built vehicles never reached the front. Nevertheless, despite all the hardship, Vomag managed to keep up with the planned production, as can be seen in the following production table from T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV).
The month of production
Planned production quota
Actual production numbers
1944
August
60
57
September
90
41
October
100
104
November
150
178
December
180
180
1945
January
200
185
February
160
135
March
180
50
Total
1,120
930
Up to March 1945, the production numbers were often reached and sometimes even exceeded the planned quotas. Production dropped in March 1945 before ultimately stopping. That month, Vomag’s facilities were completely devastated by an Allied bombing raid. Given the chaotic state of Germany at that time, there was no time nor resources to restart production. While the production could not be restarted, there were some 30 hulls and 10 superstructures left available. Some of these were completed likely in April and issued for frontline use. It is possible that at least 10 more vehicles were completed.
In July 1944, Adolf Hitler insisted that production of the Panzer IV was to be terminated in February 1945 at the latest. Instead, the companies that were initially involved in the Panzer IV production were to focus on the Panzer IV/70 tank hunter. Given the insufficient production numbers of tanks such as the Panther and the Tiger II, the Panzer IV could simply not be phased out. This order was never implemented in reality.
Design
The Panzer IV/70(V) inherited the Jagdpanzer IV’s overall design. In essence, it was the same vehicle with better armament. Still, some modifications were necessary in order to fit the larger gun, while other changes were implemented in order to reduce production costs or to reduce the usage for materials that were in short supply. The Panzer IV/70(V) was built using chassis taken from Panzer IV Ausf.H and Panzer IV Ausf.J tanks.
The Panzer IV Ausf.H and J chassis served as the base for this new vehicle. Source: www.panzernet.net
Hull
The overall hull design was mostly unchanged from its predecessor. Some minor modifications were introduced during the production run. For example, the air intake vents on the brake inspection hatches were replaced with simple handles. They had become unnecessary, as the Germans had added ducts that extracted the smoke to the ventilation ports of the engine compartment. Their locking mechanism was also altered slightly. Another small modification was adding a vertical towing bracket which was welded to the rear part of the hull. This was a late introduction, first appearing in December 1944.
This vehicle uses early brake inspection hatches with ventilation ports on them. Source: Digital Collection of Armin FreitagIt is difficult to find a proper photograph that shows in more detail the Panzer IV/70(V)’s front hull, especially the brake inspection hatches. In this photograph, the soldier on the left actually holds the handle from the left brake inspection hatch. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IVDrawing of brake inspection hatches. The larger one to the right (number 3) is the original Panzer IV hatch. The remaining two were used on the Jagdpanzer IV and Panzer IV/70. The air intake vents (number 2) would be replaced with a simple handle (number 1). Source: J. Ledwoch. Panzer IV/70 (V)
Suspension and Running Gear
Given the added extra weight of the gun and armor, the Panzer IV/70(V)’s suspension became overburdened and thus prone to breakdowns. The rubber rims on the two front wheels wore out quickly. In addition, steering the vehicle on the uneven ground became problematic.
The problem with the suspension was already an issue with the slightly lighter Jagdpanzer IV, but became a serious problem for the later vehicle. One of the earliest attempts to resolve this issue was a proposal to move the road wheels’ positions to the front by 10 cm. It was hoped that this would shift the center of gravity a bit. This idea was flawed from the start, as the front road wheels were already too close to the drive sprocket. It would also necessitate huge changes to the hull design. In turn, this would cause delays in production, and thus it was never implemented.
The only real attempt that gave some positive results regarding the overburden suspension was the introduction of steel-tired road wheels. The two front road wheels were replaced with this new model. In addition, lighter tracks were to replace the ones in use. Both of these measures were introduced starting in September 1944. Of course, the older vehicles were at some point likewise provided with these reinforced wheels to help cope with the added weight.
The number of return rollers would be reduced to three. In addition, these were made of steel due to the lack of rubber. Lastly, different types of idlers were used depending on the availability of spare parts.
The engine compartment received no major modifications. It was still powered by the Maybach HL 120 TRM which produced 265 hp @ 2,600 rpm. Given the increase in weight from 24 to 25.8 tonnes, the overall drive performance dropped significantly. The maximum speed was reduced from 40 km/h to 35 km/h. The cross-country speed remained the same, at around 15-18 km/h. While this decrease in maximum speed does not appear as much at the first glance, the Panzer IV/7(V) became difficult to steer and the added weight caused huge stress on the engine itself. With a fuel load of some 470 liters, the operational range was 210 km.
The cylindrical exhaust muffler was replaced with two upright-positioned Flammentoeter (English: flame exhaust mufflers). These were implemented on vehicles produced starting from November 1944. Chain links were attached to the cooling air intake and flap so that they could be manually opened or closed depending on the need.
A good illustration of the changes implemented to the engine exhaust mufflers. Initially, a standard cylindrical exhaust muffler was used. This would be replaced with flame exhaust mufflers. Lastly, their cover was slightly modified during production. Also, note the added vertical towing bracket on the last illustration. Source: И. Мощанский, И. Переяславцев Tank Destroyer Pz.IV/70V)
The Superstructure
The upper superstructure design was mostly the same, except for one major difference which is not obvious and somewhat illogical. The superstructure’s top, despite the use of a larger gun which would require more working space inside the vehicle, was actually lowered by some 30 mm. While not a huge difference, the reason why this was implemented is unknown.
Besides that, other minor improvements were also introduced, mostly near the end of the war. Some vehicles received rain channels which were positioned under the commander and the loader’s hatches. The Panzer IV/70(V) was meant to receive a jib boom crane installation. This required adding five sockets that needed to be welded to its top superstructure. This crane would provide the crews with a means to easily remove heavier components, such as the engine. This was rarely added to the vehicles and appears to be mainly present on vehicles produced near the end of the war.
The design of the sliding gun sight cover was also slightly changed to make it easier to build. Initially, it consisted of two curved single-piece sliding rods. These would be replaced with sliding rods that consisted of many smaller parts.
Some vehicles had spare track link holders added to the sides of the superstructure. It is not clear if these were introduced during production or added by some of the crews as an improvisation.
A good view of the Panzer IV/70(V)’s upper superstructure. Source: Digital Collection of Armin FreitagGiven its late introduction, pictures of the Panzer IV/70(V) with the jib boom crane installation are hard to come by. Here is a picture of a StuG IV with a jib boom crane. In essence, the installation on the Panzer IV/70(V) would be quite similar if not the same as here. Source: Walter J. Spielberger Sturmgeschütz and its VariantsThe leading gun sight cover was also modified. To the left was the one used initially. It would be replaced with a new design that incorporated many segmented parts (on the right). Source: И. Мощанский, И. Переяславцев Tank Destroyer Pz.IV/70V)Some vehicles had spare track link holders added to the sides of the superstructure. Source: И. Мощанский, И. Переяславцев Tank Destroyer Pz.IV/70V)Another such example with slightly shortened spare track link holders. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag
Armor and Protection
The Panzer IV/70(V)’s armor was the same as on its predecessor. It was well protected, with thick and well-angled armor plates. For the lower hull, the upper front armor plate was 80 mm thick at a 45° angle and the lower plate was 50 mm at a 55° angle. The side armor was 30 mm thick, the rear 20 mm, and the bottom 10 mm. The hull crew compartment had 20 mm of bottom armor.
The upper superstructure frontal armor was 80 mm at a 50° angle, the sides were 40 mm at a 30° angle, the rear armor was 30 mm, and the top was 20 mm. The engine compartment design and armor were unchanged from the Panzer IV, with 20 mm all around and 10 mm of top armor.
The 80 mm of front armor was introduced on the Jagdpanzer IV series in May 1944. The later version incorporated a larger gun which led to an increase in weight. Thus, in August 1944, it was proposed to once again use weaker 60 mm thick frontal armor. Even Hitler agreed that the superstructure frontal armor needed to be reduced in thickness in order to save some weight. For unknown reasons, this decision was never implemented.
The Panzer IV/70(V) was initially provided with Zimmerit anti-magnetic coating, but after September 1944, its use was abandoned. Additional 5 mm thick armor plates were also provided for extra protection of the engine compartment’s sides. The Panzer IV/70 (V) could be equipped with additional 5 mm thick armor plates (Schürzen) covering the sides of the vehicle. They served mainly to protect against Soviet anti-tank rifles. In rarer cases, at the end of the war, these were replaced with Thoma Schürtzen wire mesh. While these were lighter and provided the same level of protection, their use was delayed due to problems with production.
The 5 mm thick armor plates (Schürzen) cover the side of the vehicle. They served mainly to protect against Soviet anti-tank rifles. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag
The crews of some vehicles often added all kinds of improvised armor. These were often reused spare parts, such as tracks and road wheels. Some of the crews added concrete to the front armor plates. The effectiveness of this improvised armor was dubious at best, but these improvised up-armoring jobs were relatively common on other German vehicles, such as the StuG III series.
The crew of this vehicle added concrete on the front superstructure armor. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag
Armament
The Panzer IV/70(V) was rearmed with the stronger 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70 (sometimes referred to as 7.5 cm StuK 42 L/70) gun. The position of the gun was unchanged, as it was placed slightly off-center to the right. Given that it was a much larger gun with stronger recoil forces, some structural changes were needed. For example, the gun mantlet was redesigned in order to save weight. In addition, a hydro-pneumatic equilibrator was installed on the right side of the gun. To provide better gun balance, an iron counterweight was added at the end of the recoil guard. Despite being a considerably longer gun and using stronger rounds, the recoil was only 42 cm. The total weight of the gun itself was 2.2 tonnes. Surprisingly, no ventilation fan was present in the crew compartment. Instead, an air blast mechanism was meant to blow fumes created after firing the gun out the barrel.
Given the longer length of the gun barrel, an external travel lock had to be provided. Its purpose was to help stabilize the gun during traveling. This in turn would help avoid damaging or even misaligning the gun sight. When connected to the travel lock, the gun was raised up at a 13° angle. This was necessary in order to avoid accidentally hitting the ground when driving on uneven ground. While this seems unlikely to happen, the Panzer IV/70(V)’s lower height and longer barrel meant that this was a real possibility. The prototype was initially not provided with a travel lock, but it quickly became apparent that such a device would be needed. In order to free the gun, the gun operator only had to elevate the gun a bit and the travel lock would fall down. This allowed for a quick combat response but also avoided the need for a crew member to exit the vehicle in order to do it manually. The shape of the travel lock was changed during production. Initially, these had a large opening in them. Later built travel locks did not have this opening.
The elevation of the main gun was –6° to +15° and the traverse was 24°. Here it is important to note that these numbers differ greatly in the sources. These particular numbers were taken from T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV). A muzzle brake would not be added to the gun, as it would create a lot of dust during firing and also increase the cost of construction slightly. Some guns had threaded ends on the barrel for the installation of a muzzle brake. As this was a labor-intensive task, most were likely not provided with such a feature.
The 7.5 cm StuK 42 L/70 could fire a few different types of rounds, including armor-piercing (PzGr 39/42 or 40/42), high-explosive (SpGr 42), and armor-piercing tungsten rounds. While the latter had superb anti-armor penetration power, due to the scarcity of tungsten, these rounds were rarely employed.
Distance:
500 m
1 km
2 km
Standard Armor-piercing round
124 mm
111 mm
89 mm
Armor-piercing tungsten round
174 mm
149 mm
n/a
Thanks to this firepower, this gun could effectively engage most Allied tanks up to the war’s end. The maximum firing range of the high-explosive rounds was 5.1 km, while the armor-piercing range was 3 km.
The 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70 Armor penetration (maximum range) table against enemy tanks. Source: T.L. Jentz (Germany’s Panther Tank)
The ammunition load consisted of 55 rounds, but this would be increased to 60. Usually, around 34 were armor-piercing, while the remaining 21 were high-explosive. This could differ depending on the combat need or availability of ammunition.
The 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70 gun used a Sfl.Z.F.1a gun sight which had a magnification of x5 and a field of view of 8°. On some vehicles, the gunner sight was encased into protective covers. Starting from November 1944, one-third of the produced Panzer IV/70(V) were meant to receive the SF 14 Z scissor periscope. In addition, these were also to incorporate the use of an Entfernungs-Messer 0.9 m (Eng. Range finder). Three small connecting points were welded around the commander’s hatch for the installation of this range finder. Due to delays with the delivery of such equipment, the first vehicles mounting this were supplied in March 1945.
A good view of the Panzer IV/70(V) commander and gunner’s periscopes. In addition, notice the three connecting points, with one in front and two to the rear of the commander’s hatch. These were to be used to mount the range finder but were introduced too late to see any real service. Source: https://warspot.ru/12584-slishkom-dlinnyy-stvol
As a secondary weapon, the MG 42 machine gun was retained. The ammunition load for it consisted of 1,950 rounds. In addition, at least one 9 mm submachine gun MP 40 or a later 7.92 mm MP 44 assault rifle was carried inside for crew protection.
Some vehicles were equipped with the Rundumfeuer machine gun mount that was operated from inside the vehicle. This mount provided an all-around firing arc. In addition, the operator did not have to expose himself to fire when he was using the machine gun. However, he still needed to go outside to manually load the machine gun. While this installation was tested on the prototype, it did not see wide use on the Panzer IV/70(V).
The first prototype did receive the Rundumfeuer machine gun mount, but its use appears to have been limited on the later production vehicles. Source: https://warspot.ru/12584-slishkom-dlinnyy-stvolA destroyed vehicle that was provided with the Rundumfeuer machine gun mount. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag
The Panzer IV/70(V) was also equipped with the Nahverteidigungswaffe (Eng. close defense grenade launcher), with some 40 rounds of ammunition (high explosive and smoke rounds), placed on the vehicle’s top. Due to the general lack of resources though, not all vehicles were provided with this weapon. In such cases, the Nahverteidigungswaffe’s opening hole was closed off with a round plate.
The Nahverteidigungswaffe’s firing port was located on the left of the commander’s hatch. When not provided (which was often the case), the opening was simply hidden by an armored cover. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag
For defense against infantry that got too close, an unusual weapon attachment named Vorsatz P was provided. This was a curved muzzle attachment for the MP 43/44 assault rifles. With this curved barrel, the loader (who was to be equipped with this weapon attachment) could engage enemy infantry from inside the vehicle without exposing himself. The Vorsatz P barrel was angled at 90°. For installation on armored vehicles, such as the Panzer IV/70(V), a small ball mount was developed. It was to be attached to the top superstructure hatches. For combat use, the assault rifles were to be attached to this ball mount vertically, pointing up. With the extended curved barrel, the maximum firing range was around 15 m. Despite its odd appearance, the system actually worked. This weapon system was introduced too late and was only issued in limited numbers in 1945.
The crew number and position remained unchanged. It consisted of the commander, the gunner, the loader/radio operator, and the driver. The loader’s position was to the left while the remaining three crew members were placed opposite him.
Organization and Distribution to Units
In July 1944, Hitler came up with the idea of using smaller mobile armored formations. Their purpose would be to act as a quick response to enemy attacks. These were the so-called Panzer Brigaden (Eng. Tank Brigades). They were to consist of three 11-vehicle-strong Panther companies and one 11-strong Panzer IV/70(V) company. In addition, they were to be protected by at least 4 anti-aircraft vehicles. Guderian was against the formation of such small units, as they diverted vital resources of men and materiel that were desperately needed by the Panzer Divisions. Regardless, Hitler persisted and some 10 such units were to be formed. A few additional brigades were equipped mainly with Panzer IVs.
The first units to be equipped with a Panzer IV/70(V) company were the 105th and 106th Panzer Brigades in August 1944. A month later, five more such units were formed. These were the 107th, 108th, 109th, 110th, and the Führer Grenadier Brigade. The whole Brigade concept was quickly abandoned and, by November 1944, nearly all such units were absorbed by the existing Panzer Divisions.
Besides these short-lived brigades, the Panzer IV/70(V)s were issued to 10-vehicle strong Panzerjäger Kompanie (Eng. Anti-tank company). Other units, such as the Panzer Grenadier Divisions and schwere Panzerjäger Abteilungen (Eng. Heavy anti-tank battalions) were to be slightly stronger, at 14 vehicles. It is worth pointing out that not all units received these in the prescribed number strength. There were often variations in the delivered number of vehicles Besides forming new units, the Panzer IV/70 (V) was also issued as a replacement vehicle to existing formations.
A destroyed vehicle from the Führer Grenadier Brigade lost in January 1945 on the Western Front. Despite most of these brigades being disbanded, the Führer Grenadier Brigade was one of few that did not share this fate. Source: И. Мощанский, И. Переяславцев Tank Destroyer Pz.IV/70V)
The 24th and 116th Panzer Divisions each received 10 vehicles during September and October 1944. As the Eastern Front came under pressure from the Soviets, more Panzer IV/70(V)s were rushed there. The 7th, 13th, and 17th Panzer Divisions each received 21 vehicles, while the 24th Panzer Division received 19 vehicles.
At the start of 1945, the quick collapse of all fronts meant that the Panzer IV/70(V) was issued to frontline units without much training. The numbers allocated to different units were also dependent on the available vehicles. For example, the 563rd Heavy Anti-Tank Battalion received 31 vehicles in January 1945. It was probably the strongest single unit supplied with this vehicle. On the other hand, others were less lucky, receiving only 10 vehicles, such as the 510th Anti-Tank Battalion in February 1945.
After March 1945, the situation became even more chaotic. Any form of organization was discarded, and instead, vehicles were sent to various units as they arrived at the front. For example, in late March and early April 1945, the Panzer Lehr Division received 12, 114th Panzer Division 5, and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 21 vehicles. Even some assault gun brigades received Panzer IV/70(V)s during this period. These units finally received the vehicle that was initially designed for them way back in 1942.
The same month, out of desperation, the Germans tried to mobilize some 711 armored vehicles that were used for training. While this seems like a huge number, most of these vehicles were either obsolete older equipment or had been stored and not operational. At least two Panzer IV/70(V)s were used in this manner. One of them was likely the first prototype built.
In Combat
The Panzer IV/70(V)’s late production start meant that it took some time to actually deliver these vehicles to the frontlines. Crew training was also an important part, as it also required much-needed time. The German logistical infrastructure had been ravaged by Allied bombing runs. As the Allies liberated France, it was possible to build new air bases closer to Germany itself. Roads and railroads were under constant threat of enemy air attacks. This meant that vital supply transportation lines were often targeted. Transportation of new vehicles to the frontline became dangerous and, in many cases, they failed to reach their destinations.
Ardennes Offensive and the End of the War in Western Europe
The Panzer IV/70(V) began to reach frontline units in significant numbers only at the end of 1944 and the start of 1945. The first vehicles were concentrated for the German Ardennes offensive in late 1944. At that time, the Germans mustered some 210 vehicles of this type. An additional 90 were to be used as reinforcements and replacements. The precise numbers of Panzer IV/70(V)s used during the Ardennes offensive differ between sources. The previously mentioned number is according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV), while K. Mucha and G. Parada (Jagdpanzer IV) give a much smaller number of 135 vehicles.
A well-recorded action where the Panzer IV/70(V) saw combat action was during the battles around the Belgian Krinkelt-Rocherath villages at the end of 1944. This was part of a German attack spearheaded by elements from the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. This Division’s 12th SS Panzerjäger Abteilung had Panzer IV/70(V)s in its inventory. The attack was also accompanied by infantry support from the SS Panzergreandier Regiment 25. It is worth mentioning that, by this point of the war, the German soldiers were mostly inexperienced and poorly trained.
As the Germans advanced, they threatened to surround two Allied infantry divisions. In order to prevent this, the 9th Infantry Regiment, together with various elements from the retreating Allied soldiers were gathered to form a defense line at the Krinkelt-Rocherath villages and the Lausdell crossroads. Interestingly, the commander of the 9th Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel William Dawes McKinley, favored the use of bazookas over towed 57 mm anti-tank guns. Both struggled to do damage to the front armor of some of the better German armored vehicles. Still, a team armed with bazookas could be effective, especially from concealed positions.
German infantry, supported by two Panzer IV/70(V) companies, attacked the Allied positions on 17th December 1944. The defenders did not have any armor support at this point, but they laid a huge number of mines. Several Panzer IV/70(V)s from the 2nd Company led the attack, supported by small Panzergrenadier infantry groups, some of them hiding on the Panzer IV/70(V)’s engine decks. The remaining infantry followed up from behind.
Illustrated map of the fighting that took place during the battle for Krinkelt-Rocherath (to the left) and Lausdell crossroads (to the right) Source: S. Zaloga Bazooka Vs. Panzers Battle for the Bulge
Once the German vehicles were spotted, they were immediately bombarded by American artillery. One vehicle was destroyed by an artillery hit, and two were immobilized by mines. Two more were destroyed by the Allied’s bazooka teams. Later that day, despite heavy losses and pressure from the Allies’ artillery, the Germans made another attack. They were supported by the fire of one immobilized Panzer IV/70(V). This vehicle would be destroyed with thermite grenades and a fuel canister. At least one more was destroyed in this attack.
At the same time as the attack on the Lausdell crossroads was carried out, the Germans also attacked the Allied’s positions at the Krinkelt-Rocherath villages. At least three Panzer IV/70(V)s led the attack and managed to penetrate into the villages. The M4 tanks sent against the Germans were quickly taken out. There was heavy fighting that lasted the whole day, but the Germans withdrew the next morning, expecting reinforcements and supplies. On the 18th, the Germans attacked again, this time advancing with Panther tanks in the direction of Rocherath. Two leading Panthers would be taken out, blocking the road to the village, forcing the remaining vehicles to try to go around them. Around one hour later, one Panzer IV/70(V) came to the place where the two Panthers were lost. This vehicle was quickly taken out by bazooka fire.
The precise losses suffered by both sides are not well documented. The defenders lost some 11 tanks, 2 M10 tank destroyers, and a large number of anti-tank guns. The Allies reported the destruction of over 40 German armored vehicles, including 5 Tigers. These reports were not correct, as no Tiger was used during this battle. In addition, the precise number of destroyed German vehicles was likely less than mentioned above, as many vehicles would be recovered.
Interestingly, the Allies used a captured Panzer IV/70(V) during the winter of 1944/45 to test the effectiveness of bazookas. While the front armor proved impervious, the sides and the rear were vulnerable to this weapon.
The two Panthers taken out near Rocherath, which blocked the entrance to the village. Just behind them is the destroyed Panzer IV/70. The two Allied soldiers are standing on it. Source: S. Zaloga Bazooka Vs. Panzers Battle for the BulgeThe captured Panzer IV/70(V) was used for testing the bazooka’s effectiveness against armor. The hits were marked with chalk numbers. Its thick and angled frontal armor proved to be immune to bazooka rockets. Source: S. Zaloga Bazooka Vs. Panzers Battle for the Bulge
At the end of December 1944, some Panzer IV/70(V)s participated in the last large German offensive in the West, Operation Northwind. The operation ended in another German failure by late January 1945, further depleting the strength of its armored units.
After the last offensive against the Western Allies, the German armored formations in this part of Europe were dangerously depleted. There were only six surviving anti-tank battalions equipped with Panzer IV/70 vehicles. By mid-March, the Germans had only 77 Panzer IV/70s vehicles on this front, with only 33 operational. This number likely included both the Vomag and Alkett versions.
An abandoned Panzer IV/70 vehicle was captured by the Allied Forces near Bremen in April 1945. Interestingly, this vehicle only has one steel roadwheel. Source W. J. Spielberger Military Vehicle Prints
Eastern Front
The Panzer IV/70(V) also saw heavy action on the Eastern Front. For example, on 16th March 1945, at the Oder River near Stettin, in north Poland, a platoon leader of the 6th Company from the 9th Panzer Regiment noted the following:
“ … About 900 hours, we learned that Ivan had positioned many tanks ready to attack in front of our infantry’s defensive positions. After signaling the Abteilung and Regiment by radio, we learned from an infantry messenger that the rest of our Kompanie and Abteilung must already be advancing. Their progress was delayed by the plowed up terrain caused by the heavy artillery barrage. At exactly 1100 hours, the artillery fire stopped. It was still deadly all around us. Then, from the deep holes and machinegun nests, signal flares were fired – Enemy attack! The first Russian T-34-85 and SU-85 rolled into the field of view of our Jagdpanzers which were in defiladed positions. Quickly, flashes appeared from hits on two of the forward T-34s, then they started were smoking. Thereafter, a further five to eight enemy tanks quickly appeared beside and behind these. They burnt just as fast. So it went for most of the other enemy tanks that continued to appear in advancing tank squadrons. Every shot from our gun was now a hit. Our knowledgeable and experienced gunners, who were the oldest corporals and sergeants in the Abteilung, could hardly miss their targets. After about a 30 minute fight, a strong formation of T-34s attempted to bypass the right flank of our position. We had fired almost all of our ammunition when behind and beside us additional guns opened fire. The rest of the Abteilung had arrived and supported our bitter defensive battle against the overwhelming Red tank formations.’’
Unfortunately, the report does not mention the precise Soviet armor losses, but these were possibly heavy. The report was meant to highlight the effectiveness and experience of the German gunners. This may somewhat be misleading, as the number of experienced German gunners and crews by the end of the war was greatly reduced due to attrition. The majority would be replaced with inexperienced and poorly trained crew members. Not surprisingly, their performance would be greatly diminished. In any case, the particular Panzer IV/70(V) mentioned in the report would be immobilized by a hit from a T-34-85 to the rear.
Another example would be the 563rd Heavy Anti-Tank Battalion, which saw extensive combat action against the advancing Soviet forces in early 1945. This unit was in the process of reorganization and was supplied with one Jagdpanther company and two Panzer IV/70(V) companies. The total combat strength was 18 Jagdpanther and 24 Panzer IV/70(V). The crew of these vehicles had been previously used as standard infantry and were quite exhausted from heavy fighting with the Soviets. As there was no time for recuperation, on 21st January 1945, they advanced toward the enemy. The unit reached Wormditt that day, where heavy fighting with the enemy occurred. Thanks to their superior firepower and experience, the German vehicles managed to inflict severe losses to the enemy. During a period of 10 days, some 58 enemy tanks were reported destroyed. The Germans only lost one Jagdpanther and four Panzer IV/70(V)s. The remaining vehicles had to be blown up to prevent being captured due to a lack of fuel or spare parts.
The IV SS-Panzer Corps, which engaged the Soviets in a desperate attempt to reach the besieged Budapest, had in its inventory some 55 Jagdpanzer IV and Panzer IV/70(V) tank destroyers. Some would also see service at the last major German armored offensive in the East at Lake Balaton during March 1945. By mid-March, the German Army on this front had some 357 vehicles in its inventory, of which 189 were operational.
Abandoned Panzer IV/70(V) somewhere in Hungary during early 1945. Source: https://www.yaplakal.com/forum2/st/25/topic1261749.htmlPanzer IV/70(V) from the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend retreating after the Battle of Lake Balaton during March 1945. Source: H. Meyer The 12th SS The History of the Hitler Youth Panzer Division: Volume TwoSome Panzer IV/70(V)s participated in the fighting around and in Budapest in early 1945. Source: И. Мощанский, И. Переяславцев Tank Destroyer Pz.IV/70V)
Italy
The Panzer IV/70(V) saw limited use in this part of Europe. Newly produced vehicles were rushed to either the Eastern or Western Fronts. The hilly terrain in Northern Italy would likely have led to overheating and transmission problems. Thus, by April 1945, only three such vehicles were present on this front.
Jagdpanzer IV Versions
Panzer IV/70(V) Befehlswagen
An unknown number of Panzer IV/70(V)s were modified to be used as Befehlswagen (Eng. command vehicles). These vehicles had additional radio equipment installed, namely the FuG 8 30 radio station (30 W power) with an operational range of 80 km. The extra equipment was positioned behind the loader and was to be operated by an extra crew member. The Befehlswagen would also use a Sternantenne (English: star radio antenna) which was 1.4 m long and located on the left side of the engine compartment.
Other Users
After the war, some surviving Panzer IV/70s would see service with a few different armies.
Bulgaria
The Bulgarians, who were allied to the Germans, switched sides in late 1944. They joined the Soviet Union in the fight against Germany. In March 1945, the Bulgarian armored force was supplemented with one captured Panzer IV/70(V) (chassis number 320662) supplied by the Soviets. In Bulgarian service, this vehicle was known under the Maybach T-IV designation. This vehicle still exists to this day and can be seen at the National Museum of Military History in Sofia.
An unknown numbers of captured Panzer IV/70(V)s were supplied to the Romanian Army by the Soviet Union (possibly after the war). In Romanian service, they were known under the TAs T-4 designation. The TAs was an abbreviation for Tun de Asalt (Eng. Assault Gun) and T-4 was the Romanian designation for the Panzer IV.
A Romanian Panzer IV/70(V) seen during a military parade held in May 1948. Source: Trupele Blindate din Armata Română 1919-1947
Syria
Around five to six vehicles (both L/48 and L/70 armed versions) were given to Syria in 1950 by the French, although, depending on the sources, it is possible that the Soviets actually supplied them. During combat with Israeli forces in 1967 during the Six-Day War, one Jagdpanzer IV was lost when it was hit by a tank round. The remaining were withdrawn from the front and probably stored in reserve. These Jagdpanzer IVs were still listed in the Syrian Army inventory during 1990-1991. What became of them is, unfortunately, not currently known.
Surviving Vehicles
At least several Panzer IV/70(V) vehicles are known to have survived the war. They can be seen in museums around the world. The National Armor and Cavalry Museum Fort Benning in the US has one vehicle. Another US vehicle can be seen at the Army Ordnance Museum, Aberdeen Proving Ground. One can be seen at the Bulgarian National Museum of Military History in the capital, Sofia. Another vehicle is located at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa. The well-known military museum at Kubinka also has one vehicle in its collection.
Surviving Panzer IV/70(V) at the National Armor and Cavalry Museum, Fort Benning, in the US. Source: https://preservedtanks.com/Profile.aspx?UniqueID=201&Select=1 Another Panzer IV/70(V) located at the Aberdeen Proving Ground. Source: www.net-maquettes.comPanzer IV/70(V) at the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. Source: WikipediaAnother example can be seen at the Kubinka Museum near Moscow. Source: Wikipedia
Conclusion
The Panzer IV/70(V) was the final result of the German attempts to create a new and better-armed assault gun to replace the StuG III. Ironically, some Sturmartillarie units only received these vehicles near the end of the war. The Panzer IV/70(V) would remain primarily a dedicated anti-tank vehicle. It possessed strong armament, was well protected, and was a small target. On paper, it met nearly all the requirements that were often associated with an effective anti-tank vehicle for Second World War standards at least. But it was far from perfect, as the added weight led to the chassis being overburdened, which resulted in reduced maximum speed, reliability, and mobility issues.
Despite being produced in relatively large numbers (for German standards), not all of these ever reach the frontline units. The German logistic supply lines were all but destroyed by the end of 1944. The Panzer IV/70(V)s were not concentrated in numbers but instead given in smaller groups to fill the gaps created on the fronts. Thus, their effectiveness was greatly reduced. By late 1944, there was a general lack of panzers, so the Germans were forced to use the Jagdpanzers as replacement vehicles instead. The Panzer IV/70(V) suffered losses, as it was often used in the role of panzer, a role for which it was not suited nor designed for. But, as there were no other solutions, something was better than nothing.
In the end, the Panzer IV/70 (V) was a sound design that exploited the old Panzer IV chassis that was reaching the end of its development limits. Its effectiveness was hampered due to its late introduction in the war, when it could do little to change the final outcome.
Late-type Panzer IV/70(V) based on the Panzer IV Ausf.H, 13th Panzer Division, Hungary, January 1945.Early type Panzer IV/70(V) in winter camouflage, Hungary, possibly January 1945.Panzer IV/70(V), late version, 1st SS Panzer Division, Hungary, 1945.Panzer IV/70(V), late version, 13th Panzer Division, Hungary, January 1945.
Specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
8.5. x 3.17 x 1.85 m
Total weight, battle-ready
25.8 tonnes
Crew
4 (driver, commander, gunner, loader)
Propulsion
Maybach HL 120 TRM, 265 hp @ 2,800 rpm
Speed
35 km/h 15-18 km/h (cross-country)
Operational range
210 km, 130 km (cross-country)
Traverse
12° right and 12° left
Elevation
-6° to +15°
Armament
7.5 cm (2.95 in) PaK 42 L/70 (55-60 rounds)
7.9 mm (0.31 in) MG 42, 1200 rounds
Armor
Front 80 mm, sides 40 mm, rear 30 mm and top 20 mm
Semovente M43 da 75/46. Illustrations by the illustrious Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.
Italian Social Republic/German Reich (1943-1945)
Tank Destroyer – 11 to 18 Built
The Semovente M43 da 75/46 (English: 75 mm L/46 M43 Self-Propelled Gun) was the last self-propelled gun (SPG) produced by Italy during the Second World War. It was based on the previous Semovente M43 (plural semoventi) chassis, but featured new spaced armor that offered better protection to the crew. It was developed by Italian companies after a German request of late 1943.
A total of 11 to 18 vehicles were produced, but most of the vehicles were delivered to the Germans, who deployed them on the Italian peninsula against the Allied forces in the last stages of the Second World War.
Semovente M43 da 75/46 of the production series without the anti-aircraft support and the 20 liter can supports. Source: Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano
Previous Models
The effective Semovente M40 da 75/18 self-propelled howitzer based on the chassis of the Carro Armato M13/40 IIIa Serie immediately proved to be more potent than Italian-produced medium tanks in terms of firepower. When deployed in North Africa by the Italians, it demonstrated to be an effective support vehicle, and could deal with almost all the Allied tanks in that theater of operations. It was deployed mainly as an assault tank or to support infantry attacks, but it was also deployed to attack Commonwealth armored formations with success.
It was armed with a Obice da 75/18 Modello 1934 (English: 75 mm L/18 Howitzer Model 1934) with 44 rounds and a Fucile Mitragliatore Breda Modello 1930 (English: Breda Light Machine Gun Model 1930) with 600 rounds. Its engine was the FIAT-SPA 8T Modello 1940 diesel giving out 125 hp at 1,800 rpm.
Side view of the Semovente M40 da 75/18 at Ansaldo-Fossati plant. Source: Semovente da 75/18
After the production of a small series of 60 vehicles, the Semovente da 75/18 was changed to the chassis of the more advanced and modern Carro Armato M14/41, becoming the Semovente M41 da 75/18. This vehicle was powered by the new FIAT-SPA 15T Modello 1941 diesel engine with a maximum power of 145 hp at 1,800 rpm. This semovente was also captured by the Germans and renamed as the Beute Sturmgeschütz M41 mit 7,5 cm KwK L/18 850 (Italienisch) (English: Captured Assault Gun M41 with 75 mm L/18 Cannon [Coded] 850 [italian])
Semovente M41 da 75/18 outside the Ansaldo-Fossati plant of Sestri Ponente. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com
In 1942, the chassis was again changed to the Carro Armato M15/42’s, becoming the Semovente M42 da 75/18. It was longer than its predecessors by 14 cm due to the new engine compartment mounting a powerful 190 hp petrol engine, the FIAT-SPA 15TB Modello 1942. The M42 da 75/18 was known in German service as the Beute Sturmgeschütz M42 mit 7,5 cm KwK L/18 850 (Italienisch).
The Obice da 75/18 Modello 1934 had a great High-Explosive Anti-Tank round, but had a short firing range and was imprecise at long ranges. A new armored vehicle with a different gun had to be produced, and, in October 1942, Ansaldo-Fossati started the new development. In February 1943, the prototype of the new semovente was ready.
The new tank destroyer had a casemate that was made 11 cm longer in order to host the Cannone da 75/34 Modello SF [Sfera] (English: 75 mm L/34 Cannon Model [on Spherical Support]), which had more recoil than the previous howitzer.
In German service, the vehicle was known as Beute Sturmgeschütz M42 mit 7,5 cm KwK L/34 851(Italienisch).
A Semovente M42 da 75/18 (top) and a Semovente M42M da 75/34 (bottom) outside the Ansaldo-Fossati plant of Sestri Ponente. These are early vehicles from the 1943 production run (the M42M was produced from 26th March 1943). In these 2 images, the different casemate fronts are clearly visible. Sources: La Meccanizzazione dell’Esercito fino al 1943
Other developments were the Semoventi M41M da 90/53 tank destroyer, based on a heavily modified Carro Armato M14/41 chassis with the engine compartment in the center and the main gun on the rear. It was accompanied by the more conventional-shaped Semovente M43 da 105/25, a new self-propelled gun on a completely modified M42 chassis.
The Semovente M43 da 105/25 at the Ansaldo-Fossati plant of Sestri Ponente. Source: pinterest.com
The M43 Chassis
The Semovente M43 chassis, also called in Ansaldo documents Semovente M42L (L for ‘Lungo’ – English: ‘Long’), was 4 cm longer than the M42, reaching a length of 5.10 m. It was also 17 cm wider (2.40 m compared to 2.23 m of the M42) and 10 cm lower (1.75 m compared to 1.85 m of the M42).
A Semovente M42 da 75/18 (left) and the Semovente M43 da 105/25 prototype (right). Note the differences in the chassis’ dimensions. Source: associazioneansaldo.com
Finally, the flameproof bulkhead separating the engine compartment from the fighting compartment was moved back 20 cm, increasing the fighting compartment’s space. All these modifications brought the total weight of the vehicle to 15.7 tonnes battle-ready, compared to the 15 tonnes of the M42.
The Semovente M43 da 105/25 prototype (left) and a Semovente M42 da 75/18 (right). Source: associazioneansaldo.com
The Semovente M43 chassis was first adopted for the Semovente M43 da 105/25 equipped with the Obice da 105/25 Modello SF [Sfera] (English: 105 mm L/25 Cannon Model [on Spherical Support]), which needed more space for the cumbersome gun breech and longer ammunition.
A Semovente M42 da 75/18 (left) and the Semovente M43 da 105/25 prototype (right). Note the differences in the chassis’ dimensions. Source: Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano
It was also adopted by the Germans as the base for their new chassis, to which some original Italian production documents referred to as Semovente M42T (T for ‘Tedesco’ – English: German), meaning that it was derived from the previous Semovente M42L chassis.
The German ordered the installation of the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 (English: 75 mm L/46 Anti-Aircraft Cannon Model 1934) and Cannone da 75/34 Modello SF on this chassis to the Italian Ansaldo factory, which remained in the German controlled zone after the Armistice.
History of the Project
After the Armistice of 8th September 1943 and Operation Achse (English: Axis), the German forces captured thousands of Italian vehicles. Many of these were obsolete or needed to be repaired, but some were immediately redistributed to frontline German units in Italy and Balkans to replace some losses.
The Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen (English: Inspector General of the Armed Forces) of the Wehrmacht inspected the various Italian factories and their armored vehicle projects in order to reorganize the production of Italian vehicles. He canceled the production of non-suitable vehicles by German Army standards and ordered modification to some vehicles to meet some German tank requirements.
On 18th December 1943, the Abteilung Waffen und Gerät beim Wehrkreiskommando 6 (Italienisch) (English: Weapons and Equipment Department of the Military District Headquarters No. 6 [Italian]) reported the proposal of the modification of the Semovente M43 da 105/25, called by the Germans Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 10,5 cm KwK L/25 853 (italienisch) (English: Captured Assault Gun M43 with 105 mm L/25 Cannon [Coded] 853 [italian]).
After authorization from the LXXXVIII Armee Korps (English: 88th Armored Corps), German Hauptmann Dobiey, commander of the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 356 (English: 356th Anti-Tank Battalion) assigned to the 356. Infanterie-Division, proposed a series of modifications for the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 10,5 cm KwK L/25 853(i) that his unit had received after the Armistice. The 356. Infanterie-Division was formed in Toulon, France in May 1943, and was moved to northern Italy, between Genoa and Ventimiglia, in November 1943, where it received the Italian Semoventi M43 da 105/25.
Hauptmann Dobiey proposed the addition of 25 mm Schotten-Panzerung (English: Shadow Armor) and Seitenschürzen (English: Side Aprons) to increase the protection on the casemate to 60 mm on the superstructure sides and 34 mm on the chassis.
The German Hauptmann assumed an increase in weight of 600 kg, bringing the vehicle weight to about 16 tonnes, a weight that the original suspensions could withstand.
The Semovente M43 da 75/46 or Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) prototype at the Ansaldo-Fossati plant in Sestri Ponente. The gun barrel had a counterweight on the muzzle and was not painted as the chassis. Apart from the counterweight and the absence of the gun shield and the radio antenna, the prototype is identical to the production vehicles. Source: Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano Fino al 1943
It is not clear who proposed to mount the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 on this upgraded chassis. It is improbable that Hauptmann Dobiey, a German officer, had such extensive knowledge of the Italian cannon that he knew it was also an adequate anti-tank weapon and could be installed inside an armored vehicle.
Another note on the armament is that it was planned to modify the Cannone da 75/46 Antiaereo Modello 1934 to fire German PaK 40 ammunition. This would have increased the anti-tank performances of the Italian cannon and standardized ammunition production.
The Semovente M43 da 75/46 prototype from another angle. The absence of the gun shield here is more visible. Source: svppbellum.blogspot.com
Major General Ernst von Horstig, head of Dienststelle Italien des Heereswaffenamt (English: Italian Branch of the [German] Army Weapons Office), took the initiative and ordered the development of the vehicle. Ansaldo had to produce the prototype by 15th January 1944, less than a month later. The German general wanted the prototype tested before deciding its fate.
The Semovente M43 da 75/46 was rarely mentioned in Second World War Italian documents. It was barely mentioned by German sources either, but when it was mentioned, it was named with its German designation: Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) (English: Captured Assault Gun M43 with 75 mm L/46 Cannon [Coded] 852 [italian]).
In this article, the vehicle was referred to with both designations. The factory designation Semovente M42T will be used while referring to an up-armored version of the Semovente M42L chassis.
Production and Delivery
It is not known when the Semovente M43 da 75/46 prototype was ready and tested, but the German response was positive. Its production was organized at the Ansaldo-Fossati plant.
Ansaldo archive sources claim a total production of 11 Semoventi M43 da 75/46, 8 (including the prototype) in 1944 and 3 in 1945. The same document reports that only 7 spherical supports for the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 were produced, all in 1944. Photographic evidence confirms the existence of 6 production vehicles and a prototype.
A total of 6 Semoventi M43 da 75/46 equipped with guns ready to be delivered at Ansaldo-Fossati plant. This image confirms a production of 6 vehicles and a prototype, as declared by Ansaldo in 1944. Source: wardrawings.be
In the late war, the German Army wanted to save on raw materials, producing only the most powerful and reliable vehicles. This was done in Germany and also in Italy. It was planned to cancel the production of all Italian armored fighting vehicles apart for the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i), the Beute Panzerspähwagen AB43 203(i) (aka the Autoblinda AB43 medium reconnaissance armored car), and the Beute Panzerkampfwagen P40 737(i) (aka the Carro Armato P26/40 heavy tank).
On 20th February 1945, the Wehrmacht planned to equip 4 infantry divisions with Italian armored fighting vehicles. The Aufstellungsstab Sued was in favor of a production contract extension with the Italian factories. They essentially wanted to let all the Italian armored vehicle factories still capable of producing vehicles convert their production lines to Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) and Beute Panzerspähwagen AB43 203(i) (no mention was made of of the Beute Panzerkampfwagen P40 737(i) in this document), with a production estimated at 50 StuG and 50 Pz.Sp.Wg. per month.
The new production schedule for Ansaldo-Fossati plant of Sestri Ponente, where all the semoventi were produced, was of 116 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 (not specifying the armament) in total until August 1945.
Ansaldo-Fossati production planned by the Germans in early 1945
Vehicle’s Name
March
April
May
June
July
August
Total number
Panzerkampfwagen P40 737(i)
2
4
12
12
15
6
51
Beute Sturmgeschütz M43
14
22
25
25
25
5
116
Panzerbefehlswagen M42 772(i)
3
3
8
8
0
0
22
The document did not specify which of the 3 semoventi on the M43 chassis it refers to, but, the Germans wanted to standardize the production of the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i). It could be assumed that, in German plans, all or the majority of Sturmgeschütz M43 mentioned in the document would have been armed with the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934.
The German document also mentioned that the Ansaldo-Fossati plant produced 7 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) in 1944. Another 12 vehicles with and without main guns were produced in 1945.
Some of these were produced at the Ansaldo-Fossati plant but then sent to Milan, at the Fonderia Milanese di Acciaio Vanzetti Società Anonima (English: Milanese Steel Foundry Vanzetti Limited Company), which was reconverted into an assembly plant.
In fact, the German report specifically mentions the presence of 12 completed (but without guns) Sturmgeschütz M43 at the Fonderia Milanese di Acciaio Vanzetti S.A. assembly plant. At that plant, the vehicles were equipped with cannons and delivered to their German units, so it is probable that some of the 12 unarmed chassis at Fonderia Milanese di Acciaio Vanzetti S.A. plant of Milan were later equipped with Cannoni da 75/34 in order to send them to the frontline as soon as possible.
At the end of the war, Aufstellungsstab Sued (English: Positioning Staff South) reported the production of a prototype and 7 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) in 1944 plus 2 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) between 5th December 1944 and 5th January 1945.
Another 2 were produced between 5th January to 15th February 1945 and another 6 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) chassis were produced between 16th February and 20th March 1945, of which only 2 equipped with main guns.
Beute Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) Production as Reported in German Documents
Data
StuG M43 mit 75/46 852(i) Chassis Produced
StuG M43 mit 75/46 852(i) with Main Guns Installed
Status
1944
81
8
All delivered
5th January 1945
2
2
All delivered
15th February 1945
2
2
All delivered
20th March 1945
6
2
2 on the way to their unit2
Total
18
14
Note
1Including the prototype 2Nothing is known about the other 4 chassis
The total German number of 18 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) differs from the Ansaldo-Fossati one, of just 11. This difference in sources can be easily explained as, from early 1945 on, assembly (and probably production) of Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) was moved from the Ansaldo-Fossati plant of Sestri Ponente to Fonderia Milanese di Acciaio Vanzetti S.A. of Milan. When assembly was moved, Ansaldo simply stopped counting the Semoventi M43 da 75/46. Another explanation could be that some chassis meant for other types were armed with the Cannone da 75/34 in order to put them in service as soon as possible.
The same report from 20th February 1945 claimed that Beauftragte für Waffen (English: Weapons Commissioner) Goering had reported that 25 StuG M43 mit 75/46 852(i) should be delivered in March 1945.
A last note about Italian armored vehicle production was sent on 9th April 1945 to the Reichsministerium fuer Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion (English: Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production), directed to Reichsminister Albert Speer. The note was sent by the Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen and reported that the Beauftragter fuer Panzerkampfwagen bei Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion (English: Representative for Armored Fighting Vehicles at Armament and War Production) in Milan wanted to order more Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) and Beute Panzerspähwagen AB43 203(i), reaching a full rate production of 50 StuG and 50 Pz.Sp.Wg. per month.
The Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen wrote to Reichsminister Speer that he was in favor of continuing the Italian armored vehicle production if it did not interfere with German vehicle production because of the very few raw materials available.
The Generalinspekteur’s note reported that, if the Reichsministerium fuer Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion would approve, the Italian factories would increase, by every means, the production rate of armored vehicle currently on the lines, especially the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i).
This unrealistic production plan was never realized. On 25th April 1945, 2 weeks later, the Italian Partisans started a great insurrection, attacking the last Axis forces in the main cities of northern Italy. Turin, Milan, Novara and Genoa, where the Italian armored fighting vehicles were produced, were freed between 25th to 28th April 1945, capturing the production plants with the help of the workers.
German Modifications
Apart from the new armored plates, mounted only on some Semoventi M43 chassis, other upgrades were done on the Italian semoventi produced for the Germans. These included 4 bigger teeth bolted on the outside of the sprocket wheel, intended to prevent the track slipping off the wheels while driving in muddy or snowy terrain. Another modification was the addition of 3 helmet supports on the roof, 2 on the left side and one on the right, for the crew members when operating with open hatches. The third modification requested by the Germans was to substitute the right roof hatch with one openable in 2 parts for better ventilation of the fighting compartment.
A British light mortar squad near an abandoned Semovente M42M da 75/34 produced for the Germans. Note that the right roof hatch was shorter than the left one. Source: beutepanzer.ru
Other unconfirmed modifications claimed by many sources were:
Substituting the Italian radio apparatus with more reliable German-produced ones
Replacing the gearbox with one of German origin
German-produced Mauser MG34s or MG42s instead of the original Italian anti-aircraft machine guns
The Germans did not usually change the radio apparatus of the Italian tanks and self-propelled guns they used. It is possible the sources refer to occasional changes made by individual crews, such as German intercoms or new batteries and accumulators. The Germans did not modify the powerpacks on the Italian vehicles.
There is no photographic evidence showing the adoption of German machine guns on Italian self-propelled guns. This suggests that these were not widely adopted on Italian vehicles. Most likely, many sources are confusing the machine guns due to the German caliber. In fact, during the German occupation, the factories were ordered to change the caliber of the Italian machine guns and even some rifles to standardize to the German 7.92 x 57 mm Mauser caliber. Many Breda Modello 1938 Italian medium machine guns were modified to fire the Mauser cartridges. This could be considered another German modification of the Semovente M43 da 75/46.
Design
Armor
The armor was both bolted to an internal frame and partially welded (a great innovation for Italian vehicles) and had great thickness compared to Italian standards. The hull armor had 2 angled armored plates with a thickness of 50 mm at 40° on top and 35 mm at 50° on the bottom for the transmission.
The transmission deck plate was 25 mm-thick angled at 78°. It also had 2 brake inspection hatches of the same thickness. The hull side armored plates were 40 mm thick.
The superstructure had a 75 mm thick armor plate angled at 5° frontally, while the gun spherical support was 60 mm thick.
On the casemate’s sides, the 45 mm thick armored plates were angled at 7°, while the rear was protected by a 45 mm thick plate angled at 0°. A plate of 25 mm angled at 15° protected the back of the engine compartment. The roof and floor of the vehicle were 15 mm thick. Unlike its predecessors, the Semovente M43 da 75/46 had three-part side skirts.
The peculiarity of the Semovente M42T was the addition of 25 mm thick spaced armored plates angled at 25° on the front. They had a hatch where the driver port of the M43 was placed. The gun barrel received a 25 mm thick gun shield angled at 25°. This was a great improvement. For all the duration of the war, one of the problems encountered in Italian semoventi was the absence of protection to the spherical support that was sometimes blocked by light arm fire or artillery splinters. On the side, protecting the casemate and the lower part of the fighting compartment, there was a 25 mm spaced armored plate.
A Semovente M43 da 75/34 with its spaced armor plates. In this image, the hatches for the driving port and the gun shield are visible. Source: warthunder.com
Nothing is known about the real efficacy of this spaced armor. At the end of the war, the Italian ballistic armor, like the German one, was produced with poor raw materials and the final result was of bad quality and often broke or split.
Nevertheless, the spaced armor probably guaranteed more chances to survive thanks to the distance between the spaced armor and the casemate’s plate. The total weight of the vehicle was about 15.6 tonnes, 100 kg less than the less-armored Semovente M43 da 105/25.
Hull
On the left front mudguard, there was a support for the jack. On the sides of the superstructure, there were two headlights for night operations. On the rear part, the engine deck had two large-size inspection hatches which could be opened by 45°. Between the two inspection hatches were the sapper tools, including a shovel, a pickaxe, a crowbar, and a track removal system.
Rear of a Carro Armato M15/42. Even if many tools were removed, it was essentially identical to the one of the Semovente M43 da 75/46. Source: masterminiatures.it
The rear of the vehicle had the horizontal radiator cooling grills in the center, the cooling water cap and, on the sides, two fuel caps. The rear had a towing ring in the center and two hooks on the sides, one spare wheel on the left side, and a license plate on the lower left side with a brake light. A smoke grenade box was placed on the rear armored plate, on the right.
On either side of engine deck, on the rear fenders, there were two storage boxes and the mufflers covered by a steel shield to protect them from impacts.
Better view of the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 75/46 852(i) ready to be delivered at the Ansaldo-Fossati plant. This image allows seeing the turret roof details and bolted armor. Source: forum.warthunder.com
A total of 6 racks for 20-liter cans were placed on the sides of the vehicle, 3 on each spaced armored plate on the sides, just like on other Italian self-propelled guns and tanks. It should be noted, however, that on the Semoventi M43 da 75/46, the cans were not transported because they were never sent to North Africa, and it was not necessary to transport a great amount of fuel during operations in Italy, where it was deployed.
On the inside, starting from the front of the vehicle, was the transmission connected to the braking system, which had two armored inspection hatches. These could be opened from outside by means of two handles, or from the inside by means of a knob located on the right side of the vehicle, which could be used by the gunner. On the left was the driver’s seat, equipped with a fold-down back for easy access. In front, it had two steering tillers, a driving port that could be closed with a lever, and a hyposcope used when the port was closed. The hyposcope had 19 x 36 cm dimensions and a vertical field of view of 30°, from +52° to +82°. On the left was the dashboard and, on the right, the gun breech.
Interior of Semovente M43 da 105/25 prototype. Even if Semovente da 75/46 and Semovente da 105/25 had different main armament and main ammunition racks, they shared the same radio apparatus, dashboard (left) and machine gun maintenance kit and racks (right). Source: fondazioneansaldo.com
Behind the driver was the seat for the loader. The loader had, on the left, the radio apparatus and, above him, one of two armored hatches. In case of an attack from the air, the loader would also have to use the anti-aircraft machine gun. On the right side of the fighting compartment was the gunner’s seat without a backrest. In front of his seat, the gunner had the elevation and traverse handwheels.
On the gunner’s right was the support for the anti-aircraft machine gun when not in use, a maintenance kit, and a fire extinguisher. Behind the support was a wooden rack for ammunition for the secondary armament. In order to prevent the magazines from falling on rough terrain, the rack had a closable curtain. Behind the gunner/commander were the ammunition racks for the main gun. On the rear wall were the engine fan, an engine cooling water tank, and the Magneti Marelli batteries. On the rear side of the superstructure were two pistol ports which could be closed by revolving shutters from the inside. These were used for self-defense and to check the rear side of the vehicle in order to avoid the crew having to expose themselves outside of the vehicle. The transmission shaft ran through the entire fighting compartment, dividing it in half.
How the Semovente M43 da 75/46 would have looked without the spaced armor. It was based on a slightly modified Semovente M43 da 105/25 chassis. Source: Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano with author’s modifications
Radio Equipment
The Semovente M43 da 75/46’s radio apparatus was an Apparato Ricetrasmittente Radio Fonica 1 per Carro Armato or Apparato Ricevente RF1CA (English: Tank Audio Radio Receiver Apparatus 1) produced by Magneti Marelli. This was a radiotelephone and radiotelegraph station box of 415 x 208 x 196 mm and a weight of about 18.5 kg. It had 10 watts of power in both voice and telegraphy. It had a small cover that was raised up when the radio was in use.
The Apparato Ricevente RF1CA mounted on Italian semoventi and carri armati. Numbers refer to: 1) audio radio receiver apparatus, 2) power supply, 3) antenna support (early type), 4) accessories, 5) cable that connected the audio radio receiver apparatus with the antenna, 6) cable that connected the audio radio receiver apparatus with the power supply, 7) cable that connected power supply to the batteries, 8) headphones, 9) laryngophone, and 10) fuses. Source: Manuale Apparato Ricevente RF1CA TR7
Operating frequency range was between 27 and 33.4 MHz. It was powered by an AL-1 Dynamotor supplying 9-10 Watts, mounted on the hull’s right side, with a power supply of 12 Volts from NF-12-1-24 batteries produced by Magneti Marelli connected in series. It had a range of 8 km in voice mode and 12 km in telegraph mode. These capabilities were reduced when the self-propelled guns were on the move.
The radio had 2 ranges, Vicino (Eng: Near), with a maximum range of 5 km, and Lontano (Eng: Afar), with a maximum range of 12 km. Even with the Lontano range, in the voice mode it had a range of 8 km.
It was produced from 1940 by the Magneti Marelli company of Sesto San Giovanni, near Milan. and was mounted on all the Italian self-propelled guns and tanks of the M series (except for the Carro Armato M11/39) and the Carro Armato P26/40 heavy tank.
The radio was produced after the Armistice for the Germans, together with manual books in German language. The production of the Apparato Ricevente RF1CA until 1945 also contrasts the hypothesis of the use of German radios on semoventi. After the war, the turning unit of this transceiver was almost entirely copied on the US Army AN/GRR-5 receiver.
On the previous models of semoventi, the antenna radio was mounted on a support that was lowerable thanks to a crank inside the vehicle. The loader had to turn the crank until the 1.8 m antenna was fully raised or fully down. This was a slow operation and the crank occupied space inside the fighting compartment.
From 1942, a new antenna support was mounted on Italian vehicles. The first model equipped with this new antenna was the Semovente M41M da 90/53, while it was introduced in the Semovente M42 da 75/18 later. The new antenna had a 360° lowerable support, meaning that it could be folded in any direction. Usually, a hook on the left side of the front of the casemate permitted it to rest during long drives to avoid it hitting electrical cables or interfering with driving in narrow areas. It seems that, on the prototype and the production Semoventi M43 da 75/46, this support was never mounted and the crew did not have the possibility to lower the antenna.
The different types of antennas and supports mounted on the Italian medium tanks and semoventi. Early type (left) and new type (right), mounted from 1942 on. Source: Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano
On all the semoventi produced before the Semovente M43 chassis, the antenna support was mounted on the rear left side of the casemate’s roof, while on the Semovente M43 da 105/25, it was moved on the front left side for a different internal arrangement. On the Semovente M43 da 75/46, the antenna radio support was again moved to the rear left side of the roof. To speed up production, Ansaldo-Fossati deployed a single M43 chassis production line. When the chassis was ready, Ansaldo’s workers made a hole on the rear side on the semoventi that would have received spaced armored plates, filling the front left hole with a round armored plate welded on it.
Engine and Transmission
The petrol engine of the Semovente M43 was inherited from previous semoventi M42 and M43 and the Carro Armato M15/42. The new model, the FIAT-SPA 15TB (‘B’ for ‘Benzina’ – Petrol) Modello 1943 petrol, 12-cylinder, V-shaped, water-cooled 11,980 cm³ engine developed 190 hp at 2,400 rpm (some other sources claim a maximum output of 192 hp or even 195 hp).
FIAT-SPA 15TB Modello 1942 petrol engine, radiator, and cooling vents. On the right top is the cooling water tank that was located, on the vehicle, in the fighting compartment. It was divided from the engine by a bulkhead. Source: bnamodel.com
It is not clear if the Germans modified the vehicle in other ways. It seems improbable that they ordered the mounting of German transmissions or other German-produced parts on the semoventi. The engine was designed by Fabbrica Italiana Automobili di Torino or FIAT (English: Italian Automobile Factory of Turin) and produced by one of its subsidiary companies, the Società Piemontese Automobili, or SPA (English: Piedmontese Automobile Company).
Engine and radiator on a Carro Armato M15/42. Even if the Semovente M43 da 75/46 and the Carro Armato M15/42 were different, the engine compartment was only slightly modified. Source: facebook.com Associazione Raggruppamento SPA
The engine ignition system and lighting systems, engine cooling system, and fuel circulation systems were inherited from the previous Semovente M43 da 105/25. In order to start the engine, there was a Magneti Marelli electric starter but also an inertial starter produced by the Turin-based company Onagro. The lever for the inertial starter could be inserted outside the vehicle, on the rear, or from the inside of the fighting compartment. Two crew members needed to turn the crank, reaching about 60 rotations per minute. At that point, the driver could turn the engine button on the dashboard until the first strokes of the engine. The crew members rarely ignited the engine from the inside due to the cramped space, but this could become useful when under enemy artillery fire or in areas in which the enemy could easily ambush dismounted crews.
Ignition crank mounted on the rear of a Carro Armato M15/42. On the Semovente M43 da 75/46, the only difference was the presence of a smoke grenade box on the right. Source: associazioneansaldo.com
On road, the Semovente M43 da 75/46’s maximum speed was 38 km/h, while off-road, the maximum speed was about 15 km/h. It had an on-road range of 180 km and an off-road range similar to the one of Semovente M43 da 105/25, of about 100 km.
On the Carro Armato M15/42, thanks to the increased space in the engine compartment, the fuel tanks were increased to 367 liters in main tanks, plus 40 liters in the reserve tank. This gave a total of 407 liters. On the M43 chassis, the fighting compartment was 20 cm longer, reducing the space in the engine compartment. In other words, the fuel tanks were shortened, decreasing the volume from 407 liters to 316 liters.
This was also likely due to some changes to the engine. The Carro Armato M15/42 and Semovente M42 chassis mounted the FIAT-SPA 15 TB Modello 1942 petrol engine, while the M42T chassis mounted a FIAT-SPA 15TB Modello 1943. This could be simply a wrong official designation or a 1943 development by FIAT and SPA. The modifications are unknown, but it seems that they did not modify the overall performances of the engine. They probably concerned a decrease of the weight of engine or upgraded engine fire extinguisher system due to the extremely flammable petrol. Modifications to the engine weight are plausible due the extremely modest weight of Semovente M43 da 75/46, 15.6 tonnes battle ready, lighter than the Semovente M43 da 105/25 which did not have the spaced armor.
The engine was connected to a transmission produced by FIAT, with 5 forward and one reverse gears. The transmission was mounted frontally. In order to remove it, the transmission deck’s armored plate had to be removed first.
Image of the FIAT gearbox (produced by SPA) mounted on all Italian armored vehicles starting with the Carro Armato M15/42. It was connected to the transmission shaft. Source: Manuale Uso e Manutenzione Carro Armato M15/42 e Derivati
Due to the increased size of the casemate, the rear bulkhead that divided the engine compartment from the fighting compartment was moved 20 cm back. This increased the space occupied by the engine’s flywheel cover inside the fighting compartment, increasing the heat coming from the engine in the crew’s compartment.
The heat and proximity of fuel tanks near ammunition could be a serious danger in case of fire, but during winters, it warmed up the crew members that had to leave at least an upper hatch opened during fighting to ventilate the fighting compartment.
Suspension and Tracks
The Semovente M43 da 75/46’s suspension was a semi-elliptical leaf spring type, as on all vehicles developed from Italian medium tanks. On each side, there were 4 bogies connected to a leaf-spring with 8 doubled rubber road wheels paired on 2 suspension units in total. This suspension type was obsolete and did not allow the vehicle to reach a high top speed. In addition, it was very vulnerable to enemy fire or mines. Due to the lengthening of the hull on the Semoventi M43, one of the 2 suspension units was mounted a few centimeters back.
The tank had 26 cm wide tracks with 86 track links per side, 6 more than the other tanks of the ‘M’ series due to the hull lengthening.
One of the 2 suspension units of a Semovente M41M da 90/53. Each suspension unit was composed of 4 rubber road wheels divided in 2 suspension arms. Source: flikr.com @Chris Streckfus
The drive sprocket wheels were at the front and the idlers, with modified track tension adjusters, at the back, with 3 rubber return rollers on each side. The small surface area of the tracks (about 14,750 cm²) gave a ground pressure of about 1 kg/cm², increasing risk that the vehicle would bog down in soft soils, such as mud or snow.
In a photo taken in 1944 outside the Ansaldo-Fossati plant production line, there were a Semovente M43 da 75/46 and M43 da 105/25 for comparison. The Semovente da 75/46 was equipped with Ostketten (English: Eastern Chains) on the right track. These were probably delivered by the Germans for tests. They were meant to increase surface in contact with the ground and to decrease overall pressure on the ground. Apart from this photo, no other photographic evidence suggests the use of Ostketten on Italian captured armored vehicles.
The Semovente M43 da 75/46 prototype (left) next to a Semovente M43 da 105/25 without side skirts (right). Apart from the main armament and added armor plates, the vehicles were externally identical. The Semovente M43 da 75/46 had the right track equipped with German Ostketten. Source: militaryimages.net
Like the Semovente M43 da 105/35, the M43 da 75/46 was equipped with a side skirt. These were only 4 mm thick and partially protected the sides of the vehicle. Their role was not to protect the semovente from anti-tank rifle rounds or shaped charges ammunition, but to prevent shrapnel from damaging the suspension units and track links. The side skirts had a cut in the back to allow crew to be able to reach the track tension adjuster without dismounting the skirt. Another 3 small holes were made to add lubricant to the return rollers without losing time by removing the side skirt.
Main Armament
The Semovente M43 da 75/46’s main armament was the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934, an Italian anti-aircraft cannon developed by Ansaldo in 1932 that entered service in 1934. It appeared after an Italian Regio Esercito’s High Command request for a new anti-aircraft cannon in 1929.
Ansaldo and Odero-Terni-Orlando (OTO) not only developed some guns but also tested foreign ones, such as the 80 mm luftvärnskanon m/29 anti-aircraft gun produced by Swedish Bofors. The Bofors gun inspired the Ansaldo design office, which presented the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei in 1932.
Drawing of the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com
During trials, the Direzione Superiore del Servizio Tecnico Armi e Munizioni or DSSTAM (English: Higher Directorate of Technical Service Weapons and Ammunition), the branch of the Regio Esercito’s High Command which created artillery design requests and accepted them into service, helped Ansaldo to modify the cannon. This was done to such an extent that some sources even called the cannon the DSTAM-Ansaldo. In 1933, the gun was ready (even if it was only accepted into service in 1934), and the Regio Esercito ordered 100. Ninety-two were delivered by October 1939, while another 240 were to be built in 1940.
A Cannone da 75/46 Cotraerei Modello 1934 in North Africa in November 1940. Source: Istituto Luce via italie1935-45.com
At the start, only the Ansaldo Pozzuoli plant (specialized in artillery production) and the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano (English: Artillery Plant of Cornigliano), which was under Ansaldo’s control, produced the cannon. A total of 232 pieces were delivered between 1941 and 1942, while another 4 were delivered in the first 4 months of 1943, together with 108 spare barrels.
OTO and Arsenale Regio Esercito di Piacenza or AREP (English: Royal Army Arsenal of Piacenza) also produced spare parts. OTO delivered a total of 120 cannons by December 1942. The last order of the Regio Esercito’s High Command for 472 Cannoni da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 to be delivered by the end of 1943 was never started due to the Armistice of 8th September.
The Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei of the first batch at the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com
When the cannon appeared in the mid-1930s, it was a great artillery piece. It had high initial muzzle velocity due to the use of powerful propellant and barrel length, sustained rate of fire, and large firing arcs thanks to a cross-platform. The gun’s breech had a system to switch between being manually-opened or semiautomatic, with a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute with a trained crew. Its muzzle velocity was 800 m/s and maximum range was 8,500 m in the anti-aircraft role and 13,000 m against ground targets. The traverse was 360° while the elevation was from 0° to 90°.
Two Cannoni da 75/46 Cotraerei Modello 1934M towed by Pavesi P4 prime movers at the Nettuno shooting range. Source: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito via italie1935-45.comA Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 with a rangefinder telemeter and Centrale di Tiro Modello 1937 ‘Gala’ deployed by artillerymen of the Nettuno Anti-Aircraft Artillery School. Source: Giuseppe Calò via italie1935-45.com
In July 1943, there were 31 batterie antiaeree da 75/46 (English: 75 mm L/46 anti-aircraft batteries) operational. The Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 was deployed on all fronts of the war, in the Modello 1934 version, Modello 1934M version (slightly modified), and Modello 1940 static defense version. The majority of the batteries were sent to North Africa. In the Soviet Union, the few groups sent gave great results in the anti-tank role against early variants of Soviet T-34 medium tanks.
A Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 of the Regio Esercito in the Soviet Union during the winter of 1942-43. Source: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito via italie1935-45.com
Although it was a marked improvement over the 75 mm guns of the First World War and it had cutting edge characteristics for the 1930s, the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 showed some weaknesses during its use. Rapid wear and tear of cannon’s bore caused its muzzle velocity to drop from 800 m/s to 750 m/s. The Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 was quickly superseded as a positional piece for territorial anti-aircraft defense as the war continued. It was therefore time to switch to a more powerful weapon, the Cannone da 90/53 Modello 1939.
After the Armistice of 8th September 1943, the anti-aircraft gun was deployed by the Germans, who renamed it 7,5 cm Flugabwehrkanone 264/3 (italienisch) (English: 75 mm Aircraft-Defense Cannon coded 264/3 [italian]) and continued its production. Even the Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano (English: National Republican Army), the Italian Army allied to the Germans, equipped a pair of anti-aircraft units with this cannon. Some guns were also deployed by Italian soldiers in the Allied armies in order to defend Southern Italy from Axis air attacks.
A Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 of an Italian AA unit during deployment maneuvers after the Armistice. Source: Giuseppe Calò via italie1935-45.com
The Cannone da 75/46 mounted on the semovente was called Kampfwagenkanone 75/46 (English: 75 mm L/46 Tank Cannon) by the Germans. On the semovente mount, the Cannone da 75/46 had an elevation of -10° to +18° and traverse was 17° to either side. The traverse decreased compared to the Semoventi M42M da 75/34 and M43 da 105/25 of 18° due to the presence of new spaced plates.
Semovente M43 da 75/46 sight. Per Alzo da 75/46 Semovente can be read on it. Source: heroesandgeneral.com
The barrel weighed 686 kg, while the gun mounted on the spherical support of the semoventi weighed 810 kg according to German reports. An interesting feature was that the vehicle had the possibility of also being equipped with the Cannone da 105/25 Modello SF just by removing the 75 mm cannon and spherical support with a winch and changing the main gun’s ammunition racks. The difference between the Cannone da 75/46 and Cannone da 105/25 was that the latter weighed just 40 kg more.
The Semoventi M42L armed with the Cannone da 105/25 weighed more than the Semoventi M42T with spaced armor and Cannone da 75/46. This was largely due to weight of 105 mm ammunition. In other words, if the Semovente M43 da 75/46 was equipped with the Cannone da 105/25, its weight would have increased by several hundred kilograms.
Rare images of a rare Semovente M42T da 105/25. It was a Cannone da 105/25 mounted on the chassis of a Semovente M43 da 75/46. Source: pinterest.com @lucky01
The Cannone da 105/25 Modello S.F. was developed by Ansaldo and produced by the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano. It was developed on the basis of the Obice da 105/23 Modello 1942 a howitzer developed by Ansaldo as a prototype for divisional artillery, together with the Cannone da 105/40 Modello 1943. Due to delays and high costs, only the Cannone da 105/40 Modello 1943 was accepted in service, however it was only adopted from May 1943 and saw limited use. The the tank version of the Obice da 105/23 Modello 1942 was adopted on the Semovente M43 da 105/25 and, after the war, also used in Italian fortifications on the Italo-Yugoslavian border.
The Cannone da 105/25 Modello SF at the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com
Inside the semoventi, the Cannone da 105/25 Modello SF had a horizontal traverse of 18° to either side, as well as a depression of -10° and an elevation of +18°. Traverse probably decreased on the Semoventi M42T due to the spaced armor, like the horizontal traverse of other cannons mounted on the same chassis.
The Cannone da 105/25 Modello SF fired the same ammunition as the Cannone da 105/28 Modello 1916, with a maximum muzzle velocity of 500 m/s with armor-piercing rounds. It was capable of piercing a Rolled Homogeneous Armor (RHA) plate of 80 mm at 1,000 m according to German reports.
The Main Gun’s Problems
The Germans proposed to modify the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934, or as they called it, the 7,5 cm Fliegerabwehrkanone 264/3(i). It is unknown if they finally ordered a modification to the cannons, as planned in December 1943. The really slow production rate of the Cannoni da 75/46 for the Semoventi M43 da 75/46 could be explained by a long and difficult breech modification made in order to permit Panzerabwehrkanone 40 or PaK 40 ammunition to be fired.
The PaK 40 rounds had a length of 714 mm (75 x 714 mm R), while the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 round’s cartridge had a length of 580 mm (75 x 580 mm R). In order to fire PaK 40 rounds, Ansaldo had to modify the chamber, if necessary also modify the inner face of the bolt, the extractor, and probably also reinforce the breech and powder chamber if the pressures resulting from firing the PaK 40 ammunition exceed those tolerated by the Cannone da 75/46.
A partially assembled Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 at the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano in 1938. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com
However, the slow rate of delivery of Italian cannons could also be explained by other hypotheses. The first one could be the slow production of spherical supports used to mount the cannons on the semoventi chassis. This does seem an unsatisfactory explanation. In fact, the Italian industry, albeit always failing in the delivery of self-propelled gun spherical supports in large quantities, could probably have fulfilled a request for so few 75 mm cannon mounts.
An image showing off some Semoventi M43 da 105/25 lined up in an Ansaldo-Fossati depot, ready to be delivered. Even if this photo dates before the Armistice, it shows that, even if the Italian industry sometimes failed in the delivery of self-propelled gun spherical mounts, it had an average monthly production that matched the production of the hulls produced in one month by Ansaldo-Fossati with guns from the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano. Source: associazioneansaldo.com
The last hypothesis that could explain the low delivery rate of the Cannone da 75/46 is the really low production rate of Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934. It was produced in Piacenza, Pozzuoli, and Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano, under Ansaldo’s control. After the Armistice of 1943, Pozzuoli was freed by Allied forces in late September, while Arsenale Regio Esercito di Piacenza was converted mainly for vehicle reparation and production of armored improvised vehicles. The artillery production decreased. This meant that the majority of Cannoni da 75/46 production was the responsibility of the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano, which remained one of the few Italian artillery producers until 1945.
Main Gun Considerations
The Germans and Ansaldo probably decided to mount the Cannone da 75/46 on the Semovente M42T due to its better anti-tank performance compared to other Italian guns at their disposal.
The choice of mounting a modified anti-aircraft gun proved to be a poor choice for the Germans and it cost them a very low production rate, especially compared to the production rate of Semoventi M42L da 105/25 and Semoventi M42T da 75/34, other last ones produced on the same chassis.
In order to increase the production of better armed Semoventi M42T, the mounting on the Semoventi M42T chassis of the German Panzerabwehrkanone 40 could have been an alternative option. The weight of the vehicle would not have increased by much, as the 7.5 cm KwK40 weighed 750 kg, compared to the 686 kg of the Cannone da 75/46.
Before the Armistice, Italy and Germany signed a contract for the license production of the field version of the PaK 40 in Italy (Italian nomenclature Cannone da 75/43 Modello 1940). The production was not started before September 1943, but some production lines were assembled. It is not known why the Germans did not restart the project earlier instead of adopting the Cannone da 75/46. It would probably have been easier to start delivering German-produced PaK 40 in Italy and then make Italian industry autonomous instead of modifying the Italian anti-aircraft cannon’s production line. After the armistice, OTO produced some spare parts for the PaK 40 for the Germans until the late war.
How the Semovente M43 armed with PaK 40 anti-tank cannon could have looked like. Source: drawingdatabase.com and the-blueprints.com with author modification
Secondary Armament
Secondary armament consisted of a Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938 (English: Breda Medium Machine Gun Model 1938) produced by Società Italiana Ernesto Breda per Costruzioni Meccaniche (English: Italian Ernesto Breda’s Company for Mechanical Constructions). It was derived from the Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1937, the most modern Italian medium machine gun during the war.
A Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938 on a Semovente M41 da 75/18 on an earlier anti-aircraft support. Source: pinterest.com
Breda Modello 1938 was its vehicle version, with a shorter and heavier barrel, pistol grip, and top-mounted curved magazine with a capacity of 24 rounds. These modifications were made to ease the use of the machine gun inside vehicles. Breda machine guns fired a particular cartridge developed by Breda especially for machine guns, the 8 x 59 mm RB with a muzzle velocity between 790 m/s and 800 m/s, depending on the round type.
Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938 with top-curved magazine without anti-aircraft sight. When not in use, it was stored in the left sponson of the self-propelled gun. Source: dandbmilitaria.com
The machine gun was fixed on an anti-aircraft mount attached to a crowbar that offered an increased horizontal traverse for the machine gun in case of an aerial attack. The anti-aircraft supports mounted on the previous model of Italian self-propelled guns barely covered the frontal arc of the vehicles. A similar feature was made on Beute Sturmgeschütz L6 mit 47/32 770(i) (Semovente L40 da 47/32), on which the Germans added a crowbar support for a machine gun to increase the horizontal traverse of the machine gun.
Semovente M43 da 75/46 with a new anti-aircraft support for the Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938. The vehicle is also equipped with 20 liter can supports on the sides and steel helmet supports for the crew member’s helmets. This particular vehicle was probably the prototype brought to production series status. In fact, this vehicle had the cannon barrel’s counterweight, which was mounted only on the prototype. Source: wikipedia.org
During the German occupation of Northern Italy, the Mitragliatrici Medie Breda Modello 1938 were rechambered for German 7.92 x 57 mm Mauser cartridges, due to the similar dimensions of the bullets: 82.00 mm for the German compared to the 80.44 mm of the Italian cartridge and casing diameter of 11.95 mm compared to the 11.92 of the Italian casings. The 24-round magazine and wooden ammunition racks were left unchanged.
Beginning in 1942, Italian factories started to produce a licensed copy of the German Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung or NKAV (English: Smoke Grenade Dropping Device). It was a smoke grenade system that, through a wire connected to a camshaft, dropped a smoke grenade to the ground. Total capacity was 5 Schnellnebelkerze 39 (English: Quick Smoke Grenade 39) smoke grenades. The grenades had a length of 140 mm, a diameter of 90 mm, and a weight of 1.8 kg. They had a burning time of 4 to 7 minutes, depending on wind and in which area the SPG released the smoke grenades.
The commander had to pull the wire and the camshaft rotated, dropping a smoke grenade.
This system was mounted on the rear of the vehicle, so the smoke screen was created behind the vehicle and not around it, on the front arc.
An unarmored Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung dismounted from a vehicle. Source: Bundesarchiv
The Germans began to stop using this system in 1942 in favor of smoke grenade launchers on the turret, because the grenades fell at the back and the tank had to reverse to hide behind. The Italians, on the other hand, apparently gave no thought to this problem and adopted it in 1942.
A Semovente M43 da 105/25 equipped with Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung mit Schutzmantel (where the Balkenkreuz was painted). Even if they were differently armed and protected, the M43 da 105/25 was similar to the M43 da 75/46. Source: beutepanzer.ru
It seems that the Italians copied the protected variant, called Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung mit Schutzmantel (English: Smoke Grenades Dropping Device with Protective Sheath). It had a rectangular protection, even if the Italian and German protections seem different. It is not known if the Italians also produced the Schnellnebelkerze 39 smoke grenades under license or if the Italian vehicles used the grenades imported from Germany. This smoke system was quickly adopted on all the Italian armored tracked vehicles starting from the Carro Armato M15/42 and on all the semoventi on its chassis. A smaller version appeared even on the Autoblinde AB41 and AB43 medium reconnaissance armored cars.
A cylindrical support for spare smoke grenades was also transported on the vehicle. It was fixed on the rear side of the armored superstructure, behind the engine’s cooling grilles and could transport 5 more smoke grenades.
A Semovente M43 da 75/46 during training. This is the only image of the semovente showing off its rear side. The Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung mit Schutzmantel (red) and the cylindrical support for spare smoke grenades (green) are visible. Source: instagram.com @forza_italiana with highlights by author
Ammunition
Ammunition for the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 transported on the vehicle was stored in 2 racks, totalling 42 rounds. One was on the left side of the floor of the fighting compartment and the second one on the floor of the right side of the fighting compartment. The left one was used by the loader as a seat, while the right one was behind the gunner and was openable from the top.
The left rack had the rounds stored in 2 5-round rows and 2 6-round rows for a total of 22 rounds, while the second rack had 2 4-round rows and 2 5-round rows, for a total of 18 rounds.
Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 Rounds
Name
Type
Muzzle Velocity
Fuze
Filler
Weight
Penetration (RHA angled 30° from vertical)
Perforante da 75/46
APCBC
~ 800 m/s
Percussion Model 1909
//
6.2/6.9 kg
70 mm at 500 m
55 mm at 1,500 m
Dirompente da 75/46
HE
?
Percussion I.O. 36/40
335 – 345 g of TNT
~ 6.3/6.5 kg
//
Notes
The gun could fire other three different types of rounds, but these were anti-aircraft rounds not adopted on the Semovente
Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 anti-aircraft round. Image taken at Cornigliano Artillery Plant. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com
Compared to other semoventi racks, these were under the level of the vehicle’s sponsons and were difficult to hit by enemy rounds that pierced the vehicle’s armor. This problem caused many Semoventi M42M da 75/34 or Semoventi M43 da 105/25 to blow up after penetration.
If the Cannoni da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 were really modified to fire the same ammunition as the PaK 40, it would probably fire all German ammunition for this type of gun.
Ammunition fired by the 7.5 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 40
Name
Type
Muzzle Velocity
Weight
Penetration (RHA angled 30° from vertical)
Panzergranate 1939 (PzGr. 39)
APCBC-HE-T
790 m/s
6.80 kg
108 mm at 100 m; 80 mm at 1,000 m
Panzergranate 1940 (PzGr. 40)
APCR
990 m/s
4.50 kg
143 mm at 100 m; 97 mm at 1,000 m
Sprenggranate 1934 (SprGr. 34)
HE
550 m/s
5.64 kg
N/A
Hohlladung pattern C grenades. (Gr.38 HL/C)
HEAT
450 m/s
4.57 kg
75 mm
Crew
The Semovente M43 da 75/46 had a crew of 3. The driver was positioned on the left of the fighting compartment. On his left was the dashboard and on his right was the gun breech. The commander/gunner was positioned on the right of the vehicle, on the left side of the breech, while the loader/radio operator was sat on the left, behind the driver.
Some German sources state that the Germans preferred to add a fourth crew member behind the gunner, who would load the gun. The loader’s seat would be occupied by the commander/radio operator and the gunner would perform only one function. Obviously, adding a fourth crew member meant reducing the space inside the cramped fighting compartment, which was already cramped with only 3 crew members.
A Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 10,5 cm KwK L/25 853(i) crew posing in front of their vehicle in an Italian depot. Source: beutepanzer.ru
Very little is known about the Semovente M43 da 75/46’s service. Due to their short service, there are no reports about the operational service or German crews opinions.
Major German complaints on other Italian semoventi were about their lack of proper observation sights, insufficient frontal armor, a cramped crew compartment, and (apart from the Semovente M43 da 105/25) main armament not capable of dealing with the most modern enemy tanks. The driving capabilities were never seriously complained about while, whereas for maintenance, complaints depended on a number of factors. If the German unit that deployed Italian semoventi had veteran Italian mechanics or was located in Italy, where Italian military workshops were present, the complaints were much lesser compared to German units that deployed them outside Italy, where the experienced Italian mechanics were few, and there was a general lack of Italian spare parts.
With the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i), in all likelihood, the insufficient armor and main armament’s anti-tank performance complaints were solved.
Operational Use
Not much is known about the Semoventi M43 da 75/46’s service in German hands. Neither Italian nor German sources mention to which German Panzerjäger-Abteilung (English: Tank Destroyer Battalion) the few vehicles produced were assigned to.
The prototype was assigned to a training school in northern Italy that trained German Panzerjäger and German-equipped Italian tank destroyer squads. Infantrymen were also trained to attack enemy tanks and self-propelled guns with anti-tank improvised devices, mines, anti-tank hand grenades, and rocket launchers. Unfortunately, the name of the German training unit is unknown.
A Semovente M43 da 75/46 deployed by the Germans to train a Panzerjäger unit in Italy. From the first image, it can be assumed that the vehicle was the prototype due the gun’s counterweight on the barrel’s muzzle. Source: instagram.com @forza_italiana
Some guesses can be made as to which German units used the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i). The 26. Panzer-Division (English: 26th Armored Division), which operated Italian self-propelled guns, created the Jägdpanzer-Abteilung 51 on 17th November 1944. The personnel of the new battalion consisted of veterans from Panzer-Regiment .26 (English: 26th Tank Regiment) and some Sd.Kfz.164 Nashorns from the Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 525 (English: 525th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion) were used to equip the 1. Kompagnie (English: 1st Company).
The heavy anti-tank gun platoons of the Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9. and Panzergrenadier-Regiment 67. (English: 9th and 67th Mechanized Infantry Regiments) were used to form the 3. Kompagnie (English: 3rd Company). In November 1944, the unit was operational without the 2. Kompagnie (English: 2nd Company), which was deployed only in January 1945. Some vehicles of the 2. Kompagnie may have been Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i). The 26. Panzer-Division surrendered to the Allied forces in early May 1945 in the Vicenza area, about 200 km east of Parma.
The only unit that for certain deployed the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) was the 148. Infanterie-Division (English: 148th Infantry Division) that was deployed in Italy after mid-September 1944. On 1st October 1944, it had in its ranks 6 mechanized infantry battalions supported by the 13. Kanonen-Kompanie (English: 13th Cannon Company) and 14. Schwere-Kanonen-Kompanie (English: 14th Heavy Cannon Company). These 6 battalions and 3 companies were divided in 3 regiments: Grenadier-Regiment 281., Grenadier-Regiment 285., and Grenadier-Regiment 286..
The Artillerie-Regiment 1048. (English: 1048th Artillery Regiment) deployed a total of 3 105 mm howitzers groups and 1 150 mm heavy howitzer group with 3 batteries each. It also had Füsilier-Battalion 148. (English: 148th Rifle Battalion), with 4 squadrons, together with many other logistic units, such as the Pioneer-Battalion 1048. (English: 1048th Engineer Battalion) and the Veterinär-Kompanie 148. (English: 148th Veterinary Company). In fact, only 30% of the division was mechanized, the rest of the logistics were towed by horses.
A Semovente M43 da 75/46 captured by the Brazilian troops of the 1st Infantry Regiment “Sampaio” of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. It was captured in Caorso, near Piacenza in the last days of war. In this image, the right opened split-hatch is visible. It seems to be damaged on the side skirt sections and appliqué side armored plate, but these seem to be more like transport damage than fighting damage. Source: Italian Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War II
On 3rd December 1944, the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1048 (English: 1048th Anti-Tank Battalion) was created, composed of Panzerabwehrkanone-Batterie 1. or PaK-Batterie 1. (English: 1st Anti-Tank Battery) with anti-tank cannons, Schwere-Panzerabwehrkanone-Batterie 2. or Schwere-PaK-Batterie 2. (English: 2nd Heavy Anti-Tank Battery) equipped with 8,8 cm PaK 43 anti-tank cannons. On 19th December 1944, it received a platoon of the Festungs-Pantherturm 2. (English: 2nd Fixed Panther Tank Turrets) and then, on 28th December, it also received 6 half-track-mounted 88 mm cannons, quite surely the surviving 8.8 cm Flak 37 (Selbstfahrlafette) auf Schwere Zugkraftwagen 18t (Sd.Kfz.9) (English: 8.8 cm FlaK 18 [Self-Propelled Gun Carriage] on [Sd.Kfz.9] Heavy Traction Vehicle 18 tonnes) formerly belonging to the 26. Panzer-Division that operated in the same areas.
The last company assigned to the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1048 was the FlaK Kompanie 3. (English: 3rd Anti-Aircraft Cannon Company). After March 1945, the Schwere PaK Batterie 2. was equipped with, as referred to by the original document, 11 7.5 cm Sturmgeschütze. These were in all likelihood of Italian origin, as also claimed by Italian historian Leonardo Sandri in La 148^ Infantrie Division sul Fronte Italiano 1944-1945: Una Documentazione. Eleven of these Beute StuGs is equal to the total production of the entire Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) until January 1945, so it is impossible that all the vehicles were Semoventi M43 da 75/46, some could have been Semoventi M43 da 75/34 or their pre-Armistice version, the Semoventi M42M da 75/34. It could also be a document error. In fact, in many cases, the official German documents referred to “in service” vehicles whilst, in reality, they had not yet been delivered to the unit. In March 1945, the 11 Sturmgeschütz had almost certainly already left the factory but they were still on their way to Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1048.
The Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) probably arrived at the German anti-tank unit between mid-March to early April 1945. They had a really short operative life with the German soldiers.
A Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) was captured by the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Regiment “Sampaio” of the Força Expedicionária Brasileira or FEB (English: Brazilian Expeditionary Force) in Caorso, 60 km from Parma.
The history behind the capture of this particular vehicle is not clear. It was probably abandoned by Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1048 due to a lack of fuel or mechanical breakdown during the retreat from Bologna, trying to reach the southern shore of the River Po to cross it in the Piacenza area and try to reach northern Italian border to return home before the surrender of the entire 148. Infanterie Division. Another plausible hypothesis was that it was surrendered peacefully by the German soldiers of the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1048 after various failed attempts at opening a gap in the US and Brazilian encirclement in the Parma and Piacenza areas between 28th April and the morning of 29th April. The unit transferred over 600 wounded Axis soldiers between 13:00 and 14:30 on 21 ambulances to the Mantova Allied hospital and then surrendered to the Allied forces on the afternoon of 29th April 1945.
About 80 pieces of equipment, including 7,5 cm PaK 40, mortars, 105 mm and 150 mm artillery pieces, 8.8 cm half-track-mounted artillery pieces, and Sturmgeschütz, were captured. Together with these, the US and Brazilian forces captured 4,000 horses, 2,500 motor vehicles (trucks, staff cars, cargo half-tracks etc), 1,000 motorcycles, and between 13,579 and 14,779 Axis soldiers.
The only other operational service of the Semovente M43 da 75/46 was in Milan on 25th April 1945. One was captured by the Italian Partisans, probably at the Fonderia Milanese di Acciaio Vanzetti S.A. assembly plant, left abandoned by the German soldiers. This suggests that not all the semoventi in the Vanzetti plant were delivered to the German units.
The Semovente M43 da 75/46 captured in Milan by the Italian Partisans in late April 1945. Source: italiantanktree.files.wordpress.com
The Semovente M43 da 75/46 captured in Milan was ‘graffitied’ by the Partisans, with “W la Libertà” (English: Long Live Freedom) and the acronym “C.L.N.” or Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (English: National Liberation Committee) written on to avoid friendly fire. It probably had no ammunition and no secondary armament. The Partisans added a 7.7 mm Breda-SAFAT medium machine gun on the roof. It was probably delivered to the Allies after the war ended and scrapped.
Camouflage
The Semoventi M43 da 75/46 produced for the Germans were painted with a single camouflage scheme. It was similar to the Italian Continentale (English: Continental) adopted in mid-1943. The standard Kaki Sahariano (English: Saharan Khaki) monochrome sand camouflage was covered by reddish brown and dark green spots.
Continentale camouflage adopted by the Regio Esercito before the Armistice of 8th September 1943. Source: instagram.com @Forza_Italiana colourized by Johannes Dorn
The Regio Esercito’s Continentale camouflage scheme was upgraded, covering the Italian armored cars, medium tanks, and self-propelled guns with dark green and adding on them reddish brown spots and sand yellow stripes that bordered the reddish brown and dark green spots.
The Semovente M43 da 75/46’s prototype outside the Ansaldo-Fossati plant. In this image, colorized by Johannes Dorn, the 1944 Continentale camouflage is clearly visible. Source: wikipedia.org
As the Semoventi M43 da 75/34 received only this type of 3-tone camouflage, it never received Italian-style camouflage schemes. The prototype, probably assigned to a training school in northern Italy, received the Balkenkreuz, the German tanks’ coat of arms, for identification on the sides and rear, and the number “22” painted on the sides. The other vehicles seem to have been without coats of arms. This was also caused, in all likelihood, by the delivery of the semoventi in the last months of 1944 and early 1945, when German troops were in a shortage of trained crews, fuel, ammunition, and paint and did not waste time painting reconnaissance coat of arms or the unit’s own coats of arms.
Versions
Semovente M43 da 75/34
In 1944, a total of 29 Semoventi M43 da 75/34 were produced for the Germans on the same upgraded and uparmored Semovente M43 da 75/46 chassis. It was essentially a Semovente M43 da 75/46 armed with a shorter and less powerful Cannone da 75/34 Modello SF, already mounted on the Semovente M42M da 75/34. All the rest of the vehicle remained unchanged compared to the Semovente da 75/46.
A Semovente M43 da 75/34 in service with a German unit supporting Italian soldiers of the 1ª Divisione Bersaglieri ‘Italia’ in the Garfagnana area in winter 1944. Source: wikipedia.org
The Semoventi M43 da 75/34, known by the Germans as Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7,5 cm KwK L/34 851(i), were employed only by the Germans in Italy after late 1944. They supported an unknown German Panzerjäger-Abteilung in the Gothic Line, occasionally operating with Fascist soldiers loyal to Mussolini belonging to the 1ª Divisione Bersaglieri ‘Italia’ (English: 1st Bersaglieri Division).
Many sources place the total number of Semoventi M42M da 75/34 at 174 instead of 145. This is not correct, as the first number also counts the 29 Semoventi M43 da 75/34.
A Semovente M42T chassis was armed with a Cannone da 105/25 Modello SF and tested by the Germans but nothing is known about its fate after the German tests.
Conclusion
The Semovente M43 da 75/46 was the first Italian project that had offensive and defensive characteristics that made it capable of dealing with most of the Allied armored vehicles in the Second World War. This was mainly thanks to the German effort to upgrade some Italian vehicles.
The few vehicles produced and equipped with main guns had short operational lifes and not much is known about their service or their crew’s complaints.
The low delivery rate of the main armament provided by the Cornigliano artillery plant was the greatest problem causing the slow production rate. This forced the Germans to place the finished vehicles in depots awaiting for their main guns, which were delivered with a rate of 1 or 2 per month.
The low gun production rate was not the only criticism of the self-propelled gun. In the same period, the Germans also produced the Semovente M43 da 75/34 with a shorter and less powerful cannon as a stopgap while waiting for the ones armed with 75 mm L/46 guns.
Twenty-nine were built, and while more than those equipped with the 75/46 gun, this was insufficient to even put a dent in the thousands of armored vehicles of the Allied armies.
This low production rate, that was characteristic of the Italian industry during the Second World War, became more pronounced in the last stages of the war due to the scarcity of raw materials, Allied bombardments, and worker’s strikes.
Semovente M43 da 75/46. Illustrations by Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.
1 Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 with 42 rounds, 1 Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938 with 504 rounds.
Armor
75 mm + 25 mm front, 45 mm + 25 mm sides and 45 mm rear
Production
1 prototype and 12 vehicles produced
Sources
Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano, Volume Secondo, Tomo II – Nicola Pignato and Filippo Cappellano – Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito – 2002
Italian Medium Tanks 1939-45; New Vanguard Book 195 – Filippo Cappellani and Pier Paolo Battistelli – Osprey Publishing, 20th December 2012
Carro M – Carri Medi M11/39, M13/40, M14/41, M15/42, Semoventi ed Altri Derivati Volume Primo and Secondo – Antonio Tallillo, Andrea Tallillo and Daniele Guglielmi – Gruppo Modellistico Trentino di Studio e Ricerca Storica, 2012
Jagdpanzer IV in France in 1944 Illustation made by David B.
German Reich (1943)
Tank Destroyer – 750-800 Built
As the Second World War progressed, the German Army faced an ever-increasing amount of enemy armor, while its own tank forces were steadily being reduced. Due to losses and meager production capabilities, the Germans were forced to introduce a series of improvised anti-tank vehicles. While these were nothing more than ad hoc solutions, they were effective thanks to their powerful guns and cheap cost. On the other hand, their survivability was quite limited due to their limited armored protection. Additionally, a series of vehicles, such as the StuG III, performed excellently in the anti-tank role when equipped with long guns. Further development of the StuG III concept armed with even stronger guns would lead to the creation of Germany’s first dedicated anti-tank vehicle, the Jagdpanzer IV.
The German Army’s main anti-tank weapon before and in the first period of the Second World War was the 3.7 cm Pak 36. This was an effective anti-tank gun when used against pre-war tank designs. It could be easily concealed or transported by a few men. Despite being lightweight, this gun still needed to be towed for longer distances and required some time to be set up for combat. Later, stronger anti-tank guns provided a huge boost in firepower when engaging enemy armor, but their weight greatly increased too, which limited their mobility. An anti-tank mounted on a tank chassis that had sufficient mobility to follow tanks and motorized units was seen as a desirable concept even before the war. Given the lack of German industrial production capacity, little could be done in this regard prior to the war.
The first attempt to produce an improvised self-propelled anti-tank vehicle was made just prior to the German invasion of the West in May 1940. This was the 4.7 cm PaK (t) (Sfl) auf Pz.Kpfw.I, generally known today as the ‘Panzerjäger I’ (Eng. tank destroyer or hunter). This vehicle consisted of a Panzer I Ausf.B chassis combined with a 4.7 cm PaK (t) gun (a captured Czechoslavkian 4.7 cm gun – hence the ‘t’ for ‘Tschechoslowakei’ after the name). This vehicle, technically speaking, was not new. Instead, it was constructed using obsolete Panzer I chassis and guns that were taken from Czechoslovakia. Despite being a hasty improvisation, it performed well, which showed the Germans that this concept had merits. But, given the nature of its design, it was also flawed in many aspects, such as using an underpowered chassis, the fact it was a relatively large target, and its weak protection.
In the following years, as the Germans made progress on other fronts, namely the Soviet Union and North Africa, the need for mobile and effective anti-tank vehicles became urgent. Once again, due to a lack of production capabilities, they were often forced to reuse already existing tank chassis and, in rare cases, half-tracks in order to mount the effective 7.5 cm Pak 40 anti-tank gun. This would lead to three different series of vehicles, known generally as ‘Marder’. In 1943, the 8.8 cm armed Nashornanti-tank vehicle based on the Panzer IV and Panzer III chassis was also introduced. While these vehicles did their job well, they were also plagued with many shortcomings.
Side view of a Panzerjager I. Source: www.panzernet.netWhilst lightly protected, the Nashorn anti-tank vehicle was armed with probably the best gun in the war, the 88 mm L/71. Source: www.panzernet.net
On the other hand, officials such as Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, one of the brains behind the German invasion of the West in 1940, argued for the introduction of a highly mobile, well-protected, and well-armed self-propelled artillery gun. Such vehicles were meant to provide infantry with mobile close fire support during combat operations. These vehicles were known as Sturmgeschütz (Eng. Assault gun), or simply ‘StuGs’, which would be introduced into service at the same time as the first anti-tank vehicles during the attack on the West in May 1940. These were dedicated designs that were fully protected and strongly armed. By late 1941, out of desperation, the Germans began refitting these vehicles with long guns to create new anti-tank vehicles. Combining their low silhouette, good frontal protection, and powerful gun, the Germans unintentionally created a highly effective tank destroyer. The StuG III would go on to be built in great numbers and used up to the end of the war. These misgivings and the addition of a more powerful gun led to a creation of a new series of anti-tank vehicles based on the Panzer IV chassis.
Compared to the improvised anti-tank vehicles, the StuG III was a dedicated design with a fully enclosed crew compartment. Source: Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (199) Panzer Tracts No.8 Sturmgeschütz
Development
The ‘story’ of the Jagpanzer IV began in September 1942, when the Waffenamt (Eng. Army Weapon’s Office) issued a request for the development of a new Sturmgeschütz design – the ‘Sturmgeschütze Neue Art’, Stu.Gesch.n.A. (Eng. Assault Gun New Type). The new vehicle was to be armed with the 7.5 cm KwK L/70 gun and protected with 100 mm frontal and 40 to 50 mm of side armor. It was intended to have the lowest possible height, a top speed of 25 km/h, 500 mm ground clearance, and a weight of up to 26 tonnes. Additional armament proposals included a 10.5 cm and 15 cm gun for the infantry support roles, but these two projects were never implemented.
At first glance, the obvious choice was to reuse the StuG III vehicles for this purpose in order to reduce the time of development and to reuse already produced components. The StuG III, despite not being designed for that specific role, performed excellently when used in the anti-tank role thanks to its improved weaponry. Their 7.5 cm L/24 short barrel gun was replaced with a 7.5 cm L/43, and later, the more mass-produced L/48 gun. These proved more than capable of destroying most enemy targets at ranges greater than 1 km.
The Germans predicted that, in the future, more capable guns with superior anti-tank performance would be needed. With the development of the Panther tank project, a new gun, the 7.5 cm L/70, would be made available. Attempts to install this gun were initially to be tested using the VK16.02 Leopard chassis. Given the rather small chassis, insufficient space to install the large gun, and the cancelation of this vehicle, the project did not go beyond the drawing boards.
The later version of the StuG III was rearmed with a long gun, creating excellent anti-tank vehicles. Source: www.worldwarphotos.infoA short-lived project included adding the long 7.5 cm gun on the Panzer II Leopard chassis. Given the sheer size of the gun and the small chassis, it is unsurprising that nothing came of it. Source: T. L. Jentz and H. L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.20-1 Paper Panzers
Alkett, the main producer of the StuG III series, went to work on figuring out a way to install the 7.5 cm L/70 in the StuG III vehicles. In late 1942, a wooden mock-up was completed. This mock-up had a much larger upper superstructure, somewhat resembling the later Jagdpanzer 38, in order to accommodate the new gun. It quickly became obvious that such an installation on the Panzer III chassis was impossible, so another solution would be needed.
Alkett wooden mock-up proof of concept of a modified StuG III armed with the long 7.5 cm gun. Source: T. L. Jentz and H. L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.20-1 Paper Panzers
The Panzer IV chassis was seen as a much better solution, given that it was larger and that the installation of the new superstructure and gun were feasible. Alkett once again presented a project of such a vehicle based on the Panzer IV chassis that could be armed either with a 7.5 cm L/70 (Gerät No.822) or 10.5 cm (Gerät No.823) gun. In late October 1942, a scale model was even presented to Adolf Hitler, but nothing came of it.
Vogtlandische Maschinenfabrik AG (Vomag) proposed its own version of the new tank hunter based on the Panzer IV to Adolf Hitler on 2nd October 1942. Hitler was impressed by what he saw and gave the project the go-ahead. The wooden mock-up was completed by May 1943, when it was presented to Hitler. This wooden mock-up was different from the later-built vehicles, as it was based on an unchanged Panzer IV Ausf.F tank chassis. After the presentation of the new vehicle, Hitler was satisfied and ordered the production of the first prototypes as soon as possible. In September 1943, Vomag began the assembly of two soft-steel 0-series vehicles. These prototypes were similar to the wooden mock-up, having rounded front corners, but the Panzer IV’s front hull was heavily modified with new angled armor plates. Additionally, on the Jagdpanzer IV’s superstructure sides, firing ports for a 9 mm MP-38/40 submachine gun were placed. Both of these features would be dropped on the production vehicles in favor of a simpler armor design and deletion of the side-firing ports. In January 1944, the second prototype was completed. After a brief examination, it was chosen as the basis for the production series.
The Vomag wooden mock-up, which was based on the Panzer IV Ausf.F chassis. Source: www.panzernet.netA slightly improved mock-up, with two front machine gun ports cover, was presented to Hitler in May 1943. Source: warspot.ruFront view of the Jagdpanzer IV’s first prototype. Note the quite different design of the front hull armor. Source: www.panzernet.netSide view of the same vehicle. The side superstructure’s round-shaped machine gun ports are visible here. Source: warspot.ruThe second prototype of the 0-series was mainly used for training. Source: www.panzernet.net
Designation
The new tank hunter was, in reality, a further development of the assault tank concept, but more specialized and purely dedicated to the anti-tank role. It is not surprising that it was initially designated as Sturmgeschütze Neue Art. This project was initiated months before the position of the General der Panzertruppe was even created. The close involvement of the assault gun branch of the Army in this project can be seen in a letter written by General der Artillerie Fritz Lindemann to Heinz Guderian in early 1944.
“.. Because Sturmgeschütz fire 25 percent of their ammunition at tanks and 75 percent at other types of targets, the designation “Panzerjäger” relates to only part of the Sturmgeschütz assigned tasks. The designation “Sturmgeschütz” is a well-known concept to the infantry. Therefore, the General der Infanterie is for retaining the Sturmgeschützdesignation.”
Parallel to the StuG III development, the Germans also employed anti-tank vehicles that were known as Panzerjäger. The term Panzerjäger originated in the First World War. The use of Jagdpanzer (Eng. tank hunter) in some sources is also interesting. Nowadays, the term Panzerjäger is often associated with improvised lightly protected, usually open-top vehicles, while Jagdpanzer is associated with fully enclosed anti-tank vehicles. This is a recent assignment, as both terms were, according to German military terminology and concepts, essentially one and the same.
Throughout its development and service life, the new tank hunter received several different designations, which was quite common for the Germans during the war. One of the earlier designations was Kleine Panzerjäger der Firma Vomag (Eng. Small Tank Hunter from the Vomag Company), dated May 1943. Other designations included: Panzerjäger auf Fahrgestell Panzer IV (Eng. Tank Destroyer on the Panzer IV Chassis) in August 1943, Stu.Gesch.n.A. auf Pz.IV (Eng. New Type Assault Gun on the Panzer IV Chassis) November 1943, and Leichter Panzerjäger auf Fgst.Pz.Kpf.Wg.IV mit 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 (Eng. Light Tank Destroyer on the Panzer IV Chassis) in December 1943. From 1944 onwards, much shorter designations were used: Panzerjäger IV 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 (March 1944), Jagdpanzer IV Ausf.F (September 1944), and Jagdpanzer IV – Panzerjäger IV (November 1944). Interestingly, despite being allocated to Panzer units, the designation Sturmgeschütze Neue Art mit 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw was used during the period of February to October 1944. Given that the vehicle is generally best known today simply as the Jagdpanzer IV, this article will use this name throughout.
Production
After Germany’s defeats in 1942, Heinz Guderian was brought back from retirement by Hitler, who hoped that he could somehow magically rebuild the shattered Panzer divisions. Guderian set immediately to the task of rebuilding this formation. At that time, the German industry was in the process of developing various new tanks and other armored vehicle projects, even more than it was realistically able of successfully mass-producing. With the support of Albert Speer, the Minister for Armaments and War Production, Guderian wanted to introduce rationalization programs and discard projects that could not be immediately put into production. The Jadgpanzer IV was deemed one such project. Both Guderian and Speer were not enthusiastic about this vehicle, as they deemed that it would only cause delays in Panzer IV production. In addition, the StuG III vehicle performed this role excellently and they believed its production should be increased instead.
On the other hand, Hitler, based on the field reports regarding the StuG III’s performance when used in the anti-tank role, had a very enthusiastic view of the new Jagdpanzer IV. He urged that its mass production should begin as soon as possible and that this vehicle was to totally replace the Panzer IV tanks. While without a doubt an effective vehicle, the Jagdpanzer IV’s lack of turret means that, if it was used in offensive operations as a tank substitute, its combat effectiveness would be greatly reduced. Both Guderian and Albert Speer could do little to convince Hitler of the opposite. Thanks to their insistence, though, only Vomag was selected for Jagdpanzer IV production in order to avoid causing delays in tank production.
The production of the Jagdpanzer IV was meant to commence with the first 10 vehicles being completed by September 1943. In the following months, the production rate was predicted to be increased by 10 vehicles every month. This meant that, in 1943, the production run should have been as follows: 20 in October, 30 in November, and 40 vehicles by the end of December. This did not occur and Vomag was only able to complete only 10 vehicles during that year. The problem with the delivery of sufficient numbers of gun mounts, in addition to the poor quality of the armor plates, led to delays in production. Up to May 1944, Vomag was involved in the Panzer IV’s production, after which it solely focused on the Jagdpanzer IV’s production.
By the time the production of the Jagdpanzer IV stopped in November 1944, some 750 vehicles had been built by Vomag. Monthly production was as follows. Note the sudden drop in numbers in September, which was due to the Allied bombings of the Vomag factory.
Date
Numbers
1943
All year
10
1944
January
30
February
45
March
75
April
106
May
90
June
120
July
125
August
92
September
19
October
46
November
2
Of course, like many other German vehicles, the exact production numbers differ depending on the author. The previously mentioned numbers are according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No. 9-2 Jagdpanzer IV). Author T. J Gander (Tanks in Detail: JgdPz IV, V, VI, and Hetzer) gives a number of 769 built vehicles. Authors K. Mucha and G. Parada (Jagdpanzer IV L/48) give an estimation of 769 to 784 produced vehicles and that some 26 more chassis reused for other projects. Author P. Thomas (Images of War: Hitler’s Tank Destroyers) mentions that some 800 were built.
A column of newly built Jagdpanzer IVs. Source: warspot.net
Design
The Hull
The Jagdpanzer IV was built by using the chassis of the Panzer IV Ausf.H tank, which was, for the most part, unchanged. It consisted of the front transmission, central crew, and rear engine compartments. The most obvious change was the new angled superstructure and the redesigned sharply angled lower front hull. This was done to provide an increased level of protection by using thick angled armor plates interlocked to each other. In addition, some internal redesigns were needed in order to accommodate the new superstructure and the gun mount. One example is the changing position of the bottom escape hatch. Originally, it was located under the radio operator on the Panzer IV, but on the Jagdpanzer IV, it was moved close to the gunner.
The Panzer IV Ausf.H, on the chassis of which the Jagdpanzer IV was based. Source: www.panzernet.net
The Suspension and Running Gear
The suspension and running gear were other elements reused from the Panzer IV. They consisted of eight small double road wheels suspended in four pairs by leaf-spring units per side. There were two front drive sprockets, two rear idlers, and eight return rollers in total. The standard Panzer IV return rollers were replaced with ones made of steel due to the lack of rubber later during production. In addition, by the end of production, some vehicles had only three return rollers on each side. Depending on the need or availability, wider tracks could be used instead of regular tracks in order to increase driving performance on mud or snow.
The Jagdpanzer IV’s suspension was taken directly from the Panzer IV. The simple leaf-spring suspension, whilst not perfect, did its job. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV
The Engine
The Jagdpanzer IV was powered by the Maybach HL 120 TRM which produced 265 hp @ 2,600 rpm. The maximum speed was 40 km/h (15-18 km/h cross-country). With a fuel load of some 470 liters, the operational range was 210 km. The engine and the crew compartment were separated by a fire-resistant and gas-tight armored firewall. In order to avoid any fire accidents, an automatic fire extinguisher system was installed in the engine compartment. The original position of the Panzer IV’s fuel tanks, under the turret, had to be changed in order to lower the vehicle’s height. Two fuel tanks were placed under the gun and a third smaller one in the engine compartment. In order to refuel the front fuel tanks, two (one on each side) fuel filler pipes were located behind the front drive sprockets.
The added front armor plates caused huge stress on the front suspension. To somewhat overcome the issue, most spare parts and auxiliary equipment were moved to the rear engine compartment later during the production. This included things such as spare tracks, wheels, repair tools, fire extinguishers, and the crew’s equipment.
To reduce the front weight as much as possible, auxiliary spare equipment was moved to the rear of the vehicle. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV
The Superstructure
The new superstructure was well protected, with its angled, thick, and simple armor design. The angled shape of the superstructure provided thicker nominal armor and also increased the chance of deflecting enemy shots. Also, by using larger one-piece plates, it was much stronger and easier to produce. This way, the need for more carefully machined armored plates, like on Panzer III or IV, was unnecessary. Using single-piece armor plates interlocked to each other greatly strengthened the overall structure, making it more durable.
A good view of the upper angled superstructure of the Jagdpanzer IV. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV
On the front plate, the gun with its mantlet was positioned slightly to the right of center. The gun mount was protected by a large ball-shaped shield, further protected by a larger cast gun mantlet known as Topfblende. On each side of the gun was a movable conical-shaped armored machine gun port cover. Lastly, to the lower left, the driver vision apparatus was placed. The side and rear plates did not receive any kind of vision port.
On the top part of the superstructure were two escape hatches. The right round-shaped one was for the loader. Left of it, the commander’s hatch had a small rotating periscope in the middle. The commander had a small additional hatch for the use of a retractable telescope. In front of the loader and commander hatches was a sliding armored cover for the gunsight.
Top view of a Jagdpanzer IV. There were two hatches for the crew. The front curved opening was used for the gunner’s gun sight. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IVThe commander had a small additional hatch for the use of a retractable telescope, present here. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IVThe Jagdpanzer IV, surprisingly for German standards, did not receive a command cupola. While such designs were tested, like this one, none were adopted for service. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV
Armor and Protection
The Jagdpanzer IV was well protected, with thick and well-angled armor plates. For the lower hull, the upper front armor plate was 60 mm thick at a 45° angle and the lower plate was 50 mm at a 55° angle. The side armor was 30 mm thick, the rear 20 mm, and the bottom 10 mm. The hull crew compartment had 20 mm of bottom armor.
The new upper superstructure frontal armor was 60 mm at a 50° angle, the sides were 40 mm at a 30° angle, the rear armor was 30 mm, and the top was 20 mm. The engine compartment design and armor were unchanged from the Panzer IV, with 20 mm all around and 10 mm of top armor.
Even a well-protected vehicle, like the Jagdpanzer IV, was not impervious to enemy fire. This vehicle was taken out by a direct frontal hit that pierced its armor. Source: warspot.ru
Even before this vehicle entered production, it was estimated that, in order to further improve protection, the armor plates had to be placed at even greater angles. This would be rejected, as it would lead to a huge delay in production and problems with space management.
Finally, in May 1944, it was finally possible to use 80 mm thick frontal armor plates. This was initially planned from the start, but the use of such thick plates would lead to delays in production which were deemed unacceptable, and their application was temporarily postponed.
The upper hull was built out of surface-hardened steel plates manufactured by Witkowitzer Bergbau und Eisenhütten. It is important to note that, by 1944, when the Jagdpanzer IV entered production, the quality of German production steel was not always guaranteed. The constant Allied air raids, lack of resources, and the use of slave labor greatly affected the quality of many constructions in Germany at that time, even armor plates.
The Jagdpanzer IVs were also provided with Zimmerit anti-magnetic coating, but after September 1944, its use was abandoned. Additional 5 mm thick armor plates were also provided for extra protection of the engine compartment’s sides. The Jagdpanzer IV could be equipped with additional 5 mm thick armor plates (Schürzen) covering the side of the vehicle. They served mainly to protect against Soviet anti-tank rifles.
A Jagdpanzer IV equipped with Zimmerit and Schürzen plates. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IVSome imaginative crews found other ways to increase their protection. In this case, they poured concrete on the front armor plate. Source: K. Mucha and G. Parada Jagdpanzer IV
The Armament
The first few prototypes were equipped with 7.5 cm L/43 guns. For the production version of the Jagdpanzer IV, the 7.5 cm PaK 39 L/48 was chosen. This gun was developed and produced by Rheinmetall-Borsig AG with the support of Seitz-Werke GmbH. In essence, this was the same weapon as the 7.5 cm StuK 40 gun used on the StuG III vehicles, but it was modified to be mounted on the new Jagdpanzer IV. This gun had a semi-automatic sliding block. This means that, after firing the gun, the spent round would be self-ejected, increasing the firing rate.
The elevation of this gun went from –8° to +15° (–5° to +15° or –6° to +20° depending on the source) and the traverse was 15° to right and 12° left (or 10° in both directions, once more, depending on the source). The main gun was not placed at the vehicle’s center, but was instead moved some 20 cm to the right side, mainly because of the gun sights. The gun was protected by the round-shaped gun mantlet. The ammunition supply for the main gun was 79 rounds. Usually, half were armor-piercing, and the other half were high explosive rounds. This was not always the case as, depending on the combat situation and needs, the ammunition load could be changed. In rarer cases, tungsten armor-piercing ammunition would be used. The standard armor-piercing round was capable of piercing 109 mm of flat armor at 1 km distance. The rare tungsten core round, at the same distance, could defeat 130 mm of armor.
An illustration of the Jagdpanzer IV’s interior. Source: D. R. Higgins Cromwell Vs Jagdpanzer IV Normandy 1944Close-up view of the Jagdpanzer IV’s interior. Note the two gunner hand wheels needed to elevate or traverse the gun. This particular gun lacks its recoil cylinders. Source: Military Vehicle Prints 30 Panzerjager IV
Initially, the Jagdpanzer IV vehicles produced were equipped with a muzzle brake. The crews that operated these vehicles quickly noticed that, during firing, the muzzle brake would create extensive dust clouds in front of the vehicle due to Jagdpanzer IV’s small height. This reduced visibility, but more importantly, gave away the vehicle’s position to the enemy. As a result, crews began removing the muzzle brake from their vehicles. To compensate for removing it, Vomag engineers designed an improved recoil cylinder to help ease the recoil during firing. As this was being put into production, the troop field reports indicated that, despite removing the muzzle brake, the 7.5 cm gun worked without problems. Because of this, the introduction of the new improved recoil cylinder was actually not needed. Nevertheless, some newly built vehicles were equipped with it during production. From May 1944, the muzzle brake would be removed from the Jagdpanzer IV program. The later-produced vehicles did not have threaded ends on the barrel, as they were no longer needed.
There were also experiments with fixed non-recoiling mounts, known as ‘neur Art Starr’ (which could roughly be translated as ‘new fixed mount version’). Two Jagdpanzer IVs were modified for this purpose in September 1944, though this was unsuccessful and soon abandoned, but continued on the Jagdpanzer 38(t).
The Jagdpanzer IV was initially provided with a muzzle brake. It served to reduce the recoil during the firing of the gun. In the case of the Jagdpanzer, with the short height, it caused more problems than it was worth, so its use was quickly discarded. Source: www.panzernet.net
For self-defense, a 7.92 mm MG 42 machine gun with some 1,200 rounds of ammunition was provided. Unlike most other German armored vehicles, a ball mount was not used on the Jagdpanzer IV. Instead, the machine gun could be fired from two front gun ports located on the left and right of the main gun, which were 13 cm wide. These two machine gun ports were protected with conical-shaped armored covers. The left machine gun port proved difficult to use by the gunner and would be abandoned from March 1944. The vehicles that were at that time under production received a 60 mm thick round plate to cover the now useless machine gun port. The newly produced vehicle would receive the front superstructure armor plate that did not have this hole at all. From May 1944, the conical-shaped armored cover for the remaining machine gun port was slightly enlarged. When not in use, the machine gun could be pulled into a small travel lock that was connected to the vehicle’s roof. In this case, the machine gun port could be closed by pivoting the armor cover.
Both machine gun covers are open on this vehicle. The left-positioned machine gun port would prove to be difficult to be used and would be deleted from production. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IVThis vehicle’s left machine gun port was covered with a simple round-shaped armored cover. Source: Military Vehicle Prints 30 Panzerjager IV
The prototype vehicles initially had two pistol ports placed on their superstructure sides. These were not adopted for service, as it was planned to add a remote-controlled machine gun mount (Rundumsfeuer) with a 360º firing arc on top of the superstructure. In theory, it would provide the crew with effective anti-personnel fire on all sides. However, the Rundumsfeuer machine gun mount was deleted early on. Some Jagdpanzer IVs were tested with this weapon system during March and April 1944, but it was noted that there was not enough room for it to be effectively mounted. This is peculiar, as the same machine gun mount was used without major problems on the much smaller Jagdpanzer 38(t) tank-hunter.
The prototype installation of the Rundumsfeuer mount. While it offered the crew with an all-around firing arc, it would not be adopted for service. Source: warspot.netThe crew of this vehicle use an MG 42 mounted on top of the superstructure. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV
The Jagdpanzer IV was also equipped with the Nahverteidigungswaffe (Eng. close defense grenade launcher), with some 16 rounds of ammunition (high explosive and smoke rounds), located on the vehicle’s top. Due to the general lack of resources though, not all vehicles were provided with this weapon. In such cases, the Nahverteidigungswaffe opening hole was closed off with a round plate.
The Crew
The four-man crew consisted of the commander, the gunner, the loader/radio operator, and the driver. The driver’s position was on the front left side. While he was provided with two front-mounted vision slits, his overall awareness of the surroundings was limited. For example, due to the position of the gun, the driver had a huge blind spot to the right. Just behind him was the gunner’s position. He was tasked with operating the main gun, using two hand wheels, one for elevation and the other for traverse, located in front of him. A Sfl.Z.F.1a gun sight for acquiring targets was used. When in use, the sight was projected through the sliding armored cover on the vehicle’s top armor.
The commander was positioned behind the gunner. For observation and finding targets, the commander had at his disposal three periscopes. These were a fixed sight (Rundblickfehrnrohr Rbl F 3b), binocular rangefinder (Scherenfernrohr SF 14 Z), and a rotatable periscope. The commander had a small additional hatch door for the use of a retractable Sf.14Z telescope. Lastly, the commander was also responsible for providing the loader with the ammunition located on the left sidewall.
The last crew member was the loader, who was positioned on the vehicle’s right side. He operated the radio, which was located to the right rear, and he also doubled as the 7.92 mm MG 42 machine gun operator. There was a small opening located above the machine gun which provided the gun operator with a limited view of the front. Nearly all periscopes were protected with an armored flap cover.
Organization
In the previously mentioned letter by the General der Artillery to Guderian, a desire and hope were expressed that the new vehicle would also be allocated to assault gun units. This actually never occurred, mostly on the insistence of Guderian himself. While the Jagdpanzer IV’s development history seems straightforward at first glance, it was actually followed by a fight between the German artillery and tank branches. The Jagdpanzer IV’s development was initiated by the artillery branch, in the hope of improving its StuG III vehicles with a new design, known as the Sturmgeschütze Neue Art. But, during its development, General Heinz Guderian insisted that it should be reclassified as a Panzerjäger and assigned to the Panzer units. In the end, Guderian won and the Jagdpanzer IV was allocated to existing Panzerjäger units, which were part of Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions, instead of the assault artillery units. This meant that the new Jagdpanzer IV was allocated to units that had little prior experience with this kind of vehicle. At the same time, the assault artillery units, which had experience operating such vehicles, were denied a weapon that could have potentially increased their effectiveness.
The Jagdpanzer IV was used to equip Panzerjäger Abteilungen (Eng. anti-tank battalions) of Panzer or Panzer Grenadier divisions. The anti-tank battalions assigned to a Panzer division were usually divided into two companies, each 10 vehicles strong. One more vehicle was to be assigned for the battalion commander, reaching the total strength of 21 vehicles.
Panzer Grenadier anti-tank battalions had two companies, with 14 vehicles each. Three more vehicles were used for the battalion commander’s platoon. In total, its strength was 31 vehicles. In both cases, a third company consisted of towed anti-tank guns. Depending on the availability and combat situation, the number of vehicles per Panzerjäger Abteilung varied depending on many factors, such as losses or availability of vehicles.
At the end of 1943, on the insistence of Guderian and with Hitler’s approval, the Panzer Lehr Division was to be formed, which would serve as a training point for armored formations. It would include experienced personnel from various other units. This unit was actually the first German division to be supplied with the Jagdpanzer IV. On 1st June 1944, its Panzerjäger Lehr Abteilung 130 was equipped with 31 Jagdpanzer IVs. Its structure was a bit unusual, with each of the three anti-tank companies being equipped with 9 Jagdpanzer IV. The remaining four vehicles were attached to the Battalion command. The reason for this unusual organizational structure lies in the fact that this unit was originally meant to be equipped with 14 Jagdpanzer IV and 14 Jagdtigers. As no Jagdtigers were available at this point, additional Jagdpanzer IVs were provided instead. Another unit with Jagdpanzer IVs was the Panzer Division Hermann Goering.
In Combat
France 1944
During the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944, various German units had been meant to receive the new Jagdpanzer IV. Some were already equipped, including the 2nd Panzer Division, 116th Panzer Division, and 12th SS Panzer Division, having 21 vehicles each, while the Panzer Lehr Division and 17th Panzergrenadier Divisions had 31. In the case of the 17th Panzergrenadier Division, its Jagdpanzer IVs arrived in France in August due to delays. The 9th Panzer Division was meant to receive the Jagdpanzer IV to replace its Marder II anti-tank vehicles, but these were not available by the time of the Allied invasion of the West in June 1944. Other divisions that would be included in this campaign that had the Jagdpanzer IV were the 9th, 11th, 116th, and 10th SS Panzer Divisions.
In the days following the Allied landings in Normandy, heavy fighting took place as the Allies tried to extend their beachhead and the Germans to turn them back. In the area between Caen and Bayeux, elements of the 12th SS Panzer Division were quite active. On 9th June, the Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment 901 and Panzerjäger Lehr Abteilung 130 proceeded toward Bayeux in an attempt to recapture this city and prevent future Allied advances. During this drive, some six Jagdpanzer IV were left behind the line, as they had faultily aligned gunsights. Given that the Germans were unsure as to what the next Allied main objective would be, even expecting a second landing in Belgium, organizing an effective offensive operation could not be easily achieved. The superior Allied air power and the long supply lines greatly affected the German overall combat performance.
A destroyed Jagdpanzer IV near Cintheaux from the 12th SS Panzer Division. Source: H. Meyer The 12th SS The History of the Hitler Youth Panzer Division: Volume Two
On the 10th, heavy fighting occurred, as both sides tried to engage each other. Fighting in this area, due to bocage-terrain in this part of France, was not easy nor suited for larger armored formations. On the evening of that day, some 5 Allied Cromwell tanks found themself behind the enemy line and even threatened the headquarters of the Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment 902. Unfortunately for them, some Jagdpanzer IVs, with their unit commander, Oberleutnant Werner Wagner, were close by and prepared to engage the enemy. After positioning the vehicles to have the best possible firing range, they engaged the enemy tanks. Soon, one Cromwell was hit and set ablaze. A second Cromwell was immobilized by two hits before a third one destroyed it. A third Cromwell was also reported to be destroyed. The remaining Allied tanks tried to retreat but were unable to, forcing the crews to surrender.
The following day, the Allies mounted a great offensive in the area of Tilly-sur-Seulles. As the German defense line held the onslaught, the Allies dispatched another group of Cromwell tanks. Six Jagdpanzer IVs spearheaded the German’s own counter-attack. After destroying a few Cromwells, the remaining retreated back. The Jagdpanzer IVs proceeded with the attack, pushing the Allies back.
On 9th August 1944, the Allies launched large armored formations that moved toward the Caen-Falaise road, in order to liberate Cauvicourt. The Allied advance was met by Jagdpanzer IVs of the SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 12’s 1st Company, positioned around Hill 112, together with other German armor. During the engagements, of 22 destroyed Allied M4 tanks, between 16 to 22 were credited to the Jagdpanzer IVs. The German losses were four Panthers, six Panzer IVs, five Tiger Is, and five Jagdpanzer IVs. Two Jagdpanzer IVs would be sent forwards in reconnaissance missions and would go on to destroy 5 additional tanks.
A 116. Panzer-Division Jagdpanzer IV during the French camping in 1944. Source: D. R. Higgins Cromwell Vs Jagdpanzer IV Normandy 1944
Later that day, the Allies, frustrated by the lack of progress, dispatched some 9 Cromwell tanks from the 10th Mounted Rifle Regiment to try to outflank the German positions at Maizières Estrées-la-Campagne road. All would be taken out by the German Jagdpanzer IVs. Due to the heavy Allied artillery barrage though, the Germans began evacuating their positions. They quickly came under a night attack from the tanks of the Polish 1st Armoured Regiment. The SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 12’s Jagdpanzer IVs defeated the Polish-operated tanks, destroying some 22 M4 and Cromwell tanks.
The Jagdpanzer IV did not always perform well against the Allies. For example, during the fighting in the area of Laval and Le Mans, the 17th Panzergrenadier Division lost 9 Jagdpanzer IVs.
Nevertheless, overall, they performed excellently during the French campaign of 1944. For example, Oberscharfuehrer Rudolf Roy of the 12th SS Panzer Division claimed to have destroyed some 36 Allied tanks before being killed by an enemy sniper in December 1944.
Ardennes Offensive and the End of the War in Western Europe
During the Ardennes Offensive, on the Western Front, the Germans had 92 Jagdpanzer IVs. Some 20 Jagdpanzer IVs were part of the 2nd SS Division Das Reich. By the end of 1944, there were 56 Jagdpanzer IVs, of which only 28 were operational.
In December 1944, the Jagdpanzer IVs participated in the last large German offensive in the West, Operation Northwind. The 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division that participated in the offensive had 31 StuG IIIs, two Jagdpanzer IVs, and one Marder vehicle. The 22nd Panzer Division had four Jagdpanzer IVs and the 25th Panzergrenadier Division five Jagdpanzer IVs. The operation ended in another German failure by late January 1945, further depleting the strength of its armored units.
Italy
The Jagdpanzer IV also saw action in Italy, albeit in limited numbers. Three Panzer divisions received this vehicle: the Panzer Division Hermann Goering, the 3rd and the 15th Panzergrenadier divisions. Their combined combat strength was 83 Jagdpanzer IVs. By the end of 1944, this number was reduced to only 8 vehicles, of which 6 were operational.
Jagdpanzer IV in Italy in 1944. For unknown reasons, this vehicle had its track shortened. It was likely damaged and then towed to the rear for repairs. In this track configuration, it could not move on its own. Source: warspot.net
Eastern Front
The majority of the Jagdpanzer IVs produced were deployed on the Eastern Front, in an attempt to stop the Soviet advance. They saw heavy action there, but were also used in the role of tanks or assault guns, the former of which the vehicle could not fulfil. The heavy fighting in Poland during October 1944 cost the Germans many casualties, including at least 55 Jagdpanzer IVs.
Some 55 Jagdpanzer IV’s would be lost during the heavy fighting in Poland in October 1944. Source: S. J. Zaloga and J. Grandsen The Road to Berlin
Other examples included the heavy fighting in Hungary. While attacking Soviet lines at Homok (Hungary) on 19th December 1944, Panzerjäger Abteilung 43 lost three out of four Jagdpanzer IVs. On 23rd December 1944, the Kampfgruppe “Scheppelmann”, which had 8 Panzer IVs and 13 Jagdpanzer IVs, engaged a Soviet force north of Kisgyarmat. They managed to take out some 12 tanks, 3 American-supplied anti-aircraft half-tracks, 1 armored car, and 2 armored personnel carriers. By the end of 1944, there were some 311 Jagdpanzer IVs, of which 209 were operational. In an attempt to relieve the besieged city of Budapest, the Germans employed the IV SS Panzer Corps, which had some 285 armored vehicles in its inventory, of which 55 were Jagdpanzer IVs. All attempts to reach Budapest ultimately failed, with many losses among the German forces. During the last few months of the war, there is little information about the Jagdpanzer IV, as the sources mainly focus on the later improved version armed with the long gun. Like other German forces, they fought a fighting retreat all the way to the Battle of Berlin.
A Jagdpanzer IV was captured by the Soviets, possibly near the end of the war. Note that this Jagdpanzer IV still has its muzzle brake, which indicates that it is an early-built vehicle. Source: wio.ruDespite its effectiveness, the Jagdpanzer IV was generally a rare vehicle and often could do little to come on top of the ever-increasing Allied armored formations. Source: warspot.net
Jagdpanzer IV Versions
Panzer IV/70 (V)
From the very start, the new Jagdpanzer IV project was intended to be armed with the longer 7.5 cm L/70 gun. As these weapons were not available in sufficient numbers, this was initially not possible. Once the 7.5 cm L/70 gun production was increased sufficiently that sufficient numbers could be spared for the Jagdpanzer IV project, work on an improved Jagdpanzer IV armed with this gun was immediately started. After a period of modification and testing in the first half of 1944, the production of a new Jagdpanzer IV version armed with the long 7.5 cm gun finally began in November 1944. The new vehicle was named Panzer IV/70 (V) and, by the time war ended, under 1,000 had been produced.
The development of the Jagdpanzer IV eventually led to the Panzer IV/70 (V). Source: www.panzernet.net
Jagdpanzer IV Befehlswagen
An unknown number of Jagdpanzer IVs were modified to be used as Befehlswagen (Eng. command vehicles). These vehicles had an additional FuG 8 radio station installed and one extra crew member. The Befehlswagen can be easily identified by the second radio antenna located on the rear left side.
The command version of the Jagdpanzer IV, the Befehlswagen, was visually identical to regular vehicles, aside from the rod antenna. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV
After the War
Syria
Strangely, the Jagdpanzer IV would see limited combat action after the Second World War. Around five vehicles were given to Syria in 1950 by the French, although, depending on the sources, it is possible that the Soviets actually supplied them. During combat with Israeli forces in 1967 during the Six-Day War, one Jagdpanzer IV was lost when it was hit by a tank round. The remaining were withdrawn from the front and probably placed in reserve or even stored. These Jagdpanzers IV were still listed in the Syrian Army inventory during 1990-1991. What became of them is, unfortunately, not currently known.
A few Jagdpanzer IVs were supplied to Syria and used against Israeli forces. Source: tankisworldoftanks
Bulgaria
As Bulgaria was part of the Axis alliance during World War II, it was supplied with German equipment, including some StuG IIIs, Panzer IIIs and IVs, and a small number of Jagdpanzer IVs. During the Cold War, in order to protect its border with Turkey, Bulgaria, a member of the Communist Eastern Bloc, used the older German-supplied armored vehicles, including the Jagdpanzer IV, as static bunkers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these vehicles were abandoned by the Bulgarian Army. They would remain there until 2007, when the Bulgarian Army made extensive recovery operations in order to salvage these vehicles. One of the salvaged vehicles was a Jagdpanzer IV.
This Jagdpanzer IV was salvaged by the Bulgarian Army in 2007. Source: www.reddit.com
For the reorganized West German Army after the war, the concept of an anti-tank vehicle was not completely lost. They would develop and build the Kanonenjagdpanzer, which was, by design, very similar to the Jagdpanzer IV. While such a vehicle was effective during the Second World War, the technological developments and the introduction and widespread use of anti-tank rockets and missiles made such dedicated tank hunter vehicles obsolete.
The post-war Kanonenjagdpanzer, closely resembling the Jagdpanzer IV. Source: Wikimedia Commons
Surviving Vehicles
Today, several vehicles have survived the war around the world. One Jagdanzer IV can be found in the Bulgarian Museum of Glory in Yambol. There were three vehicles, including one of the 0-series, located in France, at the Saumur Armor Museum. The 0-series vehicle was given to Germany and can be today seen in the Panzermuseum Munster, together with another Jagdpanzer IV that was already there. One more can be seen in Switzerland at the Panzermuseum Thun. There is also one located in Syria.
The surviving 0-series Jagdpanzer at the Panzermuseum Munster. Source: Wikimedia CommonsThe second Jagdpanzer IV at the Panzermuseum Munster. Source: Wikimedia CommonsThe Jagdpanzer IV located in the French Saumur Armor Museum. Source:http://tank-photographs.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/jagdpanzer-IV-ausf-f-sdkfz162-tank-destroyer.htmlThe Jagdpanzer IV located in Switzerland at the Panzermuseum Thun. Source: http://preservedtanks.com/Types.aspx?TypeCategoryId=105&Select=1
Conclusion
The Jagdpanzer IV was the first German dedicated anti-tank vehicle. It had excellent protection and firepower and a low silhouette. The Jagdpanzer IV had all the characteristics needed to be an excellent tank hunter. It would see action on nearly all fronts the German Army fought on at the time, in the East, in the West, and on the Italian Front.
When used in combat, it quickly proved to be an effective anti-tank vehicle. While an adequate vehicle for sure, its overall performance was slightly better than the mass-produced StuG III. It shared many elements with it regarding the overall design, firepower, and small height. In retrospect, the Germans could well have been better suited had they followed Guederian’s advice and focused more on the production of an even greater number of StuG III vehicles. The Jagdpanzer IV drained significant and necessary resources from Panzer IV production. In the end, like many German late-war projects, it was built too late and in too few numbers to really have any impact on the whole war.
Early production Jagdpanzer IV. Illustation made by David B.Jagdpanzer IV, Kampfgruppe Von Luck, Normandy, June 1944.Jagdpanzer IV lost in France in 1944 and photographed by Sergeant Walther Shrek of the 3rd Armored Division.Jagdpanzer IV L/48 in winter camouflage, 53rd Panzerjäger Abteilung, 5th Panzer Division, East Prussia, January 1945.Jagdpanzer IV L/48, 3rd SS Panzerjäger Abteilung, 3rd SS Panzer Division, Hungary, March 1945.Jagdpanzer IV L/48, Germany, April 1945.Captured Russian Jagdpanzer IV, 3rd Ukrainian Front, Hungary, March 1945.
Specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
6.85 x 3.17 x 1.86 m
Total weight, battle-ready
24 tonnes
Crew
4 (driver, commander, gunner, loader)
Propulsion
Maybach HL 120 TRM, 272 hp @ 2,800 rpm
Speed
40 km/h (25 mph), 15-18 km/h (cross-country)
Operational range
210 km, 130 km (cross-country)
Traverse
15° right and 12° left
Elevation
-8° to +15°
Armament
7.5 cm (2.95 in) Pak 39 L/48 (79 rounds)
7.9 mm (0.31 in) MG 42, 1200 rounds
Superstructure armor
Front 60 mm, sides 40 mm, rear 30 mm and top 20 mm
The 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz. 6/3 in action is North Africa. Both illustrations by David Bocquelet.
German Reich (1941)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 9 Built
During the war, the Germans encountered ever increasing numbers of strong enemy armor. Due to a general lack of numbers of their own tanks, they were often forced to field improvised anti-tank vehicles. These were mostly based on obsolete tank chassis, such as the Marder series, and armed with good anti-tank guns. In some rare cases, half-tracks were also employed in this manner. One such vehicle was the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette (Sd.Kfz.6/3) developed during late 1941. While the increase in firepower was welcome, these vehicles had a number of defects which ultimately lead to a small production run of only 9 vehicles.
The 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette (Sd.Kfz.6/3). Source: https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/506317-sdkfz-63-diana-soviet-guns-for-the-afrika-korps/
History
From 1941 onwards, on the Eastern Front, the Germans were starting to encounter tanks like the T-34 and KV series, which their tank and anti-tank guns struggled against. The situation in North Africa was not better either, as the British employed tanks such as the Matilda II, which were difficult to effectively deal with. The 7.5 cm PaK 40 towed anti-tank gun that was slowly entering service from the end of 1941 was able to successfully destroy these vehicles at long ranges. However, its main issue was its general lack of mobility, being a heavy towed gun. In the vast expanses of North Africa, a self-propelled anti-tank vehicle could offer a number of advantages, being able to quickly respond to enemy armor movements. It was for this reason that, in August 1941, the Germans began developing such a vehicle. It was meant to reinforce the German forces (Deutsches Afrikakorps DAK – German Africa Corps) fighting in North Africa.
For the initial tests, truck or half-track chassis were proposed. Regarding the armament, the Germans had two options to choose from, either the 5 cm PaK 38 or the captured Soviet 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r). The 7.5 cm PaK 40 was still under development at this time and far from entering service. Ultimately, the choice was cast in favor of the stronger and larger 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r) gun. According to the original plans, if the whole assembly proved viable, a limited production run of some 20 vehicles was to be carried out. This was ultimately changed to only 9 vehicles for unknown reasons. At the end of August, the German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres) announced that, due to the urgent need for such vehicles, the chassis of a modified Sd.Kfz.6 half-track was to be armed with a 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r).
The Sd.Kfz.6 5-ton half-track was one of several similar half-track vehicles employed by the Germans during the war. It was developed back in 1934 by Buessing-NAG with the intention of providing the Pioniere (German Army engineers) with a vehicle for towing pontoon bridges and other equipment and the standard German 10.5 cm field howitzers. During the war, these were modified and used as self-propelled anti-aircraft vehicles. Depending on the role it was to perform, it received a slightly modified designation. The regular engineer version was named Sd.Kfz.6, the artillery towing version was the Sd.Kfz.6/1 and the later anti-aircraft version was the Sd.Kfz.6/2. While the half-track had a somewhat complicated suspension which consisted of 5 (later increased to 7) overlapping and interleaved double road wheels, its performance was deemed satisfactory. Like many other German vehicles, there were simply never enough of them to fulfill the Army’s needs. When the production ended in 1943, some 3,122 had been built.
An Sd.Kfz.6 5-ton half-track towing the standard 10.5 cm leFH 18. Source: Wiki
The main gun for this modification was actually a Soviet 76.2 mm M1936 (F-22) divisional gun. Such guns were captured in huge numbers during the initial months of Operation Barbarossa in the East. After a brief assessment of the gun’s characteristics, the Germans were satisfied with its performance. The gun was given to the army for use, under the name 7.62 cm F.K. (Feldkanone) 36(r) (also sometimes designated as Feldkanone (FK) 296(r)). It was initially used in its original field gun role, but very soon it became clear that it possessed great anti-tank capabilities. As this was a captured weapon, the German Army High Command also issued orders to collect as much armor-piercing and high-explosive ammunition as possible. These were to be then allocated to the unit that was to be equipped with this gun.
The 7.62 cm M1936 (F-22) was a Soviet divisional gun. Source: Wiki
Testing the Prototype
Once the first prototype was completed by Alkett sometime during late August or early September, it was transported for testing at the secret research center in Kummersdorf during September 1941. The prototype had a very basic design, with a large thinly armored structure placed on the former cargo bay of the half-track chassis. The front driver’s compartment was unchanged. The gun was placed inside this new box-shaped firing compartment. In order to fit inside, its trailing legs were shortened.
A series of evaluation and firing tests were conducted on 10th September. A few days later, Wa Prüf 6 (the tanks and motorized equipment design office) personnel made a report of its overall performance. In short, the report described that some 44 high-explosive and armor-piercing rounds were fired from the prototype vehicle at different elevations and traverse angles. No major issues were detected with the gun assembly. The half-track chassis also proved to be up to the job, as it could withstand the recoil of the 7.62 cm gun.
The 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 had a laconic overall design, which is quite evident here. It consisted of a box-shaped fighting compartment and the unchanged driver compartment to the front. Given its short and fast development process, this should not come as a surprise. Source: https://www.chaosbunker.de/en/2020/02/07/sdkfz-6-3-diana-for-the-afrikakorps-but-how/
While the overall design was deemed satisfactory, some changes were requested. The prototype was provided with an armored cover for the half-track’s radiator to protect it from damage from firing the gun, but this did not happen. It was proposed that it be removed, likely to save as much weight as possible. Another change that was requested was to remove part of the rear armor. The reason for this was the noted difficulty that arose during the replacement of the gun barrel and recoil cylinder due to lack of space. The opening to the rear provided the crew with plenty of room to effectively change the gun barrel. To avoid any possible delays, simple soft-steel doors were placed in the opening. On 17th September, further firing tests were conducted using Soviet but also German rounds adapted for the gun. These tests were to be followed up by driving trials.
While not directly related to these projects, the Germans were also experimenting with the idea of using half-track chassis as highly mobile anti-tank vehicles. One of these, which saw combat, was the Panzer-Selbstfahrlafette II, built using the experimental HKP 902 half-track. Only two would be built and they were lost in North Africa.
Another half-track project, the Panzer-Selbstfahrlafette II. Source: red
Name
This vehicle received the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 designation. It is also known under the similar 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf 5t Zkgw designation. There are some misconceptions about the ‘Diana’ nickname for this vehicle. According to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No. Rommel’s Funnies), this name was associated with a subsequent Alkett project from 1942 based on the same half-track chassis, known as the 7.62cm PaK 36 auf 5t Zgkw Diana. While similar to the previous vehicle, it was to incorporate a number of improvements, namely a modified and improved anti-tank gun, better protection and fewer crew members. To complicate matters even more, according to the author T. Cockle (Armor of the Deutsches Afrikakorps), the ‘Diana’ nickname was actually given by the British.
Production Numbers
Only nine 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 vehicles were requested. For this reason, Buessing-NAG was tasked with the production of nine Sd.Kfz.6 chassis, which were delivered during October and November 1941. The company responsible for their final assembly was Alkett. Interestingly, while the majority of sources agree that only nine such vehicles were built, author G. Rottman (German self-propelled guns) notes that only six vehicles were built.
Specifications
The Chassis
This vehicle was based on the modified chassis of the Sd.Kfz.6 half-track. This half-track had a number of changes during its production run, aimed at improving its overall performance. In the case of the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3, the BN 9b subversion was used. Some of the changes compared to previous versions included redesigning the suspension by using the torsion bar units, adding two extra road wheels, and installing a stronger Maybach NL 54 TUKRM engine giving 115 hp @ 2,600 rpm. With this engine and a weight of around 10 to 10.5 tonnes (depending on the source), the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 could reach a maximum speed of some 50 km/h. The fuel load of some 190 liters offered an operational range of 222 km on road and 112 km off-road.
The 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 used a torsion bar suspension with overlapping and interleaved double road wheels. While somewhat complicated, it provided a relatively good off-road drive. Source: https://www.nevingtonwarmuseum.com/sdkfz-63-diana.html
The Fighting Compartment
The Sd.Kfz.6 cargo bay was replaced with a new fighting compartment that was protected by a simple but quite bulky box-shaped armored fighting compartment. The sides of this box-shaped fighting compartment were 3.6 m long and had a height of some 1.5 m. The rear plate was some 2 m wide with the same height. The front was open, with two smaller armored plates connected to the side walls. This is where the gun was to be located and its armored shield was to provide the crew protection from incoming fire. On top, this armored compartment was completely open, but could be covered with canvas to protect the crew from the harsh desert weather if needed. For this reason, three metal bar rails were added on the top to help stretch the canvas cover better.
The front was open in the center to provide room for the gun. Source: https://www.chaosbunker.de/en/2020/02/07/sdkfz-6-3-diana-for-the-afrikakorps-but-how/
On each side of this armored compartment, a large door was added for the crew to enter their positions. These doors could be opened toward the vehicle’s front. They were 90 cm wide and had a height of nearly 1 m. On the rear armor plate, a larger 60 cm wide door made of soft-steel was placed. This door was hinged at its bottom edge. Its primary function was to provide the crew with easy access in order to facilitate the replacement of the gun barrel and other parts. It could also be used to eject spent cartridges.
The doors are visible here. Source: https://www.armedconflicts.com/7-62-cm-FK-296-r-auf-gp-Selbstfahrlafette-Sd-Kfz-6-3-t8911
The Armor
The new fighting compartment was protected (except the rear positioned door, which was made of soft steel) by 4.5 mm armor plates. While it was hoped this would provide protection at least against small-caliber rounds, in reality, it did not. The front was mostly protected with a 3 mm thick gun shield. Some older sources mention that the overall armor thickness was either 8 or 10 mm thick. In a German war report about this vehicle’s performance, it was noted that this armor was insufficient to provide protection from even small caliber machine gun fire.
In theory, for any self-propelled vehicle that was lightly armored, the best defense was a well-selected combat position and good camouflage. While the first of these two could be achieved with good reconnaissance, the latter was quite tricky given the vehicle’s huge size. The half-track SPG was a notoriously large target, with a length of 6.33 m, a width of 2.26 m, and a height of 3.05 m.
While this vehicle was provided with 4.5 mm thick armored plates, in reality, these proved mostly useless against enemy return fire. The large size also did not help much in the survivability of this vehicle. Source: http://www.panzernet.net/panzernet/start.php
The Armament
The main armament was a captured Soviet 7.62 cm M1936 field gun. For installation in this vehicle, only the rear trail legs were shortened and then bolted down to provide stability during firing. The large wheels were also retained, but they were bolted down for the same reason. This gun had a traverse of 30° in both directions and an elevation of -7° to +20°. The armor penetration at 1 km was (depending on the ammunition used) 67 to 77 mm, more than enough to deal with enemy tanks encountered in North Africa.
In a German war report made by a Waffenamt liaison officer, it was noted that this gun (both in the towed and self-propelled versions) would generate fear among the enemy, who in turn would attempt to neutralize it by using artillery or airstrikes.
The 7.62 cm M1936 field gun, while possessing good anti-tank capabilities, was generally unsuited for this role. The main reason for this was the general arrangement of its traverse and elevation wheels. Namely, the traverse wheel was on the left, together with the gun sights, while the elevation handwheel was on the right side. As the gunner was positioned on the left, targeting was made quite difficult, if not almost impossible. The Germans took steps to address the issue, moving the elevation handwheel to the left side, but the linkages limited total elevation.
During the war, the Germans would modify and improve the 7.62 cm M1936 field gun for the anti-tank role. The changes involved adding a muzzle brake (but not all guns were equipped with it), cutting the gun shield in half (the upper part was welded to the lower part of the shield in a similar fashion to the PaK 40 two-part shield) and rechambering the gun to 7.5 cm caliber in order to use standard German ammunition ( as on the PaK 40). After these changes, the gun was renamed 7.62 cm PaK 36(r). This version was not the one mounted on the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3, but the original version of the gun.
The ammunition load was huge, with 100 rounds being stored in an ammunition bin which was located to the rear of the new fighting compartment. An additional 40 rounds could be stored on a towed trailer, if needed. Some sources claim that the ammunition load consisted of 64 rounds, while author D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka) mentions that only 20 rounds were carried inside.
The original Soviet gun had its traverse and elevation handwheel positioned on opposite sides of the gun, which made aiming this gun for anti-tank duties quite difficult. The Germans would later change this by moving both handwheels on the left side. Source: WikiThe armor plates offered no real protection against enemy return fire, and possibly most vehicles were lost this way. To save time and to provide stability for the gun, the wheels of the gun were retained and can be seen here. In addition, the shortened trail legs are also visible. Source: https://www.nevingtonwarmuseum.com/sdkfz-63-diana.htmlThe 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 gun had a traverse of 30° in both directions and an elevation of -7° to +20°. Source: https://www.nevingtonwarmuseum.com/sdkfz-63-diana.htm
The secondary armament consisted of one 9 mm MP 40 submachine gun allocated to the vehicle commander. The remaining crew were issued with pistols for self-defense.
The Crew
This vehicle had a rather large crew, which consisted of a commander, a gunner, a driver, a loader, and two additional ammunition bearers. Beside the driver, who was fully exposed at the front, the remaining crewmen were located in the box-shaped fighting compartment. The number of crew members is listed as 5 in a number of sources.
The 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 had a large crew of six. The driver was probably in the worst situation, as he was completely unprotected and exposed to enemy fire. Source: https://guerra-mundial-1914-1945.fandom.com/es/wiki/7.62cm_Flak_36(r)_auf_Selbstfahrlafette_Zugkraftwagen_5t_Sd.Kfz._6/3_%22Diana%22
Forming the First Units and Organisation
At the end of September 1941, an order was issued to begin the necessary steps for forming a unit equipped with 9 such vehicles. The delivery of completed vehicles was expected to be ready by 25th October. In mid-November, a new order gave instructions to form three Platoons (Zuge). each equipped with three vehicles. The commanders of these Platoons were to be supplied with cars including and support staff, like a motorcycle messenger.
In North Africa
The 9 vehicles were transported from Germany to Italy at the end of December 1941. From there, they were transported by ship to Tripoli. Six vehicles arrived there on 12th January 1942, while the remaining three arrived in late February 1942. The first six 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 were used to reinforce the 3rd Kompanie (Company) of the 605th Panzerjäger Abteilung (Anti-tank Battalion), which was part of the 90th Leichte Division (Light Division). Beside the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3, the 605th Anti-Tank Battalion was also equipped with at least 6 Panzerjäger Is (anti-tank vehicles based on the Panzer I chassis).
Beside the small number of 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 vehicles, the 605th Anti-Tank Battalion was also equipped with the Panzerjäger I which can be seen in the background. Source: https://www.nevingtonwarmuseum.com/sdkfz-63-diana.html
As only six arrived in January, these initially saw action against the British in early 1942. By the 10th of February, probably due to high mechanical failures, only one vehicle of the original six was still operational. By March, with the arrival of the remaining three vehicles, the whole unit was finally attached to the 90th Light Division. The first losses occurred during April, when two vehicles were written-off, but the precise cause of these losses is not recorded.
In May 1942, the 605th anti-tank Battalion still had three operational platoons equipped with this vehicle, which were slightly reduced in strength. The 1st Platoon had three vehicles, while the remaining two Platoons each were equipped with two vehicles. These remaining seven vehicles saw extensive action during Unternehmen Venezia (Operation Venice), an Axis attack on the British positions at Gazala in late May 1942. On 28th May, the few 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 managed to beat back the tanks of the British 4th Armored Brigade near El Adem.
Due to further fighting, the number of these vehicles was reduced to four, while one was under repair on 8th June 1942. Due to further losses, by the start of July, only one operational and two non-operational vehicles were left. The same month, at least two vehicles participated in the Axis conquest of Tobruk. During the failed attempt to break the El Alamein line, one more was lost. At the start of December 1942, the last remaining 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 were finally lost. Of the 9 vehicles built, at least one was captured by the British in North Africa.
This vehicle was captured and examined by the British. Source: http://www.panzernet.net/panzernet/start.phpWhile the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 offered a great increase in firepower and mobility, due to its weak armor and large size, it did not prove to be a successful overall design. Source: https://www.chaosbunker.de/en/2020/02/07/sdkfz-6-3-diana-for-the-afrikakorps-but-how/
Related Vehicles
7.62 cm PaK 36 auf 5t Zgkw ‘Diana’
The ‘Diana’ was a subsequent project from Alkett, meant to provide a more mature design for this type of vehicle. While based on the same chassis, it used the modified Pak 36(r), which had better anti-tank performance, better armor and a smaller crew.
The 7.62 cm PaK 36 auf 8t ZgKw ‘Artemis’
Using the Sd.Kfz.6 was not the last attempt to develop an anti-tank vehicle based on a half-track chassis. The development of such a vehicle based on the larger Sd.Kfz.7 was initiated in August 1941. It was to be lightly protected and to have a crew of only four. While a single prototype was completed, the whole project was eventually abandoned and no photos have survived.
Conclusion
The decision to build only nine 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 was quite justified, as this vehicle had a number of disadvantages. While its gun had good overall armor-piercing properties, its origin as a field gun made it somewhat unfit for the anti-tank role. The overall large shape of the vehicle offered an excellent target for enemy gunners. The weak, almost useless armor offered no real protection against any kind of enemy fire. The low numbers built also limited its overall performance on the front. In the end, while the Germans made some attempts to develop self-propelled anti-tank vehicles based on half-tracks, these projects ended in failure and were built in limited numbers.
The basic Sd.Kfz.6 half-track.The 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 in action is North Africa. Both illustrations by David Bocquelet.
Specifications
Dimensions (l-w-h)
6.33 m, 2.26 m, 3.05 m
Total weight, battle-ready
10 to 10.5 tonnes
Crew
6 (Commander, Gunner, Driver, Loader and two Ammunition )
German Reich (1941)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 174 Anti-Tank and 26 Command Vehicles Built
After the defeat of France in June 1940, the Germans captured huge stockpiles of British and French war materiel. Some of the greatest prizes were the large quantities of tanks of several different types, including the Renault R35. While the R35 was available in great numbers and had good armor for its time, it lacked firepower, speed and had only two crew members. While some would be used in their original tank configuration on less important fronts, the majority would be adapted for various other roles, such as artillery tractors or ammunition supply vehicles. Some 174 would be modified and used as anti-tank vehicles with an additional 24 (based on the same model) being used as command vehicles.
The 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.35 R 731. Source: https://www.armedconflicts.com/4-7-cm-PaK-t-Sfl-auf-Fgst-Pz-Kpfw-35-R-731-f-t6459
History
After the conclusion of the Western campaign, the Germans were in possession of nearly 800 R35 tanks. At the end of 1940, In 6 (the inspectorate for motorized and armored units) issued a request to Wa Prüf 6 for the development of an anti-tank vehicle based on the R35 tank. This vehicle was to be used to equip non-motorized Infantry Divisions. Prior to this request, the Germans had already tested the use of so-called Panzerjäger (anti-tank vehicles) during the Western campaign. These represented an attempt to increase the mobility of anti-tank guns by placing them on an obsolete tank chassis, like the Panzer I. The standard German anti-tank gun was the 3.7 cm PaK 36, which proved a good design in the Polish campaign, but was deemed insufficient for the task afterward. The Germans had in their inventory a good number of the more potent Czechoslovakian 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38 anti-tank guns, known as the 4.7 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 36(t), or simply as 4.7 cm PaK(t). Due to its better firepower, the Germans decided to use this cannon to arm the first self-propelled anti-tank vehicle, known simply as the Panzerjäger I. It consisted of a Panzer I chassis on which the turret was replaced with a 4.7 cm PaK(t) mount and a three-sided shield. While this concept proved to have merit, as shown in France, it was far from perfect. Simply put, the chassis was insufficient for the task and was poorly protected.
The Panzerjager I, the first German self-propelled anti-tank gun, based on the Panzer I chassis and armed with a 47 mm gun. Source: Wiki
As the larger Panzer III and IV were better armed than the Panzer I, there was no point in using them for such modifications at this early stage of the war, as they were too valuable as tanks for the Panzer Divisions. The French R35, on the other hand, was available in great numbers, was better protected than the Panzer I and had a stronger chassis. Adding the potent 4.7 cm PaK(t) instead of the weak 3.7 cm main gun would have kept these vehicles relevant on the contemporary battlefields. These were probably the main reasons why the Germans decided to utilize the R35 chassis for this role.
The R35 in German service. These vehicles were mainly used for occupation and anti-partisan activities. Source: http://www.tankarchives.ca/The R35 was commonly used as a towing vehicle for German heavy artillery. Source: http://www.tankarchives.ca/
For the development of such a vehicle, Wa Prüf 6 chose Alkett to build the first prototype. The soft steel prototype was completed during early February 1941. The conversion included removing the turret and replacing it with an open topped combat compartment armed with the 4.7 cm anti-tank gun. At the end of March, it was presented to Adolf Hitler. He approved the design and an order for 200 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.35 R 731, as it was known, was given, which was to be completed by August that year.
The R35
The Renault R35 was a French light tank developed during the early thirties to replace the aging FT tank. While the French Army tested other heavier designs (the Renault D1 and D2), a simpler and cheaper vehicle was deemed more desirable. Work on this tank began in 1933 at the French Army’s request for a new light tank design. Renault was quick to respond and presented its prototype to the France Army which, after a series of modifications (among which increasing the armor to 40 mm and improving the running gear), placed an order for over 1,600 tanks. While the R35 was well protected, with 40 mm-thick cast armor, it was plagued with problems such as weak firepower (it had the same 37 mm gun as the FT), just two crew members, a lack of radio and slow speed. During its service life, a number of further modifications and tests were carried out in order to improve its firepower and mobility, all with limited success. Regardless, it was the most numerous French tank during the German Invasion of 1940.
The R35 in French service. Source: http://www.warlordgames.com/new-french-renault-r35-tank/
Name
The designation of the German tank destroyer is slightly different depending on the source used. According to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No. 7-1), it is known as 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.35 R 731(f). Author D. Nešić, (Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-Francuska) mentions it as the Selbstfahrlafette 4.7 cm PaK(t) auf PzKpfw 35 R(f). W.J. Spielberger (Beute-Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Deutschen Wehrmacht) names it the 4.7 cm PaK(t) auf Panzerkampfwagen 35 R(f) ohne turm. The precise name is also somewhat complicated by the Germans using both R35 and 35R in their documents.
This article, for the sake of simplicity, will use the simple and unofficial Panzerjäger 35R designation.
Design
Chassis and hull
The hull and superstructure were built using casting. The hull actually consisted of three cast parts that were bolted together. In the front part of the hull, the transmission was placed. Behind it was the crew compartment and, to the rear, separated by a firewall, was the engine compartment. On top of the chassis, a cast superstructure was added. It completely covered most of the vehicle, including the rear engine compartment. In front of the superstructure, a two-part hatch for the driver was located.
The R35 had a somewhat innovative cast hull and superstructure construction. Source: Pinterest
Armored crew compartment
For the construction of the Panzerjäger 35R, the Germans simply removed the R35’s turret and placed a box-shaped and open-topped armored compartment on top of the vehicle. To accommodate this new compartment, the Germans added a metal base that was extended over most of the upper part of the R35 superstructure.
The Panzerjager I was built using the R35 chassis without the turret. This particular R35 (on the left) is a perfect example of the chassis on which the German armored compartment would be added. Source: Unknown
The front rectangular plate of this compartment was placed at 30°. In the middle of it, an opening for the gun was placed. This opening was enclosed with an internal gun shield. On the gun’s left side, a hatch was placed. Its purpose was to cover the gun’s sight and had to be open when engaging enemy targets.
A view of the front plate, with the gun sight hatch closed on the left and open on the right vehicle. In addition, the right vehicle had metal bars welded to the top for better canvas support. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info
The compartment sides consisted of two armored plates. The smaller one, to the front, was slightly angled towards the front plate. The larger side armor had narrow rectangular hatches for the crew on both sides to the rear. On the left side, to the rear, an aerial antenna cubical mount base was installed.
Side view of the vehicle. The side doors are somewhat hard to spot, but they can be identified by the two hinges just behind the Balkenkreuz. In addition, note the antenna’s cubical mount. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No7.1A close-up view of the Panyerjäger 35R’s interior, but with many parts (including the rear part) missing. Sources: http://ritastatusreport.blogspot.com/2015/04/47mm-gun-on-renault-r35-chassis-in-thun.html
The rear part of the compartment consisted of a storage area which was elevated above the engine compartment. This was supported by three metal poles. While all were open-topped, some vehicles had two metal bars welded to the top to provide a better base for the canvas cover.
Rear view of the tank-hunter. Two metal bars holding the rear part of the upper armored crew compartment are visible. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info
Suspension
The Panzerjäger 35R’s suspension was unchanged from the original French design and consisted of five road wheels, three return rollers, one idler and one drive sprocket. Of the five road wheels, four were suspended in pairs and one was independently mounted. The paired road wheels were mounted on bell cranks and suspended using rubber springs. The rear idler was put close to the ground.
A good view of the Panzerjäger 35R’s suspension. Source: Pinterest
Engine
This vehicle was powered by a Renault 4 cylinder engine giving out 85 hp @ 220 rpm. While the overall weight, due to the added extra armor, crew members, armament and ammunition, was increased to 11 tonnes (or 10 tonnes, depending on the source), the driving performance seems to be unchanged in the specifications in most sources. The maximum speed was 20 km/h, while the cross-country speed was only 12 km/h. The low speed was not that a great deficiency for this vehicle, as it was intended to support the non-motorised infantry units. The operational range was some 130 km, dropping down to 80 km cross-country.
To reduce the wear and tear on the suspension and engine, the Germans often employed trailers to transport their tanks. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info
Armor protection
The armor protection could be divided into two sections, the French R35 hull and superstructure, and the German-added top fighting compartment. The French R35 was relatively well protected for its day. Its front hull armor was 32 mm rounded armor. The sides were 40 mm thick, the rear also 40 mm, but placed at 35°, and the bottom was 14 mm thick. The superstructure front armor was 32 mm thick, the sides and rear were 40 mm placed at 10° and 11°. The top armor of the superstructure was 13 mm.
Being lightly armored, good camouflage was one way to increase its survivability in combat. Source: www.armedconflicts.com
The new fighting compartment was less armored. The front was 25 mm thick, placed at 30°. The sides were 20 mm thick at 10° and the flat rear was 20 mm thick. Older sources mention that the frontal armor was 20 mm thick and the sides and rear only 10 mm thick.
The Panzerjäger 35R’s armored crew compartment was only lightly protected, as evidenced by the door’s armor thickness. Source: Pinterest
Armament
The gun used to arm this vehicle was the captured Škoda 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38, known as the 4.7 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 36(t), or simply as the 4.7 cm PaK(t) in German service. The standard armor-piercing Panzergranate 36(t) had a muzzle velocity of 775 m/s and a maximum effective range of 1.5 km. The armor penetration of this round was 48-59 mm at 500 m and 41 mm at 1 km.
In order to extend its operational effectiveness, a new Pzgr.Patr.40 tungsten round was developed (the muzzle velocity was 1,080 m/s). As the Germans lacked sufficient tungsten, this type of ammunition could not be produced in large quantities and its usage was rare. The 4.7 cm PaK(t) also fired high-explosive rounds (2.3 kg weight) with impact fuses to be used against light armor and infantry.
The Škoda 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38 Source: Wiki
The gun itself, without the wheels and the trail legs, was simply bolted on the front, where the R35’s turret ring was previously positioned. The 4.7 cm gun had an elevation of -8° to +10° and a traverse angle of 17.5° on each side. The elevation and traverse were controlled by two handwheels located on the gun’s left side. The main monocular gunsight was not changed. The total ammunition load is unknown. Seeing as the smaller Panzerjäger I was able to carry some 86 rounds, it would be logical to assume that the new Panzerjäger 35R’s ammunition load would be similar, if not slightly larger.
For crew protection, one MP38/40 submachine gun was carried inside. The ammunition load for it was 192 rounds. Being designed to cooperate with the infantry, the lack of a machine gun was not a major issue.
A close-up view of the 4.7 cm mount being bolted to the R35 tank. Source:https://imgur.com/a/vvL8xcN http://ritastatusreport.blogspot.com/2015/04/47mm-gun-on-renault-r35-chassis-in-thun.htmlA dismantled 4.7 cm gun mount from a Panzerjäger I. The Panzerjäger 35R had the same design. Source: H. F. Duske, Panzerjager I, Nuts and Bolts
Crew
This vehicle had a crew of three, which included the commander, who was also the gunner, the loader and the driver. The driver’s position was on the left side of the vehicle. He entered his position through a two-part hatch with a visor. The remaining two crewmen were positioned in the new armored fighting compartment. The commander/gunner was positioned to the left of the gun, and the loader to the right of him. While not listed in the sources, it is likely that the loader would also act as the radio operator.
The Panzerjäger 35R had a crew of three. Source: Pinterest
Production
As already mentioned, the production order for this vehicle was awarded to Alkett. The preparation for production was to begin in February/March 1941, with some 30 vehicles per month. There would be some delays in production, so the quota of 30 vehicles was not always achieved. By May 1941, some 93 vehicles were completed, followed by 33 in June, only 5 in July, 22 in August, 28 in September and the final 19 vehicles in October 1941. Not all were built as anti-tank vehicles. Of the 200 vehicles, some 26 were constructed as command vehicles.
Organization
The first available vehicles were used to form three 30-vehicle strong Panzerjäger Abteilung – Pz.Jg.Abt (self-propelled anti-tank battalions), the 559th, 561st, and the 611th. Each of these battalions consisted of an HQ unit and three Kompanie (Companies). Each Company was divided into smaller three-vehicle strong Zuge (Platoons). There was an additional Company sent to the 43rd Battalion, supplied with a few vehicles, to act as a reserve and training unit. The remaining vehicles would be mainly distributed in smaller numbers to various Infantry Divisions.
Service
Failed actions in the East
The Panzerjäger 35Rs, like many other German armored vehicles, were mobilized for the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The 559th was allocated to Army Group North, while the 561st and 611th went to Army Group Center. For these vehicles, the war started pretty badly. Nearly all vehicles were out of action due to mechanical breakdowns just a few days after the start of the German attack. For example, in the case of the 611th Battalion, it lost all its vehicles on the first day of the attack. In desperation, the unit was instead equipped with the 3.7 cm PaK 36 towed gun and even some Soviet captured anti-tank guns. The 559th Battalion also had the same fate, replacing its vehicles with 3.7 cm PaK anti-tank guns. The 561st was pulled back from the front, temporarily waiting to replace the tank destroyers with towed anti-tank guns.
Another unit that was sent to the Soviet Union, probably in late 1941, was the 318th Company, which had ten 35R tank-hunters and 2 command vehicles. These performed poorly based on the unit report dated from February 1942. In this report, it was noted that these vehicles had poor engines, which were ill suited for the field conditions of the East. Bad weather and the poor road system prevented long road marches with this vehicle. Due to the low temperatures, the engines could not be started and even the road wheels would be blocked and unable to move because of this. After this poor performance, no more 35R anti-tank vehicles would be sent to the East. The fate of these vehicles is not clear in the sources.
A Panzerjäger passing a destroyed T-34 somewhere on the Eastern Front. Source: www.armedconflicts.comThe command version (easily identified by the lack of gun) based on the Panzerjäger 35R. Source: Pinterest
In the West
The remaining Panzerjäger 35Rs, some 148 vehicles in April 1942, would be stationed in the West, where the climate was more suitable for their use. In the West, these vehicles were not used in Battalion strength, but instead mostly allocated to a number of Infantry Divisions in small numbers. Some of these included 3 with the 100th Panzer Regiment, 2 in the 243rd Panzer Division, 11 in the 343rd Infantry Division, 10 in the 191st Reserve Division, etcetera. In December 1943, of 92 Panzerjäger 35Rs, some 88 were operational. Prior to the Allied invasion of France in 1944, some 110 vehicles of this type were available. Why this number is higher than the previous year is sadly not mentioned in the sources. Between 1942 and 1944, these vehicles were mainly used for occupation and patrol duties and crew training.
A Panzerjäger 35R during an exercise, possibly somewhere in France. Source: http://www.tankarchives.ca/
The available Panzerjäger 35Rs would meet the Allied invasion of occupied France. Unfortunately, the sources do not give much information about their actual combat service. Being based on a pre-war vehicle and armed with a weak 4.7 cm anti-tank gun (by 1944 standards), its effectiveness was limited at best. It is hard to know precisely, but probably all were lost in the first few months of combat in France.
An abandoned Panzerjäger 35R being inspected by American soldiers in late June 1944, at Littry. Source: www.armedconflicts.com
Modifications
Führungs-fahrzeuge auf Fgst.Kpfw.35 R 731(f)
The Führungs-fahrzeuge auf Fgst.Kpfw.35 R 731(f) (also known in sources as the Befehlspanzer fur 4.7 cm PaK(t) Einheiten auf Panzerkampfwagen 35 R) was a command vehicle based on the Panzerjäger 35R. It was built by removing the 4.7 cm anti-tank gun and replacing it with a ball mounted Kugelblende 30 MG 34 machine gun. Not all vehicles were actually equipped with the machine gun mount, as some were left without any armament. It was equipped with additional radio equipment and built in small numbers, some 26 vehicles in total.
Führungs-fahrzeuge auf Fgst.Kpfw.35 R 731(f). Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No7.1
The 5 cm Pak 38 auf R35(f) project
At the end of July 1941, Alkett was instructed by Wa Prüf 6 to design and produce a modified version of this vehicle armed with the 5 cm PaK 38. This vehicle was designated 5 cm PaK 38 auf R 35(f). Once adopted, it was to be allocated to anti-tank units of standard Infantry Divisions. Due to the addition of the larger gun, the weight of the vehicle would rise to 11.5 tonnes. Ultimately, while one vehicle was to be ready by August 1941, it is unlikely that this was ever achieved.
The 5 cm gun was a powerful weapon with much stronger recoil, and it is not clear if the R35 chassis could have successfully handled it without major mechanical problems. The poor performance of this chassis in the East probably also influenced the decision to drop this project.
Drawing of how the 5 cm PaK 38 R35(t) may have looked. Source: http://www.tankarchives.ca/2016/10/renault-r-35-in-german-service.html
In Hungarian Service
At least two of these vehicles were temporarily given to Hungarians to fight Soviet partisans. Sadly, not much is known about their use by the Hungarians.
One of the two Panzerjäger 35Rs temporarily given to the Hungarians by the Germans. Source: B. Adam, E. Miklos, S. Gyula, A Magyar Királyi Honvédség külföldi gyártású páncélos harcjárművei 1920-1945
Surviving vehicle
Today, only one Panzerjäger 35R (with some parts missing) exists and can be seen at the Swiss military Museum at Thun.
The lone surviving Panzerjäger 35R Source: http://ritastatusreport.blogspot.com/2015/04/47mm-gun-on-renault-r35-chassis-in-thun.html
The Panzerjäger 35R shared a number of positive and negative characteristics with its cousin, the Panzerjäger I. It provided the German infantry with a more mobile anti-tank platform with a relatively good gun and somewhat better protection than the earlier Panzerjäger I. While it was slow, the infantry it was designed to provide cover for were themselves not a very mobile force, so it was not a major issue.
The problem with this vehicle was its mechanical unsuitability for the Eastern Front (a problem that most French vehicles had when they were used there by the Germans). The poor roads and cold climate prevented the Panzerjäger 35R from being of any use on this front. The armor protection, especially the all around (but open-top) crew compartment, was still weak by the standards of 1942. While the later Marder series was also poorly protected, they had the benefit of longer range guns, which this vehicle did not have. In any case, the Panzerjäger 35R was surely a good way of increasing the effectiveness of the obsolete R35 tank, but was let down by its basis.
The Renault R35s were given a new utility by mounting the Czech 4.7 cm gun on top. Illustration by David Bocquelet.
4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.35 R 731 specifications
German Reich (1943)
Assault Gun/Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 89 Built + 2 Prototypes
Following the cancelation of the Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Porsche’s VK45.01(P) heavy tank project, the Germans were left with 100 built chassis, including several completed tanks. As these represented a huge material, financial, and time investment, a solution for reusing these in some way had to be found. One solution was to modify them as self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, which the Germans ultimately did. The majority of Dr. Porsche’s VK45.01(P) heavy tank chassis would be rebuilt for this purpose. These would be armed with the powerful 88 mm L/71 gun and protected with 200 mm of frontal armor, making them formidable adversaries on the battlefield at that time. Despite the small numbers built, these would see extensive combat use during the war, where their effectiveness was plagued with many mechanical and logistical problems.
The Ferdinand tank destroyer. Source: Panzernet.net
Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Porsche’s heavy tanks projects
Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Porsche began his engineering career in the early twentieth century when he showed great interest in developing hybrid (combination of electric and petrol) engines. He even built a few new automobile designs which incorporated hybrid engines. During the First World War, while working for the Austrian Daimler factory, he proposed an artillery tractor that would use this hybrid engine. Eventually, nothing came from this idea. In 1930, he founded his own company located in Stuttgart. Porsche’s new company was mainly engaged in developing various designs based on the request of the clients.
Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Porsche. Source: WIki
Dr. Porsche would also get a chance to participate in military tank design, as he was appointed chairman of the German Panzer Commission in September 1939. This Commission was composed of leading owners of major industrial plants and engineers. Their primary function was to give suggestions and new ideas for further or already existing tank designs. While working on a number of military design projects, Dr. Porsche would establish a good relationship with Adolf Hitler. This support gave Dr. Porsche’s work a huge advantage over the competition, despite generally creating either too complicated or too expensive designs.
By the end of 1939, Dr. Porsche began working on designing components for a new heavy tank project for the German Army. His approach was somewhat unorthodox, as he was not limited by any requirements or technical specifications. Dr. Porsche’s initial work was mainly focused on the development of engines and transmissions. In cooperation with Oberingenieur Karl Rabe, Dr. Porsche made his first plans and calculations for a new vehicle called Porsche Typ 100 in early December 1939. While the name of this vehicle would change several times, today it is best known as the VK30.01(P), given by Krupp in March 1941. The following year, in 1940, in a meeting with Wa Prüf 6 (automotive design office under the Waffenamt) officials, Dr. Porsche received proper specifications for the new tank and received the necessary funds to actually build the first prototype. The Typ 100 was to be powered by two air-cooled engines placed at the rear. Each of these two engines was then connected to an electrical generator. These were used to provide power to the two additional engines placed in the hull. These in turn were used to power the front-drive sprockets. The Typ 100 used new longitudinally mounted torsion bars suspension. The six road wheels were to be placed in pairs on the three torsion bar units on each unit. Eventually, due to urgent needs of the development of the Tiger program, and due to a number of problems identified (huge fuel consumption, suspension problems, etc.) on the Typ 100, the project was canceled. Only one (or two, depending on the source) soft steel operational prototypes would be built and used for testing.
Porsche’s first heavy tank prototype, known as the Typ 100. Source: http://www.tankarchives.ca/2018/06/porsches-leopard.html
By the end of May 1941, Hitler issued the requirements for the new heavy tank project. These included an increase in armor thickness (up to 100 mm maximum) and the use of an 88 mm gun. Dr. Porsche began working on this new design during July 1941, and two months later, the first drawings and calculations were ready. Similar to the previous vehicle, this project was initially designated as Typ 101, but the name changed several times during the span of a year. Today, it is generally known as the VK45.01(P) or Tiger (P). This vehicle had several changes to its design in comparison to its predecessor. To have a better distribution of weight, the turret was moved more to the front and the final drive unit was repositioned to the rear. The engine was replaced with a more powerful one. Additionally, there were many overall design changes to its chassis and superstructure design.
The Typ 101, also known as VK45.01(P). Despite being produced in a small series, only one vehicle in its original configuration was used in combat. Source: Panzernet.net
Construction of such a vehicle was given to Nibelungenwerk. The first prototype was completed in April 1942 and presented to Hitler on his birthday, 20th April. Hitler was impressed with it, as Dr. Porsche received a production order for 90 vehicles (plus 10 with hydraulic drive) in May 1942. A second prototype, which was built shortly after, was transported to the Army weapon test site at Kummersdorf in June 1942. There, the VK45.01(P) proved to be prone to malfunctions, especially with the new engine.
Porsche gets rejected
Following a number of rigorous tests, the VK45.01(P) proved to be a complicated and mechanically unreliable vehicle. The competing Henschel prototype was also prone to malfunctions but was nevertheless deemed to have a better overall design. At the end of August 1942, the Reichsminister (Minister of Armaments and War Production), Albert Speer, had the opportunity to examine Dr. Porsche’s work at Nibelungenwerke. Reichsminister Speer even had the chance to actually drive the VK45.01(P) prototype. However, this visit was quite unsuccessful for Dr. Porsche. Witnessing the overall performance of the VK45.01(P), Reichsminister Speer insisted that this project be canceled, despite having received great favor from Hitler himself. Due to the many mechanical problems and overcomplicated design, even Hitler agreed that the VK45.01(P) was a failure and, on 22nd November (or October, depending on the source) 1942, he officially ended Dr. Porsche’s heavy tank project. While less than 10 (out of an order of 100) VK45.01(P) would be fully completed as tanks, only one heavily modified vehicle would be ever used in combat during 1944, on the Eastern Front, as a command vehicle.
As these chassis were already produced, they presented a huge financial and resource investment that could not be simply discarded, so something had to be done on that matter. Wa Prüf 6 made proposals to mount 150, 170, or even 210 mm heavy caliber guns on them, but nothing came from these proposals. Hitler proposed for them to be modified and used as schwere Sturmgeschütz (heavy assault guns). The frontal armor was to be increased to 200 mm (from the original 100 mm) and to be armed with the newly developed 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 anti-tank gun. In the following months, the precise role that this vehicle would fulfill was changed a few times. Initially, it was allocated to the Artillery Army branch. The project officially got the green light by the direct order of Reichsminister Speer on 22nd September 1942.
Name
This vehicle was initially designated as Typ 130 by Alkett (who was responsible for the development of prototypes). During its early development phase, in late 1942, a number of different designations were allocated to it. One of these was Sturmgeschütz mit der 8.8 cm lang or Tiger Sturmgeschütz. At that time, the simpler Ferdinand name (given in honor of Dr. Porsche) was becoming more frequently used by the designers and, later, even by the troops.
During February 1943, Wa Prüf 6 issued a list of potential names for this vehicle. These included Sturmgeschütz auf Fahrgestell Porsche Tiger mit der langer 8.8, Panzerjäger Tiger (P) 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71 Sd.Kfz 184 or the similar 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 Sfl L/71 Panzerjäger Tiger (P) Sd. Kfz. 184. The simplest one was Panzejäger Tiger (P).
At the end of November 1943, Adolf Hitler gave a suggestion for a new name, Elefant (Elephant). The name was officially adopted during February 1944 and came to be implemented from May 1944 on. Despite the common misconception that this designation was applied to modified vehicles that were used from 1944 on, this was not the case (source T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9 Jagdpanzer). For the Germans, the Ferdinand and Elefant were one and the same vehicle.
Production
The Ferdinand was initially designated to fulfill the role of an assault gun. The major manufacturer of such vehicles (primarily the Sturmgeschütz III, StuG III) was Alkett for most of the war. While Alkett possessed the necessary tools and manpower to complete the construction of the Ferdinand vehicles, it was decided by Wa Prüf 6 (during February 1943) that these were to be completed at Nibelungenwerke. On the other hand, Alkett (with the support of Dr. Porsche) would be involved in the construction of the first two prototype vehicles (chassis numbers 150010 and 150011 – depending on the source, the numbers are written with a space after the third number or without it). In general, Alkett was unable to proceed with the Ferdinand project. It was heavily involved with StuG III production and could not free up its production capacity to be involved in another project. There was also a general lack of proper rail transport units that were able to successfully carry the heavy weight of the Ferdinand’s larger components.
The Nibelungenwerke factory was located in the city of Sankt Valentin (near Steyr, in Austria) and was founded shortly after the German annexation of Austria. Initially, it was involved in production of Panzer IVs, which were then transported to Krupp-Gruson. Nibelungenwerke would be substantially enlarged so that it was capable of producing Panzer IV Ausf.F tanks. Its officials would also make an agreement with Dr. Porsche to develop his heavy tank projects. While it possessed production capabilities to conduct the construction process, Alkett provided Nibelungenwerke with a group of 120 skilled metalworkers to speed up the whole production process.
Alkett’s first blueprints of the Typ 130. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer
As the construction of the Ferdinand required extensive modifications to the VK45.01(P) chassis, other subcontractors would be needed. For example, Eisenwerke Oberdonau from Linz was responsible for making the necessary modifications to the hull. Siemens-Schuckert of Berlin was to provide the electrical motors and the generator. Krupp from Essen was responsible for producing the large casemates.
Due to some delays, the first 15 hulls were completed in January 1943. The remaining hulls would be ready by mid-April 1943 when they were transported to Nibelungenwerke for final assembly. Krupp was also involved in providing additional necessary parts. On 16th February 1943, the construction of the first vehicle (chassis number 150010) began. According to the original production plans, the last vehicle was to be completed by mid-May 1943.
The precise production run was slightly different depending on the source. For example, according to T. Melleman (Ferdinand Elefant Vol.I), production began in early 1943, when 15 vehicles were completed. These were followed by 26 vehicles in February, 37 in March, and, by May, all 90 were completed. Initially, four vehicles were used for training purposes.
According to T. Anderson (Ferdinand and Elefant tank destroyer), production was planned as 15 vehicles in February, 35 in March, and the final 40 in April. T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.23, Panzer production 1933-1945) state that 30 were built in April and the remaining 60 in May.
A row of Ferdinands under construction. Source: Panzernet.netThe last completed Ferdinand, chassis number 150100, containing various inscriptions added by the workers. Source: www.worldwarphotos.infoThe Ferdinand components were built by a number of different subcontractors. When completed, these were sent to Nibelungenwerke for final assembly. Source: J. Ledwoch Ferdinand/Elefant,
Initial testing
As the production of the first vehicles was going on, two Alkett prototype vehicles, chassis numbers 150010 and 150011, were transported to the weapon test site at Kummersdorf and Magdeburg by order of Wa Prüf 6 for testing and evaluation. These two can be easily identified by the rear positioned flexible fenders and protective covers for the forward-mounted headlights (both would be removed on the production vehicles). One of these vehicles would be presented to Hitler on 19th March 1943 during an exhibition of new vehicle prototypes at the Rugenwalde proving ground.
One of the two prototypes was presented to Hitler at the Rugenwalde proving ground on the 19th March 1943. Source; T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank DestroyerOne of the first constructed Ferdinands (Chassis number 150011) at Kummersdorf during testing in mid-April 1943. Source: Vol.1 book
In a report dated 23rd February 1943, over a dozen or so deficiencies were listed for the second prototype (chassis number 150011). Some of these included that the fuel line from the left engine was positioned too close to the exhaust pipe, the electric-powered fuel pumps were unreliable, the fact that in order to drain the cooling liquid, nearly 50 screws had to be removed, checking the oil level in the air compressor was difficult, the short life of the cooling system drive belts, the hand brakes were too weak, the inadequate size of the towing hooks, and spring breakages on the running gears, among several others. In normal conditions, the Ferdinands would have probably spent months in the workshops, where designers and engineers would try to resolve these issues. But, in 1943, the German Army was preparing to commence a new offensive operation on the Eastern Front. The majority of the Ferdinands were already on their way to this front. The only real option was to provide the Ferdinand-equipped units with Formveräderungen (Modification kit equipment) to be implemented in the field.
The two prototype vehicles would be thoroughly tested during 1943, mainly focusing on their mechanical reliability. In the case of the prototype with chassis number 150011, by late August 1943, it was reported to have driven some 911 km. With a weight of 64.37 tonnes (without crew and ammunition), the fuel consumption was noted to be huge. On good roads, in order to cross 100 km, the Ferdinand needed 867.9 liters. Cross country, this reached up to 1,620 liters at the same range. Many defects with the engine design, huge fuel and oil consumption, problems with the suspension design, poor accessibility for maintenance etcetera were noted.
Specifications
The Ferdinand was, in essence, divided into two large sections. The hull contained the two front crew members, four engines, and generators. The enclosed casemate positioned at the rear held the 8.8 cm main gun, the ammunition, and the rest of the crew. Each of these components was built using welded armor plates with some elements being connected using bolts.
A cross-section showing Ferdinand’s interior. Source: butterfingeredmodelbuilder.wordpress.com
Lower Hull
The Ferdinand’s lower hull could be divided into four sections: the front driving compartment, the main engines positioned in the center, the lower rear electric engines, and the fighting compartment placed on top of it. The hull was constructed using welding, with the added frontal armor held in place by bolts.
Close-up view of a Ferdinand hull under construction. The original VK45.01(P) rear engine compartment’s curved armor is evident here. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II,
Superstructure
On top of the Ferdinand lower hull was a fully enclosed superstructure which provided protection for the two crew members and the engines. It had a rather simple square design, with flat sides that angled inwards toward the front plate, while the rear part had a reverse angle.
The front part of the superstructure was where the driver and the radio operator were positioned. These two crewmembers entered their position through two hatches placed on top of the superstructure. The original VK45.01(P) round side doors intended for these two crew members were simply welded shut. The front driver visor and the machine gun ball mount were removed and replaced with a simple 100 mm thick armored plate. To provide the driver with a means to see where he was driving, a protected three-sided periscope was placed on top of his hatch door. In addition, there were two round-shaped visor ports (additionally protected with armored glass) placed on both sides of the inward-angling side armor. Next to the radio operator’s hatch on the vehicle’s right side was placed the antenna mount.
Close-up view of the driver’s hatch and the three periscopes. Source: J. Ledwoch Ferdinand/Elefant,
These two crew members were separated from the remaining rear-positioned crew members. The only way of communication with the commander was by using an intercom. It consisted of earphones and a throat microphone. In real combat conditions, this system proved to be prone to malfunctions. In an attempt to solve this issue, the Germans tried using light signals for communication between the driver and commander.
Behind these two crew members was placed the engine compartment, which was separated (on both sides) by a fire-resistant wall. It consisted of the two gasoline engines, electric generators, coolant radiators, and cooling fans, oil and fuel tanks. In order to put all these components into the engine compartment, they had to be placed close to each other, which caused many overheating problems and even cases of fire were not uncommon later during Ferdinand’s service life.
The top of this compartment was protected by an armored plate that was held in place by simple bolts. This way, it could be easily removed to facilitate necessary repairs. In the middle of this plate, a square armored grid cover was placed for the air intakes. On both sides of it, two rectangular grid hatches for the protection of the radiator’s air fan exhausts were placed. Close to the large casemate, there were three narrow hatches that covered most of the width of the engine compartment. They mainly served as engine access doors but, in the field, the crews would often leave them open for better ventilation. The engine exhaust pipes ran internally on both sides of the hull. They exited through a small opening which was located close to the fifth road wheel on both sides. While this arrangement provided protection for the exhaust pipes, the extensive heat rapidly deteriorated the grease lubricants on the fifth wheels. These affected their life expectancy and they had to be replaced often.
Behind the rear positioned engine firewall, two Siemens generators were placed. Atop them, the remaining crew members were stationed, protected by the large and well-protected casemate. While the original VK45.01(P) hull was reused for the Ferdinand vehicle, the rear part was changed. The two angled side plates were replaced with a flat one extended to the rear, which was more suited to carry the huge casemate.
A brand new Ferdinand. Note the small round-shaped visor port on the angled left side. Source: www.armedconflicts.comFront view of the Ferdinand vehicle. The front armored plates were held in place by over 30 bolts. Source: Panzernet.net
The toolbox was placed on the superstructure’s right front side. This was not an ideal location, as it could be easily damaged during combat operations. So, it would be moved to the rear of the vehicles. The crews would also add additional spare boxes for various additional equipment.
Ferdinands had a spare toolbox placed on the superstructure’s right front side. This particular box is opened and the tools stored inside can be seen. Source: Pinterest
Casemate
The huge casemate positioned to the rear of the vehicle housed the 8.8 cm gun and four crew members. Its overall construction was simple, as it consisted of four armored plates plus the top one which were welded together. Viewed from the front, the casemate had a trapezoidal shape. While these plates were thick, they were also slightly sloped to provide additional protection. It was not actually welded to the superstructure but was instead held in place by bolts. Outside, close to the engine compartment, there was a small rectangular plate (with five bolts) that served as a reinforced connector between the superstructure and the casemate.
The front plate had a round-shaped opening in the middle for the gun ball mount. To avoid getting rainwater into the engine, some crews welded two diagonal improvised drains in front of the superstructure.
This vehicle is under repair and in the process of removing its large casemate. The small reinforced connector plate is actually removed for this purpose. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank DestroyerThis vehicle had the improvised rain drains located just below the third bolt on the gun mantlet. The Source: Unknown
To the rear part of each side armor plate, a cone-shaped pistol port was placed. These were actually plugs that were connected to chains. When in use, the armored cover would simply be pushed out by one of the crew members. Once open, these would just hang on to the chains and could be closed back by dragging the chain back in. To the rear, in the middle of the casemate, a large round-shaped one-piece hatch was located. In the center of this door, a much smaller round-shaped hatch was located. Its main role was to act as another pistol port and to be used during the ammunition resupply. Two additional pistol ports were placed on both sides of this door.
The rear positioned round door with the smaller center-positioned hatch being open and used for ammunition resupply. Source: Pinterest
The top was not flat and was actually slightly angled toward the engine compartment. In front of it, the arc-shaped armored cover was used for the gunner’s periscope. To the right of it, the commander’s square-shaped two-piece hatch was located. Somewhat surprisingly for German standards, the commander was not provided with a command cupola and his view of the surroundings was quite limited. Further back, on the left side, the loader’s round-shaped two-part hatch was located. In the back corners, two round-shaped ports were used by the two loaders to see the surrounding with periscopes. In the middle, a ventilation port with protective sides was installed.
Due to its extreme weight, every bridge crossing was not to be taken lightly. If the bridge construction was not strong, there was a good chance to disintegrate and take the Ferdinand with it, like in this case. However, this provides us with a good view of the commander’s (to the right) hatch, gunner’s (to the left) curved periscope shield, and the ventilation port in the middle. The loader’s hatch and the two periscope ports are not visible here. Source: PinterestThis particular Ferdinand is missing its rear hatch. The two pistol port cone-shaped covers were out hanging on the chains. Source: Warspor.ruA dismantled casemate awaiting repair and later assembly. Source: https://mikesresearch.com/2020/05/24/ferdinands-elefants-on-the-eastern-front/
Suspension and Running Gear
The Ferdinand’s suspension consisted of six large road wheels, a front idler, and a rear drive sprocket on each side. The six road wheels were divided into pairs and were placed on bell cranks, which in turn were mounted on longitudinal torsion bar units. Each of these pairs of road wheels was actually suspended individually. Initially, Dr. Porsche’s design utilized rubber-rimmed wheels. As these were quickly worn out due to the extreme friction between the track and the wheels, Dr. Porsche designed a much simpler solution, using steel wheels with inbuilt spring units to help with shock absorption. The Germans, by this time, were having shortages of rare materials, including rubber, so this was a welcome innovation that would see use in later years on the Panther and the Tiger tanks. The road wheels had a diameter of 794 mm.
The Ferdinand, on paper, had a relatively simple suspension that consisted of six large road wheels. To save rubber and to extend their service life, they were made of steel with no rubber rim. Source: Pinterest
The shapes of the front idler and rear drive sprocket were visually almost identical. The main difference between these two was in their internal construction. They were identical to simplify the production of parts. But the main reason was to prevent the track from falling off the suspension due to the vehicle’s length and lack of any return rollers. Both the idler and the drive sprocket had a diameter of 920 mm and consisted of two toothed rings that had 19 teeth. The tracks used were 600 mm wide and were connected using single-pins. The ground clearance of this vehicle was 50 cm.
Close-up view of the longitudinal torsion bar units. Source: tank-photographs.s3
Dr. Porsche’s suspension design had positive and negative sides. The positive side was that the whole suspension system was completely external. This allowed him to lower the vehicle’s hull and provide more working space inside it. On the other hand, while the overall design was (at least in theory) simple, it was prone to malfunctions and breakdowns. Due to the vehicle’s extreme weight, replacing broken parts was difficult to achieve without proper equipment.
Engine and Transmission
As Dr. Porsche’s original VK45.01(P) dual-electrical engine system proved to be too complicated and unreliable, it was decided to replace these with a more orthodox power unit. Two Maybach HL 120 TRM gasoline engines giving out 265 hp@ 2600 rpm were chosen instead. Each of these two engines was provided with a 74-octane gasoline fuel tank. The engine was water-cooled, with some 37 l placed in two coolant tanks. One cooling tank was placed on top of the generators, while the second was in front of the engine. Based on the experience the Germans gained during the previous two Russian winters, they paid great attention to providing Ferdinand’s oil radiator with a system that would enable it to start during cold weather. This was a simple system that redirected hot water from the cooling radiator to a small vessel placed next to the oil radiator, which in turn heated the oil. The engine’s gearbox had three forward and three reverse speeds. The engine compartment was designed rather hastily and the maintenance was not always easy to accomplish.
Each fuel tank could carry some 475 liters (950 l in total). The Ferdinand was, due to its weight, a heavy fuel consuming beast. It needed some 1,100 l for crossing 100 km of road. With the fuel load carried inside, the operational range was 150 km on good roads, while off-road, often the case on the Eastern Front, the operational range was reduced to only 95 km. The maximum speed for a vehicle weighing 65 tonnes was a solid 30 km/h, but it could be only achieved on good roads and for a short period of time. The maximum cross-country speed was only 10 km/h or even less.
The engines used to power the two Siemens Typ K58-8 generators. These two generators would in turn produce the necessary power for the two Siemens Typ 1495a direct current electric (230 kW each) motors. These two electric motors were positioned under the casemate. Each of them was responsible for providing power to one side of the vehicle, being connected to the rear positioned drive sprockets through electromechanical drives.
The rear positioned Siemens Typ 1495a direct current electric motors gave the necessary power to turn the two drive sprockets. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.IITop view of the engine compartment cover plate. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank DestroyerThe position and the design of the engine compartment meant that any repair of this part of the vehicle was overcomplicated. Without proper tools and crane equipment, it was almost impossible. Source: Thoma
Armor Protection
The Ferdinand had formidable armor protection for its day. The upper front armor of the hull was 200 mm thick (at a 30-32° angle, depending on the source). This was not a single-piece armor plate, but instead two 100 mm thick plates (or 90 and 110 mm, depending on the source) joined together. These were held in place by 32 conical head bolts. Alkett initially proposed adding 80 mm of 55° angled armor to the front, but this was not implemented
The lower part of the hull was a single piece measuring 80 mm placed at an angle of 45° (42°). The top part of the lower hull was 60 mm at 78° (82°) angle. The flat hull side armor was 60 mm and the rear ranged from 40 (60 mm depending on the source) to 80 mm (at a 60° to 90° angle). The bottom armor was 20 mm thick. It is not clear in the sources if the previously positioned machine gun ball mount and the driver visor port openings were left empty or filled in with armor plates.
The superstructure frontal armor was 200 mm thick placed at a 9° (12°) angle. It too consisted of two separated armor plates held in place by a combination of welding and bolts. Some sources state both plates were 100 mm thick, while others claim they were 90 and 110 mm thick. The flat sides were 80 mm, rear 80 mm placed at a 40° angle, and 30 mm on the top.
This captured vehicle was used by the Russian as target practice. It has a hole where the machine gun ball mount was previously located. Source: Warspot.ru
The rear positioned casemate was protected with a single piece of 200 mm frontal armor plate placed at a 20° angle. The sides were 80 mm thick and placed at a 30° angle. The rear armor was the same armor thickness placed at a 20° angle. The top was much lighter, at 30 mm placed at an 86° angle.
The same vehicle as above. It had its casemate armor used as a firing target for a number of different weapons. While the Ferdinand’s front armor was formidable, the side and rear were still thick, but certainly not invincible. Source: Warspot.ru
Crew
The Ferdinand had a crew of six, which were separated into two groups. The first group consisted of the driver and the radio operator, who were placed in the front hull. For steering the Ferdinand, a standard lever arrangement was used. However, their operation was slightly different in comparison to other vehicles. Namely, by moving the steering levers, instead of controlling the two drive sprockets, on the Ferdinand, they actually controlled the two electric motors, each responsible for powering one side. In front of the driver, there were two pedals: one for acceleration and the second for activating the drum brake. There was also an auxiliary lever parking brake, which also served as a clutch.
The huge Ferdinand needed six crew members to be operated properly. Source: Panzernet.net
The radio operator’s job was to operate the Fu 5 radio set, which consisted of the transmitter and a receiver. The 2-meter aerial antenna was placed next to his hatch. An additional 1.8 m Sternantenne D antenna mount was placed on the rear right corner of the casemate. This antenna was used for the command vehicles which were equipped with Fu 8 radio, which had a stronger transmitter and receiver. The spare batteries for the radio were held under the radio operator’s seat.
The remainder of the crew, which included the commander, gunner, and two loaders were positioned in the rear casemate. The commander had only a limited view of the surroundings by using the Scherenfernrohr (scissor periscope), and only with the hatch open. The loaders had two Turmbeobachtungsfernrohr (observation periscopes).
Quite surprisingly, the Ferdinand did not have a commander’s cupola, which was quite a common sight on other German vehicles. The only way a commander could see potential targets was through a scissor periscope with a limited arc and with an open hatch. Source: K. Münch (2005) Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II,
Armament
The main armament of the Ferdinand was the 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71, probably the best anti-tank gun of the Second World War. It was, in essence, a modified version of the 8.8 cm Flak 41 anti-aircraft gun. During the war, the Germans developed and used two towed 8.8 cm anti-tank gun versions. The first one was the PaK 43, which was mounted on a four-wheel carriage, and the second was the PaK 43/41, placed on a mount with components from a few different artillery pieces (wheels from 15 cm s.FH.18 and the split trail legs from the 10.5 cm le.FH.18). The PaK 43/41 used a horizontal sliding block mechanism, while the Pak 43 had a vertical one. The PaK 43/41 was an effective anti-tank gun, being able to take out all of the Allied tanks, but was also too heavy.
The 88 mm PaK 43 and the 43/41 (in the picture) were some of the most effective anti-tank guns of the war. Their heavy weight, on the other hand, meant that they were difficult to transport or move by their crews. For this reason, they were jokingly known by their crews as the ‘barn doors’ (Scheunentor). Source: Wiki
For use on the Ferdinand (and, later, the Jagdpanther), the Germans introduced a slightly modified version, named 8.8 cm PaK 43/2, which was more suitable for installation into enclosed armored vehicles. It had a semi-automatic and vertical sliding block. It had an electrical trigger, with the firing trigger being placed on the elevation handwheel.
The gun itself was mounted on a cradle that stood on two runnions connected to two curved post arms. This installation was specially designed in order to reduce the stress acting on the elevation gears. The hydropneumatic buffer and the recuperator cylinders were placed on top of the gun.
The 8.8 cm gun had a traverse of 30° (15° on each side) and an elevation of -5° to +14° (or -8° to +18°, depending on the source). The traverse and elevation hand wheels were positioned on the left side of the gun and operated by the gunner.
After firing the gun, the spent case was caught by a canvas sleeve basket. Due to the 8.8 cm case’s large size, nearly a meter, not many could fit into this basket, so the loader had to frequently empty it. It also had a secondary role of measuring the recoil travel of the gun that had to be in the range of 550-580 mm. When on the move, the gun was held in place by a forward-positioned travel lock. Inside the casemate, there was another smaller ‘H’ shaped travel lock, located in the casemate ceiling.
A close-up look of an 8.8 cm mount, waiting to be assembled into a Ferdinand. The vertical sliding block and a part of the canvas sleeve basket are also visible. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank DestroyerThe forward-positioned travel lock. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer
Despite being a huge vehicle, the total ammunition load was quite limited, with only 40 rounds. These were held in storage bins located inside the casemate sides. The Ferdinand crews would often use any available spare space to add additional rounds, reaching a total load of 50. Authors such as T. Melleman (Ferdinand Elefant Vol.I) mention that some crews managed to squeeze in up to 90 rounds!
When firing at longer ranges, the Ferdinand crews used the Sfl Zielfernrohr 1 a type telescopic sight. When engaging targets with direct fire, the Rundblickfernrohr 36 periscope sight was used. While the Ferdinand could be used as mobile artillery thanks to its armament’s range, sufficient elevation, and firepower, it was rarely used in this manner. The main problem would be the small ammunition load of high explosive rounds and the fact its main task was hunting tanks and other armored vehicles.
While the 8.8 cm gun could fire either armor-piercing or high-explosive rounds, the Ferdinands were initially to be armed with the armor-piercing only. Prior to their first engagement at Kursk, each Ferdinand was supplied with 20 two-part (propellant charge and explosive round) semi-fixed high-explosive (HE) rounds. These proved to be of poor quality and prone to jamming during extraction after firing. Another issue with the two-part rounds was their time fuse, which worked well for the original anti-aircraft use. On the Ferdinand, however, the significant forces exerted on the time fuse due to the high acceleration in the barrel could lead to premature explosions. These would later be replaced with better-designed rounds. The range of the HE rounds was around 5.4 km.
Regarding the armor-piercing (AP) rounds, there was a better choice, with a few different types available. These included the standard Pzgr.39-1 and the improved Pzgr.39/43 AP, which had a range of 4 km. The Pzgr. Patr 40 was a tungsten-cored armor-piercing shell with the same range of 4 km. Lastly, the Gr.Patr 39 H1 and Gr.Patr 39/43 H1 hollow charge rounds were available, which had a range of around 3 km.
When using the standard AP round, the gun could penetrate 182 mm of armor sloped at 30° at a range of 500 m. At 1,000 m this dropped to 167 mm, and at 2,000 m to 139 mm. The tungsten round, at the same ranges and angles, could penetrate 226 mm, 162 mm and 136 mm. As the Germans had problems with the supply of tungsten, this round was rarely used. The hollow charge round could penetrate 90 mm of armor inclined at 30° at any range. These hollow charge rounds were not well known for their precision and, when the target was hit, there was a good chance that the round would misfire.
The Ferdinands were equipped with a two-part, rectangular-shaped shield, which was bolted on the front part of the gun mantlet. Its purpose was to protect the main gun from any small-caliber rounds or shrapnel. Not all vehicles received these from the start, some were added later on (just prior to their combat use), while some never received them. During the later part of the Kursk Offensive, a number of crews improvised some by completely redesigning the gun shields, which could now be much easier replaced. After 1944, these became standard equipment and replaced the earlier design.
This vehicle is lacking the gun mantlet protective shield. Source: Worldwarphotos.comThis Ferdinand has the initial production gun mantlet protective shield, which proved too difficult to be taken off and would be replaced. Source: Warspot.ruLater modified 1944 Ferdinand, with the shield initially used as an improvisation but that later saw widespread use. Source: Panzernet.ne
For protection against infantry attacks, the Ferdinand was equipped with an MG 34 machine gun with 600 rounds of ammunition that was stored inside the vehicle. In addition, there were two 9 mm MP 38/40 submachine guns.
Organization
The Oberkommando des Heeres OKH (German High Command) initially planned to form three Schwere Sturmgeschütz Abteilung – StuGAbt (Heavy Assault Gun Battalion). These included the 190th StuGAbt, which was to be reformed and renamed into the 654th Assault Gun Battalion, the 197th, renamed into the 653rd Assault Gun Battalion, and the newly formed 600th Assault Gun Battalion. Each was to be equipped with 30 vehicles divided into three 9 vehicle strong batteries. The remaining 3 vehicles were to be allocated to a HQ battery. Once ready on the front, each battery was to be separated from the main unit and used more as mobile close artillery support.
In March 1943, the organization and employment concepts were completely reworked. This was done by the General Inspector of the Armored Troops, General Heinz Guderian. He first reallocated the Ferdinands from the Sturmartillerie to the Panzerwaffe. This change also affected the unit organization and tactical use. The Ferdinands would be allocated to two battalions, the 653rd and 654th schwere (Heeres) Panzerjäger Abteilung – sPzJagAbt (Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion). These were, in turn, part of the 656th schwere Panzerjäger Regiment (Heavy Tank Destroyer Regiment). This unit, besides the two Ferdinand-equipped units, also had a third, Sturmpanzer Abteilung 216 (216th Tank Assault Battalion), equipped with 45 Sturmpanzer IV heavy assault vehicles (based on the Panzer IV chassis). Each battalion was divided into three companies, each equipped with 14 vehicles (further divided into three platoons each, with 4 vehicles and two command vehicles), plus a Battalion HQ with three vehicles, for a total 45 per battalion. Additional vehicles based on the Panzer II and III, and Sd.Kfz 250/5 and 251/8 half-tracks were given to these units, either as command vehicles, close support, medical support, or for artillery observation. The change in tactical doctrine referred to the concentration of all available vehicles while attacking designated targets instead of dividing them into smaller units.
The Regiment HQ was officially formed on 8th June 1943, mainly from reserve cadres of the 35th Panzer Regiment. Oberstleutnant Ernst Baron von Jungenfeld was chosen as the commander of this Regiment. The command of the 653rd Battalion was given to Major Steinwachs, that of the 654th Battalion to Hauptmann Karl-Heinz Noak, and that of the 216th Battalion to Major Bruno Kahl. The 653rd Battalion, during its reorganization, was stationed at Neusiedl-am-See in Austria and the 654th in Rouen in France. By late May, the 653rd Battalion was visited by Heinz Guderian, who observed the unit during training exercises. He was quite impressed with how the vehicles managed to get over 40 km to their base without any mechanical breakdowns.
Camouflage
When they left the German factories, the Ferdinands were painted in the standard Dunkelgelb (dark yellow). They also had three Balken Kreuzen painted on the hull sides and to the rear. Once on the front, the Ferdinands crews would use their ‘artistic soul’ to paint their own vehicles to try to blend as well as possible with the surroundings (being a huge vehicle, this was not an easy task).
Each Battalion used different types of camouflages. The 653rd employed large blotches of green paint applied with either brushes or sprayed. These were either round in shape or with more straight lines. A few vehicles had three-color schemes: a combination of green with brown outlines. The 654th crews did a number of different designs mostly using dark yellow and green combinations.
Vehicles from 653rd were painted with large blotches of green paint applied with either brushes or sprayed. Also, note the Balken Kreuzen painted on the hull side and to the rear. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.IA 654th sPzJagAbt Ferdinand with a different camouflage. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.I
Markings and emblems
Once these vehicles were given to the 656th Regiment, they also received their proper unit markings. The marking system employed on the Ferdinands consisted of the standard three-digit numbers, but it was quite complicated. The 653rd and 654th Battalions were designated as the I and II Battalion of the 656th Regiment. These were then divided into the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Companies of the I Battalion and the 5th, 6th, and 7th of the II Battalion. As mentioned earlier, each of these companies had 14 vehicles plus a Battalion HQ unit with 3 vehicles. Each company was divided into 3 Platoons, each with 4 vehicles, plus a Company HQ with 2 vehicles. It was common for the Germans to name the Company HQ as the 1st Platoon.
Of the three-digit markings, the first number represented the Company number. The number 4 was not used. The middle number indicated the Platoon. The Company HQ, which was listed as the 1st Platoon, would be marked as ‘0’. This also affected the markings of the remaining Platoons, as their number is actually smaller by one. For example, the 3rd Platoon would actually have the 2 number designation instead of 3. The last digit was used to designate individual vehicles in the Platoon. The odd numbers were used to mark the section commanders in each Platoon. As the Company HQ only had two vehicles, they were just marked as 1 or 2.
As an example, the vehicle with the number ‘721’ belonged to the 654th Battalion’s 7th Company, 3rd Platoon, 1st section command vehicle.
The smaller Battalion HQ, which had only 3 vehicles, was marked differently. It also consisted of a three-digit number, but the difference is that the first number represented the Battalion and was marked with a Roman numeral. The 653rd was marked as ‘I’ and the 654th as ‘II’. Being command vehicles, the second digit was 0, followed by the vehicle number from 1 to 3. For example, the IO3 was the 653rd Battalion HQ’s 3rd vehicle.
The two Battalions, while using the same three-digit system, painted these numbers differently. The ones on vehicles of the 653rd were white with black outlines, while the 654th used completely white numbers. These were painted on the vehicles’ sides and on the rear.
While it was somewhat common among the German armored units to have some unit emblems, this was not the case for the 656th Regiment. The 653rd Battalion simply adopted its original German Army eagle (from back when it was known as the 197th Assault Gun Battalion), but with the wings folded down and standing on two crossed guns.
The 653rd Battalion unit emblem. Source: K. Münch Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II
During the Kursk Offensive, the 653rd Battalion used an identification symbol that consisted of two smaller squares and a larger rectangle. The larger rectangle represented the Company, being marked with different colors. White was used for the 1st, yellow for the 2nd, and red for the 3rd Company. The exception was the 1st Company’s 3rd platoon, which had a red stripe, and the 4th Platoon, which had a red cross. The small square indicated the platoon in question, except for the 1st Platoon, which had none. The 2nd was indicated with the same rectangle color, the 3rd with no color but with white outline, and the 4th Platoon with Company color with white outline.
A completely blown up casemate due to an internal explosion. Note the rear positioned large 653rd Battalion identification symbol Source: Panzernet.netIllustration of the 653rd Battalion’s identification symbols. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II
The 654th Battalion used less elaborate markings. These consisted of black rectangles with a white letter ‘N’, the initials of the unit commander, Karl Heinz Noak. The Company number would be added after the N, like N1, N2, and N3. In the case of the HQ, the letters ‘St’ (Stab – Command) would be added instead of the numbers. These were painted either on the glacis or left fender and on the rear left corner of the casemate. When this unit was later disbanded, all its surviving vehicles were given to the 653rd Battalion. These then received the 653rd’s markings and, in time, the camouflage scheme. When the first snow began to fall, all surviving Ferdinands received whitewash paint covering the whole vehicle, including the markings.
During the winter of 1943, all surviving Ferdinands received whitewash paint which covered all markings on them. Source: https://mikesresearch.com/2020/05/24/ferdinands-elefants-on-the-eastern-front/
The 656th Regiment officially received its own emblem, containing a shield with the silhouette of an exploding tank. Under the tank, the word ’Pampas’ was added. The precise meaning was sadly lost.
The 656th Regiment’s emblems, with the Pampas word written at the bottom. Different colors represented different Companies of the unit. https://mikesresearch.com/2020/05/24/ferdinands-elefants-on-the-eastern-front/
New marking and camouflage
The vehicles used in Italy in 1944 were painted in the same dark yellow and green combination. After 13th June, they received a new ‘U’ Gothic letter, usually at the rear end of the casemate. The precise meaning of this letter is not documented. Tactical markings were not used on the majority of the Elefants sent to Italy. A few vehicles would receive the three-digit numbers painted in white.
The vehicles that were not sent to Italy received a new emblem, the Sword of the Nibelungs which emerges from the Danube’s waves. It was usually painted in front and to the rear of the casemate, but some also had these painted on the hull sides.
The Sword of the Nibelungs emblem is visible in the right corner of the casemate. Source: PinterestAn illustration of the Sword of the Nibelungs emblem with the company markings. Source: http://panzerserra.blogspot.com/2014/05/bergepanther-mit-aufgesetztem-pzkpfw-iv.html
Service
Baptism of fire at Kursk
The 656th Regiment was transported to the Eastern Front during June 1943 for the upcoming German offensive against the Soviet Kursk Salient, Operation Citadel. The main base of operation for this Regiment was the Smiyevka train station, some 25 km south of Orel. Once the vehicles were unloaded, they were driven to their designated area of assembly. In the case of the 653rd Battalion, the 1st Company was at Kuliki, the 2nd at Gostinovo and the 3rd Company at Davidovo. By the end of June, the entirety of the 656th Regiment was at its designated initial positions. The few days before the offensive were used for training and for the vehicle commanders to get familiar with the surrounding terrain. Of the three Battalions, only the 653rd was fully equipped with 45 vehicles. The 654th had 44 and the 216th had 42 vehicles (but many sources disagree on the exact numbers).
The first Ferdinands arrive in the East. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info
As the Ferdinands were intended to spearhead the German advance, they were to be reinforced with a remote-controlled tank company (equipped with Borgward B.IV Sd.Kfz.301) for cleaning minefields. These small vehicles were equipped with detachable explosive charges designed to detonate mines in a wide area. They could be either remotely controlled or driven by a human driver.
The small Borgward B.IV. Source: pinterest
The 656th Regiment was part of the XXXXI Panzer Korps under the command of General Harpe. Its order of battle during the initial stages of the Kursk Offensive was as follows: The 653rd Battalion was to support the attack of the 86th and 292nd Infantry Divisions, while the 654th Battalion supported the 78th Infantry Division. The 216th Brigade was to follow up in the second wave, together with the 177th and 244th StuG Brigades. Their objective was a heavily fortified Soviet position around the Malo-Archangelsk and Olchovatka area, with its key position around Hill 257.7 (later known as Panzer or Tank Hill).
Prior to the start of the offensive, the Ferdinands were camouflaged to avoid Soviet aerial reconnaissance. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info
The attack on the first day by the 653rd Battalion pierced the first Soviet defenses and reached its target, destroying some 26 T-34 tanks and dozens of anti-tank guns in the process. Many of its Ferdinands were temporarily put out of action due to extensive Soviet minefields, which spanned extensive areas. To increase the lethality of their mines, the Soviets coupled them to artillery shells or even aircraft bombs. While they usually just blew up parts of the suspension, some were so strong that they would damage the hull, which could not be repaired on the front. The anti-mine auxiliary unit did its best to clear the minefields, but lost many of its vehicles in the process. The Soviet artillery also made mine clearing operations difficult. Places that were clear of mines and marked as such were usually shelled by the Soviet artillery. The advancing Ferdinand crews would lose sight of the clear paths and accidentally run into minefields that were not cleared. In total, on the first day, the 653rd Battalion lost 33 vehicles to mines. While most required only minimal repair works, their recovery proved to be difficult. In order to move one Ferdinand, at least 5 heavy Sd.Kfz.9 half tracks were needed. Being unprotected, they often fell victim to Soviet artillery fire trying to prevent recovery of these vehicles. The 653rd Battalion would receive two new Bergepanthers (based on the Panther tank chassis), but even these proved to be inadequate. During the night, Soviet demolition teams would blow up any abandoned Ferdinands they could get to.
A destroyed Soviet anti-tank gun, claimed by the Ferdinands. Source: K. Münch Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II
The 654th Battalion, while advancing toward its objectives, Hill 238.1 and 253.5, also came across many minefields. Thanks to the remote controlled vehicles, clear roads were established with the loss of 10 of the Borgwards. Still, this was far from enough, leading to the loss of a large number of the 654th Battalion’s vehicles being damaged.
In a memorandum dated from 17th July 1943, Heinz Guderian described the 653rd Battalion’s combat operation. “….The very heavy artillery barrage (on the first day, 100 heavy and 172 light guns, 386 rocket launchers, and countless grenade launchers) smashed the attack by our infantry. The Ferdinands and Strumpanzers were not able to push their attack in the depths of the enemy positions, as the infantry had been halted. Thus, the tanks had to stop in the middle of the battlefield, attracting concentrated artillery fire. The enemy artillery always found time to regroup and to reinforce. The missing secondary armament on the tanks negatively affected the tanks in combat. Subsequently, losses were high”.
The experience of the Ferdinand crews is partly shown in the report to Generalmajor Hartmann written by Unteroffizier Böhm and dated from the 19th July 1943.
“…. On the first day of combat, we successfully defeated bunkers, infantry, artillery and anti-tank positions. Our guns were under artillery barrages for three hours and still maintained their ability to fire! Several [enemy] tanks were destroyed during the first night, and others fled. Artillery and anti-tank crews fled before our guns after we fired upon them repeatedly. In addition to many batteries, anti-tank guns and bunkers, our battalion destroyed 120 tanks during the first round of fighting. We suffered 60 casualties during the first few days, mostly from mines. ….. We also had bad luck. It was at the rail embankment when a Panzer III on the other side received a direct hit and flew through the air, landing on the front part of the Ferdinand. Wrecking the tube, aiming device and engine grating. …. We were more successful during the second operation defending east of Orel. Only two total losses. One gun under Leutnant Tariete destroyed 22 tanks in one engagement. The total number of tanks destroyed is high and the Ferdinand contributed substantially to the defence, just as with the penetration. One gun commander destroyed seven of nine American built-tanks that approached him. …… The Ferdinand has proved itself. They were decisive here, and we cannot go against the mass of enemy tanks today without a weapon of this type.”
On 8th July, a group of 4 Ferdinands and 20 Tigers were advancing toward the Soviet line. On the other side, some twelve SU-152’s under the command of Major Sankovsky were waiting in ambush. Once the German vehicles came to a distance of 500 m, the Soviet vehicles opened fire. In the following engagement, the range was even more reduced, just 300 m, where the Tigers suffered under the SU-152’s heavy large caliber rounds. The Ferdinands proved more resilient but after numerous hits they too would fall victims to the 152 mm guns at close range. At the end of this engagement, the Germans lost four (or three, depending on the source) Ferdinands and 8 Tigers, inflicting no losses on the Soviets.
By 11th July, some 19 Ferdinands were reported as complete losses. Of these, four vehicles were burned out due to engine accidents. The remaining were mostly destroyed by enemy artillery fire, which hit the less protected engine compartment top. In addition, some 40 vehicles were temporarily out of action and needed repairs. Half of those were brought back to action by 11th July.
On 14th July, any further salvage operations were abandoned and, instead, the surviving vehicles of the 653rd Battalion were redirected to support the German attempts to relieve the 36th Panzergrenadier Division, which was surrounded by nearly 400 tanks of the Soviet 3rd Tank Army. The Ferdinands, under the command of Lt. Heinrich Teriete, managed to drive them back, despite the small German armored numbers. Thanks to well-selected firing positions and the poor enemy reconnaissance, the Ferdinands took advantage of the 8.8 cm gun’s long-range firepower. During this engagement, Lt. Heinrich Teriete himself claimed to have destroyed 22 Soviet tanks, for which he would be awarded a Knight Cross later on. During the same day, some 60 Ferdinands (34 from the 653rd and 26 from the 654th Battalion) took defensive positions around the Shelyaburg-Tsarevka area.
During the period between 14th and 17th July, the German units at Kursk were faced with rapid Soviet counter-attacks. The 653rd and 654th Battalions, despite losses and mechanical breakdowns, participated in German defensive operations south of Orel. Their mission was to defend the heavily contested Orel-Kursk railway line. The already poor mechanical reliability of most Ferdinands was further worsened by constant skirmishes with the Soviets. The Regiment commander, Jungenfeld, reported his unit’s poor shape to the 2nd Army (elements of the 9th Army, including the two Ferdinand Battalions, were previously sent to assist this Army) in a report dated 24th July 1943.
“.. The Regiment has been permanently in combat since 5 July… The Ferdinand, as well as the Sturmpanzer, suffered numerous technical problems. Initially, it was planned to withdraw the tanks for 2-3 days after a 4-5 day commitment to undergo maintenance and repair work. This was not possible… All tanks now need an overhaul requiring 14 to 20 days.. I herewith report to the 2nd Army that, within a short time, the regiment will no longer be combat ready…”
At the end of July, due to constant Soviet pressure, it was decided by the 2nd Army that Orel had to be abandoned. At the start of August, the 653rd Battalion had 12 Ferdinands ready for action, some 17 in repair and 16 were reported as complete losses. The 654th Battalion, on the same day, had 13 operational, 6 in repair and 26 complete losses.
There was an interesting and somewhat unusual (to say at least) situation where a Ferdinand was lost, being hit by a ‘flying’ Panzer III. The strange situation occurred when a remote-controlled mine clearing vehicle was hit by Soviet artillery fire, detonating its 350 kg explosive charge. The following explosion threw into the sky many parts (including the chassis) of a nearby Panzer III command vehicle. A part of the chassis hit the engine compartment of a Ferdinand, setting it on fire.
The destroyed Panzer III that hit and heavily damaged the nearby Ferdinand vehicle. Source: K. Münch Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War IIWhile the Soviets managed to either destroy or damage many Ferdinands, a few were captured in relatively good order. This particular vehicle (chassis number 150061) belonged to the 3rd Company of the 653rd Battalion. Source: Panzernet.netAnother captured example, belonging to the 1st Company of the 654th Battalion. While the burnt-down vehicle in the background was used as a firing practice target, the vehicle at the forefront has been preserved to this day. Source: Panzernet.netA Ferdinand from the 653rd Battalion near Karachev. Source: Panzernet.netA damaged Ferdinand from the 654th Battalion. While the frontal armor was almost immune to enemy fire, the sides were still vulnerable. Source: Panzernet.netThe ferocity of the fighting is evident on this vehicle, which received dozens of hits, but all failed to penetrate its armor. Source:T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank DestroyerThe T-34, despite its angled armor, was vulnerable to Ferdinand’s 8.8 cm gun. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer
After Kursk
By mid-August 1943, the two Ferdinand Battalions were being pulled out of Orel to the rear for recuperation and much-needed repairs. While Ferdinand achieved great success in destroying enemy armor, many Ferdinands, which were irreplaceable, were lost. On 23rd August, all surviving vehicles from the 654th were given to the 653rd Battalion. The 654th Battalion was sent to Orleans in France for recuperation and refitting with the new Jagdpanther and Jagdpanzer IV.
Following this, the 653rd Battalion was pulled back from the front line and stationed at the Dnepropetrovsk industrial center. The damage on some vehicles was such that even this center lacked proper tooling and equipment for the job. Of 54 surviving vehicles, four could not be repaired. Of the remaining 50 vehicles, only 10 to 15 (depending on the source) were combat ready by mid-September. These, together with over 10 Sturmpanzer IVs, were used to form a Sinsatzgruppe (task force) and placed under command of Hauptman Baumunk. This group received orders to divide into two smaller units, with one was tasked with heading toward Sinelnikovo and the second to Pavlograd by rail. While the Soviets held part of the railway line, after a brief engagement, they retreated.
The Ferdinands would mostly be stationed in this area when, in late September, the unit was evacuated towards Zaporozhye. In early August, during a defensive operation at Krivoy Rog, the Ferdinands claimed to have destroyed 21 enemy tanks and 23 anti-tank guns.
On 10th November 1943, the Ferdinands were repositioned from Zaporozhye to positions south of Nikopol. The German positions at Nikopol were well defended and supported by the 24th Panzer Division, to which the Ferdinand Company was attached to. On 20th November, the Soviets managed to make an opening in the German defensive line, rushing in with large numbers of tanks in an attempt to exploit their breakthrough. This formation was successfully intercepted by the 24th Panzer Division and the Ferdinands.
A Ferdinand during the battle around Nikopol in November 1943. Source: Pinteres
At the end of November, during the battles around Kochasovka and Miropol, the Ferdinands inflicted great damage on the Soviets, claiming 54 tanks. Lt. Franz Kretschmer’s vehicle alone destroyed some 21 tanks. On the following day, the 653rd Battalion’s situation became untenable, having only 4 fully operational vehicles available. Besides these, of the 42 vehicles, some 8 needed some minor repairs, and the remaining needed major overhauls. The Battalion received orders to be transported to Sankt-Pölten on 10th December 1943. The withdrawal started six day later, but due to Soviet activity, this withdrawal lasted up to 10th January 1944.
In a German report dated from the 7th August 1943, the Ferdinands were credited with the destruction of 502 enemy tanks, of which 320 were achieved by the 653rd Battalion alone. An additional 100 artillery and 200 anti-tank guns destroyed were also reported by the German Army. Three months later, another report stated that they had destroyed 582 tanks, 3 self-propelled guns, 3 armored cars, 477 (or 377 depending on the source) anti-tank guns, 133 artillery guns, 103 anti-tank rifles, and 3 aircraft! It is not clear if these numbers correspond to reality or are just inflated propaganda numbers.
German post-combat analysis
Following Operation Citadel, the German after-action reports mended the overall performance of the Ferdinand vehicles. The most praised asset of the Ferdinand were its excellent anti-tank capabilities, demonstrated by the sheer number of destroyed tanks claimed. It had good accuracy, a long range and possessed great armor piercing capabilities. The more heavily protected Soviet KV-1 tanks could be effectively destroyed at ranges of 2 km. On average, 2 to 3 rounds were enough to completely destroy enemy tanks.
The ammunition, on the other hand, proved to be problematic, most noticeably in the case of the high-explosive rounds. The problem was mainly regarding the poor quality of the ammunition casing, which often led to the clogging of the gun chamber. The loaders were often forced to carry additional improvised equipment to try to eject the stuck spent rounds.
Another great issue was the lack of a machine gun mount that could be used for self-defence against enemy infantry attacks. While the crew had their own personal weapons and an MG 34 machine gun stored inside, these could not always be put to use against enemy infantry. There were four pistol ports, two on the sides and two to the rear, but none to the front. Some Ferdinand crews improvised by using their MG 34 machine gun to fire through the main gun barrel. The gun elevation and traverse were used to direct the firing arc of this machine gun.
Many crews used spent cases to make makeshift mounts to provide a more stable machine gun firing platform, in order to avoid damaging the rifling of the gun. Installing a machine gun mount on top of the armored casemate was also attempted but proved to be unpopular as the operator had to be exposed to enemy return fire and fragments. Installing an infantry platform to the rear of the casemate was tested. However, the supporting infantry riding on this were easy targets for enemy gunners, so this idea was shortly abandoned. To somewhat resolve this issue, the Ferdinand units were reinforced with 12 Panzer III tanks that were to act as a screen against enemy infantry and soft targets.
The armor protection was deemed sufficient. During the battle for Kursk, there were no reports of the front armor being penetrated. There were cases of the side armor being pierced by 76.2 cm rounds at closer ranges. While the front armor protection of the casemate was more or less invincible, at that time, it had one major issue. Enemy rounds or artillery fragments could ricochet into the insufficiently protected engine top cover. This would cause minor to significant damage to the engine, cooling system or fuel lines, to name a few. A number of vehicles were either immobilized or lost this way. For this reason, it was later requested to add 20 to 30 mm additional armor protection atop the engine compartment.
The cooling system was not up to the task, as there were cases of the engine compartment catching fire due to the engine overheating. At least one vehicle was completely lost during a recovery operation when it caught fire due to the engine overheating itself.
The Ferdinand was noted by its crews to lack sufficient visibility and had many blind spots and poor visibility in general. Radio equipment was often jammed due to Ferdinand’s electrical equipment. The temperature inside the casemate was high and there were cases of the signal flare ammunition blowing up. Despite its weight, the Ferdinand could relatively easily cross a 2.6 m wide trench. It also possessed a good climbing ability. However, their cross-country speed was noted to be only around 10 km/h.
Interestingly, the new gasoline-electric power train performed relatively well. Its power output was sometimes problematic, and some vehicles caught fire due to electric short-circuits. The suspension was deemed ineffective and prone to malfunctions. The narrow tracks, together with the weight, caused many vehicles to be bogged down. The lack of a proper recovery vehicle was also noted, with many vehicles having to be blown up because they could not be recovered.
Despite the long list of negative issues with Ferdinand, they showed that a well-protected and armed anti-tank vehicle had merits. They offered many advantages over the poorly armored and improvised anti-tank vehicles already in service (for example, the Marder series).
Back to Germany
Following the Eastern campaign, all surviving Ferdinands were brought back to Nibelungenwerke for a major overhaul. These included the 653rd Battalion’s 42 vehicles and a smaller number of vehicles that were recovered earlier during the Kursk operation and were sent back to Germany. In addition, the two Alkett prototypes were also sent to Nibelungenwerke.
An important note here, these vehicles were still named Ferdinands at this time. The Elefant designation was only implemented from February (or May) 1944 on. As mentioned earlier, the Elefant designation was never used by the Germans to separate the improved form from the initially produced vehicles. It was more a fulfillment of Hitler’s request to change the names of many vehicles to more aggressive animal names. As the Elefant designation was becoming official with the Germans during 1944, this article will use this name from this point onward.
Assembled vehicles awaiting repairs at Nibelungenwerke. Source; www.worldwarphotos.com
As these were being gathered at Nibelungenwerke, the workers and engineers set on repairing any major damage, but they were also working hard to address a number of noted shortcomings of the Elefant. This was mainly with regard to visibility, mobility, and anti-infantry weaponry. As this was not an easy task to achieve, the Vienna Arsenal was also included in the rebuild program. It is there that some 6 completely burned-out Elefants were brought back to life.
Modifications
In order to improve mobility, the Elefants were provided with wider tracks. For better visibility, in what was surprisingly not issued on the first production vehicles, the improved Elefant received a commander’s cupola very similar to that of the StuG III. This cupola had seven periscopes which provided the commander with a good all-around view. The commander’s hatch also had a small opening for the use of a periscope if needed, without exposing himself to enemy fire. The two small vision ports located on the superstructure’s front sides were welded shut. The driver’s periscope cover was also slightly improved by adding a plate to protect from the sun. A few vehicles were equipped with two-part round-shaped rear casemate doors instead of the single-piece one regularly used.
This vehicle was turned over by an aircraft bomb explosion. Thanks to this, we have a good view of the improved top. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.IIClose-up view of the new commander’s cupola. Source; T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank DestroyeFour vehicles received the new two-part hatches. The angled part on top of the doors was used for water drainage. Source: https://mikesresearch.com/2020/05/24/ferdinands-elefants-on-the-eastern-front/Drawing of the two-part hatch. Source: https://mikesresearch.com/2020/05/24/ferdinands-elefants-on-the-eastern-front/
Visually, the most obvious change was the introduction of a machine gun ball mount (Kugelblende 100 or 80, depending on the source) placed on the right side of the superstructure. It was protected by an additional 100 mm of armored cover, with a small opening for the machine gun. This mount had an elevation of -10° to + 15° and a traverse of 5° in both directions. It was to be operated by the radio operator. The machine gun operator was provided with a 1.8x KFZ 2 optical sight.
The most obvious improvement was the introduction of the ball-mounted machine gun. Source: Panzernet
Why the machine gun mount was never installed in the original vehicles is not clear in the sources. There are a few different possibilities. While the original VK45.01(P) had a ball-mounted machine gun, this was not carried over to the later Ferdinand vehicles. One source gives information that this was done simply as the Krupp engineers lacked the men and skill to make an opening in the 200 mm thick plate. This explanation is somewhat problematic, because there were actually two 100 mm thick plates and that the German engineers already had some experience making the holes necessary for the installation of the ball mount. The second possible reason includes Alkett’s original proposal to mount additional angled armor plates in front of the vehicle. Adding a ball mount machine gun position would be much more difficult to achieve in this case. The main reason was probably that Nibelungenwerke’s engineers were forced to speed up the production and did not have the time nor tools to implement it. Also, the Ferdinand was initially intended to be used as an assault gun (like the StuG III), which themselves lacked a machine gun. The protection against enemy infantry was to be provided by the supporting infantry. Whatever the case may be, from early 1944 onward, the Elefant had better means of fighting off infantry attacks from the front.
The new machine gun ball mount was added starting from early 1944 on . Source: Ledwoch Ferdinand/Elefant
The lower hull armor of the driver’s compartment was increased by an additional 30 mm thick armor plate. The engine compartment top cover was slightly improved to provide better engine protection. The worn out engines were also replaced with brand new Maybach HL 120 models. Additional protection included Zimmerit anti-magnetic paste that was applied to roughly half the height of the vehicle.
The gun shield, previously more of a field modification, was now being used as standard. It was much easier to replace when damaged or during the change of the gun barrel. The ammunition load was increased to 55 rounds. The troublesome crew communication system was improved. With all these modifications, the overall weight of the vehicle rose to 70 tonnes.
The changes also included the appointment of a new 656th Regiment unit commander. The previous commander, Baron von Jungenfeld, was promoted to Colonel. In his place, Oberst Richard Schmitgen was appointed. Another change concluded the 656th Regiment’s fate. While on paper it still existed, in reality, its units were detached and sent to Italy in 1944, after which the 656th Regiment was never actually used at full regimental strength.
The overall repair process lasted from January to April (or March depending on the sources) 1944, with the first vehicles being combat ready by February 1944. During this time, some 47 vehicles and the 2 prototypes would be improved to the new standard.
Elefants in Italy
Following the Allied invasion of Italy in 1943 and, later, the American amphibious landing at Anzio in January 1944, the German High Command was forced to rapidly send more and more troops and equipment there. For this reason, elements of the 656th Regiment were also to be sent there. This included the 216th Assault Tank Battalion and at least one Elefant Company. Not many Elefants could be spared, as a large number of them were still in Nibelungenwerke’s workshop waiting to be repaired and modified. On 15th February 1944, the 653rd Battalion’s 1st Company, with 11 vehicles and one recovery vehicle under the command of Helmut Ulbrich, was ready to be transported to Italy. Initially, it was planned to send 14 vehicles, but the last three could not be repaired in time due to a lack of spare parts.
Elefant in Italy, 1944. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info
All vehicles reached Rome by 24th February 1944. Once there, the 1st Company was attached to the 508th Heavy Tank Battalion equipped with Tiger tanks under the command of Major Hudel. At the end of February, under bad weather, the Elefants and Tigers were ordered to attack American positions. The Elefants were once again used in a role for which they were not designed for. This attack was to be conducted through marshes which were unsuitable for heavy vehicles. During this attack, while crossing a bridge, one Elefant was immobilized. After a number of failed recovery attempts, it was abandoned. The next day, another vehicle struck a German mine, and once again, due to the inability to tow it to safety, it was blown up by its own commander, Gustav Koss. Due to the loss of two vehicles in a short amount of time, the remaining vehicles were pulled back. They would be stationed in a more defensive role near the cities of Cisterna and Velletri for the next few months. Due to problems with the arrival of spare parts, their use after the initial action around Anzio was limited.
The second Elefant to be lost hit a mine and, as it was unable to be recovered, it was abandoned. Source: Pinterest
American sources give us some information on their engagements with the Elefants around Cisterna. In the report of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, while on the road to Cisterna, two M10 tank destroyers commanded by Sergeant Harry J. Ritchie and Sergeant John D. Christian came under fire from a group of Tigers and two Elefants at ranges just over 230 meters. The gunner of one M10, Corporal James F. Goldsmith later wrote.
“ Sgt Ritchie ordered me to pull into open view around the corner of the building, and from this exposed position, directed three hits onto the most exposed tank, it being about 550 yards (some 500 meters) up the road at that time, and knocked it out. We received heavy armor-piercing and high-explosive fire from the other tanks, shells barely missing our destroyer by a few feet and fragments hitting us. We were exposed for about five minutes. Sgt Ritchie ducked his head and shoulders below the turret and pulled back behind the house. When enemy fire ceased, Sgt. Ritchie had me pull out again, and from the same exposed position, directed two rounds of AP shells that hit and bounced off the front armor of the Ferdinand 250 yards (230 meters) east of us. We again received intensive fire from the enemy tanks and shells were landing so close that fragments were coming through the open turret, one slightly wounding our gunner in the head when it hit our tank and damaging the counter-balance and .50 caliber machine gun mounted on the edge of the turret. We were again exposed to enemy fire for about five minutes. He ducked into the tank and we pulled behind the house again. We continued to fight throughout the day with our damaged gun. ”
While Sergeant Ritchie’s vehicle was under fire, the second M10, commanded by Sergeant Christian, shot several rounds at the German vehicles, scoring two hits on a Tiger and two more on the Elefants. He reported that only two crew members from the hit vehicles managed to escape. Whatever damage he did to them, or whether his 76 mm gun managed to pierce the Elefant’s armor is not mentioned.
By 20th May 1944, the Elefants were mostly kept in reserve for maintenance and repairs. A few days later, the Allies made a breakthrough, so the Elefants were once more put into action. In the initial engagements, they destroyed 4 to 6 (depending on the source) enemy Shermans, with the loss of two vehicles. One had an engine malfunction and was burned down, the second was blown up by its crew when it became immobilized. Following this, the unit had to retreat back to Rome by June 1944. The enemy armor was not the only threat that the Elefants had to face. The extensive Allied air superiority caused the further loss of two more burned-down vehicles. One was hit by a P-47 bomb on 5th June, while on the Via Aurelia road. The second vehicle was lost five days later, near Orvieto.
The stream of bad luck did not end there. While crossing an old bridge, the bridge construction simply collapsed under the Elefant’s extreme weight, taking the vehicle with it. The vehicle commander was killed during this accident As there was no way to recover it, the crew had no choice but to destroy it.
At the start of July, the 1st Company of the 653rd had only 3 (or 4, depending on the source) vehicles with only 2 operational and one undergoing repairs. In addition, the unit still possessed the recovery Bergetiger (P). Though orders for the unit to pull back to Germany were given on 26th June, frontline developments prevented this from happening. The few Ferdinands would see more combat action up to early August when they were finally pulled out to the Vienna Arsenal. By that time, only three (or two, depending on the source) combat vehicles and the recovery vehicle survived.
Most Elefants that were sent to Italy were blown up by their own crews to avoid capture. Source: Vol.2 Ferdinand near Rome
Back to the East
Despite some misconceptions that the Elefant’s story ended in Italy, this was not the case. Those vehicles that were not involved in Italy were actually being prepared to once again face the Soviets. The 653rd Battalion was now under command by Rudolf Grillenberger, while the 2nd Company was commanded by Werner Salamon and the 3rd Company by Bernhard Konnak.
An Elefant and some of its crew in Poland, at Rabka, in early 1944. Source; T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II
While the German Army planned to send the Elefants to the East in March 1944, this was not possible. By late February, only 8 vehicles were fully operational, while the remaining were still under repair. Among other reasons, shortages of spare materials, workforce, and a lack of electricity further delayed the completion of the remaining vehicles. Delays were also caused by a lack of sufficient supply of soft-skinned vehicles.
On 8th April 1944, the Battalion reached Brzezany and was attached to the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen by mid-April. The 653rd Battalion had 30 operational Elefants, 2 Bergetiger (P), 1 Bergepanther and 2 Panzer III ammunition carriers. Additionally, one Elefant was still in Austria and was not available due to needing repairs. At this time, the problem with the acquisition of soft-skinned vehicles was not solved. In essence, the necessary ammunition, fuel, or supply operations could not be carried out.
The SS Panzer Division and the supporting units, including the Elefants, were intended to be used as a relief force for the trapped German units near Tarnopol. The bad weather caused huge logistical problems and greatly slowed down the 653rd Battalion’s attack, which led to the cancellation of an attack on the city of Siemakovce. On 24th April, another attack on Siemakovce was attempted. An advance unit consisting of German infantry and 9 Elefants managed to capture the city after two days of fighting. The next day, they crossed the Strype River and made a defensive line. After an engagement with the Soviets, the 2nd Company had two damaged vehicles, which were recovered, but the mechanics were not able to immediately repair them. Ultimately, the Germans failed their objective and were forced to retreat due to extensive Soviet attacks. The 2nd Company lost two more vehicles. Like many times before, they had to be blown up, being unable to be recovered. By late April, the 2nd Company was attacking Soviet positions at Siemienkowicz, but due to bad terrain, most vehicles were left temporarily disabled due to their engines being overheated.
By May 1944, the mechanical situation of all surviving Elefants was dire. Due to a lack of sufficient supply vehicles, the recovery vehicles had to be used in this role. Despite many tank destroyers being temporarily out of action due to a lack of much-needed repairs, the Elefants showed that they were still effective tank killers. The Elefant also gained a great reputation among the Russian but also the German ranks, but not all were impressed. In his memoirs, a Nashorn tank destroyer driver (from the 88th Heavy Anti-Tank Battalion), Gefreiter Hoffmann, wrote.
“I never saw this Porsche-thing. Everybody on the front was talking of it, calling it a wonder-weapon, being better than the Tiger … My boss was very proud of our Hornisse with its long gun, we were pretty successful. He scoffed at this giant vehicle: “Too heavy to move, too clumsy to steer, what a dreck”, he said”
On 11th May, the Battalion was repositioned to Kozova and Zborev, which were only 15 km from their positions. The sources are not clear about the precise number of vehicles at this point. While T. Melleman (Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II) states that few vehicles had to be blown up, author T. Anderson (Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer), on the other hand, stated that by June, no complete loss was reported.
After this operation, the Battalion was pulled back to a resting position near Brzhezhany. During this time, this unit received at least 4 Elefants which had the new rear casemate two-piece hatches. It was also supplemented with some bizarre field modifications based on the Bergepanther and the Soviet T-34 tanks.
In mid-July 1944, the Soviets launched a huge offensive against the German North Ukraine Army. The Germans responded by sending the 653rd Battalion to this area. The Elefants were attached to the Eingreiftruppe Nordukraine, in essence, a ready deployment force. This mixed unit managed to achieve success against the enemy armor. However, the Soviets managed to break through other points of the German defense line. The deployment force and the Elefants were forced to retreat to Landeshut. On 20th July, the Soviets were trying to stop this retreat but were constantly kept at bay, with the loss of a number of Elefants in the process. These were mostly blown up by their crews, as their engines would often break down due to overheating. The 653rd Battalion would see extensive action up to 27th July, when it managed to complete its retreat thanks to its tenacious defense and the shift of the Soviet direction of attack. Heavy fighting during July cost the 653rd Battalion some 19 to 22 vehicles plus 2 recovery Bergetiger (P), the command Tiger (P), and some 4 ammunition supply tanks. While only a few were actually lost in combat, the majority had to be blown up by their crews due to a lack of fuel and breakdowns. The loss of crewmen was surprisingly low, with 19 wounded and only 5 dead.
An ISU-152 taken out by precise Elefant fire. The round hole atop the driver visor is actually the place where the 8.8 cm round penetrated the ISU’s armor. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer
At the start of August 1944, there were still more combat operations which cost the battalion a few more vehicles. On 4th August, the 653rd Battalion received orders to reposition to Krakow. Due to a lack of vehicles, the 3rd Company was disbanded and sent back to Germany to be armed with the new Jagdtigers. In addition, at this time, two of the surviving vehicles from Italy were used to reinforce the depleted 653rd Battalion.
One of the several Elefants that survived the retreat of July-August 1944. Source: K. Münch Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II, Stackpole Books.
In mid-December 1944, the 653rd Battalion was renamed to Heeres schwere Panzerjäger Kompanie 614 (614th Independent Tank Destroyer Company). It was then attached to the 4th Panzer Army near the Bodzentyn area on 22nd December. The 614th Company saw heavy action in combat south of Kielce, where it lost some 10 vehicles from 14th to 15th January 1945. Interestingly, even by this time, the Elefant’s front armor was almost invincible, even capable of resisting several hits from the IS-2’s 122 mm gun. By the end of January 1945, there were only four Elefants and one Bergepanther left. The unit was moved to Stahnsdorf for much-needed repairs in late February 1945. The mechanical condition of these vehicles was poor and they badly needed repairs. Luckily for them, there were still some resources available to put them back in action.
Once repaired, the unit was repositioned to Wünsdorf in April 1945. On 21st April, it was attached to Kampfgruppe Möws, which, with the 4 Elefants, was to support Kampfgruppe Ritter. During preparation for transport on rails at the Mittendorf station, one vehicle had to be left behind, as it broke down and could not be repaired. It would remain there up to 1947, before finally being towed away. The remaining three vehicles would be separated, with one left defending a position at Löpten, and the remaining two sent to defend Berlin. These took action near Karl-August Platz, where they would be captured by the Soviet Forces.
This picture is often described as the last Elefant in Berlin. Source: http://panzerserra.blogspot.com/2014/05/bergepanther-mit-aufgesetztem-pzkpfw-iv.html
Bergepanzer Ferdinand and other improvised support vehicles
Prior to their engagement on the frontline, while used for crew training, the Ferdinands did not have many mechanical breakdowns that needed towing vehicles. Even if they did break down, there were Sd.Kfz.9 vehicles available for towing to the repair workshops. The reality of frontline service, however, showed the need for a dedicated recovery vehicle. In the field, a great number of Ferdinands were immobilized. As the Germans lacked the required numbers of Sd.Kfz.9 and tank-based recovery vehicles, the damaged Ferdinands were often blown up by their crews to avoid being captured.
To somewhat resolve this issue, three available Tiger (P) chassis were to be rebuilt as Bergepanzers (recovery tank). The modification included adding a new much smaller fully enclosed casemate to the rear. In front of it, a ball-mounted 7.92 mm MG-34 machine gun was placed, with two additional pistol ports on the sides. On top of this casemate, a round hatch door was installed, while to the rear, a two-piece hatch was placed, taken from a Panzer III turret. There were also three smaller slits on the front and sides of the crew compartment. The armor thickness of these vehicles was much lighter than the Ferdinand, with 100 mm to the front. The front casemate armor was 50 mm and 30 m on the side. A boom crane was placed on top of the vehicle’s superstructure. Another change was the use of longer tracks which, with the lower weight, provided them with better overall drive.
These three were completed by August 1943 and issued to the 653rd Battalion, with one vehicle per company. They solved the lack of towing vehicles and many Ferdinands were recovered thanks to their help.
Bergepanzer Ferdinand Source: Panzernet.net
Of special note, during 1944, the 653rd Battalion’s mechanics and engineers managed to build a number of improvised vehicles based on German and also captured vehicles. One such vehicle was created using a Panzer IV turret which was welded on a Bergepanther. Another example involved installing a 2 cm Flakvierling 38 on a second Bergepanther.
A Soviet T-34 armed with the 2 cm Flakvierling 38 placed in a new turret. Source: http://beutepanzer.ru/A few Bergepanthers were allocated to the Elefant units. Source: http://panzerserra.blogspot.com/2014/05/bergepanther-mit-aufgesetztem-pzkpfw-iv.htmlAt the front is the only Porsche Tiger ever used in combat. Behind it is the strange Panzer IV/Panther hybrid vehicle. Source:https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/321507-panzer-v-ausfuhrung-d1-mit-panzer-iv-h-turm-39panzer-viv39/The 653rd Battalion managed to capture one rare KV-85 vehicle. This vehicle had its turret removed and was used as a recovery vehicle by this unit. Source: K. Münch Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II, Stackpole Books.
Surviving vehicles
Despite the small number built, today, there are two surviving vehicles left. One restored Elefant is located at the Fort Lee U.S. Army Ordnance Museum. This particular vehicle belonged to the 653rd Battalion and was captured in Italy by the Allies. The vehicle spent some time on loan at the Bovington Tank Museum in Dorset, UK. The vehicle was displayed as part of the museum’s “Tiger Collection” display from April 2017 until January 2019, when it was returned to the United States. This display brought all the members of the Tiger family together in one place for the first time. The second vehicle is located at the Russian Patriot Park and was captured during the Battle of Kursk.
The surviving Elefant located at Fort Lee. Source www.Tank-Hunter.comThe Ferdinand at Kubinka, before being moved to Patriot Park. Source: Wiki
Conclusion
Many sources that do not go into much analysis of the Ferdinand’s state that they were a waste of resources and had a poor overall design. It is important to remember that the Germans had already built 100 Porsche Tiger chassis. A lot of resources and time had already been invested in a vehicle that was not going to be put into production. They simply had no other choice than to see proper use of these already built chassis. For the later assembly of Ferdinands, additional resources were needed. The Ferdinand was rather hastily designed, which is best seen in the lack of s commander cupola and machine gun in the hull. The engine compartment was inadequate and too cramped, which later caused problems with the engine overheating. Some of these would later be corrected. Ferdinands also required frequent repairs and maintenance, but nearly all WWII vehicles required such things to be effective in combat. The armament and the armor were some of the best for their day. The Ferdinand is also often seen as too heavy. At its 65 and later 70 tonnes, it was. While it could reach a top speed of 30 km/h, its actual cross-country speed was only 10 km/h. Thanks to their long length, they had a good climbing ability.
In combat, the Ferdinands gained an enviable reputation among the German and Soviet units for their deadly gun and strong armor. The Soviets, when engaging German tank destroyers, would often describe them as Ferdinands, even though they were usually other vehicles in the German inventory. The German propaganda machine also helped by portraying the Ferdinands as wonder weapons. Despite this, the Ferdinand’s success as a deadly tank destroyer is hard to deny. During Kursk alone, over 500 Soviet armored vehicles were claimed to have been destroyed by them. Even taking into account a 50% overclaim ratio (which is excessive), the numbers remaining are still very impressive.
In the end, the Ferdinand was a deadly tank hunter that was plagued by its rushed development and lack of numbers. While not a waste of resources, they were no wonder weapons and possessed quite a number of flaws.
Porsche’s VK45.01 prototype in 1942. It was given as a favorite before problems with the complex powerplant emerged. Early production Ferdinand, Panzerabteilung 653, summer 1943. 653rd Panzer-Abteilung, Eastern front, winter 1943-44. Ferdinand of the 654th Panzer-Abteilung, Kursk, summer 1943. Ferdinand of the 654th PanzerJäger Abteilung, Kursk, Eastern front, 1943. Sd.Kfz.184 “Elefant” of the 1st company, 653rd Schwere Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung, Anzio-Nettuno, March 1944. Tiger (P) Elefant (late type) from the Abt.653 HQ Company, Brzherzhany, Ukraine, July 1944
Panzerjäger Tiger (P) 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71 “Ferdinand/Elefant” Sd.Kfz 184
Dimensions (L-W-H)
8.14 m x 3.38 m x 2.97 m
Total weight, battle-ready
65-70 tonnes
Crew
6 (Commander, Gunner, Two Loaders, Driver and Radio operator)
German Reich (1944-1945)
Tank Destroyer – Approximately 2,827 Built
Introduction
The first issue to clear up is the fact that the Jagdpanzer 38 was not officially called the Hetzer during the Second World War. Although most official wartime documents do not use the name Hetzer, a few did. Why this nickname has been associated with this tank hunter is investigated later in the article.
As the Second World War progressed, it turned into a numbers’ game. Germany needed more armored fighting vehicles that were cheaper to build and quicker to construct. They started using hulls of captured tanks and reliable but obsolete tanks, such as the Panzer 38(t), to mount anti-tank guns and artillery howitzers. This resulted in the production of the Marder series and Nashorn anti-tank self-propelled guns. They all carried powerful guns but had thin armor, an open-top fighting compartment, and a high profile which made them easy to spot on the battlefield. They could deal out punishment, but they could not take it.
German Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter self-propelled gun (UK School of Tank Technology)
The Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter was designed to have a very low profile which made it hard to target and easy to conceal. It was only 2.10 m (6 ft 10.6 inches) high which was ideal for ambush tactics. It was armed with a powerful high velocity 75 mm Pak 39 L/48 gun that could knock-out most enemy tanks. It was cheaper and quicker to build than a Panzer IV, Panther or Tiger tank.
It was not designed to be a close combat vehicle, used at the head of an attack like a tank. It was a self-propelled anti-tank gun that was intended to be deployed on the flanks to stop counter-attacks. A pack of Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters would hide in a wood or thick hedgerow and pick off enemy tanks at long range. The sloping front armor gave the crew reasonable protection from frontal attack. So long as the driver pointed the front of the vehicle at any threat, the crew could expect to survive a hit from an enemy armor-piercing shell. The thin armor on the sides of the vehicle and at the rear meant that there was a risk of being knocked out by flank and rear attacks with armor-piercing shells. If there was a danger of being outflanked, the driver had to change to a different location quickly.
In 1944, the Panzer 38(t) tank was considered outclassed and obsolete. It had been withdrawn from frontline units. The Jagdpanzer 38 utilized the tried and tested components of the Panzer 38(t) tank on a new wider hull. This meant that the Jagdpanzer 38 was relatively reliable, as all the early mechanical problems had been overcome. Because of this, production could start earlier than usual for a new armored fighting vehicle design, as most of the factory tooling for the manufacture of the Panzer 38(t) tank was still available. Due to the gun’s limited traverse, the driver had to continually change the vehicle’s orientation or move to engage new targets. This could reveal its location.
Inspiration: The Romanian Mareșal
Among the early inspiration sources for the casemate shape and light tank accommodation, the Romanian Mareșal is often cited. It was developed by Ateliere Leonida. This vehicle was born after the Romanian encounters with the Russian T-34 in Ukraine, which radically changed their opinion on armor and especially the possibilities of sloped armor. From there a project was born, which tried to create a tank hunter that would be extremely well-protected over an existing, readily available captured light tank chassis (the T-60), while keeping the weight down. It was achieved by giving the hull an extremely sloped, all-side armor. This resulted in the 50 mm (1.97 in) armor plates offering 100 mm (3.94 in) of effective protection against direct fire, which provided this small tank destroyer with the heavy tank protection level.
The Romanian Mareșal tank hunter self-propelled gun (Romanian military archives)
Six prototypes were built (M-00, M-01, M-02, M-03, M-04, M-05) between December 1942 and January 1944, but, after the 23 August coup d’etat, the plans and the remaining prototypes were seized by the Soviet army. Its main armament was a 7.5 cm (2.95 in) DT-UDR Resita Model 1943 and secondary ZB-53 7.92 mm (0.31 in) machine gun. Other guns were looked at. It was propelled by a Hotchkiss H-39 120 hp engine (10 hp/t) and transmission. It was based on a modified T-60 chassis, but with Rogifer suspension, comprising four stamped roadwheels per side. The top speed was 45 km/h (28 mph) on flat and 25 km/h (15 mph) cross-country.
The Romanian Mareșal tank hunter self-propelled gun with the glacis plate removed. (Romanian military archives)
German officers were sent to inspect the Romanian Mareșal tank hunter. They were impressed with many aspects of the overall vehicle design and at one point considered it being used in the German Army, but there were too many practical issues that would have to be rectified before entering service. The external shape and some ideas were incorporated in the later Jagdpanzer 38 design. A Romanian Army report of the inspection of the Mareșal tank hunter by the German officers was found from the Romanian military archives in Bucharest. The Romanian Army document dated April 1944 recorded the visit of two German officers: Lieutenant-Colonel Ventz from the Waffenamt (German Army Weapons Agency responsible for research and development) and Lieutenant-Colonel Haymann from German High Command OKH. Their initial reactions are also recorded in the report. This document is covered in more detail later in this article when we cover the origins of the nickname ‘Hetzer.’
A better view of the gunners position on the left of the Romanian Mareșal tank hunter self-propelled gun (Romanian military archives)
Development
On 26 November 1943, the production of Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III) assault guns at the Alkett company was severely interrupted when Allied bombers dropped a total of 1,424 tons of explosive and incendiary bombs on their Berlin factory. Due to the damage, the German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres – OKH) investigated the possibility of starting Sturmgeschütz III production at the Böhmisch-Mährische Maschinenfabrik AG (BMM) company in Prague. Before the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, this factory used to be called Českomoravská Kolben-Daněk (ČKD) and built tanks for the Czechoslovakian Army.
On 6 December 1943, the OKH reported to Hitler that the BMM company was unable to carry out this type of production order, as it did not have the infrastructure to manufacture the 24-tonne StuG III. The factory cranes could not lift a completed vehicle. The BMM factory cranes could only lift 13 tonnes. It had spent most of the war constructing 9.8 tonnes Panzer 38(t) light tanks for the German Army.
Hitler gave orders that the BMM factory was to concentrate on producing the new lighter Sturmgeschütz. It was proposed this vehicle would have a top speed of 55 – 60 km/h (34 – 37 mph), weigh 13 tonnes, and, as a result, have thin but sloped frontal armor to keep the vehicle’s weight low. The side armor was only to be thick enough to provide protection from small arms fire and high explosive shell shrapnel.
On 17 December 1943, designs for the new vehicle based on the hull of the now obsolete Panzer 38(t) light tank and a new type of reconnaissance vehicle (Aufklärungsfahrzeug) were presented to Hitler. They were approved for production.
Development work was carried out quickly. On 8 January 1944, the drawings of the final version of the vehicle were finished. By 24 January 1944, a wooden 1:1 scale model had been built and, two days later, demonstrated to officers from the Heereswaffenamt (HWA), the Army weaponry research and development agency. The size of the fighting compartment on the wooden mock-up was shorter than on the production vehicle, and the engine compartment had a longer sloped cover. These features were changed to give the crew more room.
Wooden mock-up of the Jagdpanzer 38 with muzzle brake. (German Federal archives)
There were plans to design and mount a 7.5 cm rücklauflose main gun in the production version of Jagdpanzer 38. A rücklauflose weapon featured a gun barrel fixed to the turret or casemate, which took on the full recoil of a shot. Development of the rücklauflose gun would take too long, so in the meantime, it was decided that a 7.5 cm Pak 39 (L/48) anti-tank gun would be installed in the Jagdpanzer 38. This gun was already in production and available for use. Oberst Thomale (Colonel Thomale) ordered three prototype Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters to be built and available for trials. It took less than four months from the initial design approval to the production of the first prototype.
Production
Once the final design of the production Jagdpanzer 38 was agreed upon, BMM was awarded a contract to produce 2,000 vehicles. More were needed, so the Czechoslovakian company Škoda was also awarded a contract to build 2,000 Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters. Both factories suffered bombing raids.
The Jagdpanzer 38 production line (German Federal Archives)
Both factories were supplied with components from subcontractors. Three hundred and sixteen such companies were based in Bohemia and Moravia in the Czech Protectorate. A further one hundred and seventeen came from other occupied countries and Germany. Due to advancing Allied forces and the constant bombing, the source of parts for construction of the Jagdpanzer 38 changed repeatedly. This caused delays in supply which affected monthly production figures.
The armored hulls were produced in the steel factory in Vitkovice and by the Poldi steel mills in Kladno: both were in the Czech Protectorate. They were also supplied by two German steel-factories: Linke-Hoffman in Breslau and Ruhrstahl in Hattingen. The tracks were cast in the Czech Protectorate at the steel mills of Chomutov in north-west Bohemia and Královo Pole in Brno. The engines were manufactured by the Czech car manufacturer Praga, which also supplied the Wilson-type gearboxes.
A total of 2,827 Jagdpanzer 38 were produced by BMM and Škoda. About 2,612 were Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters, 14 were Jagdpanzer 38t Starr, 181 Bergepanzer 38 and 20 Flammpanzer.
Jagdpanzer 38 production
Month
Completed by Škoda
Completed by BMM
March 1944
0
3
April 1944
0
20
May 1944
0
50
June 1944
0
100
July 1944
10
100
August 1944
20
150
September 1944
30
190
October 1944
57
133
November 1944
89
298
December 1944
104
223
January 1945
145
289
February 1945
125
237
March 1945
153
148
April/May 1945
47
70
Total
780
2047
Note: The figures for BMM include Jagdpanzer 38 Starr and Bergepanzerwagen 38 (Source: Spielberger, Jentz and Doyle)
Jagdpanzer 38 at Škoda Works, Pilsen, Czechoslovakia. Notice the three false vision ports painted around the driver’s position to confuse Soviet anti-tank rifle snipers. (German Federal archives)
Design
Due to the limited space inside the Jagdpanzer 38 and the desire to keep the profile of the vehicle low, the gun mount was not bolted to the floor of the vehicle. Instead, a gun cradle mount was fixed to the glacis plate. The gun had to be installed off-center, to the right of the vehicle. This enabled the driver, gunner, and loader‘s positions to be on the left side of the vehicle, in line, one behind the other. The commander sat on the right side of the vehicle, at the rear of the fighting compartment, directly behind the gun, with his hatch above him. He did not have access to an armored cupola.
The gun was mounted to the right of the vehicle. This restricted its traverse to only 5° left and 11° right. To engage targets outside this narrow 16° traverse range, the whole vehicle would have to be moved. The off-center gun meant that there was too much weight on the right track and suspension. To the vehicle did not tilt towards the right, 850 kg of crew and equipment had to be placed on the left side of the gun as a counterbalance.
If all the hatches were closed, the crew had limited visibility, especially to the side and rear of the vehicle. The driver had two angled periscopes that protruded out of the upper glacis plate under a protective armored cover. The gunner was provided with a forward-looking Selbstfahrlafetten-Zielfernrohr 1a (Sfl.ZF 1a) periscope gun sight. The loader had a periscope to look out for threats on the left side of the vehicle. The roof machine gun was aimed by looking through a periscope. It could rotate 360°. The commander had access to a rearward-looking periscope. If the commander’s hatch was closed, he had no forward vision. It would only be kept closed in extreme emergencies, such as during an artillery or mortar barrage. Also available was a Scherenfernohrs 14Z (Sf.14Z) scissor telescope which poked out the top of the open roof hatch which had a magnification of 8 x 10.
Engine and Transmission
The Jagdpanzer 38 was powered by a Praga EPA AC 2800 6-cylinder 158 hp petrol engine. The Praga engine was very similar to the one used in the Panzer 38(t) tank but had been uprated. Instead of producing 129 hp, it now produced 158 hp. The engine was connected to a five-speed Praga-Wilson transmission which was in turn connected to a Planetary steering system. The vehicle had a top road speed of 40 km/h (24.9 mph). This was less than initially hoped for. The production vehicle weighed 16 tonnes rather than the proposed 13 tonnes, which affected the vehicle‘s speed.
The dome at the back of the tank is a simple cover for the hand crank. Although the Jagdpanzer 38 had an electrical starter, crews were instructed that the preferred method was to use the hand crank where possible, as the electrical starter was not robust and should only be used in emergencies. To the bottom right of the rear armor plate, there was a port to gain access to the cooling water heater. In severe weather conditions, the engine coolant would freeze. A blow lamp could be placed in this port to warm the coolant and defrost it before the engine was started.
When the left rear engine compartment hatch is opened, access can be gained to the fuel filler cap behind the 12V battery. The Jagdpanzer 38 had two interconnected fuel tanks. The fuel tank on the left held 220 liters while the fuel tank on the right held 100 liters. This would give an approximate operational range of 180 km (111 miles).
Cooling the engine was a problem, as it only had a small air intake vent on the rear deck. It required a powerful motor to drive the air intake fan, which reduced the overall performance of the vehicle because it took power from the engine.
Suspension
Although the hull, suspension, tracks, and road wheels look very similar to those used on the Panzer 38(t) tank, the vehicle was a new build. The hull was wider: the Panzer 38(t) tank was 2.13 m (7ft) wide, but the Jagdpanzer 38 was 2.63 m (8ft 7.5 in) wide. The road wheels were larger than those used on the Panzer 38(t) tanks: they were 82 cm diameter instead of the tank’s 77.7 cm (2 ft 7 in) diameter. The suspension has been made more durable than that used on the Panzer 38(t) tank, especially at the front of the vehicle, in order to cope with the extra weight. The tracks have been widened from 29 cm to 35 cm (11in to 1ft 2 in). The Jagdpanzer 38 was only provided with one track return roller, unlike the Panzer 38(t) that had two.
The Driver’s position
The Jagdpanzer 38 driver had a basic instrument panel in front of him. He steered the vehicle by using two hand tillers. Each one of these levers controlled one of the two tracks. The driver also had a handbrake. The foot pedals were not in the standard order that we have come to expect in a modern car. The accelerator was in the middle. The pedal on the right was the foot brake. The gear change pedal was on the far left.
The gearbox was to the right of the driver. It was a 5-speed Praga-Wilson preselector. The Wilson type was the same system used by the British and developed by the Wilson gearbox company. The driver did not change gear like you would in a modern car, where you put the clutch in first and then select the gear. Instead, while the engine was running, they had to choose the next gear first and then depress the gear change pedal, which acted like a clutch, and let it come back up, hence the name pre-selector. To stop the vehicle without stalling, the driver had to remember to select neutral first, then apply the brake and the gear change pedal at the same time.
Exhaust system
Early versions of the exhaust system at the rear of the Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter had the pipe coming down the back of the vehicle into a tubular silencer box that ran along the top of the rear armor plate, mounted horizontally. This was changed to a single pipe going into a flame hider on the back of the vehicle.
Front and rear view of captured Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters (US archives)
Main Armament
The 7.5 cm Panzerjägerkanone 39 L/48 (7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48) anti-tank gun was used to equip Jagdpanzer IV and Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters. The German word ‘Panzerjägerkanone’ literally translates to ‘tank hunter gun’ (anti-tank gun) and is usually abbreviated to Pak, thus sharing the contraction of the more common ‘Panzerabwehrkanone’. It was an electrically fired weapon fitted with a semi-automatic breech mechanism and a 48 caliber long barrel (3615 mm or 11 ft 10.3 in). It could penetrate the armor of most common Allied tanks at ranges up to 1,000 meters as shown in the table below.
When travelling across rough ground, the gunner used the internal gun travel lock to minimize any damage to the gun. The Sfl.ZF 1a periscope gun sight was fixed to the left side of the gun and protruded out of the roof in a semi-circular sliding section of the roof armor. It moved when the gun was moved. It did not rotate. The gunner had to change his body positions to follow the gun periscope as he searched to bring the gun onto the next target by turning the traverse wheel. He also had to avoid being hit in the head by the remote control machine gun handles above him.
The loader sat on the left side of the main gun, behind the gunner and driver. He had a very challenging job because the 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 anti-tank gun had been designed to be loaded from the right side. The loader’s controls were on the wrong side. To open the breech, he had to lean across the gun to access the breech opening lever. The main weapon had a semi-automatic loading system: once the first round was loaded, every time the gun fired, the recoil ejected the shell casing, and the breech block remained down in the open position waiting for another shell to be loaded. The large recoil guard was to his right, and this got in the way when loading shells. Not all of the ammunition was stored near the loader on the left side of the vehicle. Sometimes, he would have to reach over the gun breach and the recoil guard to access the shells stowed on the right side of this cramped tank hunter. The commander had a safety lever near him that prevented the gun from being fired while the loader was servicing the gun. When he was clear of the gun mechanism and a shell was in the breech ready for firing, the commander released the lever to enable the gun to be fired.
Design work on the 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 started in 1939, but it was manufactured from 1943 onwards by Rheinmetall-Borsig AG in Unterlüß and by Seitz-Werke GmbH in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. It used the same 75 x 495 mm R ammunition as the 7.5 cm KwK 40 of Panzer IV medium tank and 7.5 cm StuK 40 gun fitted on the later models of the Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III) assault guns. No towed version of the 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 was manufactured.
It could fire three common types of ammunition: Panzergranatepatrone 39 (Pzgr.Patr. 39) armor-piercing capped ballistic cap (APCBC) shell, Sprenggranatepatrone 37 (Sprgr. Patr. 37) high explosive (HE) shell, and different versions of the Granatpatrone 38 HL (Gr. Patr. 38 HL) high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round. The latter was an effective high-explosive anti-tank shell and could be used against soft-skinned targets as well as armored vehicles. Its armor penetration qualities were not as high as the Pzgr.Patr. 39 (APCBC) shell. When fired, the Panzergranatepatrone 39 shell had a muzzle velocity of 750 meters/second (2460 feet/second).
Depending on availability, a few rounds of Panzergranatepatrone 40 (Pzgr.Patr. 40) high velocity, sub-caliber, tungsten core armor-piercing rounds were carried in case the crew encountered heavily armored Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns. The supplies of tungsten were limited.
7.5 cm Panzerjägerkanone 39 L/48 anti-tank gun armor penetration
(The data was obtained on a firing range. The armor plate was laid back at a 30-degree angle)
Pzgr.Patr. 39
Pzgr.Patr. 40
Gr. Patr. 38 HL
Shell Weight
6.8 kg
4.1 kg
5 kg
Initial Velocity
750 m/s
930 m/s
450 m/s
Range
100 m
106 mm
143 mm
100 mm
500 m
96 mm
120 mm
100 mm
1000 m
85 mm
97 mm
100 mm
1500 m
74 mm
77 mm
100 mm
2000 m
64 mm
100 mm
(Source: Spielberger, Jentz and Doyle)
The initial design of the gun mantlet was 200 kg heavier than the later design. The early vehicle was nose heavy, and this put stress on the front suspension. By changing the mantlet to a lighter model, and making adjustments to the suspension, the maneuverability of the vehicle became tolerable.
Secondary Armament
The loader had the job of rearming and firing the remote-controlled roof-mounted 360 degrees swiveling 7.92 mm M.G.34 machine gun. It was fired from inside the armored protection of the fighting compartment. A hinged gun shield could be fixed in place to protect the crewman when reloading the gun. It was aimed by looking through a periscope. Behind him, on the rear wall, there was the radio, usually a Fu5 and the on-off master power handle.
Top view of the remote-controlled roof-mounted 360 degrees swiveling 7.92 mm M.G.34 machine gun (German Federal Archives)
Armor
The front upper glacis plate of the Jagdpanzer 38 was designed to be 60 mm (2.4 inches) thick, sloped at 30 degrees from the horizontal. This meant that an armor-piercing (AP) round fired straight at the front upper glacis plate would have to penetrate 120 mm (4.7 inches) of armor due to the angle. The steep slope would also help increase the chance that the round would ricochet. The feared Tiger 1 heavy tank only had 100 mm (3.93 inches) thick effective frontal hull armor. The front glacis armor plate had interlocking welded joints for added strength and security. Sloping the armor meant that the level of protection could be kept high, but the costs and complexity of manufacturing the armor could be kept low. The lower front glacis plate was 60 mm (2.4 inches) thick angled at 50 degrees. This would make the effective thickness of that armor plate 78 mm (3.07 inches).
From these statistics, it would appear that the front armor of the Jagdpanzer 38 was very strong. According to H.L.Doyle, these figures are deceptive because the armor plate used was of inferior quality to the face hardened armor used on the Panzer IV and Panther tanks. The 60 mm armor on the upper and lower glacis was roughly equivalent to the 30 mm (1.18 inches) face hardened armor used on the Panzer III. It was manufactured to E22 specifications and had a hardness of 265 to 309 Brinell. However, Panzer Tracts no.9, by T.Jentz, states that the Jagdpanzer 38’s front armor was meant to be immune to most anti-tank guns, contradicting Doyle’s statements.
The upper side armor of 20 mm (0.78 inches) thickness was comparable to the 14.5 mm plate used on the front of a Sd.Kfz.251 half-track. It was made from a low alloy Siemens-Marteneit (SM) steel. It had a hardness of 220 to 265 Brinell. The tolerances on armor production were quite wide. The thicknesses of four different Jagdpanzer 38 upper glacis plates’ 60 mm (2.4 inches) thick armor were measured. They all belonged to the Wheatcroft Collection. One was built in February 1945, but the other three were built after the war as part of the G13 Swiss Contract. The thickness ranged from 62.2 mm to 64.8 mm (2.44 – 2.55 inches).
The lower hull side armor was 20 mm (0.78 inches) thick and sloped inwards at an angle of 75o. The rear armor was 20 mm (0.78 inches) thick angled at 75 degrees. The roof armor was 10 mm thick (0.39 inches). The belly armor was 8 mm thick (0.3 inches). The Schürzen side skirt armor was made from 5 mm steel plate. It was designed to protect the side 20 mm thick lower hull armor from the Soviet 14.5 mm anti-tank rifles.
Modifications
As with all other German armored fighting vehicles, improvements were continuously introduced during production to improve the performance of the vehicle and increase the speed of manufacture through simplification of its design. Some changes had to be introduced due to the problems with the supply of parts or raw materials.
The idler wheel design went through several changes. In order to reduce the amount of time it took to manufacture the rear idler wheel with twelve holes, different designs were introduced in the following order.
1. Six holes in a flat disc
2. Welded spokes with eight holes on a smooth flat disc.
3. Stamped ribs with six holes on a dish-shaped disc.
4. Six holes on a smooth flat disc.
5. Four holes on a smooth flat disc.
When Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters were damaged, the maintenance workshop would fit whatever replacement idler wheels were available in their stores. Sometimes, late version vehicles would be equipped with early version idler wheels with twelve holes. If only one idler wheel needed replacing, then there would be situations where a vehicle would have idler wheels of different types.
In April 1944, further changes were introduced. The ram’s-horn towing hooks at the front and rear of the vehicle were omitted. They were replaced by extending the side hull armor plates and drilling a hole into the metal. The flange around the gun mantlet helped transfer the weight of the gun to the upper hull glacis plate. The size of the flange was reduced to decrease the weight of the gun mantlet. The length of the rooftop 7.92 mm MG 34 machine gun hinged shield was shortened to stop it from hitting the top of the Sfl.ZF 1a periscope gun sight.
The design of the front track drive sprocket wheel was changed. To save production time, the holes were no longer drilled on the outer ring of the sprocket wheel. A different type of rear idler wheel was fitted. It had four large holes in the disk rather than twelve holes in the earlier version.
Starting in May and continuing into July 1944, more changes were ordered. To stop having to open large hatches on the rear of the Jagdpanzer 38 to access the crew compartment, the commander was given a small hatch that opened to the rear. A hatch was added on the lower right to enable access to the radiator cooling fluid filling cap. Another hatch was added to the lower left to give access to the petrol fuel tank filling cap. The heat shield around the exhaust was no longer fitted. Three ‘mushroom’ short threaded cylinders were welded to the top of the Jagdpanzer 38 to enable a two-tonne temporary crane to be mounted to help with mechanical maintenance, replacement of heavy parts, and repairs.
Further changes were made in August 1944. As a result of a redesign of the metal used in the internal and external construction of the gun mantlet, the weight of the Jagdpanzer 38 was reduced by 200 kg. Road wheels with a larger diameter center disk with thinner rims were introduced. Initially, the rim was drilled for 32 bolts around the edge, but often only 16 bolts were fitted. To help the driver exit his seat quickly in case the vehicle was hit, two handles were welded above the driver’s seat.
Production line changes were introduced in September 1944. To protect the crew from Soviet 14.5 mm anti-tank rifles being fired at the lower hull armor, the Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter was fitted with Schürzen skirt armor plates. Crews found that these plates were ripped off as they brushed past bushes and trees. The front ends of the Schürtzen were bent in towards the hull to try and stop them from being torn off.
The front set of leaf springs experienced more stress than the rear set and often broke. The thickness of the front set of sixteen leaf springs was increased from 7 mm to 9 mm. The rear set of sixteen leaf springs remained 7 mm thick.
More design changes were implemented in October 1944. The design of the driver’s periscope mounting had to be altered after the early version acted as a ‘shell trap. When incoming armor-piercing shells hit the front upper glacis plate but failed to penetrate it, they would slide upwards and enter the crew compartment via the protruding cover over the driver’s periscopes, after getting caught on it. The armored cover was no longer fitted. Holes were cut flush with the glacis plate to hold the periscopes. A thin sheet metal dual-purpose sun and rain guard was installed over the holes. If a shell slid up the upper glacis plate and hit this guard, it would be ripped off but would not act as a ‘shell-trap.’
New road wheels were introduced that were riveted instead of being bolted. It had been found that some of the bolts on the earlier versions of the Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter’s road wheels came undone.
The red-hot glowing exhaust pipes and flames of a backfire can give away the position of the vehicle at dusk and during the night. This can result in it being spotted by an enemy artillery forward observer and calling in an artillery barrage. The cylindrical silencer was replaced with a Flamm-Vernichter (flame destroyer) exhaust.
Allied bombing disrupted the supply of ball bearings. The gun mount had to be changed. The ball bearings used in the gun mount were replaced with roller bearings. This necessitated the installation of a spring compensator to help with elevating the gun.
Filling the Jagdpanzer 38’s fuel tanks took a long time. To enable the tanks to be refilled faster, a larger nozzle with an overflow pan was fitted. Also, there had been reliability problems with the electric fuel pump, so a Solex-handpumpe manual hand pump was issued. The commander’s hatch was equipped with a head cushion.
As the cold weather arrived in November 1944, just in time for winter, a new heating plate was fitted to keep the battery from freezing. The heating inside the crew compartment was also upgraded. A better heat distribution vent was installed in the engine compartment firewall. It gave a more even heat distribution inside the vehicle. The water pump also upgraded to one that was more robust.
By changing the location of an internal stowage box to the right of the commander’s position, a further five 75 mm shells were able to be carried.
The last batch of changes started in January 1945. The Model 6 final drive had a gear ratio of 12:88. They suffered from mechanical failure due to the stresses put on them. The Jagdpanzer 38 was three tonnes over the initial design specifications. It was front heavy, and the driver regularly had to maneuver the whole vehicle to enable the gun to be aimed at a new target. In January 1945, a new more robust Model 6.75 final drive was fitted. It had a gear ratio of 10:80.
The Jagdpanzer 38 was an ambush vehicle and needed to hide. To make the crew’s task of fixing cut tree branches and bushes to the exterior of the vehicle easier, ‘U’ shaped brackets were welded to the upper front glacis plate and the side armor. Wire or string could be threaded through these ‘U’ shaped brackets and foliage tied onto it. The exact date in 1945 this feature started to be added onto vehicles under production is not known.
To strengthen the towing brackets on some vehicles, side supports were welded at the junction of the hull side armor and the front and rear armor plates. Others had the extended hull armor towing brackets removed and replaced with ‘U’ brackets welded onto the lower front glacis plate and the rear armor plate.
Did the Jagdpanzer 38 have a muzzle brake?
The answer is yes, no, then yes. A muzzle brake is designed to increase the life expectancy of a gun barrel by directing some of the explosive force of the shell gasses sideways rather than just forward. The wooden mock-up of the prototype was fitted with a muzzle brake. The early production Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters were fitted with a muzzle brake but these were removed by crews and later production vehicles did not have them fitted. It was found they produced too much dust and smoke, which gave away their ambush position. This was often fatal. The post-war Swiss G13 version had a muzzle brake fitted.
Early production Jagdpanzer 38 with muzzle brake. (German Federal Archives)
Camouflage
Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters left the factory painted dark sandy yellow (Dunkelgelb RAL 7028). Camouflage patterns were painted onto the vehicle when it arrived at the unit it was assigned to. In October 1944, new Jagdpanzer 38s were painted in a camouflage pattern before they left the BMM factory. It had a base color of dark sandy yellow (Dunkelgelb RAL 7028) with stripes and patches of dark red-brown (Rotbraun RAL 8017) paint and dark olive green (Olivgrün RAL 6003). Black rectangular false vision ports were painted on the upper front glacis plate to try and draw the enemy’s fire away from the driver’s periscopes.
The vehicle’s designation
The Jagdpanzer 38 was not officially called the Hetzer during WW2. What follows is an investigation into why the Hetzer nickname is associated with this tank hunter. Many German armored fighting vehicles had very long official designations, so shorter nicknames were used to assist in recognition, for example, the Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausf.E was called the Tiger. There are others, like the Ferdinand, Panther, Grille, Wespe, Hummel and many more. Some were official designations while others were unofficial and came from the soldiers using the vehicle. The German High Command even issued orders for vehicle names to be changed because they were deemed to be misleading or not suitable for a vehicle belonging to the German Army. Some of the names now used to describe Second World War German fighting vehicles arose after the war. A few were the invention of scale model kit companies.
Ein grosser Hetzer
A Romanian Army document dated April 1944 recorded the visit of two German officers: Lieutenant-Colonel Ventz from the Waffenamt (German Army Weapons Agency responsible for research and development) and Lieutenant-Colonel Haymann from German High Command OKH. They had come to inspect several vehicles including the Mareşal light tank hunter. Its design is believed to have influenced the final development of the Jagdpanzer 38. The comments of Lieutenant-Colonel Haymann were recorded in the last paragraph on the first page. He said the Mareşal would make ‘ein grosser Hetzer’ (an impressive hunter). The German word “Gross” does not only translate to big as in size. It can also mean good or impressive (Großartig). He went on to say it would be a superior adversary against the Russians.
This is a Romanian Army document dated 1944 that recorded the visit of two German officers to inspect the Mareşal light tank hunter. In the last paragraph, they describe it as, ‘ein grosser Hetzer.’ (Source: Romainain Military Archives, Bucharest)
The Jagdpanzer 38 had many different official names
The word ‘Hetzer’ has not been used during this article because it was not used officially by the German Army during WW2. It is a nickname used by some of the troops. The Jagdpanzer 38 was known by many different designations and abbreviations in official German Army and factory documents.
These are two monthly Heereswaffenamt (HWA – German Army Weapons Agency) reports: one is dated March 1944 and the other November 1944. It is one example of how the Jagdpanzer 38 underwent name changes. (Source: Steven Zaloga/NARA)
The following is an updated list of the different names and abbreviations given to the Jagdpanzer 38, followed by the source, and date of the document that was initially compiled by Thomas L. Jentz and Hilary Louis Doyle. The term ‘Hetzer’ was a nickname and not an official designation.
leichter Panzerjäger auf 38(t) Wa Prüf 6, (7 January 1944) leichter Panzerjäger auf 38(t) Wa Prüf 6, (28 February 1944) Pz.Jäger 38(t) KTB, GenStdH/Gen.d.Art. (18 January 1944) Pz.Jäger 38(t) KTB, GenStdH/Gen.d.Art. (16 April 1944) Sturmgeschütz neuer Art Gen Insp.d.Pz.Tr. an OKH/Wa Prüf (28 January 1944) Le. Pz.Jäger (38t) Gen Insp.d.Pz.Tr. an OKH/Wa Prüf (28 January 1944) leichtes Sturmgeschütz auf 38(t) Führer Konferenz (28 January 1944) Panzerjäger 38 für 7,5cm Pak 39 (L-/48) (Sd Kfz 138/2) K.St.N. 1149 (1 January 1944) le.Pz.Jg.38t Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr.Akten (4 March to October 1944) le.Pz.Jg.38t Panzerjäger-Abteilung 743 (3 August 1944) 7,5 cm Panzerjäger 38(t) Chef.H.Rüst.u.BdE, Wa.Abn. (6 April to 31 July 1944) Stu.Gesch.38(t) Chef.H.Rüst.u.BdE, Wa.Abn. (6 April to 6 June 1944) Stu.Gesch.n.Aa mit 7.5cm Pak 39 L/48 auf Fgst.Pz.Kpf.Wg.38(t) Waffen bzw.Geräte (March 1944) Stu.Gesch.n.Aa mit 7.5cm Pak 39 L/48 auf Fgst.Pz.Kpf.Wg.38(t) Überblick über den Rüstungsstand des Heeres Chef.H.Rüst.u. BdE/Stab Rüst lil. (15 May to 15 October 1944) Ie.Pz.Jäg.38(t) GenSTdH/General der Artillerie Kriegstagebuch (7 June to 30 July 1944) Stu.Gesch.38(t) GenSTdH/Org.Abt. Bericht (12 June and 28 June 1944) I.Pz.Jg.38(t) Wa Prüf 6 (23 June 1944) Ie.Pz.Jg.38(t) mit 7,5cm Pak L/48 auf Fgst Pz 38t GenSTdH/Org.Abt./Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr. (8 September 1944) le. Panzerjäger 38t GenSTdH/Org.Abt./Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr. (8 September 1944) Jagdpanzer 38 Name of Troop – GenSTdH/Org.Abt./Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr. (11 September 1944) Jagdpanzer 38 Ausf Name of regulations – GenSTdH/Org.Abt./Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr. (11 September 1944) Pz.-Jäger 38(t) (späterer Name wahrscheinlich Jagdpanzer) (probable later name Jagdpanzer) GenSTdH/General der Artillerie Kriegstagebuch (12 September 1944) Jagdpanzer 38 Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr.Akten (19 October 1944 to 6 April 1945) Jagdpanzer 38 D652/63 (1 November 1944) Jagdpanzer 38 und Panzerjäger 38 (7,5cm Pak 39 (L/48) (Sd.Kfz 138/2) K.St.N. 1149 (1 November 1944) Jagdpz. 38 this style of abbreviation was used in a list as part of a combat readiness report by the Panzergrenadier Division “Feldherrnhalle”. None were shown on strength. (3 November 1944) Jagdpanzer 38, Panzerjäger 38 (m 7,5cm Pak 39 (L/48) (Sd.Kfz 138/2) Überblick über den Rüstungsstand des Heeres, Chef H.Rüst u. BdE/Stab Rüst III. (15 November 1944 to 15 March 1945) Jagdpanzer 38 WaA/Wa Prüf 6 (17 November and 19 December 1944) Hetzer The origin of this name was explained in this document as coming from the troops to denote the Jagdpanzer 38 Gen. Insp.d.Pz.Tr. Guderian. (4 December 1944) (Source: Spielberger, Jentz and Doyle) Hetzer and Pz.Jg.38(T) IX.SS.Geb.A.K (19 December 1944) Panzerjager G13 Škoda parts list document 1944 edition. Jagdpanzer 38 T (Hetzer) Chief General Quartermaster I.A.Gschwender, Luftwaffe High Command telex (16 February 1945) Jg.Pz.38 t SS-Sturmbannführer combat readiness report. (March 1945) Jg.Pz.38 t Hetzer SS-Sturmbannfüher combat readiness report. (March 1945)
The Project Hetzer E-10 prototype design confusion
‘Project Hetzer’ was the name used by the team tasked with designing a low-profile self-propelled tank hunter with a fast, powerful 400 hp engine that would give the vehicle a maximum road speed of 70 km/h (43.49 mph). It was an Entwicklungs-Serien (developmental series) 10-tonne vehicle that was allocated the designation ‘E-10’. It did not enter production. Weight designations in E-series were not very accurate. The E-10 was planned to weigh between 12-15 tonnes.
The plans for the Jagdpanzer 38 and E-10 were discussed at a concept design meeting between the German army ordnance officers from Wa Prüf 6, and the Czech Böhmisch-Märische Maschinenfabrik (B.M.M.) company. The language barrier may have led to a misunderstanding. It is assumed the Czech company officials believed the Germans were using the name ‘Hetzer‘ when talking about their Jagdpanzer 38 and not the rival company’s E-10 project. Thus, the nickname ‘Hetzer’ became connected to the Jagdpanzer 38 but not used as an official designation.
Military historian Herbert Ackermans found in the German Archives a report dated 21 January 1944, that detailed the items on the agenda and minutes of a number of meetings about the development and production of weapons and equipment, that took place with General Friedrich Fromm, German Army High Command (OKH), between April 1943 and 21 January 1944. (Archiv Signatur RH 10/37)
Klein-Panzerjäger (Source: Herbert Ackermans/Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv. Signatur RH 10/37)
Item 5 of the report dealt with Klein-Panzerjäger (small tank hunter). Major-General Beißwänger (General beim Chef der Heeresrüstung) remarked that the introduction of such designation (like ‘Klein-Panzerjäger’) was undesirable and that precise designations were required.
Oberst Crohn’s of Wa.Prüf. 6, informed those present at the meeting that the Romanian Maresal tank hunter was of no further interest to Germany as the production of the Jagdpanzer 38 has been decided upon. This also meant that Project Hetzer, Project Rutscher, and Project Sprengstoffträger mit Puppchen had been canceled.
This document provides evidence that the Jagdpanzer 38 and the Project Hetzer E-10 were treated as two separate vehicles.
The few wartime documents where the nickname ‘Hetzer’ was used
Hetzer document No.1
On 31 July 1944, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 743 (743rd Tank Hunter Battalion) reported having twenty-eight Hetzers available, with an additional fourteen Hetzers expected to arrive on 3 August 1944 when the battalion would be joined by the 3.Kompanie (3rd company) near Warsaw. On 3 August 1944, the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 743 submitted a ‘strength report‘ that listed how many vehicles were operational and how many were lost, damaged or needing mechanical repair. In this and later reports, the nickname Hetzer was not used. They were given the abbreviated designation of le.Pz.Jg.38t.
Hetzer document No.2
In a Führervortrag briefing sheet, dated 4 December 1944, from German General Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, Hitler is informed that the nickname Hetzer was used by the troops to refer to the Jagdpanzer 38. Hilary Louis Doyle and Thomas L. Jentz mentions this in his Panzer Tracts book. (Found again by military historian Herbert Ackermans in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration – NARA)
8.) Erklärung Ausdruck “Hetzer.” Der kommt aus der Truppe und bezeichnet damit den Jagdpanzer 38.
8.) Declaration Expression “Hetzer.” The expression comes from the troops and refers to the Jagdpanzer 38.
This is the front page of the Führervortrag briefing sheet, showing the date 4 December 1944 (Source: Herbert Ackermans/NARA)
This is the second page of the same report.
This is the second page of the Führervortrag briefing sheet. The translation of the last point is “8.) Declaration Expression “Hetzer.” The expression comes from the troops and refers to the Jagdpanzer 38.” (Source: Herbert Ackermans/Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv.)
Hetzer document No.3
On 19 December 1944, a unit combat readiness report was submitted. It used both the abbreviation Pz.Jg.38(T) and just the nickname Hetzer when collating the figures of combat-ready Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters. The 22 SS-Kavallerie-Division reported they had two Pz.Jg.38(T) available. The 8 SS-Kavallerie-Division reported they had three Hetzers available. The subordinated unit to the Panzer-Division Feldherrnhalle stated they had three Hetzers available.
This unit combat readiness report dated 19 December 1944 uses both the abbreviation Pz.Jg.38(T) and just the nickname Hetzer (Source Russian Archives CAMO 500-12472-383 War Diary of AOK 6, late 1944)
Hetzer document No.4
The fourth document was discovered by historian Herbert Ackerman in October 2020 as he was looking at documents in the Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv (German Military Archives). It is a telex from Chief General Quartermaster I.A.Gschwender, Luftwaffe High Command addressed to the German High Command Panzertruppen Inspector. He asks when the Fallschirmjaeger Panzerjäger Abteilungen (airborne tank hunter battalion) are planned to be reequipped with Jagdpanzer 38 Hetzer, what are the composition numbers and delivery dates. It was sent on 16 February 1945 and used the name Jagdpanzer 38 T (Hetzer)
Wartime telex dated dated 16 February 1945 from Luftwaffe High Command to German Army High Command Panzertruppen D Inspector where the name Jagdpanzer 38 T (Hetzer) was used.(Source Herbert Ackermans/Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv Signatur RH 10/123)
Hetzer document No.5
The fifth document was a unit combat readiness report for March 1945. In the eighth line down, under the heading Pz.Abt.17 (17th Panzer battalion) there is an entry, Jg.Pz. 38 t Hetzer. It is strange why this SS-Sturmbannführer (Major) listed one Jg.Pz. 38 t in short term repair as a “Hetzer”, but later listed ten Jagdpanzer 38(t) tank hunters belonging to the Pz.Jg.Abt.Nibelungen (Anti-tank battalion “Nibelungen”) as just Jg.Pz. 38 t and did not include the nickname “Hetzer”. Seven of those ten are shown as operational, one in short-term repair, one in long-term repair, and one with transmission failure. (Source Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv)
A unit combat readiness report for March 1945 that uses the term Jg.Pz.38 t Hetzer. (Source: Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv)
Hetzer document No.6
The sixth document is also a unit combat readiness report dated 7 March 1945 for the attention of the German Army High Command Panzertruppen D Inspector from Kampfgruppe Panzer Korps “Feldherrnhalle”. In point 2, under the heading Pz.Jg.Abt.13 (13th Tank Hunter Battalion) there is an entry, (20 Hetzer) ready only after retraining of personnel on the Jg.Pz. 38. Earliest date 25 March 1945. Like some of the other documents it also uses both terms, Hetzer and Jg.Pz.38.
This document shows that the Pz.Jg.Abt.13 (13th Tank Hunter Battalion) will have 20 Hetzers ready only after retraining of personnel (Source: Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv)
How are the words ‘baiter and agitator’ connected with the Jagdpanzer 38?
During the Second World War and when hostilities had finished, German military prisoners, engineers, and factory workers were interviewed by Intelligence officers. The Allied translators chose to translate the German word ‘Hetzer’ when it was used by the person being interviewed to describe the Jagdpanzer 38, as ‘baiter’. These words appear in U.S. Soviet, British and Commonwealth reports. The interviews were recorded in German. They also noted that the nickname ‘Hetzer’ was used to refer to the Jagdpanzer 38 and some intelligence documents used the German word Hetzer rather than the English translation.
British M.I.10 intelligence source document noting that the Jagdpanzer 38 was also referred to as ‘Panzerjaeger 38’ and ‘Hetzer’ (Source Ed Webster/M.I.10)
Military Intelligence, Section 10 (M.I.10) was part of the British War Office, which would later become part of M.I.6. It was responsible for technical analysis of weapons. The original Secret documents were declassified on 22 November 1988. Multiple British army intelligence reports and English transcripts of German prisoner interrogations make use of the term ‘Baiter’ as an English translation for the German nickname ‘Hetzer’ when used to refer to the Jagdpanzer 38. These documents were collated and analyzed by M.I.10. The following extract is one such example.
British M.I.10 translation of an interview with Herr Mehlert about the Jagdpanzer 38. The Allied translator has used the English word ‘baiter’ as a translation for the German word ‘hetzer’. (Source Ed Webster/M.I.10)
In 1947, the M.I.10 used the name ‘Pz.Jäg. 38(t) – Hetzer’ under a photograph of a Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter in an official, secret, military reference book called ‘Illustrated Record of German Army Equipment 1939 – 1945, Volume III, armored Fighting Vehicles.’ The publication was a summary of all the intelligence reports that M.I.10 had collected on German vehicles. Unfortunately, there is no information in this document about the intelligence source on which naming the Jagdpanzer 38, ‘Hetzer’ was based.
This is a page from the British M.I.10 War Office 1947 publication Illustrated Record Of German Army Equipment 1939-1945 Volume III – Armoured Fighting Vehicles. It uses the nickname Hetzer (Source: Shrivenham Defence Academy/M.I.10)
Ralf Raths, the director of the German Tank Museum, whose first language is German, states that Hetzer is a German hunting term. ‘Hetzen” means to hunt your prey at high speed until it collapses or is caught. This is what wolves do in the wild. This would also cover hunting fox, deer, and hare with dogs and on horseback. The term Hetzer was applicable to the Project Hetzer E-10 fast tank hunter but not to the Jagdpanzer 38 which was a slow vehicle that only had a top maximum road speed of 40 km/h (25 mph). The popular modern phrase found on T-shirts, websites, and memes, ‘The Hetzer gonna Hetz’ is totally inaccurate. The Jagdpanzer 38 could not Hetz. It could not chase after its prey at speed. Its tactical deployment was as an ambush weapon.
Unfortunately, there is not a word in English that is a good translation of the German Word Hetzer. We have ‘hare coursing’, but ‘a coursing’ or ‘Project Coursing’ sounds wrong. There is not an overall general descriptive word in English that covers hunting fox/deer/hare/rabbit at high speed until it collapses. The verb ‘to harry’ is a hunting term but is associated with the bird of prey, the Harrier and the British fighter jet the Harrier: the ‘Harrier is gonna harry’. The ‘chaser’ would be the nearest accurate translation. ‘Project Chaser’ and ‘the Chaser’ sound correct in English: the ‘Chaser is gonna chase’. The problem with ‘chaser’ is that word does not always have a hunting association, unlike the German word Hetzer. The way a Jagdpanzer 38 operated in combat was the exact opposite of all these terms.
Many military history authors and magazine article writers translate the nickname ‘Hetzer’ as baiter or agitator. A dictionary definition of a ‘baiter’ is someone who ‘deliberately annoys or tauts another’. It is also defined as referring to a ‘malicious rabble-rousing agitator’ (This definition is where the word ‘agitator’ comes from). Both these explanations of the use of the word ‘baiter’ have caused confusion as it does not describe or hint at the tactical deployment of the Jagdpanzer 38.
There is another definition. A ‘baiter’ is a hunting term. It describes a hunter who baits a trap, lays in ambush hoping his prey takes the bait so that he can kill it. This describes the tactical deployment of the Jagdpanzer 38. They were given the job of protecting the flanks of an attack or defending a section of the front line. Crews were taught to camouflage their vehicles and hide on the edge of woodland. They would be deployed in a troop of three or more Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters and wait in ambush in a position where they had good visibility of advancing enemy units at a location they believed would be an Allied attack route.
Designation conclusion
To summarise, the Jagdpanzer 38 was not officially called the Hetzer by the Germans during WW2. Although most official wartime documents do not use the nickname Hetzer, a few did.
Operational service
Starting from 20 June 1944, Panzerjäger Schulen (tank hunter training schools) started to receive Jagdpanzer 38 vehicles for crew training. A surviving Panzerjäger Schule Milowitz (Tank hunter training school at Milowitz) document showed that Jagdpanzer 38 crews were encouraged to find preselected firing positions, preferably behind an earth wall in cover, like at the edge of a wood. Once targets had been engaged and there were no more targets available, the commander was to direct the driver to change to a different location by reversing out of their current position, to avoid being hit by enemy artillery.
Jagdpanzer 38 in Hungary. (German Federal Archives)
The Jagdpanzer 38s were assigned to independent Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilungen (Army Tank Hunter Battalions). They were to provide Infantry Divisions with a mobile anti-tank resource. When the infantry was under attack, they could be used as a resource to support the infantry’s counterattack. They were not intended to be used instead of a tank at the front of an attack in a major offensive. The guns’ limited traverse would make them liable to flank attacks.
Each of the Battalion’s three companies was given fourteen Jagdpanzer 38s, and three were allocated to the Abteilung Stab (Battalion headquarters). One vehicle per company and two of the headquarters’ vehicles were issued with long-range command and control Fu 8 radios. By February 1945, the authorized number of Jagdpanzer 38s per company was reduced from fourteen to ten. The Abteilung (battalion) approved total was reduced to thirty-eight from forty-five.
The Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 731 (731st Army Tank Hunter Battalion) was formed on 2 November 1943 by Heeresgruppe Nord (Northern Army group). Between 4 and 13 July 1944, they were issued with forty-five Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters for deployment on the Eastern Front.
Between 19 and 28 July 1944, Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 743 (743rd Army Tank Hunter Battalion) was issued with forty-five Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters for deployment on the Eastern Front with Heeresgruppe Mitte (Middle Army group).
In September 1944, the Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 741 (741st Army Tank Hunter Battalion) was issued with forty-five Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters. One company was sent to the Eastern Front, but the other two were directed to the Arnhem sector in Holland.
In February 1945, the Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 561 (561st Army Tank Hunter Battalion) was issued with forty-five Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters.
In March 1945, the Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 744 (744th Army Tank Hunter Battalion) was issued with forty-five Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters.
In December 1944 and January 1945, 295 Jagdpanzer 38s were used in the winter Ardennes offensive, the Battle of the Bulge. The two companies of Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 741 and eighteen other Heeres Panzerjäger companies were deployed in the region. A Heeres Gruppe B (Army group B) ‘combat strength’ report dated 30 December 1944 stated that 131 Jagdpanzer 38s were still operational out of their initial strength of 190. Heeres Gruppe G (Army group G) reported that it had 38 Jagdpanzer 38s still functional out of an initial total of 67.
On 16 April 1945, during the attack on Bolatice in Northern Moravia by Soviet Forces, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the T-34-85 equipped 1st Czechoslovak Tank Brigade advanced from an area near Albertovec Farm. Two tanks were left behind just south of the farm to guard against a flanking attack. Corporal Ján Zámečník was the gunner in tank number 603. He fired on what he thought was a German machine gun nest on the edge of a wood. When it was neutralized, the crew went to examine the enemy position. They were shocked to find they had knocked out a very well camouflaged Jagdpanzer 38. The German crew had run out of fuel and main gun ammunition but had still decided to fight using the machine gun on the roof of their vehicle. The T-34-85 crew had not identified it as an enemy vehicle because it was so hard to see.
On 27 April 1945, eight T-34-85 tanks of the 3rd battalion, 1st Czechoslovak Tank Brigade advanced from the railway station at Dolni Lhota to Čavisov a village in Ostrava-City District, Moravian-Silesian Region. The attack halted as it encountered anti-tank obstacles. It was an ambush. Two tanks were knocked out, and a further three were damaged by a number of self-propelled anti-tank guns in concealed positions. The remaining tanks were forced to retreat. The Germans then made a tactical mistake. The crews of the Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters counter-attacked. They moved out of cover and into the village near the railroad station. One was knocked out before it reached the village and another was destroyed near the houses on the edge of the village. The others withdrew.
Jagdpanzer 38 driving over rubble in Prague 8 May 1945. (German Federal archives)
Swiss contract Jagdpanzer G13 tank hunters
The first Jagdpanzer 38 came off the production line in March 1944. By the end of World War II, the Czech company BMM had built 2,047 of them and refurbished 173 that came back to the factory for repairs. Another Czech company called Škoda started manufacturing Jagdpanzer 38s and built a further 780 by the time of the German surrender. A 91 paged 1944 Škoda parts list document was titled ‘Panzerjager G13 Ersatzteilliste’ showing that Škoda used their factory code G13 as part of the vehicle’s designation rather than the normal number 38.
Swiss contract Jagdpanzer G13 tank hunter
After the war ended, the Swiss were looking for new armored vehicles. They placed a contract with the Czechs. The first 10 that they received were German specification Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters. The rest were new-build vehicles for the Swiss contract. Some of them used World War Two parts that were readily available. Later vehicles had newly designed parts.
One hundred and fifty-eight Swiss contract Jagdpanzer G13 tank hunters entered service with the Swiss army. Ninety-four of them were re-engined with diesel power packs. The last G13 left the Swiss army in 1970. Many were sold to museums and private collectors who converted them to externally look like Second World War German Jagdanzer 38 tank hunters.
The G13 name
G13 – It is just the internal manufacturer’s code name for the Jagdpanzer 38 in the Škoda Factory. A WW2 wartime Škoda Jagdpanzer 38 Hetzer was called a G13 in the factory and on all internal documentation. G = tank hunter, 1 = light, 3 = model i.e number 3. G11 was Panzerjaeger I, G12 was Marder III.
Postwar – the 75 mm PaK 40 with a muzzle brake was used instead of the 75mm PaK 39 on Jagdpanzer 38(t). The Škoda Factory did not have access to PaK 39 guns and used the PaK 40. In the Swiss Army this tank hunter was known by the factory code G13 rather than the Jagdpanzer 38 or Hetzer name.
This parts list document produced by Skoda in 1948 is good evidence of the use of the factory code G13 and that it was written G13 and not G-13.
Variants
Jagdpanzer 38 Starr
The Starr was characterized by a rigid mount for the main gun. It was tailored for simplified mass-production, and therefore the gun recoil system was entirely eliminated. The recoil had to be absorbed by the chassis and suspensions. Aiming was entirely performed by the same transmission, but coupled to a new Tatra 8 cylinder diesel engine in development. Also, in order to cope with poor vision, the commander received a rotating periscope. The diesel prototype remained the sole one to see combat and was used during the Prague uprising by both sides. Ultimately 10 were built, but later seven were converted back as standard Jagdpanzer 38 after the war because the Starr tubes had worn out. The Jagdpanzer 38 Starr was also meant to receive later a longer L/70 gun, but it came too late to see action.
Hitler inspecting the new Jagdpanzer 38 Starr. (German Federal Archives)
The German army needed more flame-throwing tanks for their December 1944 winter offensive in Ardennes, Operation Watch on the Rhine and the Operation North Wind in Rhineland-Palatinate, Alsace and Lorraine. Twenty Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter chassis were fitted with a 14 mm Flammenwerfer flamethrower gun, instead of its normal 7.5 cm PaK 39 anti-tank gun. A tube was installed on the front of the flamethrower to make the vehicle look like the standard Jagdpanzer 38 in an effort to confuse the enemy.
Bergepanzer 38
Bergepanzer 38 light recovery vehicle. (German Federal Archives)
A light recovery vehicle created especially for the Jagdpanzer 38 and light vehicles of its class. Between 64 and 106 (even 120) were converted until the end of the war (chassis numbers 321001-323000-323001), equipped with jack handbars, winch, steel cables, wooden support planks, and a rear hydraulic leg for a better grip. Its only armament was a single 7.92 mm (0.31 in) Rheinmetall MG 34 or 42 mounted on the front arm.
Rearview of the Bergepanzer 38 light recovery vehicle with a dozer blade deployed at the back of the vehicle. (German Federal Archives)
Befehlspanzer 38
The standard command variant. Nothing really special except for a 30W FuG 8 radio set and extra whip antennas. It was still armed the same way as regular Hetzers, making it even more cramped inside.
Bergepanzer 38 mit 2 cm Flak 38 anti-aircraft cannon
A number of Bergepanzer 38 light armored recovery vehicles were converted into anti-aircraft Flakpanzers. They were fitted with a 2 cm Flak 38 anti-aircraft cannon.
In the background, you can see a Jagdpanzer 38 hull armed with a 2 cm Flak 38 anti-aircraft cannon with its gun barrel raised.
This weapon was originally designed to be mounted in German combat aircraft and intended to have a dual purpose as an anti-tank and air-to-air fighting weapon. This gun was also used on the five prototype Flakpanzer IV “Kugelblitz”. If necessary the gun could also be used in a ground support role against enemy troops and vehicles.
A Bergepanzer 38 with 2 cm Flak 38 anti-aircraft cannon
Soviet Army capture the factories
When the Red Army liberated Czechoslovakia, they conducted a stocktake of what was in production at the Škoda factories at the time they came under ‘new management’. A report was filed on the possibility of completing the vehicles found at Škoda factories. The auditor found 1,200 unfinished Jagdpanzer 38 tank-destroyers “G13” chassis. It was worked out that 150 of them could be finished from the parts available. The remaining 1,050 vehicles were 45%-60% completed and had only 78 main guns available between them. This report showed that production of the Hetzer chassis was outstripping the manufacturing capacity to build the main gun in sufficient quantities.
Czechoslovakian ST-1
The Czech Jagdpanzer 38 Hetzers (several dozens were captured in and around Budapest in 1945) were designated ST-1, for Stihac Tanku or “Tank Hunter”. 249 were pressed into service. There was also a school driver version designated ST-III/CVP (50 vehicles), the Praga VT-III armored recovery vehicle and the PM-1 flamethrower tank. 50 existing Jagdpanzer 38 tank destroyers were to be modified with a flame thrower turret, but the program was cancelled.
During the Prague uprising, 5th-9th May 1945, freedom fighters captured this German Jagdpanzer 38. It did not have a gun fitted but in its place, it was armed with a German anti-tank Panzerfaust. (photo capture taken from the film called ‘Květnová revoluce v Praze 1945’ held in the Národní filmový archive)
Foreign Users
Thanks to the great numbers of Jagdpanzer 38s built at the end of the war, it got to see service with a number of different armies during the war and after.
The only export user of the Jagdpanzer 38 was the Hungarian Army, which received about 85 vehicles between August 1944 and January 1945.
While the Soviets captured large numbers of Jagdpanzer 38s during their successful drive against the German armies, there is no evidence they put any into use. They did, however, supply some to their new allies, the Bulgarians (some 4 vehicles). Romania also captured a couple of Jagdpanzer 38s after switching sides and moving into Transylvania.
One of the most famous wartime Jagdpanzer 38s is Chwat, a single tank destroyer captured by the Poles during the Warsaw uprising that saw no combat use.
Another Jagdpanzer 38 was captured by Czechoslovakian rebels during the Prague uprising at the end of the war.
After the war, the Czechoslovakians had a number of Jagdpanzer 38s available to them left from production or abandoned on their soil. They produced 150 more and used them until at least the early 60s.
The Czechoslovaks also exported the Jagdpanzer 38 to Switzerland, which bought 158 vehicles that were in service until the 70s. Most of the current surviving Jagdpanzer 38s are actually Swiss G13s.
Overall, the vehicle was successful. It was quick to build, and cheap compared with the cost of constructing a Tiger, King Tiger or Panther tank. It was mechanically reliable, easily concealed, hard-hitting, and when used right, a hard-to-kill vehicle. A company of Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters working together, concealed in a good location, could damage or knock-out a considerable number of attacking enemy tanks.
Surviving Jagdpanzer 38
Currently, there are only 13 known surviving Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters left. If the Jagdpanzer 38 you are looking at on display at a museum is not on this list of surviving vehicles then it is a post-war Swiss Contract G13 altered to resemble a wartime Jagdpanzer 38.
Australian Armour and Artillery Museum, Cairns, Queensland, Australia
Arsenalen Swedish Tank Museum
The Tank Museum, Bovington, UK
Bruce Crompton Collection, UK
Rex and Rod Cadman Collection, UK
Private Collection, Germany
Panzermuseum, Thun, Switzerland
Polish Army Museum, Warsaw, Poland
Army Technical Museum, Lešany, Czech Republic
Kubinka Tank Museum, Russia
Fort Lee U.S. Army Ordnance Museum, VA, USA
Canadian Forces Base, Borden, Canada
Wheatcroft Collection, UK
Sources
Liechte Jagdpanzer by Walter J. Spielberger, Thomas Jentz and Hilary L. Doyle
Jagdpanzer 38 ‘Hetzer; 1944-45 by Thomas Jentz and Hilary L. Doyle
Panzerkampfwagen 38 Panzer Tracts No.18 by Thomas Jentz and Hilary L. Doyle
Panzer Production from 1933 to 1945 Panzer Tracts No.23 by Thomas Jentz and Hilary L. Doyle
Jagdpanzer 38 ‘Box’ at the Tank Museum, Bovington Archives
Romanian Military Museum Archives, Bucharest
British War Office Military of Intelligence M.I.10 ‘Illustrated Record of German Army Equipment 1939 – 1945, Volume III, Armoured Fighting Vehicles. ’
Hilary L. Doyle. Start from the 17 min time period https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HG_mY-jSZzQ
Private correspondence with Mr. Hilary L. Doyle (1)
Herbert Ackermans document collection.
Jagdpanzer 38 specifications
Dimensions (L W H)
6.27 m x 2.63m x 2.10 m
20 ft 6.8 in x 8 ft 7.5 in x 6 ft 10.6 in
Total weight, battle-ready
16 tonnes
Armament
7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48, 41 rounds
7.92 mm (0.31 in) M.G.34, 1,200 rounds
Armor
8 to 60 mm (0.3 – 2.36 in)
Crew
4 (driver, commander, gunner, loader)
Propulsion
Praga EPA AC 2800 6-cylinder 160 hp @ 3000 rpm petrol/gasoline engine
Maximum Road Speed
40 km/h (25 mph)
Suspension
Leaf springs
Range
180 km (111 miles)
Total production
approx. 2,827
Romanian Mareșal, 1943.
Jagdpanzer 38, the first command model built with Fgst.nr.321001 radio.
Jagdpanzer 38 “Chwat” (Brave) captured by Polish insurgents. An early production tank, Warsaw, August 1944.
Hungarian early type Jagdpanzer 38, 1944.
Early type Jagdpanzer 38 “Black 233”, western front, one of the earliest captured by the Allies.
Hungarian Jagdpanzer 38, winter 1944-45.
Hungarian Jagdpanzer 38, 1944.
Hungarian Jagdpanzer 38, 1945.
Unknown unit, Bohemia, spring 1945.
Jagdpanzer 38 of the 11th SS Panzerdivision “Nordland”, winter 1944-45.
Jagdpanzer 38 with the spotted ambush camouflage, Germany, April-May 1945.
Czech Jagdpanzer 38, in service by May 1945 with the Russian Liberation Army (Русская освободительная армия)
Hungarian Jagdpanzer 38 “Mokus” tank destroyer, Lake Balaton battle, 1945.
Hetzer captured by the Russian army, Czechoslovakia, 1945.
Jagdpanzer 38 of an unknown Panzerjäger unit in Italy, 1945
Jagdpanzer 38 captured by Czech insurgents, Prague, May 1945.
Bulgarian Jagdpanzer 38, March 1945.
Unknown unit, ambush camouflage, Germany, April-May 1945
Unknown unit, Bohemia, 1945.
Variants
Befehlspanzerjäger 38, 741st Antitank Battalion, Eastern Front, 1944.
Flammpanzer 38, 352nd Panzer-Flamm-Kompanie, Army Group G, Belgium, December 1944.
Jagdpanzer 38 Starr (1945). Being rather disappointing, the six built of this much simplified versions were converted back as regular Hetzers.
Panzerjäger 38 mit 75 mm L/70.
Swiss G13 in 1960, notice the spare roadwheel should be on the other side. For identification only.
Derivatives
Bergepanzer 38.
Another, more common type of Aufklärungspanzer mit 7,5 cm KwK-37 L/23.
Jagdpanzer 38 mit 7,5 cm KwK-37 L/23, Battle of the Bulge, winter 1944-1945.
Vollkettenaufklärer 38 prototype.
German Reich (1942)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 170-184 Converted
Even before the Second World War, the famous German tank commander Heinz Guderian had predicted the need for highly mobile self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, later known as Panzerjäger or Jagdpanzer (tank destroyer or hunter). However, in the early years of the war, beside the 4.7 cm PaK (t) (Sfl) auf Pz.Kpfw. I ohne turm, which was in essence just a 4.7 cm PaK (t) gun mounted on a modified Panzer I Ausf.B tank hull, the Germans did little to develop such vehicles. During the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht encountered tanks which they had trouble dealing with effectively due to their thick armor (T-34 and KV series) and were forced to introduce a number of different hastily built and developed Panzerjäger based on any chassis that was available. From this, a series of vehicles generally known today as the ‘Marder’ (Marten) was created. The first such vehicle was built by using a captured French Lorraine 37L fully-tracked armored tractor and arming it with the German 7.5 PaK 40 anti-tank gun.
A brand new 7.5 cm PaK 40 auf Sfl.LrS Marder I. Source: panzerserra.blogspot.com
History
During Operation Barbarossa, the Panzer Divisions were once again spearheading the German advance, as in the previous year in the West. Initially, the lightly protected Soviet early tanks such as the BT series and the T-26 proved to be easy prey for the advancing German Panzers. However, the Panzer crews were shocked to discover that their guns were mostly ineffective against the armor of the newer T-34, the KV-1 and KV-2. German infantry units also discovered that their 3.7 cm PaK 36 anti-tank towed guns were of little use against these. The stronger 5 cm PaK 38 anti-tank towed gun was only effective at shorter distances and it had not been produced in great numbers by that time. Luckily for the Germans, the new Soviets tanks were plagued by a not-yet-matured design, inexperienced crews, a lack of spare parts and ammunition, and poor operational use. Nevertheless, they played a significant role in slowing down and eventually stopping the German assault in late 1941. In North Africa, the Germans also faced increasing numbers of Matilda tanks which also proved to be hard to knock out.
The experience gained during the first year of the invasion of the Soviet Union raised a red alert in the highest German military circles. One possible solution to this problem was the introduction of the new Rheinmetall 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun. It was first issued in very limited numbers at the end of 1941 and the start of 1942. It became the standard German anti-tank gun used until the end of the war, with some 20,000 guns being built. It was an excellent anti-tank gun, but the main problem with it was its heavyweight, making it somewhat difficult to deploy and hard to manhandle.
The solution to this problem was to mount the PaK 40 on available tank chassis. These new Panzerjäger vehicles followed the same pattern: most were open-topped, with limited gun traverse, and thin armor. They were, though, armed with an effective anti-tank gun, and usually with one machine gun. They were also cheap and easy to build. Panzerjägers were, in essence, improvised and temporary solutions, but effective ones nevertheless. Just as the name suggests (Panzerjäger means “tank hunter” in English), they were designed to engage enemy tanks at long ranges on open fields. Their primary mission was to engage enemy tanks and to act as fire support at long range from carefully selected combat positions, usually on the flanks. This mentality led to a series of such vehicles named Marder that was developed using many different armored vehicles as a basis.
The first series of Marder vehicles was based on captured French armored vehicles. While small series were built using tank chassis, the majority were built using captured Lorraine 37L fully-tracked armored tractors. The Lorraine 37L would be also converted into a self-propelled artillery gun. The man responsible for the creation of the first Marders was Major Alfred Becker. His design was presented to Adolf Hitler in May 1942, who immediately ordered that 100 armed with 10.5 cm and 15 cm artillery guns and 60 PaK 40 armed vehicles should be built. Due to the high demand for self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, the majority of the available captured Lorraine 37Ls would be converted into Marder I (as this vehicle would be known) vehicles.
Major Alfred Becker. Source: Wikimedia commons
The Lorraine 37L
After the First World War, the French Army had shown interest in developing a tracked armored supply vehicle. The first vehicle that was adopted for this role was the small Renault UE. During 1935, the Lorraine company began working on a faster alternative for this vehicle meant for the cavalry units. By 1937, the first prototype of the Lorraine 37L was completed. Its performance was deemed sufficient by the French Army and ordered into mass production. It was mainly used for the transport of ammunition, fuel and other supplies. There was also an infantry transport variant called Voiture blindée de chasseurs portés 38L, which can be identified by an added box-shaped armored superstructure mounted to the rear.
From 11th January 1939 to 16th May 1940, over four hundred Lorraine 37L armored supply vehicles were built. By the time of France’s capitulation, the Germans had managed to capture some 300 Lorraine 37L vehicles. In German service, these vehicles were known as the Lorraine Schlepper(f).
The Lorraine 37L in French service before the war. Source: panzerserra.blogspot.com
Name
During its service life, this self-propelled anti-tank gun was known under several different names. On 1st August 1942, it was known as the 7.5 cm PaK 40 auf Sfl.LrS. Sfl, which stands for ‘Selbstfahrlafette’, which can be translated as ‘self-propelled’, while LrS stands for Lorraine-Schlepper. In May 1943, the name was changed to 7.5 cm PaK 40/1 auf Sfl.Lorraine-Schlepper. In August 1943, it was again changed to Pz.Jaeg. LrS fuer 7.5 cm PaK 40/1 (Sd.Kfz.135). It received the Marder I name, by which it is best known today, due to Adolf Hitler’s personal suggestion made at the end of November 1943.
Production
Following the decision to adopt the Marder I into service on 9th June 1942, the German Waffenamt (Ordnance Department) laid out the plans for a number of vehicles to be built by the Becker Baukommando workshop located in Paris and the H.K.P Bielitz workshop. The main supplier of the Marder I components was Alkett. This firm was responsible for modifying the PaK 40’s lower carriage and gun shield, but also for the assembly of the upper superstructure for the Marder I vehicle.
The monthly production target in Paris was 20 vehicles in June 1942 and 78 in July, with an additional 30 in June and 50 in July from Bielitz. In total, 178 were planned to be converted. The actual production numbers were a bit lower, with 170 rebuilt vehicles completed. 104 were converted in July and the remaining 66 in August 1942.
Unfortunately, the exact number of rebuilt vehicles depends on the source. While the number of 170 is quite commonly found in the literature, there are still some disagreements between the sources. The previously mentioned production numbers were according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjäger). Author Walter J. Spielberger, in his book Beute-Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Deutschen Wehrmacht, mentions that 184 were planned but 170 were actually built. D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka) mentions 179 vehicles being built. Author A. Lüdeke (Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg) lists a number of 184 vehicles being built.
The Design
Suspension
The Marder I suspension consisted of six road wheels placed on each side, suspended in pairs and placed on three bogies. Above each bogie, a leaf-spring unit was placed. There were also four return rollers, front-drive sprockets and an idler placed on each side at the rear. The transmission was placed in the front hull of the vehicle.
The Marder I’s suspension can be seen here. Source: ww2db.com
The Lorraine 37L suspension was a very robust and simple design. This was rather uncommon among pre-war French tank designs, which generally had overly complicated suspension systems. In its original role as an armored tractor, the Lorraine 37L had little problems following French tanks on good or muddy terrain. The German version had an increased weight of up to 8.5 tonnes (7.5 or 8 tonnes depending on the source), compared to the original 6 tonnes. While the Lorraine 37L suspension system was considered adequate in its original role, the added extra weight proved to be problematic, especially on the Eastern Front mostly due to low temperatures and muddy roads. In addition, vibrations caused by firing the main gun put enormous stress on the suspension, which increased the chance of malfunctions or damage.
The Engine
The Marder I engine type and its position were not changed from the original Lorraine 37L. The Delahaye Type 135 6-cylinder water-cooled 70 hp@2800 rpm engine was located in the center of the vehicle’s hull. While the maximum speed with this engine was a solid 35 km/h, the cross country speed was only 8 km/h. The operational range was also quite limited, with 120 km on good roads and 75 km cross country. The low speed on bad roads and the small operational radius is possibly the main reason why the Marder I was mostly allocated to Infantry Divisions. The exhaust pipe was located on the left side of the hull and was protected by a thin curved armored plate. The Marder I’s fuel capacity was 111 liters.
Superstructure
The Marder I was built using mostly unmodified Lorraine 37L chassis, by simply replacing the original rear positioned transport compartment with a new armored superstructure. The new armored superstructure had a relatively simple design, which consisted of rectangular armored plates welded together. These armored plates were angled in order to provide additional protection, as the armor thickness was quite low. The front of this armored superstructure was protected by the main gun’s enlarged gun shield. The Marder I was an open-top vehicle and, for this reason, a canvas cover was provided to protect the crew from bad weather. Of course, this offered no real protection during combat. The added superstructure served as the crew fighting compartment for operating the main gun. Due to the Marder I’s tiny size, the crew compartment offered a small working space.
The Marder I superstructure had a very simple design but offered the crews only limited protection. The large gun shield is also evident here. Source: panzerserra.blogspot.comAs the Marder I was open-topped, a canvas cover was often installed over the fighting compartment and used to protect the crew from bad weather. However, it offered no real protection during combat. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info
Armor Thickness
The Lorraine 37L, being designed to fulfill the role of a supply vehicle, was only lightly armored. The front armor was 12 mm thick, while the top and bottom were only 6 mm thick.
The superstructure armor thickness, depending on the source, is usually noted to be around 10 to 11 mm all-around thick. Luckily, the Tank Encyclopedia team was given access to the Marder I auf Geschutzwagen Lorraine Schlepper(f) at the French Tank Museum in Saumur, France. A digital micrometer was used to measure the armor thickness of the upper superstructure. When books state that the armor thickness was 11 mm, this is the design thickness. In reality, the rolled armor plate used by the Germans was not of a precise thickness. It varied over the length of the plate within a certain tolerance range. It should be remembered that these measurements included the thickness of the primer base coat and final coat of paint.
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The Armament
The main gun chosen for the Marder I was the standard 7.5 cm PaK 40/1 L/46. This gun, with its slightly modified mount, was placed above the engine compartment. Its original two-part armored shield was replaced with a single enlarged shield covering the front of the superstructure. The elevation of the main gun was -8° to +10° (or -5° to +22° depending on the source) and the traverse: -20° to +20° (-16° to +16° depending on the source). The total ammunition load also differs depending on the source. According to authors H. Doyle (German Military Vehicles) and G. Parada, W. Styrna and S. Jablonski (Marder III), the Marder I could carry 40 rounds. Authors T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjager) mentions a number of 48 rounds.
In order to relieve the stress on the elevation and traverse mechanisms during long drives, a travel lock was added. Secondary armament consisted of one 7.92 mm MG 34 machine gun and possibly the crew’s personal weapons.
Interestingly, there is a photograph of a Marder I armed with the 5 cm PaK 38. More information on the circumstances under which this modification occurred is unfortunately lacking. It could have been either a field modification, which is very likely or a simple training vehicle. It could be also a post-war modification, possibly done by the French. What is interesting is the front gun shield had an added armor plate around the gun.
The Marder I had been armed with the effective 7.5 cm anti-tank gun. With this gun, it could destroy most Allied or Soviet tanks at long ranges up to the war’s end. Source: BundesarchivThe 5 cm PaK armed Marder I. The history of this vehicle is unknown. Source: Unknown
Crew members
According to the T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjager), the Marder I had a crew of four which consisted of the commander, gunner, loader and the driver. Other sources, for example, G. Parada, W. Styrna and S. Jablonski (Marder III), give a number of five crew members. The reason why authors state different information regarding the number of crew members is not clear. To complicate matters further, there are old photographs of the Marder I with either three or four crew members in the rear fighting compartment (besides the driver, who was in his own compartment at the front).
This vehicle appears to have three crew members in the crew compartment. Source: Wikipedia CommonsThis vehicle had four crew members in the fighting compartment. Two crew members had steel helmets (Stahlhelm) and one was armed with what appears to be a machine gun. Source: Pinterest
The driver was positioned inside the Marder I hull and was the only crew member that had all-around armor protection. To reach his own position inside the vehicle, a horizontally positioned two-part rectangular-shaped hatch was used. For observation, there were two simple vision slots on the front and one on each side. While these had a simple design, the Germans never replaced them, probably to save time or simply because they had nothing better at hand.
The driver‘s hatch is completely open in order to give him a much better view when driving out of combat. In addition, the armored slide that protects the gun sight can be observed. Source. Wikipedia Commons
The remaining crew members were placed in the armored superstructure compartment. The gunner would be positioned to the left of the gun. On the front of the gun shield, there was a small armored slide that could be opened for use of the gun sight. To the right of the gun was probably the position occupied by the commander and behind him was the loader. If there was a fifth crew member, he would likely have been a radio operator for the Fu 5 radio set or an assistant loader. If there were only four crew members, another crew member would have served as a radio operator.
Organization
The Marder I was used to equip smaller anti-tank companies (Panzerjäger Kompanie). These were allocated as reinforcement to the anti-tank battalions (Panzerjäger Abteilungen) mostly of Infantry and a few Panzer Divisions. The anti-tank companies were initially equipped with nine Marder I vehicles. From early 1943, the number of vehicles per company was usually increased by one more vehicle.
Use in combat
The Marder I would mostly see service in France, but also on the Eastern Front and in smaller numbers in North Africa.
In France
The majority of newly built Marder I vehicles would be used by units stationed in France. It was standard practice that the unit equipped with the Marder I would retain its vehicles until it was relocated to another front. When that happened, they would be supplied with another self-propelled anti-tank vehicle or with towed 7.5 cm PaK 40 guns. This was done mostly to ease maintenance and procurement of spare parts.
During late June 1942, the German High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres – OKH) predicted that at least 20 Marder Is would be ready for operational field test trials by the end of July 1942. Two Panzer Divisions, the 14th and 16th, were initially chosen for this purpose. In July, the OKH decided that the first Marder I were instead to be given to the 15th, 17th, 106th and 167th Infantry Divisions and to the 26th Panzer Division once they were available in sufficient numbers.
The 15th Infantry Division received its 9 Marder I vehicles by late July 1942. On 21st January 1943, the 15th Infantry Division received an additional twelve Marder III vehicles based on the Panzer 38(t). Its Marder Is were then given to 158th Reserve Division.
The 17th Infantry Division received 9 Marder I by the end of July 1942. Their use by this unit was problematic from the start due to a lack of radio operators and mechanics. Additional problems were created by the inexperience of the driver with such fully tracked vehicles. The height of some of these drivers was also problematic, as they had issues entering their positions inside the Marder I hull. What was interesting was the fact that the driver would go out of the vehicle during the firing of the main gun. The capacity of the inboard batteries was too weak. For example, they would usually be discharged after only one hour of using the radio with the engine off. This would result in the batteries having no power to start the engine. Then, it had to be manually started by two crew members by using a hand crank, which in practice proved to be difficult to do. One more big flaw was noted during a long off-road marches, with the accumulating mud and earth that could lead to the loss of the rear idler wheels. At least two vehicles were reported to have lost the rear idler.
Marder I rearview. This particular vehicle belongs to the 15th Infantry Division stationed in France. Source. https://www.worldwarphotos.info/gallery/germany/tanks-2-3/marder/
The 106th Infantry Division operated an anti-tank company with 9 Marder I vehicles after late July 1942. One command vehicle based on the Panzer I and six ammunition transport vehicles based on the Panzer I were also available. In late February 1943, the 106th Infantry Division was repositioned to the Eastern Front and the Marder I vehicles of the anti-tank company were replaced with 9 towed 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank guns.
The 167th Infantry Division had 9 Marder I vehicles up to late January 1943. When it was sent to the Eastern Front in late February 1943, all the Marder Is were replaced with 9 towed 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank guns.
The 26th Panzer Division operated a company of Marder I vehicles for a short time from 1st January to 1st May 1943.
The same vehicle is seen from the side. Due to its weak armor protection, the Marder I’s best defense was a well selected and camouflaged combat position. Source: https://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=14264
By the end of 1942, the 1st Panzer Division was repositioned to France for recuperation and refitting with new weapons and equipment. At this time, it was reinforced with one Marder I company. These vehicles would be replaced with Marder IIIs in late February 1943.
During 1943, many more units stationed in France would also be reinforced with Marder I vehicles before they were relocated to other fronts. The number of supplied Marder I vehicles varied between each division. For example, the 94th Infantry Division received 14, while the 348th Infantry Division received only 5. By the end of 1943, there were 94 Marder Is with 83 operational vehicles in Western Europe. In total, at the start of 1944, there were 131 Marder Is available. The last known unit that received a company of 10 vehicles was the 245th Infantry Division on 13th May 1944.
The Marder I would see extensive action during the Allied Normandy landings in June 1944. While they managed to achieve some success, nearly all were lost with the German defeat in France. The 719th Infantry Division was the last unit to still possess 7 (with 3 operational) Marder Is on 27th January 1945. Interestingly, at the end of the war, the Belgian resistance managed to capture one Marder I vehicle.
An abandoned Marder I somewhere on the Western Front 1944. Source: http://panzerserra.blogspot.com/2019/02/marder-i-auf-geschutzwagen-lorraine.htmlMarder I was captured by the Belgian resistance. They painted a large white star on the side and, on the front, a Belgian flag. Source: Unknown
In the Soviet Union
As stated previously, OKH plans for the Marder I stated that it was to be used to equip units stationed in France in order to ease maintenance and procurement of spare parts. But, as the demand for such vehicles on the Eastern Front was great, the original plans had to be changed. Through direct orders from the OKH (dated from the 9th August 1942), six divisions from Heeresgruppe Mitte were to be equipped with Marder I anti-tank companies.
The 31st Infantry Division was reinforced with a Marder I anti-tank company on the 27th of August 1942. Due to harsh conditions and strong Soviet resistance, by the end of June 1943, this unit had only 4 Marder I left. By the end of October, the last three Marder I was given to Pz.Jg.Abt 743 (Panzerjäger Abteilung). At the start of 1944, none of these were still operational, with two requiring extensive repairs, while the third could not be repaired.
The 35th Infantry Division received its Marder Is by the start of September 1942. By the end of 1943, only two non-operational vehicles were available
The 36th Motorized Infantry Division was to be reinforced with a Marder I company that was initially attached to the 2nd Panzer Division. By the start of December 1942, all 9 vehicles were operational. The last Marder I vehicle was lost in July 1943.
The 72nd Infantry Division received 9 Marder I vehicles together with 6 Muni-Anhaenger (ammunition and supply wheel trailers) on 3rd September 1942. When the vehicles arrived, it was noted that there were issues with the breech block mechanism which had to be repaired. Additional problems with transmission breakdowns were also noted. What is interesting is that the Marder I company also had a Panzer 38(t) that probably acted as a command vehicle. By the end of June 1943, there were 7 Marder Is operational with the last vehicle being lost by the end of the year.
One Marder I company was to be allocated to the 206th Infantry Division, but this company was instead given to the 72nd Infantry Division. This caused a delay in the delivery of the first five Marder I vehicles up to the end of 1942, with the remaining arriving in January the following year. By the end of June, there were 8 vehicles with 5 operational. By the end of 1943, there were still 7 vehicles with only five operational.
Some Marder Is were equipped with Muni-Anhaenger trailers which provided additional spare ammunition. Source. Wikimedia Commons
The last unit on the Eastern Front that received the Marder I was the 256th Infantry Division. Initially, it had eight Marder I vehicles in its inventory, dated from 3rd November 1942. At the start of 1943, there were 9 Marder Is with eight operational. By the end of the year, the number of vehicles was reduced to 7 Marder Is, with only three operational. The 256th Infantry Division would be reinforced with three additional Marder Is vehicles in early 1944.
While the Marder I had sufficient firepower to destroy any enemy tank in 1942/43, the Soviet weather simply proved too much for the Lorraine 37L chassis. This can be seen in a combat report made by Pz.Jg.Abt 72 (belonging to the 72nd Infantry Division), which states: ‘as experience has shown, these (Marder I) don’t have any significant combat value because of their limited employability due to the weather’. In another report made by Pz.Jg.Abt 256, it is stated that: ‘with the exception of the Marder I, the other weapons and vehicles have been proven useful’. Due to bad weather, low numbers, problems with spare parts and others, not many Marder Is would be used on the Eastern Front and they would be replaced with Marder II and III vehicles which were built on more reliable chassis.
A Marder I on the Eastern Front painted in white camouflage. The harsh weather conditions proved to be too much for the French chassis and for this reason most remained in France. Source: Unknown
In North Africa
While the majority of the Marder Is would be used on the Western and Eastern fronts, few would also be found in North Africa. The 334th Infantry Division was to be resupplied with a Marder I company and, for this reason, the crewmen necessary to operate these vehicles were to be sent to the Sprember training center at the start of December 1942. After the completion of the crew training, which lasted two weeks, this company with 9 Marder I and 6 ammunition transport vehicles were to be transported from Naples to Tunisia by using the large Me 323 transport planes. By 1st March 1943, there were 8 vehicles operational with 4 under repair. Due to losses, this company was reinforced with Marder III vehicles based on the Panzer 38(t) chassis in early April 1943. Two Marder Is together with a group of Marder III participated in the defense of the Kairouan Line against Allied tanks. In the following engagement, seven enemy tanks were destroyed with the loss of one Marder I and five Marder III.
Surviving vehicles
While nearly two hundred vehicles were built, only one Marder I still exists and can be seen at the Musée des Blindés, Saumur (France).
Front view of the surviving Marder I vehicle. Source. Wikimedia Commons
Conclusion
The Marder I tank hunter was an attempt to solve the problem of the low mobility of towed anti-tank guns, but it failed in many other aspects. The most obvious was the fact that it was built on a captured chassis which led to logistical problems, as spare parts for it would be difficult to find. The low armor thickness meant that, while it could engage enemy tanks at range, any kind of return fire would likely mean the destruction of this vehicle. The Marder I’s armor provided the crew with only a basic level of protection against rifle rounds or shrapnel. Its speed and operational range were also not too impressive. The suspension and the running gear were not adequate for the weather condition present on the Eastern Front.
In conclusion, the Marder I vehicle was far from perfect, but gave the German a means to increase the mobility of the effective PaK 40 anti-tank gun, thus giving them a chance to fight back against enemy armored formations.
Marder I on the Eastern Front, winter 1942-43.
7.5cm Pak 40/1 auf Geschutzwagen Lorraine Schlepper(f) Sd.Kfz.135 – Normandy, 1944.
Marder I in France, September 1944. Notice the camouflage nets. Inspiration for the illustrations: RPM, Ironsides model kits
German Reich (1942)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 202 Converted
Even before the Second World War, the famous German tank commander Heinz Guderian had predicted the need for highly mobile self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, later known as Panzerjäger or Jagdpanzer (tank destroyer or hunter). However, in the early years of the war, beside the 4.7 cm PaK (t) (Sfl) auf Pz.Kpfw. I ohne turm, which was in essence just a 4.7 cm PaK (t) gun mounted on a modified Panzer I Ausf.B tank hull, the Germans did little to develop such vehicles. During the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht encountered the T-34 and KV series tanks, which they had trouble dealing with effectively. Fortunately for the Germans, they also managed to capture large numbers of the 7.62 cm field gun (M1936) which had good anti-tank firepower. This gun was immediately put to use by the German ground forces, but mobility was an issue, so an idea appeared to install this gun on the Panzer II tank chassis in order to increase its mobility. The new vehicle belonged to a series of vehicles generally known today as the ‘Marder’ (Marten).
History
During Operation Barbarossa, the Panzer Divisions were once again spearheading the German advance, as in the previous year in the West. Initially, the lighty protected early Soviet tanks (like the BT series and the T-26) proved to be easy prey for the advancing German Panzers. However, the Panzer crews were shocked to discover that their guns were mostly ineffective against the armor of the newer T-34, KV-1 and KV-2. German infantry units also discovered that their 3.7 cm PaK 36 towed anti-tank guns were of little use against these tanks. The stronger 5 cm PaK 38 towed anti-tank gun was only effective at shorter distances and it had not been produced in great numbers by that time. Luckily for the Germans, the new Soviet tanks were immature designs, plagued by inexperienced crews, a lack of spare parts, ammunition and poor operational use. Nevertheless, they played a significant role in slowing down and eventually stopping the German assault in late 1941. In North Africa, the Germans also faced increasing numbers of Matilda tanks, which also proved to be hard to knock out.
The experience gained during the first year of the invasion of the Soviet Union raised a red alert in the highest German military circles. One possible solution to this problem was the introduction of the new Rheinmetall 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun. This was first issued in very limited numbers at the end of 1941 and the start of 1942. While it would eventually become the standard German anti-tank gun used until the end of the war, its initial production was slow and thus a temporary solution was needed. During Operation Barbarossa, the German ground forces managed to capture large numbers of field guns of different calibers. One of the guns captured was the 76.2 mm M1936 (F-22) divisional gun. After a brief assessment of the characteristics of this gun, the Germans were satisfied with its performance. The gun was given to the army for use under the name Feldkanone (FK) 296(r). It was at first used as a field gun, but very soon it became clear that it possessed great anti-tank capabilities. For this reason, the 7.62 cm M1936 gun was modified for use as an anti-tank weapon. The changes involved adding a muzzle brake (but not all guns were equipped with it), cutting the gun shield in half (the upper part was welded to the lower part of the shield in a similar fashion to the PaK 40 two-part shield), rechambering the gun to 7.5 cm caliber in order to use the standard German ammunition (same as the PaK 40) and moving the elevating handwheel to the left side. After these changes, the gun was renamed 7.62 cm PaK 36(r), and remained in use throughout WWII.
In late December 1941, Wa Prüf 6 (the office of the German Army’s Ordnance Department responsible for designing tanks and other motorized vehicles) gave instructions to the Alkett firm to design a new Panzerjäger mounting the 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) on a modified Panzer II Flamm (which itself was based on the Panzer II Ausf.D and E) tank chassis. The Alkett designers and engineers threw themselves into the work of designing and building the first prototype. The prototype was built quickly, mainly due to its relatively simple construction. The Panzer II Flamm chassis was unchanged, but the majority of the superstructure (except for the front plate) and the turret were removed. On the back of the engine compartment a gun mount with the 7.62 cm PaK 36(r), which had an enlarged shield, was placed. Additionally, the front and the sides were protected by extended armored plates. Its armor was designed to protect against small-caliber fire and shrapnel. As its primary mission was to engage enemy tanks and to act as fire support at long range from carefully selected combat positions, thick armor was not necessary, at least in theory.
Brand new Marder II. Source: Pinterest
Panzer II Ausf.D and E
The first German tank that was produced in great numbers was the Panzer I. As it was armed with only two machine guns and was lightly protected, its combat potential was quite limited. For these reasons, the Panzer II was developed to overcome the many shortcomings of the previous Panzer I model. Its main armament consisted of one 20 mm cannon and one machine gun. The maximum armor protection was initially only 14.5 mm, but it would be increased to 35 mm and even to 80 mm on later versions.
During 1938, new versions of the Panzer II, the Ausf.D and E, were developed and adopted for service. They had the same armament and turret but with a modified superstructure and most importantly used a new torsion bar suspension which ran on four larger road wheels without any return rollers. While the Panzer II Ausf.D and E did see combat action in Poland, due to their poor suspension performance, less than 50 vehicles would be built.
The short lived Panzer II Ausf.D/E. Source: http://www.panzernet.net/panzernet/stranky/tanky/pz2.php
In 1939, the German army was interested in the development of a flame-throwing Panzer to be used as an anti-bunker weapon. As the Panzer II Ausf.D and E were rejected from service, their chassis were chosen for this modification. The resulting vehicle was designated as the Panzer II Flamm Ausf.A und B, although today it is generally known as the ‘Flamingo’. By March 1942, around 150 had been produced, but their performance was deemed inadequate mostly due to weak armor and the poor performance of the flame projector system. As these Panzer II flamm were returned from the front lines and due to the high demand for mobile anti-tank vehicles, the Germans once again reused the chassis for this new role. Starting from April 1942, all available Panzer II flamm chassis would be reused for this purpose.
Panzer II Flamm during Operation Barbarossa. Source: Pinterest
Name
During its service life, this self-propelled anti-tank gun was known under several different names. Upon its adoption on 1st April 1942, it was designated 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) auf Fgst. PzKpfw.II(F) (Sfl.). In June 1942, this was changed to Pz.Sfl.1 fuer 7.62 cm PaK 36 (Sd.Kfz.132); by September 1942, it had changed again to Pz.Sfl.1 (7.62 cm PaK 36) auf Fahrg.Pz.Kpfw.II Ausf.D1 und D2. In September 1943, a much simpler name was given: 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) auf Pz.Kpfw.II. The last change to the name was made on 18th March 1944, with the vehicle then being called Panzerjäger II fuer 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) (Sd.Kfz.132).
The Marder II name, by which it is best known today, was actually Adolf Hitler’s personal suggestion made at the end of November 1943. For the sake of simplicity, this article will use the Marder II designation. Care should be taken not to mistake this vehicle with the other Marder II, the Pz.Kpfw.II als Sfl. mit 7.5 cm PaK 40 ‘Marder II’ (Sd.Kfz.131).
Production
Due to the inadequate combat performance of the Panzer II flamm, the production of the second series of 150 vehicles was canceled. However, M.A.N (which was responsible for its production) was tasked with delivering these 150 chassis to Alkett for the construction of new Marder II vehicles. Alkett was ordered to produce the first 45 vehicles in April, followed by 75 in May and the last 30 in June 1942. Somewhat unusually for German production standards, all 150 vehicles were completed before the deadline, with 60 in April and the remaining 90 by mid-May.
Due to the availability of the Panzer II flamm chassis, a further order for 60 Marder II vehicles was placed. The completion of this production order was slow, as it was dependent on the available Panzer II flamm chassis. Only 52 Marder II would be completed this way, with 13 in June, 9 in July, 15 in September and 7 in October 1942. In 1943, 8 more Marder II vehicles would be built. These conversions would be carried out by Wegmann from Kassel.
It should be noted that the Marder II utilized both the Ausf.D1 and Ausf.D2 chassis. These had only minor differences, the main one being the drive sprocket, which had 11 spokes on the Ausf.D1 and 8 spokes on the Ausf.D2. It appears to be the case that all 150 of the new-build Marder IIs utilized the Ausf.D2 chassis, while those converted from older Panzer II flamm chassis were based upon the Ausf.D1 chassis.
The Design
Suspension
The suspension of the Marder II was the same as on the Panzer II Ausf.D and E. This version used a torsion bar suspension in contrast to the leaf spring suspension used on the majority of the Panzer IIs. In some sources (like Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch, Marder II), it is noted that the Marder II used the Christie type suspension system. This is false. The Christie suspension used large helical springs placed vertically or diagonally in the side of the hull, not torsion bars. The larger wheels had a diameter of 690 mm. There was also a front-drive sprocket and a rear positioned idler on each side, but no return rollers.
A good view of the Marder II suspension. Source: https://warspot.ru/9099-marder-ii-lyogkiy-istrebitel
The engine
The Marder II was powered by a Maybach HL 62 TRM six-cylinder liquid-cooled engine positioned to the rear. This produced 140 hp @2600 rpm. The maximum speed with this engine was 55 km/h and the cross country speed was 20 km/h. The operational range was 200-220 km on good roads and 130-140 km cross country. The total fuel capacity for this vehicle was 200 liters. The Marder II crew compartment was separated from the engine by a 12 mm thick protective firewall.
Superstructure
The Marder II was built using the Panzer II Flamm chassis by simply removing the turret and most of the superstructure except for the front driver’s plate. Extended armor was added on top of the driver’s compartment and on the sides. These armored plates were slightly angled, for extra protection. To the rear, initially, a wire mesh frame was added, possibly to make the construction easier and to reduce weight. Its main purpose was to serve as a storage area for equipment and spent ammo cartridges. During the production run, this was replaced with armor plates. An extended armored shield was added around the gun, the design of which would be slightly changed during the production.
The Marder II was an open-top vehicle and, for this reason, a canvas cover was provided to protect the crew from bad weather. Of course, this offered no real protection during combat. It appears that some vehicles had a metal frame added to the gun compartment, possibly used to help hold down the canvas cover. Another possibility was that it served as an extra security measure for the crews lest they accidentally fall out of the vehicle. Due to the Panzer II’s relatively small size, the crew compartment was cramped and additional wooden storage boxes were often added by the crew for extra equipment.
This vehicle had a wire mesh rear frame that was used to store equipment and spent ammo cartridges. Due to the cramped interior, the crews of this vehicle attached all sorts of equipment to this wire mesh frame. Source: http://www.panzerdepot.com/Story.htmThis vehicle has had armor plates added instead of the wire mesh. Also note the MG 34 mounted to the left side of the modified gun shield. Source: http://www.panther-panzer.de/Sonstige/MarderIILaS138.htmThis vehicle had a wire mesh rear frame that was used to store equipment and spent ammo cartridges. Due to the cramped interior, the crews of this vehicle attached all sorts of equipment to this wire mesh frame. Source: http://www.panzerdepot.com/Story.htmExcellent view of the Marder II’s cramped rear gun crew compartment. Here we can see the front travel lock, the big metal ring around the barrel. Source: https://warspot.ru/9099-marder-ii-lyogkiy-istrebitel
Armor thickness
The armor thickness of the Marder II hull was relatively thin by the standards of 1942. The maximum front hull armor was 35 mm, while the sides and rear were only 14.5 mm thick and the bottom was 5 mm thick. The driver’s front armor plate was 35 mm thick. The new superstructure was also only lightly protected, with 14.5 mm thick front and side armor, and later rear armor too. The gun was protected by a standard armor shield which was extended to cover the sides. Spare tracks could be added on the front armor plate to act as extra protection, but in reality, this offered only a limited improvement.
On the open steppes of the Soviet Union, good camouflage and a well-selected position were the Marder II’s best defense. Source: https://www.worldwarphotos.info/gallery/germany/tanks-2-3/marder/The tracks added to the front armor would primarily serve as spare equipment and offered only a limited increase in protection. Source: Wikimedia Commons
The armament
The main gun chosen for the Marder II was the modified ex-Soviet 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) anti-tank gun. This gun, with its modified ‘T’ mount, was placed directly above the engine compartment. The elevation of the main gun was -5° to +16° and the traverse 25° to the left and to the right. The total ammunition load consisted of only 30 rounds, placed in ammunition bins located just below the gun, inside the Marder II hull. In order to relieve the stress on the elevation and traverse mechanisms during long drives, two travel locks were added, one at the front and one to the rear.
Secondary armament consisted of one 7.92 mm MG 34 machine gun with 900 rounds of ammunition and one 9 mm MP 38/40 submachine gun. While most 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) anti-tank guns were provided with a standard muzzle brake, there were a number of vehicles that did not have one. They were possibly either discarded by their crews, damaged or more likely never fitted due to the urgent need for such vehicles.
These Marder IIs are lacking the muzzle brake. Source: UnknownThe German 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) gun in a well dug-in position. Source: http://acemodel.com.ua/en/model/685
Crew members
The Marder II had a crew of four men, which, according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle in Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjager, consisted of the commander, gunner, loader, and the driver. Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch, in their Marder II book, mentions that the crew consisted of the commander, radio operator, loader, and driver. Taking T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle as the main source, it would mean that the commander was located in the vehicle’s hull, next to the driver, and he would also serve as the radio operator. On the other hand, according to Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch, the crew positioning would be different, with the commander serving as the gunner and placed left of the main gun.
While sources cite only four crew members, interestingly, Marder II photographs often show one more crew member present. This practice was initiated by field units emulating their Panzer cousins, as the extra crew member would help increase the vehicle’s overall performance by freeing up the commander from any other tasks.
The driver’s position was unchanged from the original Panzer II. He was positioned on the vehicle hull’s left side. On his right side was the radio operator. The radio equipment used was the FuG Spr d transmitter and receiver. For observing the surroundings, the crew positioned in the hull had two standard front vision ports. One of these two men would also have the task of releasing the forward travel lock. In addition, the crew positioned in the hull could also supply the gun operators with the ammunition rounds which were stored inside the hull.
In the rear gun compartment were the positions for the gunner and the loader. The gunner was positioned on the left and the loader to the right. The loader also operated the MG 34 used against enemy infantry and soft skin targets. To avoid being hit by enemy fire, crew in the gun compartment were sometimes provided with movable periscopes for observation. For crew communication, an internal telephone was used.
The Marder II, as standard, had four crew members. The small rectangular shaped object just above the gun shield is actually a movable periscope for observation. Source: https://www.worldwarphotos.info/gallery/germany/tanks-2-3/marder/This vehicle has five crew members. Source: https://www.worldwarphotos.info/gallery/germany/tanks-2-3/marder/The front driver’s plate with its two vision ports is the only part of the original Panzer II Ausf.D and E that was left unchanged. Source: https://warspot.ru/9099-marder-ii-lyogkiy-istrebitelA Marder II during crew training. Note the two movable periscopes next to the crewmembers’ heads. Source: https://warspot.ru/9099-marder-ii-lyogkiy-istrebitel
Organization and Distribution to Frontline Units
The Marder II was used to form 9 vehicle-strong anti-tank companies (Panzerjäger Kompanie). These were divided into 3 vehicle-strong platoons (Zuge). Each platoon was to have one Sd.Kfz.10 half-track, an ammunition carrier version of the Panzer I and two trailers for ammunition and supply deliveries. Of course, due to a general lack of such supply vehicles, it is likely that this was never truly implemented.
The Marder II companies would mostly be used to equip Infantry Divisions, Infantry Motorised Divisions, SS Divisions, Panzer Divisions and to reinforce some self-propelled anti-tank battalions (Panzerjäger-Abteilungen). Interestingly, despite the fact that each anti-tank company was meant to have 9 vehicles, some were instead only equipped with 6.
The following units were equipped with Marder II vehicles from 9th March 1942 onwards: the Großdeutschland Infantry Division, 18th, 10th, 16th, 29th and the 60th Infantry Motorised Divisions with 12 each, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division with 18 and the SS Panzer Division Wiking with 12 vehicles. By the time of the German 1942 campaign on the Eastern Front, nearly all available Marder II vehicles (145 in total) were ready for service. In July 1942, there were plans to equip the 14th and 16th Panzer Divisions with Marder I (based on captured French fully tracked chassis) vehicles. Due to logistical problems, these were instead each issued with 6 Marder II.
In Combat
The Marder II would see action mostly on the Eastern Front, with smaller numbers positioned in the West. The majority of produced Marder IIs would be used in the German advance toward the oil-rich Caucasus and Stalingrad. Due to the disastrous German losses suffered by the end of 1942, the majority of Marder II tank destroyers would be lost, either to enemy fire or just being abandoned due to a lack of fuel or spare parts.
Due to extensive losses suffered the previous year, there were only small numbers available during the Battle of Kursk (Operation Zidatelle) in June of 1943. The units that still possessed operational Marder IIs were the 31st Infantry Division with 4, 4th and 6th Panzer Divisions with 1 each, the 525th self-propelled anti-tank battalion with 4, the 150th self-propelled anti-tank battalion with 3 (1 in repair), the 16th Panzer Grenadier Division with 7 and the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division and the SS Panzer Division Wiking with 1 vehicle each. In total, there were only 23 vehicles left on the Eastern Front. In the West, there were 7 vehicles with 1 in repair, operated by the Ersatz und Ausbildungs Regiment H.G., a training unit that was positioned in Holland.
A group of abandoned Marder IIs on the Eastern Front. Source: https://www.worldwarphotos.info/gallery/germany/tanks-2-3/marder/
By August 1944, there were only two units equipped with the Marder II. These were the 1st self-propelled anti-tank battalion with 10 and the 8th self-propelled anti-tank battalion with 5 vehicles. By March 1945, the number of Marder IIs had dropped to only 6 vehicles.
While having weak armor, thanks to its gun, the Marder II could destroy any Soviet tank in 1942/43 with little problem. The effectiveness of the Marder II’s 7.62 cm gun was demonstrated by the 661st self-propelled anti-tank battalion, which, by mid-July 1942, claimed to have destroyed 17 Soviet tanks (4 KV-1, 11 T-34 and 2 Valentine Mark II). The 559th self-propelled anti-tank battalion reported similar successes (up to mid-July 1942), with 17 T-34, 4 KV-1 and 1 tank marked only as a T 8 (possibly a misprint) for the loss of only one Marder II. This unit also gave reports about the distances from which the Soviet tanks were destroyed. The T-34 were mainly engaged at ranges from 600 to 1000 meters, with the 7.62 cm gun having no problem penetrating the armor of this tank. Two T-34s were destroyed by side hits at ranges of 1.3 to 1.4 km. One KV-1 was reportedly destroyed when hit from the side at a range of 1.3 km. It is important to note that, due to the Marder II’s low ammunition storage, shooting at enemy tanks at distances greater than 1 km was generally avoided by the crews.
A Marder II somewhere on the Eastern Front, possibly in 1942. Source: https://www.worldwarphotos.info/gallery/germany/tanks-2-3/An interesting photograph that shows the two different types of vehicles used by the Germans to combat tanks. To the left is the low, fully enclosed StuG III with the longer 7.5 cm gun, while on the right is the tall, lightly armored Marder II. Both vehicles were used as anti-tank vehicles, even though the StuG had a different doctrinal employment. Although the StuG III was better in every aspect, due to high demand for tank destroyers, the production of the Marder series would continue until almost the end of the war. Source: Unknown
Operational Experience
The Marder II’s general combat performance can be seen in a report made in July 1942 by the 661st self-propelled anti-tank battalion. In this report, the effectiveness of the 7.62 cm gun was deemed satisfactory as it was able to destroy a KV-1 from ranges of 1.2 to 1.4 km. The high-explosive rounds were also effective against enemy machine gun nests and even against earthen bunkers. However, firing the gun could create large dust clouds which made finding targets difficult. The Marder II was provided with two travel locks. While the rear one performed well, the front one was prone to malfunctions.
Cooperation with infantry formations proved to be problematic. The infantry commanders would often call for the Marder II to engage enemy tanks offensively in unfavorable situations, for example if the enemy tanks were dug in or on higher ground. The Marder IIs were not infantry support vehicles like the StuG III and thus should not have been used in this kind of combat.
The vehicle’s great height was a huge issue for the Marder II, as it was difficult to camouflage and was an easy target for enemy gunners. Interestingly, on some vehicles, the gun sunk down a bit, meaning that the gun could not be traversed. To solve this problem, a few millimeters of the side armor had to be cut off. The low ammunition load and the lack of more mobile machine gun mounts were another issue. The gas pedals were too weak and prone to malfunctions, so spare gas pedals were in great demand. Radio equipment was also of poor quality and improved models were requested. The Marder II also lacked space for the storage of spare parts and other equipment. Ingenious crews would often add wooden boxes to the rear. The lack of a command vehicle for the company commander was deemed problematic. Adding a fifth crew member to direct the operational employment was proven to have merit.
As the Marder II interior was cramped, crews would often add wooden boxes to the rear. Also note the fifth crew member in this photograph. Source: https://www.worldwarphotos.info/gallery/germany/tanks-2-3/marder/Thanks to its simple construction, the Marder II’s overall maintenance and replacement of damaged parts could be done relatively easily. Source: https://warspot.ru/9099-marder-ii-lyogkiy-istrebitel
Conclusion
The Marder II tank destroyer was an attempt to solve the problem of the low mobility of towed anti-tank guns but, unfortunately for the Germans, it failed in many other aspects. The low armor thickness coupled with its large silhouette meant that, while it could engage enemy tanks at range, any kind of return fire would likely mean the destruction of this vehicle. The small ammunition load was also problematic for its crew. Even so, while the Marder II vehicles were not perfect, they gave the Germans a means to increase the mobility of the effective 7.62 cm anti-tank gun, thus giving them a chance to fight back against the numerous enemy armored formations.
Marder II, early type vehicle , Afrika Korps Abteilung, Libya, fall 1942.
Marder II Ausf.D-1, Russia, fall 1942.
Marder II Ausf.E, Russia, fall 1942.
Panzer Selbstfahrlafette 1 für 7.62 cm Pak 36(r) Ausf.D-2, Kursk, summer 1943.
7.62 cm PaK 36(r) auf Fgst. Pz.Kpfw.II(F) (Sfl.) specifications
German Reich (1942)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 531-576 Built + 68-75 Converted + 10 Field Conversions
Even before the Second World War, the famous German tank commander Heinz Guderian had predicted the need for highly mobile self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, later known as Panzerjäger or Jagdpanzer (tank destroyer or hunter). However, in the early years of the war, beside the 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl) auf Pz.Kpfw. I ohne turm, which was in essence just a 4.7 cm PaK(t) gun mounted on a modified Panzer I Ausf.B tank hull, the Germans did little to develop such vehicles. During the Invasion of the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht encountered tanks which they had trouble dealing with effectively (T-34 and KV series) and were forced to introduce a number of different hastily built and developed Panzerjäger based on any chassis that was available. From this, a series of vehicles generally known today as the ‘Marder’ (Marten) was created.
History
During Operation Barbarossa, the Panzer Divisions were once again spearheading the German advance, as in the previous year in the West. Initially, the lightly protected Soviet early tanks (like the BT series and the T-26) proved to be easy prey for the advancing German Panzers. However, the Panzer crews were shocked to discover that their guns were mostly ineffective against the armor of the newer T-34, the KV-1 and KV-2. German infantry units also discovered that their 3.7 cm PaK 36 anti-tank towed guns were of little use against these. The stronger 5 cm PaK 38 towed anti-tank gun was only effective at shorter distances and it had not been produced in great numbers by that time. Luckily for the Germans, the new Soviets tanks were immature designs, plagued by inexperienced crews, a lack of spare parts, ammunition and poor operational use. Nevertheless, they played a significant role in slowing down and eventually stopping the German assault in late 1941. In North Africa, the Germans also faced increasing numbers of Matilda tanks which also proved to be hard to knock out.
The experience gained during the first year of the invasion of the Soviet Union raised a red alert in the highest German military circles. One possible solution to this problem was the introduction of the new Rheinmetall 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun. It was first issued in very limited numbers at the end of 1941 and the start of 1942. It became the standard German anti-tank gun used until the end of the war, with some 20,000 guns being built. It was an excellent anti-tank gun, but the main problem with it was its heavy weight, making it somewhat difficult to deploy and hard to manhandle.
The solution to this problem was to mount the PaK 40 on available tank chassis. These new Panzerjäger vehicles followed the same pattern: most were open-topped, with limited gun traverse, and thin armor. Notwithstanding these limitations, they were armed with an effective anti-tank gun, and usually with one machine gun. They were also cheap and easy to build. Panzerjägers were, in essence, improvised and temporary solutions, but effective ones nevertheless. Just as the name suggests (Panzerjäger means “tank hunter” in English), they were designed to engage enemy tanks at long ranges on open fields. Their primary mission was to engage enemy tanks and to act as fire support at long range from carefully selected combat positions, usually on the flanks. This mentality led to a series of such vehicles named Marder that was developed using many different armored vehicles as a basis.
The first series of Marder vehicles was based on captured French armored vehicles. The second series of the Marder II would be produced using the Panzer II tank chassis. The first steps in the Marder II development were undertaken by the Minister of Armament, Albert Speer. On 13th May 1942, he informed Adolf Hitler about the current state of Panzer II production and the possibility of using this tank for the purpose of an anti-tank modification. Hitler was generally interested in this modification and gave a green light for its implementation. Several days later, Speer, with the approval of Hitler, gave instructions to the OKH (German Army High Command) to modify a Panzer II Ausf.F by arming it with the 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun (order 6772/42). There was also a second version of the Marder II development earlier in April, but this version was based on the Panzer Ausf.D chassis and armed with the captured Soviet 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) guns.
After a brief period of consideration, Wa Pruef 6 (the office of the German Army’s Ordnance Department responsible for designing tanks and other motorized vehicles) officials chose Rheinmetall-Borsig, Alkett and M.A.N for this task. Rheinmetall-Borsig was charged with adapting the main gun, Alkett with constructing and designing the main superstructure and M.A.N was responsible for modifying the Panzer II chassis. The prototype was to be built by mid-June 1942. On 20th June 1942, a prototype vehicle was presented to the OKH, which proved to be satisfactory and thus it was adopted for production.
The Alkett Marder II prototype. Source: beyondthesprues.com
Panzer II
The first German tank that was produced in great numbers was the Panzer I. As it was armed only with two machine guns and was lightly protected, its combat potential was quite limited. For these reasons, the Panzer II was developed to overcome the many shortcomings of the previous Panzer I model. Its main armament consisted of one 20 mm main gun and one machine gun. The maximum armor protection was initially only 14.5 mm, but it would be increased to 35 mm and even to 80 mm on later versions. It would be produced in several versions with some differences like armor thickness and different suspension, but the armament would remain mostly the same. While its own combat potential was not that great, it was nevertheless used in great numbers (some 1067 were ready in July 1941), as the Germans were still struggling to mass-produce the better Panzer III and IV. By 1942, due to attrition and obsolescence, Panzer II numbers began to dwindle and the surviving vehicles were allocated to be reused for other purposes, most notably for the Marder II and Wespe self-propelled gun.
The Panzer II, despite having lackluster performance on paper, nevertheless represented the backbone of the German Panzer Divisions during the early years of the war. Source: armouredfightingvehicle.fandom.com
Name
During its service life, this self-propelled anti-tank gun was known under several different names. On 20th June 1942, it was known as the Pz.Kpfw.II als Sfl. mit 7.5 cm PaK 40. Sfl stands for ‘Selbstfahrlafette’, which can be translated as ‘self-propelled’. The next month, this was changed to 7.5 cm PaK 40 auf Fahrgest.Pz.Kpfw.II. In December 1942, this became 7.5 cm PaK 40/2 auf. Sfl.II. In July 1943, it was known as Panzerjäger II 7.5 cm PaK 40/2 (Sd.Kfz.131). The Marder II name, by which it is best known today, was actually Adolf Hitler’s personal suggestion made at the end of November 1943. In March 1944, the name was changed to Panzerjäger. II für 7.5 cm PaK 40/2 (Sd.Kfz.131). For the sake of simplicity, this article will use the Marder II designation.
Production
For the production of the Marder II, FAMO (Fahrzeug und Motorenwerke GmbH) factories located in Breslau and Warsaw were chosen. According to Panzer-Programm II Plan 14 (dated from the 11th July 1942), the production of the Marder II would commence in July with 30 vehicles. This would then be followed up by 50 in August and September, 57 in October and November, 67 in December, January and February and the last 68 in March 1943. Actual production numbers were much different: 18 in July 1942, 50 in August, 55 in September, 59 in October, 62 in November, 83 in December, 80 in January 1943 and 45 in February. After this, the ‘Wespe’ self-propelled artillery version also based on the Panzer II chassis received a higher priority and was produced on the same lines. In addition, there was a decision to increase the production of Marder III vehicles based on the Panzer 38(t). For these reasons, the production of Marder II was delayed by a few months. Production resumed in May at a reduced pace with 46 being built and with the last 33 being completed in June 1943.
As the Panzer II was considered obsolete by 1942, the Škoda, FAMO and M.A.N companies were contracted to convert any available vehicle (even older versions) into the Marder II. The conversion could be relatively easily carried out by simply removing the Panzer II turret and superstructure. How many were actually built this way is hard to say. The first converted vehicles were not recorded in these registries, as these were included in the standard monthly production. It appears that, from June 1943 to January 1944, less than 68 Panzer IIs were thus converted.
Interestingly, a small number of Marder II were actually built by front units. In late September 1942, the 4th Panzer Division tried to convert three Panzer II into Marder II, but due to lack of main guns, it was not possible. The 12th Panzer Division had more luck and, in June 1943, it transferred 10 Panzer II to the Pz.Inst.Abt. 559 station in the area of Smolensk to be rebuilt in the Marder II configuration.
Some 531 new Marder II tank destroyers were produced, 68 were converted from older vehicles and at least 10 were field conversions. In total, according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjäger), some 609 Marder II were built by FAMO, M.A.N., Daimler-Benz and Škoda.
The number of 531 newly built Marder IIs is also supported by Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch (Marder II, Militaria), but they state that 75 vehicles were converted. Other sources, like D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka) or D. Doyle (German military Vehicles) mention that 576 new vehicles and 75 converted vehicles were built.
Design
Suspension
The suspension of the Marder II was visually the same as on the Panzer II. It consisted of five large 550 x 98x 455 mm road wheels (on each side) which had rubber rims. Above each wheel, on a rocker arm, a quarter elliptical leaf spring unit with a movable roller was placed. The added gun, ammunition, armor and other changes lead to an increase of weight from 9.5 to 11 tonnes. To successfully cope with this extra weight, the Panzer II suspension was additionally strengthened by widening the leaf springs above the wheels. In addition, vertical volute shock absorbers were added on the first, second, and last road wheels on each side. There was also a front drive sprocket (with a diameter of 755 mm), a rear positioned idler (650 mm diameter) and four return rollers (220 mm x 105 mm) on each side. The track had a width of 300 mm with a length of 2400 mm. The total track weight was 400 kg.
While modified, the Marder II suspension was mostly visually the same as that of the Panzer II. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info
Engine
The Marder II engine and its positioning were the same as on the Panzer II Ausf.F. The Maybach HL 62 TR 6-cylinder water-cooled engine giving 140 hp@3000 rpm was located in the rear of the vehicle’s hull. The driveshaft went from the engine through the right side of the crew compartment and was connected to the forward-mounted transmission system. The maximum speed with this engine was 40 km/h and the cross country speed was 20 km/h. The operational range was 190 km on good roads and 125 km cross country. The total fuel capacity for this vehicle was 170 liters stored in two fuel tanks (102 + 68). The Marder II crew compartment was separated from the engine by a 12 mm thick protective firewall.
Superstructure
The Marder II was built using Panzer II Ausf.F (with smaller numbers of older versions) chassis by simply removing the turret and most of the superstructure except for the driver’s compartment. On top of the driver’s compartment, a specially designed mount for the main gun was welded to the hull. Around the gun, an armored superstructure with a relatively simple design was added for the crew protection. These armored plates were slightly angled, but the armor thickness was quite low. The Marder II was an open-top vehicle and, for this reason, a canvas cover was provided to protect the crew from bad weather. Of course, this offered no real protection during combat. Due to the Panzer II’s relatively small size, the crew compartment was cramped. To avoid being hit by enemy fire, the crews were sometimes provided with movable periscopes for observation. Extra equipment like shovels, cables, and spare tracks were usually stored outside the superstructure. Additional storage wooden boxes were often added by the crew for extra equipment.
A rear view of a Marder II crew compartment. Note the periscope behind the head of the crew member on the left. Source: www.armedconflicts.comFor bad weather, the crews were provided with a canvas cover. Source: www.worldwarphotos.infoClose front view of the Marder II superstructure. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info
Armor
The armor thickness of the Marder II hull was relatively thin by the standards of 1942. The front hull armor was 35 mm, sides and rear were only 15 mm and the bottom was 10 mm thick. The driver’s front armor plate was 35 cm thick. The new superstructure was also only lightly protected, with a 10 mm thick front and side armor. The gun was protected by a standard armor shield which consisted of two 4 mm thick separated armored plates.
Armament
The main gun chosen for the Marder II was the standard 7.5 cm PaK 40/2 L/46. This gun, with its modified mount, was placed directly on the left side of the Panzer II hull. This was done in order to provide the loader with more working space. The elevation of the main gun was -8° to +10° and the traverse 32° to the left and 25° to the right. The total ammunition load consisted of 37 rounds placed in three ammunition bins located above the engine compartment. The largest, with 24 rounds, was placed on the left side. In the middle, there was space for 7 and the last 6 were in the right ammunition bin. In order to relieve the stress on the elevation and traverse mechanisms during long drives, two travel locks were added, one at the front to support the barrel and one in the crew compartment. Secondary armament consisted of one 7.92 mm MG 34 machine gun with 600 rounds of ammunition and one 9 mm MP 38/40 submachine gun.
Beside the main gun, the crews had an MG 34 at their disposal, which could be mounted on the vehicle’s top right side. Source: www.worldwarphotos.infoAbove the engine compartment, three ammunition storage bins were added. The crew of this vehicle had added an additional wooden box, possibly for spare parts or even more ammunition, Source: www.worldwarphotos.infoClose up view of the largest ammunition bin. Source: www.armedconflicts.comA travel lock was highly important in order to relieve the stress on the elevation and traverse mechanisms during long drives. Source: www.worldwarphotos.infoThe large size of the 7.5 cm PaK 40 ammunition is evident here. Source: www.armedconflicts.com
Crew
The Marder II had a crew of three men, which consisted of the commander/gunner, loader and the driver/radio operator, according to the T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjager). Other sources, for example W.J.K. Davies (Panzerjager, German anti-tank battalions of World War Two), give a number of four crew members. W. Oswald (Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer) also noted that the crew count was four. Author R. Hutchins (Tanks and Other Fighting Vehicles) mentions that the Marder II could have 3 or 4 crew members. The reason why authors state different numbers of crew members is not clear. To complicate matters further, photographs of the Marder II with both two and three crew members in the rear fighting compartment exist (besides the driver, who was in his own compartment at the front).
This vehicle had two crew members in the fighting compartment. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info
The driver’s position was unchanged from the original Panzer II. He was the only crew member that was fully protected. The driver was positioned on the vehicle hull’s left side. For observing the surroundings, he was provided with a standard front vision port with two additional smaller ones on each side. The driver could close the visor in combat situations. In this case, he could use the small twin periscope (type K.F.F.2) for observation. This periscope was completely removed from January 1943 on.
The driver could enter his position through the crew compartment or through a small rectangular hatch door in front of his post. He also had to manually release the front travel lock. Source: www.armedconflicts.com
Some vehicles were provided with a dummy front visor which was added right of the driver. Its purpose was to fool enemy gunners. The driver could enter his position from the crew compartment or through a small rectangular hatch door in front of him.
This vehicle and the ones in the front appear to have more than two crew members in the crew compartment. Source: www.worldwarphotos.infoThe fake driver vision port is visible here, on the right of the real driver’s visor. Source: warspot.ru
The driver was also the radio operator but, according to authors Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch (Marder II, Militaria), this task was reassigned to the gunner during the war. The Marder II was provided with a transmitter and receiver radio set and, in addition, with an intercom set. The last but maybe the most important task of the driver was to manually release the forward travel lock. In an unexpected combat situation, this would mean that he had to expose himself to potential enemy fire. For driving at night, initially, two front-mounted headlights were used. Later in production, only one was kept. The commander, who was also the gunner if the crew was only composed of 3 soldiers, was positioned to the left of the main gun. To his right was the loader. The loader also operated the MG 34 used against enemy infantry and soft skin targets. The commander and the driver communicated by using an internal telephone.
Organization
Initially, the Marder II was used to equip smaller 9 vehicle-strong anti-tank companies (Panzerjäger Kompanie). These were divided into 3 vehicle-strong platoons (Zuge). By the end of 1942, the number of vehicles per company had increased by one more vehicle. The single added vehicle was used as a command unit (Gruppe Führer) which was also usually accompanied by a command vehicle based on an obsolete Panzer I. This was the case for normal companies attached to Infantry or Panzer Divisions.
In addition, independent army anti-tank battalions (Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilungen) were formed with 13 vehicles per company, which consisted of one command vehicle and three platoons with four vehicles each.
In June 1943, the anti-tank company’s size was increased to 14, with two vehicles given to the command platoon and four vehicles to each platoon. At the same time, the independent army anti-tank battalions received one more command vehicle and the overall strength was to reach 45 operational vehicles in theory. Of course, in reality, due to high demand, insufficient numbers built, and combat losses these numbers were never fully achieved. Due to increased losses and as more advanced anti-tank vehicles were introduced for service, the surviving Marder IIs were mostly allocated to Infantry and Grenadier Divisions in the later stages of the war.
Distribution to the Units
With the production of first Marder II, the OKH ordered the formation of the first anti-tank companies which were to be given to the 3rd, 9th, 13th and 24th Panzer Divisions during the period of July to August 1942. These plans would not materialize as planned and there were some delays in deliveries. Possibly due to lack of 7.5 cm armed Marder II, the 13th Panzer Division was instead supplied with six 7.62 cm armed Marder II vehicles based on Panzer II Ausf.D/E chassis. The 3rd Panzer Division received nine Marder II vehicles in August and three the following month. The 24th Panzer Division did not receive its promised Marder II vehicles until September.
Due to critical situations and high demand for effective anti-tank vehicles in mid-August 1942, a group of 72 Marder Is and IIs were allocated to the Heeresgruppe Mitte on the Eastern Front and distributed to various Infantry and Panzer Divisions. In October 1942, the OKH planned to increase the number of Marder IIs on the Eastern Front by creating four new 36-vehicle strong anti-tank battalions: the 521st, 559th, 611th and 670th. These units were to be formed by the end of 1942. The Soviet counteroffensive around Stalingrad stopped these plans. The Germans were forced to send all available Marder vehicles to reinforce as many SS and Panzer Divisions as possible. This decision meant that Marder II vehicles had to be sent in smaller numbers to equip as many units as possible, which diminished the effectiveness of the units equipped with them. For example, the SS Totenkopf Division had 9 Marder II, 6th Panzer Division had 10, 11th Panzer Division had 10, 17th Panzer Division had 6 and 20th Panzer Division had 13. Some Infantry Divisions were also supplied with Marder II vehicles, like the 206th, 306th and 336th.
During 1943, some fourteen Infantry and Panzer Divisions were supplied with Marder II vehicles, with numbers ranging from 1 to 14 per unit, some probably being reinforcements or replacements for lost vehicles. For example, just one Marder II was given to the 306th Infantry Division in June, 3 were given to the 17th Panzer Division and 14 to the 5th Panzer Division.
Interestingly, the 4th Panzer Division used 18 Marder IIs (out of their 27) to equip the 1st Abteilung of the 35th Panzer Regiment in February 1943. This was done due to a lack of Panzer IVs armed with the longer barreled gun. These Marder IIs would finally be replaced with Panzer IVs in May 1943.
Combat Experience
A report made by the 4th Panzer Division’s 49th anti-tank battalion, based on the experience gained while serving on the Eastern Front, gives a good insight into the Marder II’s general performance.
The main gun was described as having good stability during firing and was capable of penetrating the T-34 hull and turret armor without a problem. There were cases of penetrating the T-34’s turret side armor at a range of 1200 m, along with another case of destroying an American-supplied Lee tank at the same range.
On the negative side, the average rate of fire was only 5 rounds per minute due to the large size of the ammunition and the rear-positioned storage bin. In addition, firing more than 5 rounds caused the accumulation of a smoke cloud in front of the vehicle. Additional problems were the poor quality of the muzzle brake assembly which usually became loose after only 8 to 10 shots. The ammunition load was also noted to be insufficient. In combat situations, this load could be quite quickly spent. In that case, due to a lack of ammunition vehicles, the Marder II had to return to the rear. The recoil during firing the gun would sometimes cause the internal or external spare parts to knock away and the large number of damaged periscopes meant that spare periscopes were in high demand. A huge problem was the lack of armored or even soft skin ammunition and supply carriers.
The armor was weak overall and provided the crew with minimal forward and side protection. The canvas cover was also noted to be of poor quality and was not efficiently protecting the crew and more importantly the onboard equipment (radio etc.) from the weather, which could lead to its malfunctioning. For operations on the Eastern Front, where the weather was quite harsh, this was an important point.
Radio equipment problems were also noted. The main reason for the malfunctions of the radio equipment was the breaking of the sensitive vacuum tubes and other parts due to the strong gun recoil or simply by moving on uneven terrain. The range of the onboard radios was also noted to be insufficient and the installation of the Fu 5 sets was more desirable.
The increase of weight caused some problems with the engine overheating. Another issue was the lack of spare parts for the leaf spring units. The problem with the inadequate command vehicles based on the Panzer I was also noted.
In combat, it was often a practice (albeit unpopular among the Marder II crews) for the local commander to ask for the Marder IIs to be dispersed and used piecemeal in support of the infantry. This tactic was dangerous for the vehicle, as the tank destroyers functioned best working together to destroy enemy vehicles and provide mutual cover. Providing close fire support for infantry was the job of the StuG vehicles which were designed for this role. When used in the infantry support role, the Marder II would stay behind in a well-selected position and provide long-range fire against enemy armor only. It was open-topped, with thin armor and any close engagement could easily lead to losses. The Marder II, despite having a range of 2000 m, could not be used as an artillery weapon due to the small ammunition load which could be quickly expended.
When enemy vehicles were spotted, a Panzerjäger Kompanie’s primary duty was to engage them with any available vehicle. Despite the fact that the 7.5 cm gun could destroy Soviet tanks at great ranges, shooting at distances greater than 1 km was generally to be avoided due to the reduced chance of hitting the enemy and the small ammunition loads. During an attack, the job of the Marder II was to support the Panzers with covering fire from the flanks. It was also a practice for Panzer units to attach a number of light tanks to the Marder II units to act as a defence against possible enemy infantry counter-attacks. In addition, during such operations, attaching infantry support to the Marder IIs was also noted to be important.
When supporting defensive operations, the report mentions that Marder II should not be used as a normal anti-tank gun in a static defensive position. The commander of each company was tasked, in this situation, to make a detailed scouting of the position and indicate the possible directions from which the enemy tanks were likely to attack from. Once these were identified, the Marder IIs were to be used as a mobile reserve. If this was not done by regulation and the Marder IIs were put in front in a static defensive position, there was a huge chance that the enemy would detect them and destroy them from range.
Use in Combat
Unfortunately, for unknown reasons, the sources do not provide precise information about the Marder II during combat operations. While over six hundred were built, the majority would be used on the Eastern front, with smaller numbers on the remaining fronts. During the German attack in the Kursk area, the Marder II distribution was as followed: Heeres Gruppe A had 25 operational vehicles, Heeres Gruppe Sud had 113 operational with 4 in repair, Heeres Gruppe Mitte had 172 operational with 5 in repair, and Heeres Gruppe Nord had 74 operational vehicles. By the end of 1943, the number of operational Marder II was reduced for Heeres Gruppe A to 9 vehicles, Heeres Gruppe Sud to 76 with 43 operational, Heeres Gruppe Mitte to 81 with 62 operational, and Heeres Gruppe Nord had 30 operational vehicles.
Smaller number of vehicles also found their way to the Western Front, with 8 vehicles being positioned in Denmark, 15 in France and 20 in the Netherlands. Smaller numbers were also used in Italy and North Africa.
One of the best known Marder IIs photographed, nicknamed ‘Kohlenklau’ (coal thief). This particular vehicle had an astonishing 20 kill rings painted on the gun barrel. Source: www.worldwarphotos.infoHaving only thin armor protection, a well selected position and camouflage were essential for the crew’s survival. Source: www.worldwarphotos.infoA number of Marder II saw action in North Africa. Some vehicles were transported by using the large Me-323 Gigant transport planes. Source: www.armedconflicts.comDue to its thin armor protection, the Marder II was an easy target for enemy gunners. Source: www.reddit.com
5 cm PaK 38 Marder II
Interestingly, beside the Marder II armed with the powerful 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun, there was also a version armed with the weaker 5 cm PaK 38 anti-tank gun. Sources disagree on whether this was a simple field conversion, a limited production series or a prototype vehicle. According to authors Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch (Marder II, Militaria), a small series of 30 to 50 such vehicles was built in 1944. These vehicles were used on the Eastern Front. According to internet sources, only one field-built vehicle was made and used by Panzerjäger Abteilung 128 of the 23rd Panzer Division. Authors G. Parada, W. Styrna and S. Jablonski (Marder III, Kagero) note that the 5 cm armed version was built in small numbers due to the lack of stronger 7.5 cm guns.
Abandoned 5 cm PaK 38 (to the right) and a 7.5 cm PaK 40 Marder II (to the left), possibly on the Eastern Front. Source: www.worldwarphotos.infoWhile its origin is unclear, this conversion had a much simpler superstructure design than the standard produced Marder II. Source: warspot.ru
Night Hunter Version
During 1943, at least one Marder II was used to test the Zielgeraet 1221 night vision equipment. This conversion and testing were carried out at the Army School at Fallingbostel. The night vision equipment consisted of one 500 W infrared reflector that illuminated possible targets with a beam of infrared radiation. The illuminated targets would then be observed by a ZG 1221 electro-optical converter. This system had an effective range of about 600 m. For the needed extra power, a GC 400 electric generator with a HS5F power supply unit was added. Whether this equipment was ever used in combat on a Marder II is unclear.
The Marder II equipped with the experimental night vision equipment. Source: Pinterest
Hungarian Marder II
In June 1941, the Hungarians joined their German allies during the Invasion of the Soviet Union. By 1942, their armored formations were decimated by the Soviet T-34 and KV tanks. The Hungarians mostly fielded 37 to 40 mm gun-armed tanks (Turan I and 38M Toldi), which were of limited utility against the Soviet medium and heavy tanks. To help their desperate allies, during late 1941 and early 1942, the Germans provided them with 102 Panzer 38(t) and a smaller number of Panzer IV vehicles. In December 1942, five Marder II vehicles were also supplied.
These Marder II tank destroyers saw action against Soviet forces with some success. By 9th February 1943, due to extensive combat with the Soviets, only two Marder II vehicles were still operational. These vehicles would be returned to the Germans in the summer 1943. The Hungarians tried to build their own self-propelled anti-tank vehicle inspired by the Marder II. This vehicle was based on the Toldi I tank and armed with a German 7.5 cm PaK 40, but only one prototype was ever built.
Only five Marder II vehicles were supplied by the Germans by the end of 1942. The Hungarian Marder IIs managed to achieve limited success. Source: Pinterest
Surviving vehicles
Today, there are four surviving Marder II vehicles, with one at the National Armor and Cavalry Museum, Fort Benning (USA), one in Kubinka (Russia) and one at the Arsenalen Tank Museum Strängnäs (Sweden). Another Marder II that was in the US was given to the German Auto und Technik Museum in Sinsheim in 1989. The Swedish Marder II was acquired from Denmark late 1945 for evaluation.
The Swedish Marder II. Source: http://tank-photographs.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/marder-II-german-ww2-self-propelled-gun-spg.html
Conclusion
The Marder II tank destroyer was an attempt to solve the problem of the low mobility of towed anti-tank guns, but it failed in many other aspects. The low armor thickness meant that, while it could engage enemy tanks at range, any kind of return fire would likely mean the destruction of this vehicle. The small ammunition load was also problematic for its crew. Even so, while the Marder II vehicles were not perfect, they gave the Germans a means to increase the mobility of the effective PaK 40 anti-tank gun, thus giving them a chance to fight back against the numerous enemy armored formations.
The famous “Kohlenkau”, 3/Pz.jg.Abt.561, Geschützfuhrer Uffz. Helmuth Kohlke, Russia, February 1943.
Marder II Ausf.C, Afrika Korps, Tunisia, 1943.
Marder II from the Panzejäger Abteilung 50, 9th Panzerdivision, Russia, winter 1942-1943.
Marder II Ausf.F from the Pz.jg.Abt.40 attached to the 24th Panzerdivision, Russia, 1944.
Hungarian Marder II Ausf.F, late 1944.
These illustrations were produced by Tank Encyclopedia’s own David Bocquelet
Sd.Kfz.131 specifications
Dimensions
6.36 x 2.28 x 2.2 meters (20,86 x 7.48 x 7.21 feet
Total weight, battle ready
11 tonnes (24250,8 lbs)
Crew
3 (Commander/Gunner, Loader and the Driver/Radio operator)
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German Reich (1944)
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