Category: WW2 German Tank Destroyers

German Reich (1943)
Tank Destroyer – 750-800 Built

As the Second World War progressed, the German Army faced an ever-increasing amount of enemy armor, while its own tank forces were steadily being reduced. Due to losses and meager production capabilities, the Germans were forced to introduce a series of improvised anti-tank vehicles. While these were nothing more than ad hoc solutions, they were effective thanks to their powerful guns and cheap cost. On the other hand, their survivability was quite limited due to their limited armored protection. Additionally, a series of vehicles, such as the StuG III, performed excellently in the anti-tank role when equipped with long guns. Further development of the StuG III concept armed with even stronger guns would lead to the creation of Germany’s first dedicated anti-tank vehicle, the Jagdpanzer IV.

The Need for a Mobile Anti-Tank Vehicle

The German Army’s main anti-tank weapon before and in the first period of the Second World War was the 3.7 cm Pak 36. This was an effective anti-tank gun when used against pre-war tank designs. It could be easily concealed or transported by a few men. Despite being lightweight, this gun still needed to be towed for longer distances and required some time to be set up for combat. Later, stronger anti-tank guns provided a huge boost in firepower when engaging enemy armor, but their weight greatly increased too, which limited their mobility. An anti-tank mounted on a tank chassis that had sufficient mobility to follow tanks and motorized units was seen as a desirable concept even before the war. Given the lack of German industrial production capacity, little could be done in this regard prior to the war.

The first attempt to produce an improvised self-propelled anti-tank vehicle was made just prior to the German invasion of the West in May 1940. This was the 4.7 cm PaK (t) (Sfl) auf Pz.Kpfw.I, generally known today as the ‘Panzerjäger I’ (Eng. tank destroyer or hunter). This vehicle consisted of a Panzer I Ausf.B chassis combined with a 4.7 cm PaK (t) gun (a captured Czechoslavkian 4.7 cm gun – hence the ‘t’ for ‘Tschechoslowakei’ after the name). This vehicle, technically speaking, was not new. Instead, it was constructed using obsolete Panzer I chassis and guns that were taken from Czechoslovakia. Despite being a hasty improvisation, it performed well, which showed the Germans that this concept had merits. But, given the nature of its design, it was also flawed in many aspects, such as using an underpowered chassis, the fact it was a relatively large target, and its weak protection.

In the following years, as the Germans made progress on other fronts, namely the Soviet Union and North Africa, the need for mobile and effective anti-tank vehicles became urgent. Once again, due to a lack of production capabilities, they were often forced to reuse already existing tank chassis and, in rare cases, half-tracks in order to mount the effective 7.5 cm Pak 40 anti-tank gun. This would lead to three different series of vehicles, known generally as ‘Marder’. In 1943, the 8.8 cm armed Nashorn anti-tank vehicle based on the Panzer IV and Panzer III chassis was also introduced. While these vehicles did their job well, they were also plagued with many shortcomings.

On the other hand, officials such as Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, one of the brains behind the German invasion of the West in 1940, argued for the introduction of a highly mobile, well-protected, and well-armed self-propelled artillery gun. Such vehicles were meant to provide infantry with mobile close fire support during combat operations. These vehicles were known as Sturmgeschütz (Eng. Assault gun), or simply ‘StuGs’, which would be introduced into service at the same time as the first anti-tank vehicles during the attack on the West in May 1940. These were dedicated designs that were fully protected and strongly armed. By late 1941, out of desperation, the Germans began refitting these vehicles with long guns to create new anti-tank vehicles. Combining their low silhouette, good frontal protection, and powerful gun, the Germans unintentionally created a highly effective tank destroyer. The StuG III would go on to be built in great numbers and used up to the end of the war. These misgivings and the addition of a more powerful gun led to a creation of a new series of anti-tank vehicles based on the Panzer IV chassis.

Development

The ‘story’ of the Jagpanzer IV began in September 1942, when the Waffenamt (Eng. Army Weapon’s Office) issued a request for the development of a new Sturmgeschütz design – the ‘Sturmgeschütze Neue Art’, Stu.Gesch.n.A. (Eng. Assault Gun New Type). The new vehicle was to be armed with the 7.5 cm KwK L/70 gun and protected with 100 mm frontal and 40 to 50 mm of side armor. It was intended to have the lowest possible height, a top speed of 25 km/h, 500 mm ground clearance, and a weight of up to 26 tonnes. Additional armament proposals included a 10.5 cm and 15 cm gun for the infantry support roles, but these two projects were never implemented.

At first glance, the obvious choice was to reuse the StuG III vehicles for this purpose in order to reduce the time of development and to reuse already produced components. The StuG III, despite not being designed for that specific role, performed excellently when used in the anti-tank role thanks to its improved weaponry. Their 7.5 cm L/24 short barrel gun was replaced with a 7.5 cm L/43, and later, the more mass-produced L/48 gun. These proved more than capable of destroying most enemy targets at ranges greater than 1 km.

The Germans predicted that, in the future, more capable guns with superior anti-tank performance would be needed. With the development of the Panther tank project, a new gun, the 7.5 cm L/70, would be made available. Attempts to install this gun were initially to be tested using the VK16.02 Leopard chassis. Given the rather small chassis, insufficient space to install the large gun, and the cancelation of this vehicle, the project did not go beyond the drawing boards.

Alkett, the main producer of the StuG III series, went to work on figuring out a way to install the 7.5 cm L/70 in the StuG III vehicles. In late 1942, a wooden mock-up was completed. This mock-up had a much larger upper superstructure, somewhat resembling the later Jagdpanzer 38, in order to accommodate the new gun. It quickly became obvious that such an installation on the Panzer III chassis was impossible, so another solution would be needed.

The Panzer IV chassis was seen as a much better solution, given that it was larger and that the installation of the new superstructure and gun were feasible. Alkett once again presented a project of such a vehicle based on the Panzer IV chassis that could be armed either with a 7.5 cm L/70 (Gerät No.822) or 10.5 cm (Gerät No.823) gun. In late October 1942, a scale model was even presented to Adolf Hitler, but nothing came of it.

Vogtlandische Maschinenfabrik AG (Vomag) proposed its own version of the new tank hunter based on the Panzer IV to Adolf Hitler on 2nd October 1942. Hitler was impressed by what he saw and gave the project the go-ahead. The wooden mock-up was completed by May 1943, when it was presented to Hitler. This wooden mock-up was different from the later-built vehicles, as it was based on an unchanged Panzer IV Ausf.F tank chassis. After the presentation of the new vehicle, Hitler was satisfied and ordered the production of the first prototypes as soon as possible. In September 1943, Vomag began the assembly of two soft-steel 0-series vehicles. These prototypes were similar to the wooden mock-up, having rounded front corners, but the Panzer IV’s front hull was heavily modified with new angled armor plates. Additionally, on the Jagdpanzer IV’s superstructure sides, firing ports for a 9 mm MP-38/40 submachine gun were placed. Both of these features would be dropped on the production vehicles in favor of a simpler armor design and deletion of the side-firing ports. In January 1944, the second prototype was completed. After a brief examination, it was chosen as the basis for the production series.

Designation

The new tank hunter was, in reality, a further development of the assault tank concept, but more specialized and purely dedicated to the anti-tank role. It is not surprising that it was initially designated as Sturmgeschütze Neue Art. This project was initiated months before the position of the General der Panzertruppe was even created. The close involvement of the assault gun branch of the Army in this project can be seen in a letter written by General der Artillerie Fritz Lindemann to Heinz Guderian in early 1944.

“.. Because Sturmgeschütz fire 25 percent of their ammunition at tanks and 75 percent at other types of targets, the designation “Panzerjäger” relates to only part of the Sturmgeschütz assigned tasks. The designation “Sturmgeschütz” is a well-known concept to the infantry. Therefore, the General der Infanterie is for retaining the Sturmgeschütz designation.”  

Parallel to the StuG III development, the Germans also employed anti-tank vehicles that were known as Panzerjäger. The term Panzerjäger originated in the First World War. The use of Jagdpanzer (Eng. tank hunter) in some sources is also interesting. Nowadays, the term Panzerjäger is often associated with improvised lightly protected, usually open-top vehicles, while Jagdpanzer is associated with fully enclosed anti-tank vehicles. This is a recent assignment, as both terms were, according to German military terminology and concepts, essentially one and the same.

Throughout its development and service life, the new tank hunter received several different designations, which was quite common for the Germans during the war. One of the earlier designations was Kleine Panzerjäger der Firma Vomag (Eng. Small Tank Hunter from the Vomag Company), dated May 1943. Other designations included: Panzerjäger auf Fahrgestell Panzer IV (Eng. Tank Destroyer on the Panzer IV Chassis) in August 1943, Stu.Gesch.n.A. auf Pz.IV (Eng. New Type Assault Gun on the Panzer IV Chassis) November 1943, and Leichter Panzerjäger auf Fgst.Pz.Kpf.Wg.IV mit 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 (Eng. Light Tank Destroyer on the Panzer IV Chassis) in December 1943. From 1944 onwards, much shorter designations were used: Panzerjäger IV 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 (March 1944), Jagdpanzer IV Ausf.F (September 1944), and Jagdpanzer IV – Panzerjäger IV (November 1944). Interestingly, despite being allocated to Panzer units, the designation Sturmgeschütze Neue Art mit 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw was used during the period of February to October 1944. Given that the vehicle is generally best known today simply as the Jagdpanzer IV, this article will use this name throughout.

Production

After Germany’s defeats in 1942, Heinz Guderian was brought back from retirement by Hitler, who hoped that he could somehow magically rebuild the shattered Panzer divisions. Guderian set immediately to the task of rebuilding this formation. At that time, the German industry was in the process of developing various new tanks and other armored vehicle projects, even more than it was realistically able of successfully mass-producing. With the support of Albert Speer, the Minister for Armaments and War Production, Guderian wanted to introduce rationalization programs and discard projects that could not be immediately put into production. The Jadgpanzer IV was deemed one such project. Both Guderian and Speer were not enthusiastic about this vehicle, as they deemed that it would only cause delays in Panzer IV production. In addition, the StuG III vehicle performed this role excellently and they believed its production should be increased instead.

On the other hand, Hitler, based on the field reports regarding the StuG III’s performance when used in the anti-tank role, had a very enthusiastic view of the new Jagdpanzer IV.  He urged that its mass production should begin as soon as possible and that this vehicle was to totally replace the Panzer IV tanks. While without a doubt an effective vehicle, the Jagdpanzer IV’s lack of turret means that, if it was used in offensive operations as a tank substitute, its combat effectiveness would be greatly reduced. Both Guderian and Albert Speer could do little to convince Hitler of the opposite. Thanks to their insistence, though, only Vomag was selected for Jagdpanzer IV production in order to avoid causing delays in tank production.

The production of the Jagdpanzer IV was meant to commence with the first 10 vehicles being completed by September 1943. In the following months, the production rate was predicted to be increased by 10 vehicles every month. This meant that, in 1943, the production run should have been as follows: 20 in October, 30 in November, and 40 vehicles by the end of December. This did not occur and Vomag was only able to complete only 10 vehicles during that year. The problem with the delivery of sufficient numbers of gun mounts, in addition to the poor quality of the armor plates, led to delays in production. Up to May 1944, Vomag was involved in the Panzer IV’s production, after which it solely focused on the Jagdpanzer IV’s production.

By the time the production of the Jagdpanzer IV stopped in November 1944, some 750 vehicles had been built by Vomag. Monthly production was as follows. Note the sudden drop in numbers in September, which was due to the Allied bombings of the Vomag factory.

Of course, like many other German vehicles, the exact production numbers differ depending on the author. The previously mentioned numbers are according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No. 9-2 Jagdpanzer IV). Author T. J Gander (Tanks in Detail: JgdPz IV, V, VI, and Hetzer) gives a number of 769 built vehicles. Authors K. Mucha and G. Parada (Jagdpanzer IV L/48) give an estimation of 769 to 784 produced vehicles and that some 26 more chassis reused for other projects. Author P. Thomas (Images of War: Hitler’s Tank Destroyers) mentions that some 800 were built.

Design

The Hull

The Jagdpanzer IV was built by using the chassis of the Panzer IV Ausf.H tank, which was, for the most part, unchanged. It consisted of the front transmission, central crew, and rear engine compartments. The most obvious change was the new angled superstructure and the redesigned sharply angled lower front hull. This was done to provide an increased level of protection by using thick angled armor plates interlocked to each other. In addition, some internal redesigns were needed in order to accommodate the new superstructure and the gun mount. One example is the changing position of the bottom escape hatch. Originally, it was located under the radio operator on the Panzer IV, but on the Jagdpanzer IV, it was moved close to the gunner.

The Suspension and Running Gear

The suspension and running gear were other elements reused from the Panzer IV. They consisted of eight small double road wheels suspended in four pairs by leaf-spring units per side. There were two front drive sprockets, two rear idlers, and eight return rollers in total. The standard Panzer IV return rollers were replaced with ones made of steel due to the lack of rubber later during production. In addition, by the end of production, some vehicles had only three return rollers on each side. Depending on the need or availability, wider tracks could be used instead of regular tracks in order to increase driving performance on mud or snow.

The Engine

The Jagdpanzer IV was powered by the Maybach HL 120 TRM which produced 265 hp @ 2,600 rpm. The maximum speed was 40 km/h (15-18 km/h cross-country). With a fuel load of some 470 liters, the operational range was 210 km. The engine and the crew compartment were separated by a fire-resistant and gas-tight armored firewall. In order to avoid any fire accidents, an automatic fire extinguisher system was installed in the engine compartment. The original position of the Panzer IV’s fuel tanks, under the turret, had to be changed in order to lower the vehicle’s height. Two fuel tanks were placed under the gun and a third smaller one in the engine compartment. In order to refuel the front fuel tanks, two (one on each side) fuel filler pipes were located behind the front drive sprockets.

The added front armor plates caused huge stress on the front suspension. To somewhat overcome the issue, most spare parts and auxiliary equipment were moved to the rear engine compartment later during the production. This included things such as spare tracks, wheels, repair tools, fire extinguishers, and the crew’s equipment.

The Superstructure

The new superstructure was well protected, with its angled, thick, and simple armor design. The angled shape of the superstructure provided thicker nominal armor and also increased the chance of deflecting enemy shots. Also, by using larger one-piece plates, it was much stronger and easier to produce. This way, the need for more carefully machined armored plates, like on Panzer III or IV, was unnecessary. Using single-piece armor plates interlocked to each other greatly strengthened the overall structure, making it more durable.

On the front plate, the gun with its mantlet was positioned slightly to the right of center. The gun mount was protected by a large ball-shaped shield, further protected by a larger cast gun mantlet known as Topfblende. On each side of the gun was a movable conical-shaped armored machine gun port cover. Lastly, to the lower left, the driver vision apparatus was placed. The side and rear plates did not receive any kind of vision port.

On the top part of the superstructure were two escape hatches. The right round-shaped one was for the loader. Left of it, the commander’s hatch had a small rotating periscope in the middle. The commander had a small additional hatch for the use of a retractable telescope. In front of the loader and commander hatches was a sliding armored cover for the gunsight.

Armor and Protection

The Jagdpanzer IV was well protected, with thick and well-angled armor plates. For the lower hull, the upper front armor plate was 60 mm thick at a 45° angle and the lower plate was 50 mm at a 55° angle. The side armor was 30 mm thick, the rear 20 mm, and the bottom 10 mm. The hull crew compartment had 20 mm of bottom armor.

The new upper superstructure frontal armor was 60 mm at a 50° angle, the sides were 40 mm at a 30° angle, the rear armor was 30 mm, and the top was 20 mm. The engine compartment design and armor were unchanged from the Panzer IV,  with 20 mm all around and 10 mm of top armor.

Even before this vehicle entered production, it was estimated that, in order to further improve protection, the armor plates had to be placed at even greater angles. This would be rejected, as it would lead to a huge delay in production and problems with space management.

Finally, in May 1944, it was finally possible to use 80 mm thick frontal armor plates. This was initially planned from the start, but the use of such thick plates would lead to delays in production which were deemed unacceptable, and their application was temporarily postponed.

The upper hull was built out of surface-hardened steel plates manufactured by Witkowitzer Bergbau und Eisenhütten. It is important to note that, by 1944, when the Jagdpanzer IV entered production, the quality of German production steel was not always guaranteed. The constant Allied air raids, lack of resources, and the use of slave labor greatly affected the quality of many constructions in Germany at that time, even armor plates.

The Jagdpanzer IVs were also provided with Zimmerit anti-magnetic coating, but after September 1944, its use was abandoned. Additional 5 mm thick armor plates were also provided for extra protection of the engine compartment’s sides. The Jagdpanzer IV could be equipped with additional 5 mm thick armor plates (Schürzen) covering the side of the vehicle. They served mainly to protect against Soviet anti-tank rifles.

The Armament

The first few prototypes were equipped with 7.5 cm L/43 guns. For the production version of the Jagdpanzer IV, the 7.5 cm PaK 39 L/48 was chosen. This gun was developed and produced by Rheinmetall-Borsig AG with the support of Seitz-Werke GmbH. In essence, this was the same weapon as the 7.5 cm StuK 40 gun used on the StuG III vehicles, but it was modified to be mounted on the new Jagdpanzer IV. This gun had a semi-automatic sliding block. This means that, after firing the gun, the spent round would be self-ejected, increasing the firing rate.

The elevation of this gun went from –8° to +15° (–5° to +15° or –6° to +20° depending on the source) and the traverse was 15° to right and 12° left (or 10° in both directions, once more, depending on the source). The main gun was not placed at the vehicle’s center, but was instead moved some 20 cm to the right side, mainly because of the gun sights. The gun was protected by the round-shaped gun mantlet. The ammunition supply for the main gun was 79 rounds. Usually, half were armor-piercing, and the other half were high explosive rounds. This was not always the case as, depending on the combat situation and needs, the ammunition load could be changed. In rarer cases, tungsten armor-piercing ammunition would be used. The standard armor-piercing round was capable of piercing 109 mm of flat armor at 1 km distance. The rare tungsten core round, at the same distance, could defeat 130 mm of armor.

Initially, the Jagdpanzer IV vehicles produced were equipped with a muzzle brake. The crews that operated these vehicles quickly noticed that, during firing, the muzzle brake would create extensive dust clouds in front of the vehicle due to Jagdpanzer IV’s small height. This reduced visibility, but more importantly, gave away the vehicle’s position to the enemy. As a result, crews began removing the muzzle brake from their vehicles. To compensate for removing it, Vomag engineers designed an improved recoil cylinder to help ease the recoil during firing. As this was being put into production, the troop field reports indicated that, despite removing the muzzle brake, the 7.5 cm gun worked without problems. Because of this, the introduction of the new improved recoil cylinder was actually not needed. Nevertheless, some newly built vehicles were equipped with it during production. From May 1944, the muzzle brake would be removed from the Jagdpanzer IV program. The later-produced vehicles did not have threaded ends on the barrel, as they were no longer needed.

There were also experiments with fixed non-recoiling mounts, known as ‘neur Art Starr’ (which could roughly be translated as ‘new fixed mount version’). Two Jagdpanzer IVs were modified for this purpose in September 1944, though this was unsuccessful and soon abandoned, but continued on the Jagdpanzer 38(t).

For self-defense, a 7.92 mm MG 42 machine gun with some 1,200 rounds of ammunition was provided. Unlike most other German armored vehicles, a ball mount was not used on the Jagdpanzer IV. Instead, the machine gun could be fired from two front gun ports located on the left and right of the main gun, which were 13 cm wide. These two machine gun ports were protected with conical-shaped armored covers. The left machine gun port proved difficult to use by the gunner and would be abandoned from March 1944. The vehicles that were at that time under production received a 60 mm thick round plate to cover the now useless machine gun port. The newly produced vehicle would receive the front superstructure armor plate that did not have this hole at all. From May 1944, the conical-shaped armored cover for the remaining machine gun port was slightly enlarged. When not in use, the machine gun could be pulled into a small travel lock that was connected to the vehicle’s roof. In this case, the machine gun port could be closed by pivoting the armor cover.

The prototype vehicles initially had two pistol ports placed on their superstructure sides. These were not adopted for service, as it was planned to add a remote-controlled machine gun mount (Rundumsfeuer) with a 360º firing arc on top of the superstructure. In theory, it would provide the crew with effective anti-personnel fire on all sides. However, the Rundumsfeuer machine gun mount was deleted early on. Some Jagdpanzer IVs were tested with this weapon system during March and April 1944, but it was noted that there was not enough room for it to be effectively mounted. This is peculiar, as the same machine gun mount was used without major problems on the much smaller Jagdpanzer 38(t) tank-hunter.

The Jagdpanzer IV was also equipped with the Nahverteidigungswaffe (Eng. close defense grenade launcher), with some 16 rounds of ammunition (high explosive and smoke rounds), located on the vehicle’s top. Due to the general lack of resources though, not all vehicles were provided with this weapon. In such cases, the Nahverteidigungswaffe opening hole was closed off with a round plate.

The Crew

The four-man crew consisted of the commander, the gunner, the loader/radio operator, and the driver. The driver’s position was on the front left side. While he was provided with two front-mounted vision slits, his overall awareness of the surroundings was limited. For example, due to the position of the gun, the driver had a huge blind spot to the right. Just behind him was the gunner’s position. He was tasked with operating the main gun, using two hand wheels, one for elevation and the other for traverse, located in front of him. A Sfl.Z.F.1a gun sight for acquiring targets was used. When in use, the sight was projected through the sliding armored cover on the vehicle’s top armor.

The commander was positioned behind the gunner. For observation and finding targets, the commander had at his disposal three periscopes. These were a fixed sight (Rundblickfehrnrohr Rbl F 3b), binocular rangefinder (Scherenfernrohr SF 14 Z), and a rotatable periscope. The commander had a small additional hatch door for the use of a retractable Sf.14Z telescope. Lastly, the commander was also responsible for providing the loader with the ammunition located on the left sidewall.

The last crew member was the loader, who was positioned on the vehicle’s right side. He operated the radio, which was located to the right rear, and he also doubled as the 7.92 mm MG 42 machine gun operator. There was a small opening located above the machine gun which provided the gun operator with a limited view of the front.  Nearly all periscopes were protected with an armored flap cover.

Organization

In the previously mentioned letter by the General der Artillery to Guderian, a desire and hope were expressed that the new vehicle would also be allocated to assault gun units. This actually never occurred, mostly on the insistence of Guderian himself. While the Jagdpanzer IV’s development history seems straightforward at first glance, it was actually followed by a fight between the German artillery and tank branches. The Jagdpanzer IV’s development was initiated by the artillery branch, in the hope of improving its StuG III vehicles with a new design, known as the Sturmgeschütze Neue Art. But, during its development, General Heinz Guderian insisted that it should be reclassified as a Panzerjäger and assigned to the Panzer units. In the end, Guderian won and the Jagdpanzer IV was allocated to existing Panzerjäger units, which were part of Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions, instead of the assault artillery units. This meant that the new Jagdpanzer IV was allocated to units that had little prior experience with this kind of vehicle. At the same time, the assault artillery units, which had experience operating such vehicles, were denied a weapon that could have potentially increased their effectiveness.

The Jagdpanzer IV was used to equip Panzerjäger Abteilungen (Eng. anti-tank battalions) of Panzer or Panzer Grenadier divisions. The anti-tank battalions assigned to a Panzer division were usually divided into two companies, each 10 vehicles strong. One more vehicle was to be assigned for the battalion commander, reaching the total strength of 21 vehicles.

Panzer Grenadier anti-tank battalions had two companies, with 14 vehicles each. Three more vehicles were used for the battalion commander’s platoon. In total, its strength was 31 vehicles. In both cases, a third company consisted of towed anti-tank guns. Depending on the availability and combat situation, the number of vehicles per Panzerjäger Abteilung varied depending on many factors, such as losses or availability of vehicles.

At the end of 1943, on the insistence of Guderian and with Hitler’s approval, the Panzer Lehr Division was to be formed, which would serve as a training point for armored formations. It would include experienced personnel from various other units. This unit was actually the first German division to be supplied with the Jagdpanzer IV. On 1st June 1944, its Panzerjäger Lehr Abteilung 130 was equipped with 31 Jagdpanzer IVs. Its structure was a bit unusual, with each of the three anti-tank companies being equipped with 9 Jagdpanzer IV. The remaining four vehicles were attached to the Battalion command. The reason for this unusual organizational structure lies in the fact that this unit was originally meant to be equipped with 14 Jagdpanzer IV and 14 Jagdtigers. As no Jagdtigers were available at this point, additional Jagdpanzer IVs were provided instead. Another unit with Jagdpanzer IVs was the Panzer Division Hermann Goering.

In Combat

France 1944

During the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944, various German units had been meant to receive the new Jagdpanzer IV. Some were already equipped, including the 2nd Panzer Division, 116th Panzer Division, and 12th SS Panzer Division, having 21 vehicles each, while the Panzer Lehr Division and 17th Panzergrenadier Divisions had 31. In the case of the 17th Panzergrenadier Division, its Jagdpanzer IVs arrived in France in August due to delays. The 9th Panzer Division was meant to receive the Jagdpanzer IV to replace its Marder II anti-tank vehicles, but these were not available by the time of the Allied invasion of the West in June 1944. Other divisions that would be included in this campaign that had the Jagdpanzer IV were the 9th, 11th, 116th, and 10th SS Panzer Divisions.

In the days following the Allied landings in Normandy, heavy fighting took place as the Allies tried to extend their beachhead and the Germans to turn them back. In the area between Caen and Bayeux, elements of the 12th SS Panzer Division were quite active. On 9th June, the Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment 901 and Panzerjäger Lehr Abteilung 130 proceeded toward Bayeux in an attempt to recapture this city and prevent future Allied advances. During this drive, some six Jagdpanzer IV were left behind the line, as they had faultily aligned gunsights. Given that the Germans were unsure as to what the next Allied main objective would be, even expecting a second landing in Belgium, organizing an effective offensive operation could not be easily achieved. The superior Allied air power and the long supply lines greatly affected the German overall combat performance.

On the 10th, heavy fighting occurred, as both sides tried to engage each other. Fighting in this area, due to bocage-terrain in this part of France, was not easy nor suited for larger armored formations. On the evening of that day, some 5 Allied Cromwell tanks found themself behind the enemy line and even threatened the headquarters of the Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment 902. Unfortunately for them, some Jagdpanzer IVs, with their unit commander, Oberleutnant Werner Wagner, were close by and prepared to engage the enemy. After positioning the vehicles to have the best possible firing range, they engaged the enemy tanks. Soon, one Cromwell was hit and set ablaze. A second Cromwell was immobilized by two hits before a third one destroyed it. A third Cromwell was also reported to be destroyed. The remaining Allied tanks tried to retreat but were unable to, forcing the crews to surrender.

The following day, the Allies mounted a great offensive in the area of Tilly-sur-Seulles. As the German defense line held the onslaught, the Allies dispatched another group of Cromwell tanks. Six Jagdpanzer IVs spearheaded the German’s own counter-attack. After destroying a few Cromwells, the remaining retreated back. The Jagdpanzer IVs proceeded with the attack, pushing the Allies back.

On 9th August 1944, the Allies launched large armored formations that moved toward the Caen-Falaise road, in order to liberate Cauvicourt. The Allied advance was met by Jagdpanzer IVs of the SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 12’s 1st Company, positioned around Hill 112, together with other German armor. During the engagements, of 22 destroyed Allied M4 tanks, between 16 to 22 were credited to the Jagdpanzer IVs. The German losses were four Panthers, six Panzer IVs, five Tiger Is, and five Jagdpanzer IVs. Two Jagdpanzer IVs would be sent forwards in reconnaissance missions and would go on to destroy 5 additional tanks.

Later that day, the Allies, frustrated by the lack of progress, dispatched some 9 Cromwell tanks from the 10th Mounted Rifle Regiment to try to outflank the German positions at Maizières Estrées-la-Campagne road. All would be taken out by the German Jagdpanzer IVs. Due to the heavy Allied artillery barrage though, the Germans began evacuating their positions. They quickly came under a night attack from the tanks of the Polish 1st Armoured Regiment. The SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 12’s Jagdpanzer IVs defeated the Polish-operated tanks, destroying some 22 M4 and Cromwell tanks.

The Jagdpanzer IV did not always perform well against the Allies. For example, during the fighting in the area of Laval and Le Mans, the 17th Panzergrenadier Division lost 9 Jagdpanzer IVs.

Nevertheless, overall, they performed excellently during the French campaign of 1944. For example, Oberscharfuehrer Rudolf Roy of the 12th SS Panzer Division claimed to have destroyed some 36 Allied tanks before being killed by an enemy sniper in December 1944.

Ardennes Offensive and the End of the War in Western Europe

During the Ardennes Offensive, on the Western Front, the Germans had 92 Jagdpanzer IVs. Some 20 Jagdpanzer IVs were part of the 2nd SS Division Das Reich. By the end of 1944, there were 56 Jagdpanzer IVs, of which only 28 were operational.

In December 1944, the Jagdpanzer IVs participated in the last large German offensive in the West, Operation Northwind. The 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division that participated in the offensive had 31 StuG IIIs, two Jagdpanzer IVs, and one Marder vehicle. The 22nd Panzer Division had four Jagdpanzer IVs and the 25th Panzergrenadier Division five Jagdpanzer IVs. The operation ended in another German failure by late January 1945, further depleting the strength of its armored units.

Italy

The Jagdpanzer IV also saw action in Italy, albeit in limited numbers. Three Panzer divisions received this vehicle: the Panzer Division Hermann Goering, the 3rd and the 15th Panzergrenadier divisions. Their combined combat strength was 83 Jagdpanzer IVs. By the end of 1944, this number was reduced to only 8 vehicles, of which 6 were operational.

Eastern Front

The majority of the Jagdpanzer IVs produced were deployed on the Eastern Front, in an attempt to stop the Soviet advance. They saw heavy action there, but were also used in the role of tanks or assault guns, the former of which the vehicle could not fulfil. The heavy fighting in Poland during October 1944 cost the Germans many casualties, including at least 55 Jagdpanzer IVs.

Other examples included the heavy fighting in Hungary. While attacking Soviet lines at Homok (Hungary) on 19th December 1944, Panzerjäger Abteilung 43 lost three out of four Jagdpanzer IVs. On 23rd December 1944, the Kampfgruppe “Scheppelmann”, which had 8 Panzer IVs and 13 Jagdpanzer IVs, engaged a Soviet force  north of Kisgyarmat. They managed to take out some 12 tanks, 3 American-supplied anti-aircraft half-tracks, 1 armored car, and 2 armored personnel carriers.  By the end of 1944, there were some 311 Jagdpanzer IVs, of which 209 were operational. In an attempt to relieve the besieged city of Budapest, the Germans employed the IV SS Panzer Corps, which had some 285 armored vehicles in its inventory, of which 55 were Jagdpanzer IVs. All attempts to reach Budapest ultimately failed, with many losses among the German forces. During the last few months of the war, there is little information about the Jagdpanzer IV, as the sources mainly focus on the later improved version armed with the long gun. Like other German forces, they fought a fighting retreat all the way to the Battle of Berlin.

Jagdpanzer IV Versions

Panzer IV/70 (V)

From the very start, the new Jagdpanzer IV project was intended to be armed with the longer 7.5 cm L/70 gun. As these weapons were not available in sufficient numbers, this was initially not possible. Once the 7.5 cm L/70 gun production was increased sufficiently that sufficient numbers could be spared for the Jagdpanzer IV project, work on an improved Jagdpanzer IV armed with this gun was immediately started. After a period of modification and testing in the first half of 1944, the production of a new Jagdpanzer IV version armed with the long 7.5 cm gun finally began in November 1944. The new vehicle was named Panzer IV/70 (V) and, by the time war ended, under 1,000 had been produced.

Jagdpanzer IV Befehlswagen

An unknown number of Jagdpanzer IVs were modified to be used as Befehlswagen (Eng. command vehicles). These vehicles had an additional FuG 8 radio station installed and one extra crew member. The Befehlswagen can be easily identified by the second radio antenna located on the rear left side.

After the War

Syria

Strangely, the Jagdpanzer IV would see limited combat action after the Second World War. Around five vehicles were given to Syria in 1950 by the French, although, depending on the sources, it is possible that the Soviets actually supplied them. During combat with Israeli forces in 1967 during the Six-Day War, one Jagdpanzer IV was lost when it was hit by a tank round. The remaining were withdrawn from the front and probably placed in reserve or even stored. These Jagdpanzers IV were still listed in the Syrian Army inventory during 1990-1991. What became of them is, unfortunately, not currently known.

Bulgaria

As Bulgaria was part of the Axis alliance during World War II, it was supplied with German equipment, including some StuG IIIs, Panzer IIIs and IVs, and a small number of Jagdpanzer IVs. During the Cold War, in order to protect its border with Turkey, Bulgaria, a member of the Communist Eastern Bloc, used the older German-supplied armored vehicles, including the Jagdpanzer IV, as static bunkers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these vehicles were abandoned by the Bulgarian Army. They would remain there until 2007, when the Bulgarian Army made extensive recovery operations in order to salvage these vehicles. One of the salvaged vehicles was a Jagdpanzer IV.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1AvM6-EE2Ww&ab_channel=MissingMilitary

The Jagdpanzer IV’s Grandson?

For the reorganized West German Army after the war, the concept of an anti-tank vehicle was not completely lost. They would develop and build the Kanonenjagdpanzer, which was, by design, very similar to the Jagdpanzer IV. While such a vehicle was effective during the Second World War, the technological developments and the introduction and widespread use of anti-tank rockets and missiles made such dedicated tank hunter vehicles obsolete.

Surviving Vehicles

Today, several vehicles have survived the war around the world. One Jagdanzer IV can be found in the Bulgarian Museum of Glory in Yambol. There were three vehicles, including one of the 0-series, located in France, at the Saumur Armor Museum. The 0-series vehicle was given to Germany and can be today seen in the Panzermuseum Munster, together with another Jagdpanzer IV that was already there. One more can be seen in Switzerland at the Panzermuseum Thun. There is also one located in Syria.

Conclusion

The Jagdpanzer IV was the first German dedicated anti-tank vehicle. It had excellent protection and firepower and a low silhouette. The Jagdpanzer IV had all the characteristics needed to be an excellent tank hunter. It would see action on nearly all fronts the German Army fought on at the time, in the East, in the West, and on the Italian Front.

When used in combat, it quickly proved to be an effective anti-tank vehicle. While an adequate vehicle for sure, its overall performance was slightly better than the mass-produced StuG III. It shared many elements with it regarding the overall design, firepower, and small height. In retrospect, the Germans could well have been better suited had they followed Guederian’s advice and focused more on the production of an even greater number of StuG III vehicles. The Jagdpanzer IV drained significant and necessary resources from Panzer IV production. In the end, like many German late-war projects, it was built too late and in too few numbers to really have any impact on the whole war.

Sources

• T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2001)  Panzer Tracts No.20-1 Paper Panzers
• T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2012) Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV
• T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (1997) Panzer Tracts No.9 Jagdpanzer
• D. R. Higgins (2018) Cromwell Vs Jagdpanzer IV Normandy 1944, Osprey Publishing
• D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
• T. J. Gander (2004), Tanks in Detail JgdPz IV, V, VI and Hetzer, Ian Allan Publishing
• B. Perrett (1999) Sturmartillerie and Panzerjager 1939-1945, New Vanguard
• Military Vehicle Prints 30 (1976) Panzerjager IV, Bellona prints
• S. J. Zaloga (2021) German tanks In Normandy, Osprey Publishing
• K. Mucha and  G. Parada (2001) Jagdpanzer IV, Kagero Publishing
• P. Chamberlain and T.J. Gander (2005) Enzyklopadie Deutscher waffen 1939-1945 Handwaffen
• A. Lüdeke (2007) Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon books
• H. Doyle (2005). German Military Vehicles, Krause Publications
• S. J. Zaloga (2010) Operation Nordwind 1945, Osprey publishing
• P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
• P. C. Adams (2010) Snow and Steel The Battle of the Bulge 1944-45, Oxford University press
• P. Thomas (2017), Hitler’s Tank Destroyers 1940-45. Pen and Sword Military.
• Walter J. Spielberger (1993). Panzer IV and its Variants, Schiffer Publishing Ltd.
• P. Paolo (2009) Panzer Divisions 1944-1945, Osprey Publishing
• N. Szamveber (2013) Days of Battle Armoured Operations North Of The River Danube, Hungary 1944-45, Helion & Company
• J. Ledwoch (2009) Bulgaria 1945-1955, Militaria.

German Reich (1941)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 9 Built

During the war, the Germans encountered ever increasing numbers of strong enemy armor. Due to a general lack of numbers of their own tanks, they were often forced to field improvised anti-tank vehicles. These were mostly based on obsolete tank chassis, such as the Marder series, and armed with good anti-tank guns. In some rare cases, half-tracks were also employed in this manner. One such vehicle was the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette (Sd.Kfz.6/3) developed during late 1941. While the increase in firepower was welcome, these vehicles had a number of defects which ultimately lead to a small production run of only 9 vehicles.

History

From 1941 onwards, on the Eastern Front, the Germans were starting to encounter tanks like the T-34 and KV series, which their tank and anti-tank guns struggled against. The situation in North Africa was not better either, as the British employed tanks such as the Matilda II, which were difficult to effectively deal with. The 7.5 cm PaK 40 towed anti-tank gun that was slowly entering service from the end of 1941 was able to successfully destroy these vehicles at long ranges. However, its main issue was its general lack of mobility, being a heavy towed gun. In the vast expanses of North Africa, a self-propelled anti-tank vehicle could offer a number of advantages, being able to quickly respond to enemy armor movements. It was for this reason that, in August 1941, the Germans began developing such a vehicle. It was meant to reinforce the German forces (Deutsches Afrikakorps DAK – German Africa Corps) fighting in North Africa.

For the initial tests, truck or half-track chassis were proposed. Regarding the armament, the Germans had two options to choose from, either the 5 cm PaK 38 or the captured Soviet 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r). The 7.5 cm PaK 40 was still under development at this time and far from entering service. Ultimately, the choice was cast in favor of the stronger and larger 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r) gun. According to the original plans, if the whole assembly proved viable, a limited production run of some 20 vehicles was to be carried out. This was ultimately changed to only 9 vehicles for unknown reasons. At the end of August, the German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres) announced that, due to the urgent need for such vehicles, the chassis of a modified Sd.Kfz.6 half-track was to be armed with a 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r).

The Sd.Kfz.6 5-ton half-track was one of several similar half-track vehicles employed by the Germans during the war. It was developed back in 1934 by Buessing-NAG with the intention of providing the Pioniere (German Army engineers) with a vehicle for towing pontoon bridges and other equipment and the standard German 10.5 cm field howitzers. During the war, these were modified and used as self-propelled anti-aircraft vehicles. Depending on the role it was to perform, it received a slightly modified designation. The regular engineer version was named Sd.Kfz.6, the artillery towing version was the Sd.Kfz.6/1 and the later anti-aircraft version was the Sd.Kfz.6/2. While the half-track had a somewhat complicated suspension which consisted of 5 (later increased to 7) overlapping and interleaved double road wheels, its performance was deemed satisfactory. Like many other German vehicles, there were simply never enough of them to fulfill the Army’s needs. When the production ended in 1943, some 3,122 had been built.

The main gun for this modification was actually a Soviet 76.2 mm M1936 (F-22) divisional gun. Such guns were captured in huge numbers during the initial months of Operation Barbarossa in the East. After a brief assessment of the gun’s characteristics, the Germans were satisfied with its performance. The gun was given to the army for use, under the name 7.62 cm F.K. (Feldkanone) 36(r) (also sometimes designated as Feldkanone (FK) 296(r)). It was initially used in its original field gun role, but very soon it became clear that it possessed great anti-tank capabilities. As this was a captured weapon, the German Army High Command also issued orders to collect as much armor-piercing and high-explosive ammunition as possible. These were to be then allocated to the unit that was to be equipped with this gun.

Testing the Prototype

Once the first prototype was completed by Alkett sometime during late August or early September, it was transported for testing at the secret research center in Kummersdorf during September 1941. The prototype had a very basic design, with a large thinly armored structure placed on the former cargo bay of the half-track chassis. The front driver’s compartment was unchanged. The gun was placed inside this new box-shaped firing compartment. In order to fit inside, its trailing legs were shortened.

A series of evaluation and firing tests were conducted on 10th September. A few days later, Wa Prüf 6 (the tanks and motorized equipment design office) personnel made a report of its overall performance. In short, the report described that some 44 high-explosive and armor-piercing rounds were fired from the prototype vehicle at different elevations and traverse angles. No major issues were detected with the gun assembly. The half-track chassis also proved to be up to the job, as it could withstand the recoil of the 7.62 cm gun.

While the overall design was deemed satisfactory, some changes were requested. The prototype was provided with an armored cover for the half-track’s radiator to protect it from damage from firing the gun, but this did not happen. It was proposed that it be removed, likely to save as much weight as possible. Another change that was requested was to remove part of the rear armor. The reason for this was the noted difficulty that arose during the replacement of the gun barrel and recoil cylinder due to lack of space. The opening to the rear provided the crew with plenty of room to effectively change the gun barrel. To avoid any possible delays, simple soft-steel doors were placed in the opening. On 17th September, further firing tests were conducted using Soviet but also German rounds adapted for the gun. These tests were to be followed up by driving trials.

While not directly related to these projects, the Germans were also experimenting with the idea of using half-track chassis as highly mobile anti-tank vehicles. One of these, which saw combat, was the Panzer-Selbstfahrlafette II, built using the experimental HKP 902 half-track. Only two would be built and they were lost in North Africa.

Name

This vehicle received the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 designation. It is also known under the similar 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf 5t Zkgw designation. There are some misconceptions about the ‘Diana’ nickname for this vehicle. According to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No. Rommel’s Funnies), this name was associated with a subsequent Alkett project from 1942 based on the same half-track chassis, known as the 7.62cm PaK 36 auf 5t Zgkw Diana. While similar to the previous vehicle, it was to incorporate a number of improvements, namely a modified and improved anti-tank gun, better protection and fewer crew members. To complicate matters even more, according to the author T. Cockle (Armor of the Deutsches Afrikakorps), the ‘Diana’ nickname was actually given by the British.

Production Numbers

Only nine 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 vehicles were requested. For this reason, Buessing-NAG was tasked with the production of nine Sd.Kfz.6 chassis, which were delivered during October and November 1941. The company responsible for their final assembly was Alkett. Interestingly, while the majority of sources agree that only nine such vehicles were built, author G. Rottman (German self-propelled guns) notes that only six vehicles were built.

Specifications

The Chassis

This vehicle was based on the modified chassis of the Sd.Kfz.6 half-track. This half-track had a number of changes during its production run, aimed at improving its overall performance. In the case of the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3, the BN 9b subversion was used. Some of the changes compared to previous versions included redesigning the suspension by using the torsion bar units, adding two extra road wheels, and installing a stronger Maybach NL 54 TUKRM engine giving 115 hp @ 2,600 rpm. With this engine and a weight of around 10 to 10.5 tonnes (depending on the source), the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 could reach a maximum speed of some 50 km/h. The fuel load of some 190 liters offered an operational range of 222 km on road and 112 km off-road.

The Fighting Compartment

The Sd.Kfz.6 cargo bay was replaced with a new fighting compartment that was protected by a simple but quite bulky box-shaped armored fighting compartment. The sides of this box-shaped fighting compartment were 3.6 m long and had a height of some 1.5 m. The rear plate was some 2 m wide with the same height. The front was open, with two smaller armored plates connected to the side walls. This is where the gun was to be located and its armored shield was to provide the crew protection from incoming fire. On top, this armored compartment was completely open, but could be covered with canvas to protect the crew from the harsh desert weather if needed. For this reason, three metal bar rails were added on the top to help stretch the canvas cover better.

On each side of this armored compartment, a large door was added for the crew to enter their positions. These doors could be opened toward the vehicle’s front. They were 90 cm wide and had a height of nearly 1 m. On the rear armor plate, a larger 60 cm wide door made of soft-steel was placed. This door was hinged at its bottom edge. Its primary function was to provide the crew with easy access in order to facilitate the replacement of the gun barrel and other parts. It could also be used to eject spent cartridges.

The Armor

The new fighting compartment was protected (except the rear positioned door, which was made of soft steel) by 4.5 mm armor plates. While it was hoped this would provide protection at least against small-caliber rounds, in reality, it did not. The front was mostly protected with a 3 mm thick gun shield. Some older sources mention that the overall armor thickness was either 8 or 10 mm thick. In a German war report about this vehicle’s performance, it was noted that this armor was insufficient to provide protection from even small caliber machine gun fire.

In theory, for any self-propelled vehicle that was lightly armored, the best defense was a well-selected combat position and good camouflage. While the first of these two could be achieved with good reconnaissance, the latter was quite tricky given the vehicle’s huge size. The half-track SPG was a notoriously large target, with a length of 6.33 m, a width of 2.26 m, and a height of 3.05 m.

The Armament

The main armament was a captured Soviet 7.62 cm M1936 field gun. For installation in this vehicle, only the rear trail legs were shortened and then bolted down to provide stability during firing. The large wheels were also retained, but they were bolted down for the same reason. This gun had a traverse of 30° in both directions and an elevation of -7° to +20°. The armor penetration at 1 km was (depending on the ammunition used) 67 to 77 mm, more than enough to deal with enemy tanks encountered in North Africa.
In a German war report made by a Waffenamt liaison officer, it was noted that this gun (both in the towed and self-propelled versions) would generate fear among the enemy, who in turn would attempt to neutralize it by using artillery or airstrikes.

The 7.62 cm M1936 field gun, while possessing good anti-tank capabilities, was generally unsuited for this role. The main reason for this was the general arrangement of its traverse and elevation wheels. Namely, the traverse wheel was on the left, together with the gun sights, while the elevation handwheel was on the right side. As the gunner was positioned on the left, targeting was made quite difficult, if not almost impossible. The Germans took steps to address the issue, moving the elevation handwheel to the left side, but the linkages limited total elevation.

During the war, the Germans would modify and improve the 7.62 cm M1936 field gun for the anti-tank role. The changes involved adding a muzzle brake (but not all guns were equipped with it), cutting the gun shield in half (the upper part was welded to the lower part of the shield in a similar fashion to the PaK 40 two-part shield) and rechambering the gun to 7.5 cm caliber in order to use standard German ammunition ( as on the PaK 40). After these changes, the gun was renamed 7.62 cm PaK 36(r). This version was not the one mounted on the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3, but the original version of the gun.

The ammunition load was huge, with 100 rounds being stored in an ammunition bin which was located to the rear of the new fighting compartment. An additional 40 rounds could be stored on a towed trailer, if needed. Some sources claim that the ammunition load consisted of 64 rounds, while author D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka) mentions that only 20 rounds were carried inside.

The secondary armament consisted of one 9 mm MP 40 submachine gun allocated to the vehicle commander. The remaining crew were issued with pistols for self-defense.

The Crew

This vehicle had a rather large crew, which consisted of a commander, a gunner, a driver, a loader, and two additional ammunition bearers. Beside the driver, who was fully exposed at the front, the remaining crewmen were located in the box-shaped fighting compartment. The number of crew members is listed as 5 in a number of sources.

Forming the First Units and Organisation

At the end of September 1941, an order was issued to begin the necessary steps for forming a unit equipped with 9 such vehicles. The delivery of completed vehicles was expected to be ready by 25th October. In mid-November, a new order gave instructions to form three Platoons (Zuge). each equipped with three vehicles. The commanders of these Platoons were to be supplied with cars including and support staff, like a motorcycle messenger.

In North Africa

The 9 vehicles were transported from Germany to Italy at the end of December 1941. From there, they were transported by ship to Tripoli. Six vehicles arrived there on 12th January 1942, while the remaining three arrived in late February 1942. The first six 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 were used to reinforce the 3rd Kompanie (Company) of the 605th Panzerjäger Abteilung (Anti-tank Battalion), which was part of the 90th Leichte Division (Light Division). Beside the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3, the 605th Anti-Tank Battalion was also equipped with at least 6 Panzerjäger Is (anti-tank vehicles based on the Panzer I chassis).

As only six arrived in January, these initially saw action against the British in early 1942. By the 10th of February, probably due to high mechanical failures, only one vehicle of the original six was still operational. By March, with the arrival of the remaining three vehicles, the whole unit was finally attached to the 90th Light Division. The first losses occurred during April, when two vehicles were written-off, but the precise cause of these losses is not recorded.

In May 1942, the 605th anti-tank Battalion still had three operational platoons equipped with this vehicle, which were slightly reduced in strength. The 1st Platoon had three vehicles, while the remaining two Platoons each were equipped with two vehicles. These remaining seven vehicles saw extensive action during Unternehmen Venezia (Operation Venice), an Axis attack on the British positions at Gazala in late May 1942. On 28th May, the few 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 managed to beat back the tanks of the British 4th Armored Brigade near El Adem.

Due to further fighting, the number of these vehicles was reduced to four, while one was under repair on 8th June 1942. Due to further losses, by the start of July, only one operational and two non-operational vehicles were left. The same month, at least two vehicles participated in the Axis conquest of Tobruk. During the failed attempt to break the El Alamein line, one more was lost. At the start of December 1942, the last remaining 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 were finally lost. Of the 9 vehicles built, at least one was captured by the British in North Africa.

Related Vehicles

7.62 cm PaK 36 auf 5t Zgkw ‘Diana’

The ‘Diana’ was a subsequent project from Alkett, meant to provide a more mature design for this type of vehicle. While based on the same chassis, it used the modified Pak 36(r), which had better anti-tank performance, better armor and a smaller crew.

The 7.62 cm PaK 36 auf 8t ZgKw ‘Artemis’

Using the Sd.Kfz.6 was not the last attempt to develop an anti-tank vehicle based on a half-track chassis. The development of such a vehicle based on the larger Sd.Kfz.7 was initiated in August 1941. It was to be lightly protected and to have a crew of only four. While a single prototype was completed, the whole project was eventually abandoned and no photos have survived.

Conclusion

The decision to build only nine 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 was quite justified, as this vehicle had a number of disadvantages. While its gun had good overall armor-piercing properties, its origin as a field gun made it somewhat unfit for the anti-tank role. The overall large shape of the vehicle offered an excellent target for enemy gunners. The weak, almost useless armor offered no real protection against any kind of enemy fire. The low numbers built also limited its overall performance on the front. In the end, while the Germans made some attempts to develop self-propelled anti-tank vehicles based on half-tracks, these projects ended in failure and were built in limited numbers.

Sources

• P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
• D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
• P. P. Battistelli (2006) Rommel’s Afrika Korps, Osprey Publishing
• F. Kurowski (2010) Das Afrika Korps Stackpole books.
• G. Rottman, German self-propelled guns, Concord
• D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
• A. Lüdeke (2007) Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon books.
• V. Andorfer, M. Block and J, Nelson, Marder III, Nuts and Bolts Vol. 15
• H. Scheibert, Die Deutschen Panzer Des Zweiten Weltkriegs, Dörfler.
• T. Cockle (Armor of the Deutsches Afrikakorps)
• T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2005) Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjager
• T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2014) Panzer Tracts No.22-5 Gepanzerter 8t Zugkraftwagen and SFL. Flak (Sd.Kfz.7)
• T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (1997) Panzer Tracts No. Rommel’s Funnies
• W.J.K. Davies (1979), Panzerjager German Anti-Tank Battalions of World War Two. Almark Publishing Co.Ltd.

German Reich (1941)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 174 Anti-Tank and 26 Command Vehicles Built

After the defeat of France in June 1940, the Germans captured huge stockpiles of British and French war materiel. Some of the greatest prizes were the large quantities of tanks of several different types, including the Renault R35. While the R35 was available in great numbers and had good armor for its time, it lacked firepower, speed and had only two crew members. While some would be used in their original tank configuration on less important fronts, the majority would be adapted for various other roles, such as artillery tractors or ammunition supply vehicles. Some 174 would be modified and used as anti-tank vehicles with an additional 24 (based on the same model) being used as command vehicles.

History

After the conclusion of the Western campaign, the Germans were in possession of nearly 800 R35 tanks. At the end of 1940, In 6 (the inspectorate for motorized and armored units) issued a request to Wa Prüf 6 for the development of an anti-tank vehicle based on the R35 tank. This vehicle was to be used to equip non-motorized Infantry Divisions. Prior to this request, the Germans had already tested the use of so-called Panzerjäger (anti-tank vehicles) during the Western campaign. These represented an attempt to increase the mobility of anti-tank guns by placing them on an obsolete tank chassis, like the Panzer I. The standard German anti-tank gun was the 3.7 cm PaK 36, which proved a good design in the Polish campaign, but was deemed insufficient for the task afterward. The Germans had in their inventory a good number of the more potent Czechoslovakian 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38 anti-tank guns, known as the 4.7 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 36(t), or simply as 4.7 cm PaK(t). Due to its better firepower, the Germans decided to use this cannon to arm the first self-propelled anti-tank vehicle, known simply as the Panzerjäger I. It consisted of a Panzer I chassis on which the turret was replaced with a 4.7 cm PaK(t) mount and a three-sided shield. While this concept proved to have merit, as shown in France, it was far from perfect. Simply put, the chassis was insufficient for the task and was poorly protected.

As the larger Panzer III and IV were better armed than the Panzer I, there was no point in using them for such modifications at this early stage of the war, as they were too valuable as tanks for the Panzer Divisions. The French R35, on the other hand, was available in great numbers, was better protected than the Panzer I and had a stronger chassis. Adding the potent 4.7 cm PaK(t) instead of the weak 3.7 cm main gun would have kept these vehicles relevant on the contemporary battlefields. These were probably the main reasons why the Germans decided to utilize the R35 chassis for this role.

For the development of such a vehicle, Wa Prüf 6 chose Alkett to build the first prototype. The soft steel prototype was completed during early February 1941. The conversion included removing the turret and replacing it with an open topped combat compartment armed with the 4.7 cm anti-tank gun. At the end of March, it was presented to Adolf Hitler. He approved the design and an order for 200 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.35 R 731, as it was known, was given, which was to be completed by August that year.

The R35

The Renault R35 was a French light tank developed during the early thirties to replace the aging FT tank. While the French Army tested other heavier designs (the Renault D1 and D2), a simpler and cheaper vehicle was deemed more desirable. Work on this tank began in 1933 at the French Army’s request for a new light tank design. Renault was quick to respond and presented its prototype to the France Army which, after a series of modifications (among which increasing the armor to 40 mm and improving the running gear), placed an order for over 1,600 tanks. While the R35 was well protected, with 40 mm-thick cast armor, it was plagued with problems such as weak firepower (it had the same 37 mm gun as the FT), just two crew members, a lack of radio and slow speed. During its service life, a number of further modifications and tests were carried out in order to improve its firepower and mobility, all with limited success. Regardless, it was the most numerous French tank during the German Invasion of 1940.

Name

The designation of the German tank destroyer is slightly different depending on the source used. According to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No. 7-1), it is known as 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.35 R 731(f). Author D. Nešić, (Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-Francuska) mentions it as the Selbstfahrlafette 4.7 cm PaK(t) auf PzKpfw 35 R(f). W.J. Spielberger (Beute-Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Deutschen Wehrmacht) names it the 4.7 cm PaK(t) auf Panzerkampfwagen 35 R(f) ohne turm. The precise name is also somewhat complicated by the Germans using both R35 and 35R in their documents.

This article, for the sake of simplicity, will use the simple and unofficial Panzerjäger 35R designation.

Design

Chassis and hull

The hull and superstructure were built using casting. The hull actually consisted of three cast parts that were bolted together. In the front part of the hull, the transmission was placed. Behind it was the crew compartment and, to the rear, separated by a firewall, was the engine compartment. On top of the chassis, a cast superstructure was added. It completely covered most of the vehicle, including the rear engine compartment. In front of the superstructure, a two-part hatch for the driver was located.

Armored crew compartment

For the construction of the Panzerjäger 35R, the Germans simply removed the R35’s turret and placed a box-shaped and open-topped armored compartment on top of the vehicle. To accommodate this new compartment, the Germans added a metal base that was extended over most of the upper part of the R35 superstructure.

The front rectangular plate of this compartment was placed at 30°. In the middle of it, an opening for the gun was placed. This opening was enclosed with an internal gun shield. On the gun’s left side, a hatch was placed. Its purpose was to cover the gun’s sight and had to be open when engaging enemy targets.

The compartment sides consisted of two armored plates. The smaller one, to the front, was slightly angled towards the front plate. The larger side armor had narrow rectangular hatches for the crew on both sides to the rear. On the left side, to the rear, an aerial antenna cubical mount base was installed.

The rear part of the compartment consisted of a storage area which was elevated above the engine compartment. This was supported by three metal poles. While all were open-topped, some vehicles had two metal bars welded to the top to provide a better base for the canvas cover.

Suspension

The Panzerjäger 35R’s suspension was unchanged from the original French design and consisted of five road wheels, three return rollers, one idler and one drive sprocket. Of the five road wheels, four were suspended in pairs and one was independently mounted. The paired road wheels were mounted on bell cranks and suspended using rubber springs. The rear idler was put close to the ground.

Engine

This vehicle was powered by a Renault 4 cylinder engine giving out 85 hp @ 220 rpm. While the overall weight, due to the added extra armor, crew members, armament and ammunition, was increased to 11 tonnes (or 10 tonnes, depending on the source), the driving performance seems to be unchanged in the specifications in most sources. The maximum speed was 20 km/h, while the cross-country speed was only 12 km/h. The low speed was not that a great deficiency for this vehicle, as it was intended to support the non-motorised infantry units. The operational range was some 130 km, dropping down to 80 km cross-country.

Armor protection

The armor protection could be divided into two sections, the French R35 hull and superstructure, and the German-added top fighting compartment. The French R35 was relatively well protected for its day. Its front hull armor was 32 mm rounded armor. The sides were 40 mm thick, the rear also 40 mm, but placed at 35°, and the bottom was 14 mm thick. The superstructure front armor was 32 mm thick, the sides and rear were 40 mm placed at 10° and 11°. The top armor of the superstructure was 13 mm.

The new fighting compartment was less armored. The front was 25 mm thick, placed at 30°. The sides were 20 mm thick at 10° and the flat rear was 20 mm thick. Older sources mention that the frontal armor was 20 mm thick and the sides and rear only 10 mm thick.

Armament

The gun used to arm this vehicle was the captured Škoda 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38, known as the 4.7 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 36(t), or simply as the 4.7 cm PaK(t) in German service. The standard armor-piercing Panzergranate 36(t) had a muzzle velocity of 775 m/s and a maximum effective range of 1.5 km. The armor penetration of this round was 48-59 mm at 500 m and 41 mm at 1 km.

In order to extend its operational effectiveness, a new Pzgr.Patr.40 tungsten round was developed (the muzzle velocity was 1,080 m/s). As the Germans lacked sufficient tungsten, this type of ammunition could not be produced in large quantities and its usage was rare. The 4.7 cm PaK(t) also fired high-explosive rounds (2.3 kg weight) with impact fuses to be used against light armor and infantry.

The gun itself, without the wheels and the trail legs, was simply bolted on the front, where the R35’s turret ring was previously positioned. The 4.7 cm gun had an elevation of -8° to +10° and a traverse angle of 17.5° on each side. The elevation and traverse were controlled by two handwheels located on the gun’s left side. The main monocular gunsight was not changed. The total ammunition load is unknown. Seeing as the smaller Panzerjäger I was able to carry some 86 rounds, it would be logical to assume that the new Panzerjäger 35R’s ammunition load would be similar, if not slightly larger.

For crew protection, one MP38/40 submachine gun was carried inside. The ammunition load for it was 192 rounds. Being designed to cooperate with the infantry, the lack of a machine gun was not a major issue.

Crew

This vehicle had a crew of three, which included the commander, who was also the gunner, the loader and the driver. The driver’s position was on the left side of the vehicle. He entered his position through a two-part hatch with a visor. The remaining two crewmen were positioned in the new armored fighting compartment. The commander/gunner was positioned to the left of the gun, and the loader to the right of him. While not listed in the sources, it is likely that the loader would also act as the radio operator.

Production

As already mentioned, the production order for this vehicle was awarded to Alkett. The preparation for production was to begin in February/March 1941, with some 30 vehicles per month. There would be some delays in production, so the quota of 30 vehicles was not always achieved. By May 1941, some 93 vehicles were completed, followed by 33 in June, only 5 in July, 22 in August, 28 in September and the final 19 vehicles in October 1941. Not all were built as anti-tank vehicles. Of the 200 vehicles, some 26 were constructed as command vehicles.

Organization

The first available vehicles were used to form three 30-vehicle strong Panzerjäger Abteilung – Pz.Jg.Abt (self-propelled anti-tank battalions), the 559th, 561st, and the 611th. Each of these battalions consisted of an HQ unit and three Kompanie (Companies). Each Company was divided into smaller three-vehicle strong Zuge (Platoons). There was an additional Company sent to the 43rd Battalion, supplied with a few vehicles, to act as a reserve and training unit. The remaining vehicles would be mainly distributed in smaller numbers to various Infantry Divisions.

Service

Failed actions in the East

The Panzerjäger 35Rs, like many other German armored vehicles, were mobilized for the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The 559th was allocated to Army Group North, while the 561st and 611th went to Army Group Center. For these vehicles, the war started pretty badly. Nearly all vehicles were out of action due to mechanical breakdowns just a few days after the start of the German attack. For example, in the case of the 611th Battalion, it lost all its vehicles on the first day of the attack. In desperation, the unit was instead equipped with the 3.7 cm PaK 36 towed gun and even some Soviet captured anti-tank guns. The 559th Battalion also had the same fate, replacing its vehicles with 3.7 cm PaK anti-tank guns. The 561st was pulled back from the front, temporarily waiting to replace the tank destroyers with towed anti-tank guns.

Another unit that was sent to the Soviet Union, probably in late 1941, was the 318th Company, which had ten 35R tank-hunters and 2 command vehicles. These performed poorly based on the unit report dated from February 1942. In this report, it was noted that these vehicles had poor engines, which were ill suited for the field conditions of the East. Bad weather and the poor road system prevented long road marches with this vehicle. Due to the low temperatures, the engines could not be started and even the road wheels would be blocked and unable to move because of this. After this poor performance, no more 35R anti-tank vehicles would be sent to the East. The fate of these vehicles is not clear in the sources.

In the West

The remaining Panzerjäger 35Rs, some 148 vehicles in April 1942, would be stationed in the West, where the climate was more suitable for their use. In the West, these vehicles were not used in Battalion strength, but instead mostly allocated to a number of Infantry Divisions in small numbers. Some of these included 3 with the 100th Panzer Regiment, 2 in the 243rd Panzer Division, 11 in the 343rd Infantry Division, 10 in the 191st Reserve Division, etcetera. In December 1943, of 92 Panzerjäger 35Rs, some 88 were operational. Prior to the Allied invasion of France in 1944, some 110 vehicles of this type were available. Why this number is higher than the previous year is sadly not mentioned in the sources. Between 1942 and 1944, these vehicles were mainly used for occupation and patrol duties and crew training.

The available Panzerjäger 35Rs would meet the Allied invasion of occupied France. Unfortunately, the sources do not give much information about their actual combat service. Being based on a pre-war vehicle and armed with a weak 4.7 cm anti-tank gun (by 1944 standards), its effectiveness was limited at best. It is hard to know precisely, but probably all were lost in the first few months of combat in France.

Modifications

Führungs-fahrzeuge auf Fgst.Kpfw.35 R 731(f)

The Führungs-fahrzeuge auf Fgst.Kpfw.35 R 731(f) (also known in sources as the Befehlspanzer fur 4.7 cm PaK(t) Einheiten auf Panzerkampfwagen 35 R) was a command vehicle based on the Panzerjäger 35R. It was built by removing the 4.7 cm anti-tank gun and replacing it with a ball mounted Kugelblende 30 MG 34 machine gun. Not all vehicles were actually equipped with the machine gun mount, as some were left without any armament. It was equipped with additional radio equipment and built in small numbers, some 26 vehicles in total.

The 5 cm Pak 38 auf R35(f) project

At the end of July 1941, Alkett was instructed by Wa Prüf 6 to design and produce a modified version of this vehicle armed with the 5 cm PaK 38. This vehicle was designated 5 cm PaK 38 auf R 35(f). Once adopted, it was to be allocated to anti-tank units of standard Infantry Divisions. Due to the addition of the larger gun, the weight of the vehicle would rise to 11.5 tonnes. Ultimately, while one vehicle was to be ready by August 1941, it is unlikely that this was ever achieved.

The 5 cm gun was a powerful weapon with much stronger recoil, and it is not clear if the R35 chassis could have successfully handled it without major mechanical problems. The poor performance of this chassis in the East probably also influenced the decision to drop this project.

In Hungarian Service

At least two of these vehicles were temporarily given to Hungarians to fight Soviet partisans. Sadly, not much is known about their use by the Hungarians.

Surviving vehicle

Today, only one Panzerjäger 35R (with some parts missing) exists and can be seen at the Swiss military Museum at Thun.

The Panzerjäger 35R shared a number of positive and negative characteristics with its cousin, the Panzerjäger I. It provided the German infantry with a more mobile anti-tank platform with a relatively good gun and somewhat better protection than the earlier Panzerjäger I. While it was slow, the infantry it was designed to provide cover for were themselves not a very mobile force, so it was not a major issue.

The problem with this vehicle was its mechanical unsuitability for the Eastern Front (a problem that most French vehicles had when they were used there by the Germans). The poor roads and cold climate prevented the Panzerjäger 35R from being of any use on this front. The armor protection, especially the all around (but open-top) crew compartment, was still weak by the standards of 1942. While the later Marder series was also poorly protected, they had the benefit of longer range guns, which this vehicle did not have. In any case, the Panzerjäger 35R was surely a good way of increasing the effectiveness of the obsolete R35 tank, but was let down by its basis.

Source:

• T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2004) Panzer Tracts No7.1, Panzerjager.
• Major J. Bingham (1973) French Infantry Tanks: Part II, AFV weapons
• H. F. Duske, Panzerjager I, Nuts and Bolts
• W.J. Spielberger (1992) Beute-Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Deutschen Wehrmacht, Militärfahrzeuge.
• D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-Francuska, Beograd.
• P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
• D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
• A. Lüdeke (2007) Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon Books.
• S. Zaloga (2011) Armored attack 1944 U.S. Army tank combat in the European theater from D-day to the Battle of the Bulge, Stackpole Books.
• S.J. Zaloga (2014) French tanks of World War II (1), Osprey Publishing
• B. Adam, E. Miklos, S. Gyula (2006) A Magyar Királyi Honvédség külföldi gyártású páncélos harcjárművei 1920-1945, Petit Real

German Reich (1942)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 202 Converted

Even before the Second World War, the famous German tank commander Heinz Guderian had predicted the need for highly mobile self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, later known as Panzerjäger or Jagdpanzer (tank destroyer or hunter). However, in the early years of the war, beside the 4.7 cm PaK (t) (Sfl) auf Pz.Kpfw. I ohne turm, which was in essence just a 4.7 cm PaK (t) gun mounted on a modified Panzer I Ausf.B tank hull, the Germans did little to develop such vehicles. During the invasion of the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht encountered the T-34 and KV series tanks, which they had trouble dealing with effectively. Fortunately for the Germans, they also managed to capture large numbers of the 7.62 cm field gun (M1936) which had good anti-tank firepower. This gun was immediately put to use by the German ground forces, but mobility was an issue, so an idea appeared to install this gun on the Panzer II tank chassis in order to increase its mobility. The new vehicle belonged to a series of vehicles generally known today as the ‘Marder’ (Marten).

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History

During Operation Barbarossa, the Panzer Divisions were once again spearheading the German advance, as in the previous year in the West. Initially, the lighty protected early Soviet tanks (like the BT series and the T-26) proved to be easy prey for the advancing German Panzers. However, the Panzer crews were shocked to discover that their guns were mostly ineffective against the armor of the newer T-34, KV-1 and KV-2. German infantry units also discovered that their 3.7 cm PaK 36 towed anti-tank guns were of little use against these tanks. The stronger 5 cm PaK 38 towed anti-tank gun was only effective at shorter distances and it had not been produced in great numbers by that time. Luckily for the Germans, the new Soviet tanks were immature designs, plagued by inexperienced crews, a lack of spare parts, ammunition and poor operational use. Nevertheless, they played a significant role in slowing down and eventually stopping the German assault in late 1941. In North Africa, the Germans also faced increasing numbers of Matilda tanks, which also proved to be hard to knock out.

The experience gained during the first year of the invasion of the Soviet Union raised a red alert in the highest German military circles. One possible solution to this problem was the introduction of the new Rheinmetall 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun. This was first issued in very limited numbers at the end of 1941 and the start of 1942. While it would eventually become the standard German anti-tank gun used until the end of the war, its initial production was slow and thus a temporary solution was needed. During Operation Barbarossa, the German ground forces managed to capture large numbers of field guns of different calibers. One of the guns captured was the 76.2 mm M1936 (F-22) divisional gun. After a brief assessment of the characteristics of this gun, the Germans were satisfied with its performance. The gun was given to the army for use under the name Feldkanone (FK) 296(r). It was at first used as a field gun, but very soon it became clear that it possessed great anti-tank capabilities. For this reason, the 7.62 cm M1936 gun was modified for use as an anti-tank weapon. The changes involved adding a muzzle brake (but not all guns were equipped with it), cutting the gun shield in half (the upper part was welded to the lower part of the shield in a similar fashion to the PaK 40 two-part shield), rechambering the gun to 7.5 cm caliber in order to use the standard German ammunition (same as the PaK 40) and moving the elevating handwheel to the left side. After these changes, the gun was renamed 7.62 cm PaK 36(r), and remained in use throughout WWII.

In late December 1941, Wa Prüf 6 (the office of the German Army’s Ordnance Department responsible for designing tanks and other motorized vehicles) gave instructions to the Alkett firm to design a new Panzerjäger mounting the 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) on a modified Panzer II Flamm (which itself was based on the Panzer II Ausf.D and E) tank chassis. The Alkett designers and engineers threw themselves into the work of designing and building the first prototype. The prototype was built quickly, mainly due to its relatively simple construction. The Panzer II Flamm chassis was unchanged, but the majority of the superstructure (except for the front plate) and the turret were removed. On the back of the engine compartment a gun mount with the 7.62 cm PaK 36(r), which had an enlarged shield, was placed. Additionally, the front and the sides were protected by extended armored plates. Its armor was designed to protect against small-caliber fire and shrapnel. As its primary mission was to engage enemy tanks and to act as fire support at long range from carefully selected combat positions, thick armor was not necessary, at least in theory.

Panzer II Ausf.D and E

The first German tank that was produced in great numbers was the Panzer I. As it was armed with only two machine guns and was lightly protected, its combat potential was quite limited. For these reasons, the Panzer II was developed to overcome the many shortcomings of the previous Panzer I model. Its main armament consisted of one 20 mm cannon and one machine gun. The maximum armor protection was initially only 14.5 mm, but it would be increased to 35 mm and even to 80 mm on later versions.

During 1938, new versions of the Panzer II, the Ausf.D and E, were developed and adopted for service. They had the same armament and turret but with a modified superstructure and most importantly used a new torsion bar suspension which ran on four larger road wheels without any return rollers. While the Panzer II Ausf.D and E did see combat action in Poland, due to their poor suspension performance, less than 50 vehicles would be built.

In 1939, the German army was interested in the development of a flame-throwing Panzer to be used as an anti-bunker weapon. As the Panzer II Ausf.D and E were rejected from service, their chassis were chosen for this modification. The resulting vehicle was designated as the Panzer II Flamm Ausf.A und B, although today it is generally known as the ‘Flamingo’. By March 1942, around 150 had been produced, but their performance was deemed inadequate mostly due to weak armor and the poor performance of the flame projector system. As these Panzer II flamm were returned from the front lines and due to the high demand for mobile anti-tank vehicles, the Germans once again reused the chassis for this new role. Starting from April 1942, all available Panzer II flamm chassis would be reused for this purpose.

Name

During its service life, this self-propelled anti-tank gun was known under several different names. Upon its adoption on 1st April 1942, it was designated 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) auf Fgst. PzKpfw.II(F) (Sfl.). In June 1942, this was changed to Pz.Sfl.1 fuer 7.62 cm PaK 36 (Sd.Kfz.132); by September 1942, it had changed again to Pz.Sfl.1 (7.62 cm PaK 36) auf Fahrg.Pz.Kpfw.II Ausf.D1 und D2. In September 1943, a much simpler name was given: 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) auf Pz.Kpfw.II. The last change to the name was made on 18th March 1944, with the vehicle then being called Panzerjäger II fuer 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) (Sd.Kfz.132).

The Marder II name, by which it is best known today, was actually Adolf Hitler’s personal suggestion made at the end of November 1943. For the sake of simplicity, this article will use the Marder II designation. Care should be taken not to mistake this vehicle with the other Marder II, the Pz.Kpfw.II als Sfl. mit 7.5 cm PaK 40 ‘Marder II’ (Sd.Kfz.131).

Production

Due to the inadequate combat performance of the Panzer II flamm, the production of the second series of 150 vehicles was canceled. However, M.A.N (which was responsible for its production) was tasked with delivering these 150 chassis to Alkett for the construction of new Marder II vehicles. Alkett was ordered to produce the first 45 vehicles in April, followed by 75 in May and the last 30 in June 1942. Somewhat unusually for German production standards, all 150 vehicles were completed before the deadline, with 60 in April and the remaining 90 by mid-May.

Due to the availability of the Panzer II flamm chassis, a further order for 60 Marder II vehicles was placed. The completion of this production order was slow, as it was dependent on the available Panzer II flamm chassis. Only 52 Marder II would be completed this way, with 13 in June, 9 in July, 15 in September and 7 in October 1942. In 1943, 8 more Marder II vehicles would be built. These conversions would be carried out by Wegmann from Kassel.

It should be noted that the Marder II utilized both the Ausf.D1 and Ausf.D2 chassis. These had only minor differences, the main one being the drive sprocket, which had 11 spokes on the Ausf.D1 and 8 spokes on the Ausf.D2. It appears to be the case that all 150 of the new-build Marder IIs utilized the Ausf.D2 chassis, while those converted from older Panzer II flamm chassis were based upon the Ausf.D1 chassis.

The Design

Suspension

The suspension of the Marder II was the same as on the Panzer II Ausf.D and E. This version used a torsion bar suspension in contrast to the leaf spring suspension used on the majority of the Panzer IIs. In some sources (like Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch, Marder II), it is noted that the Marder II used the Christie type suspension system. This is false. The Christie suspension used large helical springs placed vertically or diagonally in the side of the hull, not torsion bars. The larger wheels had a diameter of 690 mm. There was also a front-drive sprocket and a rear positioned idler on each side, but no return rollers.

The engine

The Marder II was powered by a Maybach HL 62 TRM six-cylinder liquid-cooled engine positioned to the rear. This produced 140 hp @2600 rpm. The maximum speed with this engine was 55 km/h and the cross country speed was 20 km/h. The operational range was 200-220 km on good roads and 130-140 km cross country. The total fuel capacity for this vehicle was 200 liters. The Marder II crew compartment was separated from the engine by a 12 mm thick protective firewall.

Superstructure

The Marder II was built using the Panzer II Flamm chassis by simply removing the turret and most of the superstructure except for the front driver’s plate. Extended armor was added on top of the driver’s compartment and on the sides. These armored plates were slightly angled, for extra protection. To the rear, initially, a wire mesh frame was added, possibly to make the construction easier and to reduce weight. Its main purpose was to serve as a storage area for equipment and spent ammo cartridges. During the production run, this was replaced with armor plates. An extended armored shield was added around the gun, the design of which would be slightly changed during the production.

The Marder II was an open-top vehicle and, for this reason, a canvas cover was provided to protect the crew from bad weather. Of course, this offered no real protection during combat. It appears that some vehicles had a metal frame added to the gun compartment, possibly used to help hold down the canvas cover. Another possibility was that it served as an extra security measure for the crews lest they accidentally fall out of the vehicle. Due to the Panzer II’s relatively small size, the crew compartment was cramped and additional wooden storage boxes were often added by the crew for extra equipment.

Armor thickness

The armor thickness of the Marder II hull was relatively thin by the standards of 1942. The maximum front hull armor was 35 mm, while the sides and rear were only 14.5 mm thick and the bottom was 5 mm thick. The driver’s front armor plate was 35 mm thick. The new superstructure was also only lightly protected, with 14.5 mm thick front and side armor, and later rear armor too. The gun was protected by a standard armor shield which was extended to cover the sides. Spare tracks could be added on the front armor plate to act as extra protection, but in reality, this offered only a limited improvement.

The armament

The main gun chosen for the Marder II was the modified ex-Soviet 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) anti-tank gun. This gun, with its modified ‘T’ mount, was placed directly above the engine compartment. The elevation of the main gun was -5° to +16° and the traverse 25° to the left and to the right. The total ammunition load consisted of only 30 rounds, placed in ammunition bins located just below the gun, inside the Marder II hull. In order to relieve the stress on the elevation and traverse mechanisms during long drives, two travel locks were added, one at the front and one to the rear.

Secondary armament consisted of one 7.92 mm MG 34 machine gun with 900 rounds of ammunition and one 9 mm MP 38/40 submachine gun. While most 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) anti-tank guns were provided with a standard muzzle brake, there were a number of vehicles that did not have one. They were possibly either discarded by their crews, damaged or more likely never fitted due to the urgent need for such vehicles.

Crew members

The Marder II had a crew of four men, which, according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle in Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjager, consisted of the commander, gunner, loader, and the driver. Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch, in their Marder II book, mentions that the crew consisted of the commander, radio operator, loader, and driver. Taking T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle as the main source, it would mean that the commander was located in the vehicle’s hull, next to the driver, and he would also serve as the radio operator. On the other hand, according to Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch, the crew positioning would be different, with the commander serving as the gunner and placed left of the main gun.

While sources cite only four crew members, interestingly, Marder II photographs often show one more crew member present. This practice was initiated by field units emulating their Panzer cousins, as the extra crew member would help increase the vehicle’s overall performance by freeing up the commander from any other tasks.

The driver’s position was unchanged from the original Panzer II. He was positioned on the vehicle hull’s left side. On his right side was the radio operator. The radio equipment used was the FuG Spr d transmitter and receiver. For observing the surroundings, the crew positioned in the hull had two standard front vision ports. One of these two men would also have the task of releasing the forward travel lock. In addition, the crew positioned in the hull could also supply the gun operators with the ammunition rounds which were stored inside the hull.

In the rear gun compartment were the positions for the gunner and the loader. The gunner was positioned on the left and the loader to the right. The loader also operated the MG 34 used against enemy infantry and soft skin targets. To avoid being hit by enemy fire, crew in the gun compartment were sometimes provided with movable periscopes for observation. For crew communication, an internal telephone was used.

Organization and Distribution to Frontline Units

The Marder II was used to form 9 vehicle-strong anti-tank companies (Panzerjäger Kompanie). These were divided into 3 vehicle-strong platoons (Zuge). Each platoon was to have one Sd.Kfz.10 half-track, an ammunition carrier version of the Panzer I and two trailers for ammunition and supply deliveries. Of course, due to a general lack of such supply vehicles, it is likely that this was never truly implemented.

The Marder II companies would mostly be used to equip Infantry Divisions, Infantry Motorised Divisions, SS Divisions, Panzer Divisions and to reinforce some self-propelled anti-tank battalions (Panzerjäger-Abteilungen). Interestingly, despite the fact that each anti-tank company was meant to have 9 vehicles, some were instead only equipped with 6.

The following units were equipped with Marder II vehicles from 9th March 1942 onwards: the Großdeutschland Infantry Division, 18th, 10th, 16th, 29th and the 60th Infantry Motorised Divisions with 12 each, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division with 18 and the SS Panzer Division Wiking with 12 vehicles. By the time of the German 1942 campaign on the Eastern Front, nearly all available Marder II vehicles (145 in total) were ready for service. In July 1942, there were plans to equip the 14th and 16th Panzer Divisions with Marder I (based on captured French fully tracked chassis) vehicles. Due to logistical problems, these were instead each issued with 6 Marder II.

In Combat

The Marder II would see action mostly on the Eastern Front, with smaller numbers positioned in the West. The majority of produced Marder IIs would be used in the German advance toward the oil-rich Caucasus and Stalingrad. Due to the disastrous German losses suffered by the end of 1942, the majority of Marder II tank destroyers would be lost, either to enemy fire or just being abandoned due to a lack of fuel or spare parts.

Due to extensive losses suffered the previous year, there were only small numbers available during the Battle of Kursk (Operation Zidatelle) in June of 1943. The units that still possessed operational Marder IIs were the 31st Infantry Division with 4, 4th and 6th Panzer Divisions with 1 each, the 525th self-propelled anti-tank battalion with 4, the 150th self-propelled anti-tank battalion with 3 (1 in repair), the 16th Panzer Grenadier Division with 7 and the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler Division and the SS Panzer Division Wiking with 1 vehicle each. In total, there were only 23 vehicles left on the Eastern Front. In the West, there were 7 vehicles with 1 in repair, operated by the Ersatz und Ausbildungs Regiment H.G., a training unit that was positioned in Holland.

By August 1944, there were only two units equipped with the Marder II. These were the 1st self-propelled anti-tank battalion with 10 and the 8th self-propelled anti-tank battalion with 5 vehicles. By March 1945, the number of Marder IIs had dropped to only 6 vehicles.

While having weak armor, thanks to its gun, the Marder II could destroy any Soviet tank in 1942/43 with little problem. The effectiveness of the Marder II’s 7.62 cm gun was demonstrated by the 661st self-propelled anti-tank battalion, which, by mid-July 1942, claimed to have destroyed 17 Soviet tanks (4 KV-1, 11 T-34 and 2 Valentine Mark II). The 559th self-propelled anti-tank battalion reported similar successes (up to mid-July 1942), with 17 T-34, 4 KV-1 and 1 tank marked only as a T 8 (possibly a misprint) for the loss of only one Marder II. This unit also gave reports about the distances from which the Soviet tanks were destroyed. The T-34 were mainly engaged at ranges from 600 to 1000 meters, with the 7.62 cm gun having no problem penetrating the armor of this tank. Two T-34s were destroyed by side hits at ranges of 1.3 to 1.4 km. One KV-1 was reportedly destroyed when hit from the side at a range of 1.3 km. It is important to note that, due to the Marder II’s low ammunition storage, shooting at enemy tanks at distances greater than 1 km was generally avoided by the crews.

Operational Experience

The Marder II’s general combat performance can be seen in a report made in July 1942 by the 661st self-propelled anti-tank battalion. In this report, the effectiveness of the 7.62 cm gun was deemed satisfactory as it was able to destroy a KV-1 from ranges of 1.2 to 1.4 km. The high-explosive rounds were also effective against enemy machine gun nests and even against earthen bunkers. However, firing the gun could create large dust clouds which made finding targets difficult. The Marder II was provided with two travel locks. While the rear one performed well, the front one was prone to malfunctions.

Cooperation with infantry formations proved to be problematic. The infantry commanders would often call for the Marder II to engage enemy tanks offensively in unfavorable situations, for example if the enemy tanks were dug in or on higher ground. The Marder IIs were not infantry support vehicles like the StuG III and thus should not have been used in this kind of combat.

The vehicle’s great height was a huge issue for the Marder II, as it was difficult to camouflage and was an easy target for enemy gunners. Interestingly, on some vehicles, the gun sunk down a bit, meaning that the gun could not be traversed. To solve this problem, a few millimeters of the side armor had to be cut off. The low ammunition load and the lack of more mobile machine gun mounts were another issue. The gas pedals were too weak and prone to malfunctions, so spare gas pedals were in great demand. Radio equipment was also of poor quality and improved models were requested. The Marder II also lacked space for the storage of spare parts and other equipment. Ingenious crews would often add wooden boxes to the rear. The lack of a command vehicle for the company commander was deemed problematic. Adding a fifth crew member to direct the operational employment was proven to have merit.

Conclusion

The Marder II tank destroyer was an attempt to solve the problem of the low mobility of towed anti-tank guns but, unfortunately for the Germans, it failed in many other aspects. The low armor thickness coupled with its large silhouette meant that, while it could engage enemy tanks at range, any kind of return fire would likely mean the destruction of this vehicle. The small ammunition load was also problematic for its crew. Even so, while the Marder II vehicles were not perfect, they gave the Germans a means to increase the mobility of the effective 7.62 cm anti-tank gun, thus giving them a chance to fight back against the numerous enemy armored formations.

Marder II, early type vehicle , Afrika Korps Abteilung, Libya, fall 1942.

Marder II Ausf.D-1, Russia, fall 1942.

Marder II Ausf.E, Russia, fall 1942.

Panzer Selbstfahrlafette 1 für 7.62 cm Pak 36(r) Ausf.D-2, Kursk, summer 1943.

Sources

D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2005) Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjager
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2010) Panzer Tracts No.2-3 Panzerkampwagen II Ausf.D, E and F
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2011) Panzer Tracts No.23 Panzer Production
A. Lüdeke (2007) Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon books
P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
G. Parada, W. Styrna and S. Jablonski (2002), Marder III, Kagero
W.J. Gawrych Marder II, Armor PhotoGallery
Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch (2004) Marder II, Militaria.
W.J.K. Davies (1979) Panzerjager, German anti-tank battalions of World War Two, Almark
W. Oswald (2004) Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer, Motorbuch Verlag.
R. Hutchins (2005) Tanks and other fighting vehicles, Bounty Book.

German Reich (1942)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 531-576 Built + 68-75 Converted + 10 Field Conversions

Even before the Second World War, the famous German tank commander Heinz Guderian had predicted the need for highly mobile self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, later known as Panzerjäger or Jagdpanzer (tank destroyer or hunter). However, in the early years of the war, beside the 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl) auf Pz.Kpfw. I ohne turm, which was in essence just a 4.7 cm PaK(t) gun mounted on a modified Panzer I Ausf.B tank hull, the Germans did little to develop such vehicles. During the Invasion of the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht encountered tanks which they had trouble dealing with effectively (T-34 and KV series) and were forced to introduce a number of different hastily built and developed Panzerjäger based on any chassis that was available. From this, a series of vehicles generally known today as the ‘Marder’ (Marten) was created.

History

During Operation Barbarossa, the Panzer Divisions were once again spearheading the German advance, as in the previous year in the West. Initially, the lightly protected Soviet early tanks (like the BT series and the T-26) proved to be easy prey for the advancing German Panzers. However, the Panzer crews were shocked to discover that their guns were mostly ineffective against the armor of the newer T-34, the KV-1 and KV-2. German infantry units also discovered that their 3.7 cm PaK 36 anti-tank towed guns were of little use against these. The stronger 5 cm PaK 38 towed anti-tank gun was only effective at shorter distances and it had not been produced in great numbers by that time. Luckily for the Germans, the new Soviets tanks were immature designs, plagued by inexperienced crews, a lack of spare parts, ammunition and poor operational use. Nevertheless, they played a significant role in slowing down and eventually stopping the German assault in late 1941. In North Africa, the Germans also faced increasing numbers of Matilda tanks which also proved to be hard to knock out.

The experience gained during the first year of the invasion of the Soviet Union raised a red alert in the highest German military circles. One possible solution to this problem was the introduction of the new Rheinmetall 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun. It was first issued in very limited numbers at the end of 1941 and the start of 1942. It became the standard German anti-tank gun used until the end of the war, with some 20,000 guns being built. It was an excellent anti-tank gun, but the main problem with it was its heavy weight, making it somewhat difficult to deploy and hard to manhandle.

The solution to this problem was to mount the PaK 40 on available tank chassis. These new Panzerjäger vehicles followed the same pattern: most were open-topped, with limited gun traverse, and thin armor. Notwithstanding these limitations, they were armed with an effective anti-tank gun, and usually with one machine gun. They were also cheap and easy to build. Panzerjägers were, in essence, improvised and temporary solutions, but effective ones nevertheless. Just as the name suggests (Panzerjäger means “tank hunter” in English), they were designed to engage enemy tanks at long ranges on open fields. Their primary mission was to engage enemy tanks and to act as fire support at long range from carefully selected combat positions, usually on the flanks. This mentality led to a series of such vehicles named Marder that was developed using many different armored vehicles as a basis.

The first series of Marder vehicles was based on captured French armored vehicles. The second series of the Marder II would be produced using the Panzer II tank chassis. The first steps in the Marder II development were undertaken by the Minister of Armament, Albert Speer. On 13th May 1942, he informed Adolf Hitler about the current state of Panzer II production and the possibility of using this tank for the purpose of an anti-tank modification. Hitler was generally interested in this modification and gave a green light for its implementation. Several days later, Speer, with the approval of Hitler, gave instructions to the OKH (German Army High Command) to modify a Panzer II Ausf.F by arming it with the 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun (order 6772/42). There was also a second version of the Marder II development earlier in April, but this version was based on the Panzer Ausf.D chassis and armed with the captured Soviet 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) guns.

After a brief period of consideration, Wa Pruef 6 (the office of the German Army’s Ordnance Department responsible for designing tanks and other motorized vehicles) officials chose Rheinmetall-Borsig, Alkett and M.A.N for this task. Rheinmetall-Borsig was charged with adapting the main gun, Alkett with constructing and designing the main superstructure and M.A.N was responsible for modifying the Panzer II chassis. The prototype was to be built by mid-June 1942. On 20th June 1942, a prototype vehicle was presented to the OKH, which proved to be satisfactory and thus it was adopted for production.

Panzer II

The first German tank that was produced in great numbers was the Panzer I. As it was armed only with two machine guns and was lightly protected, its combat potential was quite limited. For these reasons, the Panzer II was developed to overcome the many shortcomings of the previous Panzer I model. Its main armament consisted of one 20 mm main gun and one machine gun. The maximum armor protection was initially only 14.5 mm, but it would be increased to 35 mm and even to 80 mm on later versions. It would be produced in several versions with some differences like armor thickness and different suspension, but the armament would remain mostly the same. While its own combat potential was not that great, it was nevertheless used in great numbers (some 1067 were ready in July 1941), as the Germans were still struggling to mass-produce the better Panzer III and IV. By 1942, due to attrition and obsolescence, Panzer II numbers began to dwindle and the surviving vehicles were allocated to be reused for other purposes, most notably for the Marder II and Wespe self-propelled gun.

Name

During its service life, this self-propelled anti-tank gun was known under several different names. On 20th June 1942, it was known as the Pz.Kpfw.II als Sfl. mit 7.5 cm PaK 40. Sfl stands for ‘Selbstfahrlafette’, which can be translated as ‘self-propelled’. The next month, this was changed to 7.5 cm PaK 40 auf Fahrgest.Pz.Kpfw.II. In December 1942, this became 7.5 cm PaK 40/2 auf. Sfl.II. In July 1943, it was known as Panzerjäger II 7.5 cm PaK 40/2 (Sd.Kfz.131). The Marder II name, by which it is best known today, was actually Adolf Hitler’s personal suggestion made at the end of November 1943. In March 1944, the name was changed to Panzerjäger. II für 7.5 cm PaK 40/2 (Sd.Kfz.131). For the sake of simplicity, this article will use the Marder II designation.

Production

For the production of the Marder II, FAMO (Fahrzeug und Motorenwerke GmbH) factories located in Breslau and Warsaw were chosen. According to Panzer-Programm II Plan 14 (dated from the 11th July 1942), the production of the Marder II would commence in July with 30 vehicles. This would then be followed up by 50 in August and September, 57 in October and November, 67 in December, January and February and the last 68 in March 1943. Actual production numbers were much different: 18 in July 1942, 50 in August, 55 in September, 59 in October, 62 in November, 83 in December, 80 in January 1943 and 45 in February. After this, the ‘Wespe’ self-propelled artillery version also based on the Panzer II chassis received a higher priority and was produced on the same lines. In addition, there was a decision to increase the production of Marder III vehicles based on the Panzer 38(t). For these reasons, the production of Marder II was delayed by a few months. Production resumed in May at a reduced pace with 46 being built and with the last 33 being completed in June 1943.

As the Panzer II was considered obsolete by 1942, the Škoda, FAMO and M.A.N companies were contracted to convert any available vehicle (even older versions) into the Marder II. The conversion could be relatively easily carried out by simply removing the Panzer II turret and superstructure. How many were actually built this way is hard to say. The first converted vehicles were not recorded in these registries, as these were included in the standard monthly production. It appears that, from June 1943 to January 1944, less than 68 Panzer IIs were thus converted.

Interestingly, a small number of Marder II were actually built by front units. In late September 1942, the 4th Panzer Division tried to convert three Panzer II into Marder II, but due to lack of main guns, it was not possible. The 12th Panzer Division had more luck and, in June 1943, it transferred 10 Panzer II to the Pz.Inst.Abt. 559 station in the area of Smolensk to be rebuilt in the Marder II configuration.

Some 531 new Marder II tank destroyers were produced, 68 were converted from older vehicles and at least 10 were field conversions. In total, according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjäger), some 609 Marder II were built by FAMO, M.A.N., Daimler-Benz and Škoda.

The number of 531 newly built Marder IIs is also supported by Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch (Marder II, Militaria), but they state that 75 vehicles were converted. Other sources, like D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka) or D. Doyle (German military Vehicles) mention that 576 new vehicles and 75 converted vehicles were built.

Design

Suspension

The suspension of the Marder II was visually the same as on the Panzer II. It consisted of five large 550 x 98x 455 mm road wheels (on each side) which had rubber rims. Above each wheel, on a rocker arm, a quarter elliptical leaf spring unit with a movable roller was placed. The added gun, ammunition, armor and other changes lead to an increase of weight from 9.5 to 11 tonnes. To successfully cope with this extra weight, the Panzer II suspension was additionally strengthened by widening the leaf springs above the wheels. In addition, vertical volute shock absorbers were added on the first, second, and last road wheels on each side. There was also a front drive sprocket (with a diameter of 755 mm), a rear positioned idler (650 mm diameter) and four return rollers (220 mm x 105 mm) on each side. The track had a width of 300 mm with a length of 2400 mm. The total track weight was 400 kg.

Engine

The Marder II engine and its positioning were the same as on the Panzer II Ausf.F. The Maybach HL 62 TR 6-cylinder water-cooled engine giving 140 [email protected] rpm was located in the rear of the vehicle’s hull. The driveshaft went from the engine through the right side of the crew compartment and was connected to the forward-mounted transmission system. The maximum speed with this engine was 40 km/h and the cross country speed was 20 km/h. The operational range was 190 km on good roads and 125 km cross country. The total fuel capacity for this vehicle was 170 liters stored in two fuel tanks (102 + 68). The Marder II crew compartment was separated from the engine by a 12 mm thick protective firewall.

Superstructure

The Marder II was built using Panzer II Ausf.F (with smaller numbers of older versions) chassis by simply removing the turret and most of the superstructure except for the driver’s compartment. On top of the driver’s compartment, a specially designed mount for the main gun was welded to the hull. Around the gun, an armored superstructure with a relatively simple design was added for the crew protection. These armored plates were slightly angled, but the armor thickness was quite low. The Marder II was an open-top vehicle and, for this reason, a canvas cover was provided to protect the crew from bad weather. Of course, this offered no real protection during combat. Due to the Panzer II’s relatively small size, the crew compartment was cramped. To avoid being hit by enemy fire, the crews were sometimes provided with movable periscopes for observation. Extra equipment like shovels, cables, and spare tracks were usually stored outside the superstructure. Additional storage wooden boxes were often added by the crew for extra equipment.

Armor

The armor thickness of the Marder II hull was relatively thin by the standards of 1942. The front hull armor was 35 mm, sides and rear were only 15 mm and the bottom was 10 mm thick. The driver’s front armor plate was 35 cm thick. The new superstructure was also only lightly protected, with a 10 mm thick front and side armor. The gun was protected by a standard armor shield which consisted of two 4 mm thick separated armored plates.

Armament

The main gun chosen for the Marder II was the standard 7.5 cm PaK 40/2 L/46. This gun, with its modified mount, was placed directly on the left side of the Panzer II hull. This was done in order to provide the loader with more working space. The elevation of the main gun was -8° to +10° and the traverse 32° to the left and 25° to the right. The total ammunition load consisted of 37 rounds placed in three ammunition bins located above the engine compartment. The largest, with 24 rounds, was placed on the left side. In the middle, there was space for 7 and the last 6 were in the right ammunition bin. In order to relieve the stress on the elevation and traverse mechanisms during long drives, two travel locks were added, one at the front to support the barrel and one in the crew compartment. Secondary armament consisted of one 7.92 mm MG 34 machine gun with 600 rounds of ammunition and one 9 mm MP 38/40 submachine gun.

Crew

The Marder II had a crew of three men, which consisted of the commander/gunner, loader and the driver/radio operator, according to the T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjager). Other sources, for example W.J.K. Davies (Panzerjager, German anti-tank battalions of World War Two), give a number of four crew members. W. Oswald (Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer) also noted that the crew count was four. Author R. Hutchins (Tanks and Other Fighting Vehicles) mentions that the Marder II could have 3 or 4 crew members. The reason why authors state different numbers of crew members is not clear. To complicate matters further, photographs of the Marder II with both two and three crew members in the rear fighting compartment exist (besides the driver, who was in his own compartment at the front).

The driver’s position was unchanged from the original Panzer II. He was the only crew member that was fully protected. The driver was positioned on the vehicle hull’s left side. For observing the surroundings, he was provided with a standard front vision port with two additional smaller ones on each side. The driver could close the visor in combat situations. In this case, he could use the small twin periscope (type K.F.F.2) for observation. This periscope was completely removed from January 1943 on.

Some vehicles were provided with a dummy front visor which was added right of the driver. Its purpose was to fool enemy gunners. The driver could enter his position from the crew compartment or through a small rectangular hatch door in front of him.

The driver was also the radio operator but, according to authors Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch (Marder II, Militaria), this task was reassigned to the gunner during the war. The Marder II was provided with a transmitter and receiver radio set and, in addition, with an intercom set. The last but maybe the most important task of the driver was to manually release the forward travel lock. In an unexpected combat situation, this would mean that he had to expose himself to potential enemy fire. For driving at night, initially, two front-mounted headlights were used. Later in production, only one was kept. The commander, who was also the gunner if the crew was only composed of 3 soldiers, was positioned to the left of the main gun. To his right was the loader. The loader also operated the MG 34 used against enemy infantry and soft skin targets. The commander and the driver communicated by using an internal telephone.

Organization

Initially, the Marder II was used to equip smaller 9 vehicle-strong anti-tank companies (Panzerjäger Kompanie). These were divided into 3 vehicle-strong platoons (Zuge). By the end of 1942, the number of vehicles per company had increased by one more vehicle. The single added vehicle was used as a command unit (Gruppe Führer) which was also usually accompanied by a command vehicle based on an obsolete Panzer I. This was the case for normal companies attached to Infantry or Panzer Divisions.
In addition, independent army anti-tank battalions (Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilungen) were formed with 13 vehicles per company, which consisted of one command vehicle and three platoons with four vehicles each.

In June 1943, the anti-tank company’s size was increased to 14, with two vehicles given to the command platoon and four vehicles to each platoon. At the same time, the independent army anti-tank battalions received one more command vehicle and the overall strength was to reach 45 operational vehicles in theory. Of course, in reality, due to high demand, insufficient numbers built, and combat losses these numbers were never fully achieved. Due to increased losses and as more advanced anti-tank vehicles were introduced for service, the surviving Marder IIs were mostly allocated to Infantry and Grenadier Divisions in the later stages of the war.

Distribution to the Units

With the production of first Marder II, the OKH ordered the formation of the first anti-tank companies which were to be given to the 3rd, 9th, 13th and 24th Panzer Divisions during the period of July to August 1942. These plans would not materialize as planned and there were some delays in deliveries. Possibly due to lack of 7.5 cm armed Marder II, the 13th Panzer Division was instead supplied with six 7.62 cm armed Marder II vehicles based on Panzer II Ausf.D/E chassis. The 3rd Panzer Division received nine Marder II vehicles in August and three the following month. The 24th Panzer Division did not receive its promised Marder II vehicles until September.

Due to critical situations and high demand for effective anti-tank vehicles in mid-August 1942, a group of 72 Marder Is and IIs were allocated to the Heeresgruppe Mitte on the Eastern Front and distributed to various Infantry and Panzer Divisions. In October 1942, the OKH planned to increase the number of Marder IIs on the Eastern Front by creating four new 36-vehicle strong anti-tank battalions: the 521st, 559th, 611th and 670th. These units were to be formed by the end of 1942. The Soviet counteroffensive around Stalingrad stopped these plans. The Germans were forced to send all available Marder vehicles to reinforce as many SS and Panzer Divisions as possible. This decision meant that Marder II vehicles had to be sent in smaller numbers to equip as many units as possible, which diminished the effectiveness of the units equipped with them. For example, the SS Totenkopf Division had 9 Marder II, 6th Panzer Division had 10, 11th Panzer Division had 10, 17th Panzer Division had 6 and 20th Panzer Division had 13. Some Infantry Divisions were also supplied with Marder II vehicles, like the 206th, 306th and 336th.

During 1943, some fourteen Infantry and Panzer Divisions were supplied with Marder II vehicles, with numbers ranging from 1 to 14 per unit, some probably being reinforcements or replacements for lost vehicles. For example, just one Marder II was given to the 306th Infantry Division in June, 3 were given to the 17th Panzer Division and 14 to the 5th Panzer Division.

Interestingly, the 4th Panzer Division used 18 Marder IIs (out of their 27) to equip the 1st Abteilung of the 35th Panzer Regiment in February 1943. This was done due to a lack of Panzer IVs armed with the longer barreled gun. These Marder IIs would finally be replaced with Panzer IVs in May 1943.

Combat Experience

A report made by the 4th Panzer Division’s 49th anti-tank battalion, based on the experience gained while serving on the Eastern Front, gives a good insight into the Marder II’s general performance.

The main gun was described as having good stability during firing and was capable of penetrating the T-34 hull and turret armor without a problem. There were cases of penetrating the T-34’s turret side armor at a range of 1200 m, along with another case of destroying an American-supplied Lee tank at the same range.

On the negative side, the average rate of fire was only 5 rounds per minute due to the large size of the ammunition and the rear-positioned storage bin. In addition, firing more than 5 rounds caused the accumulation of a smoke cloud in front of the vehicle. Additional problems were the poor quality of the muzzle brake assembly which usually became loose after only 8 to 10 shots. The ammunition load was also noted to be insufficient. In combat situations, this load could be quite quickly spent. In that case, due to a lack of ammunition vehicles, the Marder II had to return to the rear. The recoil during firing the gun would sometimes cause the internal or external spare parts to knock away and the large number of damaged periscopes meant that spare periscopes were in high demand. A huge problem was the lack of armored or even soft skin ammunition and supply carriers.

The armor was weak overall and provided the crew with minimal forward and side protection. The canvas cover was also noted to be of poor quality and was not efficiently protecting the crew and more importantly the onboard equipment (radio etc.) from the weather, which could lead to its malfunctioning. For operations on the Eastern Front, where the weather was quite harsh, this was an important point.

Radio equipment problems were also noted. The main reason for the malfunctions of the radio equipment was the breaking of the sensitive vacuum tubes and other parts due to the strong gun recoil or simply by moving on uneven terrain. The range of the onboard radios was also noted to be insufficient and the installation of the Fu 5 sets was more desirable.

The increase of weight caused some problems with the engine overheating. Another issue was the lack of spare parts for the leaf spring units. The problem with the inadequate command vehicles based on the Panzer I was also noted.

In combat, it was often a practice (albeit unpopular among the Marder II crews) for the local commander to ask for the Marder IIs to be dispersed and used piecemeal in support of the infantry. This tactic was dangerous for the vehicle, as the tank destroyers functioned best working together to destroy enemy vehicles and provide mutual cover. Providing close fire support for infantry was the job of the StuG vehicles which were designed for this role. When used in the infantry support role, the Marder II would stay behind in a well-selected position and provide long-range fire against enemy armor only. It was open-topped, with thin armor and any close engagement could easily lead to losses. The Marder II, despite having a range of 2000 m, could not be used as an artillery weapon due to the small ammunition load which could be quickly expended.

When enemy vehicles were spotted, a Panzerjäger Kompanie’s primary duty was to engage them with any available vehicle. Despite the fact that the 7.5 cm gun could destroy Soviet tanks at great ranges, shooting at distances greater than 1 km was generally to be avoided due to the reduced chance of hitting the enemy and the small ammunition loads. During an attack, the job of the Marder II was to support the Panzers with covering fire from the flanks. It was also a practice for Panzer units to attach a number of light tanks to the Marder II units to act as a defence against possible enemy infantry counter-attacks. In addition, during such operations, attaching infantry support to the Marder IIs was also noted to be important.

When supporting defensive operations, the report mentions that Marder II should not be used as a normal anti-tank gun in a static defensive position. The commander of each company was tasked, in this situation, to make a detailed scouting of the position and indicate the possible directions from which the enemy tanks were likely to attack from. Once these were identified, the Marder IIs were to be used as a mobile reserve. If this was not done by regulation and the Marder IIs were put in front in a static defensive position, there was a huge chance that the enemy would detect them and destroy them from range.

Use in Combat

Unfortunately, for unknown reasons, the sources do not provide precise information about the Marder II during combat operations. While over six hundred were built, the majority would be used on the Eastern front, with smaller numbers on the remaining fronts. During the German attack in the Kursk area, the Marder II distribution was as followed: Heeres Gruppe A had 25 operational vehicles, Heeres Gruppe Sud had 113 operational with 4 in repair, Heeres Gruppe Mitte had 172 operational with 5 in repair, and Heeres Gruppe Nord had 74 operational vehicles. By the end of 1943, the number of operational Marder II was reduced for Heeres Gruppe A to 9 vehicles, Heeres Gruppe Sud to 76 with 43 operational, Heeres Gruppe Mitte to 81 with 62 operational, and Heeres Gruppe Nord had 30 operational vehicles.

Smaller number of vehicles also found their way to the Western Front, with 8 vehicles being positioned in Denmark, 15 in France and 20 in the Netherlands. Smaller numbers were also used in Italy and North Africa.

5 cm PaK 38 Marder II

Interestingly, beside the Marder II armed with the powerful 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun, there was also a version armed with the weaker 5 cm PaK 38 anti-tank gun. Sources disagree on whether this was a simple field conversion, a limited production series or a prototype vehicle. According to authors Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch (Marder II, Militaria), a small series of 30 to 50 such vehicles was built in 1944. These vehicles were used on the Eastern Front. According to internet sources, only one field-built vehicle was made and used by Panzerjäger Abteilung 128 of the 23rd Panzer Division. Authors G. Parada, W. Styrna and S. Jablonski (Marder III, Kagero) note that the 5 cm armed version was built in small numbers due to the lack of stronger 7.5 cm guns.

Night Hunter Version

During 1943, at least one Marder II was used to test the Zielgeraet 1221 night vision equipment. This conversion and testing were carried out at the Army School at Fallingbostel. The night vision equipment consisted of one 500 W infrared reflector that illuminated possible targets with a beam of infrared radiation. The illuminated targets would then be observed by a ZG 1221 electro-optical converter. This system had an effective range of about 600 m. For the needed extra power, a GC 400 electric generator with a HS5F power supply unit was added. Whether this equipment was ever used in combat on a Marder II is unclear.

Hungarian Marder II

In June 1941, the Hungarians joined their German allies during the Invasion of the Soviet Union. By 1942, their armored formations were decimated by the Soviet T-34 and KV tanks. The Hungarians mostly fielded 37 to 40 mm gun-armed tanks (Turan I and 38M Toldi), which were of limited utility against the Soviet medium and heavy tanks. To help their desperate allies, during late 1941 and early 1942, the Germans provided them with 102 Panzer 38(t) and a smaller number of Panzer IV vehicles. In December 1942, five Marder II vehicles were also supplied.

These Marder II tank destroyers saw action against Soviet forces with some success. By 9th February 1943, due to extensive combat with the Soviets, only two Marder II vehicles were still operational. These vehicles would be returned to the Germans in the summer 1943. The Hungarians tried to build their own self-propelled anti-tank vehicle inspired by the Marder II. This vehicle was based on the Toldi I tank and armed with a German 7.5 cm PaK 40, but only one prototype was ever built.

Surviving vehicles

Today, there are four surviving Marder II vehicles, with one at the National Armor and Cavalry Museum, Fort Benning (USA), one in Kubinka (Russia) and one at the Arsenalen Tank Museum Strängnäs (Sweden). Another Marder II that was in the US was given to the German Auto und Technik Museum in Sinsheim in 1989. The Swedish Marder II was acquired from Denmark late 1945 for evaluation.

Conclusion

The Marder II tank destroyer was an attempt to solve the problem of the low mobility of towed anti-tank guns, but it failed in many other aspects. The low armor thickness meant that, while it could engage enemy tanks at range, any kind of return fire would likely mean the destruction of this vehicle. The small ammunition load was also problematic for its crew. Even so, while the Marder II vehicles were not perfect, they gave the Germans a means to increase the mobility of the effective PaK 40 anti-tank gun, thus giving them a chance to fight back against the numerous enemy armored formations.

The famous “Kohlenkau”, 3/Pz.jg.Abt.561, Geschützfuhrer Uffz. Helmuth Kohlke, Russia, February 1943.

Marder II Ausf.C, Afrika Korps, Tunisia, 1943.

Marder II from the Panzejäger Abteilung 50, 9th Panzerdivision, Russia, winter 1942-1943.

Marder II Ausf.F from the Pz.jg.Abt.40 attached to the 24th Panzerdivision, Russia, 1944.

Hungarian Marder II Ausf.F, late 1944.

These illustrations were produced by Tank Encyclopedia’s own David Bocquelet

Sources

D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2005) Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjager
A. Lüdeke (2007) Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon books
P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
C. Bescze (2007) Magyar Steel Hungarian Armour in WW II, STRATUS
G. Parada, W. Styrna and S. Jablonski (2002), Marder III, Kagero
W.J. Gawrych Marder II, Armor PhotoGallery
Z. Borawski and J. Ledwoch (2004) Marder II, Militaria.
W.J.K. Davies (1979) Panzerjager, German anti-tank battalions of World War Two, Almark
W. Oswald (2004) Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer, Motorbuch Verlag.
R. Hutchins (2005) Tanks and other fighting vehicles, Bounty Book.

German Reich (1943-1945)
Tank Destroyer – 74 Built

The Jagdtiger was the heaviest armored vehicle to see service in World War Two, yet paradoxically, the vehicle has remained somewhat enigmatic with confusion over its development, production and role. The design process started out with a demand for a heavy assault gun back in 1942 when the war was still in Germany’s favor and the army needed a heavily armored and armed vehicle to smash enemy fortifications. However, by the time the Jagdtiger, based on the Tiger II tank, came along two years later, the original need for the vehicle had vanished and it was put to work as a heavy tank destroyer instead. Despite its huge size, impressive armor and powerful main gun, the Jagdtiger failed to live up to expectations.

Tank Destroyer or Assault Gun

The majority of people looking at the Jagdtiger (English: ‘Hunting Tiger’) would conclude that the use of the vehicle, the ‘hunting’ part of its name and the shape of it would undoubtedly make it a tank destroyer. Nonetheless, it was actually originally conceived as an assault gun to support the infantry. The combination of heavy armor and a powerful cannon equally adept at penetrating enemy strong points, delivering high explosive, and defeating enemy armored vehicles was the priority, with the speed seen as less important. The range of fire of the Jagdtiger’s 12.8 cm gun could classify the vehicle as a self-propelled gun (indirect fire capability had been an original requirement but was subsequently dropped), and the confusion over name and role resulted in an argument within the German military over who controlled them. If the vehicle was designated as a Sturmgeschütz (Eng. Assault Gun), it would belong to the artillery but, if it was designated as a Panzerjäger (Eng. Tank Destroyer), it would belong to the tank destroyers. The StuG. argument was bolstered by Hitler and the Inspector-General of the Panzer Troops in late March 1944. On 13th July 1944, the squabble over the name was seemingly put to rest by Heinz Guderian, Chief of the Army General Staff (who was also the General of Artillery), when he listed the vehicle as “Panzerjäger with 12.8cm Pak. L/55 on Tiger II chassis” or ‘Jagdtiger’.

The Call For a 12.8 cm Gun

As far back as spring 1942, the German Army General Staff were requesting a 12.8 cm gun mounted on a self-propelled chassis as a ‘heavy assault gun’ capable of both supporting the infantry against armored targets (such as tanks and bunkers) as well as unarmored ones. By May 1942, Hitler was ordering a rifled anti-tank gun of that caliber and, in a letter from Wa Pruef 4 (German design office for artillery) to Friedrich Krupp of Essen on 2nd February 1943, the 12.8 cm Jagdpanzer concept was born. The letter set out the idea of mounting of a 12.8 cm Stu.K. (Sturm Kanone – Assault gun) on a modified Tiger H3. The ‘Tiger H3’ concerned was the Tiger II, which was not named as such until March 1943, following the abandonment of the the VK45.02(H) project, which was known at the time as Tiger II.

The requirements for the modifications meant moving the engine forwards on the chassis with the firm of Henschel und Sohn of Kassel responsible for that part of the project. The 12.8 cm gun in question was at the time intended to be taken, along with the gun gear such as brake and recuperator, completely unchanged from the Pz.Kpfw.VIII Maus – the 12.8 cm Kw.K. L/55 (Kw.K. – Kampfwagen Kanone – Fighting vehicle gun). Strong emphasis was also placed on the removal of the muzzle brake as this allowed the use of Treibspiegel (Sabot) shells for heavy anti-armor work. Developed by Krupp as the Treibspiegel-Geschoss mit H-Kern for the 12.8 cm gun on the Maus, these were high-velocity shells with a sub-calibre core made from an 8.8 cm Pz.Gr.40. Travelling at about 1,260 m/s, they were estimated to be able to penetrate 245 mm of armor at 30 degrees from 1,000 metres away. Although this shell was not developed to the point of service and issue for the Jagdtiger, the result was that the 12.8 cm gun could not have a muzzle brake for this would have adversely affected the sabot coming off the core as it left the barrel. Not using a brake, however, meant a lot more recoil energy needed to be dealt with on the mountings for the gun.

From Early Work to the Prototype

By the end of March 1943, the chassis destined for this 12.8 cm gun was going to be either from the Panther or Tiger II. A mockup was prepared on the hull of a Panther, but this was quickly discarded as being unsuitable. Drawings from Henschel for the alternative design on a Tiger II chassis were therefore to be ready by June 1943 and, initially, Dr. Erwin Aders (design lead at Henschel) was considering armor for the design to be up to 200 mm thick on the front and up to 100 mm on the sides, although this was to be subject to change in order to keep the weight to 70-tonnes or less.

Rival Tigerjäger Designs

On 12th April 1943, Henschel presented two designs for the vehicle which was being referred to as the Tigerjäger. The first design (Design A) disregarded the plan to move the engine to the front and kept the engine at the back, but even so, the hull still had to be lengthened by 300 mm. The frontal armor for this vehicle is described by Spielberger, Jentz, and Doyle (2007) as being 150 mm at 40 degrees and 200 mm thick on the 60 degree sloping part. The side armor had been reduced though, from the 100 mm desired in March to 80 mm in order to keep the weight down.

The width of the fighting compartment for the tank had been reduced too by 40 mm, as it would otherwise be too large to be shipped by rail. With an agreement on 14th April on the new design of the gun and the adoption of two-piece ammunition which simplified stowage, the whole gun and mounting could be moved 200 mm further back on the hull thus improving the center of gravity and taking off a lot of the load on the front wheels. Reducing the rail profile and keeping the heavy armor meant the movement of the gun was slightly restricted and reduced the depression available by 1 degree (from -8 to -7). A final modification was the lowering of the driver’s seat by 100 mm which lowered the plate over his head. This cover was designed to be a large plate encompassing both of the forward crew hatches (driver and radio operator) and was removable by a series of set-screws attaching it to the roof plate of the lower hull, allowing for the transmission to be removed. “This design choice was in response to lessons learned on the Tiger I and VK45.02(H) projects”. Neither of these had a removable cover and extracting the transmission for repairs involved first lifting the turret out of the hull! The Tiger II had a removable cover, though the turret had to be turned to allow full access. The cover did not solve the problems for this Tigerjäger design as even though there was no turret,the overhang of the gun prevented transmission removal; it therefore required the gun to be withdrawn from the casemate to do this task, no small job.

The second design (Design B) for a Tigerjäger followed the original requirement for the engine moved into the front but had significant drawbacks, not least that the vehicle was too large to ship by rail. The desired -8 gun depression could also not be achieved because with the engine and ancillaries in front of the casemate, it raised the hull roof. The gun would also have impeded maintenance of the engine whilst offering no substantial advantages over Design A. Design B, despite being the initial design demanded, was dropped. The Jagdtiger would follow the layout of Tigerjäger Design A.

The 12.8 cm Panzerjäger

By 5th May 1943, the vehicle, now being referred to as the ‘12.8 cm Panzerjäger’, was determined to weigh 75 tonnes. It was to have the field of motion for the 12.8 cm gun widened from 15 degrees each way to 18 degrees, but still wanting +15 to -8 for elevation. Based on the Tiger II, the armor was this new vehicle determined to be 200 mm thick on the front of the body, 80mm on the sides and back, and 30 mm on the roof. This roof thickness was an obvious compromise considering the Tiger I and Tiger II were to have 40 mm thick rooves to protect from plunging shell fire and aircraft attack. The 12.8 cm Panzerjäger dimensions were roughly fixed too: about 10 m long, 3.59 m wide and 3.47 m high. Fitted with the same 800 mm wide tracks as the Tiger II, this vehicle had a longer ground-contact length of 4.635 m resulting in a ground pressure of just 1.01 kg/cm2. Based upon these dimensions and the decided layout, a wooden mockup was ordered, although the design of the gun was not going to be finished by Krupp until 1st July 1943 and design changes were still taking place.

Henschel, to simplify production, had requested that the hulls be made separately to the casemate, but this was rejected as it made fire and waterproofing harder, and a rectangular hatch (700 mm x 600 mm) was added in the rear of the casemate for removal of the gun. The requirements set in May had slipped by June that year when Wa Pruef 6 agreed to allow just 10 degrees of traverse each side and -7.5 degrees of depression.

Around May 1943, Henschel had determined that as a result of design changes, the weight had been brought down to 70 tonnes complete (the hull alone weighing 43-tonnes) with 200 mm thick frontal armor, 80 mm on the sides and rear, and a casemate roof now 40 mm thick. Drawings for this vehicle were to be finished and submitted to Wa Pruef 6 by 15th June with the expectation that a prototype would be finished in December.

The wooden mockup of the vehicle referred to as the ‘12.8 cm Tiger-Jaeger’ was ready in September, as it was inspected on 28th September by Colonel Crohn (Wa Pruef 6) and Major Weiche (Inspector-General Armoured Troops), who recommended the elimination of aiming spot lamps, firing ports and the gunner’s hatch. Other changes included the enlargement of the commander’s hatch and rearrangement of the periscopes. The relatively small changes to the roof were added to a decision to increase the upper front plate from 200 mm to 250 mm and to make the hull roof 40 mm thick.

The amended and full-size wooden mockup was then shown off to Hitler on 20th October 1943 at the troop training centre at Ayrs, East Prussia, identified as ‘heavy Panzerjäger with 12.8 cm L/55 on Tiger II chassis.’

Production was approved for this 12.8 cm Panzerjäger and the first production vehicle was ready on 6th April 1944.

Layout and Crew

Having considered both the Panther and Tiger hulls for the mount for the 12.8 cm gun, the vehicle selected for use was the Tiger II which was, at the time, still on the drawing board at Henschel. In order to fit the gun onto the chassis of the Tiger II, the chassis had to be lengthened by 260 mm and on top of this hull was placed a large flat-sided casmate for housing the main gun and four of the crew. The engine remained at the back and the transmission at the front, as on the Tiger II, and the hull crew positions were also retained. Inside this giant casemate would fit the no-less enormous 12.8 cm gun breech. In essence, this was the layout of the Jagdtiger, a box with a gun in the front of it sat on top of a Tiger II chassis.

The Jagdtiger had a crew of six men. The crew in the hull retained their role and positions from the Tiger II, with the driver located in the front left and the radio operator in the front right. This radio operator also had control over the secondary armament, a machine gun located in a mount in the glacis to his front. In the casemate were the remaining 4 crew. This crew consisted of a commander (front right), the gunner (front left), and two loaders located in the rear of the casemate. By 1945, with severe pressures on training caused by the war, some tank crews were even sent directly to the Nibelungen works to help with the production of the tanks they were to crew, both as a means to help familiarise them with the vehicles but also to help with production.

Production

Just as with Henschel, where the bodies of the Tiger and Tiger II were made by Krupp and then shipped to them for finishing and fitting into a fighting tank, the same is true of the Jagdtiger. The Nibelungen works did the construction, fitting, and assembly of components including the gun, but the basic armored hull was made at a different site, namely the Eisenwerke Oberdonau (Oberdonau Iron Works) in Linz, modern-day Austria.

The first prototype vehicle was assembled in Workshop VIII at the Nibelungen plant in Autumn 1943 but was fitted with a trial superstructure, Porsche suspension, and no armament. The hole in the glacis for the machine gun mount was blanked off and the vehicle was used for running trials. The second prototype was not finished until the new year and both prototypes (305001 with Porsche suspension and 305002 with Henschel suspension) were then delivered to the Army Ordnance Office for testing in February 1944.

Despite the delivery of 15 hulls from Eisenwerke Oberdonau in April, 12 more in May, and 10 more in June 1944, production of further vehicles did not begin until June 1944, with just a single vehicle complete as production problems, including the preparation of machinery and rails inside the plant, were being resolved. Firstly, the Nibelungen works had to make changes to the production line in order to accomodate the fact that after the first batch of vehicles (10)* fitted with Porsche suspension had been finished, all future vehicles were going to have Henschel suspension. That was not the only production issue either. Eisenwerke Oberdonau had some production problems of their own which then caused knock-on problems for the Nibelungen works, not least of which affected quality. Vehicle 3005005, a Porsche suspension Jagdtiger, had such defects with the construction of the armor at the front that it was unfit for service and relegated to homeland use. The protracted development of the gun and mount had caused problems too which now became apparent. The Nibelungen works had to grind off up to 40 mm of steel from the inside walls of the casemate in places to allow the gun to traverse fully, and the cradle for the gun was a problem too. It was being made larger than it was designed to be and thus fouling on the front plate. This meant it had to be moved forward slightly with the outcome that it now fouled on the hull roof, restricting depression to just 6.5 degrees. With little option but to approve this 0.5 degree loss of depression, Wa Pruef 6 agreed to the changes but wanted them fixed as production went forward.

*Including the prototype this means 11 Jagdtigers were built with Porsche suspension: chassis numbers 305001, 305003-305012

Other changes of a minor nature were made internally to the gun elevation mechanism, gun bridge, ammunition racks, and gunner’s seat. Externally, throughout production only five things were changed of consequence: the omission of sheet-metal shields over the exhausts (July 1944); the addition of a barrel brace (gun crutch) (August 1944); the addition of Zimmerit (from September 1944); the fitting of external hooks on the casemate sides for spare track links (December 1944); and the addition of ‘mushrooms’ (Pilzen) on the upper edges of the side and rear plates which were mountings for attaching a small crane.

Following a 12th October 1944 discussion with Hitler, it was planned to produce just 150 of these vehicles after which production would be switched over to the Panther. The planned 150 was broken down to an estimated rate of 30 Jagdtigers per month, a figure based on the availability of the 12.8 cm gun barrels, although 50 vehicles per month were demanded of the plant at Nibelungen which was building them.

Thirty guns a month would mean a complete production run of 5 months, and fifty vehicles a month would have reduced this to just 3 months worth of production. By 25th October 1944, with delays in the production of the Jagdtiger not meeting the numbers demanded, Hitler ordered that 53 12.8 cm anti tank guns from the Jagdtiger program should be mounted on captured Russian or French carriages to fulfill the needs of the army in the short-term.

The original order for 150 Jagdtigers was increased on 3rd January 1945 by Hitler, who demanded the continuation of production even though the production of the 12.8 cm gun barrels was a significant bottleneck in production. By the end of 1944, just 49 Jagdtigers plus the two prototypes had been finished, well behind the original schedule. Production was therefore scheduled to run through April 1945 with another 100 Jagdtigers planned, after which production would switch to the Tiger II instead. The Jagdtiger was not to be terminated however; production would simply switch to the firm of Jung in Jungenthal instead, with the first 5 planned to be ready in May 1945, 15 in June, and then 25 per month through to the end of the year.

On 25th February 1945, ‘extreme measures’ were ordered by Hitler to increase production of the Jagdtiger, which included the temporary expedient of fitting an 8.8 cm gun (the 8.8 cm KwK. Pak. 43/3) in lieu of the 12.8 cm piece if there were insufficient 12.8 cm guns available. During this period, by way of context, production of the Tiger II which had started in September 1943 was supposed to be reaching 50 vehicles a month from April through June 1944 (150 vehicles), but only 53 vehicles were completed during that period. By February 1945, when the ‘extreme measures’ were ordered to produce the Jagdtiger, production of the Tiger II was supposed to be 150 units a month but had only managed 42.

Neither the rate of 30 per month (gun production) or 50 per month (vehicle production) were ever actually met, with monthly production in the region of 20 or fewer each month due to shortages of materials and labor combined with the effects of Allied bombing.

By the end of February 1945, just 74 vehicles (chassis number 305001 to 305075*) were completed. Along with the original prototype vehicle, this meant that production reached just 50% of the original requirement.

*See Below

Chassis Numbers

The official production number of Jagdtigers is usually quoted as running from serial number 305001 to 305075, meaning a total production of 74 vehicles. Chamberlain and Doyle (1997), state that chassis numbers went from 305001 to 305077 which would mean 76 vehicles. Winninger (2013) provides a production table from the factory showing serial 305075 was a March production serial number and that March production was to run from 305075 to 305081, with seven vehicles listed as delivered. April production lists serial number 305082 to 305088, another 7 vehicles, and then 305089 to 305098 (10 vehicles), with just 3 delivered. Some of these were supposed to be fitted with the 8.8 cm gun under Sonderkraftfahrzeug number Sd.Kfz.185 and some were built but not accepted, meaning the exact number of 12.8 cm armed Jagdtiger produced cannot be accurately determined.

Armor

The Jagdtiger, as can be expected of an assault gun, had the bulk of its armor at the front, with armor 250 mm thick on the front of the casemate, 150 mm thick on the glacis, and 100 mm thick on the lower front. The forward part of the hull had a 50 mm thick roof, although the rest of the roof over the casemate and engine deck was 40 mm thick. Of note here is that the roof of the casemate was not welded into place like the roof of the Tiger or Tiger II, but was actually bolted onto the superstructure.

The lower hull sides were 80 mm thick and so were the upper hull sides, but these were also sloped inwards at 25 degrees affording the crew inside a good deal of protection from enemy fire as long as they remained facing the enemy or at an oblique angle.

Even the rear of the Jagdtiger had 80 mm thick plates including the pair of large gas-tight doors at the back. The thinnest parts of the armor were under the sponsons over the tracks which were just 25 mm thick, and under the engine which was also 25 mm thick. The forward part of the lower hull was 40 mm thick providing good protection for the crew from mines. One final note on the armor is that was it not face-hardened, but rolled homogenous plate.

Gun, Ammunition, and Performance

In February 1943, the letter from Wa Pruef 4 made it clear that the 12.8 cm gun for the vehicle was to be the same type as the one for the Pz.Kpfw. Maus: a 12.8 cm Kw.K. L/55 with the same gun gear and no muzzle brake. The elevation limits demanded were +15 to -8 degrees with a traversing field of 15 degrees each side. A design of this 12.8 cm gun was therefore requested to be ready by 10th March 1943, and after Krupp handed in the design for the 12.8 cm Stu.K on 28th April 1943, Henschel submitted its own FK-based design which moved the pivot point of the gun 120 mm further back. This moving of the gun’s pivot point allowed a depression of -7.5 degrees to where the gun met the roof, which despite a desire to lower it by 100 mm, could only be lowered by 50 mm instead.

Alone, this gun weighed 5,500 kg, with the cradle adding a further 1,000 kg. The reason for the delay in designing the mounting seems to stem from these issues over gun balance, as the designers at Henschel wanted the gun mounted further back in order to improve weight distribution,and as a result, a model of the gun was not ready from Krupp until 1st July that year. Development of the 12.8 cm gun though was slow, and the first 12.8 cm gun was not ready until the middle of August 1944. When first shown, the gun was mounted on a captured Soviet 152 mm M37 433(r) mount and later on a captured French 155 mm GBF-T cannon 419(f). It should be borne in mind too that the gun was not specifically designed for the Jagdtiger, the firm of Krupp had originally started developing this gun before the Jagdtiger was even planned.

On 15th May 1942 Hitler had expanded development of a 12.8 cm gun to include Rheinmetall-Borsig of Düsseldorf, and Skoda-Werke Pilsen and Aktiengesellschaft (A.G.) to assist Krupp in order to get the gun into production as soon as possible.

First firing trials of a 12.8 cm gun with Armor Piercing ammunition took place at Meppen in October 1943.

Even with their assistance, the work was slow. Rheinmetall’s design for the 12.8 cm gun reached the stage of several prototypes but was not approved, while the design from Skoda-Werke never left the drawing board. As such, only the Krupp 12.8 cm gun (made by Krupp at the Bertawerke in Breslau and at the Krupp plant in Essen) was ever mounted in the Jagdtiger and only about 160 of these guns were ever made.

Despite some commentary on the internet to the contrary, this 12.8 cm had nothing to do with the entirely different 12.8 cm Flak 40 anti-aircraft gun which ended up being mounted on the two VK30.01(H) Tiger chassis, popularly know as Sturer Emil. What is more, the antiaircraft 12.8 cm was a two-piece barrel design, whereas the Pak. 12.8 cm was a single-piece barrel. Moreover, the ammunition for the anti-aircraft gun was unitary, whereas on this 12.8 cm it was to be a two-piece design to save internal space.

Once finished, this new Krupp gun was designated the 12.8 cm Pak. 44 L/55 (Pak – Panzerabwehrkanone) and later redesignated as the 12.8 cm Pak. 80. This gun was big and heavy; the barrel alone weighed 2.2 tonnes and was 7.02 metres long (rifling extended for 6.61 m of this) meaning that two barrel supports were needed for when the vehicle was travelling, one on the front glacis of the tank and a second internally within the casemate.

Despite the delay in development and delivery of this gun, Colonel Crohn wrote to Krupp on 24th September 1943 suggesting an improvement to the firepower before the first 12.8 cm L/55 was even finished. This new gun suggested was a 12.8 cm Kw.K. L/70 which could fit into the original and unmodified Krupp-mount for the L/55. Krupp replied to that idea on 21st October 1943, stating that it had completed a drawing of this plan and that with the 12.8 cm L/70 fitted, the centre-of-gravity of the vehicle was seriously affected, making it significantly nose-heavy and causing the gun to overhang the front by about 4.9 m. The solution offered by Krupp to this problem was to suggest an alternative scheme with the casemate moved once more to the rear with the engine-forwards, just like the Tigerjäger Design B. The idea for this longer 12.8 cm gun was then discontinued and the focus returned to the 12.8 cm L/55 instead.

The ‘extreme measures’ ordered by Hitler on 25th February 1945 to increase Jagdtiger production had included the possibility of substituting an 8.8 cm gun in lieu of the 12.8 cm piece to increase the speed of production. The fitting, or otherwise of this gun has been subject to a lot of confusion but it never entered service and in the end, these measures proved unproductive.

The original specifications called for a gun with a range of up to 21 km but a weight of less than 6.5 tonnes. This requirement would indicate that the gun for the Jagdtiger (an assault gun) was for use as artillery indirect-fire as much as it was for direct-fire. Traverse for the gun was limited to 10 degrees left and 10 degrees right with elevation ranging from -7 to +10 degrees. Direct-fire sighting from the telescopes ranged the gun for targets up to 4 km for the Panzergranate 43 Armor Piercing High Explosive (APCBC-HE) shell and 8 km for the Sp.Gr. L/50 high explosive shell.

Despite the original consideration of a special high-velocity anti-armor shell with a sub-caliber core, no such shell was deployed on the Jagdtiger. These shells known as Treibspiegel-Geschoss mit H-Kern used the 8.8 cm Pz.Gr.40 as the armor piercing core of the shell and were being developed for the Maus program at the time the gun was selected for modification into the Jagdtiger program. With the arrival of the Pz.Gr.43 and the significant increase it brought in terms of penetrating armor, the experimental and expensive idea for these sub-calibre rounds was effectively redundant. They have been included in the following table for the purposes of reference only.

Looking at the performance data from the various sources for the performance of the Pz.Gr.39 and Pz.Gr.43 provides a great deal of confusion, and not just in modern scholarship. A British intelligence report from 1944 quoting figures from a captured German document provided identical performance for the Pz.Gr.43 to that usually quoted in modern literature for the Pz.Gr.39. Contemporary documents from Germany also show a Pz.Gr.39 as Capped (APC) and not Ballistic Capped (APCBC) with those figures. What is unusual about the British intelligence document is that it quotes both the Pz.39 and the Pz.Gr.43 together, whereas other sources usually reference just the Pz.Gr.39 and omit Pz.Gr.43 performance. The question therefore is which is right and which is wrong. A table (below) is provided for comparison.

Secondary armament for the Jagdtiger consisted of a single MG.34 mounted in the front-right of the hull. For this machine gun, 1,500 rounds of ammunition were carried.

The huge gun left little space for ammunition stowage. Ammunition was stored in the floor and side walls of the casemate and, even using two-piece ammunition, the Jagdtiger could carry just 40 rounds of ammunition. It is not known how many 8.8 cm rounds could have been carried for the vehicles (if any) which were fitted with that caliber gun, although it may not have been many more, as the 8.8 cm ammunition was single piece, which would have made stowage harder and less efficient. One final note on 12.8 cm armament is that at some point another gun between the 12.8 cm L/55 and the L/70 was contemplated. This was also a 12.8 cm gun but had a barrel length of L/66. It was not just the gun which changed either; the entire structure was lower by about 20 cm because of adjustments to the mounts for the gun. With the L/66, the gun projected 4.4 m from the front of the tank but still provided an elevation range of +15 to -7.5.

Sadly there is no information about this proposed modification, but based on the discussion over improving the performance of the L/55, it would likely date to the end of 1943, although some unverified information suggests it was considered as late as November 1944. One additional feature other than the gun and lower casemate is the large box-structure at the back over the engine deck. Unfortunately only this side view is available, so the shape of this box is debatable. From the drawing, it does appear that the engine deck may be slightly shorter than on the production Jagdtiger, although this may simply be a mistake on the drawing as the dimensions are primarily concerned with the front end and not the back.

Optics

There is no point in having either a large gun or an effective shell if you cannot get the gun on target and get the shell to hit said target, and with a rate of fire of just 3 rounds per minute, the Jagdtiger was significantly slower to fire than other tanks, meaning it was all the more important that what was fired hit the target. One problem was the lack of a turret, which hindered all-round observation, and as a result, the Jagdtiger was fitted with a rotating hatch for the commander on the front right of the casemate with a periscope integrated into it. In front of this periscope was a rectangular flap within the hatch which could be opened separately. Through that hatch-within-a-hatch, the commander could insert a stereoscopic rangefinder. The commander was also provided with a single fixed periscope facing to the right.

The gunner of the Jagdtiger, who was sat in the front left, did not have a roof hatch, but instead, had a large curved sliding cover through which a Winkelzielfernrohr (WZF) 2/1 10x magnification aiming telescope projected out. Behind this cover, on the roof, was a further periscope in a rotating mount and two more fixed periscopes pointed diagonally backwards from the rear corner at each side of the casemate.

In February 1943, it was decided that optics for the main gun were to consist of an Sfl.Z.F.5 and Rbl.F36 sight for both direct and indirect fire. Using the WZF 2/1 angled periscope, the vehicle could deliver accurate fire out to 4km with the Pz.Gr.43 and 8km with the Spr.Gr. L/5.0, although the original plan for indirect fire had been dropped along the way. The Jagdtiger was now just a direct-fire vehicle. Production vehicles were fitted with the Sfl.14Z and WZF 217 sights for the primary armament. Test firings of the 12.8cm gun showed the accuracy to be excellent with the Pz.Gr.43 achieving hits within 50% of the width and height of the target between 46cm and 86cm of the centre at 1000m, and between 90 cm and 118 cm at 2000 m. This was slightly worse for the standard AP shell with an accuracy of 128 cm to 134 cm of the centre of the target at 2000 m.

Running Gear

Other than extending the hull, the suspension and running gear of the Jagdtiger was essentially unchanged from the Tiger II. It consisted of full width torsion bars for each of the nine wheel stations fitted with 800 mm diameter steel wheels running over 80 mm wide tracks with 95 links per side and a ground clearance of 460 mm.

One curiosity for many is that two early Jagdtigers (hulls 1 and 4) were fitted with the Porsche running gear from the Elefant for the purposes of evaluation after Dr. Porsche had convinced Hitler of the benefits of his suspension in January 1944. Consisting of four wheel-units made from a pair of 700 mm diameter steel road wheels on each side, the Porsche system offered a production advantage over the Henschel running gear. Porsche promised than it took a third less time to produce than Henschel’s system, reduced the hull construction time as well as machining time, required less maintenance, and could actually be completely replaced in the field without removing other parts and without the use of a jack.

Despite the use of Porsche suspension, the system still used torsion bars – 1,077 mm long bars – but these were mounted longitudinally rather than transversely across the hull, and had pairs of wheels connected on a bogie attached to the bar. This reduced the number of bars to just 4 with two pairs of wheels on each bar, and in so doing, saved about 1,200 kg in weight, 450 man-hours of work time, gained 100 mm more ground clearance, and saved RM 404,000 (Reichsmarks) in cost. Much more importantly though, the use of this suspension freed up space inside the vehicle, an entire cubic metre extra in fact.

However, this Porsche system was not adopted and only ten of the chassis were ever fitted with this system. The promise it held for improvements were simply not borne out by trials held in May 1944, and it failed to live up to the desired performance. In particular, it resulted in a lot of shaking on a hard road when driven at 14-15 km/h. Initially, this was blamed on the Type Gg 24/800/300 tracks, and as a result, these were switched for the Type Kgs 64/640/130 tracks from the Elefant, but to no avail. With testing behind it having proven unsuccessful, the Porsche system was abandoned and the Henschel system was retained instead. As a result, by September 1944, only production of the Henschel suspension Jagdtigers was underway.

The transmission for the Jagdtiger was the same standard gearbox as on the Tiger II, a Maybach eight-speed OLVAR OG40-1216B (made by Adlerwerke of Frankfurt and Zahnradfabrik of Friedrichshafen) connected to the same Maybach HL 230 P30 TRM as fitted to the Tiger II and Panther. This engine was simply underpowered for a vehicle of the bulk of the Tiger II, let alone this even heavier Jagdtiger. One option which was still at the planning stage by the end of the war was the replacement of that Maybach engine with a 16-cylinder X engine made by Simmering-Pauker.

Delivering up to 800 horsepower*, this 36.5 litre* engine would have provided a significant performance boost for the Jagdtiger, and for that matter, potentially for the Tiger II and Panther as well. The engine had the added advantage that it was more compact than the HL230 and well suited to the tight confines of a tank’s engine bay. The most noticeable change adding this engine to the Jagdtiger would have made would have been seen at the back with the exhaust near to the top of the back plate. The engine was never fitted and how far along plans were to incorporate it into production is unknown.

*some sources provide data for the X16 engine as 36.5 litre producing up to 760 hp and there is also an 18 cylinder version although data on both is often contradictory.

Paintwork

From the end of 1944 onwards, the exteriors of Jagdtigers produced at Nibelungen were painted in a red anti-corrosion primer which was then painted over in varying quality with dark yellow and green. The interiors which had previously been painted an ivory colour were left in the red primer colour instead to save time. Camouflage was left to units to apply in the field once they had received their vehicles.

Combat

The first user of the Jagdtiger was supposed to be 3rd Company Panzerjäger Training Abteilung 130, which was scheduled to receive 14 vehicles in March 1944, with two assigned to company staff and the three platoons receiving four each. Due to delays in production, that plan did not materialize and instead, the first user became Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 653 (s.Pz. Jg.Abt. 653), which had previously been operating the Elefant. By the end of November 1944, this unit had received 16 Jagdtigers.

1st Company s.Pz.Jg.Abt.653 took 14 Jagdtigers to the Western Front in December 1944 for the planned offensive in the Ardennes. Back on 3rd November 1944, these 14 Jagdtigers had been earmarked to form part of 3rd Company s.SS.Pz.Abt.501, but this was revoked by Hitler the next day. As it was, the 14 Jagdtigers were sent, but due to rail transportation issues resulting from Allied bombing, only 6 Jagdtigers managed to get to a staging area behind the lines at Blankenheim and took no part in the offensive. On 23rd December 1944, they were withdrawn as the entire s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 was being redeployed in order to take part in Operation Nordwind (Eng: Northwind).

On New Years Eve 1944, three Jagdtigers of s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 under the command of Commander Major Fromme and subordinated to the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division ‘Gotz von Berlichingen’, 1st Army of Army Group G, took part in the operation. This unit saw sporadic action against American forces in the Schwenningen-Chiemsee area of Southern Germany but the successes were minor and after just a few days the unit was disbanded. At around this time, s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 had a listed strength of just six Jagdtigers on 4th January 1945. By 9th January 1945, s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 was down to just two Jagdtigers in operational condition in the area of Boppard, where there was a repair depot, albeit without cranes. Of note on maintenance is that in the period from 30th December 1944 to 26th April 1945, s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 had a peak of 41 Jagdtigers with a peak operational readiness of 38 out of 41 on 15th March 1945 and its lowest operational readiness on 22nd March with just 2 out of 33 Jagdtigers operational.

Two Jagdtigers of s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 took part in combat near to an enemy bunker line adjacent to the German town of Auenheim on 17th January 1945. Attached to XIV SS Army Corps, they were used for fire support for an infantry attack. The next day, they were in action again against American forces and the German report on their action showed that their accuracy at 1,000 m against the enemy bunker was excellent, and after just two shots, the armored cupola of the bunker was burning. When the Americans counterattacked with tanks, one Sherman was hit and knocked out by means of a high explosive shell. In total, these two Jagdtigers fired 56 shells (46 HE and 10 Anti-tank) and suffered no losses to enemy fire. The unit did lose at least one Jagdtiger in this period though; it was later captured by US forces after having been abandoned in working order.

On 5th February 1945, s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 had 22 Jagdtigers ready for action and a further 19 under repair when it supported the left flank of First Army of Army Group G in action in the region of the Drusenheimer Forest near to the French/German border. Whatever tactical successes the unit may have had however were at odds with the totally hopeless strategic position, and on 5th May 1945, the remaining Jagdtigers of s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 surrendered to Allied forces near Amstetten, where Soviet and American forces had met. One Jagdtiger surrendered here was subsequently taken back to the Soviet Union and remains in the collection at Kubinka.

The other user of the Jagdtiger was s.Pz.Abt.512, formed 11th February 1945 at Paderborn from the remnants of s.Pz.Abt.424 (formerly s.Pz.Abt.501) and with troops from s.Pz.Abt.511. Forty-two Jagdtigers were destined for this unit consisting of 10 for each of three companies (30), one for each of the company commanders (3), and one for each platoon commander (9), and it was expected to be fully operational by the beginning of March 1945.

1st company s.Pzj. Abt. 512 under the command of Oberleutnant Ernst had only half its nominal complement of 12 Jagdtigers when it engaged US forces at the Remagen bridgehead. These six tanks first retreated to the area of Siegen and then on through the Ludenscheid-Hagen area to the Ergste region, and then once more to relieve German forces at Unna.

2nd Company, under the Command of Oberleutnant Carius, was shipped by rail to the area of Siegburg where it fought alongside LIII Panzer Corps. Two vehicles were lost and 2nd Company retreated along the Sieg when two more were lost to enemy air attacks. There were two further losses in combat around Siegen and Weidenau to mechanical failure.

On 11th April 1945, 2nd Company, which had only been cleared for combat on 30th March, was involved in the defence of Unna against the 1st and 9th US Armies advancing on Paderborn. The five Jagdtigers of the unit stood no chance of halting the American advance. 2nd Company was at a strength of just 7 Jagdtigers by the time of its surrender on 15th April. The 1st and 3rd Companies of s.Pzj. Abt. 512 fared no better and surrendered on 16th April at Iserlohn. In its short existence the unit had achieved relatively little, although 1st Company was credited with the destruction of 16 enemy tanks in the region south of Unna alone, meaning in one way that these vehicles were eclipsing their Allied rivals, albeit too little and far too late for Germany.

Nine Jagdtigers of s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512 remained in Austria though and were put to use by the 6th SS Panzer Army. On 9th May 1945, they engaged Soviet tank forces and destroyed several enemy tanks before they abandoned their last two serviceable vehicles and retreated towards the Americans to surrender to them rather than the Soviets. An unknown number of Jagdtigers were also used in the region of the Harz Mountains at the end of the war.

Conclusion

The fate of many Jagdtigers was simply to be abandoned or blown up by their own crews. Maintenance was a huge issue as the already overstressed components intended for the Tiger II were stretched yet further with the additional 10 tonnes from this vehicle. A lack of spare parts, a lack of maintenance equipment such a heavy recovery vehicles, cranes, and specialist tools combined with inexperienced crews (especially drivers) meant that the Jagdtiger never reached its potential on the battlefield. The value of the vehicle is also questionable. Big, heavy, and labor intensive, the Jagdtiger cost the equivalent of two Panzer IVs to construct and on the battlefield they failed to provide a return on this enormous investment worthy of their cost. The consideration of bigger guns like the L/70 when the L/55 was sufficient for the work at hand, the changing between suspension types at the start of production, and the rush to get the Jagdtiger into service stand in contrast to what it achieved. The largest and heaviest tank to see service in WW2 simply failed to perform. The expectations placed upon it as some kind of panacea to fundamental failings in German military strategy, where bigger and heavier tanks with bigger and more powerful guns could stem the tide of Allied armor attacking Germany from both sides, were misplaced. Worse still, the resources it consumed were actually counterproductive to Germany’s war aims. Nonetheless, the Jagdtiger remains a powerful symbol of both the technical advances and also the limits on German industry in a wartime economy.

Surviving vehicles

Jagdtiger #305004 fitted with Porsche suspension – The Tank Museum, Bovington, UK
Jagdtiger #305020 fitted with Henschel suspension – Fort Benning, Georgia, USA
Jagdtiger #305083 fitted with Henschel suspension – Kubinka Tank Museum, Kubinka

Jagdtiger in a ‘Dunkelgelb’ scheme.

Jagdtiger in a 3-tone camoflauge scheme

Jagdtiger 331 of 3rd Kompanie, Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 653, Germany, March 1945

Jagdtiger 102, Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 653, Germany, March 1945

These illustrations were produced by Tank Encyclopedia’s own David Bocquelet.

Video

Surrender of s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512 to US troops at Iserlohn April 1945

Sources

British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee. (1945). BIOS report 1343: German Steel Armour Piercing Projectiles and Theory of Penetration. Technical Information and Documents Unit, London.
Chamberlain, P., Doyle, H. (1993). Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two. Arms and Armour Press.
Culer, B. (1989). Tiger in Action. Squadron/Signal Publications, TX, USA
Datenblätter für Heeres Waffen Fahrzeuge Gerät W127. (1976).
Duske, H., Greenland,T., Schulz, F. (1996). Nuts and Bolts Vol.1: Jagdtiger
Frohlich, M. (2015). Schwere Panzer der Wehrmacht. Motorbuch Verlag, Germany
General Inspector of the General of the Panzertruppen. (26th June 1944). Notes.
Hoffschmidt, E., Tantum, W. (1988). German Tank and Antitank  World War II, WE Inc., CT, USA
Jentz, T., Doyle, H. (1997). Panzer Tracts No.9: Jagdpanzer. Darlington Productions, MD, USA
Jentz, T., Doyle, H. (2008). Panzer Tracts No.6-3: Schwere Panzerkampfwagen Maus and E100. Darlington Productions, MD, USA
Jentz, T., Doyle, H. (1997). Tiger Tanks: VK 45.02 to Tiger II. Schiffer Military history, PA, USA
Lilienthalgesellschaft für Luftfahrtforschung. (1943). Die Vorgänge beim Beschuß von Panzerplatten, 166, Berlin, Germany
Schneider, W. (1986). Rarities of the Tiger family: Elephant, Jagdtiger, Sturmtiger. Schiffer Publishing, PA, USA
Spielberger, W., Doyle, H., Jentz, T. (2007). Heavy Jagdpanzer: Development, Production, Operations. Schiffer Military History, PA, USA
US Army. (1950). Project 47: German Tank Losses. Historical Division European Command. US Army.
US Navy. (September 1945). Technical Report 485-45 – German Powder Composition and Internal Ballistics for Guns. US Naval Technical Mission in Europe Report.
War Office. (25th October 1944). 12.8cm A.Tk. Gun Pak.44 on Pz.Jag. Tiger (Pz.Kpfw. Tiger B Chassis) Sd.Kfz.186 JAGDTIGER. Appendix D War Office Technical Intelligence Summary, No.149 1944.
War Office. (25th April 1945). Technical Intelligence Summary Report 174 Appendix C.
War Office. (9th August 1945). Technical Intelligence Summary Report 183 Appendix B.
Winninger, M. (2013). OKH Toy Factory. History Facts Publishing

Tanks Encyclopedia Magazine, #3

The third issue covers WW1 armored vehicles — Hotchkiss Htk46 and Schneider CA and CD in Italian Service. WW2 section contains two splendid stories of the US and German ‘Heavy Armor’ — T29 Heavy Tank and Jagdtiger.

Our Archive section covers the history of early requirements for the Soviet heavy (large) tank. Worth mentioning, that the article is based on documents never published before.

It also contains a modeling article on how to create a terrain for diorama. And the last article from our colleagues and friends from Plane Encyclopedia covers the story of Northrop’s Early LRI Contenders — N-126 Delta Scorpion, N-144 and N-149!

All the articles are well researched by our excellent team of writers and are accompanied by beautiful illustrations and photos. If you love tanks, this is the magazine for you!
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German Reich (1944)
Tank Destroyer – 278 Built

The Panzer IV/70(A) was born from earlier German attempts to place the 7.5 cm L/70 into a Panzer IV turret. As this was not possible, another solution was proposed by the firm of Alkett. Their design simply reused a modified Vomag Panzer IV/70(V) superstructure (armed with the 7.5 cm L/70 gun) and placed it on a standard Panzer IV tank chassis. The result was a much taller and heavier vehicle than the Panzer IV/70(V) version. In theory, this would have sped up the whole production process, but in reality, only a small number were built by the end of the war.

First Jagdpanzer Designs

Even before the war, the famous German commander General Heinz Guderian had predicted the need for highly mobile self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, later known as ‘Panzerjäger’ or ‘Jagdpanzer’ (tank destroyer or hunter). The terms ‘Jagdpanzer’ and ‘Panzerjäger’ were, according to Germany military terminology and concepts, essentially one and the same. After the war, however, the ‘Jagdpanzer’ term would be used to describe the fully enclosed tank destroyers, while ‘Panzerjäger’ would be used for the open-topped vehicles.

In March of 1940, the first attempt to build such a vehicle was made. This was the 4.7 cm PaK (t) (Sfl) auf Pz.Kpfw. I, generally known today as the ‘Panzerjäger I’. It was more or less a simple improvisation, made by using a modified Panzer I Ausf.B tank hull and mounting a 4.7 cm PaK (t) gun (a captured Czechoslavkian 4.7 cm gun – hence the ‘t’ for ‘Tschechoslowakei’ after the name) with a small protective shield fitted to it. Later, during the attack on the Soviet Union and the battles in North Africa, the need for effective anti-tank vehicles became of greater importance for the Germans. The appearance of the towed 7.5 cm PaK 40 in increasing numbers somewhat solved this problem, but the main issue with this gun was its lack of mobility.

The need for mobile anti-tank vehicles would lead to the development of the ‘Marder’ series, which was based on several different tank chassis and armed with powerful and efficient anti-tank guns. Captured tanks and other vehicles were also reused for this purpose. In 1943, the Nashorn (then called the Hornisse), armed with the excellent 88 mm Pak 43, was put into production. However, most of these types of vehicles were hastily designed and built and, while they did the job, they were far from perfect.

These vehicles were built by using different tank chassis and installing a gun with limited traverse in an open-topped superstructure. The two main issues were the great height, which made them difficult to camouflage, and the general lack of effective armor.

The German infantry support self-propelled assault gun, the Sturmgeschütz, or simply ‘StuG’, (based on the Panzer III) proved to have great potential when used as a tank hunter. It had relatively good armor, a low profile, and could be armed with the longer barrelled L/48 7.5 cm gun. The mass-produced StuG III Ausf.G armed with the longer 7.5 cm gun (L/48) was able to efficiently fight almost all Allied tanks (except for the heaviest) up to the end of the war. The StuG vehicles were also much easier, quicker, and cheaper to build than their tank equivalent.

In 1942, the first plans to equip the StuG with a stronger gun and armor were made. These would eventually lead to the development of a series of three different Jagdpanzer designs based on the Panzer IV tank chassis. Despite the initials plans to equip the first Jagdpanzer IV with the longer 7.5 cm L/70 gun, due to insufficient stocks, the 7.5 cm gun L/48 had to be used instead. When the 7.5 cm L/70 gun became available in sufficient numbers, the production of the Panzer IV/70(V) version began in late 1944. The last version, known as Panzer IV/70(A), was an attempt to mount the 7.5 cm L/70 on an unmodified Panzer IV tank chassis.

History

In mid-1944, the German Herres Waffenamt (army ordnance department) personnel conducted a series of investigation to test the Panzer IV’s combat performance. The results were disappointing but, in a way, also somewhat to be expected. The newest enemy tank designs (like the Soviet IS-2 and T-34-85, and the later version or Shermans, M26, etc.) possessed far better combat characteristics, like having stronger armor or firepower than the Panzer IV. While still a threat to the enemy tanks, the Panzer IV was reaching the limit of its development life. Its 7.5 cm L/48 gun was still a potent weapon for its time, however, a stronger gun with much better firepower was more desirable. This was one of the reasons why Adolf Hitler demanded that the production of the Panzer IV tanks should be phased out in favor of the new Panzer IV/70(V) anti-tank vehicles. As the production of the Panzer IV/70(V) was too slow and there were urgent demands for increasing numbers of tanks, another solution to use the 7.5 cm L/70 on a Panzer IV vehicle was needed. For this reason, the Alkett factory received orders from the German Army in late June 1944 to test the installation of the 7.5 cm L/70 long gun on the Panzer IV chassis.

The installation of this gun in the Panzer IV turret had already been tested previous year and proved to be impractical, so the only way to mount this gun was in a self-propelled configuration. Due to a lack of time, resources, and production capacities, Alkett engineers proposed a very simple solution. A redesigned superstructure taken from the Panzer IV/70(V) would be placed on an unmodified Panzer IV chassis. This would increase the vehicle weight and height but, on the other hand, it would make production far simpler (at least in theory). This project was designated by Alkett as ‘Gerät 558’. It is often marked in post-war sources as Zwischenlösung (interim solution), but this term was never used by the Germans for this vehicles during the war.

This project received a green light from the German Army officials and the first prototype (made by Alkett) was quickly built. It was demonstrated to Adolf Hitler in early July 1944 at Berghof. Hitler was impressed with it and immediately ordered it to be put into production as soon as possible.

Designation Name

The initial designation for this vehicle was ‘Sturmgeschütz auf Pz.Kpfw.IV Fahrgestell’. This designation was changed by Adolf Hitler himself on 18th July 1944 to the much simpler Panzer IV lang (long) (A). The capital ‘A’ stood for the Alkett company that was responsible for its development. During its service life, other designations were also used, like Panzer IV/L (A) from August 1944, Panzer IV lang (A) 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70 from October 1944 and finally Panzer IV/70(A) from November 1944. The Panzer IV/70(A) designation is the most commonly used in the literature today. For this reason and for the sake of simplicity, this article will use this designation.

Technical Characteristics

The Panzer IV/70(A) was designed to have minimal modifications to the Panzer IV Ausf.J tank chassis. For this reason, the turret and the top of the hull were removed and, in their place, a new superstructure housing the gun was added on top. Visually, the Panzer IV/70(A) was different in comparison to the other Jagpanzers based on the Panzer IV. The most obvious difference is the overall shape of the new superstructure added atop the Panzer IV hull.

The suspension and running gear were the same as those of the original Panzer IV, with no changes to their construction. This consisted, on each side, of eight small double road wheels suspended in four pairs by leaf-spring units. There were two front drive sprockets, two rear idlers, and eight return rollers in total. The number of return rollers was reduced to three per side later in the production run. However, despite this, some late produced vehicles still had four return rollers. Similar to the Panzer IV/70(V) model, this vehicle was also nose-heavy due to the added weight. For this reason, the front road wheels were prone to being rapidly worn out. In an attempt to solve this problem, most vehicles were to be equipped with four (on both sides) steel-tired and internally sprung wheels from September 1944 onwards.

The engine was the Maybach HL 120 TRM which produced 265 hp at 2,600 rpm but, according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2012) in Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV, the engine produced 272 hp at 2,800 rpm. The design of the engine compartment was unchanged. The maximum speed was 37 km/h (15-18 km/h cross country) with an operational range (with 470 liters fuel) of 200 km. These vehicles were fitted with new flame dampening exhausts and mufflers (flammentoeter). The engine and the crew compartments were separated by a fire-resistant and gas-tight armored firewall.

In order to speed up the development process and make the production as simple as possible, the Alkett engineers decided to reuse many elements from the already existing Panzer IV/70(V) superstructure. While similar in many things (like armor thickness, roof design, gun shield etc.) there were a number of changes that had to be done before the adoption for production. The first thing was the increase in height of the superstructure, which was now 1 m tall in comparison to the original Panzer IV/70(V), which was 64 cm tall. The side armor angles had to be lower and the added frontal plate had the original Panzer IV driver visor placed on the vehicle left side. The prototype vehicle had a slightly different superstructure design with vertical lower superstructure sides. The production models had the sides angled at 20°.

The Panzer IV/70(V) superstructure had to be redesigned for two reasons. Firstly, the Panzer IV’s fuel tanks were located beneath the turret. This meant that the installation of the long gun required the raising of the superstructure. The second reason was a problem noted on the Panzer IV/70(V), namely that, when on the move on rough terrain, the longer gun (if not held in position by the travel lock) occasionally hit the ground (barrel strike) which could cause damage to the elevation mechanism of the gun.

Despite the extra height, the Panzer IV/70(A)’s superstructure was well protected with its angled and thick armor and had a relatively simple design. The angled shape of the superstructure provided thicker nominal armor and also increased the chance of deflecting enemy shots. This way, the need for more carefully machined armored plates was unnecessary. Also, by using larger one-piece metal plates, the structure avoided, a lot of welding making it much stronger and also easier for production.

The Panzer IV/70(A)’s upper front hull armor plate was 80 mm thick. The side armor was 30 mm, the rear 20 mm and the bottom was 10 mm. The engine compartment design and armor were unchanged, with 20 mm all around and 10 mm of top armor. The upper superstructure frontal armor was 80 mm at a 50° angle, the sides were 40 mm at a 19° angle, the rear armor was 30 mm, and the top was 20 mm. The front driver plate was 80 mm thick and placed at a 9° angle.

The Panzer IV/70(A) could be equipped with an additional 5 mm thick armor plates (Schürzen) covering the sides of the vehicle. In practice though, these would rarely last long and would simply fall off the vehicle during combat operations. Due to material shortages, by late 1944, stiff wire mesh panels (Thoma Schürzen) were used instead of the armor plates. These were much lighter and most sources claim that they provided the same level of protection as the solid type. It is often mentioned that Schürzen were designed as a protection against shape-charged weapons, but they were actually designed to counter Soviet anti-tank rifle projectiles. One more line of protection was the possible application of Zimmerit anti-magnetic paste to counter magnetic anti-tank mines, but the use of this paste would be abandoned in the late stages of the war.

In the hope of removing any extra weight at the front, most spare parts and ancillary equipment were moved to the rear engine compartment. These included things such as spare tracks, wheels, repair tools, the fire extinguisher, and the crew’s equipment. Some vehicles had an armored and welded base for a 2-tonne crane added on the superstructure roof.

Armament

The Panzer IV/70(A) tank destroyer’s main armament was the 7.5 cm StuK 42 L/70 cannon, also known as the 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70. This gun was more or less the same one used on the German Panther tank. The elevation of the 7.5 cm StuK 42 L/70 was from –6° to +15° and the traverse was 12° on both sides. Due to the increased internal size, the Panzer IV/70(A) could carry more spare ammunition than its predecessors. Older sources noted that the total ammunition count was 60 rounds, while newer ones give a number of 90 rounds. The main gun was not placed at the vehicle’s center but was instead moved 20 cm to the right side because of the position of the gun sights

The 80 mm thick cast gun mantlet acted as extra protection for the gun. A hydro-pneumatic equilibrator was provided for better gun balance and an iron counter-weight was added at the end of the recoil guard. To avoid damaging the main gun when on the move, a heavy travel-lock was provided. In order to free the gun, the gun operator had only to elevate the gun a bit and the travel lock would fall down. This allowed for a quick combat response and also avoided the need for a crew member to exit the vehicle in order to do it manually.

The secondary support weapons consisted of a 7.92 mm MG 42 machine gun with some 1,200 rounds of ammunition, a 9 mm MP 40 submachine gun and a 7.92 mm MP 43/44 assault rifle. Unlike most other German vehicles, a ball mount was not used on this vehicle. The machine gun port was instead protected by a movable armored cover. The machine gun mount was located to the vehicle’s right side. The Panzer IV/70(A) vehicles were usually equipped with the ‘Vorsatz P’ curved muzzle attachment for the MP 43/44 (7.92 mm) assault rifles. The mounting for this weapon was placed on the loader’s hatch door and was operated by him.

Crew

The four-man crew consisted of the commander, the gunner, the loader/radio operator, and the driver. The driver’s position was on the vehicle’s left front side. Behind him was the gunner’s position, which was provided with an Sfl.Z.F. 1a gun sight for acquiring targets. This sight was linked to an azimuth indicator, the purpose of which was to tell the gunner the precise current position of the gun. When in use, the sight was projected through the sliding armored cover on the vehicle’s top armor. For operating the gun, there were two handwheels. The lower wheel was for the traverse and the upper one for the elevation. The gunner was also provided with a recoil shield, while the loader was not. Behind these two was the commander’s position, which had a rotating periscope located in the escape hatch and one pointing to the left. The commander had a small additional hatch door for the use of a retractable Sfl.4Z telescope. The commander was also responsible for providing the loader with the ammunition located on the left sidewall. The last crew member was the loader, who was positioned on the vehicle’s right side. He operated the radio (Fu 5 radio set) which was located to the right rear and he also doubled as the MG 42 machine gun operator. There was a small opening located above the machine gun which provided the gun operator with a limited view of the front. When not in use, the machine gun could be pulled into a small travel lock which was connected to the vehicle’s roof. In that case, the machine gun port could be closed by pivoting the armor cover. The crew could enter the vehicle through two hatches located at the top of the vehicle. There was an additional floor escape hatch door that could be used in case of an emergency.

Production

By the orders of Adolf Hitler himself, the production of the Panzer IV/70(A) was to begin immediately, with an initial order of 350 vehicles. The first 50 were to be built in August 1944, 100 in September, and then 50 vehicles each month until February 1945. However, for unknown reasons, these production orders were never fully implemented by the Waffenamt. The Waffenamt instead issued, on 21st June 1944, new production orders for 50 vehicles in August, 100 in September, 150 in October, 200 in November, 250 in December, and the last 300 in January. Yet very shortly thereafter, new production orders were issued for 50 in August, 100 in September, 150 in October and November, and only 100 December. In early August 1944, the production orders were once again changed to 50 in August, followed by a monthly production of 100 vehicles from October to January 1945. The last changes to the production occurred by the end of January 1945, when the monthly production was to be around 60 vehicles with the last 8 in June.

In the end, these production numbers were never reached due to the chaotic state in Germany in late 1944. Constant changes in the production orders also lead to confusion and delays in production. Besides the prototype, only 277 vehicles were ever built by Nibelungenwerk from Austria, with a monthly production of 3 in August 1944, 60 in September, 43 in October, 25 in November, 75 in December, 50 in January 1945, 20 in February, and the last one in March 1945.

In Combat

The Panzer IV/70(A) was to be allocated to units equipped with ordinary Panzer IV tanks, with the intent of increasing their firepower at longer ranges. According to initials plans, the first group of 68 vehicles was to be transported to the Eastern Front and then distributed to Panzer IV equipped units. As only five vehicles were actually ready by September 1944, these were instead given to the Führer Begleit Brigade together with a group of 17 Panzer IV tanks. The second group of 17 vehicles was to be dispatched to the Eastern Front, but it actually arrived in mid-October 1944. By the end of October, units that received the Panzer IV/70(A) were the 3rd Panzer Division, 17th Panzer Division and 25th Panzer Division, which had 17 vehicles each, while the 24th Panzer Division had 13, and the 13th Panzer Division had only 4 vehicles.

In response to the invasion in the West, in late 1944, two Abteilung with 45 vehicles each were formed and attached to the Panzer Regiment Grossdeutschland and the 2nd Panzer Regiment. The Panzer IV/70(A) Abteilung should have had 45 vehicles divided into three companies, each equipped with 14 vehicles, with three additional in the Command Abteilung. These two units were never fully formed due to the general lack of Panzer IV/70(A) vehicles. The 2nd Panzer Regiment was supplied with 11 and Grossdeutschland with 38 Panzer IV/70(A) vehicles.

By the end of 1944, Panzer Abteilung 208 was formed. It was supplied with 14 Panzer IV/70(A) and 31 Panzer IV tanks. It was organized in three companies, one of which was fully equipped with the Panzer IV/70(A). At this time, 10 Panzer IV/70(A) were also allocated to the 7th Panzer Division. In January 1945, the last Panzer units to receive 14 Panzer IV/70(A) vehicles were the 24th Panzer Division and the Panzer Brigade 103.

From January 1945 onwards, the Panzer IV/70(A) were allocated to Sturmgeschütz units only, mainly in the hope of increasing their firepower against enemy armored vehicles. Around thirteen Sturmgeschuetz Brigades (Stu.G.Brig.) were equipped with 3 vehicles each (for example 341, 394, 190, 276 etc.), while fewer (210, 244, 300 and 311) had four vehicles. Only two Stu.G.Brig. received larger numbers. The Sturm Artillerie Lehr Brigade 111 had 16 vehicles and the Stu.G.Brig. Grossdeutschland had 31.

Thanks to its thick front armor and strong gun, the Panzer IV/70(A) could be an effective weapon. An example of this comes from Stu.G.Brig. 311. During a Soviet attack on Breslau (mid-April 1945), Stu.G.Brig. 311, three StuG III and one Panzer IV/70(A) managed to destroy around 10 ISU-152 vehicles. The next day, Stu.G.Brig. 311 again engaged the Soviet armored advance. On this occasion, the Soviets lost 25 armored vehicles, of which 13 were reported to be destroyed by the lone Panzer IV/70(A). It is unclear if these values and those following are just claimed kills or verified kills.

Another example comes from Panzer Abteilung 208, which was heavily engaged in Hungary from early January 1945 on. On the 1st day of 1945, Panzer-Abteilung 208’s combat strength was 25 Panzer IV (with 21 combat-ready) and 10 Panzer IV/70(A) (with 7 fully operational). During the heavy Soviet assault (8th January) on the German position around village Izsa (located in Slovakia near the Hungarian border), Panzer Abteilung 208 managed to destroy 24 enemy tanks, of which 7 were credited to the Panzer IV/70(A), with the loss of three Panzer IV and one Panzer IV/70(A). The next day, four more Soviet tanks were destroyed, followed by seven more (five were reported to be destroyed by the Panzer IV/70(A) in the Panzer Abteilung 208’s counter-attack). On 17th January, 11 more Soviet tanks were destroyed by Panzer Abteilung 208, of which four by the Panzer IV/70(A) near Szentjánospuszta. On 22nd January, Panzer Abteilung 208, with a force of 25 Panzers and Panzer IV/70(A), made a counter-attack against the Soviet 6th Guards Tank Army, where the enemy lost nine tanks. Panzer Abteilung 208 lost most of its equipment during the failed attack on Kéménd on 19th February 1945. Of course, there is always a chance that in both cases these numbers were exaggerated for propaganda purposes.

The few produced Panzer IV/70(A) that did reach the front line were simply overrun by the vast numbers of enemy tanks. Most were simply abandoned or destroyed by their crew due to the general lack of fuel and spare parts. The German army was not overly satisfied with the Panzer IV/70(A)’s performance. In a report made on 15th January 1945 by the Generalinspekteur der Panzer truppen (Inspector General for Panzer units), the Panzer IV/70(A) was deemed as ‘not combat serviceable’ and that the Panzer IV tank production should be increased.

Surviving vehicle

Today, only one Panzer IV/70(A) (serial number 120539) is known to have survived the war and can be found at the French Musée des Blindes at Saumur. It was hit and damaged by Sherman tank fire at close range, but was still in running condition when it was captured by the French resistance army.

Conclusion

While the Panzer IV/70(A) had the potential to be an effective anti-tank weapon thanks to its good firepower and strong frontal armor, it was built in too few numbers. Another problem was weight distribution and the increase of height which made it difficult to camouflage. This made them easier targets for enemy gunners. The introduction of yet another design put even more stress on the already desperate German industry.

In the end, the Panzer IV/70(A) did not influence on the course of the war, as it was built in small numbers and too late, but it was nevertheless a potent tank destroyer.

Illustration of the Panzer IV/70(A), produced by Tank Encyclopedia’s own David Bocquelet

Jagdpanzer IV/70(A) used in support of the 352nd Volksgrenadier division, Ardennes, 1944.

Jagdpanzer IV/70(A) from the 116th Panzer Division, Compogne, Belgium, fall 1944.

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