Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Successor States (1979-2007)
Anti-Ship Coastal Defense Missile System – 10 Purchased
During the 1960s, the Yugoslav Navy (Jugoslovenska Ratna Mornarica) became interested in Soviet anti-ship missiles for installation on its ships. Based on experiences with these weapon systems, nearly two decades later, the Yugoslav Navy acquired 10 4K51 ‘Rubezh’ coastal defense systems from the Soviet Union. These vehicles and their service in Yugoslavia are generally unknown and very poorly documented, even though they would see use for nearly three decades until finally being phased out of service in 2007.
In Yugoslavia
The story of how the Yugoslav Navy got its first 4K51 Rubezh vehicles is actually related to the acquisition of 10 Project 205-type missile boats between 1965 and 1969. The armament of these vessels consisted of four 2.5 tonne Soviet P-15 ‘Termit’ anti-ship guided missiles. These carried a 454 kg hollow charge warhead out to a range of 40 kilometres. Additional Soviet naval missile launchers of this type would be purchased from 1976 to 1988 for the needs of Yugoslav Navy. They were mounted on ships like the Rade Končar-class.
Following the experience gained while operating those Soviet anti-ship missiles, the Yugoslav Navy military officials were becoming interested in acquiring a land-based system armed with the same missile. One reason was to supplement the firepower of the coastal artillery, which was mostly based on older Second World War artillery and anti-aircraft guns, such as the German 88 mm Flak. For this reason, in the late 1970s, a purchase agreement for 10 4K51 Rubezh vehicles was signed with the Soviets.
As these vehicles began to arrive, they received a five-digit designation. Somewhat confusingly, these five-digit designations were not given as the vehicles arrived, but instead by their year of production. For example, the vehicle that was built in 1978 was marked as 22764, while the ones built-in 1979 were 22761, 22762, and 22763. Vehicles built in 1980 were marked as 22765, 22766, and 22768. The one produced in 1981 was 22767, and the last two vehicles built in 1983 were marked as 22759 and 22760.
These vehicles were kept under high secrecy by the Yugoslav Navy for some time. For these reasons, their use and pictures of them from this period are quite difficult to find. Their first public appearance was during the last Yugoslav People Army parade held in Belgrade in 1985.
The last JNA (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija) Parade in Belgrade 1985.
The Soviet 4K51 Rubezh
During the late 1960s, the Soviets had the coastal mobile missile system “Redut”. It was basically an 8×8 wheeled chassis armed with one P-35 anti-ship guided missile which carried a 1,000 kg warhead and had a maximum operational range of 450 km. This vehicle was intended to destroy enemy ships at long ranges. However, the Soviet Navy wanted a new missile system that would be capable of engaging enemy ships at closer ranges, but also be able to carry at least two missiles. The new armament of this new vehicle consisted of two P-15M ‘Termit’ tactical anti-ship missiles. The large 8×8 MAZ-543 truck chassis was chosen as the carrier of the system. This new vehicle received the 4K51 Rubezh designation. The 4K51 was adopted into service by the Soviet Navy in late 1970s. Despite being newly designed, it saw use with many Communist countries around the world (Libya, Syria, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Cuba, etc.), including the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Name
In Yugoslav service, the 4K51 Rubezh was generally known as BROM, Baterija Raketa Obala-More (English: Missile Battery Coast-Sea). This was actually the name given to the unit which operated these vehicles. Why this designation was used instead of the original one is unfortunately not mentioned in the sources.
Organization
The BROMs were intended to be used as a “deterrence of aggression”, as described by the Yugoslav Navy. Their role was to act as a defense screen against any possible enemy invasion of the Adriatic coast.
The basic unit equipped with these vehicles was the Missile Battery. This battery consisted of only one vehicle, with two batteries forming a Missile Squadron, numbered from 201 to 205. These were then distributed to the islands and coastlines of the Adriatic sea in modern-day Croatia and Montenegro. The 201st was positioned on the isle of Mali Lošinj, 202nd on Visu, 203rd at Lastovu, and the last, the 204th, on Radovićima. The vehicles from the 205th Missile Squadron were stationed at Duvilama and were used for crew training and, if needed, as replacements.
Design
The BROM was divided into a few different sections, which included the chassis, the command control cabin, and the rear positioned missile launcher.
The chassis
The BROM was built using a modified chassis of the MAZ-543 (and the slightly improved MAZ-543M) 8×8 wheel truck. This vehicle had been developed by MAZ in the early 1960s and entered mass production in 1965. It was powered by a forward mounted 525 hp@2,100 rpm D12A-525A 38.9 liter V12 diesel engine. Despite its large size, the MAZ-543 had excellent off-road capabilities. It could reach a maximum speed of 60 to 65 km/h and 25-30 km/h cross-country. The operational range was some 625 to 635 km.
Armament
The main armament of the BROM consisted of two P-15M Termit missiles. These included the P-20 and P-21 sub-versions of the P-15M. The difference was that the P-20 was guided using radar, while the P-21 was guided using an infra-red signal. The BROM’s missiles had a length of 6.56 m, a diameter of 78 cm and a wingspan of 2.5 m. Their initial launch mass was some 2,523 kg.
During launch, the missiles were powered by a smaller auxiliary solid fuel rocket engine which had a thrust of 10 tons. After only 1.3 seconds, this auxiliary engine would be cast-off. The main engine of the P-15M missiles would begin to work half a second after launch. At the same time, two smaller wings would open. The main engine was fueled by a mix of TG-02 liquid fuel in combination with AK-20K nitric acid. The P-15M missiles could reach a maximum speed of 1,100 km/h (0.9 Mach). This speed could be achieved at a sea height of 25 to 50 m or 250 m over hard soil. The warhead consisted of 513 kg of explosives. The Soviets could also arm these missiles with a 15 kiloton nuclear warhead. The Yugoslavs did not have nuclear warheads. The missiles could be launched one after another, at an interval of between seven to nine seconds.
The maximum firing range of BROM missiles was about 80 km. This could be slightly increased up to 90 km with a reduced probability of hitting the target. The minimum operational range of these missiles depended on the altitude at which the BROM was located during firing. For example, at an altitude of 150 m, the minimum range was about 8 km. At 600 m, it was 18 km and at 800 m it was 22 km. Ideally, in order to achieve the best possible chance of hitting enemy targets, the BROM had to be as close to the coast as possible. If that was not the case for various reasons, the maximum distance from the coast had to be less than 19 km. The P-15M missiles could hit enemy targets with a speed of up to 80 knots and with a wind speed of 20 m/s.
Both missiles were stored in the large fully enclosed missile launcher bay (KT-161), which was placed to the rear of the vehicle. It consisted of two fully enclosed, pentagonal shaped launch bays. Inside of each of them, a ‘U’ shaped missile ramp was placed. In front and to the back of the launchers, four pyramid shaped cap covers were placed. During firing, these would be opened, moving to the top of the missile launcher compartment. In addition, there were several smaller inspection hatches across the launcher compartment. The firing missile point was actually located to the rear of the vehicle. When the vehicle was combat ready, depending on the combat situation, the missile launcher compartment could be rotated 110° either to the left or right side. The maximum elevation of this missile launcher was 20°. The dimension of the missile launcher bay length was 7 m, while the width was 1.8 m.
When reaching the designated area of deployment, the BROM needed some 2 to 5 minute to be combat ready. It depended on the experience training of the crew, but also on the geographical characteristics of the terrain.
Command control cabin
The command control cabin was located behind the front driver’s cabin. Four crew members were needed to effectively operate the missile system. They were tasked with operating a number of different systems, including pre-launch preparation, inspection of missile control systems, missile firing control, vehicle inclination measurement systems, communication equipment, etc.
For acquiring targets, the 3Ts-25 Harpun type radar was used. It was located above the command control room. When preparing for action, the radar antenna would be raised to a height of some 7.3 m with the help of a hydraulic arm. The maximum effective range of this radar was around 100 km when the vehicle was at an altitude of some 600 m. The BROM was fully capable of finding and firing at targets on its own. Depending on the combat situation, it could be linked to other external radar units.
Power to the command control cabin was provided by a 100 hp strong turbo gas engine. In addition, there were two 32 kW direct and one 22 kW alternating current generators. As a backup power source, there was an additional direct current generator. With these, the BROM could effectively work on its own power up to a maximum of two hours.
Crew
The BROM had a crew of five which consisted of the commander, the driver, who was also the launcher operator, the electrician, the radar operator and the radar technician. The precise crew positions inside the command control cabin are not mentioned in the sources.
Service during the Yugoslav Wars
During 1991, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was becoming a reality. In order to avoid losing the BROM vehicles, the Yugoslav Navy began an evacuation. The 201st and 205th Missile Squadrons were evacuated to Boka Kotorska (Montenegro) at the end of 1991. The 202nd and 203rd were evacuated during May 1992. The remaining 204th had been stationed in Montenegro prior to the war. One vehicle (22762) could not be recovered, as it was awaiting repairs at Šibenik at the time of the outbreak of the war and was captured by Croatian Forces. Luckily for the Yugoslav Navy, its vital electronic components and weapons were not present when it was captured. Its electronic components were also relocated to Montenegro and served as spare parts for the remaining vehicles. The precise fate of the Croatian captured vehicle is sadly not clear. Once all nine vehicles were relocated to Montenegro, these protected the newly created Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s (Savezna Republika Jugoslavija) coastline from an anticipated NATO intervention that was expected to occur during summer of 1992, but which never came.
During 1994, the BROM units were reorganized, placing them all into the 110th Coast Missile Brigade (Obalska Raketna Brigada). The Brigade was divided into two Squadrons, with the first having five and the second four vehicles. In 1996, the BROMs were used during the ‘Laser 21’ military exercise. During these exercises, older torpedo boats were used as target practise.
Due to international military sanctions, the acquisition of new spare parts for the BROM was impossible. While smaller repairs could be done by the Brigade’s own mechanics, major overhauls had to be completed at the repair institute in Banja Luka. Some six vehicles received a major overhaul during 1998, with two more in early 1999.
During the 1999 war against NATO
In 1999, the tense situation in Kosovo and Metohija between the Serbian and Albanian population worsened to the point that the international community felt the need to intervene. The government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia refused to allow foreign soldiers onto its territory. A war between Yugoslavia and NATO officially started on 24th March 1999. NATO Air Forces began bombing military targets like airfields, barracks and industrial centers, but civilian objectives were also targeted.
During this war, 8 BROM vehicles were fully operational. The ninth vehicle was under maintenance, awaiting repairs to its engine. These 8 were divided into two combat groups, with the task of preventing any possible NATO amphibious assault. One group was tasked with defending the Luštica Peninsula and its surroundings. The second group defended Petrovac-Bar. Some vehicles from this group were pulled back further inland.
Any reconnaissance and use of radar equipment had to be undertaken with great care due to NATO Air Supremacy. In general, the NATO ships that were patrolling in the Mediterranean did not come closer to 100 km from the Yugoslav shore. There was only one incident, when a NATO ship approached the shore accompanying a large non-military tanker. The crews of the BROM did not fire their missiles in order to avoid hitting the civilian ship. Despite its large size and huge NATO aerial advantage, no BROM vehicle was lost during the 1999 war.
Final fate
In the years after the 1999 war, the condition of the technical equipment of the Yugoslav Army was generally poor due to a lack of funds. The BROMs were gradually becoming a hindrance, slowly losing their military importance. In early 2004, Serbian and Montenegrin Army officials decided to maintain only four such vehicles in operational use for the defense of the Adriatic coast. The remaining five were to be temporarily stored. These four were allocated to the 108th Coast Defence Brigade. To compensate for the reduced number of operational BROMs, the 108th Coast Defence Brigade was reinforced with towed artillery. Due to the limited budget and huge maintenance cost, seven of the vehicles were declared surplus equipment.
In March of 2004, it was decided to sell all BROM vehicles abroad if possible. A firm called Cofis Export was responsible for organizing this sale. Shortly after that, a contract was concluded with the Egyptian Navy, which bought five fully repaired and equipped vehicles. These were shipped to Egypt the following year. This shipment also contained a number of spare P-20 and P-21 rockets.
By 2006, the remaining two operational BROMs, in addition to the two vehicles that were stored at that time, were retired from service. This was done mainly due to huge financial cuts to the Army’s budget. That same year, Serbia and Montenegro split up, which essentially meant the end of the coastal defence forces, as Serbia no longer had a coast. In 2007, the remaining two operational vehicles were also sold to Egypt. Only two non-operational vehicles (22767 and 22768) were left, which were placed in storage at Lepetinima. If they will ever be put on display in a museum or scrapped is unknown.
Conclusion
The Yugoslav Army was always interested in acquiring new and modern equipment. While not always successful, they did manage to acquire the advanced BROM system in the late 1970s. They were kept under great secrecy. Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, they remained in service with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. While this was an obscure and less known vehicle operated by the Yugoslav Navy, it nonetheless served for a long amount of time, covering the Adriatic coast from potential invasion.
Kingdom of Hungary (1935-1945)
Fast Tank – 60-150 Used
In their search for an armored vehicle to equip their army, the Hungarians began looking for potential suppliers who were willing to sell such equipment. The Italians, who already had a good connection with the Hungarian Army, were more than willing to sell their CV series of fast tanks. Thanks to this generous offer, the Hungarians managed to obtain some 150 fast tanks. These would see service during the small conflict with Slovakia, with some success. By the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 though, they were completely outdated.
Context – Hungary’s Search for Tanks
After the defeat of the Central Powers during the First World War, a new Kingdom of Hungary was created. Its Army (Honved) was forbidden by the Treaty of Trianon (signed on 4th June 1920) from developing and using tanks and other armored vehicles. During the late 1920s, the Hungarian Army officials managed to acquire small numbers of armored vehicles bought from Italy and the United Kingdom. This was mainly done thanks to a mitigated ban on arms and weapons purchases, but also under the false pretext that these would be used by the police forces. These were mostly obsolete designs with limited combat value and thus were only used for training and police duties.
Hungarian Army officials wanted to expand their own armored forces and thus needed better equipment. Unfortunately for them, the choice of where to buy these vehicles was limited. For example, Germany was unwilling to sell their tanks, being themselves in great need of such vehicles. France and the Soviet Union, for political reasons, could not be approached, and negotiations with British weapons manufacturers led nowhere. Luckily for them, Italy was more than willing to make a business deal with the Hungarians.
In June 1934, the Hungarian Military Technical Institute tested one CV33 tankette. After the conclusion of these tests, it gave a green light for the purchase of these vehicles. Soon after that, the Hungarian Army placed an order for some 150 tankettes. These vehicles began arriving during 1935, with the last one reaching Hungary at the end of 1936.
These received numbers H-100 to H-167 and H-169 to H-251. The Italians also provided them with one CV33 (H-168) without any armament. This vehicle was used mainly for training. In addition, a flamethrower version of this fast tank (H-252) was also sent for trial. It was not adopted by the Hungarians but, for unknown reasons, the single-vehicle remained in Hungarian Army storage without being paid for.
Name
In Hungarian service, these vehicles were known as the 35. M FIAT Ansaldo. A number of sources use different but similar variants of this, either 35M or 35 M Ansaldo. According to L. Ness (World War II Tanks), the CV33 was known as the 35 M, and the CV35 as the 37 M Ansaldo. For the sake of simplicity, this article will use the 35M designation.
The CV35
During the late twenties, the Italian Army began negotiating with the British Vickers company for the acquisition of new vehicles. After some negotiations, a Carden-Loyd Mk.VI tankette was purchased for testing and evaluation. Following the successful completion of these tests, during 1929, 25 new vehicles were ordered. In Italian service, these vehicles would be known as Carro Veloce 29 (Eng. fast tank).
Based on the CV29, the Ansaldo company began developing a new vehicle. While the prototype was completed in 1929, the Army was not impressed with it, mostly due to its weak and problematic suspension. The following year, the Italian Army requested a number of changes regarding its armor, size, and armament. Ansaldo constructed a few new prototypes with some differences in the suspension and even a tractor version, which were all presented to Italian Royal Army officials. The Army officials were satisfied with the improved prototypes and, in 1933, a production order for some 240 vehicles was placed. Next year, the first production vehicles, known as Carro Veloce 33, were ready for service. While, initially, this vehicle was equipped with one 6.5 mm FIAT-Revelli Mod. 1914 machine gun, from 1935 on, all vehicles would be rearmed with two 8 mm FIAT-Revelli Mod. 1914 machine guns.
In 1935, a slightly improved version, named Carro Veloce Ansaldo-FIAT tipo CV35, was accepted for service. It was shorter, had a slightly redesigned superstructure, with some being constructed with bolted armor instead of rivets. In total, by 1936, some 2,800 CV fast tanks would be built. Of that number, large numbers were sold abroad, including to countries such as China, Brazil, and Bulgaria.
How many were actually acquired?
Regarding the precise numbers of CV tankettes operated by the Hungarians, the sources are somewhat contradictory and even confusing. The previously mentioned information about the year of adoption and numbers are mostly according to C. Bescze (Magyar Steel Hungarian Armour in WWII). Other authors, like F. Cappellano and P. P. Battistelli (Italian light tanks 1919-45), state that the Hungarians acquired from Italy and even produced under license some 104 tankettes. Author S. J. Zaloga states that, in 1934, 30 CV33s were purchased from Italy. Additionally, 110 CV35s were acquired in 1936 and a few more in later years, reaching a total number of 151 vehicles. L. Ness mentions that, in 1934, some 25 CV33s were purchased, with many more in 1935.
Author P. Mujzer (Hungarian Armored Forces in World War II) mentions that the CV tankettes were put in use during 1935, and the last one arrived in December 1936. While the author gives a total number of 150 vehicles, in one part of the book, he is describing them as a CV33 and in another part of the same book as CV35.
Authors B. Adam, E. Miklos and S. Gyula (A Magyar Királyi Honvédség külföldi gyártású páncélos harcjárművei 1920-1945) mention that 68 CV35s were acquired in 1935 and the remaining 82 in 1936. Older and less reliable sources, like P. Chamberlain and C. Ellis (Axis Combat Vehicles), note that, between 1934 and 1938, some 60 to 70 tankettes were brought.
Initial distribution
Initial Hungarian pre-war plans stated that each armored unit should have an independent mixed unit equipped with light tanks and tankettes. As these formations were never truly formed, the 35Ms were, for some time, stored in Army warehouses. Some 15 fast tanks were used for crew training at Örkénytábor and Hajmáskér.
During 1938, the reorganization of the Hungarian Army led to the creation of Motorized Armored Brigades. The 2nd Motorized Armored Brigade received one 35M company. The Cavalry Armored Brigades were also reinforced with a 35M company. Each 35M company was divided into three platoons. These platoons had 5 fast tanks plus one command vehicle equipped with a commander’s cupola.
Hungarian modifications
During its service life, the Hungarians implemented some modifications to their 35M vehicles. The most obvious change was the modified armament. Initially, the Italian fast tanks received were armed with one machine gun (likely a 6.5 mm FIAT-Revelli Mod. 1914). Their firepower would be increased by replacing this machine gun with two Hungarian-built 8 mm Gebauer 34AM and later 34M/37M machine guns. The installation of the new armament necessitated the modification of the machine gun mount by increasing its size. If all or just a part were modified with the new armament is not completely clear in the sources. For example, authors B. Adam, E. Miklos, and S. Gyula mention that some 45 vehicles were modified with the twin machine gun armament.
Besides the change in the machine gun mount and armament, the Hungarians added a new commander’s cupola. This cupola had a simple square shape with a hatch on the top. To see the surroundings, the commander could use 7 periscopes placed in this cupola. The armor thickness of this cupola is not listed in the sources, but was probably light. In total, some 45 cupolas were mounted on the 35Ms. These were allocated to the platoon commander vehicles.
The Hungarians had plans to equip the 35M with a fully rotating turret. This would necessitate many changes to the vehicle’s design and would lead to an increase in overall weight. As it was deemed too complicated to operate, this was abandoned with no prototypes being built.
In combat
Against Czechoslovakia
After the Munich Agreement signed in 1938, the Germans managed to take parts of Czechoslovakia. Hungary, seeing a chance to get part of its pre-Great War territories back, began negotiations with Czechoslovakia to resolve this issue. As the talks led nowhere, both sides started preparing for a possible conflict. Thanks to the support of Germany and Italy, Hungary managed to peacefully take parts of southern Slovakia and southern Ruthenia. The 35Ms were used as the vanguard for the Hungarian occupation units in these territories.
After this event, the relations between these two countries were on the verge of war. Small border skirmishes occurred on several occasions. In March of 1939, Czechoslovakia was completely taken over by the Germans, which created the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. Slovakia, under German pressure, declared independence from Czechoslovakia. Wanting to gain more land, Hungarian officials demanded that Slovakia give away parts of Ruthenia. Elements of the Hungarian 2nd Motorized Brigade and 2nd Cavalry Brigade began advancing toward the disputed territories on 14th March. During this advance, the 35Ms belonging to the 12th Bicycle Battalion engaged a Slovakian unit stationed at the village of Orhegyalja. The defenders’ machine gun nest was taken out by a 35M commanded by Lieutenant Tamas Frater. The 35M fast tanks also participated in the defense of the Alsohalas village against the Slovakian forces. On the 24th, 35Ms from the 15th Bicycle Battalion also saw limited action in this area. On the 25th, due to German insistence, Slovakia ceded the disputed lands to the Hungarians. During this brief war, while no 35Ms were lost in combat, many were temporarily put out of action due to mechanical breakdowns and a lack of spare parts.
Transylvania 1940
Parts of Czechoslovakia were not the only ones that the Hungarian government wanted back. Transylvania was also lost after the First World War, when it was given to Romania. In 1940, the Hungarian Army began preparing for a possible war with Romania. By July, some three armies were ready, together with almost all available armor. But, in reality, the Hungarian Army was far from prepared, lacking manpower, and in the case of the 35M, some 50 or more were under repair, awaiting necessary spare parts which would not be available until October 1940. As neither side was willing to enter a hastily prepared war, negotiations began to find a possible solution. Ultimately, at the end of August, Romania asked Germany to arbitrate the issue regarding the disputed territory. Hungary managed to get the northern part of Transylvania. While moving its army to the new borders, many vehicles broke down, either due to mechanical breakdowns or due to poor roads.
Yugoslavia 1941
Hungary joined the Germans during the short war against Yugoslavia in April 1941. While the German attack began on the 6th, the Hungarians launched their own attack five days later. For this operation, the Hungarian Army mobilized its Fast Corp (Gyorshadtest), which consisted of the 1st and 2nd Motorized Brigades, together with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade had three 35M companies, with 18 vehicles each. One 35M Company participated in engaging Yugoslavian defensive bunkers at Subotica. Besides that, they saw limited combat service. The whole Axis invasion ended on the 17th with the capitulation of Yugoslavia.
In the Soviet Union 1941
Initially, the Hungarians did not intend to wage war against the Soviets. But, on 26th June 1941, a group of Soviet bombers hit the town of Kassa. After this, the Hungarians retaliated with their own bombing raids toward Ukraine, at which point both countries were effectively at war. For this war, the Hungarians allocated an army formation named the Carpathian Group. It consisted of the VIII Corps and the Fast Corps. The Fast Corps was under the command of Major General Bela Miklos. It consisted of the 1st Cavalry Brigade and the 1st and 2nd Motorised Rifle Brigades. It was additionally reinforced with 3 artillery battalions, two bicycle battalions, signal and engineers battalions. The Hungarian combat operations were to start at the end of June, as there was too little time for proper mobilization. These units were understrength.
The 35Ms were allocated to the 1st Cavalry Armored Battalion, which had 36 such vehicles. These were divided into two companies (each with 18 vehicles), which were further divided into three six-vehicle strong platoons. Additionally, the 10th, 12th, 13th, and 14th Bicycle Battalions each had a 35M platoon with 6 vehicles. In total, some 60 35M fast tanks were allocated for this invasion.
The Hungarians began combat operations on 30th June 1941. While the Soviet forces were already retreating, the Hungarians had trouble following them. The Soviets sabotaged or simply destroyed much of the infrastructure, which slowed the Hungarian advance. Additionally, the Hungarians were plagued by the poor mechanical reliability of their trucks, which were mostly civilian vehicles pressed into service.
On 9th July, the Carpathian Group was divided into two groups. While the VIII Corps was to remain in the rear to protect the supply lines, the Fast Corps was allocated to the German Army Group South. During their advance, the long drives and poor roads caused many mechanical breakdowns of the 35M fast tanks. On 17th July, some 30 35Ms were in desperate need of repair. The situation was so bad that the Hungarian Army had to organize additional civilian mechanics and move them to the front.
The 1st Cavalry Armored Battalion received orders to support the 2nd Motorised Rifle Brigade’s attack on the Soviet positions near Tulchin. On 27th July 1941, the Armored Battalion participated in the poorly organized Hungarian attack, which led to heavy losses. As the Armored Battalion was about to advance against the Soviet line at Gordievka, the unit’s Commander advised against such an attack, given the poor state of the surrounding ground. He was berated by his superiors and urged to begin the attack. The Armored Battalion commander allegedly replied, “Order confirmed. We are going to die”.
A 35M company began its attack on Gordievka, but due to bad road conditions, many vehicles were bogged down and unable to move. Those that were unable to move were simply shelled by the Soviet artillery. Some 35Ms had engine stalling problems, which forced their drivers to manually restart their engines. But to do so, they had to get out of the vehicle, which made them easy targets and many were killed. In this failed attack, the 1st Cavalry Armored Battalion lost 12 vehicles with their crews, including two platoon commanders. Only one platoon escaped destruction, as its commander ordered a retreat after seeing the carnage. The second 35M company also suffered losses and had only 6 operational fast tanks left.
This battle alone marked the end of large-scale 35M participation on this front. To somewhat reinforce the depleted units, a group of 5 fast tanks, 14 Toldi tanks, and 9 Csaba armored cars were sent from Hungary on 27th July, but these actually arrived on 7th October.
On 6th November, the Fast Corps received orders to pull back to Hungary. Nearly all the 35Ms were lost in combat. Given their poor performance, the available fast tanks were relocated to secondary roles.
Back to Hungary
The Hungarian 1941 campaign in the East showed without any doubt that the 35Ms were obsolete as fighting vehicles. In 1942, the surviving 35Ms were removed from frontline service and allocated to Police and Gendarmerie forces. The Police forces received 10 35Ms and a few Csaba armored cars in 1942. The main armament of the 35M was replaced with a single 31M machine gun. These were mainly used for the security of Budapest. The fate of these vehicles is not clear in the sources, but probably lost in the defense of Budapest by the war’s end.
In 1942, the Hungarians formed a Gendarmerie Battalion located at Galanta. The main purpose of this unit was to act as an anti-riot and possibly even in anti-partisan operations in Hungary. For this reason, it was supplied with 12 35M fast tanks. These were, in desperation, used against the Soviet forces during the Battle for Budapest in 1944/45.
35M Croatian service
The Independent State of Croatia was unable to acquire more armored vehicles (except a smaller number of Panzer Is and tank turrets which were mounted on trains) from Germany, despite being their puppet state. They instead turned to Hungary. In October 1942, a Croatian military delegation was sent to Hungary with the aim of reaching an agreement on the purchase of any available armored vehicle. The negotiations were successful and the Hungarians agreed to sell 10 (or up to 15) 35M fast tanks, including some 500,000 rounds of spare ammunition. In early November, these vehicles were handed over to Croatia, which used them (together with other Italian CV fast tanks) against the Partisan forces in Yugoslavia.
Surviving vehicles
There are a few surviving 35M fast tanks today. One can be seen at the Belgrade Military Museum. While it is not completely clear, this vehicle may have been one of 10 sold to Croatia by the Hungarians. The second vehicle (H-153) is now located in the Russian museum at Kubinka. It was captured by the advancing Soviet forces at the Piliscsaba Hungarian military base.
Conclusion
During the mid-1930s, the Hungarian Army, due to a lack of better available vehicles, purchased over 100 Italian light fast tanks. Unfortunately for them, these were fairly obsolete as fighting vehicles even before the start of the war, as they lacked a turret, sufficient armor protection, and were weakly armed. These fast tanks helped with crew training and saw limited combat service in the pre-war skirmishes with Hungary’s neighbors. By 1941, when these were used against an enemy like the Soviet Union, which had plenty of tanks and anti-tank guns, the 35M was quickly shown to be completely useless in such a situation. It was not a surprise that the Hungarians relocated the surviving vehicles to secondary roles after 1941.
35M specifications
Dimensions (L-w-h)
3.15 x 1.5 x 1.3 m
Total weight, battle-ready
3.2 tonnes
Crew
2 (Commander/Gunner, Driver.)
Propulsion
SPA CV3-005 43 hp @ 2,400 rpm
Speed (off road)
42 km/h, 15 km/h
Range
150 km
Armament
Two 8 mm Gebauer 34AM
Armor
6-15 mm
Number Operated
60 to 150
Source
D. Nešić, (2008) Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Italija, Beograd.
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1968)
Amphibious Light Tank – 63 Operated
During the 1960s, the Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, JNA (Yugoslav People Army, YPA) wanted to replace their aging Second World War reconnaissance armored cars. Given the good military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, it was logical for the JNA military to ask the Soviets for such equipment. By the late 1960s, an agreement was sought for purchasing 63 PT-76B amphibious light tanks. These would be used to reinforce the reconnaissance elements of many armored units. During the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, these would see action mostly as fire support vehicles.
The Need for a Reconnaissance Vehicle
In the years after the Second World War, the main reconnaissance vehicles of the JNA were the American-built M3A1 Scout Cars and M8 Armored Cars. These were clearly aging and outdated designs and not suited for more modern combat operations, having insufficient firepower and weak armor protection. On some occasions, Sherman or T-34-85 tanks were used to supplement the firepower of reconnaissance units. The JNA needed a more modern vehicle that had sufficient firepower and good speed to reinforce the reconnaissance elements of the armored formations.
In the 1960s, JNA Army officials began negotiating with the Soviet Union to resolve this issue. As a provisional solution, small numbers of BRDM-1 reconnaissance armored cars were acquired. However, this only temporarily solved the critical lack the suitable vehicles. In 1965, JNA Army officials decided to try to procure the PT-76 amphibious light tank. While the necessary funds were allocated for this project, the final decision was postponed for the next year.
In early 1966, a delegation led by the commander of the Yugoslav Armored Formations, General Dušan Ćorković, arrived in the Soviet Union. In March 1966, another delegation arrived in the Soviet Union to finalize an agreement for the purchase of military equipment. Interestingly, during the initial negotiations, the Yugoslav delegation showed interest in buying the new BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, but nothing came from this. Eventually, the deal was struck for the purchase of 600 T-34-85 and 67 PT-76B tanks, although the number of PT-76Bs was eventually reduced to 63. As these vehicles began to arrive in late 1967, they would be first transported to the military base at Pančevo, near the Yugoslav capital of Belgrade. Officially the PT-76Bs were accepted into service on 25th April 1968.
PT-76B
Work on a new Soviet amphibious light tank began shortly after the end of the Second World War. It was introduced to service in the early 1950s. The PT-76 had good amphibious capabilities. On the other hand, it was a relatively large target and had poor armor protection. Despite this, some 12,000 would be produced and would see widespread use in the Soviet Army (and later Russian army, up to 2006), as well as service aboard. During its service life, a number of modifications would be introduced in order to improve its overall performance and extend its operational service life. One of these included the PT-76B (original name PT-76 Model 1957), which incorporated changes such as an improved muzzle brake. This version would be exported to Yugoslav Army.
Organization and distribution to first units
Once the PT-76Bs were available, they would be used to reinforce the reconnaissance companies of armored units. The basic unit was a Platoon that consisted of three PT-76Bs and was supported by a Platoon of BRDM-2 armored cars (also with three vehicles). These were mainly allocated to Armored Regiments in addition to the Armored and Mechanized Brigades. During its service life, the PT-76B was almost never issued in units greater than a Platoon. The only exception to this rule was the reconnaissance Battalion of the 7th Armored Division, which had in its inventory 7 PT-76B tanks. A few tanks were allocated to various training centers and schools.
Service Life
The PT-76B in JNA service kept the original Soviet dark green camouflage. In addition, it received five-digit numbers painted in white. These were usually painted on the turret sides.
In order to train new crews, the first vehicles were allocated to various training schools. Initial training programs were carried out with the help of Soviet instructors from 15th May to 15th August 1968 at the main training center in Banjaluka. After some experience was gained with operating the PT-76B tanks, it was possible for further training to be conducted with JNA instructors. The first local training was carried out on the Sava river and later at a specially designed military range at Manjača.
The PT-76B was frequently used during military exercises during the 1970s and 1980s. It would be also used during one of the largest military maneuvers ever undertaken in Yugoslavia, named ‘Sloboda 71’ (English: ‘Freedom’). These lasted from 2nd to 9th October 1971, and some 40,000 regular and territorial defense soldiers were present, together with large quantities of newly acquired equipment. This maneuver also had a political background. After the Prague Uprising in 1968, political tension in Europe was high. At that time, there was even some political turmoil in Yugoslavia, especially in Croatia. This potential quelling of political instability has often been cited as one of the main reasons why the Sloboda 71 maneuvers were actually carried out. The PT-76Bs were also present on a number of military parades held in the Yugoslav capital of Belgrade.
During the early 1990s, there was a huge military reorganization of the JNA known as Jedinstvo-2 (English: ‘Unity’). It was planned that the JNA would operate some 3,078 tanks during the following years, including 48 PT-76Bs.
Yugoslav Wars
During 1991, the tensions between the Yugoslav Federal Republics worsened to the point that open conflict erupted. The JNA was initially involved in preventing any larger military uprisings, which it ultimately failed to prevent. During 1992, the JNA initiated a general evacuation of its personnel and equipment to Serbia. Many of its vehicles had to be left behind, and they were often captured and reused by the various military and paramilitary organizations which were present in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina. The PT-76B, while a rare vehicle during this conflict due to the small number operated by the JNA, would be operated by all warring parties in Yugoslavia to a limited extent.
One of the first engagements of the PT-76B during the Yugoslav wars was as a part of the 1st Armored Brigade (which had three vehicles), which was stationed in Vrhnika, in Slovenia. A JNA armored column was advancing in the direction of Vrhnika-Ljubljana-Kranj at the end of June 1991. This group with three PT-76B was tasked with taking the Rateče border crossing and the Karavanke crossing. Shortly later, a brief engagement with the Slovenian territorial defence forces occurred at the Karavanke crossing. The PT-76B was used in this engagement. While one of them was hit (sources do not specify the weapon used), no damage was noted on it. After a few days, the JNA elements that participated in these operations surrendered to Slovenian forces and the three PT-76B were captured.
The Yugoslav collapse was chaotic in its nature, and this also reflected in the overall operation and use of equipment by the JNA. Despite being intended to fulfill the role of reconnaissance, during the Yugoslav wars, the PT-76Bs were used in certain combat situations for which it was never indeed to. For example, the PT-76Bs were often used to spearhead attacks either in urban centers or against fortified positions. Being lightly armored, the choice of these vehicles to lead an assault verged on suicidal. On one such occasion, a PT-76B was destroyed during an attack on the village of Jankovci.
The use of large amounts of anti-tank weapons, close proximity to the frontline, and, in many cases, hilly terrain prevented the PT-76B from performing its original task as a reconnaissance vehicle. For these reasons, the PT-76B was mostly used as a fire support vehicle. It is also unknown if the PT-76B was ever used in any offensive amphibious assault during the war.
Anti-tank weapons, which were either captured from the JNA or even received from outside of Yugoslavia, caused huge problems to any armored vehicles. To protect themselves, crews of many tanks, including PT-76Bs, often added improvised additional armor. This basically consisted of whatever was at hand (storage boxes, spare tires, rubber, etc).
The majority of PT-76Bs would be used by the JNA and later the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Army. The Slovenian forces managed to capture some 3 vehicles. Croatian armored forces captured at least 10 such vehicles during 1991, which then saw action during the war. A few, possibly up to four, PT-76Bs were operated by the Army of the Srpska Krajina. Lastly, some 9 to 11 (depending on the source) vehicles were used by the Army of the Republika Srpska.
Following the conclusion of the Yugoslav wars, in 1996, an agreement for the reduction of arms and weapons was signed by all sides. With this agreement, most of the older equipment was declared surplus and, in many cases, scrapped. The new Yugoslav Army still had over 30 PT-76B light tanks in its inventory. The majority of these, some 33, would be scrapped in 1997 (or 1996 depending on the source). The few vehicles in the Army of the Republika Srpska were also scrapped later in 2000. Croatian and Slovenian vehicles were also mostly removed from service by the war’s end.
A New Chance
The Army Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, while scrapping the majority of the PT-76Bs, preserved some turrets. Based on the experience from the Yugoslav wars, the Army wanted to develop and build a number of small fire support boats. These were to be armed with one PT-76B turret each. This plan never materialized, mostly due to a lack of funds and political will. In 1999 and 2000, there were new proposals to revive the project, but ultimately, nothing came from this, and the fate of these turrets is not clear. They were likely scrapped.
Surviving Vehicles
At least two PT-76s are now preserved in Serbia. Both are placed in Army storage, with one in Žarkovo and the second in Kačarevo. Another one is located in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the Kozara museum. One more is located in the Slovenian Museum in Pivka and a few more are located in Croatia.
Conclusion
The PT-76B was operated by the JNA in quite small numbers compared with other tanks imported from the Soviet Union. By the time of the Yugoslav 1990s wars, it was a rare vehicle and would see little use. It would mostly be employed as mobile artillery and never saw combat in its original intended role.
Serbia and Montenegro (2004)
Self-Propelled Gun – 1 to 2 Prototypes Built
Following the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 90s, the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (in 2003, its name was changed to Serbia and Montenegro and finally, in 2006, Serbia became an independent state) inherited a relatively huge stock of various armament, equipment and weapons. One of these was the Soviet 122 mm D-30 and the domestically modified D-30J (with improved ammunition) howitzer. As the Serbian Army lacked a more modern self-propelled artillery (beside the aging 2S1 Gvozdika), in 2004, an attempt was made to develop such a vehicle using a military truck chassis and arming it with a 122 mm D-30J gun.
History
During 2004, the military leadership of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro discussed the possibility of improving the performance of the 122 mm D-30J howitzer. This was, in essence, just a Soviet D-30 howitzer that was imported during the 70s. The main difference was the use of improved ammunition with stronger propellant charge, which increased the overall firing range of the howitzer. The military decided to develop a brand new self-propelled artillery vehicle equipped with this howitzer. This vehicle was to act as a mobile fire support element of infantry and armored brigades. Its main mission was to saturate enemy positions with artillery fire before changing position to avoid counter fire. Great emphasis was thus placed on good mobility and sufficient firepower.
The development of such vehicles could basically go in two directions. Either a fully tracked vehicle or a truck wheel chassis. Due to factors including cost, the possibility of using already existing production capabilities, and reducing development time, the officials of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro decided to proceed with the second option.
Name
The official designation for this vehicle was Samohodna Haubica (self-propelled howitzer) 122 D-30/04 SORA (Serbian.- Самоходна Хаубица СОРА). In many sources, it is just mentioned as SORA (SORA-122 or 122 mm SORA are also used). This article will use this designation for the sake of simplicity.
Developing process
The job for designing such a vehicle was given to the Vojno Tehnički Institut VTI (Војно Технички Институт). Work on the construction of the first operational prototype was given to the ‘14 Октобар’ (14th October) factory from Kruševac. The VTI decided to go with a simpler solution, possibly in hope of reducing the overall cost and time. The new vehicle consisted of a standard military truck with its cargo bay replaced with a new firing platform with the 122 mm D-30J howitzer. Initially, a KAMAZ truck was to be used as the main chassis, but this was changed to the FAP2026 BS/AB, which was already in use.
In 2006, after a referendum, Montenegro became an independent state, and the development of the SORA vehicle was left to the Serbian Army. During 2006, there were a number of changes in the leadership of this project (due to the retirement of people involved in it). The project was given to Colonel Novak Mitrović. He was chosen mostly due to his experience with designing such vehicles. Besides the SORA, Colonel Mitrović was also involved with the design work of another self-propelled project, the 152 mm NORA-B. Colonel Mitrović would be replaced as the head of the SORA project by Lieutenant Colonel Srboljub Ilić. He had worked earlier on the 100 mm TOPAZ anti-tank gun (which was based on the D-30J). He too would be replaced by Mihajlo Trailović in 2007 due to retirement.
In 2008, at the 14th October factory, the preparations for the final assembly of the SORA began. However, there were some issues with the design of the firing platform. For this reason, another factory, the Tehnički Remonti Zavod Čačak (TRZ Čačak) – Технички Ремонти Завод Чачак was included in the project. Its engineers managed to design the modified D-30J mounting, which they successfully placed on the FAP2026 BS/AB chassis.
The SORA vehicle was then sent back to the 14th October factory, where it was fully completed and given to the Army for field testing. The testing and evaluation of the vehicle proved to be generally positive after firing trials held in the Nikincima army test site. In 2011, it was presented to potential foreign buyers at the ‘Partner 2011’ (Партнер) Arms Fair held in the Serbian capital, Belgrade. The first prototype failed to gain any foreign interest, nor did the Serbian Army adopt it. Despite this, work on improving its performance was carried on.
The improved version
Following the completion of the first prototype and its failure to gain any military contract, attempts were made to increase its overall performance. Sources are not clear if the second vehicle was just a modified first prototype or a completely new vehicle. The second prototype incorporated several new improvements which included: an automatic loading system, an improved fire control system, reducing the numbers of crew members, increasing ammunition load, and adding a close defense machine gun. It was presented for the first time for potential buyers at the ‘Partner 2013’ Arms Fair.
Technical Characteristics
Chassis
The basis of this vehicle was the FAP2026 BS/AB 6×6 all-terrain wheeled truck. This was a vehicle domestically developed and built by the FAP (Fabrika Automobila Priboj) factory beginning in the late 1970s. It was primarily designed to act as a towing vehicle for a number of artillery pieces. It could also be used to transport troops and materials, with up to 6 tonnes capacity. It was powered by a German Mercedes OM 402 engine giving 188 kW @ 2500 rpm. The maximum speed of this truck was 80 km/h and the operational range was 600 km.
For the SORA, the FAP2026 truck chassis had to be reinforced and strengthened to be able to withstand the firing recoil of the main gun. The weight of this new vehicle was 18 tonnes and the operational range was reduced to 500 km. The maximum speed was 80 km/h, dropping down cross country to 20 km/h. A spare wheel was positioned to the vehicle’s rear. To use this wheel, a mechanical crane was added, which, when activated, lowered the wheel to the ground.
Main weapon
The main weapon chosen for this vehicle was the 122 mm D-30J howitzer. This weapon was originally designed during the early ’60s in the Soviet Union. It was a somewhat unusual howitzer, mostly due to the design of its trail legs that, when fully deployed, enabled the gun to have a 360° traverse. During deployment, the rails of this howitzer are split into three different smaller legs, evenly separated. The wheels would be then raised from the ground up, thus creating a stable platform for the gun for firing in any direction. During transport, these three legs would be connected together and placed under the barrel. On the muzzle brake was a towing hook.
The original Soviet 122 mm D-30, with its nearly 22 kg round, had a range of some 15.4 km. The Yugoslav modified howitzer had a slightly longer range thanks to improved ammunition and larger propellant charge, reaching up to 17.5 km.
To make room for the D-30J howitzer and its mounting on the truck chassis, the rear positioned storage bin was removed. Instead of it, a new firing platform was placed to the rear. The howitzer, without its wheels and trail legs, was placed on a new round-shaped mount. Below this mount, a hydraulically operated support leg was to be lowered during firing. When ready for the firing mission, the main weapon was rotated to the rear. Despite the appearance of possessing an all-around firing arc, this was not the case.
During 2005, while still in the development phase, a number of experiments were done in order to test the durability of the front driver’s cabin during the firing of the main weapon to the front. As the tests showed that it lacked proper durability and general stability, instead the D-30J howitzer was pointed to the rear to avoid any damage to the driver cabin. Elevation of the D-30J howitzer was -5° to 70°, and the traverse was 25° in both directions. To help with absorbing recoil and providing a stable firing platform, two hydraulically operated supporting legs would be placed to the ground. When on the move, the D-30J howitzer was to be repositioned to the front and held in place at a 10° angle by a travel lock placed above the ammunition and crew housing. The SORA has an ammunition load of 24 rounds.
The SORA-122 D-30J howitzer had to be manually loaded and fired, which, given the lack of crew protection, made it quite vulnerable to enemy return fire. For this reason, following the completion of the first prototype, a new project was started with the aim of equipping the SORA with a more modern automatic loading and improved fire control systems. The new automatic loading system consisted of two round-shaped drums placed on both sides of the main gun. These were used to store six rounds of ammunition (placed in the right drum) together with six propellant charges (in the left drum). When these were all fired, they had to be manually reloaded.
When moving to the designated area of attack, this new configuration required some 3.5 minutes to deploy, fire six rounds, and disengage. Around 90 seconds were needed for the vehicle to be combat-ready for firing. The firing cycle of all six rounds was 1 minute. An additional minute was needed for the vehicle to prepare for moving again. The speed for redeployment after firing was desired to be as short as possible. It was estimated that enemy radar detectors would need at least 2 minutes to detect the SORA’s firing position after it fired, by which time it had already changed position to a new location. The whole process of deploying and redeploying was completely automated and easy to use.
On the improved prototype, the firing of the main weapon could effectively be done either from the vehicle itself or from a distance of 150 to 200 m (wired or wireless) from a mobile computer. The D-30J firing trigger was activated by a pneumatic cylinder. If, for some reason (malfunction or combat damage), the firing trigger failed, it could be operated manually by the crew members.
The new total ammunition load of the self-propelled guns would be 40 rounds, mainly located in the ammunition racks in the back of the cabin. The SORA could fire a number of domestically developed ammunition. These included the TF-462 with a range of 15.3 km, TF PD UD M10 with a range of 18.5 km, and the TF PD GG M10 with the greatest range, up to 21.5 km. The elevation and traverse were unchanged in comparison to the first prototype. The elevation and traverse speed ranged from 0.1 to 5 degrees per second.
For crew protection, beside their personal weapons, a 7.62 mm M84 machine gun was placed on top of the driver’s cabin. To use the machine gun, the crew were provided with a hatch.
Crew
The first prototype had at least four to five crew members (the sources do not specify the precise number). These were the commander, the driver, the gun operator, and loaders (one or more). The crew were seated inside the front cabin and in the rear positioned superstructure, which had two side doors.
The second prototype had only three crew members. It consisted of a commander, a driver, and a gun operator. While the sources do not specify it, one (or more) of these men also had to act as loaders for the drum magazine. In comparison to the previous model, the new one did not have the rear positioned crew compartment. This was instead replaced with added ammunition storage bins.
Armor
The SORA was not provided with any armor protection, neither for the front driver cabin nor for the gun operators (besides the small gun shield on the first prototype). The main reason for this was to reduce the cost and weight as much as possible. While the use of a protective armored cabin for the gun operators was considered, it was not adopted.
Fate of the project
The overall situation of the SORA within the Serbian Army is unclear. While, in the media and according to many statements of the Ministry of Defense over the years, one gets the impression that the SORA would be adopted, the project is nearly two decades old and still in the prototype phase. In addition, very recently, the Serbian Army stated that it is interested in upgrading its old 2S1 Gvozdika vehicles. The SORA also failed to gain any foreign interest despite its low price and simplicity. The Serbian Army appears to be focusing more attention in developing and introducing into service the much larger NORA B-52 and another 122 mm armed SOKO self-propelled artillery vehicle. Based on these factors, it is unlikely that it will be adopted for service within the Serbian Army in the near future, if ever.
Conclusion
The SORA is designed as a cheap and quick solution to the Serbian army’s lack of more modern self-propelled artillery. Despite achieving these goals, for unknown reasons, it is still not yet adopted for service. Despite its final fate, it provided the Serbian engineers with a good deal of experience in designing more modern vehicles.
German Reich (1943-1945)
Medium Tank – Over 100 Operated
During the Second World War, the Germans operated great numbers of enemy combat vehicles that they had managed to capture. These were mostly French and Russian tanks. These were usually pressed into service in their original role or modified for other roles. For example, many were converted as ammunition transport vehicles or as self-propelled anti-tank guns. From their former ally Italy, the Germans also managed to capture a relatively huge stockpile of various war materials. This also included a number of tank designs, including the M15/42 medium tank. While this tank was already obsolete before its introduction, the German nevertheless put them to use against the Yugoslav Partisans. There, they would be used up to the war’s end.
M15/42 tank
Due to the increasing obsolescence of the M13 Series (including the M14/41) and the slow development of the heavy tank program, the Italians were forced to introduce the M15/42 medium tank as a stopgap solution. The M15/42 was mostly based on the M14/41 tank, but with a number of improvements. Most noticeable was the introduction of a new 190 hp FIAT-SPA 15TB (‘B’ stands for Benzina – Petrol) engine and a new transmission. With the installation of the new engine, the tank hull was lengthened by some 15 cm compared to the M13 Series tanks. The standard 8 mm Breda anti-aircraft machine gun was removed and the access hatch was repositioned to the right side. A new 4.7 cm main gun with a longer barrel was installed, producing a more effective anti-tank gun, albeit still inadequate by that point in the war. The armor protection on the tank was also slightly increased, but this too was still inadequate to keep up with newer and better Allied tanks. The Royal Army placed an order for some 280 M15/42s in October 1942. However, due to attempts to produce more Semovente self-propelled vehicles, this production order was never fully achieved. While some of them were issued to Italian troops, their operational service life with them was limited.
The M15/42 had introduced some improvements, but it was generally outdated by the time it was put into service. Nevertheless, it would remain in service up to the end of the war, mostly with its new German owners, although some would also serve with Italian Fascist troops of the Italian Social Republic (RSI – Republicca Sociale Italiana).
In German service, the M15/42 was known as the Beutepanzer M15 738(i) or Pz.Kpfw. M15/42 738(i). For the sake of simplicity, this article will use the original M15/42 designation.
In German hands
In September 1943, due to the Allied invasion and internal pressure, Italy sought to negotiate peace with the Western Allied powers. The Germans were expecting this and sought to occupy as much of Italy as possible. With the occupation of most of Italy, the Germans came into possession of a number of armored vehicles, but also arms and weapon production facilities, with many vehicles that were awaiting assembly, from their former Ally.
The Germans managed to acquire, either by capturing or producing, over 100 M15/42 tanks. The Italian equipment, including tanks, was mainly used to replace the older French captured vehicles which were operated in the Balkans fighting the Partisan forces there. Note that the number of M15/42 tanks is difficult to pinpoint precisely, as sources have different numbers. The units that used them in Yugoslavia also had other M-series tanks in their inventory, which may sometimes lead to confusion. Another quite common issue with determining the precise type of tanks was the poor knowledge of the Partisans in identifying the enemy armor. Being that the Italian M-series tanks were quite similar to each other, distinguishing them was not always an easy task.
Combat use
One of the first units to be equipped with the M15/42 tanks was Panzer Abteilung 202. This particular unit was formed in early 1941, mostly equipped with French captured tanks. In September 1941, it was relocated to the Balkans to fight the Partisans there. By early 1944, it was reinforced with Italian armored vehicles in order to replenish the older and worn-out French tanks. Elements of Panzer Abteilung 202 were used to defend the vital Belgrade-Zagreb railway line during mid-1944.
On September 10th, 1944, this unit was transported to Belgrade. Some elements of Panzer Abteilung 202 were dispatched to the city of Valjevo, which was surrounded by the Partisans. They, together with other support units, managed to free the surrounded Germans. Two M15/42 tanks were damaged in the process, but recovered. Due to significant Partisan pressure, the Germans retreated to the north. On September 20th, some 15 tanks engaged with the Partisans near Šabac and Obrenovac, west of Belgrade. During the following skirmishes, one tank was destroyed and a second was damaged but later recovered by the Germans. The Germans managed to repel the Partisan attempts to liberate Šabac, as these were ill-prepared to engage tanks. Nevertheless, the Germans eventually abandoned Šabac in late October, moving with a group of 15 to 20 tanks north, toward Srem.
Other elements from Panzer Abteilung 202 were also engaged with Partisans forces in the area of Srem (north of Belgrade). At the start of October, at least three tanks of Panzer Abteilung 202 were attempting to repel the Partisans around Grabovci. The Partisans, using an anti-tank rifle, managed to destroy one of the three tanks. Two more tanks were lost in a Partisan ambush on October 11th.
Despite its obsolescence, the M15/42 could be used with some success against the Partisans, which often lacked proper anti-tank weapons. The situation for the Germans, who were holding the Yugoslavian capital Belgrade and eastern parts of the country, became desperate once the Soviet forces advanced to help the Partisans. During the Battle for Belgrade, which lasted from October 12th to 20th, 1944, Panzer Abteilung 202’s M15/42 tanks performed poorly against the Soviet T-34s (both 76 and 85 mm armed versions) and other armored vehicles. The M15/42’s armor was also noted to be unable to stop any Soviet anti-tank fire, including the anti-tank rifles. Many were lost during this battle, either destroyed in action or simply left behind. There was an accident when a Soviet T-34 rammed an M15/42 and completely turned it on its side.
From late October 1944 onwards, Panzer Abteilung 202 would be involved in the German defensive on the so called Syrmian Front in the northern part of Yugoslavia. By the end of 1944, Panzer Abteilung 202 had some 30 M15/42 tanks, of which only 18 were fully operational. Due to attrition, the number of available tanks was further diminished to 13 operational and 12 in repair. The effectiveness of these vehicles was greatly reduced due to heavy wear down and the increasing presence of Partisan anti-tank guns of various calibers. The lack of fuel and spare parts often meant that the M15/42s were of limited use and only on short distances. At the end of the war, what was left of the equipment of Panzer Abteilung 202, which was attempting to evacuate from Yugoslavia, was captured by the Partisans in Slovenia.
Panzer Abteilung z.b.V.12 was another unit stationed in Yugoslavia from 1941 on. It was heavily involved in fighting the Partisan forces there. At the beginning of March 1944, Panzer Abteilung z.b.V.12 was in the process of reorganization and the older French tanks were slowly being replaced with Italian built vehicles. During this time, the first M15/42 tanks began to arrive. By April 1944, there were some 42 Italian built M15/42 tanks in use by this unit. An additional M15/42 tanks built by the Germans would be allocated to Panzer Abteilung z.b.V.12. During the summer of 1944, Panzer Abteilung z.b.V.12 was moved to Serbia to reinforce the desperate attempts to keep the transit roads to Greece open. These roads and rails were vital for the evacuation of German forces stationed in Greece. Panzer Abteilung z.b.V.12 would not be used as a single unit, but instead would be divided into smaller groups and allocated to various German units stationed in Serbia at that time.
At the start of July 1944, the number of M15/42 tanks in this unit was increased to 59 vehicles, but only a third were fully operational. In October and November 1944, the unit saw extensive action against the Partisans, losing many vehicles in the process. For example, during the German defence of Niš, elements of Panzer Abteilung z.b.V.12 were present. The Germans were eventually forced to retreat, losing a number of tanks in the process, including at least one M15/42 which was captured by the Partisans. Panzer Abteilung z.b.V.12 had some 33 M15/42 tanks reported in October, which were reduced to 15 vehicles by the end of the following month. Panzer Abteilung z.b.V.12 would remain in Yugoslavia up to the start of 1945, when it was recalled to Germany. What was left of their equipment was given to Panzer Abteilung 202.
The M15/42 tanks employed by the Germans in Yugoslavia were plagued by a lack of spare parts, ammunition, and fuel. Many tanks were not used in combat, as they needed constant maintenance and repairs, and, too often, they would be simply cannibalized for spare parts. The vehicles used in Yugoslavia often received a large storage box placed behind the turret. In addition, spare track links would often be placed around the vehicle to act as limited extra protection.
SS Panzer Abteilung 105, which was part of V-SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgskorps, also operated the M15/42 tank in small numbers. It was involved in fighting Bosnian Partisans during 1944. In May 1944, it participated in the German Operation Rösselsprung (Eng. Knight’s Move), an attempt to liquidate the Partisan leaders, including Josip Broz Tito, at Drvar. To help achieve this, smaller parts of Panzer Abteilung 202 were also present. There is a possibility that some M15/42 tanks were used during this operation. At the end of 1944, when the unit was recalled to Germany, it had 5 M15/42 tanks in its inventory. While the unit fought the Soviets in the defence of Franfrukt, it is unknown if, by this time, it still possessed any M15/42 tanks.
The 12. verstärkte Polizei-Panzer-Kompanie, which was meant to be moved to Yugoslavia, had 14 tanks. At the end of 1944, it had some 8 M15/42 tanks, with only one operational. This police unit would be repositioned to Hungary from early 1945 onwards. It would be lost, with its equipment, during the siege of Budapest, fighting against the Soviets.
M15/42 with a Panzer 38(t) turret
The M15/42 was also used as a field modification by replacing its original turret with one taken from a Panzer 38(t). This vehicle is quite a mystery regarding who made it and why. What is known is that it was built during 1944 or in early 1945. On one of few existing photographs of it, during what appears to be some kind of parade, it has the marking of the German puppet state of Croatia (large capital U, which was used for Ustaše Croatian units). The problem is that the Croat forces, while infrequently supplied by the Germans and Italians (and even Hungarians) with armored vehicles, never operated any M-series or Panzer 38(t) tanks. The Croatian Army possessed some limited industry, as they managed to locally build a small number of armored trucks. The relatively easy task of placing a new turret on a damaged M15/42 could be achieved. Another issue with this theory is the fact that the vehicle would be captured by the Yugoslav Partisans at the end of the war on a train together with other German-operated armored vehicles. There is a chance that the Germans may have supplied the Croats with these vehicles, but this seems unlikely. The Germans barely had spare parts and ammunition for the M15/42 for themselves, let alone sharing these with the Croats.
More likely, the creators of this modification were the Germans. Firstly, they used both M15/42 and Panzer 38(t) tanks. The M15/42 was used in its original configuration. The Panzer 38(t) tank, on the other hand, was mainly attached to armored trains by the Germans and rarely used outside of that. Two units that may have built this vehicle were either Panzer Abteilung 202 or Panzer Abteilung z.b.V.12. While, due to lack of information, it is almost impossible to determine the creator, it is likely that it was made or at least operated by Panzer Abteilung 202. The reason for this is that the captured train transporting these vehicles also transported a number of vehicles belonging to this unit. Of course, this by itself is not a direct proof of it, as a number of other vehicles not belonging to the Panzer Abteilung 202 area were present on this train.
Yugoslav Partisan service
The Yugoslav Communist resistance movement managed to capture a number of M15/42 tanks. Some of these were probably used in combat, while smaller numbers were even used as training vehicles. The M15/42s were also used in military victory parades, like the one held in Kragujevac in May 1945. Following the end of the war, the M15/42s, together with other captured vehicles, were employed by the new Yugoslavian People’s Army. Their use would be quite limited due to the general lack of spare parts and ammunition. Nearly all would be scrapped a few years later, with one vehicle being preserved at the Belgrade Military Museum.
Conclusion
By the time the M15/42 was developed and put into production, it was already an obsolete design. It had poor armor protection and insufficient firepower as a medium tank by late-war standards. For fighting the Partisans, which lacked tanks or even anti-tank guns, this was a good opportunity to use an otherwise useless vehicle and free up more important vehicles. The Germans were in desperate need to find a tank that was available in some numbers that could be used to replace the older and generally worn out French equipment. Unfortunately for them, the M15/42’s overall performance was poor, as the majority were mostly stored awaiting repairs. In addition, once the Soviet Army reached Yugoslavia, they had little chance against more modern armor. But, despite these drawbacks, the M15/42 was certainly a welcome addition for the desperate Germans, who, by this time, did not have the luxury of being too picky. Given the fact that nothing else was available, the M15/42 saw use until the end of the war.
Specifications
Dimensions (l-w-h)
5.06 x 2.28 x 2.37 m
Total weight, battle-ready
15.5 tonnes
Crew
4 (Commander/Gunner, Loader, Radio Operator and Driver)
Propulsion
FIAT-SPA T15B, petrol, water-cooled 11,980 cm³, 190 hp at 2400 rpm with 407 liters
Speed
38 km/h
Range
220 km
Primary Armament
Cannone da 47/40 Mod. 38 with 111 rounds
Secondary Armament
3 or 4 Breda Mod. 1938 with 2,592 rounds
Armor
42 mm to 20 mm
Production
>167
Source:
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-Italija, Beograd
Pafi, Falessi e Fiore Corazzati Italiani Storia dei mezzi corazzati
N. Pignato, F. Cappellano. Gli Autoveicoli da combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano Volume secondo
L. Ceva and A. Curami (1989) La meccanizzazione dell’esercito italiano dalle origini al 1943, Volume 2″ from Stato maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio storico,
N. Pignato, (2004) Italian Armored Vehicles of World War Two, Squadron Signal publication.
Following the completion of the first four Panzer III series, it was realized that they left much room for improvements and changes. The next version in line was the Panzer III Ausf.E, which introduced a number of improvements, like a necessary increase in armor protection. More importantly, it finally solved the significant issues with the problematic suspensions from the previous versions with the introduction of a simple torsion bar suspension design. The most important legacy of this vehicle was that it set the production standard for all later Panzer III versions to come. The Panzer III Ausf.E would prove itself as a good overall design for its day.
History
In March 1936, Waffen Prüfwesen 6 (Wa Prw 6 – the automotive design office of the German Army) issued an Entwicklung von Panzerkampfwagen (development of tanks) document, in which it described a possible further development and use of tanks. A great deal of it was dedicated to armor protection. At that time, the German Army had imposed a weight limit for its tanks, so that they were able to cross bridges without collapsing them. In the case of the Panzer III series, it was limited to 18 tonnes. This regulation, together with other factors (number of crewmen, armament, power output of the engine, etcetera) actually limited the effective armor thickness of the vehicles. Most German tanks were thus mostly lightly armored, as armor was intended to provide protection against small caliber rounds only. The new document put great emphasis on the fact that weapons like the French 25 mm rapid fire anti-tank gun could destroy the lightly armored German tanks without a problem.
The development of the Z.W.4 (Zugführerwagen, platoon commander’s vehicle, also marked sometime as Z.W.38), better known simply as the Panzer III Ausf.E, incorporated a number of suggestions from this document. The armor thickness was increased to 30 mm, providing better overall protection. It also incorporated some highly advanced features advocated by the chief engineer of Wa Prw 6, Kniepkamp. He intended to increase the maximum speed of the Panzer III to a staggering 70 km/h! This would be done by replacing the engine with a more powerful model, introducing a new 10-gear semi-automatic transmission and replacing the previously used complicated 8 small road wheel suspension with a torsion type. The larger wheels were chosen as they had a longer service life than smaller models. The use of lubricating tracks with rubber pads was also suggested. After some consideration, the problems with the quick wear of the suspension at speeds of 70 km/h was deemed unfeasible and the idea rejected. The maximum speed was limited to 40 km/h and the lubricated tracks were replaced with normal cast tracks.
Production
Production orders for 96 Panzer III Ausf.E tanks would be placed by the Heeres Waffenamt. It was planned to complete the first vehicle in May 1938 and the last by September the same year. To fulfil the production quota and in order to include other manufactures into direct tank production, Daimler-Benz and M.A.N. Werk Nuernberg were included. Daimler-Benz was to build 41 (chassis number 60401 to 60441) and M.A.N the remaining 55 (chassis number 60442 to 60496) chassis.
As the German industry slowly began increasing production capabilities, these two simply could not produce all necessary parts. For this reason, the production of 90 turrets was given to Alkett and 6 more to Krupp. Many smaller subcontractors, including Werk Hannover, Eisen und Huettenwerk AG, Bochum, and several others, were also involved in the Panzer III project and were responsible for providing armor components. The engine was supplied by Maybach and the main armament by Rheinmetall.
Despite the plan to finish the production of the Ausf.E by September 1938, the actual first vehicles were completed by the end of 1938. The Daimler-Benz production run was delayed due to slow deliveries of necessary parts and components. By December 1938, only 9 vehicles were completed. An additional 9 were built in January 1939, 7 in February and only 2 in March. A short delay accrued due to shortages of transmissions. The production resumed in May, with the last vehicles being completed by July 1939. Production at M.A.N. was only fully completed by the end of 1939. Once the hulls were built, they would then be transported to Alkett to be fully assembled with their turrets. When Alkett actually completed these vehicles is unknown, as the documentation did not survive the war.
Hull
The Panzer III hull can be divided into three major sections. These were the forward-mounted transmission, central crew compartment and rear engine compartment. The front hull was where the transmission and steering systems were placed and was protected with an angled armor plate. The two square-shaped, two-part hatch brake inspection doors located on the front hull were still present on this version. The difference is that they now opened horizontally, in contrast to earlier versions, where they opened vertically. The two bolted square-shaped plates that were previously added on the front transmission armor were removed. Another change introduced was a significantly shorter hull length, at 5.38 m, while the older vehicles were 5.9 m long. Lastly, there were four towing couplings, with two placed in the front and two at the rear of the hull. The front hull also served as a base for the spare track links that were mounted on it. Some vehicles would receive armored ventilation ports for the steering brakes. These would be placed in the front glacis armor plate.
Unlike the larger Panzer IV, the Panzer III was not provided with driver and radio operator top hatches. These two crew members could instead use the front two-part brake inspection doors to enter or exit the vehicle. The Panzer III Ausf.E also received two small emergency escape doors placed on the hull sides, just behind the first return roller.
Superstructure
On top of the Panzer III Ausf.E hull, a fully enclosed and square-shaped superstructure was added. The superstructure had a very simple design, with mostly flat armored sides which were welded together, and bolted down to the hull. The position of the left driver visor and the machine ball mount next to it were unchanged. These were replaced with newer and improved models. In the case of the machine gun ball mount, this was the Kugelblende 30. The driver vision port was replaced with a Fahrersehklappe 30 model. This model consisted of two horizontal 30 mm thick plates. The upper plate could be raised, so that the driver had a direct vision, or lowered during combat situations. To further improve driver survivability, a 90 mm thick armored glass block was placed behind it. When the visor was closed, the driver would use a K.F.F.1 binocular periscope to see through two small round ports located just above the visor. This periscope had a 1.15 x magnification and a field of vision of 50°. The driver vision port was not completely waterproof and so a rain channel cover was placed atop of it during the production run.
The driver also had one smaller vision port (Sehklappe 30) placed on the left side of the superstructure. It was provided with a small 8 mm wide visor slit. It too had a 90 mm thick armored glass block for extra protection. Initially, the radio operator was not provided with a side vision port. During production, however, it would be added on some vehicles. Its design was the same as that of the driver’s side port
Turret
The Panzer III Ausf.E turret inherited the overall design from the previous versions, but there were still some modifications implemented on the Ausf.E. Firstly, the top turret plate was at a slightly different angle. The forward top plate was placed at 83° instead of the 81° used on the previous models. The rear top plate was completely flat now. Previously, it was placed at 91° from the vertical.
The gun mantlet also received some modifications, with added protective covers for the twin machine gun mount. The two mantlet observation hatches, located above the twin machine guns and to the left of the main gun, were slightly redesigned. The turret was also built using mostly welding and thus reducing the number of bolts used extensively on the previous versions.
Each of the turret sides received new pyramid-shaped observation vision ports. While the right visor port had an 8 mm wide slit, the left port did not have one. The visor ports were 30 mm thick and further protected by a 90 mm armored glass block. To the back, the simple one-piece doors were replaced by new two-piece doors. The forward door had an observation port, while the second door had a small pistol port. These doors could be locked in place with a gap of some 30 mm to provide the crew with additional ventilation. Above the doors, a rain drain guard was placed, which prevented rain weather from getting into the turret’s interior. In addition, the two square-shaped machine gun ports, located to the rear of the turret, were also replaced with new round-shaped covers.
The Panzer III Ausf.E commander’s cupola was bolted to the rear of the turret top. It had five vision slits, protected with sliding blocks. For extra protection, behind each vision slit, an armored glass block was added. The commander was also provided with a direction indicator placed on the front vision slit, and a graduated ring with markings from 1 to 12 to help him identify the direction in which the vehicle was going.
On top of the turret, two round shaped signal ports, just in front of the commander cupola, were placed. The left one was initially provided with a fake periscope cover, but this was quickly dropped during production. The signal ports were not completely closed. Instead, they had a 3 mm wide gap left in order to act as auxiliary ventilation ports for the turret crew. The main purpose of these signal ports (as their name suggests) was to be used by the commander to communicate or give order to other vehicles by using signal flags.
From late 1940 onwards, most Panzer IIIs received an additional and properly dedicated ventilation port placed on top of the turret. It was protected by a round shaped cover. Another addition to the turret was the rear positioned storage bin, which was added on most Panzer IIIs from April 1941 onwards.
Suspension and Running Gear
The Panzer III Ausf.E suspension consisted of six doubled road wheels on each side. These were suspended using a combination of individual swing axles together with torsion bars which were placed in the hull bottom. The upper movement of each wheel’s swing arm was limited by contact blocks covered in rubber. Additionally, the first and the last wheels were equipped with a hydraulic shock absorber. At the front, there was a 360 mm wide 21 tooth drive sprocket. On the back of the hull was the idler with adjustable crank arm. The number of return rolles was three per side.
The cast tracks were 380 mm wide. To help prevent the tracks from accidentally falling off, a 80 mm long cast tooth was placed in the middle of the track link. In order to improve passability on bad terrain, each track link had a gripper bar. There were some issues with how quick the rubber tires on the road wheels wore down when the driver was using 9th and 10th gears. To prevent this, the drivers were instructed to avoid driving above 40 km/h.
By the end of 1940, a number of improvements were introduced to Panzer III production. These included adding extra armor and better armament. To cope with the extra weight and prevent the loss of driving performance, the track was widened to 400 mm.
Engine
The Panzer III Ausf.E’s engine was placed at the rear of the hull, and was separated by a firewall from the central crew compartment. The firewall had a small door. Its purpose was to provide the crew member with access to the engine if needed.
To cope with the increase in weight (from 16 tonnes on the Ausf.D to 19.5 tonnes), a new, stronger engine was installed. This was a twelve-cylinder, water-cooled Maybach HL 120 TR which produced 265 hp@ 2800 rpm. The engine was held in place by three rubber bushings. With this power unit, the Panzer III Ausf.E’s maximum speed was increased to 40 km/h, while the cross-country speed was 15 km/h. The fuel load of 310 liters was stored in two fuel tanks placed below the radiators in the engine compartment. With this fuel load, the Panzer III Ausf.E’s operational range was 165 km and 95 km cross-country. To avoid any accidental fires, these fuel tanks were protected by firewalls.
The engine compartment was protected by an enclosed superstructure. On top of this compartment, two two-part hatch doors for access to the engine were added. Further back, two smaller doors were added to provide the crew access to the fan drives. The air intakes were repositioned to the engine compartment sides and were protected with armor plates. A new type of exhaust was used on the Ausf.E.
The engine was started by an auxiliary electric motor starter. The power to this electrical starter was provided by two 12 volt Varta batteries which were in turn powered by a 12 volt Bosch generator. Some vehicles received improved starters that helped start the engine somewhat easier during early 1941.
Transmission
The Panzer III Ausf.E was equipped with the ten-speed (and one reverse) Maybach Variotex SRG 32 8 145 semi-automatic transmission. The transmission was connected to the engine by a drive shaft that ran through the bottom of the fighting compartment. The steering mechanism used on the Panzer III was bolted to the hull. It was connected to the two final drives that were themselves bolted to the outside of the hull.
The Germans were a little carried away when they intended to use semi-automatic transmission in the hope of reaching speeds of up to 70 km/h. The semi-automatic transmission required frequent changes of the gears during driving. To change the gears, the driver first had to select one in advance and then the gear was actually changed once he pressed the clutch pedal. The frequent changing of the gears created friction that was passed on to the clutches. To prevent this, the inertia moment of the rotating parts had to be kept small. Using smaller, somewhat unproven and not properly tested transmissions caused significant mechanical breakdowns. To somewhat resolve this issue, an accelerator clutch would be installed. The problem still remained and the transmission would eventually be replaced with the older and properly tested SSG 76 on the Panzer III Ausf.H.
Armor Protection
The hull front armor was 30 mm thick, placed at a 21° angle. The upper hull front was 30 mm at 52°, while the lower front hull armor was 25 mm and placed at 75°. The glacis armor was 25 mm thick and placed at 87°. The flat side armor was 30 mm thick, the rear was 20 mm (at a 10° to 65° angle) and the bottom 16 mm. The Panzer III Ausf.E front armored plates were actually face-hardened, further increasing their protection against certain types of shells.
All-around, the superstructure armor was 30 mm thick. While the sides and rear were flat, the front plate placed almost vertical, at a 9° angle. The top armor plate was 16 mm thick. The rear engine compartment was protected with flat 30 mm side armor, while the rear one was placed at 30° and was slightly weaker, at 20 mm.
The front turret armor was 30 mm (at a 15° angle), while the sides and rear were 30 mm (at a 25° angle) and the top was 10 mm (at an 83-90° angle). The front gun mantlet was a 30 mm thick rounded armor plate. The commander’s cupola had all-around 30 mm of armor. The armor plates were made using nickel-free homogeneous rolled plates.
When the Germans were examining the proper armor thickness needed for the new Panzer III Ausf.E, they mainly focused on the French 25 mm quick firing anti-tank gun. They eventually decided that 30 mm of armor should be up to the task. The frontal armor plate was strong enough to resist the 25 mm rounds at ranges of over 500 m at 30°.
The Panzer III Ausf.E was also equipped with a Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung (smoke grenade rack system), placed on the rear of the hull. This rack contained five grenades which were activated with a wire system by the Panzer III’s commander.
At the end of 1940, most available Panzer IIIs, including the Ausf.E, were reinforced with additional 30 mm face hardened plates. These were added to the front hull and superstructure but also to the rear. It is worth mentioning that not all Panzer III actually received the extra protection, for various reasons, but mostly due to the slow production of necessary components.
Crew
The Panzer III Ausf.E had the same crew of five, which included the commander, gunner and loader, who were positioned in the turret, and the driver and radio operator in the hull. Their positions and their duties were the same as from the previous (but also future) versions.
Main Armament
The armament configuration of the Panzer III Ausf.E was unchanged from the previous versions. It consists of one MG 34 machine gun mounted in the superstructure and a combination of the 3.7 cm Kw.K. L/46.5 and two additional machine guns in the turret. The Panzer III’s main gun was equipped with a TZF5 ‘Turmzielfernrohr’ monocular telescopic gun-sight. One change implemented was the repositioning of the left turret-mounted machine gun, which slightly protruded out. This was done to give the crew more working space for replacing the drum magazines.
On the left side of the gun, there were two mechanical handwheels for elevation and traverse. The gunner could traverse the turret by using the traverse handwheel at a speed of 2.2° per turn. For more precise aiming, the handwheel speed could be reduced to 1.5° per turn. The elevation speed by using the elevation handwheel was 2.5° per turn. On the right side of the turret was a second handwheel to allow the loader to assist with turret traverse.
In February 1940, the Panzer III’s were supplied with the 3.7 cm Spenggranatepartone 18 (high explosive round). In June 1940, a new Pzgr.Patr 40 (anti-armor tungsten core round) started to be issued for troop use.
The new superstructure Kugelblende 30 ball mounted machine gun, which was operated by the radio operator, consisted of two parts. The movable armor ball to which the machine gun was attached, and the external and fixed armor cover. This new type of ball mount offered a traverse left and right of 15°. It could be elevated to 20° and depressed to 15°. For spotting targets, a telescopic sight with an elevation of 18° and 1.8 x magnification was provided to it. While, initially, drum magazines were used for the machine guns, these would be replaced with belts from June 1940 onwards.
During the Panzer III’s early stages of development, the Germans were aware there was a possibility that the 3.7 cm gun may become obsolete. The lack of production capacities was the main reason for not installing a more potent gun from the start. This is the reason why they left the turret ring wide enough so that a larger caliber gun could be installed. In December 1940, the rearmament of the Panzer III Ausf.E (and all versions that followed it) with the 5 cm Kw.K L/42 semi-automatic gun began. With the new gun also came a new round-shaped and 35 mm thick gun external mantlet. Another change was the reduction of the number of machine guns in the turret to only one.
With the installation of the new gun, the ammunition load was reduced from the original 120 to 87 rounds (or 99, depending on the source). The removal of one machine gun led to the reduction of the machine gun ammunition carried inside to 3,750 rounds (from 4,500 previously). In addition to the new gun, new T.Z.F.5d gun sights were used. This sight had a magnification of 2.5x and a field view of 25°, which was 444 m wide at 1 km range. The gunsight reticle ranges were marked up to 1,500 m for the main gun and machine guns.
In Combat
As the Panzer III Ausf.E vehicles became available, they would be initially issued to training units. The first operational use, in limited numbers, was during the German annexation of Czechoslovak territories during March 1939.
Prior to the Invasion of Poland in September 1939, the Germans had 148 Panzer III vehicles available (Ausf.A to E). Some 98 would be allocated for combat operations (only 87 of that number would actually be used in combat). The remaining were to be used as a reserve or given to training units. The majority of the committed Panzer III’s would be allocated to the 1st Panzer Division, which had only 26 such vehicles. The remaining vehicles were distributed to other armored units in limited numbers, but not to all. For example, the 4th Panzer Division did not have any Panzer III tanks. Only a small number of (probably not more than several vehicles) Panzer III Ausf.Es saw combat, with some not even managing to reach the front lines due to problems with their transmission.
By May 1940, the number of Panzer IIIs was increased to 349 vehicles which were distributed to seven Panzer Divisions. The disposition of Panzer III tanks was as follows. The 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions had 58 each, the 3rd 42, the 4th 40, the 5th 52, the 9th 41 and the 10th Panzer Division had 58 Panzer IIIs. By this time, the Panzer III Ausf.A to D were removed from front line service, as these were mainly given to training units.
The Panzer Divisions saw extensive combat operations against French armor. An example of this was the 4th Panzer Division which, with the 3rd Panzer Division, were part of the XVI Panzerkorps under the command of General Eric Hoeppner. The combined strength of these two divisions was over 670 tanks, with the majority being the Panzer I and II. Opposing them there was a force of 176 Somua S35 and 239 Hotchkiss tanks. In comparison to the Germans, the French redistributed their armor formation across the 35 km wide front. With this decision, they actually made any counterattack less likely to succeed in stopping the Germans.
During the drive toward the village of Hannut, the forward elements of the 4th Panzer Division, consisting of Panzer I and II tanks, managed to capture the village. The French made a counterattack with over 20 Hotchkiss tanks. While they managed to gain the upper hand against the Panzer II, once the Panzer IIIs arrived, the situation changed drastically in favor of the Germans. The French lost some 11 Hotchkiss tanks, most being credited to the Panzer IIIs, with some to the weaker Panzer II. Later that day, the German Panzers engaged a group of Somua S35 tanks. After losing four tanks, the French made another retreat. Eventually, with losses of some 160 tanks (the majority being the Panzer Is and IIs), the Germans broke through the French line, who lost 140 tanks and were forced to retreat. The Germans could recover many of their lost tanks and repair them, while the French were unable to do so. The Panzer IIIs were at a disadvantage against the larger B1 bis tanks. For example, during the battles around Sedan, a single B1 tank managed to destroy some 11 Panzer III tanks alone.
The combat experience in the West showed that, while the Panzer III were not protected against the French 47 mm gun, neither was their 3.7 cm gun effective. The Panzer III’s 3.7 cm gun was only effective against the Somua S35’s side armor from ranges of less than 200 m. Thanks to their speed, training, better tactics and use of radios, the German tanks could easily outmaneuver the enemy tanks and engage them from the more vulnerable rear and sides. The five-man crew proved to be superior in contrast to the French two to three crew tanks. In case of the Somua S35, the tank commander had to take several roles during the heat of battle, including loading and firing the gun, finding targets, and commanding the vehicle, overburdening him. On the other hand, in German vehicles, each crew member had a specific role to complete, which provided their tanks with a greater tactical advantage.
After the French campaign, the Germans tried to amend some of the shortcomings identified with the Panzer III, especially regarding its armor and firepower. The Panzer III would be rearmed with the 5 cm L/42 gun and receive additional 30 mm of frontal and rear armor. This included the Panzer III Ausf.E, but despite best attempts, not all tanks were modified by mid-1941.
The Panzer III Ausf.E likely saw use during the German operations in the Balkans. The use of Panzer III Ausf.Es in Africa is not completely clear. At the start of German operations, for example, the 5th Panzer Regiment had 61 (10 lost during the transport) Panzer IIIs armed with 3.7 cm guns and the 8th Panzer Regiment had 31. It is possible that some of these were of the Ausf.E version.
For the invasion of the Soviet Union, there were 350 3.7 cm and 1,090 5 cm armed Panzer IIIs. By this time, it is somewhat difficult to pinpoint the precise version of the Panzer III used, as the sources rarely mention them. The identification of the precise version is not always possible, as the Ausf.F looked exactly the same as the Ausf.E. Like in the previous campaigns, the Panzer III was the backbone of the German armored thrust. The German tanks were able to quickly overcome the older Soviets models, like the T-26 and the BT series. The T-34 and KV vehicles proved to be almost invulnerable to the German tank guns. Following the harsh German losses in the Soviet Union, its likely that only a small number of Panzer III Ausf.Es would have survived 1941.
Variants based on the Panzer III Ausf.E
Panzerbefehlswagen Ausf.E
The Panzer III Ausf.E was used for the Panzerbefehlswagen (tank command vehicle) configuration. This included a number of modifications, some of which were reducing the armament to only one machine gun (located in the turret) and using a dummy main gun (to hide its main purpose as a command vehicle), fixing the turret in place, replacing the gunner and the loader with one more radio operator and a commander adjutant, adding additional radio equipment, and, probably most noticeably, adding a large antenna to the rear of the turret. In total, some 45 such vehicles would be built by Daimler-Benz. These are not converted or rebuilt vehicles but instead completely new built vehicles.
The Panzer III Ausf.E received a number of modifications and improvements in comparison to the previous versions. Most noticeable were the added armor and the use of the new type of suspension, which was simpler and more efficient. On the other hand, the new transmission was problematic and not properly tested. In the early stages of the war, despite the somewhat weaker main armament, thanks to its speed, crew training and radio equipment, the Panzer III Ausf.E could easily outflank its opponents. Perhaps the greatest success of the Panzer III Ausf.E was that it provided the Germans with a good base for further modifications and improvements of a vehicle that would become the backbone of the Panzer Divisions in the first years of World War Two.
Specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
5.8 m x 2.91 m x 2.5 m
Total weight, battle-ready
19.5 tonnes
Crew
5 (Commander, Gunner, Loader, Radio Operator and Driver)
German Reich (1941)
Medium Support Tank – 471 Built + 2 Hulls
The Panzer IV Ausf.F was an important turning point for the whole further Panzer IV development for several reasons. Firstly, it reintroduced the single-piece straight front armor plate, which would become standard on all subsequent Panzer IV tanks. Secondly, it was the last version to be equipped with the short barreled 7.5 cm gun, after which the Germans decided to upgrade the vehicle with longer barreled guns for better anti-tank penetration. The Panzer IV Ausf.F was also supplied to the Hungarians in an attempt to rebuild their armored formations. Lastly, due to the large demands for more vehicles, the Panzer IV Ausf.F, would be also produced by Vomag and Nibelungenwerke beside Krupp-Grusonwerke, which was initially the only manufacturer of the Panzer IV.
History
By the time the Panzer IV Ausf.E was entering production, some deficiencies were noted for it and previous versions. The most noticeable was the relatively weak armor protection. While it was planned to provide the Ausf.E with 50 mm thick frontal armor, this was not implemented by the time of production. When the Ausf.F entered production in April 1941, it was possible to install the thicker, single-piece armor plates without the need to use two weaker armor plates like it was initially implemented on the previous version. Some structural changes on the superstructure and chassis were also to be implemented on the new Ausf.F. Other than these, the Ausf.F would serve the same purpose as a support tank. It would be allocated to Panzer Divisions as a replacement for the lost vehicles in the previous campaigns.
Production
At the end of 1938, In 6 (Inspektorat 6, the inspectorate for mechanization) issued a request for the production of 129 Panzer IV Ausf.F tanks, which were to be built by Krupp-Grusonwerke. The outbreak of the war in September 1939 changed the initial production plans. Due to the great need for more modern Panzer IVs, the initial order was increased to 500 vehicles in November 1939
In order to increase the production speed, other manufacturers were to be included in the Panzer IV project. These include Vomag and Nibelungenwerk, both of which were to produce 100 new Panzer IV Ausf.F vehicles starting from June 1940. Due to the anticipated invasion of the Soviet Union, these production orders were once again changed to include 300 additional vehicles which were to be assembled at Krupp-Grusonwerke.
The Panzer IV Ausf.F production lasted from April (or May, depending on the source) 1941 to February 1942. By that time, Krupp-Grusonwerke managed to produce 393 tanks plus two chassis which were used as ammunition vehicles for the large Karlgerät. Vomag made 65 and Nibelungenwerk was able to produce only 13 Panzer IV tanks. In total, some 471 Panzer IV Ausf.F plus the two chassis were built. The main reason why the production goal was not reached was the sudden decision to drop the use of the shorter gun and focus on the production of the longer 7.5 cm gun.
Specifications
While the Panzer IV Ausf.F represented a further development of the previous version, it incorporated a number of improvements.
The Engine
While the Panzer IV Ausf.F had the same engine as the previous version, it received a much shorter exhaust muffler. To its left, a small auxiliary engine muffler was added. The engine top cover was also completely redesigned, adding two large radiator ventilation grilles.
The Hull
The hull received some minor modifications. One of these was the installation of armored covers for the ventilation vents on the hull frontal brake access hatches. In order to increase the operational range and to reduce the dependency on auxiliary fuel supply vehicles, after April 1941, Panzer IV Ausf.F (like all other Panzer IVs) tanks were equipped with a tow hitch and fuel trailers. These were primarily used during the first year of the invasion of the Soviet Union but proved to be more of a hindrance and their use after that generally declined.
The Superstructure
The Panzer IV Ausf.F’s superstructure reintroduced the completely straight front superstructure armor plate. The use of a single plate made the front armor stronger structurally, but also made production somewhat easier. This was not new, as it had been used on the Ausf.B and C versions, but had been discarded on the Ausf.D and Ausf.E versions. Other changes included the installation of the completely new and better machine gun ball-mount (Kugelblende 50). The driver visor port was replaced with a slightly thicker Fagrersehklappe 50 model.
The Turret
The turret design on the Ausf.F received new two-part side doors taken from the Panzer III Ausf.E. The forward door had an observation port, while the second door had a small pistol port. The pistol and visor ports were also taken from the same Panzer III. The visor ports were 30 mm thick and further protected by a 90 mm armored glass block.
Suspension and Running Gear
The added armor protection and other changes lead to a slight increase in weight, from 22 to 22.3 tonnes. To prevent this from affecting the overall drive performance, some changes were implemented on the Panzer IV Ausf.F’s suspension. The tracks were widened to 40 mm, which necessitated the widening of the road wheels. The front-drive sprocket was slightly redesigned to be able to accommodate the wider tracks. The rear idler wheel was replaced with a new much simpler and easier to produce design.
Armor Protection
The Polish and Western campaigns showed that the Panzer IV was not sufficiently protected. To resolve this issue, the Panzer IV Ausf.F was meant to have improved armor protection that would be able to frontally resist 3.7 cm anti-tank rounds. For this reason, the front hull, superstructure, and turret (including the gun mantlet) were reinforced. These were now 50 mm thick face hardened armor plates. In addition, the overall side armor was increased to 30 mm. During production, some vehicles received side armor plates that were also face-hardened.
The Panzer IV Ausf.F was also equipped with the smoke grenade rack system (Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung). This was discarded from use after 1942, being mostly replaced with a new one that was mounted on the turret sides. Some vehicles were equipped with 5 mm thick armor plates (Schürzen) covering the side of the vehicle. These served to protect the tank from Soviet anti-tank rifles.
A number of vehicles were equipped with the 20 mm thick front-spaced armor (Vorpanzer). Its primary function was to provide protection from tungsten and hollow-charge rounds. The crews would often add whatever they had to the tank for protection. This usually consisted of various track types (taken from other German or even captured vehicles), spare wheels, etcetera, in the hope to increase the survivability of their vehicles.
The Armament
The main armament was unchanged and consisted of the 7.5 cm KwK 37 L/24 with 80 rounds of ammunition. The secondary armament consisted of two 7.92 mm MG 34 machine guns. The ammunition load for these two machine guns was stored in 21 belt sacks, each with 150 rounds (with 3,150 rounds in total).
The 7.5 cm gun could fire high-explosive, smoke or anti-tank rounds. Experience during the first years in the Soviet Union had shown that the 7.5 cm was not up to the task of effectively countering enemy tanks. As a quick solution, in December 1941, Adolf Hitler issued an order that the production of the 7.5 cm GrPatr 38 (shaped-charge round) should begin as soon as possible. While this ammunition was developed in 1940, its actual production began only in early 1942. The 7.5 cm Gr.Patr. 38 could penetrate 75 mm of armor regardless of the combat range. It had a low velocity of 450 m/s, which greatly affected its precision. Another issue was that, when hitting enemy tanks, the shaped-charge would not always penetrate the enemy armor, as it would sometimes simply bounce off. Later models would greatly improve the overall performance.
In Combat
Being produced after April 1941, the Panzer IV Ausf.F would mostly see action in the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, in North Africa. Some were used against the Yugoslav Partisans up to the war’s end.
In North Africa
In the North African theater of war, during 1941 and early 1942, the short-barreled Panzer IV would see service in small numbers. The more dominant German tank at that time was the Panzer III.
On 23rd August 1942, there were only 8 operational Panzer IVs available at El Alamein. There were initially 40 Panzer IVs in service with the Deutsche Afrika Korps (DAK) [Eng. German Africa Corps].
In the Soviet Union
By the time of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the number of Panzer IVs was around 517 (or 531 according to some sources). Each Panzer Division possessed in their inventory, on average, around 30 such vehicles. Of these, some 70 were the Ausf.F version. Sadly, it is quite difficult to pinpoint the precise combat operations of individual Panzer IV versions, as the sources do not distinguish between the short barrel versions. Those Panzer IV Ausf.Fs that were produced after June 1941 were usually distributed to various Panzer Divisions in smaller numbers to supplement their losses.
The overall performance of the Panzer IV Ausf.F was not that much different from the previous versions. Its gun was sufficient (despite originally not being intended to) and was quite effective against the lightly armored BT and T-26 series. Against the KVs and T-34s, the Panzer IV had much lower chances of success. The stronger 50 mm frontal armor could provide good protection against the 45 mm Soviet guns, but the stronger 76 mm could effectively pierce it.
The harsh winter, poor mechanical condition and stiff Soviet resistance led to huge tank losses by the end of 1941. The 5th Panzer Division, for example, had some 20 Panzer IVs in December 1941. This number fell to 14 Panzer IVs by February 1942. While some would survive up to 1943, their numbers would be greatly reduced.
In the Balkans
The Axis forces defeated Yugoslavia in April of 1941. The territory of Yugoslavia was then divided between Germany and its Allies. Due to their harsh occupation policy, two resistance movements emerged to resist the invaders. To counter these movements and to secure their vital supply lines to Greece, the Germans had to send additional forces and even some armored vehicles. These were mostly obsolete or even captured vehicles. In 1944, a small number of Panzer IV Ausf.Fs were allocated to the 13th Reinforced Police Tank Company (Verstärkt Polizei Panzer Kompanie). These were used in fighting against the communist partisans up to the war’s end.
Other modifications
The Panzer IV Ausf.F was used for several different test projects. These went into two different directions, either using the whole vehicle but with a different armament, or using the chassis for various modifications.
Panzer IV Ausf.G (F2)
In an attempt to counter the Soviet T-34 and KV tanks, in early 1942, the Germans began to up-gun their Panzer IVs with longer L/43 guns. These provided much better armor penetration. The Panzer IV Ausf.F was used as the base for this modification. In order to distinguish them from the short barrel armed vehicles, these were initially marked as Ausf.F2. After July 1942, these were all renamed Ausf.G. Some sources also note that some 25 newly produced Panzer IV Ausf.F tanks were rearmed with the longer gun, replacing the shorter barrel guns.
Panzer IV Ausf.F mit Waffe 0725
The Germans were experimenting with increasing the firepower of the Panzer IV. One such experiment included the installation of the Waffe 0725. This was actually an experimental taper-bore gun with a 75/55 mm caliber firing a tungsten round. Due to a shortage of tungsten, this particular gun was never introduced into service.
Panzerfähre
The Panzerfähre was a specially designed vehicle based on the Panzer IV Ausf.F chassis that was interned to transport German tanks over water. In theory, two Panzerfähre would be connected by a raft on which a tank or any other vehicle would be placed. Then, the two Panzerfähre basically acted as a ferry to transport the cargo from shore to shore. While not clear, it appears that, in practice, this did not work and no production orders were placed. Beside the two prototypes, no more were built.
Munitionsschlepper für Karlgerät
An unknown number of different Panzer IV chassis (including the Ausf.F) were modified to be used as ammunition supply vehicles for the huge self-propelled siege mortars codenamed ‘Karlgerät’. Depending on the source, the number of modified Ausf.F chassis ranges between 2 and 13 vehicles.
Fahrschulpanzer IV Ausf.E
Some Panzer IV Ausf.Fs were given to tank training schools. While new vehicles were certainly used, others may have been returned from the frontline for repairs and were reused for this purpose too.
Sturmpanzer IV
Damaged Panzer IV Ausf.E and F tanks that were returned to Germany for repairs were reused for the Sturmpanzer IV program. The precise number of modified chassis is difficult to know precisely.
Jagdpanzer IV wooden prototype
In May 1943, Vomag presented a wooden mock-up of the future Jagdpanzer IV to the German Army. This was based on the Panzer IV Ausf.F chassis.
Panzer IV Ausf.F Tropen
The Panzer IV Ausf.F, like all German tanks that were used in Africa, was modified by improving the ventilation system to cope with the high temperatures. In addition, sand filters were also added to prevent sand from getting into the engine. These vehicles were given a special designation Tr., which stands for Tropen (Eng. Tropic).
Bergepanzer IV
In late 1944, a few Panzer IV Ausf.F chassis would be modified as Bergepanzers, essentially tank recovery vehicles. On these vehicles, the turret was removed and replaced with simple round wooden planks.
Other operators
In order to help somewhat rebuild the shattered Hungarian Forces that would be needed in the 1942 offensive toward the Caucasus, the Germans provided them with large quantities of armored vehicles. These included some 22 Panzer IV Ausf.Fs. In 1942, these were the best tanks that the Hungarian Army operated on this front. By the end of 1943, due to heavy fighting, nearly all were lost.
Interestingly enough, the Soviets often managed to capture significant quantities of German military equipment that had been left abandoned. This included the Panzer IV Ausf.F, some of which were put into service, possibly as training vehicles.
Surviving vehicles
Today, only one rebuilt Panzer IV Ausf.F exists. It was a restoration project which included a Panzer IV Ausf.F turret and a hull which was rebuilt using some original and some new parts. The vehicle is located at the Moscow Victory Park in Russia.
Conclusion
The Panzer IV Ausf.F was the last vehicle of the whole series to be equipped with the short 7.5 cm guns. It had improved armor protection compared to its predecessors. While certainly not special in its overall performance, it had a more important role, being used as a base for newer versions that would implement stronger armor and armament.
Specifications
Dimensions (l-w-h)
5.92 x 2.88 x 2.68 m (17.7 x 6.11, 8.7 in)
Total weight, battle-ready
22.3 tonnes
Crew
5 (Commander, Gunner, Loader, Radio Operator, and Driver)
Propulsion
Maybach HL 120 TR(M) 265 HP @ 2600 rpm
Speed (road/off-road)
42 km/h, 25 km/h (cross-country)
Range (road/off-road)
210 km, 130 km (cross-country)
Primary Armament
7.5 cm KwK L/24
Secondary Armament
Two 7.92 mm MG 34
Elevation
-10° to +20°
Turret Armor
Front 50 mm, sides 30 mm, rear 30, and top 8-10 mm
Hull Armor
Front 30-50 mm, sides 20-30 mm, rear 14.5-20 mm, and the top and bottom 10-11 mm.
German Reich (1942)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 1 Prototype Built
Following the setbacks during the 1941 campaign in the Soviet Union, the Germans were in great need of finding a proper answer to the T-34 and the KV tanks. They decided to go with two different solutions. One was to simply upgun vehicles already in production, for example, the Panzer IV and the StuG III. The other solution involved more modifications, chief among which was removing the turret or parts of the superstructure and adding a new fighting compartment onto an older vehicle, usually equipped with different variants of the 7.5 cm anti-tank gun, and sometimes even using some captured weapons. One such project was based on the Panzer 38(t) chassis and armed with the StuG III’s L/43 gun.
History
The Panzer 38(t) or LT (‘Lehky Tank’, light tank) vz.38, as it was originally known, was a light tank developed by a Czechoslovakian company called ČKD (Českomoravská Kolben-Daněk) from Prague. This company was formed back in 1871 and was initially involved in the production of industrial machinery, while, in later years, it would begin to develop and produce military equipment and weapons. Just prior to the Second World War, ČKD managed to design and build a tank initially called TNH which, in early 1938, would be presented to the Czechoslovakian Army. The Army was impressed with its overall performance and placed an order for 150 such vehicles in 1938. The first series of 10 tanks was actually completed by the time of the German annexation of what was left of Czechoslovakia and the creation of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the Slovakian Republic puppet states.
With the occupation of former Czechoslovakian territories, the Germans came into possession of the Škoda and ČKD factories. ČKD would be renamed to BMM (Böhmisch-Mährische Maschinenfabrik) by the Germans. The new owners were highly impressed with the LT vz.38 design, so they not only completed the first series of 150 but continued producing more in the coming years. Under German use, the name of this vehicle was changed to Panzer 38(t).
Suffering from great shortages of tanks, the Germans employed the Panzer 38(t) during the Polish, Western, and even Balkan campaigns. The Panzer 38(t) to a great extent ended its carrier as a first-line combat tank in 1941, during the Invasion of the Soviet Union. While it would still be used in smaller numbers by the Germans on the front lines, its reliable chassis was instead massively reused for other projects during the war. These mostly consisted of anti-tank vehicles, but other configurations, such as self-propelled artillery or anti-aircraft guns, would also be developed.
During early March 1942, Adolf Hitler gave instructions that a Panzer 38(t) chassis was to be modified and equipped with the newly developed 7.5 cm Sturmkannone. This was a version of the German 7.5 cm PaK gun modified to be used on Sturmgeschütz vehicles. BMM began making the necessary preparations for this project once it received the instructions. The gun and the mount were to be provided by Rheinmetall-Borsig.
Unfortunately, the precise history of this vehicle is poorly documented in the sources. Actually, there is barely any information on it. What is known is that BMM managed to build one prototype or at least a partially built wooden mock-up which was placed on a Panzer 38(t) chassis.
Which version was used?
Unfortunately, the few available sources do not mention the precise type of Panzer 38(t) chassis used. Based on the few existing photographs, an educated guess can be made. This vehicle had a completely flat frontal superstructure armor. This was introduced during the production on the Ausf.E version, remaining on the Ausf.F, S and G. The Ausf.S can be ruled out however, as it had a completely different front visor port. The remaining three versions are almost identical and very difficult to distinguish. While the Ausf.E and F had two 25 mm thick frontal plates, the Ausf.G had a single 50 mm thick armored plate. Due to the photograph angles, it is difficult to observe this area and precisely make a judgment on the chassis version used. It appears that the vehicle used a single frontal piece armor plate, so it is probable that this was built on the Ausf.G chassis.
Design
The hull
The Panzer 38(t) hull was divided into a few sections which included the forward-mounted transmission, central crew fighting compartment, and, to the rear, the engine compartment. The transmission and steering systems were placed at the front of the hull and were protected with a large angled armored plate. To allow better access for repairs, a rectangular-shaped transmission hatch was located in the middle of this plate. It was protected by an extended ‘U’-shaped splash ring.
The hull and the remaining parts of the Panzer 38(t) body were constructed using armored plates riveted to an armored frame. The armor plates that needed to be easily removable (like the upper horizontal plate in the hull for access to the gearbox, rear-engine plate, etcetera) were held in place by using bolts.
The superstructure
The original Panzer 38(t) superstructure was modified. The two front crew members and the ball mounted machine gun remained in their usual locations. Due to bad angles and the quality of available photographs, it is difficult to see if the two side observation ports are still present or not. The sides and top of the superstructure armor just behind the driver and radio operator positions were removed.
The Panzer 38(t) had a hatch door placed above the radio operator’s position. Based on the photograph of the 7.5 cm StuK prototype, it appears that this vehicle would have two larger hatches (one for the radio operator and one for the driver). This is reasonable, since the Panzer 38(t) was a small vehicle with a very cramped interior, making the emergency exit of the hull positioned crew members very difficult.
Fighting compartment
On top of the modified superstructure, a new rear opened fighting compartment was placed. The front part of this compartment was to be made using three plates with the opening in the centre for the main gun. The sides were to be also fully protected. The top plate actually curved down slightly, toward the front of the vehicle. On the top left front corner, there was an opening left for the gunner’s periscope sight. On the photographed vehicle, this fighting compartment appears to be a wooden mock-up.
Suspension and Running Gear
The 7.5 cm StuK auf Panzer 38(t)’s suspension consisted of four large road wheels with split rubber tires. The use of large diameter wheels was meant to reduce wear on the rubber tires. These wheels were connected in pairs and were suspended using semi-elliptical leaf spring units. In addition, there was a front-drive sprocket, rear idler, and two return rollers per side.
The Engine
The power unit of this new vehicle was a Praga TNHPS/II six-cylinder gasoline, 125 hp@2200 rpm engine. With the added armor plates, ammunition, and the larger gun, the overall weight increased from 9.4 to 11 tonnes. While the original maximum speed was around 42 km/h, with the added weight, it was decreased to 35 km/h
The Armor Protection
Given that this vehicle was based on the Ausf.E or later versions, its frontal chassis armor was 50 mm thick. This was either made of two welded 25 mm plates or a single 50 mm plate. The sides were 15 or 30 mm, thick depending on the version chassis being used.
The new combat compartment’s armor protection is unknown, but it would probably have been only lightly protected in order to save weight. The sides and top armor would probably be around 10 mm thick, while the frontal armor would be either the same thickness or slightly thicker, possibly up to 30 mm.
The gun deflector guard (the thick trapezoidal part in front of the gun shield) was 50 mm thick. The sides were 30 mm and placed at 17°. The top and bottom were also 30 mm thick. The large gun shield was 50 mm thick.
The Armament
The main armament of this vehicle was the 7.5 cm StuK 40 L/43 gun. It was developed by Rheinmetall-Borsig and Krupp for use in Sturmgeschütz vehicles. This gun had a semi-automatic breech with a vertical sliding block and was electrically fired. The 7.5 cm StuK 40 L/43 could fire shells at a muzzle velocity of 750 m/s and could penetrate 82 mm of 30° angled armor at 1 km. In its original configuration on the StuG III, the elevation was -6° to +17°, while the traverse was 10° in both directions. For engaging direct targets, a Sf1.ZF1a gun sight was used. The recoil cylinders were placed above the gun and were protected by an armored deflector guard. To the rear of the breach, a protective recoil shield was placed. In addition, a canvas bag for spent ammunition was placed under the gun breach. Production started in March 1942, but it did not last long, as it would be replaced with the L/48 version.
The 7.5cm StuK auf Panzer 38(t) was to be armed with this gun together with the enclosed deflector guard. While the armor-piercing capabilities would remain the same, other characteristics, like the elevation or the quantity of ammunition, are unknown. Given that the center of mass for the gun was rather high and with the extra weight of the gun armored deflector guard, some stability issues might have been incurred. Probably in order to counter this, a large travel lock was provided.
Beside the main gun, the machine gun in the hull was unchanged. The 7.92 mm ZB vz. 37 ball-mounted machine was operated by the radio operator. It had a traverse of 35° to the right and 11° to the left, with an elevation of -14° to +25°. For aiming this machine gun, a telescopic sight with 2.6x magnification was provided.
The Crew
The precise number of crewmen that the vehicle would have had is unknown. Similar vehicles developed during the war (the Marder series) had four crew members. This seems quite possible, as the hull positioned crew member (radio operator and driver) positions were unchanged. In the fighting compartment, the gunner would be positioned to the left of the main gun, and he would also probably be the vehicle commander. To his right would be the loader.
Fate
Once the produced prototype was examined, a production order was not given. While the sources do not provide any reason for it, they do offer some suggestions. Authors P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition), in the section that discusses the 7.5 cm PaK 40/3 Auf Panzer 38(t) Ausf.H, mentioned that, besides it, a second prototype armed with StuK 40 based on the Panzer 38(t) Ausf.G was also presented. This is interesting information, as both vehicles are quite similar in appearance, with some differences, like the armament and the armor’s overall design.
A possible reason why this project was rejected may lay in the main gun chosen for this vehicle. The Sturmgeschütz gun was probably unsuited for this vehicle. On the other hand, the slightly modified 7.5 cm PaK 40/3 offered much simpler installation, without the need for the deflector guard. The 7.5 cm StuK 40 L/43 gun was also a weapon that was built in small numbers and was phased out in favor of the longer barrel L/48 gun. We also do not know if this gun caused any mechanical difficulties or problems during the installation. The most logical conclusion is that this vehicle was rejected because other anti-tank Panzer 38(t) based vehicles had a much simpler design and could be produced easier and cheaper.
Conclusion
The generally unknown and poorly documented 7.5 cm StuK auf Panzer 38(t) was surely an interesting attempt made by the Germans to reuse available resources and production capabilities to quickly produce an anti-tank vehicle. The Panzer 38(t) chassis, for example, was well developed and quite mechanically reliable. Despite being not adopted for service, it was built on a concept used extensively by the Germans during the war (the Marder series, for example) by mounting a strong anti-tank gun on lightly protected tank chassis. While it would have had sufficient firepower to oppose Soviet armor, its own poor protection would offer limited survivability in case of enemy retaliation.
7.5cm StuK auf Panzer 38(t)
Total weight, battle-ready
11 tonnes
Crew
Commander/Gunner, Loader, Driver and Radio operator
German Reich (1937)
Medium Tank – 25 Built + 5 Hulls
The Panzer III Ausf.D was the last version of the experimental series developed starting from the Ausf.A. It incorporated a number of improvements, of which the most obvious was the redesign of the rear engine compartment and introduction of a slightly modified 8-wheel suspension. It was also different from the previous version by being built in somewhat larger (but still limited) numbers. The Panzer III Ausf.D also had the longest service life, soldiering on to 1941 and possibly even after that
Development
Daimler-Benz, which was responsible for the construction of the Panzer III Ausf.A, was contacted by Waffen Prüfwesen 6 (Wa Prw 6 – the automotive design office of the German Army) to produce an additional number of experimental chassis to test new types of suspensions and other elements that could be further improved (like the commander’s cupola, engine compartment interior, etcetera). To fulfill the production orders, Daimler-Benz built the Versuchs-Fahrgestell (experimental chassis) Z.W.3 (Zugführerwagen platoon commander’s vehicle), which would lead to the Panzer III Ausf.B. The Z.W.4 would be used as the base of the Panzer III Ausf.C (marked as 3a. Serie Z.W.) and D (marked as 3b. Serie Z.W.).
Production
The Heeres Waffenamt issued an order to Daimler-Benz to produce 25 Panzer III Ausf.D chassis. Other components, such as the turrets, were to be provided by Krupp-Gruson Werke and Alkett. The main guns were to be provided by Krupp-Essen and Rheinmetall. For the acquisition of necessary armored parts, numerous subcontractors, like AG Vochum, Deutsche Edelstahlwerke AG, etcetera were contracted. While the production of these vehicles began sometime in early 1938, it took several months to actually build them. The last of the 25 vehicles was completed either in July or September 1938. Five more chassis would be built by Daimler-Benz and merged with five Panzer III Ausf.B turrets during 1940.
Interestingly, according to H. Scheibert (Panzer III), 55 Panzer III Ausf.D were produced during 1938. If he includes the modified chassis and command vehicles based on the Panzer III Ausf.D in this counting is not clear.
Specifications
The Panzer III Ausf.D received some modification to its overall design, in many aspects, like the armament and engine, it was virtually unchanged.
The engine compartment
While the engine type used was the same as on the previous versions, there were some changes and rearrangements of some elements of the engine compartment. The position of the two radiators was changed, as they were now placed completely vertical. They were previously in an angled position. In addition, these were provided with louvres which could be controlled by the crew (from the crew compartment) to provide a better flow of air, depending on the need. The previously used mechanical fuel pumps were replaced with electrically operated ones. Lastly, four smaller and armored fuel tanks (each could contain 75 liters) were placed under the engine in pairs.
The overall design of the engine compartment was changed due to the modifications of its interior. The rear part of the engine compartment was put at a steeper angle. Two cooling air grills were placed on each side of the engine compartment. While no additional ventilation ports were placed on the armor cover of the engine, the four hatches (two on top, and two more on the angled side) could be opened to act as improvised ventilation ports. The change in design of the engine compartment led to a slight extension of the whole Panzer III Ausf.D, from 5.66 m to 5.92 m.
The transmission
Panzer IIIs from A to C incorporated a 5 speed transmission. The Ausf.D received an improved 6 speed SSG 76 type transmission. As the remaining components of the drivetrain were essentially unchanged, the drive performance was also left largely unchanged.
Suspension
The Panzer III Ausf.D suspension was quite similar to the Ausf.C one in appearance and could sometimes be difficult to distinguish. The Ausf.D also employed the same 8 small road wheels. However, they were divided into three parts, with two pairs of double wheels placed in front and to the rear and four pairs in the middle. There were also three return rollers, one drive sprocket and one idler per side.
The change included the repositioning of the front and rear swing arms’ pivoting points. These were centrally placed. The leaf spring units’ positions on the first and last pairs of road wheels were placed diagonally in contrast to the vertical ones used previously. Lastly, two improved shock absorbers were placed on each suspension side. One was placed behind the drive sprocket and the second in front of the idler.
Armor protection
Regarding the precise armor thickness of the Panzer III Ausf.D, the sources are basically split into two camps. Authors such as D. Nešić, (Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-Nemačka) and Walter J. Spielberger (Panzer III and its Variants) mention that the overall armor protection was increased to 30 mm (same as the later built Ausf.E). The increase in armor, together with other modifications, raised the Ausf.D’s weight to nearly 20 tonnes.
On the other hand, authors such as T. L. Jentz and H. L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.3-1 Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf.A, B, C, und D) and P. Chamberlain (Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition) note that the armor thickness was the same as on the previous versions, up to 14.5 mm. In addition, the overall weight of the Panzer III Ausf.D was, again like the previous versions, at 16 tonnes. The reason for this divergence of sources is unclear. One possible culprit for this may be the command vehicle that was developed based on the Panzer III Ausf.D, as it had 30 mm of armor.
In Combat
When the war with Poland broke out in September 1939, the Germans had less than 98 Panzer III tanks. Of these, some 87 saw actual combat service, while the remaining were used as replacement and training vehicles. These were distributed to Panzer Regiments in limited numbers. The exceptions were the 1st Panzer Regiment, which had 20, and the 2nd which had 6 Panzer IIIs.
To determine the precise combat engagements of the Ausf.D (but also other older versions) is difficult. The issue is that the sources list them simply as Panzer IIIs, without mentioning the precise version in question. For example, Panzer IIIs from the 4th Panzer Regiment were ordered to take the Polish barracks and train station at Kamionka on 19th September. While the barracks were successfully stormed, the train managed to leave the station. What followed was a race between the German Panzer III and IV tanks and the elusive train. After sustaining heavy damage from German fire, the Panzers, reaching a speed of over 40 km/h, eventually managed to capture the train. The Germans lost some 30 Panzer IIIs during the entirety of the campaign, but most of these would be repaired and put back into use.
Following the completion of the Polish Campaign, the Germans initiated a slow withdrawal of the earlier types of the Panzer III, including the Ausf.D. This was mainly done as more advanced versions were developed and became available in sufficient numbers to replace the older experimental Panzer IIIs. From February 1940 onwards, all available Panzer III Ausf.A to D tanks, after an extensive overhaul, were given to training units. This did not include the five modified Ausf.Ds that were equipped with Ausf.B turrets.
Variants based on the Panzer III Ausf.D
Panzerbefehlswagen Ausf.D1
The Panzer III Ausf.D was used for the Panzerbefehlswagen (tank command vehicle) configuration. This included a number of modifications, some of which was reducing the armament to only one machine gun (located in the turret), using a dummy main gun (to hide its main purpose as a command vehicle), fixing the turret in place, replacing the gunner and the loader with one more radio operator and a commander adjutant, adding additional radio equipment, and, probably most noticeably, adding a large antenna to the rear of the turret. Another large change was that the armor protection was reinforced with another 14.5 m of armor, raising the overall protection to 29 mm. The driver’s visor and the machine gun ball mount were also replaced with newer models. Daimler-Benz produced 26 brand-new vehicles in 1938 and 4 more in 1939. This vehicle was designated as Panzerbefehlswagen Ausf.D1. These were used starting from Poland in 1939 up to possibly the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 or even after that.
Panzer III Ausf.D/B hybrid
During the late 1930s, the Germans were developing the Sturmgeschütz concept. For this purpose, some 5 Panzer III Ausf.B chassis were allocated to be rebuilt as Sturmgeschütz III test series. Not wanting to waste the turrets from these tanks, the Heeres Waffenamt gave Daimler-Benz instructions to build an additional five Ausf.D chassis to be merged with them. As these were never a huge priority, it took Daimler-Benz some two years (until October 1940) to actually complete these vehicles.
During their construction, Daimler-Benz introduced some improved components that were not present on the 25 original Panzer III Ausf.D vehicles. The best example is the use of the new Kugel Blende 30 type of machine ball mount. Additionally, these received a new idler and the position of the rear shock absorber was slightly lowered.
It is unclear how many, but likely all five were transported to Norway in the summer of 1941 and allocated to Panzer-Abteilung z.b.V. 40 (special assignment unit). These may have participated in the German combat operations in Finland during the Invasion of the Soviet Union.
Conclusion
The Panzer III Ausf.D would be a further improvement of the previously built Ausf.C. It would incorporate a majority of elements from this previous version, except for the suspension and some interior modifications. Following the completion of the Ausf.D series, Daimler-Benz and the German Army officials simply gave up on the idea of using the unnecessarily complicated 8 wheel suspension and instead developed a brand new torsion bar that would be used as standard from the Ausf.E onward.
The whole experimental Panzer III Ausf.A to D series, while not long in service, was vital for the Germans in gaining valuable experience in tank design, but also in training the Panzer crews. Given the fact that these were built by the yet underdeveloped German industry, they could be considered a success, as they paved the way for further Panzer development.
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf.D Specifications
Dimensions (l-w-h)
5.92 m x 2.82 m x 2.41 m
Total weight, battle-ready
16 tonnes
Crew
5 (Commander, Gunner, Loader, Radio Operator and Driver)
Propulsion
Maybach HL 108 TR 250 hp@ 2800 rpm
Speed (road/off road)
35 km/h, 10-12 km/h (cross country)
Range (road/off road)
165 km, 95 km
Primary Armament
3.7 cm Kw.K. L/46.5
Secondary Armament
Three 7.92 mm MG 34
Elevation
-10° to +20°
Armor
5-30mm
Source:
D. Nešić, (2008) Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1930)
Light Tank – 45 (Renault FT) and 10 to 11 (M-28) Operated
At the start of the 1930s, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia bought its first tanks from France. These were the older Renault FT and the slightly improved Renault-Kégresse tanks. While their combat value was limited at best, they served as a base for further development of the armored forces in Yugoslavia. By the time the Axis began their major offensive operation in the Balkans during April 1941, the aging Renault FT and Renault-Kégresse tanks represented nearly half of the armored strength of the Yugoslav Army.
The birth of the first Yugoslav tank formations
Following the collapse of the Central Powers during the First World War, much of the southern territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were absorbed by the newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (Kingdom of SHS) during 1918. The newly created army of this Kingdom received a number of weapons from the Allied forces present in the Balkans. This shipment of weapons did not include Renault FT tanks, which were present in smaller numbers within the Allied Balkan forces. In September of 1919, the Kingdom of SHS Army officially requested that some of these be allocated to them. This request was not granted, as the Allies informed the SHS Army representatives that these were to be stationed in Bulgaria and Romania. This did not stop the SHS Army officials, which sent an additional delegation to France directly to ask for permission to receive these tanks. Eventually, these attempts proved to be futile, as the French Ministry of War stated (in November of 1919) that this was not possible. The Kingdom of SHS was instead reassured that, once sufficient numbers of Renault FTs were available, these would be allocated to them.
In early December of 1919, Louis Franchet d’Espèrey, the commander of Allied forces in the Balkans, officially allowed that an SHS group of 10 drivers and as many mechanics as possible be moved to the Bulgarian capital, Sofia to begin training and familiarisation with the 8 Renault FT tanks which were stationed there. On 12th December, by the direct orders of the SHS Ministry of War, the first Armored Company, equipped with 8 Renault FTs (which were still in Sofia) was to be formed. A military delegation was formed, which consisted of 6 officers and non-commissioned officers and 10 artillerymen in addition to 10 drivers and 3 mechanics. In February 1920, the French officially started to transfer these tanks to the SHS Army. The contingent of 8 Renault FTs consisted of 3 armed with machine guns, 4 with 37 mm guns and one radio (télégraphie sans fil – TSF) version.
It is important to note that the SHS and later Yugoslav Army did not use the term ‘tank’, but instead ‘Борна Кола’. This term could be translated as armored or even combat vehicle, depending on the source used. To avoid confusion, this article will use the term tank.
There is some disagreement in the sources on the precise date or even number of tanks of this type operated by the Yugoslav Army. The previously mentioned information was according to author N. Đokić (Vojni informator). Other authors, like Captain Mag. D. Denda and D. Dimitrijević, give a completely different account of how the first tanks were acquired. At the end of 1920s, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (the name was changed in 1929) took a loan of some 300 million French Francs for purchasing their first tanks. By doing this, the Yugoslav Army was able to acquire 21 Renault tanks. The first group of 10 tanks arrived in April, and the remaining on 11th July 1929. These included 10 Renault FTs and 11 improved Renault-Kégresse tanks (in many Serbian sources marked as ‘M-28’, ‘M.28’, or even as ‘M28’). Author B. B. Dimitrijević (Borna kola Jugoslovenske vojske 1918-1941) mentions that there is a possibility that the M-28 used by the Yugoslav Army had a stronger engine, but with no more information about it.
The precise number of Renault-Kégresse tanks acquired is not completely clear in the sources, ranging from 10 to 11 vehicles. The reasons why this version was bought and not the old FT is not mentioned in the sources. While they were almost identical to the older Renault FT model, the M-28 had a different suspension which necessitated the acquisition of additional spare parts. The M-28s were used to form the first tank company in the Yugoslav Army, stationed in Kragujevac during April 1930. It would be allocated to Sarajevo, where a tank training school was formed. The remaining Renault FTs would be used to equip another Tank Company, which was stationed in the capital, Belgrade. The French also provided a group of instructors to help train crews for these vehicles. The precise strength of these two companies is unclear. The first actual documents that mention these units’ peacetime compositions are dated from 1935. According to them, each Company contained 12 tanks. Each Company was further divided into four Platoons, each with 3 tanks.
However, author D. Predoević (Oklopna vozila i oklopne postrojbe u drugom svjetskom ratu u Hrvatskoj) indicates that the first 21 tanks were all actually Renault FTs. He also notes that, in 1935, an additional 20 tanks were bought. To complicate matters even further, both he and D. Babac (Elitni Vidovi Jugoslovenske Vojske u Aprilskom Ratu) state that the Yugosavian Army had 20 and not 10 M-28 tanks.
Renault FT
During the First World War, France employed tanks like the St-Chamond and Schneider CA 1 in an attempt to break the German lines. These designs were far from perfect and were plagued by a number of issues (limited firing arc, low armor thickness etc.). However, the most significant problem was the slow and expensive production. During 1916, in French military circles, the idea of using cheap and easy-to-produce light tanks began to take hold. By the end of 1916, after the first wooden prototype was completed and inspected, a production order for 100 vehicles was placed. This light tank received the simple Renault FT designation.
At the start of the following year, the first prototype was tested and, after some delays, production orders for 1,150 such tanks were placed. Of these, some 500 were to be armed with one 8 mm machine gun, while the remaining 650 were to be armed with a 37 mm gun. The Renault FTs were first used in combat during the French attempts to stop the large German offensive of 1918. It proved to be a successful vehicle, presenting a small target, having a fully rotating turret, and being available in great numbers. By August 1918, the French managed to produce more than 2,000 Renault FT light tanks.
After the First World War, the Renault FT became generally obsolete and was widely exported by the French Army, which was unwilling to sell their better designs. Those that bought the Renault FT were countries like Poland, the USA, Finland, Japan, Greece, and Yugoslavia amongst others.
In an attempt to somewhat improve the Renault FT’s overall driving performance, during the 1920s, the French army tested a new type of suspension. The completely redesigned Kegresse type suspension consisted of eight smaller road wheels, one return roller and larger idler and drive sprockets. It employed new metal and rubber band tracks. While it offered better driving characteristics, it was only built in limited numbers, mostly due to reduction in the budget of the French Army.
Yugoslav-Poland cooperation
After the First World War, the Yugoslav Army was in desperate need of all kinds of weapons, ranging from ordinary rifles to artillery. In 1921, the first negotiations with Poland took place regarding this issue. In the following years, Yugoslavia bought a number of Polish weapons, including aviation bombs, rifle ammunition, artillery pieces, etc. In 1932, Poland and the Yugoslav Army signed an agreement for purchasing some 14 Renault FT tanks. While the Yugoslav Army later showed great interest in the 7TP tank, due to the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, nothing came from this.
Further developments
Following the arrival of the first tanks, Yugoslav Army cycles began theorizing how to best employ them, about the further acquisition of more tanks and general organization. One of the Yugoslav Generals that advocated for forming Tank Battalions supported by Motorized Infantry placed under unified command was Milan Đ. Nedić. He made the first steps in proposing this plan in 1932. Two years later, the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, together with King Aleksandar I Karađorđević, examined it. The plan for creating mechanized and armored units met with the approval of Army officials but, more importantly, also the King himself. For the realization of this plan, General Nedić was appointed as the chief of the General Staff in June 1934. His success was short-lived as, only a few months later, the King was assassinated in Marseille while visiting France. General Nedić was removed from his new position shortly after that. He was replaced by General Ljubomir M. Marić, who continued working on extending the armored formations.
The process of reorganization and modernization of Yugoslav forces was accelerated after the start of the Second Italian-Ethiopian war in 1935. France agreed to supply Yugoslavia with an additional contingent of 20 Renault FT tanks during 1935 and 1936 as military aid. The whole operation was held in secrecy by both sides. While the last tank arrived in 1936, it would take almost a whole year before they were actually allocated for troop use.
Organization
By September 1936, there were some 45 Renault FTs and 10 (or 11) M-28s available. That same month, from these vehicles, a Battalion of Armored Vehicles was formed under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Pavao J. Begović. This unit is often mistakenly called the First Battalion, a unit which was actually formed later. The Battalion, when it was formed, had only a single Company which was stationed in Belgrade. This Company was used primarily for crew training, but was also used on a military parade held in honor of the king’s birthday in September of 1936. During the same year, a new regulation regarding the Battalion strength was adopted. According to it, the Battalion consisted of one Command unit, three Companies, and a reserve Company. The Command unit had 3 tanks, the same as the reserve Company. The three Companies each had 10 tanks, for a total of 36 tanks. In addition, there was also an independent support Company with 4 tanks. Only in March of 1937 did the Battalion reach full combat readiness with three Companies.
In 1938, the Battalion organization was once again changed. This time, each company was further reinforced with an additional platoon of M-28 tanks. This indicates that the M-28 were not used previously and were probably stored for some eight years. The Battalion strength was increased to 48 tanks in total.
Two years later, the Yugoslav Army bought 54 R35 tanks from France. Thanks to this, it was possible to form an additional Battalion. The original Battalion of Armored Vehicles was renamed the 1st Battalion of Armored Vehicles. The 2nd Battalion of Armored Vehicles was equipped with newly acquired R35 tanks. Most of the 1st Battalion personnel was relocated to the 2nd Battalion, which necessitated retraining the crew members. At the end of 1940, the number of tanks in each Battalion was noted to be 50 tanks. Other changes included that the Command unit did not have tanks and that the strength of each Company was increased to 13 tanks, with 11 more in reserve. Regarding the armament of the FT and M-28 tanks, one-third were armed with machine guns, while the remaining were armed with 37 mm guns. In addition, during this time, elements of the 1st Battalion were rearranged across three major cities. The Command unit with the 1st Company and the reserve Company were stationed in Belgrade (together with the 2nd Battalion). The 2nd Company was positioned in Zagreb (Croatia) and the last in Sarajevo (Bosnia).
Experience with the FT and M-28 tanks
The Yugoslav Army initiated a number of infantry and tank exercises in order to test the idea of cooperation between these two Army branches. One such exercise was held in hilly terrains in Šumadija (in Serbia). There, the Renault FT proved to be unsuited for supporting infantry due to its unsuitability for bad terrain. Its performance was so poor that the infantry commanders suggested to the High Command to urgently find more modern equipment. In September of 1939, huge exercises that should have included three tank Companies were to be carried out. However, after only a few weeks, this was canceled and never carried out on a larger scale.
There were other problems with the crew training and the mechanical reliability of tanks. For example, the Zagreb stationed Company lacked any proper firing range. For this reason, firing practice was rarely carried out. Mechanical problems with the Renault tanks were also a huge issue. The Renault FT was outdated and generally worn out, while the M-28 had problems with its rubber tracks.
Camouflage and Markings
The Renault FT and M-28 retained their original French dark green color, even those that were brought from Poland. Some of the vehicles received different types of camouflages, but which precise color is not listed in the sources.
The FTs were usually marked with French numbers between 66000 and 74000 but also with additional four-digit numbers or two Roman numerals. These were painted either on the front of the vehicle or on the suspension. The M-28s were only marked with two-digit numbers ranging from 81 to 88. But according to some older photographs, one vehicle has the number 79 painted on it. It is unclear why this is so (it could be a modern print error in the sources).
Prior to the war
In the years before the war, the reorganization and rearmament process of the Yugoslav Army was delayed. After the military plan dated 1938, the Yugoslav army was to be reinforced with 252 medium and 36 heavy tanks. Eventually, only 8 T-32 (Š-I-D) vehicles were brought from Czechoslovakia in 1936, with 54 R35 tanks from France in 1940. One of the many reasons why the armored development was slowed down was due to short-sighted military Generals, like Dušan T. Simović, who believed that the tanks were ineffective weapons. Also, Czechoslovakia was under German occupation and France was unwilling to sell modern equipment. While negotiations with the Soviet Union, the USA, and Great Britain were undertaken, nothing came from these. By the time the Axis attacked in April 1941, Yugoslavia could only muster less than 120 armored vehicles.
The April War
In March 1941, the government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was negotiating with the Germans to join the Axis powers. A group of pro-Western Yugoslav Air Force officers, under the leadership of General Dušan Simović, staged a coup on the 27th of March 1941 in order to prevent this from happening. Hitler was furious after this event and ordered that Yugoslavia be occupied. For the upcoming invasion, the Axis forces included 30 German, 23 Italian, and 5 Hungarian Divisions. The Germans alone had some 843 tanks, including 400 modern Panzer IIIs and IVs. The attack was made on the 6th of April 1941, which started the so-called April war.
Opposing them, the Yugoslav Army could muster some 31 Divisions. However, during the attack, only 11 partially formed divisions were available. The lack of mobilization and the overextension of available forces essentially sealed the fate of the Yugoslav Army. When the Axis forces attacked, elements of the 1st Battalion were distributed to three operational bases in Belgrade, Zagreb, Skopje, and Sarajevo. At that time, the Battalion was commanded by Major Stanimir Mišić. To counter the Axis offensive, the scattered elements of these units received orders to move towards Velika Plana (south of Belgrade). But this order was unrealistic due to the rapid enemy advance, poor infrastructure connections, and slow mobilization. As Belgrade was under heavy enemy bombing raids, the Command unit and the reserve Company of this Battalion moved toward its place of gathering at Plana, but without its equipment. They awaited the remaining elements of the units and their own tanks to arrive. By 9th April, due to huge confusion, other units were unable to link up with them, so the personnel of the first Company tried to march to Bosnia, but were captured shortly by the advancing Germans.
The 1st Company was stationed in Skopje (Macedonia). It received orders on the night of the 6th to move toward the village of Pirova. On the way to that destination, one of the tanks broke down and had to be abandoned. The Company formed a defense line around Đevđelije. A German forward reconnaissance unit spotted the Yugoslav defense line. While they were also spotted by the 1st Company, the unit commander refused to open fire. Shortly after that, the 1st Company positions were bombed by German bombers, losing a number of tanks either damaged or completely destroyed. The German ground forces then attacked the 1st Company’s shattered positions. While some Renault FTs tried to fire back, they proved ineffective and nearly all would be lost. Only four tanks managed to escape and, on 8th April, together with other Yugoslav soldiers that survived the German attack in Macedonia, tried to escape to Greece, where the 1st Company effectively stopped to exist.
The history of the 2nd Company, which was stationed in Zagreb, is not completely clear. While it did not see any action, the precise location of its vehicles during the war is unknown. The main theory is that they never even tried to move from their base. The problem is that German documents after the April war do not mention any tanks being captured in Croatia.
The 3rd Company was evacuated from Sarajevo and transported to the Serbian village of Orašac, near Aranđelovac, on 9th April. Three days later, it was ordered to move towards Lazarevac to provide cover for the retreating Yugoslav forces. They failed to do so and ran out of fuel. The advancing Germans, in the meantime, captured the company’s fuel supply vehicles. The unit commander ordered that all vehicles’ 37 mm guns be sabotaged and made useless to the Germans and that the machine guns be taken with them. They tried to reach Sarajevo, but the commander decided that it was too dangerous to continue on and effectively disbanded the unit.
The new owners
After the brief April war, the Germans managed to capture some 78 (out of 120) Yugoslav armored vehicles. These were to be transported back to Germany. Following the uprising against the occupation after June 1941, the Germans were forced to allocate some of these vehicles to fight the Yugoslav Partisans. From the available stocks of captured Renault FTs, the Germans formed 6 Platoons with 5 vehicles each. These were initially engaged against the Partisan forces, supporting the German infantry formations. Due to their general obsolescence, the Renault FTs were mainly replaced with more modern French tanks, like the R35, Somua S35, and the Hotchkiss H35 and 39. Nearly all of the Renault FTs were used instead to equip over 30 auxiliary and improvised armored trains that were used to protect the vital supply lines of the Axis power in the Balkans. Each of these trains was reinforced with at least two Renault FT tanks. They would be used in this role up to the war’s end. It is also unclear but quite possible that the Germans introduced additional Renault FT tanks captured in France or elsewhere.
The fate of the M-28 tanks is not completely clear. The Germans managed to capture some of them, but how they used them is unknown. There was a video on Youtube of Montenegrin Partisans destroying some captured German equipment, including an M-28 tank. Sadly, this video is no longer available.
In Croatian service
After the collapse of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Germans created the Independent State of Croatia. While it was their puppet state and ally, the Germans were quite unwilling to give the Croats any armored vehicles captured from the Yugoslav Army. Nevertheless, the Croatian military forces managed to operate an unknown number of (but likely only a few) Renault FT tanks. It is not clear how these came into their possession. They were likely captured by the Croats from the 4th Tank Company which was stationed in Zagreb. The use of this tank was possibly quite limited in any other role than perhaps crew training.
In Partisan hands
During the war, the Yugoslav Partisans managed to capture a great number of Axis-operated armored vehicles. Due to a lack of documentation, it is often difficult to identify which precise vehicle they captured and used. By the end of the war, a number of German armored trains with Renault FTs were captured. Their use after the war would be limited at best (if used at all). Today, one surviving Renault FT tank can be seen at the Belgrade military museum.
Conclusion
The Renault FT and M-28 were the first tanks operated by the Yugoslav Army. By the time these were acquired, in 1930, they were already obsolete. Poor training, a lack of crew and personnel, and mechanical problems due to their age led to poor combat performance when they were employed against the more modern German army. While they played an insignificant role during the 1941 war with Germany, their importance may be regarded more as the first steps in the development of the Yugoslav armored force in the following years.
1st Armored Tank Batallion of the Yugoslav Royal Army, April 1941.
A Renault NC2 Kegresse, one of the ten or more which were given to the Yugoslav Royal Army. They desperately fought the Wehrmacht during the Balkan campaign, in March-April 1941. They were very similar to the nine FT Kégresse already bought in 1928.
Specifications
Dimensions
5 x 1.74 x 2.14 m
Total weight, battle-ready
6.5 metric tons
Crew
2 (commander/gunner, driver)
Propulsion
Renault 18CV 35 hp
Speed
7.5 km/h
Maximum range
35 km
Armament
Main: 37 mm SA model 18 gun
Secondary: 8 mm Hotchkiss machine gun machine-gun
Armor
8 to 16 mm
Sources
N. Đokić (2001) Vojni informator
Captain Mag. D. Denda, Tank Units In The Army Of The Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1930-1940) Institute For Strategic Research
Captain Mag. D. Denda, Yugoslav Tanks In The April War, Institute For Strategic Research
N. Đokić and B. Nadoveza (2018) Nabavka Naoružanja Iz Inostranstva Za Potrebe Vojske I Mornarice Kraljevine SHS-Jugoslavije, Metafizika
German Reich (1941)
Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun – 24 Built
During the early stages of the war, the Germans modified small quantities of Panzer I Ausf.A tanks as ammunition carriers. These lacked any kind of defensive weapons to protect themselves from either ground or air targets. For this reason, from March to May 1941, some 24 Panzer I Ausf.A would be modified as self-propelled anti-aircraft vehicles. Sadly, these vehicles are very poorly documented in the sources and there is quite little information on them.
Origin
During September 1939, the Germans converted some 51 older Panzer I Ausf.A tanks into ammunition carriers. This conversion was quite rudimentary, done by simply removing the turrets and replacing the opening with two-part hatches. These vehicles would be allocated to the Munitions Transport Abteilung 610 (ammunition transport battalion) and its two companies, the 601st and 603rd.
The 610th Battalion would see service during the German invasion of the West in 1940. There, it was noted that these vehicles lacked proper armed support vehicles that could protect them from any potential enemy threats (especially against airborne attacks).
To resolve this issue, In 6 (Armored Troop Inspectorate) issued a request for an anti-aircraft vehicle based on the Panzer I Ausf.A chassis to be designed. Receiving this request, Wa Prüf 6 appointed Alkett and Daimler-Benz with designing the first prototype. Spanish author L. M. Franco (Panzer I: the beginning of the dynasty) provides additional information claiming that, according to the soldiers who operated these vehicles, the manufacturer of the first prototype was actually Stöwer. The Stöwer company was located in Stettin and was actually a car manufacturer. Another author, J. Ledwoch (Flakpanzer), supports this information but notes that the Stöwer company lacked adequate production facilities and was probably responsible for providing some necessary parts rather than fully assembling the vehicles. Author D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka), on the other hand, states that only Alkett was responsible for the design and production of this vehicle.
While it is not clear who produced the first prototype, the 610th Battalion was tasked with acquiring the necessary equipment and manpower to build 24 vehicles. It is not clear if, for the construction of these 24 vehicles, new Panzer I hulls or already existing ammunition supply vehicles based on it were used. At this time, the Panzer I was being slowly phased out of service, so it is possible that regular tank versions (and not the ammunition supply vehicles) were used for this modification. The first vehicle was finished in March and the last one in May of 1941.
Name
Based on a few sources, this vehicle was designated as the 2 cm Flak 38 (Sf) PzKpfw I Ausf.A. It is generally referred to, more simply, as Flakpanzer I. This article will use this designation due to its simplicity.
Construction
The Flakpanzer I used an almost unchanged Panzer I Ausf.A chassis and hull. It consisted of the front driving compartment, central crew compartment and the rear engine compartment.
Engine
The design of the rear engine compartment was left almost unchanged. The main engine was the Krupp M 305 four cylinder giving out 60 hp@ 500 rpm. The only source to mention the Flakpanzer I’s driving performance is D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka). According to him, the weight was increased to 6.3 tonnes (from the original 5.4 tonnes). The increase of weight led to a reduction of maximum speed from 37.5 to 35 km/h. This source also notes that the operational range was 145 km. This is probably wrong, as the regular Panzer I Ausf.A’s operational range was 140 km. Unless there was an increase of the original 140 l fuel load that is not mentioned in the sources, this seems unlikely.
The extra added weight could also have led to engine overheating problems. To prevent this, two larger 50 to 70 mm wide holes were cut open in the engine compartment in order to provide better ventilation. Some vehicles had several smaller 10 mm holes cut for the same purpose. Another change was the removal of the vent usually located on the right side of the hull. Its purpose was to provide heated air to the crew compartment.
Suspension
The Flakpanzer I used an unmodified Panzer I Ausf.A suspension. It consisted of five road wheels on each side. The last road wheel, which was larger than the others, acted as the idler. The first wheel used a coil spring mount with an elastic shock absorber in order to prevent any outward bending. The remaining four wheels (including the last larger wheel) were mounted in pairs on a suspension cradle with leaf spring units. There was one front drive sprocket and three return rollers per side.
Superstructure
The superstructure of the original Panzer I was heavily modified. First, the turret and the superstructure top and parts of the side and rear armor were removed. On top of the frontal superstructure armor, an 18 cm high armored plate was welded. In addition, two smaller triangular in shaped plates were added to the front side armor. This added armor served to protect the opening between the lower part of the gun shield and the superstructure. The driver’s and the two side visors were left unchanged.
On top of the vehicle, a new square shaped platform for the main gun was installed. Unlike the original Panzer I turret, which was placed asymmetrically, the new gun was placed at the center of the vehicle. The Panzer I was a small vehicle, and to provide proper working space for the crew, the Germans added two additional foldable platforms. These were placed on the sides of the vehicle and some vehicles had one more to the rear, just behind the engine. The platforms actually consisted of two rectangular shaped plates. The first plate was welded to the superstructure, while the second plate could be folded down to provide additional working space.
As even these were insufficient, the crew had to move around the engine compartment. The Panzer I had muffler covers placed on either side of the engine, so the crew had to be careful to avoid accidentally burning themselves on them.
Armament
The main armament of the Flakpanzer I was the 2 cm Flak 38 anti-aircraft cannon. This was a weapon intended to replace the older 2 cm Flak 30, which it never actually did. It was designed by Mauser Werke, incorporating many elements of the Flak 30 with some internal changes, like the addition of a new bolt mechanism and return spring. In order to provide the crew with some level of protection, the armored shield was retained. The gun had a full traverse of 360° and an elevation of -20° to +90°. The maximum effective range was 2 km against air targets and 1.6 km against ground targets. The maximum rate of fire was between 420 and 480, but the practical rate of fire was usually between 180 to 220 rounds.
Interestingly, Author D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka) mentions that the first Flakpanzer I prototype was armed with the Italian 2 cm Breda Model 1935 cannon. Why this particular weapon was used is sadly not mentioned by this source. There is a possibility that the author simply confused it with the Spanish Nationalists conversion of the Panzer I which was armed with the same weapon.
The 2 cm Flak 38 was unchanged and could be (if needed) easily removed from the vehicle. The overall performance and its characteristics were also unchanged on the Flakpanzer I. The time to deploy from the march to a combat position ranged between 4 to 6 min. The ammunition for the main gun was carried inside the hull, just beside the driver and the radio operator. The ammunition load consisted of 250 rounds. This number is unusual, as the normal 2 cm Flak 38 clip contained 20 rounds. Additional spare ammunition (and other equipment) was carried either in the Sd.Ah.51 trailers (not all vehicles had them) or in support vehicles. No secondary armament was carried, but the crews would have probably been armed with pistols or submachine guns for self-defense.
Armor
The Flakpanzer I’s armor was quite thin. The Panzer I front hull’s armor ranged between 8 to 13 mm. The side armor was 13 to 14.5 mm thick, the bottom 5 mm and the rear 13 mm. The gun operators were only protected by the 2 cm Flak 38’s gun shield, with the sides, rear and top being completely exposed to enemy fire.
Crew
For such a small vehicle, the Flakpanzer I had a large crew of eight. Five of these would be stationed on the vehicle itself. They consisted of the commander, gunner, loader, driver, and radio operator. The driver’s position was unchanged from the original Panzer I, and he was seated on the vehicle’s left side. To his right, the radio operator (with the Fu 2 radio equipment) was positioned. In order to enter their positions, they had to squeeze themselves between the frontal armor and the gun platform. These two were the only fully protected crew members. The remaining three crew members were stationed around the gun platform.
Three additional crew members were positioned in the auxiliary supply vehicles and were probably responsible for providing additional ammunition or acting as target spotters.
The ammunition transport vehicle ‘Laube’
Due to Flakpanzer I’s small size, they were provided with ammunition trailers for carrying additional spare ammunition and other equipment. The Germans decided this was not enough and an additional 24 Panzer I Ausf.A chassis were supplied to the 610th Battalion to be modified as Munitionsschlepper (ammunition transports), also known as ‘Laube’ (bower). The Panzer Is were extensively modified by removing the superstructure and turret and replacing them with simple flat and vertical armored plates. The front plate had a large windshield for the driver to see where he was driving.
In combat
The 24 Flakpanzer Is were used to form Flak Abteilung 614 (Anti-Aircraft Battalion) in early May 1941. These Anti-Aircraft Battalions (with some 20 in total) were formed by the German Army, to avoid being dependent on Luftwaffe’s own anti-aircraft units. The 614th Battalion was divided into three Companies, each equipped with 8 vehicles. According to some sources, the 614th Battalion was also supplemented with the 2cm Flakvierling 38 armed SdKfz 7/1 half-tracks, which were attached to each Company.
This unit was moved to the East for the upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union. The 614th Battalion was initially not involved in the offensive, as it was stationed in Pomerania, undergoing extensive crew training. After August, the 614th Battalion was transported by rail to the Romanian city of Iași, from where it was to be redirected towards the Eastern Front.
Sadly, there is no information about its service life in the Soviet Union. The extra weight, combined with the harsh climate and poor road conditions would have been quite stressful for the fragile Panzer I suspension and engine. Surprisingly, despite their weak armor and inferior chassis, the last vehicle was lost during the Battle for Stalingrad in early 1943. This was probably because the Flakpanzer I was intended to provide cover for the ammunition supply units, which were often located behind the front lines.
Other Flakpanzer modifications based on the Panzer I
While not related to the previously mentioned vehicles, there were at least two other Panzer I field modifications adapted to the anti-aircraft role. According to D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka), beside the Flakpanzer I armed with the 2 cm Flak 38, a few were built with the triple 1.5 or 2 cm MG 151 Drilling. These (the precise numbers are unknown, it could have been only a single vehicle) were built by placing the new weapon mount inside the crew compartment. The existing photo shows it was built using a Panzer I Ausf.B chassis. Due to a lack of information, it is difficult to see how this vehicle was actually designed from the inside. The working space inside of this modification would have been quite cramped. Whether the cannons could be fully rotated is also unknown. As the MG 151 Drilling was employed in greater numbers at the war’s end, it is likely that this was a last-ditch effort to increase the Panzer I’s firepower by any means when there was nothing else available.
There is another photograph of a Panzer I equipped with a 3.7 cm Flak mount placed on top of the superstructure. Interestingly, in this photograph, the gun barrel is missing. The photograph gives the impression that it is at a repair storage facility, so maybe the gun barrel was removed for cleaning or yet to be replaced.
Conclusion
The Flakpanzer I, while not a purposefully designed vehicle, was surely an innovative way of providing better mobility for the anti-aircraft weapons. While using the Panzer I chassis had benefits, like being cheap and quick to build, with plenty of available spare parts, etcetera, it had a number of drawbacks, like insufficient protection, lack of working space, weak suspension, etcetera. When this vehicle was introduced in limited numbers for service, the Germans actually did not consider a self-propelled anti-aircraft vehicle based on the tank chassis a priority simply because the Luftwaffe was still a fearsome force. In the later years, with the increase of Allied dominance in the skies, the Germans would put much more effort into developing a dedicated anti-aircraft vehicle based on a tank chassis.
Flakpanzer I, Eastern Front, Flak Abteilung 614, 1941.
Same unit and location, winter 1941-42.
2 cm Flak 38 (Sf.) auf Panzerkampfwagen I Ausf.A Specifications
Dimensions (l-w-h)
4.02 m, 2.06 m, 1.97 m
Total weight, battle-ready
6.3 tonnes
Crew
5 (commander, gunner, loader, driver and the radio operator)
Propulsion
Krupp M 305 four cylinder 60 HP @ 2500 rpm
Speed
36 km/h
Range
145 km
Primary Armament
2 cm Flak 38
Elevation
-20° to +90°
Armor
6-13 mm
Source:
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
German Reich (1941)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 174 Anti-Tank and 26 Command Vehicles Built
After the defeat of France in June 1940, the Germans captured huge stockpiles of British and French war materiel. Some of the greatest prizes were the large quantities of tanks of several different types, including the Renault R35. While the R35 was available in great numbers and had good armor for its time, it lacked firepower, speed and had only two crew members. While some would be used in their original tank configuration on less important fronts, the majority would be adapted for various other roles, such as artillery tractors or ammunition supply vehicles. Some 174 would be modified and used as anti-tank vehicles with an additional 24 (based on the same model) being used as command vehicles.
History
After the conclusion of the Western campaign, the Germans were in possession of nearly 800 R35 tanks. At the end of 1940, In 6 (the inspectorate for motorized and armored units) issued a request to Wa Prüf 6 for the development of an anti-tank vehicle based on the R35 tank. This vehicle was to be used to equip non-motorized Infantry Divisions. Prior to this request, the Germans had already tested the use of so-called Panzerjäger (anti-tank vehicles) during the Western campaign. These represented an attempt to increase the mobility of anti-tank guns by placing them on an obsolete tank chassis, like the Panzer I. The standard German anti-tank gun was the 3.7 cm PaK 36, which proved a good design in the Polish campaign, but was deemed insufficient for the task afterward. The Germans had in their inventory a good number of the more potent Czechoslovakian 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38 anti-tank guns, known as the 4.7 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 36(t), or simply as 4.7 cm PaK(t). Due to its better firepower, the Germans decided to use this cannon to arm the first self-propelled anti-tank vehicle, known simply as the Panzerjäger I. It consisted of a Panzer I chassis on which the turret was replaced with a 4.7 cm PaK(t) mount and a three-sided shield. While this concept proved to have merit, as shown in France, it was far from perfect. Simply put, the chassis was insufficient for the task and was poorly protected.
As the larger Panzer III and IV were better armed than the Panzer I, there was no point in using them for such modifications at this early stage of the war, as they were too valuable as tanks for the Panzer Divisions. The French R35, on the other hand, was available in great numbers, was better protected than the Panzer I and had a stronger chassis. Adding the potent 4.7 cm PaK(t) instead of the weak 3.7 cm main gun would have kept these vehicles relevant on the contemporary battlefields. These were probably the main reasons why the Germans decided to utilize the R35 chassis for this role.
For the development of such a vehicle, Wa Prüf 6 chose Alkett to build the first prototype. The soft steel prototype was completed during early February 1941. The conversion included removing the turret and replacing it with an open topped combat compartment armed with the 4.7 cm anti-tank gun. At the end of March, it was presented to Adolf Hitler. He approved the design and an order for 200 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst. Pz.Kpfw. 35R 731(f), as it was known, was given, which was to be completed by August that year.
The R35
The Renault R35 was a French light tank developed during the early thirties to replace the aging FT tank. While the French Army tested other heavier designs (the Renault D1 and D2), a simpler and cheaper vehicle was deemed more desirable. Work on this tank began in 1933 at the French Army’s request for a new light tank design. Renault was quick to respond and presented its prototype to the France Army which, after a series of modifications (among which increasing the armor to 40 mm and improving the running gear), placed an order for over 1,600 tanks. While the R35 was well protected, with 40 mm-thick cast armor, it was plagued with problems such as weak firepower (it had the same 37 mm gun as the FT), just two crew members, a lack of radio and slow speed. During its service life, a number of further modifications and tests were carried out in order to improve its firepower and mobility, all with limited success. Regardless, it was the most numerous French tank during the German Invasion of 1940.
Name
The designation of the German tank destroyer is slightly different depending on the source used. According to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No. 7-1), it is known as 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst. Pz.Kpfw. 35R 731(f). Author D. Nešić, (Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-Francuska) mentions it as the Selbstfahrlafette 4.7 cm PaK(t) auf PzKpfw 35 R(f). W.J. Spielberger (Beute-Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Deutschen Wehrmacht) names it the 4.7 cm PaK(t) auf Panzerkampfwagen 35 R(f) ohne turm. The precise name is also somewhat complicated by the Germans using both R35 and 35R in their documents.
This article, for the sake of simplicity, will use the simple and unofficial Panzerjäger 35R designation.
Design
Chassis and hull
The hull and superstructure were built using casting. The hull actually consisted of three cast parts that were bolted together. In the front part of the hull, the transmission was placed. Behind it was the crew compartment and, to the rear, separated by a firewall, was the engine compartment. On top of the chassis, a cast superstructure was added. It completely covered most of the vehicle, including the rear engine compartment. In front of the superstructure, a two-part hatch for the driver was located.
Armored crew compartment
For the construction of the Panzerjäger 35R, the Germans simply removed the R35’s turret and placed a box-shaped and open-topped armored compartment on top of the vehicle. To accommodate this new compartment, the Germans added a metal base that was extended over most of the upper part of the R35 superstructure.
The front rectangular plate of this compartment was placed at 30°. In the middle of it, an opening for the gun was placed. This opening was enclosed with an internal gun shield. On the gun’s left side, a hatch was placed. Its purpose was to cover the gun’s sight and had to be open when engaging enemy targets.
The compartment sides consisted of two armored plates. The smaller one, to the front, was slightly angled towards the front plate. The larger side armor had narrow rectangular hatches for the crew on both sides to the rear. On the left side, to the rear, an aerial antenna cubical mount base was installed.
The rear part of the compartment consisted of a storage area which was elevated above the engine compartment. This was supported by three metal poles. While all were open-topped, some vehicles had two metal bars welded to the top to provide a better base for the canvas cover.
Suspension
The Panzerjäger 35R’s suspension was unchanged from the original French design and consisted of five road wheels, three return rollers, one idler and one drive sprocket. Of the five road wheels, four were suspended in pairs and one was independently mounted. The paired road wheels were mounted on bell cranks and suspended using rubber springs. The rear idler was put close to the ground.
Engine
This vehicle was powered by a Renault 4 cylinder engine giving out 85 hp @ 220 rpm. While the overall weight, due to the added extra armor, crew members, armament and ammunition, was increased to 11 tonnes (or 10 tonnes, depending on the source), the driving performance seems to be unchanged in the specifications in most sources. The maximum speed was 20 km/h, while the cross-country speed was only 12 km/h. The low speed was not that a great deficiency for this vehicle, as it was intended to support the non-motorised infantry units. The operational range was some 130 km, dropping down to 80 km cross-country.
Armor protection
The armor protection could be divided into two sections, the French R35 hull and superstructure, and the German-added top fighting compartment. The French R35 was relatively well protected for its day. Its front hull armor was 32 mm rounded armor. The sides were 40 mm thick, the rear also 40 mm, but placed at 35°, and the bottom was 14 mm thick. The superstructure front armor was 32 mm thick, the sides and rear were 40 mm placed at 10° and 11°. The top armor of the superstructure was 13 mm.
The new fighting compartment was less armored. The front was 25 mm thick, placed at 30°. The sides were 20 mm thick at 10° and the flat rear was 20 mm thick. Older sources mention that the frontal armor was 20 mm thick and the sides and rear only 10 mm thick.
Armament
The gun used to arm this vehicle was the captured Škoda 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38, known as the 4.7 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 36(t), or simply as the 4.7 cm PaK(t) in German service. The standard armor-piercing Panzergranate 36(t) had a muzzle velocity of 775 m/s and a maximum effective range of 1.5 km. The armor penetration of this round was 48-59 mm at 500 m and 41 mm at 1 km.
In order to extend its operational effectiveness, a new Pzgr.Patr.40 tungsten round was developed (the muzzle velocity was 1,080 m/s). As the Germans lacked sufficient tungsten, this type of ammunition could not be produced in large quantities and its usage was rare. The 4.7 cm PaK(t) also fired high-explosive rounds (2.3 kg weight) with impact fuses to be used against light armor and infantry.
The gun itself, without the wheels and the trail legs, was simply bolted on the front, where the R35’s turret ring was previously positioned. The 4.7 cm gun had an elevation of -8° to +10° and a traverse angle of 17.5° on each side. The elevation and traverse were controlled by two handwheels located on the gun’s left side. The main monocular gunsight was not changed. The total ammunition load is unknown. Seeing as the smaller Panzerjäger I was able to carry some 86 rounds, it would be logical to assume that the new Panzerjäger 35R’s ammunition load would be similar, if not slightly larger.
For crew protection, one MP38/40 submachine gun was carried inside. The ammunition load for it was 192 rounds. Being designed to cooperate with the infantry, the lack of a machine gun was not a major issue.
Crew
This vehicle had a crew of three, which included the commander, who was also the gunner, the loader and the driver. The driver’s position was on the left side of the vehicle. He entered his position through a two-part hatch with a visor. The remaining two crewmen were positioned in the new armored fighting compartment. The commander/gunner was positioned to the left of the gun, and the loader to the right of him. While not listed in the sources, it is likely that the loader would also act as the radio operator.
Production
As already mentioned, the production order for this vehicle was awarded to Alkett. The preparation for production was to begin in February/March 1941, with some 30 vehicles per month. There would be some delays in production, so the quota of 30 vehicles was not always achieved. By May 1941, some 93 vehicles were completed, followed by 33 in June, only 5 in July, 22 in August, 28 in September and the final 19 vehicles in October 1941. Not all were built as anti-tank vehicles. Of the 200 vehicles, some 26 were constructed as command vehicles.
Organization
The first available vehicles were used to form three 30-vehicle strong Panzerjäger Abteilung – Pz.Jg.Abt (self-propelled anti-tank battalions), the 559th, 561st, and the 611th. Each of these battalions consisted of an HQ unit and three Kompanie (Companies). Each Company was divided into smaller three-vehicle strong Zuge (Platoons). There was an additional Company sent to the 43rd Battalion, supplied with a few vehicles, to act as a reserve and training unit. The remaining vehicles would be mainly distributed in smaller numbers to various Infantry Divisions.
Service
Failed actions in the East
The Panzerjäger 35Rs, like many other German armored vehicles, were mobilized for the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The 559th was allocated to Army Group North, while the 561st and 611th went to Army Group Center. For these vehicles, the war started pretty badly. Nearly all vehicles were out of action due to mechanical breakdowns just a few days after the start of the German attack. For example, in the case of the 611th Battalion, it lost all its vehicles on the first day of the attack. In desperation, the unit was instead equipped with the 3.7 cm PaK 36 towed gun and even some Soviet captured anti-tank guns. The 559th Battalion also had the same fate, replacing its vehicles with 3.7 cm PaK anti-tank guns. The 561st was pulled back from the front, temporarily waiting to replace the tank destroyers with towed anti-tank guns.
Another unit that was sent to the Soviet Union, probably in late 1941, was the 318th Company, which had ten 35R tank-hunters and 2 command vehicles. These performed poorly based on the unit report dated from February 1942. In this report, it was noted that these vehicles had poor engines, which were ill suited for the field conditions of the East. Bad weather and the poor road system prevented long road marches with this vehicle. Due to the low temperatures, the engines could not be started and even the road wheels would be blocked and unable to move because of this. After this poor performance, no more 35R anti-tank vehicles would be sent to the East. The fate of these vehicles is not clear in the sources.
In the West
The remaining Panzerjäger 35Rs, some 148 vehicles in April 1942, would be stationed in the West, where the climate was more suitable for their use. In the West, these vehicles were not used in Battalion strength, but instead mostly allocated to a number of Infantry Divisions in small numbers. Some of these included 3 with the 100th Panzer Regiment, 2 in the 243rd Panzer Division, 11 in the 343rd Infantry Division, 10 in the 191st Reserve Division, etcetera. In December 1943, of 92 Panzerjäger 35Rs, some 88 were operational. Prior to the Allied invasion of France in 1944, some 110 vehicles of this type were available. Why this number is higher than the previous year is sadly not mentioned in the sources. Between 1942 and 1944, these vehicles were mainly used for occupation and patrol duties and crew training.
The available Panzerjäger 35Rs would meet the Allied invasion of occupied France. Unfortunately, the sources do not give much information about their actual combat service. Being based on a pre-war vehicle and armed with a weak 4.7 cm anti-tank gun (by 1944 standards), its effectiveness was limited at best. It is hard to know precisely, but probably all were lost in the first few months of combat in France.
Modifications
Führungs-fahrzeuge auf Fgst. Kpfw. 35R 731(f)
The Führungs-fahrzeuge auf Fgst. Kpfw. 35R 731(f) (also known in sources as the Befehlspanzer fur 4.7 cm PaK(t) Einheiten auf Panzerkampfwagen 35 R) was a command vehicle based on the Panzerjäger 35R. It was built by removing the 4.7 cm anti-tank gun and replacing it with a ball mounted Kugelblende 30 MG 34 machine gun. Not all vehicles were actually equipped with the machine gun mount, as some were left without any armament. It was equipped with additional radio equipment and built in small numbers, some 26 vehicles in total.
The 5 cm Pak 38 auf R35(f) project
At the end of July 1941, Alkett was instructed by Wa Prüf 6 to design and produce a modified version of this vehicle armed with the 5 cm PaK 38. This vehicle was designated 5 cm PaK 38 auf R 35(f). Once adopted, it was to be allocated to anti-tank units of standard Infantry Divisions. Due to the addition of the larger gun, the weight of the vehicle would rise to 11.5 tonnes. Ultimately, while one vehicle was to be ready by August 1941, it is unlikely that this was ever achieved.
The 5 cm gun was a powerful weapon with much stronger recoil, and it is not clear if the R35 chassis could have successfully handled it without major mechanical problems. The poor performance of this chassis in the East probably also influenced the decision to drop this project.
In Hungarian Service
At least two of these vehicles were temporarily given to Hungarians to fight Soviet partisans. Sadly, not much is known about their use by the Hungarians.
Surviving vehicle
Today, only one Panzerjäger 35R (with some parts missing) exists and can be seen at the Swiss military Museum at Thun.
The Panzerjäger 35R shared a number of positive and negative characteristics with its cousin, the Panzerjäger I. It provided the German infantry with a more mobile anti-tank platform with a relatively good gun and somewhat better protection than the earlier Panzerjäger I. While it was slow, the infantry it was designed to provide cover for were themselves not a very mobile force, so it was not a major issue.
The problem with this vehicle was its mechanical unsuitability for the Eastern Front (a problem that most French vehicles had when they were used there by the Germans). The poor roads and cold climate prevented the Panzerjäger 35R from being of any use on this front. The armor protection, especially the all around (but open-top) crew compartment, was still weak by the standards of 1942. While the later Marder series was also poorly protected, they had the benefit of longer range guns, which this vehicle did not have. In any case, the Panzerjäger 35R was surely a good way of increasing the effectiveness of the obsolete R35 tank, but was let down by its basis.
4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst. Pz.Kpfw. 35R 731(f) specifications
The greatest strength of the German Panzer Divisions during World War II was their rapid speed and ability to engage the enemy with concentrated force. But, sometimes, this was not enough, and additional firepower was needed to soften designated targets. This was the job of the Panzer Division’s own towed artillery. This was not always possible, as the mechanized towed and horse-drawn artillery could not always keep up with the advancing Panzers. They also needed time to properly set up for firing and were prone to enemy return artillery fire.
A more suitable solution was a tank-based self-propelled artillery vehicle. This was not possible to achieve in the early stages of the war, as the German tank industry was barely keeping up with the demand for tanks. It was not until 1942 that the first proper steps were undertaken in developing such vehicles. While initially, dedicated vehicle designs were considered, due to a lack of time, the Germans went for a stopgap solution. Originating from this, two different designs would emerge: the larger 15 cm armed Hummel and the smaller 10.5 cm armed Wespe. While intended as interim solutions, both would be built in relatively great numbers and used up to the end of the war.
History
During the early stages of World War II, German Army officials were aware that having mobile self-propelled artillery that could keep up and support the Panzer Divisions was desirable, but no major attempt was made in that direction. There were a number of reasons why this was never implemented during the first few years of the war or before it. One fact was that the German industry was unable to produce enough tanks, let alone have spare production capacity for other projects. The Luftwaffe provided the Panzer Divisions with adequate close operational fire support to compensate for the lack of a mobile artillery vehicle.
From 1940 to 1942, there were a number of different but limited attempts to build such vehicles. These included the Panzer I and Panzer II-based self-propelled vehicles equipped with the 15 cm sIG 33 infantry gun, which were built in small numbers. French captured tanks and tracked artillery tractors were also modified for this role. As these were built on captured chassis and without the possibility of mass-producing necessary parts, these would be built in smaller numbers and their use would be limited. Smaller numbers of British Vickers Light Tanks were modified with 10.5 cm guns and saw some use on the Eastern Front.
By 1942, it was obvious that the development of self-propelled artillery was urgent, as the Luftwaffe was losing control of the skies. For this reason, in the same year, Wa Prüf 6 (the office of the German Army’s Ordnance Department responsible for designing tanks and other motorized vehicles) issued requests for a new self-propelled artillery vehicle.
The initial request may have been somewhat overcomplicated, as it was requested that the new vehicle should have a full 360° firing arc (something that no other self-propelled artillery had during the war). The second major request was that it should have had the possibility of removing its main weapon and using it in a static emplacement. The Germans had a few such projects in development, like the ones based on the Panzer IV chassis (the Heuschrecke, for example). However, these would take too much valuable time to be properly developed and adopted for production. So, the German High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres-OKH) decided to proceed with a simpler solution for the time being. The so-called Zwischenlösung (interim solution) was to include chassis and other components that were already in production and available. After a short deliberation, in mid-July 1942, a decision was made by a Panzercommision to reuse the Panzer II Ausf.F chassis for this purpose. The Panzer II tank was already obsolete and used mostly in the reconnaissance role. Its chassis was also being reused for the Marder II anti-tank project.
To design this new vehicle, a contract was awarded to Rheinmetall-Borsig and Alkett. The Panzer II Ausf.F chassis had to be modified by moving the engine to the center of the vehicle, thus making room for a rear fighting compartment. It was to be lightly protected and armed with a 10.5 cm howitzer. When the vehicle was completed and tested, a report was presented to Hitler, in which it was noted that this modification was feasible to enter production by the end of July 1942.
Name
The first official name given to this vehicle was Leichte Feldhaubitze 18/2 (Sf) auf Geschützwagen II, dated from July 1943. During its service life, the vehicle received several slightly different designations. These included G.W. II ‘Wespe’ für le.FH 18/2 (Sf) auf Gw II from August 1943, Geschützwagen II in November 1943, leichte Panzerhaubitze auf Sd.Kfz.123 in May 1944, and le.F.H.18/2 auf. Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.II (Sf) (Sd.Kfz.124) in October 1944.
The name by which this vehicle is best known, Wespe (wasp), was actually only a suggestive name that was officially discontinued after February 1944. For the sake of simplicity only, this article will use the Wespe designation.
Production
For the production of the Wespe, FAMO (Fahrzeug und Motorenwerke GmbH) factories, located in Breslau, and the Ursus (which was also part of FAMO) ones from Warsaw were chosen. FAMO was already involved in Panzer II and Marder II production, so it possessed the production capabilities necessary for the new project. According to the German Army production plans for this project, some 1,000 vehicles were to be built by May 1944. After that, better designed mobile artillery was to replace it, something which never happened.
The first two production vehicles would be built by FAMO in February 1943. In order to speed up the production of the Wespe, the Marder II production would be terminated. The FAMO main production line at Breslau would be included in Wespe production up to August 1943, after which it was to focus solely on the production of the large Sd.Kfz.9 half-tracks. Following this decision, it was also decided to reduce the overall production order to 835 vehicles. With FAMO leaving the Wespe project, the only manufacturer remaining was Ursus. The total production price of each Wespe was 65,628 Reichsmarks (49,228 for the chassis and 16,400 for the gun).
Monthly production in 1943
February
2
March
40
April
136
May
37
June
34
July
59
August
57
September
49
October
37
November
38
December
38
Monthly production in 1944
January
37
February
33
March
35
April
19
May
20
June
19
Total
676
These production numbers are from T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle’s book, Panzer Tracts No.10-1 Artillerie Selbstfahrlafetten. As with many other German vehicles, production numbers differ between sources. Authors F. Koran and J. Starosta (Wespe in detail) list that 685 vehicles were built. According to author J. Engelmann (Wespe-Heuschrecke), 682 vehicles were built. Interestingly, author P. P. Battistelli (Panzer Divisions 1944-45) gives a production range between 662 and 753 being built.
The design
Hull
The Wespe was constructed using a heavily modified Panzer II chassis. Its hull consisted of the forward-mounted transmission, centrally positioned engine, and the rear fighting compartment for the crew and the main gun. The Wespe hull was slightly longer than the original Panzer II hull, by some 220 mm. Depending on the source, this lengthening was either introduced at the start of production or at some point in the later months of production.
Suspension
The suspension of the Wespe was, in essence, the same as that of the original Panzer II, with some changes implemented during the production. It consisted of five large 550 x 98 x 455 mm road wheels (on each side) which had rubber rims. Above each wheel, on a rocker arm, a quarter elliptical leaf spring unit with a movable roller was placed. With the addition of the new gun, more crew members, ammunition, and such, it led to an increase of the weight from 9.5 to 11 tonnes. To cope with this extra weight, the Wespe suspension was additionally strengthened by widening the leaf springs above the wheels.
There was also a front-drive sprocket (with a diameter of 755 mm), a rear positioned idler (650 mm diameter), and three return rollers (220 mm x 105 mm) on each side. The track had a width of 300 mm and consisted of 108 links. The ground pressure was 0.76 kg per square centimeter.
The first Wespes produced had the same bump stops as the original Panzer II. After only a few months of production, new stronger bump stops with vertical volute springs were added on the first two wheels on both sides. The vehicles produced after November 1943 had one more bump stop added to the last wheel. This was one of the few modifications added to the Wespe vehicles during production.
Engine and transmission
The Wespe’s engine was positioned in the center of the Panzer II Ausf.F hull. This was done to provide more working space for the crew and provide better stability during the firing of the gun. The powerplant was unchanged, using the same Maybach HL 62 TR 6-cylinder water-cooled engine giving 140 hp@2600 rpm. The two fuel tanks, with a total 170-liter capacity, were placed under the crew compartment. The maximum speed with this engine was 40 km/h and the cross-country speed was 20 km/h. The Wespe’s operational range was 140 km on good roads and 95 km cross-country. The engine and the crew compartment were separated by a 12 mm thick protective firewall.
As the engine was moved to the center, the drive shaft that connected it to the forward-mounted transmission system was shortened. The Zahnradfabrik SSG 46 type transmission had six forward and one reverse gears.
Superstructure
On top of the modified Panzer II hull, a new superstructure was placed. The front part of it consisted of a simple armored plate placed at a steep angle. On the left side, a fully enclosed driver compartment was added. The original prototype had a more rounded driver compartment cover. The actual production vehicles had a simpler three-sided design with angled armor. Some sources indicate that, during the production, both models of driver compartment design were used. This is false, as the round-shaped driver compartment was used only on the prototype vehicle. Interestingly, the surviving prototype vehicle has the production version of this compartment, which means that, at some point, it was changed.
On the sides of the driver’s compartment were two (one on each side) vision slits. In front, there was a square-shaped hatch that could be opened up. When his hatch was closed, the driver would use the front-mounted slit. All the slits were protected by a thick armored glass block. On top of the driver compartment, a two-piece escape door was placed. To have some access to the transmission, a round-shaped hatch (held in place by two bolts) was placed on the right side of the front superstructure plate.
The remainder of the superstructure covered the centrally positioned engine and served as a base for the rear crew compartment. On both sides, there were two cooling air grilles for the engines. The superstructure had mostly simple and flat sides. The central part of the superstructure sides curved slightly inward. Just behind the engine (toward the crew compartment to the rear), an opening for the gun mount was left.
Fighting compartment
To the rear of the vehicle, a new open-top fighting compartment was placed. It consisted of several armored plates bolted together. The two front plates were angled toward the gun and were additionally reinforced by the gun shield. The height of the side armor plates lowered to the back, mostly to reduce weight. To the rear, a rectangular-shaped door was placed. It could be easily lowered to provide more working room and easy access to additional spare ammunition from auxiliary vehicles. Inside the crew compartment, on both sides, there were a number of brackets for various equipment, such as the radio, fire extinguisher, canvas cover, MP submachine guns and their ammunition, etcetera. The radio and its aerial antenna were positioned on the left side of the fighting compartment. Shells were stored to the rear and the propellant on the sides inside the fighting compartment.
Armor
The Wespe was only lightly protected, but this was intentionally done in order to reduce the overall weight and speed up the production as much as possible. The armor thickness was also limited in order to not adversely affect the vehicle’s overall driving performance, as this was the main point of this new vehicle. The use of the Panzer II light tank chassis was another reason why the armor thickness had to be kept minimal, as the added weight could significantly affect its performance.
The front armor of the hull was 30 mm thick and placed at a 75° vertical angle. The sides were 14.5 mm thick, the rear 14.5 mm at 10° horizontal and the bottom was only 5 mm thick. The front superstructure armor was 15 (or 20 mm) thick and placed at a 30° vertical angle. The sides and rear of the superstructure were 15 mm and the top 10 mm thick. The fighting compartment was protected by only 10 mm thick all-around armor. The front armor was placed at 66°, side 73°, and rear 74° vertical angle.
The Wespe’s overall armor thickness was never intended to protect against direct hits, but mainly from small-caliber fire, shrapnel, etcetera. The Wespe’s greatest defense was its ability to quickly reposition to another firing position without any fear of returning enemy fire. A good camouflage was also handy for increasing its chances of surviving.
Armament
For the main weapon of the Wespe, the proven 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18/2 field howitzer was chosen. This was the most common field artillery piece that the German employed during the war. It was designed by Rheinmetall and put into service in 1930. The 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18 had good overall performance, but the range was somewhat lacking. For this reason, it was improved during the war in order to increase its range, mobility, and ease of production.
For the installation of the 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18/2 in the Wespe, the wheels, trails, and the shield were removed. The 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18/2 was then placed in the center of the vehicle, on a specially designed mount. The main weapon had an elevation of -5° to +42° and a traverse of 20° in both directions (or 17°, depending on the source). The maximum firing range, of 10,650 m, could be achieved by using the 14.8 kg heavy high-explosive round. To help with the recoil, the 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18/2 was provided with a muzzle brake. The barrel had to be replaced after firing 10,000 rounds. The Wespe’s uncomplicated construction made such a replacement an easy job, which could be achieved with a simple crane. For aiming the 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18/2, the gunner would use the Rblf 36 gun sight. The recoil distance during firing was 1.15 m, with the maximum allowed being 1.17 m.
During long marches, the Wespe’s main gun could be locked in place by two travel locks. One was placed in front of the gun’s shield and one to the rear. The Wespe’s main weapon was flanked by two curved armored shields.
In some sources (like D. Nešić, “Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka”), the main weapon of the Wespe is described as the le.F.H. 18M. This was actually a slightly improved version of the 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18. The 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18M introduced an improved recoil system, had a muzzle brake, and had a new type of long-range shell, but otherwise, it was the same artillery piece. The modified main gun of the Wespe and the 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18M are quite similar due to the muzzle brake and could have been easily misidentified as the same weapon.
The 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18/2’s two-part ammunition consisted of the shell and charge. There were three different types of shells that could be used. These included the standard High Explosive (HE), Armor Piercing (AP), and smoke rounds. The charges acted as the propellant for the shells, and there were six different types (marked as 1, 2, 3, etcetera), depending on the desired range.
Initially, the ammunition load consisted of 32 rounds and cartridges. This was officially changed to 30 rounds on 28th June 1943. Of these, 18 HE rounds had normal fuzes and 4 had double fuzes. The remaining 8 rounds were AP rounds. Regarding the charges, 45 were carried inside the vehicle. There were 30 cartridges in the 1-5 range and 15 additional 6 charge cartridges.
For close protection, the crew had at their disposal a 7.92 mm MG 34 or 42, and two 9 mm MP 38 submachine guns. But, given that these vehicles were supposed to act as artillery fire support vehicles from longer ranges, these would ideally be rarely used.
Crew
The Wespe had a crew of five, which included the commander, gunner, loader, radio operator, and driver. The driver was positioned in the front hull and was the only crew member that had all-around protection. The remaining crew were positioned in the fighting compartment. The gunner was located to the left of the main gun, with the radio operator behind him. The radio equipment consisted of a FuG Spr transmitter and receiver. Interestingly, authors G. Parada, M. Suliga, and W. Hryniewicki (Wespe Sd.Kfz 124) note that the gunners (possibly referring to the gunner and loader) were additionally trained in driving and operating the radio equipment, so that, in case of emergency, if the driver or the radio operator were unable to perform their duties, the other crew members could temporarily take over their roles. To the right of the gun were positioned the commander and the loader.
Due to the Wespe’s small size and cramped fighting compartment, the crews were left with no room to carry extra equipment and spare parts. There was not even room for their personal belongings. It was quite common to see external modifications, such as added storage boxes, spare tracks (although there were standard holders for spare track links on the lower front hull), road wheels, and all sorts of other equipment that the crew may have needed.
Organization
The Wespes were mainly issued to the Panzer or Panzer Grenadier Divisions of the German Army, but also in some quantities to the SS Panzer Divisions. Six artillery vehicles plus two ammunition Wespes were used to form a Batterie (Battery) which was allocated to the Artillery Regiment of the Panzer Divisions. On average, each Panzer Division would have 12 Wespes while, in rarer cases, some had 18 vehicles (for example, the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division). These would be further reinforced by a battery of six 15 cm Hummel self-propelled guns.
The first distribution to units
For the upcoming German Kursk Offensive, six divisions were to be equipped with Wespes by the end of May 1943. These included the 17th Panzer Division with 12 vehicles, the 3rd and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, each with 18, Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland with 12, SS Das Reich with 12 and the LSSAH also with 12 Wespes. The following month, 9 more Divisions were supplied with Wespes. By the end of 1943, over 30 Armored Divisions would be equipped with Wespes, with the majority having 12 and, in rare cases, 6 or 18 vehicles.
In Combat
The Wespe first saw combat action during the German offensive at Kursk in 1943. As the German progress was slow, the Wespes were mostly employed as static artillery support elements. But, thanks to their mobility, they could easily avoid any return artillery fire and minimize their losses.
While not intended to engage tanks other than in an emergency, the Wespes could repel such an attack under ideal circumstances. Such a thing happened some 50 km northwest of Orel, when a group of 8 Soviet tanks tried to overrun a Wespe battery. The Wespe crews opened fire at ranges of over 1.5 km, targeting the Soviet tanks with a mix of AP and HE rounds. Due to the rapid artillery fire, the Soviet tanks decided to abort their attack and retreated without losses.
Not many problems were noted by the crews of the Wespes, with one of the few being the wear of the teeth in the steering gear. There were also problems with oil leaks in the drive housing unit. By the end of 1943, very few Wespes were lost in combat. Of the over 30 Divisions which employed them, only a few had less than 10 operational vehicles, with most being at full strength or close to it.
In Italy, the Wespe performed somewhat more poorly, but this was mainly due to the terrain. In a report made by an unnamed German officer, who was sent to Italy to examine the Wespe’s performance on this front, he noted that the terrain was the Wespe’s greatest enemy:
“….The planned employment of the Sfl.-Artillerie (self-propelled artillery) within a Panzer Division practically never occurred in Italy. This was due to the peculiarity of the terrain and the combat situation. In actual fact, the Sfl. were preponderantly employed in platoons or only as individual guns. Therefore, in no way were useful experiences obtained on the tactical employment of the Sfl. ..”
He also noted several problems with the Wespe that were a consequence of the difficult terrain. These included engines that were too weak and unable to effectively overcome the steep terrain, the final drive units often broke, and that there were a number of breakdowns of other parts like brakes, brake linings, etcetera. He also mentioned that the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division had 11 vehicles operational out of 18, while the 26th Panzer Division had only 2 operational out of 12. The Wespe would also participate in the battle for France in 1944. In March 1945, there were still some 307 operational Wespes.
Geschützwagen II für Munition
The lack of a tracked ammunition supply vehicle was something that the Germans never managed to solve completely. In the case of the Wespe (and the larger Hummel), they came up with a simple solution. What the Germans did was simply reuse the Wespe chassis by removing the gun to provide room for spare ammunition. The gun opening on the fighting compartment was simply covered with a sheet of metal. This modified vehicle was able to carry some 90 rounds of ammunition. These vehicles could be repurposed back into mobile artillery vehicles quite quickly. The crew consisted of a driver and two additional crew members responsible for ammunition resupply. Between June 1943 and June 1944, some 159 such vehicles would be built.
Surviving Wespes
Today, there are a few surviving Wespes in the world. There is one Wespe in the Munster Panzer Museum in Germany. This particular vehicle is actually the first prototype. Another one is in the Russian Patriot Park Museum and one more is at the Saumur Musée des Blindés in France.
There are also a number of Wespe wrecks, like the one at the Battle of Normandy Museum in France. In Germany, there is one at the Westwall Museum at Pirmasens. Two more are in Andre Becker’s private collection in Belgium.
Conclusion
Despite being designed as a temporary solution until properly designed self-propelled artillery vehicles would be introduced, the Wespe proved to be a successful vehicle. It provided the German armored units with a fire support vehicle that was able to keep pace with them. While less than 700 were produced, these were widely distributed to various armored Divisions. They were not perfect and had a number of issues, mostly related to their original intended design as a temporary solution and the use of an old lightweight chassis. As the Wespe was meant to be quickly pushed into production, some things, like the working room and armor, had to be sacrificed.
Wespe from the 2nd Panzerartillerie Regiment, Russia, June 1944 – HD picture.
Wespe from the 146th Panzer Artillerie Regiment, PanzerLehr Regiment, Normandy, summer 1944.
Wespe from the 1st Abteilung, Panzerartillerie regiment, 8th Panzerdivision, Ukraine, summer 1944.
Wespe from an unidentified unit, Italy, summer 1944.
Wespe from an unidentified Abteilung, perhaps part of the Hermann Göring Panzer Division, Anzio, January 22, 1944.
Wespe of an unidentified unit, Hungary, March 1945.
Munitionschlepper auf Wespe, Fallschrimpanzerdivision Hermann Göring, East Prussia, winter 1944-45.
le.F.H.18/2 auf. Fgst.Pz.Kpfw.II (Sf) (Sd.Kfz.124)
Dimensions (L-W-H)
4.81 m x 2.28 m x 2.3 m,
Total weight, battle-ready
11 tonnes
Crew
5 (Commander, Gunner, Loader,Driver and Radio operator)
Republic of Serbia (2009)
Experimental Modular Robotic System – At Least 1 Prototype Built
In the last few decades, all of the major armies around the world have shown an interest in the development of remote-controlled devices. These are meant to perform various tasks and intended to supplement or even replace human soldiers in dangerous situations, thus reducing the risk to human life. The tasks of these remote-controlled devices are many, ranging from reconnaissance, target identification, ammunition and other equipment resupply, transport, engaging and destroying designated targets, etc.
The Serbian Army, in a desire to follow international arms development trends in unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), began developing a series of its own vehicles. One of these project was the short range anti-tank system named simply Милица (Eng: Milica -a Serbian female name). It was, in essence, a small remotely-controlled tracked vehicle armed with two anti-tank launchers.
History
Jugoimport (Југоимпорт СДПР Ј.П) was founded back in 1949, with the intention of acquiring necessary military equipment for abroad for the JNA (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, Yugoslav People’s Army). After 1953, Jugoimport expanded the scope of its business to the export of domestic military equipment. In 2006, Jugoimport was reorganized and became a Serbian state-owned public enterprise.
During the following years, Jugoimport would continue to work on improving the performance of a number of older projects developed during pre-Civil War Yugoslavia. It also began a series of experiments to develop new technologies and weapon systems, including self-propelled artillery vehicles, armored cars, APCs, and multiple launch rocket systems etc.
During the late 2000s, Jugoimport was also involved in the development of a number of remote-controlled systems meant to perform different tasks, ranging from reconnaissance to the anti-tank. These included the Vrabac (Sparrow) unmanned aircraft, APOS – automatizovani protiv tenkovski sistem (Eng: automated anti-tank system), DALOS – daljinski upravljanu laku modularnu osmatračko-borbenu stanicu (Eng: remotely controlled light modular observation-combat station), and the Milica – modularni robotički sistem (Eng: Modular Robotic System).
Milica was primarily intended to provide infantry with a remotely controlled anti-armor close support system that could engage modern MBTs (main battle tanks). It could also be used to engage and destroy enemy firing positions and fortifications. The Milica system was intended to be fully modular, which meant it could be adapted to fulfill various combat roles, but also secondary non-combat duties. Other roles included helping infantry with gathering intelligence, monitoring and observing areas that were not yet fully secured, transporting spare equipment, ammunition, and even transporting wounded soldiers.
Not much is listed in the sources about its development history. It was presented for the first time to the public at the military Partner 2009 fair held in the Serbian capital, Belgrade.
Design
Inspiration for the Milica’s overall design (like the hull, superstructure, and suspension) was taken directly from the BVP M-80 infantry fighting vehicle. Back in the 1960s, the JNA placed a request for a fully protected infantry fighting vehicle. From this, the BVP M-60 was developed. As it proved to be unsatisfactory, a new model, the BVP M-80, was therefore developed to replace it. It was a large improvement in contrast to the earlier model and was provided with a fully rotating turret and anti-tank rockets. From 1976 to 1988, around 658 M-80s were built. Despite their old age, a number of these vehicles are still in use with the Serbian Army.
Hull
While there is limited information on its interior, based on the available pictures, it can be seen that the hull was divided into a few sections. The transmission was placed in the front of the hull, followed by the electric motor. The batteries and other equipment needed for controlling and powering the main weapon system were stored to the rear of the vehicle.
Superstructure
The Milica’s superstructure was taken more or less from the M-80. It had a very simple design, with a highly angled front plate, slightly less angled sides, and flat rear. There were a number of rectangular-shaped hatches placed in the superstructure to provide easy access to the different components stored inside.
In the front angled glacis, there was a hatch for access to the engine and the transmission. Three hatches were placed on top of the superstructure, with two in the front and to the rear. The last hatch was placed at the rear. Next to it, there was a round-shaped plug, possibly used for powering the main motor and system batteries. All of these hatches were held in place by simple screws, so removing them was quite easy.
The Milica’s superstructure was built using simple welded steel plates. The thickness of these plates is unknown, but probably only enough to provide protection from small-caliber weapons. Its greatest protection was its relatively small size. The Milica was 1.9 m long (1.72 m without the main armament), 0.77 m wide, and had a height of 0.77 m.
Suspension
The suspension was another element that is quite similar to that of the M-80, albeit with one more roadwheel. The suspension consisted of six small road wheels, which were independently suspended with torsion support units. In addition, there was a front-drive sprocket, rear idler, and three return rollers.
Engine
The sources do not provide information about the engine type or its power output. What is known is that an electrical motor was used. With a weight of 250 kg, its maximum speed is only 3 km/h. The effective operational autonomy was noted to be 2 to 4 hours. It can climb a 30° slope and is supposed to possess amphibious capabilities.
Armament
An ‘H’ shaped metal firing platform was bolted to the superstructure top. This is then used to house either the two 9 cm M79 OSA or a single 12 cm M91 anti-tank rocket launcher. The 9 cm M79 OSA anti-tank rocket launcher is in service with the Serbian Army and its purpose is to engage enemy armor and fortified positions. Its effective range is 350 m and the maximum effective range is 650 m. Armor penetration power is 400 mm of rolled homogeneous armor.
The elevation of the Milica weapon platform was -20° to +50° and the traverse was 350° (it could not rotate a full circle). Elevation speed was 3°/s, while the traverse speed was slightly faster, at 6°/s. The two launchers were fired independently. Once both tubes were fired, the Milica had to be driven back to a safe position to be reloaded.
Depending on the combat requirement, the Milica could be armed with the 12 cm M91 rocket launcher for improved anti-tank capabilities. This is a disposable light shoulder-launched rocket launcher that is in the service of the Serbian Army. The M91 consists of two components, the launcher, and the shaped charge rocket projectile. The shaped charge warhead, containing an explosive filling of phlegmatized octagen and a contact-type electric superquick fuze. The M91’s main purpose is to engage modern MBTs at ranges up to 250 m. Its penetration power against rolled homogeneous armor is around 800 mm. Secondary targets, like fortified enemy positions, could be engaged at ranges up to 400 m. Currently, there is no picture of Milica being armed with this weapon.
While these two were intended to be the Milica’s primary armament, other weapon systems, depending on the field requirement, could be used instead. These options ranged from different types of machine guns, grenade launchers, to possibly even small-caliber cannons.
Control and optics
The Milica was a wireless remote-controlled system that was operated from a concealed command post. The effective wireless control range is around 500 meters. The command unit of the vehicle consists of a control system with telecommunication modules. In addition, there is also a laptop computer which is used for choosing the camera mode and for finding targets. The Milica’s movement and weapon system were controlled by a console with an alphanumeric monitor. The sources do not mention the precise number of operators that were needed to properly control the Milica.
For directly observing surroundings and possible targets, the Milica was provided with an all-weather, day and night, black and white IP (internet protocol) surveillance camera. This camera also possesses high sensitivity electrical and optical zoom. The camera itself was placed in a protective housing above the two rocket launchers.
Operational use and fate
When the prototype was completed, it was tested at the Nikinci experimental military test range in November 2009. It underwent a number of firing tests and, while the sources do not go into much detail regarding these tests, they note that the Milica performed satisfactorily.
As mentioned earlier, it was presented for the first time to the public in 2009. In the following year, it was still presented at the military Parner fair held in Belgrade, in the hope of gaining some foreign interest.
It appears that the Milica was not adopted for service within Serbia nor anywhere else in the world. In recent years, the Serbian Army appears to have adopted (in limited numbers) another similar system. This is named the Miloš Remote Control Unmanned Platform (Милош ДУБП – Даљински Управљива Безпосадна Платформа). The precise number of Milica built beside the one prototype is not known.
Conclusion
The Milica was one of the first Modular Robotic Systems developed by the Serbian arms industry. It offered an alternative way of supporting infantry operations, minimizing the risk to the soldiers operating it. While it was not adopted for service, it provided Serbian engineers with valuable experience in designing and building such systems. This would lead to the development of newer systems that entered limited service in recent years.
Specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
1.9 m, 0.77 m, 0.47 m
Weight
250 kg
Crew
One or more remote operators
Propulsion
Unknown
Speed
3 km/h
Operational autonomy
2 to 4 hours
Armament
Two 9 cm M79 OSA or one 12 cm M91 anti-tank launcher
Traverse
350°
Elevation
-20° to +50°
Armor
unknown, but probably only lightly protected
Production
At least one prototype
Source:
M. Jandrić Weaponry and Military equipment Fair, Partner 2009
German Reich (1943)
Assault Gun/Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 89 Built + 2 Prototypes
Following the cancelation of the Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Porsche’s VK45.01(P) heavy tank project, the Germans were left with 100 built chassis, including several completed tanks. As these represented a huge material, financial, and time investment, a solution for reusing these in some way had to be found. One solution was to modify them as self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, which the Germans ultimately did. The majority of Dr. Porsche’s VK45.01(P) heavy tank chassis would be rebuilt for this purpose. These would be armed with the powerful 88 mm L/71 gun and protected with 200 mm of frontal armor, making them formidable adversaries on the battlefield at that time. Despite the small numbers built, these would see extensive combat use during the war, where their effectiveness was plagued with many mechanical and logistical problems.
Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Porsche’s heavy tanks projects
Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Porsche began his engineering career in the early twentieth century when he showed great interest in developing hybrid (combination of electric and petrol) engines. He even built a few new automobile designs which incorporated hybrid engines. During the First World War, while working for the Austrian Daimler factory, he proposed an artillery tractor that would use this hybrid engine. Eventually, nothing came from this idea. In 1930, he founded his own company located in Stuttgart. Porsche’s new company was mainly engaged in developing various designs based on the request of the clients.
Dr. Porsche would also get a chance to participate in military tank design, as he was appointed chairman of the German Panzer Commission in September 1939. This Commission was composed of leading owners of major industrial plants and engineers. Their primary function was to give suggestions and new ideas for further or already existing tank designs. While working on a number of military design projects, Dr. Porsche would establish a good relationship with Adolf Hitler. This support gave Dr. Porsche’s work a huge advantage over the competition, despite generally creating either too complicated or too expensive designs.
By the end of 1939, Dr. Porsche began working on designing components for a new heavy tank project for the German Army. His approach was somewhat unorthodox, as he was not limited by any requirements or technical specifications. Dr. Porsche’s initial work was mainly focused on the development of engines and transmissions. In cooperation with Oberingenieur Karl Rabe, Dr. Porsche made his first plans and calculations for a new vehicle called Porsche Typ 100 in early December 1939. While the name of this vehicle would change several times, today it is best known as the VK30.01(P), given by Krupp in March 1941. The following year, in 1940, in a meeting with Wa Prüf 6 (automotive design office under the Waffenamt) officials, Dr. Porsche received proper specifications for the new tank and received the necessary funds to actually build the first prototype. The Typ 100 was to be powered by two air-cooled engines placed at the rear. Each of these two engines was then connected to an electrical generator. These were used to provide power to the two additional engines placed in the hull. These in turn were used to power the front-drive sprockets. The Typ 100 used new longitudinally mounted torsion bars suspension. The six road wheels were to be placed in pairs on the three torsion bar units on each unit. Eventually, due to urgent needs of the development of the Tiger program, and due to a number of problems identified (huge fuel consumption, suspension problems, etc.) on the Typ 100, the project was canceled. Only one (or two, depending on the source) soft steel operational prototypes would be built and used for testing.
By the end of May 1941, Hitler issued the requirements for the new heavy tank project. These included an increase in armor thickness (up to 100 mm maximum) and the use of an 88 mm gun. Dr. Porsche began working on this new design during July 1941, and two months later, the first drawings and calculations were ready. Similar to the previous vehicle, this project was initially designated as Typ 101, but the name changed several times during the span of a year. Today, it is generally known as the VK45.01(P) or Tiger (P). This vehicle had several changes to its design in comparison to its predecessor. To have a better distribution of weight, the turret was moved more to the front and the final drive unit was repositioned to the rear. The engine was replaced with a more powerful one. Additionally, there were many overall design changes to its chassis and superstructure design.
Construction of such a vehicle was given to Nibelungenwerk. The first prototype was completed in April 1942 and presented to Hitler on his birthday, 20th April. Hitler was impressed with it, as Dr. Porsche received a production order for 90 vehicles (plus 10 with hydraulic drive) in May 1942. A second prototype, which was built shortly after, was transported to the Army weapon test site at Kummersdorf in June 1942. There, the VK45.01(P) proved to be prone to malfunctions, especially with the new engine.
Porsche gets rejected
Following a number of rigorous tests, the VK45.01(P) proved to be a complicated and mechanically unreliable vehicle. The competing Henschel prototype was also prone to malfunctions but was nevertheless deemed to have a better overall design. At the end of August 1942, the Reichsminister (Minister of Armaments and War Production), Albert Speer, had the opportunity to examine Dr. Porsche’s work at Nibelungenwerke. Reichsminister Speer even had the chance to actually drive the VK45.01(P) prototype. However, this visit was quite unsuccessful for Dr. Porsche. Witnessing the overall performance of the VK45.01(P), Reichsminister Speer insisted that this project be canceled, despite having received great favor from Hitler himself. Due to the many mechanical problems and overcomplicated design, even Hitler agreed that the VK45.01(P) was a failure and, on 22nd November (or October, depending on the source) 1942, he officially ended Dr. Porsche’s heavy tank project. While less than 10 (out of an order of 100) VK45.01(P) would be fully completed as tanks, only one heavily modified vehicle would be ever used in combat during 1944, on the Eastern Front, as a command vehicle.
As these chassis were already produced, they presented a huge financial and resource investment that could not be simply discarded, so something had to be done on that matter. Wa Prüf 6 made proposals to mount 150, 170, or even 210 mm heavy caliber guns on them, but nothing came from these proposals. Hitler proposed for them to be modified and used as schwere Sturmgeschütz (heavy assault guns). The frontal armor was to be increased to 200 mm (from the original 100 mm) and to be armed with the newly developed 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 anti-tank gun. In the following months, the precise role that this vehicle would fulfill was changed a few times. Initially, it was allocated to the Artillery Army branch. The project officially got the green light by the direct order of Reichsminister Speer on 22nd September 1942.
Name
This vehicle was initially designated as Typ 130 by Alkett (who was responsible for the development of prototypes). During its early development phase, in late 1942, a number of different designations were allocated to it. One of these was Sturmgeschütz mit der 8.8 cm lang or Tiger Sturmgeschütz. At that time, the simpler Ferdinand name (given in honor of Dr. Porsche) was becoming more frequently used by the designers and, later, even by the troops.
During February 1943, Wa Prüf 6 issued a list of potential names for this vehicle. These included Sturmgeschütz auf Fahrgestell Porsche Tiger mit der langer 8.8, Panzerjäger Tiger (P) 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71 Sd.Kfz 184 or the similar 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 Sfl L/71 Panzerjäger Tiger (P) Sd. Kfz. 184. The simplest one was Panzejäger Tiger (P).
At the end of November 1943, Adolf Hitler gave a suggestion for a new name, Elefant (Elephant). The name was officially adopted during February 1944 and came to be implemented from May 1944 on. Despite the common misconception that this designation was applied to modified vehicles that were used from 1944 on, this was not the case (source T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9 Jagdpanzer). For the Germans, the Ferdinand and Elefant were one and the same vehicle.
Production
The Ferdinand was initially designated to fulfill the role of an assault gun. The major manufacturer of such vehicles (primarily the Sturmgeschütz III, StuG III) was Alkett for most of the war. While Alkett possessed the necessary tools and manpower to complete the construction of the Ferdinand vehicles, it was decided by Wa Prüf 6 (during February 1943) that these were to be completed at Nibelungenwerke. On the other hand, Alkett (with the support of Dr. Porsche) would be involved in the construction of the first two prototype vehicles (chassis numbers 150010 and 150011 – depending on the source, the numbers are written with a space after the third number or without it). In general, Alkett was unable to proceed with the Ferdinand project. It was heavily involved with StuG III production and could not free up its production capacity to be involved in another project. There was also a general lack of proper rail transport units that were able to successfully carry the heavy weight of the Ferdinand’s larger components.
The Nibelungenwerke factory was located in the city of Sankt Valentin (near Steyr, in Austria) and was founded shortly after the German annexation of Austria. Initially, it was involved in production of Panzer IVs, which were then transported to Krupp-Gruson. Nibelungenwerke would be substantially enlarged so that it was capable of producing Panzer IV Ausf.F tanks. Its officials would also make an agreement with Dr. Porsche to develop his heavy tank projects. While it possessed production capabilities to conduct the construction process, Alkett provided Nibelungenwerke with a group of 120 skilled metalworkers to speed up the whole production process.
As the construction of the Ferdinand required extensive modifications to the VK45.01(P) chassis, other subcontractors would be needed. For example, Eisenwerke Oberdonau from Linz was responsible for making the necessary modifications to the hull. Siemens-Schuckert of Berlin was to provide the electrical motors and the generator. Krupp from Essen was responsible for producing the large casemates.
Due to some delays, the first 15 hulls were completed in January 1943. The remaining hulls would be ready by mid-April 1943 when they were transported to Nibelungenwerke for final assembly. Krupp was also involved in providing additional necessary parts. On 16th February 1943, the construction of the first vehicle (chassis number 150010) began. According to the original production plans, the last vehicle was to be completed by mid-May 1943.
The precise production run was slightly different depending on the source. For example, according to T. Melleman (Ferdinand Elefant Vol.I), production began in early 1943, when 15 vehicles were completed. These were followed by 26 vehicles in February, 37 in March, and, by May, all 90 were completed. Initially, four vehicles were used for training purposes.
According to T. Anderson (Ferdinand and Elefant tank destroyer), production was planned as 15 vehicles in February, 35 in March, and the final 40 in April. T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.23, Panzer production 1933-1945) state that 30 were built in April and the remaining 60 in May.
Initial testing
As the production of the first vehicles was going on, two Alkett prototype vehicles, chassis numbers 150010 and 150011, were transported to the weapon test site at Kummersdorf and Magdeburg by order of Wa Prüf 6 for testing and evaluation. These two can be easily identified by the rear positioned flexible fenders and protective covers for the forward-mounted headlights (both would be removed on the production vehicles). One of these vehicles would be presented to Hitler on 19th March 1943 during an exhibition of new vehicle prototypes at the Rugenwalde proving ground.
In a report dated 23rd February 1943, over a dozen or so deficiencies were listed for the second prototype (chassis number 150011). Some of these included that the fuel line from the left engine was positioned too close to the exhaust pipe, the electric-powered fuel pumps were unreliable, the fact that in order to drain the cooling liquid, nearly 50 screws had to be removed, checking the oil level in the air compressor was difficult, the short life of the cooling system drive belts, the hand brakes were too weak, the inadequate size of the towing hooks, and spring breakages on the running gears, among several others. In normal conditions, the Ferdinands would have probably spent months in the workshops, where designers and engineers would try to resolve these issues. But, in 1943, the German Army was preparing to commence a new offensive operation on the Eastern Front. The majority of the Ferdinands were already on their way to this front. The only real option was to provide the Ferdinand-equipped units with Formveräderungen (Modification kit equipment) to be implemented in the field.
The two prototype vehicles would be thoroughly tested during 1943, mainly focusing on their mechanical reliability. In the case of the prototype with chassis number 150011, by late August 1943, it was reported to have driven some 911 km. With a weight of 64.37 tonnes (without crew and ammunition), the fuel consumption was noted to be huge. On good roads, in order to cross 100 km, the Ferdinand needed 867.9 liters. Cross country, this reached up to 1,620 liters at the same range. Many defects with the engine design, huge fuel and oil consumption, problems with the suspension design, poor accessibility for maintenance etcetera were noted.
Specifications
The Ferdinand was, in essence, divided into two large sections. The hull contained the two front crew members, four engines, and generators. The enclosed casemate positioned at the rear held the 8.8 cm main gun, the ammunition, and the rest of the crew. Each of these components was built using welded armor plates with some elements being connected using bolts.
Lower Hull
The Ferdinand’s lower hull could be divided into four sections: the front driving compartment, the main engines positioned in the center, the lower rear electric engines, and the fighting compartment placed on top of it. The hull was constructed using welding, with the added frontal armor held in place by bolts.
Superstructure
On top of the Ferdinand lower hull was a fully enclosed superstructure which provided protection for the two crew members and the engines. It had a rather simple square design, with flat sides that angled inwards toward the front plate, while the rear part had a reverse angle.
The front part of the superstructure was where the driver and the radio operator were positioned. These two crewmembers entered their position through two hatches placed on top of the superstructure. The original VK45.01(P) round side doors intended for these two crew members were simply welded shut. The front driver visor and the machine gun ball mount were removed and replaced with a simple 100 mm thick armored plate. To provide the driver with a means to see where he was driving, a protected three-sided periscope was placed on top of his hatch door. In addition, there were two round-shaped visor ports (additionally protected with armored glass) placed on both sides of the inward-angling side armor. Next to the radio operator’s hatch on the vehicle’s right side was placed the antenna mount.
These two crew members were separated from the remaining rear-positioned crew members. The only way of communication with the commander was by using an intercom. It consisted of earphones and a throat microphone. In real combat conditions, this system proved to be prone to malfunctions. In an attempt to solve this issue, the Germans tried using light signals for communication between the driver and commander.
Behind these two crew members was placed the engine compartment, which was separated (on both sides) by a fire-resistant wall. It consisted of the two gasoline engines, electric generators, coolant radiators, and cooling fans, oil and fuel tanks. In order to put all these components into the engine compartment, they had to be placed close to each other, which caused many overheating problems and even cases of fire were not uncommon later during Ferdinand’s service life.
The top of this compartment was protected by an armored plate that was held in place by simple bolts. This way, it could be easily removed to facilitate necessary repairs. In the middle of this plate, a square armored grid cover was placed for the air intakes. On both sides of it, two rectangular grid hatches for the protection of the radiator’s air fan exhausts were placed. Close to the large casemate, there were three narrow hatches that covered most of the width of the engine compartment. They mainly served as engine access doors but, in the field, the crews would often leave them open for better ventilation. The engine exhaust pipes ran internally on both sides of the hull. They exited through a small opening which was located close to the fifth road wheel on both sides. While this arrangement provided protection for the exhaust pipes, the extensive heat rapidly deteriorated the grease lubricants on the fifth wheels. These affected their life expectancy and they had to be replaced often.
Behind the rear positioned engine firewall, two Siemens generators were placed. Atop them, the remaining crew members were stationed, protected by the large and well-protected casemate. While the original VK45.01(P) hull was reused for the Ferdinand vehicle, the rear part was changed. The two angled side plates were replaced with a flat one extended to the rear, which was more suited to carry the huge casemate.
The toolbox was placed on the superstructure’s right front side. This was not an ideal location, as it could be easily damaged during combat operations. So, it would be moved to the rear of the vehicles. The crews would also add additional spare boxes for various additional equipment.
Casemate
The huge casemate positioned to the rear of the vehicle housed the 8.8 cm gun and four crew members. Its overall construction was simple, as it consisted of four armored plates plus the top one which were welded together. Viewed from the front, the casemate had a trapezoidal shape. While these plates were thick, they were also slightly sloped to provide additional protection. It was not actually welded to the superstructure but was instead held in place by bolts. Outside, close to the engine compartment, there was a small rectangular plate (with five bolts) that served as a reinforced connector between the superstructure and the casemate.
The front plate had a round-shaped opening in the middle for the gun ball mount. To avoid getting rainwater into the engine, some crews welded two diagonal improvised drains in front of the superstructure.
To the rear part of each side armor plate, a cone-shaped pistol port was placed. These were actually plugs that were connected to chains. When in use, the armored cover would simply be pushed out by one of the crew members. Once open, these would just hang on to the chains and could be closed back by dragging the chain back in. To the rear, in the middle of the casemate, a large round-shaped one-piece hatch was located. In the center of this door, a much smaller round-shaped hatch was located. Its main role was to act as another pistol port and to be used during the ammunition resupply. Two additional pistol ports were placed on both sides of this door.
The top was not flat and was actually slightly angled toward the engine compartment. In front of it, the arc-shaped armored cover was used for the gunner’s periscope. To the right of it, the commander’s square-shaped two-piece hatch was located. Somewhat surprisingly for German standards, the commander was not provided with a command cupola and his view of the surroundings was quite limited. Further back, on the left side, the loader’s round-shaped two-part hatch was located. In the back corners, two round-shaped ports were used by the two loaders to see the surrounding with periscopes. In the middle, a ventilation port with protective sides was installed.
Suspension and Running Gear
The Ferdinand’s suspension consisted of six large road wheels, a front idler, and a rear drive sprocket on each side. The six road wheels were divided into pairs and were placed on bell cranks, which in turn were mounted on longitudinal torsion bar units. Each of these pairs of road wheels was actually suspended individually. Initially, Dr. Porsche’s design utilized rubber-rimmed wheels. As these were quickly worn out due to the extreme friction between the track and the wheels, Dr. Porsche designed a much simpler solution, using steel wheels with inbuilt spring units to help with shock absorption. The Germans, by this time, were having shortages of rare materials, including rubber, so this was a welcome innovation that would see use in later years on the Panther and the Tiger tanks. The road wheels had a diameter of 794 mm.
The shapes of the front idler and rear drive sprocket were visually almost identical. The main difference between these two was in their internal construction. They were identical to simplify the production of parts. But the main reason was to prevent the track from falling off the suspension due to the vehicle’s length and lack of any return rollers. Both the idler and the drive sprocket had a diameter of 920 mm and consisted of two toothed rings that had 19 teeth. The tracks used were 600 mm wide and were connected using single-pins. The ground clearance of this vehicle was 50 cm.
Dr. Porsche’s suspension design had positive and negative sides. The positive side was that the whole suspension system was completely external. This allowed him to lower the vehicle’s hull and provide more working space inside it. On the other hand, while the overall design was (at least in theory) simple, it was prone to malfunctions and breakdowns. Due to the vehicle’s extreme weight, replacing broken parts was difficult to achieve without proper equipment.
Engine and Transmission
As Dr. Porsche’s original VK45.01(P) dual-electrical engine system proved to be too complicated and unreliable, it was decided to replace these with a more orthodox power unit. Two Maybach HL 120 TRM gasoline engines giving out 265 hp@ 2600 rpm were chosen instead. Each of these two engines was provided with a 74-octane gasoline fuel tank. The engine was water-cooled, with some 37 l placed in two coolant tanks. One cooling tank was placed on top of the generators, while the second was in front of the engine. Based on the experience the Germans gained during the previous two Russian winters, they paid great attention to providing Ferdinand’s oil radiator with a system that would enable it to start during cold weather. This was a simple system that redirected hot water from the cooling radiator to a small vessel placed next to the oil radiator, which in turn heated the oil. The engine’s gearbox had three forward and three reverse speeds. The engine compartment was designed rather hastily and the maintenance was not always easy to accomplish.
Each fuel tank could carry some 475 liters (950 l in total). The Ferdinand was, due to its weight, a heavy fuel consuming beast. It needed some 1,100 l for crossing 100 km of road. With the fuel load carried inside, the operational range was 150 km on good roads, while off-road, often the case on the Eastern Front, the operational range was reduced to only 95 km. The maximum speed for a vehicle weighing 65 tonnes was a solid 30 km/h, but it could be only achieved on good roads and for a short period of time. The maximum cross-country speed was only 10 km/h or even less.
The engines used to power the two Siemens Typ K58-8 generators. These two generators would in turn produce the necessary power for the two Siemens Typ 1495a direct current electric (230 kW each) motors. These two electric motors were positioned under the casemate. Each of them was responsible for providing power to one side of the vehicle, being connected to the rear positioned drive sprockets through electromechanical drives.
Armor Protection
The Ferdinand had formidable armor protection for its day. The upper front armor of the hull was 200 mm thick (at a 30-32° angle, depending on the source). This was not a single-piece armor plate, but instead two 100 mm thick plates (or 90 and 110 mm, depending on the source) joined together. These were held in place by 32 conical head bolts. Alkett initially proposed adding 80 mm of 55° angled armor to the front, but this was not implemented
The lower part of the hull was a single piece measuring 80 mm placed at an angle of 45° (42°). The top part of the lower hull was 60 mm at 78° (82°) angle. The flat hull side armor was 60 mm and the rear ranged from 40 (60 mm depending on the source) to 80 mm (at a 60° to 90° angle). The bottom armor was 20 mm thick. It is not clear in the sources if the previously positioned machine gun ball mount and the driver visor port openings were left empty or filled in with armor plates.
The superstructure frontal armor was 200 mm thick placed at a 9° (12°) angle. It too consisted of two separated armor plates held in place by a combination of welding and bolts. Some sources state both plates were 100 mm thick, while others claim they were 90 and 110 mm thick. The flat sides were 80 mm, rear 80 mm placed at a 40° angle, and 30 mm on the top.
The rear positioned casemate was protected with a single piece of 200 mm frontal armor plate placed at a 20° angle. The sides were 80 mm thick and placed at a 30° angle. The rear armor was the same armor thickness placed at a 20° angle. The top was much lighter, at 30 mm placed at an 86° angle.
Crew
The Ferdinand had a crew of six, which were separated into two groups. The first group consisted of the driver and the radio operator, who were placed in the front hull. For steering the Ferdinand, a standard lever arrangement was used. However, their operation was slightly different in comparison to other vehicles. Namely, by moving the steering levers, instead of controlling the two drive sprockets, on the Ferdinand, they actually controlled the two electric motors, each responsible for powering one side. In front of the driver, there were two pedals: one for acceleration and the second for activating the drum brake. There was also an auxiliary lever parking brake, which also served as a clutch.
The radio operator’s job was to operate the Fu 5 radio set, which consisted of the transmitter and a receiver. The 2-meter aerial antenna was placed next to his hatch. An additional 1.8 m Sternantenne D antenna mount was placed on the rear right corner of the casemate. This antenna was used for the command vehicles which were equipped with Fu 8 radio, which had a stronger transmitter and receiver. The spare batteries for the radio were held under the radio operator’s seat.
The remainder of the crew, which included the commander, gunner, and two loaders were positioned in the rear casemate. The commander had only a limited view of the surroundings by using the Scherenfernrohr (scissor periscope), and only with the hatch open. The loaders had two Turmbeobachtungsfernrohr (observation periscopes).
Armament
The main armament of the Ferdinand was the 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71, probably the best anti-tank gun of the Second World War. It was, in essence, a modified version of the 8.8 cm Flak 41 anti-aircraft gun. During the war, the Germans developed and used two towed 8.8 cm anti-tank gun versions. The first one was the PaK 43, which was mounted on a four-wheel carriage, and the second was the PaK 43/41, placed on a mount with components from a few different artillery pieces (wheels from 15 cm s.FH.18 and the split trail legs from the 10.5 cm le.FH.18). The PaK 43/41 used a horizontal sliding block mechanism, while the Pak 43 had a vertical one. The PaK 43/41 was an effective anti-tank gun, being able to take out all of the Allied tanks, but was also too heavy.
For use on the Ferdinand (and, later, the Jagdpanther), the Germans introduced a slightly modified version, named 8.8 cm PaK 43/2, which was more suitable for installation into enclosed armored vehicles. It had a semi-automatic and vertical sliding block. It had an electrical trigger, with the firing trigger being placed on the elevation handwheel.
The gun itself was mounted on a cradle that stood on two runnions connected to two curved post arms. This installation was specially designed in order to reduce the stress acting on the elevation gears. The hydropneumatic buffer and the recuperator cylinders were placed on top of the gun.
The 8.8 cm gun had a traverse of 30° (15° on each side) and an elevation of -5° to +14° (or -8° to +18°, depending on the source). The traverse and elevation hand wheels were positioned on the left side of the gun and operated by the gunner.
After firing the gun, the spent case was caught by a canvas sleeve basket. Due to the 8.8 cm case’s large size, nearly a meter, not many could fit into this basket, so the loader had to frequently empty it. It also had a secondary role of measuring the recoil travel of the gun that had to be in the range of 550-580 mm. When on the move, the gun was held in place by a forward-positioned travel lock. Inside the casemate, there was another smaller ‘H’ shaped travel lock, located in the casemate ceiling.
Despite being a huge vehicle, the total ammunition load was quite limited, with only 40 rounds. These were held in storage bins located inside the casemate sides. The Ferdinand crews would often use any available spare space to add additional rounds, reaching a total load of 50. Authors such as T. Melleman (Ferdinand Elefant Vol.I) mention that some crews managed to squeeze in up to 90 rounds!
When firing at longer ranges, the Ferdinand crews used the Sfl Zielfernrohr 1 a type telescopic sight. When engaging targets with direct fire, the Rundblickfernrohr 36 periscope sight was used. While the Ferdinand could be used as mobile artillery thanks to its armament’s range, sufficient elevation, and firepower, it was rarely used in this manner. The main problem would be the small ammunition load of high explosive rounds and the fact its main task was hunting tanks and other armored vehicles.
While the 8.8 cm gun could fire either armor-piercing or high-explosive rounds, the Ferdinands were initially to be armed with the armor-piercing only. Prior to their first engagement at Kursk, each Ferdinand was supplied with 20 two-part (propellant charge and explosive round) semi-fixed high-explosive (HE) rounds. These proved to be of poor quality and prone to jamming during extraction after firing. Another issue with the two-part rounds was their time fuse, which worked well for the original anti-aircraft use. On the Ferdinand, however, the significant forces exerted on the time fuse due to the high acceleration in the barrel could lead to premature explosions. These would later be replaced with better-designed rounds. The range of the HE rounds was around 5.4 km.
Regarding the armor-piercing (AP) rounds, there was a better choice, with a few different types available. These included the standard Pzgr.39-1 and the improved Pzgr.39/43 AP, which had a range of 4 km. The Pzgr. Patr 40 was a tungsten-cored armor-piercing shell with the same range of 4 km. Lastly, the Gr.Patr 39 H1 and Gr.Patr 39/43 H1 hollow charge rounds were available, which had a range of around 3 km.
When using the standard AP round, the gun could penetrate 182 mm of armor sloped at 30° at a range of 500 m. At 1,000 m this dropped to 167 mm, and at 2,000 m to 139 mm. The tungsten round, at the same ranges and angles, could penetrate 226 mm, 162 mm and 136 mm. As the Germans had problems with the supply of tungsten, this round was rarely used. The hollow charge round could penetrate 90 mm of armor inclined at 30° at any range. These hollow charge rounds were not well known for their precision and, when the target was hit, there was a good chance that the round would misfire.
The Ferdinands were equipped with a two-part, rectangular-shaped shield, which was bolted on the front part of the gun mantlet. Its purpose was to protect the main gun from any small-caliber rounds or shrapnel. Not all vehicles received these from the start, some were added later on (just prior to their combat use), while some never received them. During the later part of the Kursk Offensive, a number of crews improvised some by completely redesigning the gun shields, which could now be much easier replaced. After 1944, these became standard equipment and replaced the earlier design.
For protection against infantry attacks, the Ferdinand was equipped with an MG 34 machine gun with 600 rounds of ammunition that was stored inside the vehicle. In addition, there were two 9 mm MP 38/40 submachine guns.
Organization
The Oberkommando des Heeres OKH (German High Command) initially planned to form three Schwere Sturmgeschütz Abteilung – StuGAbt (Heavy Assault Gun Battalion). These included the 190th StuGAbt, which was to be reformed and renamed into the 654th Assault Gun Battalion, the 197th, renamed into the 653rd Assault Gun Battalion, and the newly formed 600th Assault Gun Battalion. Each was to be equipped with 30 vehicles divided into three 9 vehicle strong batteries. The remaining 3 vehicles were to be allocated to a HQ battery. Once ready on the front, each battery was to be separated from the main unit and used more as mobile close artillery support.
In March 1943, the organization and employment concepts were completely reworked. This was done by the General Inspector of the Armored Troops, General Heinz Guderian. He first reallocated the Ferdinands from the Sturmartillerie to the Panzerwaffe. This change also affected the unit organization and tactical use. The Ferdinands would be allocated to two battalions, the 653rd and 654th schwere (Heeres) Panzerjäger Abteilung – sPzJagAbt (Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion). These were, in turn, part of the 656th schwere Panzerjäger Regiment (Heavy Tank Destroyer Regiment). This unit, besides the two Ferdinand-equipped units, also had a third, Sturmpanzer Abteilung 216 (216th Tank Assault Battalion), equipped with 45 Sturmpanzer IV heavy assault vehicles (based on the Panzer IV chassis). Each battalion was divided into three companies, each equipped with 14 vehicles (further divided into three platoons each, with 4 vehicles and two command vehicles), plus a Battalion HQ with three vehicles, for a total 45 per battalion. Additional vehicles based on the Panzer II and III, and Sd.Kfz 250/5 and 251/8 half-tracks were given to these units, either as command vehicles, close support, medical support, or for artillery observation. The change in tactical doctrine referred to the concentration of all available vehicles while attacking designated targets instead of dividing them into smaller units.
The Regiment HQ was officially formed on 8th June 1943, mainly from reserve cadres of the 35th Panzer Regiment. Oberstleutnant Ernst Baron von Jungenfeld was chosen as the commander of this Regiment. The command of the 653rd Battalion was given to Major Steinwachs, that of the 654th Battalion to Hauptmann Karl-Heinz Noak, and that of the 216th Battalion to Major Bruno Kahl. The 653rd Battalion, during its reorganization, was stationed at Neusiedl-am-See in Austria and the 654th in Rouen in France. By late May, the 653rd Battalion was visited by Heinz Guderian, who observed the unit during training exercises. He was quite impressed with how the vehicles managed to get over 40 km to their base without any mechanical breakdowns.
Camouflage
When they left the German factories, the Ferdinands were painted in the standard Dunkelgelb (dark yellow). They also had three Balken Kreuzen painted on the hull sides and to the rear. Once on the front, the Ferdinands crews would use their ‘artistic soul’ to paint their own vehicles to try to blend as well as possible with the surroundings (being a huge vehicle, this was not an easy task).
Each Battalion used different types of camouflages. The 653rd employed large blotches of green paint applied with either brushes or sprayed. These were either round in shape or with more straight lines. A few vehicles had three-color schemes: a combination of green with brown outlines. The 654th crews did a number of different designs mostly using dark yellow and green combinations.
Markings and emblems
Once these vehicles were given to the 656th Regiment, they also received their proper unit markings. The marking system employed on the Ferdinands consisted of the standard three-digit numbers, but it was quite complicated. The 653rd and 654th Battalions were designated as the I and II Battalion of the 656th Regiment. These were then divided into the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Companies of the I Battalion and the 5th, 6th, and 7th of the II Battalion. As mentioned earlier, each of these companies had 14 vehicles plus a Battalion HQ unit with 3 vehicles. Each company was divided into 3 Platoons, each with 4 vehicles, plus a Company HQ with 2 vehicles. It was common for the Germans to name the Company HQ as the 1st Platoon.
Of the three-digit markings, the first number represented the Company number. The number 4 was not used. The middle number indicated the Platoon. The Company HQ, which was listed as the 1st Platoon, would be marked as ‘0’. This also affected the markings of the remaining Platoons, as their number is actually smaller by one. For example, the 3rd Platoon would actually have the 2 number designation instead of 3. The last digit was used to designate individual vehicles in the Platoon. The odd numbers were used to mark the section commanders in each Platoon. As the Company HQ only had two vehicles, they were just marked as 1 or 2.
As an example, the vehicle with the number ‘721’ belonged to the 654th Battalion’s 7th Company, 3rd Platoon, 1st section command vehicle.
The smaller Battalion HQ, which had only 3 vehicles, was marked differently. It also consisted of a three-digit number, but the difference is that the first number represented the Battalion and was marked with a Roman numeral. The 653rd was marked as ‘I’ and the 654th as ‘II’. Being command vehicles, the second digit was 0, followed by the vehicle number from 1 to 3. For example, the IO3 was the 653rd Battalion HQ’s 3rd vehicle.
The two Battalions, while using the same three-digit system, painted these numbers differently. The ones on vehicles of the 653rd were white with black outlines, while the 654th used completely white numbers. These were painted on the vehicles’ sides and on the rear.
While it was somewhat common among the German armored units to have some unit emblems, this was not the case for the 656th Regiment. The 653rd Battalion simply adopted its original German Army eagle (from back when it was known as the 197th Assault Gun Battalion), but with the wings folded down and standing on two crossed guns.
During the Kursk Offensive, the 653rd Battalion used an identification symbol that consisted of two smaller squares and a larger rectangle. The larger rectangle represented the Company, being marked with different colors. White was used for the 1st, yellow for the 2nd, and red for the 3rd Company. The exception was the 1st Company’s 3rd platoon, which had a red stripe, and the 4th Platoon, which had a red cross. The small square indicated the platoon in question, except for the 1st Platoon, which had none. The 2nd was indicated with the same rectangle color, the 3rd with no color but with white outline, and the 4th Platoon with Company color with white outline.
The 654th Battalion used less elaborate markings. These consisted of black rectangles with a white letter ‘N’, the initials of the unit commander, Karl Heinz Noak. The Company number would be added after the N, like N1, N2, and N3. In the case of the HQ, the letters ‘St’ (Stab – Command) would be added instead of the numbers. These were painted either on the glacis or left fender and on the rear left corner of the casemate. When this unit was later disbanded, all its surviving vehicles were given to the 653rd Battalion. These then received the 653rd’s markings and, in time, the camouflage scheme. When the first snow began to fall, all surviving Ferdinands received whitewash paint covering the whole vehicle, including the markings.
The 656th Regiment officially received its own emblem, containing a shield with the silhouette of an exploding tank. Under the tank, the word ’Pampas’ was added. The precise meaning was sadly lost.
New marking and camouflage
The vehicles used in Italy in 1944 were painted in the same dark yellow and green combination. After 13th June, they received a new ‘U’ Gothic letter, usually at the rear end of the casemate. The precise meaning of this letter is not documented. Tactical markings were not used on the majority of the Elefants sent to Italy. A few vehicles would receive the three-digit numbers painted in white.
The vehicles that were not sent to Italy received a new emblem, the Sword of the Nibelungs which emerges from the Danube’s waves. It was usually painted in front and to the rear of the casemate, but some also had these painted on the hull sides.
Service
Baptism of fire at Kursk
The 656th Regiment was transported to the Eastern Front during June 1943 for the upcoming German offensive against the Soviet Kursk Salient, Operation Citadel. The main base of operation for this Regiment was the Smiyevka train station, some 25 km south of Orel. Once the vehicles were unloaded, they were driven to their designated area of assembly. In the case of the 653rd Battalion, the 1st Company was at Kuliki, the 2nd at Gostinovo and the 3rd Company at Davidovo. By the end of June, the entirety of the 656th Regiment was at its designated initial positions. The few days before the offensive were used for training and for the vehicle commanders to get familiar with the surrounding terrain. Of the three Battalions, only the 653rd was fully equipped with 45 vehicles. The 654th had 44 and the 216th had 42 vehicles (but many sources disagree on the exact numbers).
As the Ferdinands were intended to spearhead the German advance, they were to be reinforced with a remote-controlled tank company (equipped with Borgward B.IV Sd.Kfz.301) for cleaning minefields. These small vehicles were equipped with detachable explosive charges designed to detonate mines in a wide area. They could be either remotely controlled or driven by a human driver.
The 656th Regiment was part of the XXXXI Panzer Korps under the command of General Harpe. Its order of battle during the initial stages of the Kursk Offensive was as follows: The 653rd Battalion was to support the attack of the 86th and 292nd Infantry Divisions, while the 654th Battalion supported the 78th Infantry Division. The 216th Brigade was to follow up in the second wave, together with the 177th and 244th StuG Brigades. Their objective was a heavily fortified Soviet position around the Malo-Archangelsk and Olchovatka area, with its key position around Hill 257.7 (later known as Panzer or Tank Hill).
The attack on the first day by the 653rd Battalion pierced the first Soviet defenses and reached its target, destroying some 26 T-34 tanks and dozens of anti-tank guns in the process. Many of its Ferdinands were temporarily put out of action due to extensive Soviet minefields, which spanned extensive areas. To increase the lethality of their mines, the Soviets coupled them to artillery shells or even aircraft bombs. While they usually just blew up parts of the suspension, some were so strong that they would damage the hull, which could not be repaired on the front. The anti-mine auxiliary unit did its best to clear the minefields, but lost many of its vehicles in the process. The Soviet artillery also made mine clearing operations difficult. Places that were clear of mines and marked as such were usually shelled by the Soviet artillery. The advancing Ferdinand crews would lose sight of the clear paths and accidentally run into minefields that were not cleared. In total, on the first day, the 653rd Battalion lost 33 vehicles to mines. While most required only minimal repair works, their recovery proved to be difficult. In order to move one Ferdinand, at least 5 heavy Sd.Kfz.9 half tracks were needed. Being unprotected, they often fell victim to Soviet artillery fire trying to prevent recovery of these vehicles. The 653rd Battalion would receive two new Bergepanthers (based on the Panther tank chassis), but even these proved to be inadequate. During the night, Soviet demolition teams would blow up any abandoned Ferdinands they could get to.
The 654th Battalion, while advancing toward its objectives, Hill 238.1 and 253.5, also came across many minefields. Thanks to the remote controlled vehicles, clear roads were established with the loss of 10 of the Borgwards. Still, this was far from enough, leading to the loss of a large number of the 654th Battalion’s vehicles being damaged.
In a memorandum dated from 17th July 1943, Heinz Guderian described the 653rd Battalion’s combat operation. “….The very heavy artillery barrage (on the first day, 100 heavy and 172 light guns, 386 rocket launchers, and countless grenade launchers) smashed the attack by our infantry. The Ferdinands and Strumpanzers were not able to push their attack in the depths of the enemy positions, as the infantry had been halted. Thus, the tanks had to stop in the middle of the battlefield, attracting concentrated artillery fire. The enemy artillery always found time to regroup and to reinforce. The missing secondary armament on the tanks negatively affected the tanks in combat. Subsequently, losses were high”.
The experience of the Ferdinand crews is partly shown in the report to Generalmajor Hartmann written by Unteroffizier Böhm and dated from the 19th July 1943.
“…. On the first day of combat, we successfully defeated bunkers, infantry, artillery and anti-tank positions. Our guns were under artillery barrages for three hours and still maintained their ability to fire! Several [enemy] tanks were destroyed during the first night, and others fled. Artillery and anti-tank crews fled before our guns after we fired upon them repeatedly. In addition to many batteries, anti-tank guns and bunkers, our battalion destroyed 120 tanks during the first round of fighting. We suffered 60 casualties during the first few days, mostly from mines. ….. We also had bad luck. It was at the rail embankment when a Panzer III on the other side received a direct hit and flew through the air, landing on the front part of the Ferdinand. Wrecking the tube, aiming device and engine grating. …. We were more successful during the second operation defending east of Orel. Only two total losses. One gun under Leutnant Tariete destroyed 22 tanks in one engagement. The total number of tanks destroyed is high and the Ferdinand contributed substantially to the defence, just as with the penetration. One gun commander destroyed seven of nine American built-tanks that approached him. …… The Ferdinand has proved itself. They were decisive here, and we cannot go against the mass of enemy tanks today without a weapon of this type.”
On 8th July, a group of 4 Ferdinands and 20 Tigers were advancing toward the Soviet line. On the other side, some twelve SU-152’s under the command of Major Sankovsky were waiting in ambush. Once the German vehicles came to a distance of 500 m, the Soviet vehicles opened fire. In the following engagement, the range was even more reduced, just 300 m, where the Tigers suffered under the SU-152’s heavy large caliber rounds. The Ferdinands proved more resilient but after numerous hits they too would fall victims to the 152 mm guns at close range. At the end of this engagement, the Germans lost four (or three, depending on the source) Ferdinands and 8 Tigers, inflicting no losses on the Soviets.
By 11th July, some 19 Ferdinands were reported as complete losses. Of these, four vehicles were burned out due to engine accidents. The remaining were mostly destroyed by enemy artillery fire, which hit the less protected engine compartment top. In addition, some 40 vehicles were temporarily out of action and needed repairs. Half of those were brought back to action by 11th July.
On 14th July, any further salvage operations were abandoned and, instead, the surviving vehicles of the 653rd Battalion were redirected to support the German attempts to relieve the 36th Panzergrenadier Division, which was surrounded by nearly 400 tanks of the Soviet 3rd Tank Army. The Ferdinands, under the command of Lt. Heinrich Teriete, managed to drive them back, despite the small German armored numbers. Thanks to well-selected firing positions and the poor enemy reconnaissance, the Ferdinands took advantage of the 8.8 cm gun’s long-range firepower. During this engagement, Lt. Heinrich Teriete himself claimed to have destroyed 22 Soviet tanks, for which he would be awarded a Knight Cross later on. During the same day, some 60 Ferdinands (34 from the 653rd and 26 from the 654th Battalion) took defensive positions around the Shelyaburg-Tsarevka area.
During the period between 14th and 17th July, the German units at Kursk were faced with rapid Soviet counter-attacks. The 653rd and 654th Battalions, despite losses and mechanical breakdowns, participated in German defensive operations south of Orel. Their mission was to defend the heavily contested Orel-Kursk railway line. The already poor mechanical reliability of most Ferdinands was further worsened by constant skirmishes with the Soviets. The Regiment commander, Jungenfeld, reported his unit’s poor shape to the 2nd Army (elements of the 9th Army, including the two Ferdinand Battalions, were previously sent to assist this Army) in a report dated 24th July 1943.
“.. The Regiment has been permanently in combat since 5 July… The Ferdinand, as well as the Sturmpanzer, suffered numerous technical problems. Initially, it was planned to withdraw the tanks for 2-3 days after a 4-5 day commitment to undergo maintenance and repair work. This was not possible… All tanks now need an overhaul requiring 14 to 20 days.. I herewith report to the 2nd Army that, within a short time, the regiment will no longer be combat ready…”
At the end of July, due to constant Soviet pressure, it was decided by the 2nd Army that Orel had to be abandoned. At the start of August, the 653rd Battalion had 12 Ferdinands ready for action, some 17 in repair and 16 were reported as complete losses. The 654th Battalion, on the same day, had 13 operational, 6 in repair and 26 complete losses.
There was an interesting and somewhat unusual (to say at least) situation where a Ferdinand was lost, being hit by a ‘flying’ Panzer III. The strange situation occurred when a remote-controlled mine clearing vehicle was hit by Soviet artillery fire, detonating its 350 kg explosive charge. The following explosion threw into the sky many parts (including the chassis) of a nearby Panzer III command vehicle. A part of the chassis hit the engine compartment of a Ferdinand, setting it on fire.
After Kursk
By mid-August 1943, the two Ferdinand Battalions were being pulled out of Orel to the rear for recuperation and much-needed repairs. While Ferdinand achieved great success in destroying enemy armor, many Ferdinands, which were irreplaceable, were lost. On 23rd August, all surviving vehicles from the 654th were given to the 653rd Battalion. The 654th Battalion was sent to Orleans in France for recuperation and refitting with the new Jagdpanther and Jagdpanzer IV.
Following this, the 653rd Battalion was pulled back from the front line and stationed at the Dnepropetrovsk industrial center. The damage on some vehicles was such that even this center lacked proper tooling and equipment for the job. Of 54 surviving vehicles, four could not be repaired. Of the remaining 50 vehicles, only 10 to 15 (depending on the source) were combat ready by mid-September. These, together with over 10 Sturmpanzer IVs, were used to form a Sinsatzgruppe (task force) and placed under command of Hauptman Baumunk. This group received orders to divide into two smaller units, with one was tasked with heading toward Sinelnikovo and the second to Pavlograd by rail. While the Soviets held part of the railway line, after a brief engagement, they retreated.
The Ferdinands would mostly be stationed in this area when, in late September, the unit was evacuated towards Zaporozhye. In early August, during a defensive operation at Krivoy Rog, the Ferdinands claimed to have destroyed 21 enemy tanks and 23 anti-tank guns.
On 10th November 1943, the Ferdinands were repositioned from Zaporozhye to positions south of Nikopol. The German positions at Nikopol were well defended and supported by the 24th Panzer Division, to which the Ferdinand Company was attached to. On 20th November, the Soviets managed to make an opening in the German defensive line, rushing in with large numbers of tanks in an attempt to exploit their breakthrough. This formation was successfully intercepted by the 24th Panzer Division and the Ferdinands.
At the end of November, during the battles around Kochasovka and Miropol, the Ferdinands inflicted great damage on the Soviets, claiming 54 tanks. Lt. Franz Kretschmer’s vehicle alone destroyed some 21 tanks. On the following day, the 653rd Battalion’s situation became untenable, having only 4 fully operational vehicles available. Besides these, of the 42 vehicles, some 8 needed some minor repairs, and the remaining needed major overhauls. The Battalion received orders to be transported to Sankt-Pölten on 10th December 1943. The withdrawal started six day later, but due to Soviet activity, this withdrawal lasted up to 10th January 1944.
In a German report dated from the 7th August 1943, the Ferdinands were credited with the destruction of 502 enemy tanks, of which 320 were achieved by the 653rd Battalion alone. An additional 100 artillery and 200 anti-tank guns destroyed were also reported by the German Army. Three months later, another report stated that they had destroyed 582 tanks, 3 self-propelled guns, 3 armored cars, 477 (or 377 depending on the source) anti-tank guns, 133 artillery guns, 103 anti-tank rifles, and 3 aircraft! It is not clear if these numbers correspond to reality or are just inflated propaganda numbers.
German post-combat analysis
Following Operation Citadel, the German after-action reports mended the overall performance of the Ferdinand vehicles. The most praised asset of the Ferdinand were its excellent anti-tank capabilities, demonstrated by the sheer number of destroyed tanks claimed. It had good accuracy, a long range and possessed great armor piercing capabilities. The more heavily protected Soviet KV-1 tanks could be effectively destroyed at ranges of 2 km. On average, 2 to 3 rounds were enough to completely destroy enemy tanks.
The ammunition, on the other hand, proved to be problematic, most noticeably in the case of the high-explosive rounds. The problem was mainly regarding the poor quality of the ammunition casing, which often led to the clogging of the gun chamber. The loaders were often forced to carry additional improvised equipment to try to eject the stuck spent rounds.
Another great issue was the lack of a machine gun mount that could be used for self-defence against enemy infantry attacks. While the crew had their own personal weapons and an MG 34 machine gun stored inside, these could not always be put to use against enemy infantry. There were four pistol ports, two on the sides and two to the rear, but none to the front. Some Ferdinand crews improvised by using their MG 34 machine gun to fire through the main gun barrel. The gun elevation and traverse were used to direct the firing arc of this machine gun.
Many crews used spent cases to make makeshift mounts to provide a more stable machine gun firing platform, in order to avoid damaging the rifling of the gun. Installing a machine gun mount on top of the armored casemate was also attempted but proved to be unpopular as the operator had to be exposed to enemy return fire and fragments. Installing an infantry platform to the rear of the casemate was tested. However, the supporting infantry riding on this were easy targets for enemy gunners, so this idea was shortly abandoned. To somewhat resolve this issue, the Ferdinand units were reinforced with 12 Panzer III tanks that were to act as a screen against enemy infantry and soft targets.
The armor protection was deemed sufficient. During the battle for Kursk, there were no reports of the front armor being penetrated. There were cases of the side armor being pierced by 76.2 cm rounds at closer ranges. While the front armor protection of the casemate was more or less invincible, at that time, it had one major issue. Enemy rounds or artillery fragments could ricochet into the insufficiently protected engine top cover. This would cause minor to significant damage to the engine, cooling system or fuel lines, to name a few. A number of vehicles were either immobilized or lost this way. For this reason, it was later requested to add 20 to 30 mm additional armor protection atop the engine compartment.
The cooling system was not up to the task, as there were cases of the engine compartment catching fire due to the engine overheating. At least one vehicle was completely lost during a recovery operation when it caught fire due to the engine overheating itself.
The Ferdinand was noted by its crews to lack sufficient visibility and had many blind spots and poor visibility in general. Radio equipment was often jammed due to Ferdinand’s electrical equipment. The temperature inside the casemate was high and there were cases of the signal flare ammunition blowing up. Despite its weight, the Ferdinand could relatively easily cross a 2.6 m wide trench. It also possessed a good climbing ability. However, their cross-country speed was noted to be only around 10 km/h.
Interestingly, the new gasoline-electric power train performed relatively well. Its power output was sometimes problematic, and some vehicles caught fire due to electric short-circuits. The suspension was deemed ineffective and prone to malfunctions. The narrow tracks, together with the weight, caused many vehicles to be bogged down. The lack of a proper recovery vehicle was also noted, with many vehicles having to be blown up because they could not be recovered.
Despite the long list of negative issues with Ferdinand, they showed that a well-protected and armed anti-tank vehicle had merits. They offered many advantages over the poorly armored and improvised anti-tank vehicles already in service (for example, the Marder series).
Back to Germany
Following the Eastern campaign, all surviving Ferdinands were brought back to Nibelungenwerke for a major overhaul. These included the 653rd Battalion’s 42 vehicles and a smaller number of vehicles that were recovered earlier during the Kursk operation and were sent back to Germany. In addition, the two Alkett prototypes were also sent to Nibelungenwerke.
An important note here, these vehicles were still named Ferdinands at this time. The Elefant designation was only implemented from February (or May) 1944 on. As mentioned earlier, the Elefant designation was never used by the Germans to separate the improved form from the initially produced vehicles. It was more a fulfillment of Hitler’s request to change the names of many vehicles to more aggressive animal names. As the Elefant designation was becoming official with the Germans during 1944, this article will use this name from this point onward.
As these were being gathered at Nibelungenwerke, the workers and engineers set on repairing any major damage, but they were also working hard to address a number of noted shortcomings of the Elefant. This was mainly with regard to visibility, mobility, and anti-infantry weaponry. As this was not an easy task to achieve, the Vienna Arsenal was also included in the rebuild program. It is there that some 6 completely burned-out Elefants were brought back to life.
Modifications
In order to improve mobility, the Elefants were provided with wider tracks. For better visibility, in what was surprisingly not issued on the first production vehicles, the improved Elefant received a commander’s cupola very similar to that of the StuG III. This cupola had seven periscopes which provided the commander with a good all-around view. The commander’s hatch also had a small opening for the use of a periscope if needed, without exposing himself to enemy fire. The two small vision ports located on the superstructure’s front sides were welded shut. The driver’s periscope cover was also slightly improved by adding a plate to protect from the sun. A few vehicles were equipped with two-part round-shaped rear casemate doors instead of the single-piece one regularly used.
Visually, the most obvious change was the introduction of a machine gun ball mount (Kugelblende 100 or 80, depending on the source) placed on the right side of the superstructure. It was protected by an additional 100 mm of armored cover, with a small opening for the machine gun. This mount had an elevation of -10° to + 15° and a traverse of 5° in both directions. It was to be operated by the radio operator. The machine gun operator was provided with a 1.8x KFZ 2 optical sight.
Why the machine gun mount was never installed in the original vehicles is not clear in the sources. There are a few different possibilities. While the original VK45.01(P) had a ball-mounted machine gun, this was not carried over to the later Ferdinand vehicles. One source gives information that this was done simply as the Krupp engineers lacked the men and skill to make an opening in the 200 mm thick plate. This explanation is somewhat problematic, because there were actually two 100 mm thick plates and that the German engineers already had some experience making the holes necessary for the installation of the ball mount. The second possible reason includes Alkett’s original proposal to mount additional angled armor plates in front of the vehicle. Adding a ball mount machine gun position would be much more difficult to achieve in this case. The main reason was probably that Nibelungenwerke’s engineers were forced to speed up the production and did not have the time nor tools to implement it. Also, the Ferdinand was initially intended to be used as an assault gun (like the StuG III), which themselves lacked a machine gun. The protection against enemy infantry was to be provided by the supporting infantry. Whatever the case may be, from early 1944 onward, the Elefant had better means of fighting off infantry attacks from the front.
The lower hull armor of the driver’s compartment was increased by an additional 30 mm thick armor plate. The engine compartment top cover was slightly improved to provide better engine protection. The worn out engines were also replaced with brand new Maybach HL 120 models. Additional protection included Zimmerit anti-magnetic paste that was applied to roughly half the height of the vehicle.
The gun shield, previously more of a field modification, was now being used as standard. It was much easier to replace when damaged or during the change of the gun barrel. The ammunition load was increased to 55 rounds. The troublesome crew communication system was improved. With all these modifications, the overall weight of the vehicle rose to 70 tonnes.
The changes also included the appointment of a new 656th Regiment unit commander. The previous commander, Baron von Jungenfeld, was promoted to Colonel. In his place, Oberst Richard Schmitgen was appointed. Another change concluded the 656th Regiment’s fate. While on paper it still existed, in reality, its units were detached and sent to Italy in 1944, after which the 656th Regiment was never actually used at full regimental strength.
The overall repair process lasted from January to April (or March depending on the sources) 1944, with the first vehicles being combat ready by February 1944. During this time, some 47 vehicles and the 2 prototypes would be improved to the new standard.
Elefants in Italy
Following the Allied invasion of Italy in 1943 and, later, the American amphibious landing at Anzio in January 1944, the German High Command was forced to rapidly send more and more troops and equipment there. For this reason, elements of the 656th Regiment were also to be sent there. This included the 216th Assault Tank Battalion and at least one Elefant Company. Not many Elefants could be spared, as a large number of them were still in Nibelungenwerke’s workshop waiting to be repaired and modified. On 15th February 1944, the 653rd Battalion’s 1st Company, with 11 vehicles and one recovery vehicle under the command of Helmut Ulbrich, was ready to be transported to Italy. Initially, it was planned to send 14 vehicles, but the last three could not be repaired in time due to a lack of spare parts.
All vehicles reached Rome by 24th February 1944. Once there, the 1st Company was attached to the 508th Heavy Tank Battalion equipped with Tiger tanks under the command of Major Hudel. At the end of February, under bad weather, the Elefants and Tigers were ordered to attack American positions. The Elefants were once again used in a role for which they were not designed for. This attack was to be conducted through marshes which were unsuitable for heavy vehicles. During this attack, while crossing a bridge, one Elefant was immobilized. After a number of failed recovery attempts, it was abandoned. The next day, another vehicle struck a German mine, and once again, due to the inability to tow it to safety, it was blown up by its own commander, Gustav Koss. Due to the loss of two vehicles in a short amount of time, the remaining vehicles were pulled back. They would be stationed in a more defensive role near the cities of Cisterna and Velletri for the next few months. Due to problems with the arrival of spare parts, their use after the initial action around Anzio was limited.
American sources give us some information on their engagements with the Elefants around Cisterna. In the report of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, while on the road to Cisterna, two M10 tank destroyers commanded by Sergeant Harry J. Ritchie and Sergeant John D. Christian came under fire from a group of Tigers and two Elefants at ranges just over 230 meters. The gunner of one M10, Corporal James F. Goldsmith later wrote.
“ Sgt Ritchie ordered me to pull into open view around the corner of the building, and from this exposed position, directed three hits onto the most exposed tank, it being about 550 yards (some 500 meters) up the road at that time, and knocked it out. We received heavy armor-piercing and high-explosive fire from the other tanks, shells barely missing our destroyer by a few feet and fragments hitting us. We were exposed for about five minutes. Sgt Ritchie ducked his head and shoulders below the turret and pulled back behind the house. When enemy fire ceased, Sgt. Ritchie had me pull out again, and from the same exposed position, directed two rounds of AP shells that hit and bounced off the front armor of the Ferdinand 250 yards (230 meters) east of us. We again received intensive fire from the enemy tanks and shells were landing so close that fragments were coming through the open turret, one slightly wounding our gunner in the head when it hit our tank and damaging the counter-balance and .50 caliber machine gun mounted on the edge of the turret. We were again exposed to enemy fire for about five minutes. He ducked into the tank and we pulled behind the house again. We continued to fight throughout the day with our damaged gun. ”
While Sergeant Ritchie’s vehicle was under fire, the second M10, commanded by Sergeant Christian, shot several rounds at the German vehicles, scoring two hits on a Tiger and two more on the Elefants. He reported that only two crew members from the hit vehicles managed to escape. Whatever damage he did to them, or whether his 76 mm gun managed to pierce the Elefant’s armor is not mentioned.
By 20th May 1944, the Elefants were mostly kept in reserve for maintenance and repairs. A few days later, the Allies made a breakthrough, so the Elefants were once more put into action. In the initial engagements, they destroyed 4 to 6 (depending on the source) enemy Shermans, with the loss of two vehicles. One had an engine malfunction and was burned down, the second was blown up by its crew when it became immobilized. Following this, the unit had to retreat back to Rome by June 1944. The enemy armor was not the only threat that the Elefants had to face. The extensive Allied air superiority caused the further loss of two more burned-down vehicles. One was hit by a P-47 bomb on 5th June, while on the Via Aurelia road. The second vehicle was lost five days later, near Orvieto.
The stream of bad luck did not end there. While crossing an old bridge, the bridge construction simply collapsed under the Elefant’s extreme weight, taking the vehicle with it. The vehicle commander was killed during this accident As there was no way to recover it, the crew had no choice but to destroy it.
At the start of July, the 1st Company of the 653rd had only 3 (or 4, depending on the source) vehicles with only 2 operational and one undergoing repairs. In addition, the unit still possessed the recovery Bergetiger (P). Though orders for the unit to pull back to Germany were given on 26th June, frontline developments prevented this from happening. The few Ferdinands would see more combat action up to early August when they were finally pulled out to the Vienna Arsenal. By that time, only three (or two, depending on the source) combat vehicles and the recovery vehicle survived.
Back to the East
Despite some misconceptions that the Elefant’s story ended in Italy, this was not the case. Those vehicles that were not involved in Italy were actually being prepared to once again face the Soviets. The 653rd Battalion was now under command by Rudolf Grillenberger, while the 2nd Company was commanded by Werner Salamon and the 3rd Company by Bernhard Konnak.
While the German Army planned to send the Elefants to the East in March 1944, this was not possible. By late February, only 8 vehicles were fully operational, while the remaining were still under repair. Among other reasons, shortages of spare materials, workforce, and a lack of electricity further delayed the completion of the remaining vehicles. Delays were also caused by a lack of sufficient supply of soft-skinned vehicles.
On 8th April 1944, the Battalion reached Brzezany and was attached to the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen by mid-April. The 653rd Battalion had 30 operational Elefants, 2 Bergetiger (P), 1 Bergepanther and 2 Panzer III ammunition carriers. Additionally, one Elefant was still in Austria and was not available due to needing repairs. At this time, the problem with the acquisition of soft-skinned vehicles was not solved. In essence, the necessary ammunition, fuel, or supply operations could not be carried out.
The SS Panzer Division and the supporting units, including the Elefants, were intended to be used as a relief force for the trapped German units near Tarnopol. The bad weather caused huge logistical problems and greatly slowed down the 653rd Battalion’s attack, which led to the cancellation of an attack on the city of Siemakovce. On 24th April, another attack on Siemakovce was attempted. An advance unit consisting of German infantry and 9 Elefants managed to capture the city after two days of fighting. The next day, they crossed the Strype River and made a defensive line. After an engagement with the Soviets, the 2nd Company had two damaged vehicles, which were recovered, but the mechanics were not able to immediately repair them. Ultimately, the Germans failed their objective and were forced to retreat due to extensive Soviet attacks. The 2nd Company lost two more vehicles. Like many times before, they had to be blown up, being unable to be recovered. By late April, the 2nd Company was attacking Soviet positions at Siemienkowicz, but due to bad terrain, most vehicles were left temporarily disabled due to their engines being overheated.
By May 1944, the mechanical situation of all surviving Elefants was dire. Due to a lack of sufficient supply vehicles, the recovery vehicles had to be used in this role. Despite many tank destroyers being temporarily out of action due to a lack of much-needed repairs, the Elefants showed that they were still effective tank killers. The Elefant also gained a great reputation among the Russian but also the German ranks, but not all were impressed. In his memoirs, a Nashorn tank destroyer driver (from the 88th Heavy Anti-Tank Battalion), Gefreiter Hoffmann, wrote.
“I never saw this Porsche-thing. Everybody on the front was talking of it, calling it a wonder-weapon, being better than the Tiger … My boss was very proud of our Hornisse with its long gun, we were pretty successful. He scoffed at this giant vehicle: “Too heavy to move, too clumsy to steer, what a dreck”, he said”
On 11th May, the Battalion was repositioned to Kozova and Zborev, which were only 15 km from their positions. The sources are not clear about the precise number of vehicles at this point. While T. Melleman (Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II) states that few vehicles had to be blown up, author T. Anderson (Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer), on the other hand, stated that by June, no complete loss was reported.
After this operation, the Battalion was pulled back to a resting position near Brzhezhany. During this time, this unit received at least 4 Elefants which had the new rear casemate two-piece hatches. It was also supplemented with some bizarre field modifications based on the Bergepanther and the Soviet T-34 tanks.
In mid-July 1944, the Soviets launched a huge offensive against the German North Ukraine Army. The Germans responded by sending the 653rd Battalion to this area. The Elefants were attached to the Eingreiftruppe Nordukraine, in essence, a ready deployment force. This mixed unit managed to achieve success against the enemy armor. However, the Soviets managed to break through other points of the German defense line. The deployment force and the Elefants were forced to retreat to Landeshut. On 20th July, the Soviets were trying to stop this retreat but were constantly kept at bay, with the loss of a number of Elefants in the process. These were mostly blown up by their crews, as their engines would often break down due to overheating. The 653rd Battalion would see extensive action up to 27th July, when it managed to complete its retreat thanks to its tenacious defense and the shift of the Soviet direction of attack. Heavy fighting during July cost the 653rd Battalion some 19 to 22 vehicles plus 2 recovery Bergetiger (P), the command Tiger (P), and some 4 ammunition supply tanks. While only a few were actually lost in combat, the majority had to be blown up by their crews due to a lack of fuel and breakdowns. The loss of crewmen was surprisingly low, with 19 wounded and only 5 dead.
At the start of August 1944, there were still more combat operations which cost the battalion a few more vehicles. On 4th August, the 653rd Battalion received orders to reposition to Krakow. Due to a lack of vehicles, the 3rd Company was disbanded and sent back to Germany to be armed with the new Jagdtigers. In addition, at this time, two of the surviving vehicles from Italy were used to reinforce the depleted 653rd Battalion.
In mid-December 1944, the 653rd Battalion was renamed to Heeres schwere Panzerjäger Kompanie 614 (614th Independent Tank Destroyer Company). It was then attached to the 4th Panzer Army near the Bodzentyn area on 22nd December. The 614th Company saw heavy action in combat south of Kielce, where it lost some 10 vehicles from 14th to 15th January 1945. Interestingly, even by this time, the Elefant’s front armor was almost invincible, even capable of resisting several hits from the IS-2’s 122 mm gun. By the end of January 1945, there were only four Elefants and one Bergepanther left. The unit was moved to Stahnsdorf for much-needed repairs in late February 1945. The mechanical condition of these vehicles was poor and they badly needed repairs. Luckily for them, there were still some resources available to put them back in action.
Once repaired, the unit was repositioned to Wünsdorf in April 1945. On 21st April, it was attached to Kampfgruppe Möws, which, with the 4 Elefants, was to support Kampfgruppe Ritter. During preparation for transport on rails at the Mittendorf station, one vehicle had to be left behind, as it broke down and could not be repaired. It would remain there up to 1947, before finally being towed away. The remaining three vehicles would be separated, with one left defending a position at Löpten, and the remaining two sent to defend Berlin. These took action near Karl-August Platz, where they would be captured by the Soviet Forces.
Bergepanzer Ferdinand and other improvised support vehicles
Prior to their engagement on the frontline, while used for crew training, the Ferdinands did not have many mechanical breakdowns that needed towing vehicles. Even if they did break down, there were Sd.Kfz.9 vehicles available for towing to the repair workshops. The reality of frontline service, however, showed the need for a dedicated recovery vehicle. In the field, a great number of Ferdinands were immobilized. As the Germans lacked the required numbers of Sd.Kfz.9 and tank-based recovery vehicles, the damaged Ferdinands were often blown up by their crews to avoid being captured.
To somewhat resolve this issue, three available Tiger (P) chassis were to be rebuilt as Bergepanzers (recovery tank). The modification included adding a new much smaller fully enclosed casemate to the rear. In front of it, a ball-mounted 7.92 mm MG-34 machine gun was placed, with two additional pistol ports on the sides. On top of this casemate, a round hatch door was installed, while to the rear, a two-piece hatch was placed, taken from a Panzer III turret. There were also three smaller slits on the front and sides of the crew compartment. The armor thickness of these vehicles was much lighter than the Ferdinand, with 100 mm to the front. The front casemate armor was 50 mm and 30 m on the side. A boom crane was placed on top of the vehicle’s superstructure. Another change was the use of longer tracks which, with the lower weight, provided them with better overall drive.
These three were completed by August 1943 and issued to the 653rd Battalion, with one vehicle per company. They solved the lack of towing vehicles and many Ferdinands were recovered thanks to their help.
Of special note, during 1944, the 653rd Battalion’s mechanics and engineers managed to build a number of improvised vehicles based on German and also captured vehicles. One such vehicle was created using a Panzer IV turret which was welded on a Bergepanther. Another example involved installing a 2 cm Flakvierling 38 on a second Bergepanther.
Despite the small number built, today, there are two surviving vehicles left. One restored Elefant is located at the Fort Lee U.S. Army Ordnance Museum. This particular vehicle belonged to the 653rd Battalion and was captured in Italy by the Allies. The vehicle spent some time on loan at the Bovington Tank Museum in Dorset, UK. The vehicle was displayed as part of the museum’s “Tiger Collection” display from April 2017 until January 2019, when it was returned to the United States. This display brought all the members of the Tiger family together in one place for the first time. The second vehicle is located at the Russian Patriot Park and was captured during the Battle of Kursk.
Conclusion
Many sources that do not go into much analysis of the Ferdinand’s state that they were a waste of resources and had a poor overall design. It is important to remember that the Germans had already built 100 Porsche Tiger chassis. A lot of resources and time had already been invested in a vehicle that was not going to be put into production. They simply had no other choice than to see proper use of these already built chassis. For the later assembly of Ferdinands, additional resources were needed. The Ferdinand was rather hastily designed, which is best seen in the lack of s commander cupola and machine gun in the hull. The engine compartment was inadequate and too cramped, which later caused problems with the engine overheating. Some of these would later be corrected. Ferdinands also required frequent repairs and maintenance, but nearly all WWII vehicles required such things to be effective in combat. The armament and the armor were some of the best for their day. The Ferdinand is also often seen as too heavy. At its 65 and later 70 tonnes, it was. While it could reach a top speed of 30 km/h, its actual cross-country speed was only 10 km/h. Thanks to their long length, they had a good climbing ability.
In combat, the Ferdinands gained an enviable reputation among the German and Soviet units for their deadly gun and strong armor. The Soviets, when engaging German tank destroyers, would often describe them as Ferdinands, even though they were usually other vehicles in the German inventory. The German propaganda machine also helped by portraying the Ferdinands as wonder weapons. Despite this, the Ferdinand’s success as a deadly tank destroyer is hard to deny. During Kursk alone, over 500 Soviet armored vehicles were claimed to have been destroyed by them. Even taking into account a 50% overclaim ratio (which is excessive), the numbers remaining are still very impressive.
In the end, the Ferdinand was a deadly tank hunter that was plagued by its rushed development and lack of numbers. While not a waste of resources, they were no wonder weapons and possessed quite a number of flaws.
Porsche’s VK45.01 prototype in 1942. It was given as a favorite before problems with the complex powerplant emerged.
Early production Ferdinand, Panzerabteilung 653, summer 1943.
Ferdinand of the 654th Panzer-Abteilung, Kursk, summer 1943.
Ferdinand of the 654th PanzerJäger Abteilung, Kursk, Eastern front, 1943. Sd.Kfz.184 “Elefant” of the 1st company, 653rd Schwere Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung, Anzio-Nettuno, March 1944. Tiger (P) Elefant (late type) from the Abt.653 HQ Company, Brzherzhany, Ukraine, July 1944
Panzerjäger Tiger (P) 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71 “Ferdinand/Elefant” Sd.Kfz 184
Dimensions (L-W-H)
8.14 m x 3.38 m x 2.97 m
Total weight, battle-ready
65-70 tonnes
Crew
6 (Commander, Gunner, Two Loaders, Driver and Radio operator)
The next in line in the Panzer III series after the Ausf.B was the Ausf.C. As the previous suspension used on Ausf.B still proved to be inadequate, the German engineers tried a new 8 wheel suspension. Another major change was the introduction of an improved commander cupola. Like the previous two versions, the Ausf.C would also be built in small series and used mainly for testing, but also saw limited combat action.
History
With the development of the first Panzer III Ausf.A, the German Waffen Prüfwesen 6 (Wa Prw 6 – the automotive design office of the German Army) contacted Daimler-Benz to build two additional experimental chassis. The first one was the Versuchs-Fahrgestell (experimental chassis) Z.W.3 (Zugführerwagen platoon commander’s vehicle) which would lead to the Panzer III Ausf.B. The Z.W.4 would be used as the base of the Panzer III Ausf.C (marked as 3a. Serie Z.W.) and D (marked as 3b. Serie Z.W.). Both developments were carried out to attempt to find a solution to the Ausf.A’s problematic suspension.
Production
Daimler-Benz was tasked with assembling 15 Panzer III Ausf.C tanks. In the same way as the previously built vehicles, this included a number of different subcontractors. Some of these were Krupp, Deutsche Edelstahlwerke AG, and many more much smaller companies. By the end of 1937, all 15 vehicles were completed and given to the German Army for use.
Specifications
The Panzer III Ausf.C was simply an improved version of the Ausf.B. The two major modifications were the suspension and the commander’s cupola, with some other minor modifications. The weapons, engine, armor (except the cupola), and overall design were unchanged.
Hull
The hull of the Panzer III Ausf.C was the same with one exception. The two inspection access hatch doors to access the transmission located in the lower front plate were replaced by two square-shaped armored covers that were held in place by bolts. In front of the hull, two towing bracket pins and one to the rear were added.
Superstructure
The superstructure received only minor modifications, mostly in the rear side of the engine compartment. The flat rear side on the engine compartment used on the previous Ausf.B was replaced with a new angled plate. Another change was the use of improved vision ports that provided better protection from splash.
Turret
Changes on the turret included the replacement of the visor ports with improved models. The left vision port lacked the small visor slits that the right one had. The visor ports on the turret side doors were designed to be easily replaceable.
One of the few major improvements was a completely new and better-protected commander cupola. Its armor thickness was increased from 14.5 to 30 mm all around. The number of vision ports was reduced from eight to five. These were also better protected, with two-part hatches that could be fully or partially opened. In addition, much thicker 50 mm glass blocks replaced the 12 mm ones previously used.
Suspension
The Ausf.B incorporated a new 8 road wheel suspension. This also proved to be insufficient for the job, so the Germans replaced it with a new one. The Ausf.C suspension also had 8 smaller road wheels, but with a different arrangement. It was divided into three parts, with two pairs of double wheels placed in front and to the rear. The remaining four double wheels were placed in the middle. The smaller pairs, each with two double wheels, were suspended using a shortened leaf spring unit. In addition, these were also provided with a shock absorber. The four center-positioned wheels were suspended using a much longer leaf spring unit. The last change to the suspension was the new round cap held in place with four bolts for the rear idler.
In Combat
The Panzer III Ausf.C, as the previously built versions, was allocated initially to training units. Once war with Poland broke out in September 1939, the Panzer III Ausf.C would also be pressed into combat service. The Panzer III had a good gun at the time and could destroy with ease any Polish armored vehicle. The Panzer IIIs were lightly armored and often fell victim to Polish anti-tank fire of any caliber. With the completion of the Polish campaign, the Germans initiated a slow withdrawal of the earlier types of the Panzer III. By February 1940, these, including the Ausf.C, were allocated to tank training schools.
Conclusion
The Panzer III Ausf.C was another attempt to find an adequate suspension solution for the Panzer III. While a new type of suspension was tested, it also proved to be insufficient for the job, so the work to solve this issue continued with the following Ausf.D vehicle.
Specifications
Dimensions (l-w-h)
5.66 x 2.81 x 2.36 m
Total weight, battle-ready
16 tonnes
Crew
5 (Commander, Gunner, Loader, Radio Operator, and Driver)
Propulsion
Maybach HL 108 TR 250 hp@ 2800 rpm
Speed (road/off-road)
35 km/h, 10-12 km/h (cross country)
Range (road/off-road)-fuel
165 km, 95 km (cross country)
Primary Armament
3.7 cm KwK L/46.5
Secondary Armament
Three 7.92 mm MG 34
Elevation
-10° to +20°
Armor
5-30 mm
Source
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
German Reich (1937)
Medium Tank – 10 Built + 5 Hulls
The introduction of the Panzer III Ausf.A into service provided the Germans with a base for the development of a good medium tank. While the Germans were generally satisfied with the overall concept and design, there was still a lot of room for improvements and modifications. The greatest issue with the Ausf.A was its weak suspension. Thus, the Germans introduced a new version, the Ausf.B, intended to improve the suspension and other minor elements of the vehicle.
Development
Following the introduction of the Panzer III Ausf.A, the Germans established a good design base that still offered a lot of space for improvements. As Daimler-Benz was finishing the first few Ausf.A test chassis in August 1935, Waffen Prüfwesen 6 (Wa Prw 6 – the automotive design office of the German Army) issued a new contract by which two additional experimental chassis were to be built. These were Versuchs-Fahrgestell (experimental chassis) Z.W.3 (Zugführerwagen platoon commander’s vehicle) and the Z.W.4. The Z.W.3 experimental vehicle would serve as the base for the development of the Panzer III Ausf.B, while the Z.W. 4 would become the Ausf.C and D. The development of the Ausf.B (and later C and D versions) was mainly focused on solving the issues regarding the Ausf.A’s problematic suspension.
Production
According to this contract, Daimler-Benz was to produce 15 Panzer III Ausf.B chassis and superstructures (not all would be completed as tanks) by the end of 1937. These had serial numbers ranging from 60201 to 60215. As the German industry was still not sufficiently developed for tank production, a number of subcontractors were also included in the Panzer III project. These included Krupp-Grusonwerk, producing 5 new turrets, Rheinmetall, building 5 of the 3.7 cm guns and Krupp (Essen) building another 10 turrets and 5 guns. Additionally, Stahlwerke Harkort-Eichen was to produce armor components for the needed turrets. Once all parts were completed, these were to be transported to Daimler-Benz for final assembly.
By early November 1937, 8 vehicles were completed and were mostly issued to training tank schools. The last two vehicles were completed and delivered by the start of December 1937.
Specifications
The Panzer III Ausf.B was, in essence, an attempt to improve a number of the previous Ausf.A’s shortcomings, mainly regarding its suspension.
Hull
The hull of the Panzer III Ausf.B had the same arrangement as its previous version, with the rear engine compartment, the central crew compartment, and the forward-mounted transmission and enclosed driving compartment. The only visible change introduced on the Ausf.B’s hull was the use of two inspection round access hatch doors placed in front of the transmission. These were used for the crew to have better access to the transmission during repairs.
Superstructure
There were several changes incorporated into the new Ausf.B’s superstructure. The major one was the complete redesign of the rear engine compartment. It was enlarged and the two larger air intakes were replaced with four smaller ones placed on top of the engine compartment instead of the rear.
On the left superstructure side, a triangular-shaped pivoting arm was added. Its main purpose was to serve as a machine gun mount (the machine gun had to be dismounted from the vehicle) for the crew to engage enemy aircraft. The vehicle had to be stationary, which somewhat limited its usefulness. The radio antenna and its wooden housing were moved further to the back, on the right side of the superstructure.
Turret
The Panzer III Ausf.B received a new commander’s cupola that was bolted to the rear of the top of the turret. It still had the same drum shape and eight small vision slits. In order to provide better protection for the commander from bullet splash, the internal armored slide slits were improved. These could be partly or completely open to provide the commander with a good view of the surroundings. The 12 mm thick glass blocks were also present on this cupola. The commander direction indicator was also kept unchanged. The most obvious change to the cupola was the introduction of new two-part hatch doors.
Suspension and Running Gear
The major improvement in contrast to the Ausf.A version was the introduction of a completely new (and somewhat complicated) suspension. The Ausf.B suspension consisted of eight (400 mm in diameter) small road wheels. These were placed in pairs on double swing axles, which pivoted around a swing arm. This swing arm also pivoted on a pin that was held in position by a small metal box that was welded on the hull’s lower sides. Above each group of four wheels, a leaf spring unit was installed. In addition, there were also four shock absorbers placed on each side of the suspension. While the front-drive sprocket and the rear idler were unchanged, the Ausf.B had three return rollers in comparison to the two used on the Ausf.A.
Engine
The engine used on this vehicle was the same HL 108 TR which produced 250 hp@ 2800 rpm, as on the Ausf.A. While the weight of the Ausf.B was increased by a tonne, its overall driving performance remained the same, with a maximum speed of 35 km/h (or 10-12 km/h cross country), an operational range of 165 km and 95 km cross-country. There were some internal engine modifications, like rearranging positions of the filler tanks to provide better cooling.
Armor Protection
The armor protection of the hull and the turret was also left unchanged. It still provided limited protection, as armor thickness ranged from 5 to 16 mm only.
Crew
The Panzer III Ausf.B also had a crew of five, which included the commander, gunner, and loader, who were positioned in the turret, and the driver and radio operator in the hull. Their positions were unchanged in comparison to the previous model.
Armament
The main armament of the Panzer III Ausf.B was also unchanged from the Ausf.A and it consisted of the 3.7 cm Kw.K. L/46.5 with 121 rounds of ammunition. The secondary armament consisted of three 7.92 mm MG 34 machine guns, with two placed in a coaxial configuration with the main gun, and one in the hull. The machine gun ammunition load was 4,500 rounds.
In Combat
The first 8 built Panzer III Ausf.Bs were ready for distribution by August of 1937. Six of these would be given to the Putlos tank training school. The remaining two would be given to the 5th Panzer Regiment. The last two vehicles built, when completed, were allocated to the 1st Panzer Regiment at the end of 1937.
Despite being built in small numbers, the Panzer III Ausf.B would see some action during the war. Due to the lack of more modern tanks, the Germans were forced to use some Panzer III Ausf.Bs for the invasion of Poland in 1939. The majority (if not all) Ausf.B vehicles that were damaged or required a major overhaul were retired from service and instead given to training units after February 1940.
Variants
While necessary components to complete 15 Panzer III Ausf.B vehicles were built, only 10 fully operational tanks were actually assembled. The remaining 5 turrets and chassis were actually reused for other purposes.
The 0-series Sturmgeschütz III
In June 1936, Inspektorat 4, which was in charge of artillery development, issued a request for the development of a self-propelled assault vehicle that was to support infantry formations. Krupp was charged with the development of the main weapon, while Daimler-Benz did the chassis (taken from the Panzer III Ausf.B) and superstructure. Five vehicles would be built using soft steel, but with fully operational weapons. Due to many delays in production, these would not be completed until October 1939. These would be used in the following years for testing and crew training. Eventually, these developments would give way to the famous StuG series.
Panzer III Ausf.D/B hybrid
With the allocation of the five Panzer III Ausf.B chassis to the Sturmgeschütz III project, five turrets were left unused. In order not to waste them, Heeres Waffenamt gave Daimler-Benz instructions to build five Ausf.D chassis to be merged with the Ausf.B turrets. These were never a priority and Daimler-Benz concentrated on developing and building more improved versions of the Panzer III. It took some two years (until October 1940) to actually complete these vehicles. Some of these (possibly all) were transported to Norway in the summer of 1941 and allocated to the Panzer-Abteilung z.b.V. 40 (special assignment unit).
Conclusion
The Panzer III Ausf.B was the first attempt to improve some shortcomings of the Ausf.A. While it introduced a new suspension, a weak point on the previous version, it also proved to be somewhat overcomplicated and unsuited for the job. Nevertheless, the Panzer III Ausf.B was still an important vehicle in German hands, as it provided them with a necessary increase of experience in tank design and, more importantly, in crew training.
Panzerkampfwagen III Ausf.B specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
5.66 m x 2.81 m x 2.36 m
Total weight, battle-ready
16 tonnes
Crew
5 (Commander, Gunner, Loader, Radio Operator, and Driver)
German Reich (1943)
Assault Gun – 1,141-1,500 Built
When the Alkett factory was heavily bombed by the Allied Air Force in November 1943, the production of the StuG III was almost put to a halt. In an attempt to find a relatively easy solution, the Germans simply merged the Panzer IV chassis with a StuG III upper superstructure, creating a new vehicle, the StuG IV. Production was conducted relatively quickly, with 30 vehicles completed by December 1943 and, by April 1945, over 1,000 would be built. Like its StuG III cousin, the StuG IV was also an effective assault gun which would see service on all major fronts up to the end of the war.
Sturmgeschütz concept
During the Great War, German (and many other nations) infantry formations were supported by towed artillery. For German Sturmtruppen (Eng. Stormtroopers) that depended on mobility. The necessary towed artillery proved to be slow and inadequate for the supporting task in taking more fortified enemy positions. Based on this experience, after the war, the great German Army tactician, General Erich von Manstein, proposed using highly mobile, well protected and armed self-propelled artillery. They were to provide infantry with mobile close fire support during combat operations. These were to be organic part of standard Infantry Divisions at a battalion strength of around 18 vehicles.
Due to Germany’s general lack of production industrial capacity during the 30’s, it would take years before the first prototypes were completed. The Germans were also forbidden by the Versailles Treaty to develop and produce tanks, which Hitler, when he came to power, publicly denounced. The development of these vehicles was also hindered by conflict in different branches of the Germany Armed Forces. Eventually, it was decided that these vehicles would be put under direct supervision of the Artillery. These vehicles would be known as Sturmgeschütz III (assault gun vehicles) but were generally known simply as StuG III.
To speed up the development, it was decided to reuse many elements of Panzer III vehicles. The design was very simple and consisted of a new superstructure armed with a short barrel 75 mm gun placed on the Panzer III chassis.While the first prototypes were completed in 1937, it was not until 1940 when the initially limited production actually started. Once pressed into service, the StuG III proved to be an excellent infantry support vehicle. When the Germans invaded Soviet Union in 1941, the Germans noticed that their available anti-tank weapons were almost useless against the Soviet modern tank designs (T-34 and KV’s). To address this problem, in 1942 the Germans introduced a new StuG III armed with the longer 75 mm gun that was more effective as a tank destroyer. As production of the StuG III shifted more towards the anti-tank role, the Infantry was left without a proper support vehicle. To address this, a new version of the StuG III armed with a 10.5 cm howitzer was introduced in 1943. Both versions would remain in production until the war ended with over 10,000 being produced, making them the most numerous German armored vehicle of the war.
The first StuG IV
In early 1943, Albert Speer approached Krupp officials with a suggestion for producing a new Sturmgeschütz. Soon after, Krupp began working on the first basic drawing of this vehicle, which was to incorporate a number of already produced components. These include a StuG III Ausf.F superstructure, Panzer IV Ausf.H chassis and a 7.5 cm StuK 40 L/48 gun. The superstructure of the StuG III Ausf.F was chosen as, at that time, Krupp did not possess the design plans for the newer Ausf.G version. Unlike the later produced Sturmgeschütz based on the Panzer IV that used the unchanged StuG III superstructure, the initial Krupp design was different. The front part of the superstructure incorporated a highly angled (50 mm thick) armor plate which would have provided excellent protection. Other changes included increasing the armor protection on the sides to 45 mm, compared to the original 30 mm, and the increase of the track’s width.
After the first drawing and calculation were completed, Krupp informed the Germany Army and Wa Pruf 6 officials that, although it was feasible, they did not recommend producing it. Despite removing the turret, the vehicle would have the same weight as an ordinary Panzer IV tank. In addition, the redesign and sloped armor would cause production delays which were not acceptable at that time, so the project was quickly abandoned.
A new start
While the idea for a new StuG vehicle based on the Panzer IV chassis was discarded, several months later, due to desperate necessity, it would come to life again. In November 1943, the Allies heavily bombed the Alkett factory which was instrumental for the overall StuG III production. As the production of vital StuG III vehicles was temporarily stopped, the Germans needed a new quick solution. At a military conference held in early December 1943, Adolf Hitler was informed that the StuG III Ausf.G superstructure could be, with minimal effort, mated with a Panzer IV Ausf.H or J chassis. This time, however, the new vehicle had to have minimal changes to the components used for its construction. The only major modification was the extension of the driver compartment. Hitler was impressed with this proposal, as it would be easy to implement due to available parts and production capabilities. Hitler also suggested giving this new vehicle to the Panzer Abteilungen, as it would facilitate maintenance and procurement of spare parts.
The negative side of this decision was the reduction of available chassis for the Panzer IV tank. But, as the production of the Panzer IV was to be terminated in favor of larger Panther tanks, this was not seen as a huge issue. The actual production of the Panzer IV, due to the high demands for tank vehicles, was never canceled and it lasted almost up to the end of war. As the need for the StuG III vehicles was great, Hitler gave a green light for the realisation of the project.
Production
According to Hitler’s initial orders, the StuG IV was to be produced in great numbers in a short period of time. Some 350 vehicles had to be built in December 1943 and an additional order of 500 to be built by the end of January 1944. Of course, this was impossible to achieve given Germany’s dire economical and industrial situation.
Despite these optimistic numbers given by Hitler, Krupp actually received orders to produce the first 10 trial vehicles at the end of 1943. Nevertheless, Krupp managed to quickly produce 30 vehicles by the end of December 1943. The production goal for January and February 1944 was 210, whereas Krupp managed to produce 214 vehicles. During 1944, monthly production goals were around 90, with the exception (beside January and February) of November, with 100, and December with 110 vehicles. Despite the bad economical situation and the Allied bombing raids, Krupp managed to obtain a relatively smooth production run. 87 vehicles were built in March, 91 in April, 90 in June and July, 70 in August, 56 in September, 84 in October, 80 in November, and 49 in December 1944. In 1945, the production numbers dropped down severely due to many factors, but probably most important were the Allied bombing raids and lack of resources. In January 1945, the number of produced StuG IVs was 46, 18 in February, 38 in March and the last 3 were completed in April. By the time the production run stopped in April, Krupp had managed to produce 1,111 Stug IV vehicles. Beside Krupp, Alkett also produced some 30 StuG IVs with the chassis provided by Nibelungwerke.
Of course, like many other German production numbers, there is some disagreement between authors. The previous mentioned numbers are according to T. L. Jentz and H. L. Doyle in Panzer Tracts No.23 Panzer Production from 1933 to 1945 and Walter J. Spielberger in Sturmgeschütz and its Variants. A. Lüdeke (Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg) suggests 1,500 produced vehicles. On the other hand, D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka) estimates that some 1,139 were built from December 1943 to March 1944 (this year is probably a print or author error). An interesting number is the 632 built vehicles speculated by B. Perrett (Sturmartillerie and Panzerjager 1939-45). This is almost less than half the numbers that all other sources give and it is likely incorrect.
While the final assembly, together with the manufacturing of chassis and running gears, was done by Krupp, all other necessary components were supplied by other companies. Additional frame chassis were supplied by Eisen Hüttenverein, Eisenwerke Oberdonau, Krupp (Essen) and Böhler. The guns were built by Škoda and Wimag. The StuG III superstructure was provided by Brandenburgische Eisenwerke.
Name
Being designed to supplement the StuG III, this vehicle also inherited its name of Sturmgeschütz IV für 7.5 cm Sturmkanone 40. In general, it was also simply known as StuG IV, which this article will use for the sake of simplicity.
Specifications
As previously mentioned, this vehicle was built using a combination of Panzer IV and StuG III elements. Thus, it was logical that the changes introduced on the StuG III were also implemented on the later StuG IV. The manufacturers of Panzer IV chassis were not always informed in advance for which role their chassis would be used (for ordinary tanks or assault guns). Many changes that were to be introduced to later built StuG IVs were not necessarily always applied to all vehicles.
The Hull
The StuG IV hull was built using surface-hardened steel plates which were welded together. It was divided into the rear engine compartment, the central crew compartment and the forward-mounted transmission and the new enclosed driving compartment. While, originally, the Panzer IV hull had an emergency escape hatch door placed beneath the radio operator’s seat, it was removed on the StuG IV. This was done mainly due to changing the position of the radio equipment.
The front hull was where the transmission and steering systems were placed and was protected with an angled armor plate. To gain better access for repairs, a square-shaped transmission hatch located in the middle of this plate and two rectangular steering brakes inspection hatches with ventilation ports were added.
The Superstructure
The vehicle’s superstructure design was more or less a copy of that of the StuG III. It consisted of a box shaped base with angled frontal armor plates. The most obvious change was the introduction of a new box-shaped driver compartment which protruded to the front. On top of it there was a hatch door and two periscopes with armored covers. Initially, there was a problem with the hatch door accidentally closing back and potentially injuring the driver. Thus, it was changed to include a mechanism that locked the door in the open or closed position. Just above the driver compartment, during the production run, a rain guard was added to avoid water getting to the driver. In addition, as the Panzer IV chassis was longer, next to the new driver compartment, an armored plate was bolted down to fill the gap.
On the top left of this superstructure, a command cupola was placed. On its hatch, there was a second smaller hatch which allowed the commander to use a periscope to observe possible targets. The design of the commander’s cupola changed during the production. Initially, welding was used during its construction while, later in the war, some elements were cast. While a rotary cupola was more desirable, due to production problems, it was only fit from August 1944 onwards. The frontal part of the cupola was reinforced with a protective deflector , which proved to be a weak spot on the earlier StuG III.
In front of the command cupola, there was a sliding plate which held the gunner’s retractable stereo telescope. On the superstructure’s right side, the loader’s two-part hatch was placed. This would be replaced by a single-piece hatch later in production.
From June 1944, the newly produced StuG IV received mounts placed on top of the superstructure. Their purpose was to be used to mount a fold-up crane with a lifting capacity of some 2 tonnes, to help with maintenance and repairs. The superstructure top was held in place by a simple bolt and, if needed (for example to change the gun), could be easily removed. On the rear flat armor of the superstructure, a ventilation port was added. It was protected by an armored cover.
Suspension and running gear
The suspension consisted of eight small (470 x 75 x 660 mm) wheels placed on each side, suspended in pairs and placed on four bogie assemblies. The small road wheels were suspended by leaf-spring units. The distance between each bogie shaft was 500 mm. There were also four return rollers (250 x 65 x 135 mm) on each side. While use of three return rollers per side was tested in June 1944, its implementation on StuG IV vehicles was delayed up to December 1944. Due to the shortage of rubber, steel return rolles were used instead on many vehicles. At the front, two drive sprockets were placed. To the rear, the two (650 mm) idlers had an adjustable track tensioning mechanism.
The ground clearance of this vehicle was 40 cm. While the StuG IV used standard Panzer IV tracks, for operating in the East and during Winter, specially designed and wider Ostketten tracks would be employed.
The Engine and Transmission
The engine compartment was mostly left unchanged. The StuG IV was powered by a standard Maybach HL 120TRM, which produced 265 hp@2600 rpm. With a weight of nearly 26 tonnes (or 23 depending on the source), the maximum speed was 38 km/h (or 20 km/h cross-country) with an operational range of 220 km and 130 km cross country. Some sources give a number of 320 km and 198 km cross country. The fuel load of 450 l (430 and 470 l capacities are also listed in different sources) was stored in three fuel tanks placed under the crew fighting compartment. The engine and the crew compartment were separated by a fire resistant and gas-tight armored firewall. This compartment was provided with an automatic fire extinguisher system. While the Ausf.H chassis used a canister shaped muffler, the later Ausf.J used two vertical Flammentöter mufflers.
According to Wa Pruef 6’s instructions to Krupp beginning in March 1944, the auxiliary DKW gasoline engine that was originally used to provide traverse for the Panzer IV’s turret was to be removed from tanks. To use the extra available space, Krupp engineers added additional fuel tanks instead of the DKW engine. While using this as an auxiliary ammunition bin was briefly considered, it would require removing parts of the firewall, which only would delay and complicate production. This also carried over to the StuG IV.
The ZF SSG 75S six-speed (and one more for reverse) transmission was connected to the engine by a drive shaft that ran through the bottom of the fighting compartment. The steering mechanism was the same ‘Wilson’ type which was designed and produced by Krupp.
The Armor Protection
The frontal armor protection of the StuG IV was relatively good. The upper front glacis armor plate was 20 mm thick at a 70° angle, front glacis was 80 mm placed at a 12° angle and the lower glacis was 30 mm placed at a 60° angle. The side armor was 30 mm thick, the rear was 14.5-20 mm and the bottom was 10 mm.
The front superstructure armor was 80 mm thick, with the upper armor 30 mm placed at a 50° angle. The 80 mm thick frontal armor on some vehicles was increased with an additional 30 mm armor plate. The additional armor plate was held in place using six bolts. As this proved too difficult to be accomplished in the field, those that received the extra plate were instead connected using welding. The extended armor plate of the superstructure was 50 mm thick placed at 15° angle. The sides were 30 mm at a 10° angle.
The flat mantle was protected by 50 mm of armor. The rear part of the superstructure was 30 mm thick. The superstructure and engine compartment top parts were 10 mm thick. The commander’s cupola had all-around 30 mm of armor. The new extended driver compartment was protected with 80 mm front and 30 mm side armor.
The StuG IV, similar to many other German vehicles, could be equipped with 5 mm thick side protective skirts, known in German as Schürtzen. The primary mission of these was to provide extra protection from Soviet anti-tank rifles. During rail transport, the protective skirts could easily be taken down and later put back on again. Some were also protected by Thoma Schürtzen wire mesh. While these were lighter and provided the same level of protection, their use was delayed due to problems with production. The use of Zimmerit anti-magnetic mine coating was quite common, though, by the end of September 1944, it was no longer applied to the StuG IV.
Crews would often make improvised attempts at uparmoring their vehicles, hoping to increase the combat survivability of the StuG IV. A somewhat common practise was adding layers of concrete (to a greater or lesser extent) on the front part of superstructure (this was also done on some other vehicles, such as the StuG III). This improvised concrete armor proved to be ineffective in combat. Even the General Artillery Inspector gave a report stating that this improvisation was almost useless. Nevertheless, many StuG IVs continued to receive ‘concrete armor’ up to the war’s end. Other crews added what they had at hand, ranging from captured enemy or own tracks, spare parts, such as road wheels, and some even added logs or ordinary wooden branches. Some vehicles were equipped with extra armor plates welded to the front and placed at great angles. The effectiveness of these improvised attempts was more psychological than realistic.
The Crew and Radio
The StuG IV had a crew of four, which consisted of the commander, gunner, loader and driver. The driver was positioned to the vehicle’s left front side of the hull, in the box-shaped driver compartment. Just behind him was the gunner. To the rear of the gunner was the commander, who had a command cupola for better observation of the surroundings. The last crew member was the loader, who was placed alone on the right side of the vehicle. He was perhaps the most overburdened crew member. Beside his primary role of loading the main gun, he also operated the Fu 15 or 16 transmitter-receiver radio set. This equipment had an effective voice range of about 2 km. A 2 m long antenna rod was fitted on the superstructure. Beside the radio, the crew could use the Walther LP signal pistol to communicate with other vehicles. In addition, the loader was charged with using the machine gun placed on top of the vehicle and using the grenade throwing close defence weapon (if the vehicle had one).
The Armament
The main armament of the StuG IV was the 7.5 cm StuK (Sturmkanone – assault cannon) 40 L/48. This gun was developed by Rheinmetall-Borsig especially for the StuG III and was, in essence, a modified 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun. The length of the barrel was 3.6 m and had 32 grooves, each 7.8 mm deep and 6.05 mm wide. It had a semi-automatic breech, which means that, after firing, the spent cartridge would be self-ejected, thus increasing the overall firing rate. It was fired electrically.
This gun had a muzzle velocity of 790 m/s. The armor-piercing (Pz.Gr.39) round could penetrate 85 mm of armor (sloped at 30°) at 1 km. The maximum range of the high-explosive rounds was 3.3 km while, for armor-piercing, 1.4 to 2.3 km, depending on the type used. The gunner used the ‘Selbstfahrlafetten Zielfernrohr Sfl.Z.F.1a’ gun sight to acquire targets. This sight had a magnification of x5 and a field view of 8°.
The elevation of this gun went from –6° to +20° (or –5° to +15° depending on the source), while the traverse was 10° (or 20°, depending on the source) to both sides. The ammunition load, depending on the source, consisted of 61 to 63 rounds. The ammunition was stored in holding bins located mostly on the right side of the vehicle, with some placed under the gun or to the back. Krupp specially designed ammunition box containers that were to hold 8 rounds. These could be used on the StuG IV or Panzer IV tanks without problems.
While, initially, the gun was locked at a traverse angle of 0° during driving, this would be changed to 12° later on. The main reason why this was done was to provide the driver with a better view to his right during driving. In addition, a frontal travel lock would be added to a number of vehicles during production.
Behind the gun breach, a small metal shield was placed to provide protection for the gunner. In addition, a shell sack was added to the rear of the gun, which caught spent cartridges. While, initially, the first produced StuG IVs used the earlier box type mantle, this would be replaced by the new cast Saukopfblende (sow’s head mantle), generally known simply as Saukopf.
The StuG IV’s secondary armament consisted of one (or two) 7.92 mm MG 34/42 machine guns with 500-600 rounds of ammunition. The MG was not fired from inside the vehicle, but instead was mounted with a protective shield on the superstructure’s top, on the right side. This protective shield could be folded down if needed. Additionally, there were also two different mounting brackets for the MG, depending on if it was used against ground or air targets.
Some vehicles were equipped with the Rundumfeuer machine gun mount that was operated from inside the vehicle. This mount provided an all-around firing arc. In addition, the operator did not have to expose himself to fire when he was using the machine gun. However, he still needed to go outside to manually load the machine gun. The installation of this machine gun required some changes to the loader’s escape hatch (it had to be rotated at a 90 degree) before being fit to the vehicle. The machine gun was protected by two small angled shields.
It is also mentioned that, on rare occasions, some vehicles did not receive the machine guns and were forced to use only high-explosive rounds against enemy infantry, while some vehicles received a coaxial machine gun that was fired by the gunner. The machine gun was fired through a hole that was cut in the gun mantle. This modification was implemented only from June to October 1944 and it is not clear how many vehicles were actually equipped with this machine gun configuration.
Smaller numbers of StuG IVs were equipped with the Nahverteidigungswaffe (close-quarters defense weapon). In essence, this was a close-range grenade thrower that was to be used against infantry. Due to shortages of this weapon, mass use on the StuG IV was not possible. The Nahverteidigungswaffe was placed in front of the loader’s escape hatch. When not installed, the hole was covered by an armored cover.
Besides all these, the crews also had their own personal weapons for protection. This usually consisted of one or two 9 mm MP 40 submachine guns and sometimes even a 7.92 mm MP 44 assault rifle.
Distribution to units
The StuG IVs were used to equip various German formations. They were used to supplement assault gun units equipped with StuG IIIs. Which precise assault gun units received the new StuG IV is difficult to pinpoint, as the German documents do not make a distinction between the Panzer III and IV-based vehicles. The first produced StuG IVs were given to the 311th StuG Brigade which operated on the Eastern Front.
By the later stages of the war, German Infantry Divisions were supplemented by a Panzer Jäger Abteilung that contained a company of the towed 7.5 cm PaK 40 guns (or self-propelled versions, if any was available) and one company of 14 assault vehicles. As the StuG IV became available in sufficient numbers, these were also allocated to Infantry Divisions. During 1944, the number of assault vehicles was reduced to only 10.
Other units, such as Panzer, Volksgrenadier, and Panzergrenadier Divisions also received a number of these vehicles. German Panzer Divisions in early 1943 were severely lacking tanks and, for temporary replacement purposes, StuG IIIs were used. By late 1944 and early 1945, for the same reasons, some Panzer Divisions were equipped with StuG IV vehicles as replacements for lost tanks, as there was nothing else available in sufficient numbers.
Lastly, during the summer of 1944, Waffen SS units received some 70 StuG IV vehicles. For example, the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division, due to an insufficient number of tanks, was instead reinforced with 42 StuG IVs.
Combat
The StuG IV, similar to later better-armed StuG III vehicles, were highly effective anti-tank vehicles. For example, the 394th StuG Brigade, which had two StuG IV-equipped batteries, fought the Allies on the Western Front. On 6th August, elements of these units destroyed 26 Allied tanks. The commander of the 3rd Battery claimed to have destroyed six Sherman tanks in combat with his StuG IV.
The previously mentioned 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division, which had 42 StuG IVs, participated in the fighting against the Allies in France. In the following battle with the Allies, it was left with only 11 operational StuG IVs by early July 1944.
At the start of October 1944, during the German defense of Aachen against the Allied forces, the 12th Volksgrenadier Division had 10 StuG IV vehicles. These would be reallocated to the 49th Infantry Division several days later. During the Allied attack on Aachen that started on 7th December, they came under fire from the StuG IV vehicles. While the German defenses were breached near Alsdorf, the Allies lost 2 tanks. These were destroyed by Feldwebel Peter Klimas (a veteran with 22 destroyed enemy tanks). The following day, the Germans made a counterattack toward Alsdorf, supported by 6 StuG IVs. During the following engagement, one was lost due to a breakdown, three were lost due to enemy fire and only two managed to reach Alsdorf. These two surviving StuG IV vehicles (one was commanded by Feldwebel Peter Klimas) engaged the Allied forces that held the town. While the German vehicles were heavily involved in the ensuing fighting, the Germans lacked support to retake the town and had to withdraw. While both StuG IVs survived the defense of the Allied soldiers, some even armed with bazookas, they were damaged and Feldwebel Peter Klimas was wounded by enemy rifle fire.
Larger numbers of StuG IVs would see service on the Eastern Front. Some of these were part of the 236th StuG Brigade that fought against Polish Forces in the area of Niesky at the very end of the war in Europe. Another example was the 912th StuG Brigade, which had 30 StuG IV vehicles, all of which were lost by May 1945. Unfortunately, the sources do not give more precise information about the StuG IV’s combat operations in the East.
The StuG IV also served in smaller numbers on other fronts, such as Italy or the Balkans during 1944 and 1945. One such unit was the 914th StuG Brigade. Interestingly, this particular unit was supplemented with over 30 Semovente 105/25 M43 Italian assault vehicles.
One of the last combat actions of the StuG IV was during the defense of Berlin and its surroundings from the Soviets. There were some 29 StuG IVs with the Heeresgruppe Mitte and 20 with Heeresgruppe Weichsel. On 10th April 1945, there were still some 282 StuG IVs available on all fronts. There were 219 on the Eastern Front, 40 in the West, some 16 in Italy, and 7 in Denmark and Norway.
Other Operators
By the end of the war, the Soviets had managed to capture an unknown number of StuG IV vehicles. These vehicles were part of the 912th StuG Brigade which was originally equipped with 30 StuG IV vehicles. At least one was possibly operated by the 366th Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment during the end of the war in Hungary.
According to B. B. Dumitrijević and D. Savić (Oklopne jedinice na Jugoslovenskom ratištu 1941-1945), some StuG IVs were captured by Yugoslav Partisans and were used for a short time after the war. Their final fate is unknown as none were preserved, and they were probably scrapped.
Modifications
While, officially, there were no sub-versions of the StuG IV, there were still at least two adaptations of it for other roles. One of these consisted of a StuG IV (minus the weapons) that was equipped with a large fixed dozer blade. This vehicle, named in some sources as the Räumschaufel Panzer StuG IV, was to be used for helping rebuild bombed German cities during the war, by clearing up the remains of destroyed buildings. It is unclear how many were used for this role, but unlikely more than a few. The second version was probably a field conversion, possibly used as an ammunition carried vehicle. Its main gun was removed for some reason (possibly damaged) and replaced with a simple armored shield. How many besides the one photographed were converted is not known.
Surviving vehicles
Despite over 1,000 vehicles being built, today, only a few StuG IVs exist. Two can be seen in Poland at the Armored Weapons Museum in Poznan and White Eagle Museum in the Skarżysko-Kamienna. One more is in the Russian Kubinka Museum. The last vehicle can be found at the Australian Armor and Artillery Museum.
Conclusion
Despite having been designed as a temporary replacement for its StuG III cousin, the StuG IV was actually produced up to the war’s end. While the Germans also fielded the Jagdpanzer IV anti-tank vehicle also based on the Panzer IV, the StuG IV was much easier and cheaper to produce. It was, in general, a good design with low height, solid armor protection, and a good gun. The downsides of this vehicle were that it was not produced in sufficient numbers and was often used in lieu of other vehicles for roles it was not meant for.
Sd.Kfz.167 in Ukraine, December 1943.
StuG IV in Ukraine, early 1944.
Unknown unit with Schurzen, Russia, summer 1944.
Unknown unit with space armor, Russia, 1944.
StuG IV in Eastern Prussia, September 1944.
Late production StuG IV in “ambush camouflage”, Germany, April 1945.
German Reich (1941)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 2 Prototypes Built
During the Second World War, the German Army (Ger. Heer) saw a need to equip its Motorized Infantry and Airborne units with a cheap, light and mobile anti-tank vehicle. For this reason, Rheinmetall-Borsig was tasked with designing such a vehicle. While two would be built, there were delays in the production and the ineffectiveness as the main anti-tank weapon, the 5 cm PaK 38, eventually led to shutting down the entire project.
History
In July 1940, In 6 issued orders to Wa Pruef to develop a completely new and relatively cheap 5 cm PaK 38 armed self-propelled anti-tank vehicle. This vehicle was to be issued for use by the Motorized Infantry Divisions and Airborne units and thus had to possess good mobility and light weight. These two conditions, in essence, limited its armor thickness that could be employed. To somewhat overcome this shortcoming, it should use spaced armor (Schützenpanzer).
Eventually, the Rheinmetall-Borsig company received the contract to design such a vehicle by installing the 5 cm PaK 38 on a Borgward VK3.02 ammunition supply vehicle. The vehicle received the designation Panzerselbstfahrlafette Ia 5 cm PaK 38 auf Gepanzerter Munitionsschlepper or, in short, Pz.Sfl.Ia 5cm PaK 38 auf. gp.Mun.Schlepper. Initially, an order for two trial vehicles was given, which were to be ready by the second half of 1942. Rheinmetall-Borsig managed to build two vehicles by the start of July 1942.
The VK3.02
Back in 1937, In 6 made a request for the design of a new fully tracked ammunition transport vehicle. It was to be capable of carrying 500 kg in a storage bin positioned to the rear part of the vehicle, with an additional 500 kg in a trailer. The final contract for designing and producing such a vehicle was eventually given to Borgward from Bremen. This would lead to the development of the small fully tracked Gepanzerter Munitions-Schlepper VK3.01.
In 6 was not satisfied with its performance and additional changes were requested, from which the improved VK3.02 vehicle would emerge. This vehicle had a simple design with a fully protected two-man compartment and rear positioned open storage bin. Borgward was instructed to build 400 of these vehicles. This was never achieved and fewer than 50 vehicles were ever built. Most of these would be allocated to the 1st Infantry Division, who used them up to 1944, by which time all were lost in combat.
Production orders
Even before the previously mentioned two vehicles were built, during May 1941, it was planned to produce around 3,144 such self-propelled anti-tank vehicles. Somewhat strange was that the production run was to be quite slow, with the first series of 100 vehicles completed by April 1944, followed by a second series of 200 by April 1945.
Specification
Hull and the Superstructure
The Pz.Sfl.Ia 5cm PaK 38 auf. gp.Mun.Schlepper retained much of the original VK3.02 hull design, with some changes. The most obvious change was the removal of the rear positioned storage bin, which was replaced by a new gun crew compartment. In addition, the two escape hatch doors which were located on the enclosed superstructure top were removed. Instead, on the left side, a large hatch door was added. The assistant, who, in the VK3.02, was placed on the right side of the superstructure, was removed along with his small observation port.
The rear positioned gun crew compartment was built by using six armored plates (two per side and two to the rear) bolted together. The side armor consisted of a small rectangular-shaped plate that was slightly curved inward. This was followed by a larger one, also rectangular in shape. There were two additional plates placed behind each of the two crew seats. The compartment’s overall size was quite limited and the crew’s working space was thus highly cramped. While the original VK3.02 was built using welded armor, the added armor plates were connected using mostly rivets. While the sources state a width of 1.82 m for this vehicle, other dimensions are not known precisely.
Suspension
The suspension of this vehicle was unchanged from the VK3.02. It consisted of four large road wheels (per side), suspended using a torsion bar system. There were also front-mounted drive sprockets and rear-positioned idlers. The rubber cushioned tracks had 45 links per side.
Engine and the transmission
This vehicle was powered by the VK3.02’s original Borgward 6 M 2.3 RTBV six-cylinder 55 hp @ 3600 rpm engine. The Pz.Sfl.Ia 5cm PaK 38 auf. gp.Mun.Schlepper had a maximum speed of 30 km/h. The fuel load was 95 l. Whilst the VK3.02 ammunition vehicle had an operational range of 200 km, the precise operational range of the modified vehicle is unknown but probably slightly less than that number. With the added gun and ammunition, extra crew members, and other equipment, the weight was increased from 3.7 to 4.5 tonnes. The transmission unit was placed in the frontal lower part of the hull. For necessary repairs, the crew could use the larger rectangular-shaped hatch door placed on the upper glacis.
Armament
The Pz.Sfl.Ia 5cm PaK 38 auf. gp.Mun.Schlepper was armed with the 5 cm PaK 38 anti-tank gun. This gun was developed by Rheinmetall-Borsig back in 1938 as a replacement for the weaker 3.7 cm Pak 36, but it was not ready for service until 1940. The gun was fitted with a semi-automatic breech and had a muzzle brake. This gun had a practical rate of fire of 10 to 15 rounds per minute. Average penetration at 1,000 m (at 0°) was 61 mm (Panzergranate 39) and 84 mm by using the rare tungsten ammunition (Panzergranate 40). The maximum range of high explosive shells was around 2,500 to 2,650 m.
The gun’s main controls (traverse and elevation wheel, sights, etcetera) were located on the vehicle’s left side. The originally rear positioned recoil shield guard was retained. As the vehicle was lightly built, in order to help absorb some of the 5 cm PaK 38’s recoil during firing, a three-tube spade was lowered to the ground. While providing stability, this system somewhat limited the vehicle’s combat potency, as it would constantly need to be raised or lowered depending on the combat situation, which would take precious time. In order to hold the gun in place during long-distance drive, a rear travel lock was added.
The original PaK 38 gun shield was removed. It was instead replaced by a larger three-sided armored shield. While the side armor plates were placed flat, the frontal armor plates were angled to somewhat increase the overall protection. On the left front armor, there was a small opening for the gunner’s main sight. While the few photographs of these vehicles may give the impression that this gun shield was fixed, it was actually not. It had a 40° traverse and -10° to +20° elevation. To provide better stability during the traverse, the side shields were connected to small sliding rods.
The total ammunition load for the main gun is unfortunately not mentioned in the sources, but it would have been limited due to the vehicle’s small size. Another negative side effect of the vehicle’s small size was the insufficient room for ammunition in the rear positioned gun crew compartment. For this reason, the ammunition was actually stored in the hull compartment next to the driver. While not specified in the sources, the loader would probably have access to the stored ammunition through a small hatch door placed in front of him. If the driver would provide assistance from his position inside the armored hull is not known, but likely. Additional rounds may have been stored in the gun crew compartment.
Due to the vehicle’s small size, no secondary weapon (such as an MG 34) was carried inside. While this would make the crew vulnerable to enemy infantry attacks, they would probably respond with their personal weapons (pistols, hand grenades, or submachine guns).
Armor protection
The original VK3.02 frontal and side hull was protected by an 8 mm (or 10 mm depending on the source) thickness armor plate. The upper glacis was 7.5 mm thick, while the frontal driver armor plate was 14.5 mm (placed at 20° angle), sides 10 mm with the roof armor being 6.5 mm thick.
The extended upper gun shield was only lightly armored. The frontal armor consisted of two spaced 4 mm armor plates. While the side armor which was also spaced consisted of two 3 mm thick armored places. The idea of using space armor was that the first armor plate would absorb some energy from the incoming around which was to be deflected by the second plate. For the rear side armor that was added to the crew compartment the sources do not mention its armor thickness, but probably consisted of two 3 mm thick armored plates. The lightly armored thickness of this vehicle only provided limited protection from rifle caliber ammunition.
Crew
The Pz.Sfl.Ia 5cm PaK 38 auf. gp.Mun.Schlepper had a crew of three, which included the commander, the loader, and the driver. The commander, who also served as the gunner, was positioned to the left side of the rear positioned crew compartment. Next to him was the loader. The only crew member that was fully protected was the driver. He was positioned to the vehicle’s left hull side. To see where he was driving, a vision port with two slits was added on the front armor plate. To enter his position, he was provided with a large hatch door. This door had a small observation hatch with a visor slit placed on it.
In combat
The two built vehicles were allocated to the 19th Panzer Division in August 1942 for troop trials. After one month of use, this unit made a combat report about their performance. Unfortunately, it has not been preserved and its contents are not known and lost to history. In addition, the final fate of these two trial vehicles is also unknown. They may have been lost in combat or sent back to Germany to be scrapped, but there is no proper information.
Conclusion
The use of cheap mobile anti-tank vehicles as a concept had its merits. This is especially important for airborne troops, which could put to good use a light armored vehicle that could be transported in transport planes. The negative side is the lack of armor and, by the time they could have been fielded in larger numbers, the 5 cm main gun was already insufficient for the job. In addition by 1943, the airborne units were used mainly as standard infantry units after the disaster in Crete, with no further major parachute operations planned. So this vehicle lost its intended role by that time. The Germans concentrated on the production of the larger 7.5 cm PaK 40 which had much more effective firepower. In the end, due to a lack of information about the field use of the prototypes, their overall performance cannot be known for certain.
In 1928, the Soviet Union dispatched a military commission with the aim of finding an adequate and advanced foreign tank design. While visiting the USA, they came across the automotive designer J. W. Christie, who presented them with his own tank design. The Soviets were impressed, leading to the acquisition of two vehicles, followed up by a license for production of that design in the Soviet Union. The vehicle which was built in the Soviet Union was known as the BT-2 and, while not perfect, it would be built in relatively large numbers and serve as the basis for future more successful developments.
Why a fast tank?
The BT-series tanks have often been associated with the theory of Deep Operations. While BT tanks eventually found their place and role within the cutting-edge doctrine, the reasons why BT tanks were adopted into service with the RKKA (The Red Army of Workers and Peasants, Russian: Raboche Krestyanskaya Krasnaya Armiya) are much more complicated.
In the mid-twenties, the Soviet leadership found themselves in isolation aggravated by deteriorating international relations. At the time, Great Britain was considered the primary enemy of the young Socialist Republic.
Troubled with rising tensions with the international community, the Soviet leadership decided to inspect the RKKA and determine its readiness for a future war. On 26 December 1926, the General Staff of the Red Army prepared the report “The Defence of the USSR”. The results were disastrous. Presenting the report to the Soviet leaders, the Chief of Staff of the RKKA, Mikhail Tukhachevsky, admitted the unpleasant fact ‘Neither the Red Army nor the country are ready for war.’
The consequences were twofold: firstly, the situation forced the Soviet leadership to pay attention to defense issues and urgently start a massive reorganization of the Red Army; secondly, the Soviets and Stalin himself, who, by that time, had increased his influence significantly, got an opportunity to use the ‘war scare’ as a part of internal policy, justifying the most extreme measures.
In December 1927, Tukhachevsky sent a memorandum to Voroshilov entitled “On the radical rearmament of the RKKA”. The document stressed the fundamental technical rearmament of the army as a key aspect of a successful defense policy. Later, that notion became more precisely formulated ‘to keep up with our enemies in the strength of the mobilized army and surpass them in materiel’.
Accordingly, the cornerstone of the technical rearmament of the Ground Forces was the plan to increase the level of mechanization dramatically. Eventually, technical rearmament and mechanization of the Red Army even got its own name and became known as tankization, or ‘tankizatsiya’ in Russian.
The first three-year plan presented in January 1927 anticipated producing only 150 tanks by 1930. The next plan, part of the first five-year plan, anticipated the growth of the tank fleet fifteen times compared to 1928/29. This was quite an ambitious rate considering the state of the economy and industrial development of the USSR at the time.
The plans for future production were based mostly on projections that clearly overestimated the industrial capacity and technological potential of the country. In reality, the Soviet tank program bumped into numerous difficulties with both development and production. The RKKA had only adopted into service its first indigenously developed tank, the T-18 (MS-1), in July 1927, and started its low-rate serial production in mid-1928, with only 30 tanks being built that year.
In 1928-29, production was moving slowly, experiencing constant delays of delivery and poor quality of production. For example, on 24 September 1929, the Ordnance-Arsenal Trust reported that the Bolshevik factory (No 174) would delay production for 1-2 months and the MMZ (Motovilikhinskii zavod No 172) for 8-10 months.
Additionally, in 1929, a new system of tank-tractor-auto-armored weapons of the RKKA was adopted. The document made the T-18 tank obsolete and envisaged the adoption of even more sophisticated armored vehicles in increasing numbers. Knowing these circumstances, the command of the RKKA and Tukhachevsky himself had every reason to question the ability of the Soviet industry to cope with the plan on its own and within an acceptable time frame. In November 1929, the Department of Mechanization and Motorization (Управление по механизации и моторизации, UMM) of the RKKA had to admit that ‘there is no certainty that the program will be completed’.
The remedy to this situation was quite obvious — to seek technological help abroad. The decision was made, and on 30 December 1929, the commission led by the head of the Directorate of Mechanization and Motorization of the RKKA (UMM RKKA), Innokentii Khalepskii, went abroad. The plan envisaged visiting the US, Great Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, and Germany in order to purchase technologies and armaments.
It was a juxtaposition that the Soviets were determined to find help in hostile bourgeois countries (as they were presented by official propaganda) including Great Britain, the most likely enemy state in case of war. There was another significant point regarding the connection between the Deep Battle/Deep Operations doctrine and BT tanks. Despite the fact that some elements of the future doctrine were developed by Tukhachevsky back in 1926, he was not an active supporter of mechanization until 1928-29 and saw cavalry as a main maneuver element of the army. In May 1927, presenting the new plan of military development, Tukhachevski did not even mention armored forces or tanks at all.
Although Soviet advocates of mechanization were well aware of the technological and tactical developments in other countries, including British experiments with the Experimental Mechanized Force and convertible tanks, there were no fast tanks in the system of tank-tractor-auto-armored weapons of RKKA of 1929.
The system, however, included convertible tankettes with a maximum speed of 60 km/h on wheels and 40 km/h on tracks, but their tactical role was confined to reconnaissance, surprise assault, or anti-tank defense in a variant armed with a 37 mm gun. Obviously, not even close to the role of fast tank, which was a crucial part of the independently acting mechanized formations and the Deep Battle doctrine in general.
Eventually, having appreciated the advantages and high potential of the new combat vehicles acquired from the US, the Soviet military command began to see Christie tanks as a unified platform capable of performing different tasks. ‘This type could be used not only as a tank but as a troop, machine gun, artillery, and ammunition transporter, etc., also as an armored car for the motorization of the cavalry… it could be used as a platform for carrying AA-guns, machine guns, and searchlights. Field artillery could also be put on Christie’s chassis, which surely addresses the problem of the motorization of artillery… Chemical forces, signal, and technical troops could also use Christie’s vehicle’ said the note on the organization of armored forces abroad issued on 20 January 1930.
We can assume that combat vehicles with characteristics similar to Christie’s tanks were not considered in the early stages of working on the novel theory of Deep Operations. The adoption of the BT-2 tanks luckily coincided with the development of the theory in the early 1930s and the capabilities of the military equipment successfully corresponded with the needs of the innovative theory of Deep Battle.
American origin
During the Great War, Christie was involved in designing tracked self-propelled artillery vehicles. When the US Army obtained a number of French FT tanks, Christie noted that the tank, and especially its suspension, was prone to malfunctioning and breakdowns during long distance marches. The solution used at the time was to use trucks as transport vehicles to avoid unnecessary wear of tank engines and running gear. While quite effective, this way had also some drawbacks, such as the necessity to have a large fleet of trucks (also prone to breakdowns), hard limits on weight and dimensions, and a relatively low speed of movement.
During this time, Christie came up with a new concept for a convertible armored vehicle. He simply devised a plan of using a track suspension system that could, if needed, be easily modified and used as a normal wheeled vehicle by simply removing the tracks. His first tank prototype to use this kind of suspension was presented to the US Army in early 1921, named ‘M1919’. While the vehicle was trialed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), a number of problems were noted. For this reason, Christie spent some time modifying and improving his design, which he again presented to the Army in 1923.
Once again, this tank was rejected due to many flaws in the design. Once more, Christie completely redesigned his suspension system. This time, he incorporated four larger road wheels, with the idler in the front and the drive sprocket at the rear. The last road wheel was connected with a chain belt to the drive sprocket, and was used to provide drive power when the track links were removed. The front road wheels were used for steering. During 1928 (thus the name ‘M1928’), Christie himself made great efforts to advertise his vehicle, especially to the US Army, but also to customers abroad. He actually managed to gain attention from Poland and from Soviet Army representatives.
At that time, the military and political relations between the US and the Soviet Union were almost non-existent, as the US did not even recognize the USSR as a state. Thus, any possible cooperation with Christie would be difficult to achieve.
At the time, the main base of operations for the Soviets in the US was the Amtorg Trading Corporation entrenched in New York. Amtorg was founded in 1924, with the official goal of facilitating trade operations between the Soviet Union and the United States and help with import-export operations as an intermediary. Additionally, the Soviets also used Amtorg as a cover for intelligence operations. Interestingly, Amtorg was an officially registered stock company embedded into the American market and legal system, meaning the Soviets could obtain valuable intelligence without any covert operations.
Amtorg could officially request information about any company registered in the USA on the grounds that they wanted to make a deal. Moreover, it was impossible to prevent them from doing this, since by submitting official requests, they did not go beyond the legal field, being an incorporated subject of economic activity. In this regard, federal officials called Amtorg a “bridgehead of Soviet espionage” and the oldest Soviet intelligence agency in the United States. Through Amtorg, the Soviets managed to acquire a number of technologies and, later, even weapons from the USA.
With the Amtorg Corporation, the Soviets had stationed a group of undercover military officers whose task was to try to obtain more modern military equipment under the guise of purchasing equipment for civilian purposes. While American authorities from the early twenties were strictly opposed to selling any kind of weapons or military equipment abroad, and especially to the Soviet Union, by the end of the decade, this attitude changed. To this end, at the end of 1929, Amtorg officials asked for permission to buy 50 Cunningham T1E2 light tanks (this tank never actually entered production beside the prototype), but nothing came from this, mostly as the Christie design looked more promising and was available.
In 1930, a Soviet delegation led by I. Khalepskiy, who was in charge of the Red Army Mechanization and Motorization Directorate (UMM), and D.F. Budniak, the Defence Industry representative, visited a number of American weapons and arms manufacturers, including Christie’s own plant. The Soviets were highly impressed with the M1928 vehicle and, after they informed the People’s Commissar for Defence, Kliment Voroshilov, it was agreed to acquire two vehicles for testing and even to obtain a production licence.
In June 1930, after long and difficult negotiations, Christie signed a contract with the US Army to deliver one tank for $55,000, along with $7,000 allocated for trials and fine-tuning of the engine. In the meantime, he was approached by Amtorg representatives with their own proposal and also managed to sign a separate contract with Poland to deliver one M1940 tank for $30,000 along with spare parts worth $3,000 and the production licence for another $90,000.
Knowing the Soviet fears and unwillingness to allow Poland to get any advantage over the USSR in tank production, Walter Christie skillfully used the situation in his favor. By the end of April 1930, an agreement was signed between Christie and Amtorg for purchasing two vehicles at a total price of $60,000 (over $933,000 in 2020 values), spare parts worth $4,000, followed by an agreement for a licence production and technical support for another $100,000.
The total sum was high enough to cover the costs resulting from breaking the previous contract with Poland. At the same time, to better familiarize with the construction and design of the M1928, about 60 Soviet engineers spent nearly a year at Christie’s company.
Although the contract had already been concluded, the actual delivery of these vehicles, on the other hand, was slowed to a halt by the US government. At that time, US government officials were unanimous that no weapons of any kind should be allowed to be exported to the Soviet Union. At the end of 1930, American authorities tried to find out what happened to the two M1928 vehicles. They were probably shocked and agitated to discover that these had already been dispatched to the Soviet Union under disguise as ‘tractors’.
The first Christie tanks in the Soviet Union
The Christie tanks finally reached the Soviet Union in early 1931. These two were of the M1940 model (based on the M1931 model), which had a more simplified frontal hull design. In order to ship them to the Soviet Union, they were disguised as tractors by removing the turrets, which had to be left behind.
Consequently, the Soviets had to design and build their own turrets. One of the two vehicles was moved to the Nakhabino Proving Ground for operational trials. The second vehicle was moved to the Ordnance-Arsenal Trust (GKB-OAT) in Moscow. The testing of the M1940s was completed by May 1931 and production orders were placed shortly thereafter. During the testing phase, the M1940 showed itself to be an unrefined design, but was nevertheless put into production. One of the reasons for this somewhat hurried attempt to start production was based on the false and incomplete information that the Poles were trying to adopt the same vehicle. While the Poles had indeed expressed interest in Christie’s tanks and experimented on improving the tank design, with what would be known as the 10TP, only a single prototype would be built by 1939. The other reasons lay within industrial and economical aspects and will be discussed further. Interestingly enough, the Soviets also obtained one M1932 tank model for further testing.
The Name
When the M1940 was adopted for production, it received the BT-2 (Bystrokhodny tank – ‘fast tank’) designation. As claimed by S. J. Zaloga, the BT-1 designation was not used, as this name was already taken for a failed GKB-OAT (Head Design Bureau of Ordnance-Arsenal Trust) design project dating back to 1927. According to other sources, such as T. Bean and W. Fowler (Russian Tanks of World War Two), the BT-1 name was actually used for a direct copy of the Christie vehicle armed with machine gun armament. These sources claim that it was built in small numbers. J. F. Milsom (Russian BT series), on the other hand, notes that the BT-1 designation was used for the first prototype armed with twin machine guns.
Russian sources are more certain. The two prototypes purchased in America were designated as Original-1 and Original-2 (‘Оригинал-1’ and ’Оригинал-2’ in Russian). Mikhail Svirin claims that, in 1930, the head of the UMM RKKA, Innokentii Khalepskii, rejected the idea to name the new tank in accordance with the standard Soviet designation, using the letter “T” and sequential numbering, as tanks of this type were not presented in the System of tank-tractor-auto-armored weapons of RKKA. Thus, he proposed to designate that type of combat vehicles as “ST” or “BT”, meaning skorokhodnii tank and bystrokhodnii tank in Russian. Both names could be translated as fast moving tank or simply – fast tank.
From February 1933, all tanks armed with 37 mm gun or twin-machine gun mount were officially designated as BT-2 tanks. Interestingly, according to the same author, the BT was also unofficially known by the nicknames ‘Tri Tankista’ (three tankers) and ‘Betka’, which he translates as beetle, even though this particular word does not mean anything in Russian. It was also known by other nicknames as ‘Bete’ (phonetic pronunciation from the Russian БТ, БэТэ – BeTe) or ‘Beteshka’ (little BT) by its crews.
Production
In the late 20s and early 30s, the Soviet industry was in a state of disorder and deep systemic crysis. There were many factors affecting the military industry and the rearmament, from political and administrative to a lack of technologies and experienced personnel.
The leaders of the Soviet Union wanted ‘too much too fast’ following their policy of the war scare emerging in 1927. Making things harder, the first five year plan (1928-1932) and, accordingly, the industrialization had just begun and had not produced any significant results yet. Simply put, the Soviet industry was not ready to meet the demands of the political and military leadership of the USSR within the acceptable time frame.
The proposed schedule was pretty tight even by contemporary standards: by 20 September 1931, the UMM RKKA wanted six prototype BT tanks to be ready; by 1 January 1932, the Kharkov Locomotive Factory (KhPZ) was to finish 25 BT tanks and 25 sets of spare parts, with another 25 tanks to be ready for acceptance trials. The first 100 BT tanks were to be ready no later than 15 February 1932.
By 1 December 1932, the Red Army expected to receive 2,000 BT tanks. Totally, by the end of the reorganization, the RKKA planned to have 4,497 BT tanks. This was quite an ambitious plan for a country which had started producing the indigenously developed T-18 tanks only in 1927 and, according to the previous plan of 1927/28, wanted 1,600 MS-1 tanks, 210 maneuver tanks and 1,640 Liliput tankettes by 1933.
As it was mentioned previously, there were no ‘fast tanks’ in the System of tank-tractor-auto-armored weapons of RKKA, which emerged in August 1929. Thus, the concept was completely new not only to the military, but also to the industry.
In order to start large scale production as quickly as possible, the Kharkov (KhPZ) locomotive plant was chosen. This choice was not random, as the KhPZ already had enough expertise in tank and tractor production and possessed almost all the necessary equipment to build M1940 Christie-type tanks.
On the other hand, KhPZ was already involved in the development and production of the T-24 medium tank and T-12 (A-12) ‘maneuver tank’ (manevrennii tank in Russian). Notably, the T-24 project was costly and progressed at snail speed, which was unacceptable for the senior leadership of the RKKA. Probably the main reason why the foreign project was chosen was its high readiness for serial production. The leaders of the UMM believed that putting Christie’s tank into production would be much faster, simpler and would not allow the management of the KhPZ to use deficiencies in the design as an excuse in case the factory would derail the production schedule.
Needless to say, the management of the KhPZ was unhappy with the strict plans and, in fact, was wary of producing the new combat vehicle. Moreover, the director of the plant, Bondarenko, tried to stigmatize the tank by naming it ‘wrecking’. According to Gustav Bokis, at the time deputy chief of the UMM, “It took much effort, pushing and direct orders, up to the Government level, to force the KhPZ to build BT tanks and to make necessary amendments to the design in the course of manufacturing.”
To some degree, the concerns of the factory’s leadership were understandable. KhPZ was never designed for the mass production of tanks on such a large scale. The factory needed to expand, thus it needed new production facilities, workshops, raw materials, machine tools, and equipment which required resources and more importantly – time. Some machinery crucial for the production was not even available in the USSR and had to be ordered abroad from Germany, Switzerland, and the USA.
The BT tank project at KhPZ was entrusted to the special design bureau led by military engineer of the 2nd rank Nikolai Mikhailovich Toskin, beginning its involvement in the BT’s development on 25 May 1931. On 20 September 1931, KhPZ received the No. 70900311 order. According to the order, by 20 September 1931, the factory had to build six prototypes. Of them, only three tanks were ready by the deadline. The prototypes were to participate in the military parade in Moscow in November 1931, but only two of them actually made it. The third tank caught fire originating from the engine compartment before even entering the Red Square. According to Zaloga, these prototypes lacked any kind of weapons and were built using mild-steel plates.
The production moved slowly despite all the efforts being made. In addition to the issues mentioned before, the Izhorsky factory bumped into a series of problems producing armor plates for the hulls and turrets. By the end of the year, it had produced only three sets of armored hulls and turrets from a planned 50. Another source gave different numbers – the initial series of 13 hulls and 66 turrets were to be built using mild steel. Following all the unfortunate events, on 6 December 1933, Toskin was recalled back to Moscow and another engineer, Afanasii Firsov, took over the project.
On 23 May 1931, the BT-2 was adopted into service with the RKKA and serial production began in the same year. The production plans for 1932 were overly optimistic, with an estimated production number of 900 vehicles. This number would be reduced to 482 vehicles, as it became obvious that the previous number would be impossible to achieve with the existing production capabilities.
On 3 October 1932, the chief of the Directorate of Military and Naval Inspection, Nikolai Kuibyshev, reported to Vyacheslav Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union, that on 1 September 1932, out of the 900 tanks envisioned with the initial plan and 482 according to the corrected plan, only 76 tanks were ready. Of these 76 tanks, 55 were manufactured in August. The reduced plan for September was also derailed with only 40 tanks out of 120 completed.
Kuibyshev believed it was a clear indication that the factory intentionally lowered the standards of quality control in order to commission as many tanks as possible so they could take part in the autumn maneuvers. He also stressed that the quality of the produced tanks was low. All the BTs went to the army units as training vehicles.
According to the available reports from the military maneuvers of the Belorussian Military District, on the first day of the maneuvers, half of the vehicles were out of order. After the fourth exercise (250-300 km long march), out of 28 tanks, only 7 remained operational. In 1932, some 35 BT-2 were given to the 5th Tank Battalion for testing, but 27 required extensive repairs at the end of the year. The overall attempts to increase the speed of production greatly affected the mechanical reliability of these vehicles and the quality of spare parts and components, such as tracks, engines, transmissions, gearboxes, and others.
By the end of 1933, some 620 were built with 3 being built in 1931, 393 in 1932, and the remaining 224 in 1933. D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-SSSR) mentions that 610 were built, but this does not correspond with the numbers in archive documents.
Design
The Hull and Superstructure
The BT-2 tank had a standard hull configuration, with a front crew compartment and a rear positioned engine, separated by a firewall with doors. The M-5 Liberty engine, an oil tank, radiators, and a battery were mounted in the engine compartment.
The hull had a simple box shape design with the front part having a wedge shape. While the original Christie vehicle was built using welded armor, the BT-2 was actually assembled using armored plates which were connected with rivets for ease of construction.
Suspension and Running Gear
Probably the main distinctive feature of the design was the ability to move on wheels or on tracks, which, in fact, predetermined many technical solutions of the future BT-series tanks.
The BT-2 used the Christie suspension system which consisted of four large road wheels on each side, one front idler, and rear positioned drive sprocket. Each road wheel was suspended with helical springs. The springs on the steering wheels were positioned horizontally and were installed inside the combat compartment. The rest of the springs were positioned vertically inside pipes and installed between the outer armor plate of the hull and the unarmored inner wall. The suspension allowed a road wheel vertical travel of up to 287 mm.
While this suspension offered much better drive performance than previous ones, it had a huge disadvantage. It required a lot of space inside the hull. For this reason, the hull interior was cramped. Another huge issue was the maintenance and replacing of damaged or worn-out parts of the suspension.
Maintenance was, in fact, the most exhausting and time-consuming part of the crew routine, as BT-2 tanks required all the bearings of the roadwheel arms to be lubricated every 10 hours, and all bearings had to be lubricated every 30 hours of travel.
The design of the road wheels was changed during the BT-2’s service life. Originally, the front wheel had 12 small holes in it, while the remaining wheels had 6 spokes each. All four road wheels had rubber rims. The diameter of these wheels was 815 mm, while the width was around 200 mm. In later years, some vehicles were equipped with solid road wheels taken directly from the improved BT-5 vehicles. These wheels were slightly larger – 830 mm.
The BT-2 could be driven using only the wheels by removing the tracks. In this case, the drive was provided to the rearmost road wheel, while the first set of road wheels was used for steering (similar to ordinary cars). The driver would use a standard clutch and brake system when driving with tracks, and a steering wheel when driving with the wheels. Once the tracks were mounted again, the steering wheel was stored inside the vehicle. Moving on wheels, the BT-2 could achieve much greater speeds on good roads. Another benefit of using the road wheels was lower fuel consumption.
A disadvantage of this system was the time needed (some 30 minutes) to remove or put back the tracks. The procedure was pretty laborious and challenging even for 3-men crews, not to say for two men. The weight of each track was about 345 kg. The crew had to remove the tracks, disassemble them into four parts and fasten them to the track shelves with belts. The problem was so acute that, in May 1932, UMM RKKA ordered to ‘Mechanize the removal and putting back of the tracks, as the time of 30-45 minutes required for removal and 15-30 minutes for putting back the track is extremely long.’ After changing from tracks to wheels, the crew had to adjust all the springs to align the vehicle and get the road clearance even at 350 mm.
The wheel configuration could only effectively be used on good roads, which were rare and far apart in the USSR during this period. Driving with them off-road was generally a bad idea. However, the wheeled set-up was in no way meant to be used anywhere near the front lines. When approaching the enemy, the tanks would change to tracked configuration before proceeding. Once removed, the tracks were usually placed atop the track guards.
The tracks used were of the Christie type, which were 255 mm wide with 46 links (23 of them flat and 23 with grousers). As this track was produced in the Soviet Union, its quality was poor and was frequently prone to malfunctioning.
The Engine
The BT-2 tanks were powered by a 400 hp (294 kW) Liberty L-12 engine and its reverse-engineered Soviet copies produced under the name M-5. In its essence, it was a 12-cylinder V-shaped liquid-cooled carburetor aviation engine. With a full weight of 11 tonnes (the precise tonnage differs between the sources), the BT-2 had a power-to-weight ratio of 33.2 hp per tonne. Normally, the engine worked at 1,650 rpm. The engine could be started with two 1.3 hp ‘Mach’ (Russian “МАЧ”) starters or one 2 hp Scintilla electrical starter. There was also the possibility to start the engine with a hand-crank.
According to official specifications, the serial BT-2 could reach a maximum speed of 70-72 km/h on a dry paved road (some sources even mention an astonishing 110 km/h, which sounds like an exaggeration). The maximum and average speeds in different road conditions are given in the table below:
Road conditions/Speed km/h
On Tracks
On Wheels
Dry paved road
Maximum
50
70
Average
25-35
35-40
Unpaved back road
Maximum
50
70
Average
n/a
n/a
Source: RGVA F. 31811, O. 2, D. 1141
When using tracks, the speed was a reduced, but still a respectable 50-52 km/h. Depending on the drive type (tracks or wheels), the operational range with a full fuel load of 360 liters ranged from 120 to 200 km. Older sources, such as J. F. Milsom (Russian BT series), give a range of 300 km, although this is doubtful. The gearbox had four forward and one reserve gears. The crew had to come out to switch from wheels to tracks or back. About 30 minutes was required to fulfill this operation.
On top of the engine compartment, a hatch door with a large air filter was placed. Originally, the BT-2 tanks were not provided with a protective mesh fence that protected the air intakes, but in later years, some vehicles were equipped with it. In addition, the large external mufflers would also be replaced with simpler twin exhaust pipes.
Capricious carburetor engines were prone to overheating, malfunctions, and even caused fires. While the Liberty L-12 and its M-5 copy were somewhat problematic, the main reasons for accidents were inexperienced crews and technical services, poor manufacturing quality, and even fire safety violations. Some Russian sources mention numerous accidents caused by the crews smoking near the fire-prone engines or while refueling.
On the other hand, the Head of the UMM RKKA, Khalepsky, in his report to Voroshilov on 29 April 1934, mentioned “…all BT tanks have Liberty-type aircraft engines purchased in America and partially M-5 engines transferred from aviation to industry for installation on BT tanks… Practical experience has established that these engines can operate in tanks 400-450 hours before overhaul…”. The number is quite remarkable on its own. Besides the fact that some BT-2 tanks survived to 1944 in the harsh conditions of the Northwestern Front, indicates that the engine itself was reliable enough when handled carefully, even taking into account that the Northwestern Front was quite static until 1944 and BT tanks were constrained to guard duties.
The Armor Protection
The BT-2 tank was relatively lightly armored. Initially, the UMM RKKA wanted the BT tank to have not less than 20 mm frontal armor, 13 mm side armor, and 6 mm armor for the roof and bottom.
Early production models were made of mark D armor plates and had armor thickness ranging from 6 mm to a 13 mm maximum. The hull’s frontal armor was 13 mm thick, sides 10 to 13 mm, while the rear was 13 mm. The top hull was 10 mm and the bottom was protected with 6 mm armor. The turret was protected by 13 mm all-around armor, while the roof was protected by 6 mm of armor.
BT-2 tanks of the later production batches had 13 mm thick front, side, and rear armor. The roof armor thickness was slightly increased from 6 mm to 10 mm. The turret was protected by 13 mm armor all around. After the Izhorsky plant started manufacturing the new type of armor named PI (Russian “ПИ”) in September 1932, the maximum thickness of the hull and turret increased to 15 mm.
The small frontal driver plate was positioned mostly at a 90° angle, with the rest of the front having a pyramidal shape placed at a 31° angle. Notably, the BT-2 tanks had no vision slits protected with ‘Triplex’ glass nor pistol ports protected with armored shutters.
The Turret
The two Christie’s tanks purchased in America had no turrets at all. As the Soviet leadership wanted a tank armed with a gun, it was necessary to design a new turret from scratch.
According to Zaloga, the Soviets appointed engineer Anatoliy Kolesnikov to design a turret. Kolesnikov indeed worked at the KhPZ Design Bureau under the leadership of Afanasy Firsov. However, Kolesnikov finished his education at the Leningrad Tank Academy and joined the Design Bureau at KhPZ in 1931. Given the tight schedule (three prototypes should have been ready by 15 September 1931), it seems doubtful that the leadership could have entrusted the design of the turret to the young designer and without any supervision. It was most likely a team effort and Kolesnikov was part of the design group.
Due to the importance of faster project implementation, the Soviet engineers chose to design a simple cylindrical turret. The armor plates were held in place with rivets. The top of this turret consisted of a flat rear part, where a square-shaped hatch door was placed. Additionally, there was a small hatch for flag signaling to the left of the hatch. The frontal half of the turret top was angled downward.
The early turret designs did not have the two additional square-shaped protective covers over the gun mantlet, which were added later for better protection. During production, the turret was also provided with small vision slits. Some turrets had pistol ports closed with armored plugs.
The Armament
Initially, the BT-2 tanks were to be armed with a 37 mm PS-2 gun developed by Petr Syachentov and a coaxial machine gun. This gun was actually a Soviet attempt to improve the performance of the French Hotchkiss 37 mm gun. This plan was discarded once the Soviets decided to adopt a copy of the German Rheinmetall 37 mm anti-tank gun instead, as it was a more modern design.
Based on the German gun, the Soviets developed a tank version named the 37 mm B-3 tank gun (factory designation 5K – K stands for the Kalinin plant where this gun was developed). In the summer of 1931, it was decided to adopt a mount with the 37 mm B-3 tank gun and a coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun as standard armament for the BT-2 tanks.
There are different interpretations of the decision:
According to Russian sources, GAU RKKA (Main Artillery Directorate) failed to design the prototype of the mount and, therefore, canceled its serial production. As a result, in the first quarter of 1932, the Izorsky plant had to alter the blueprints of the turret to accommodate two separate mounts (one for the 37 mm gun and the second for the machine gun) and then change the whole first batch of 60 already produced turrets.
After that, the Mariupol factory and Izhorsky plant produced the second batch of tank turrets, now redesigned for separate mounts. Each factory produced 120 turrets, 240 in total.
It was planned to switch to a new mount with a 45 mm 20K gun and coaxial DT machine gun, starting with the 301st tank. However, extensive testing revealed that the small size of the serial turret simply did not allow to do that. Instead, the Soviet engineers designed a new bigger unified turret which was subsequently used on T-26 and BT-5 tanks and on some armored cars, like the BA-3 and BA-6.
According to Zaloga, the initial batch of 60 turrets was designed for the canceled PS-2 Syachentov’s gun. As the B-3 gun was bigger, it was quickly realized that the turret’s design did not allow it to accommodate both the new gun and a coaxial machine gun. The Red Army’s command did not agree with the idea to omit the machine gun, thus the Izhorsky factory had to find another solution. Eventually, the first 60 turrets were altered to accommodate two separate mounts – the B-3 in a gun mount and DT machine gun in a ball mount to the right of the gun. To add more confusion, there are also different opinions on the adoption of twin-machine gun mounts as the main armament for BT-2 tanks.
According to the version given by Russian authors M. Pavlov, I. Pavlov, and I. Zheltov, Factory No. 8 was able to deliver only 190 B-3 guns to the KhPZ factory (Kharkov Locomotive Factory). As there were not enough tank guns, in May 1932, the Soviet leadership decided to arm the remaining BT-2 tanks with two 7.62 mm DT machine guns in twin-machine gun mounts named DA-2. The DA-2 was tested and adopted into service in the fourth quarter of 1933. Curiously enough, the DA-2 mounts were installed by the army repair services.
In turn, S. Zaloga sticks to the version that the Kalinin factory No.8 (which was the main production center of this gun) received orders to stop the production of the B-3 guns in 1931 due to the decision to switch production to the new 45 mm gun. At that time, only 352 B-3 guns were actually built.
Eventually, the solution to modify the BT-2 turret to be able to house the new 45 mm gun failed. Despite much testing and modification of the turret by adding a rear bustle, this was not possible, mostly due to the turret’s small size. Another suggestion was to reuse any available PS-1 guns, which were initially used to arm the obsolete T-18 tanks. This proposal was also rejected due to the PS-1’s poor armor-piercing performance.
As there were only enough B-3 guns to equip slightly more than half of the BT-2s, the remaining vehicles had to be left without any main armament, at least until another solution could be found. Despite lacking its weapons, some of these BT-2 were still used on military parades. As a result of all the given circumstances, BT-2 tanks had four different sets of armament:
1. Only a 37 mm gun
2. A 37 mm gun and a 7.62 mm DT machine gun in a ball mount
3. Two 7.62 mm DT machine guns in a twin-mount plus another 7.62 mm machine gun in a ball mount
4. Two 7.62 mm DT machine guns in a twin-mount and the third machine gun removed
The latter variant appeared for two reasons. Firstly, at some point, it became apparent that the commander was not able to operate two machine gun mounts efficiently at once, and secondly, the third machine gun took too much space in the already cramped turret. Therefore, a certain part (the precise number is currently unknown) of the BT-2 tanks armed with twin machine gun mounts had the ball mount removed, with an armored shutter being placed instead.
However, a document dated 29 June 1939 indicated two variants of standard armament for BT-2 tanks — a 37 mm gun and one DT machine gun or three machine guns.
The standard armor-piercing round for the B-3 37 mm tank gun had a weight of 0.66 kg and a muzzle velocity of 820 m/s. It could, at a range of some 500 m, penetrate 28 mm armor (at a 30° angle). The BT-2 was also provided with 0.645 kg high-explosive rounds.
PS-2 gun
B-3 tank gun
45 mm tank gun
Full designation
37 mm gun PS-2 mod. 1930
(Russian – 37-мм пушка ПС-2 образца 1930 года)
37 mm gun B-3 mod. 1930
(Russian – 37-мм танковая пушка образца 1930 года Б-3)
45 mm tank gun mod. 1932/38
(Russian – 45-мм танковая пушка образца 1932/38 годов)
Origin
Petr Syachentov
Rheinmetall
Factory No 8
Factory designation
n/a *
5K
20K
Caliber, mm
37
37
45
Barrel length
Unknown
L45
L46
Rate of fire, rpm
Unknown
10-15
12
Initial velocity, m/s
Unknown
820 AP (Shirokorad)
825 HE (Shirokorad)
760 AP (RGVA)
335 HE (RGVA)
Weight, kg
Unknown
150
313
Armor-piercing round
—
B-160
BR-240
Weight, kg
Unknown
0,66
1,425
Armor penetration at
300 m at 0 degrees
500 m at 0 degrees
500 m at 30 degrees
Unknown
30 mm (Shirokorad)
35 mm
(Zaloga)
28 mm
(Zaloga)
38 mm
31 mm
HE round
—
O-160
O-240
Weight, kg
—
0,645
2,15 (2,135 – RGVA)
* Was not approved for serial production.
Sources: S. J. Zaloga (2016) BT Fast Tank; RGVA F. 34014, O.2, D. 858; http://battlefield.ru/b3-1930.html ; А.Широкорад “Энциклопедия отечественной артиллерии”, 2000;
The ammunition load for the main gun was 92 rounds stored in ammunition bins located in the hull. The elevation of the gun ranged from -5° to +21° (some sources mention -4° to +40°, but this seems unlikely).
The secondary armament consisted of a 7.62 mm machine gun with 2,709 rounds of ammunition. BT-2 tanks armed with twin-machine guns had 5,166 ammo rounds. The machine gun ammo was stored in drums, with 63 rounds in a drum. BT-2 gun-armed tanks had 43 drums onboard and machine gun BT-2 tanks had 82 drums.
The Crew
The original Christie tank design included only two crew members, with one placed in the hull and the second in the turret. In Soviet service, the BT-2 employed both one and two-man turret configurations. As previously noted, due to shortages of proper guns, some vehicles had to be rearmed with twin-machine gun mounts. These vehicles had only two crew members, the driver and the overburdened commander, who had to also act as a gunner and loader in addition to his primary role.
The standard gun-armed vehicles had three crew members. The driver, the commander who was also the gunner, and the loader, who was also responsible for operating the turret machine gun. In this case, the third crew member had to be added as the commander would simply be too overburdened otherwise.
The driver’s position was in the front hull of the vehicle. To access his position, he had two rectangular hatches. The upper hatch had a small vision slit in it. The loader and commander (or only the commander in the machine gun variant) were placed in the turret. The commander was positioned on the left side of the turret, while the loader was behind him, to the right. On the turret top’s rear, they only had one small hatch.
As the BT-2 was not provided with radio equipment, the commander had, for communication between different vehicles, to use either a signal flag or a pistol flare. For internal communication, the crew members used light signals.
In combat
The BT-2 is often assumed to have been an unreliable vehicle during its use by the Soviet Army, but this is not entirely correct. The primary factors which caused frequent malfunctions and mechanical breakdowns were poor manufacturing quality, inexperienced personnel, and insufficient technical service. Thus, the problem could be considered typical for any Soviet material at the time. While some attempts were made to improve its performance, during the following years in service, it was replaced by the newer and improved BT-5 and BT-7 vehicles.
One of the first combat actions of the BT-2 was during the Soviet invasion of Poland, which started on 16 September 1939. As stated by Zaloga, of 1,764 BT tanks deployed in the campaign, 1,617 were newer BT-7 tanks and the remaining 147 were obsolete BT-2 and BT-5 tanks.
As Poland’s main defense focus was facing the Germans, there were only minor engagements involving Soviet armor. The losses were incurred mostly due to mechanical breakdowns.
Some were also used during the wars between the Soviet Union and Finland in 1940 and 1941. A large number of BT series tanks were used by the Soviets near Lake Ladoga. Due to nonexistent roads and poor terrain conditions, the BTs (and all other armored vehicles, for that matter) had limited mobility. The BT vehicles were more affected as, due to poor road conditions, they could not use their great speed and maneuverability as an advantage.
Another problem was a lack of spare parts which forced the Soviets to use them as static defense bunkers. Finnish soldiers managed to capture a number of BT-2s. These were not employed by their new Finnish owners. In 1943, there were some 15 BT-2s available in Finnish stocks. From 1944 onwards, some turrets were used as static defense emplacements. A few BT-2 turrets were even modified to be armed with the Finish 37 Psv.K/36 anti-tank gun.
According to Zaloga, by the time of the German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, there were some 323 BT-2s in service within the Mechanized Corps. Russian archive sources suggest other numbers – 515 BT-2 tanks in May 1940, distributed to various units
During 1940 and 1941, Soviet tank formations were used mainly in infantry supporting roles. During the German invasion of the East, the BT-2, like other Soviet armored vehicles, were pressed into combat, where they were outmatched by their more tactically and technically superior German counterparts. While having good speed, the BT-2 tanks were plagued with mechanical unreliability, caused by general wear, poor mechanical maintenance, and lack of spare parts. By the end of 1941, the surviving BT-2 vehicles were mostly removed from the front line. However, some of the BT-2 tanks were actively used until mid-1942 and probably even until 1943.
It is worth noting that obsolete but still operational tanks, such as the BT vehicles, were often allocated to quieter sectors to perform guard or logistical duties or to the training units in the rear. Thus some of them survived even until 1943-44. Some turrets were used as static defense bunker emplacements
The modifications of the BT-2
The Soviets tested a number of modifications based on the BT-2 chassis. These included an artillery support vehicle, a flamethrowing version, an engineer support variant, an amphibious tank, and various minor modifications.
The BT-3, BT-4, and BT-6 projects
From December 1931 to September 1932, the KhPZ Design Bureau led by Firsov developed the BT-3 tank. This was simply a serial BT-2 with all the measurements of the threads recalculated from inches to centimeters. In the RKKA, this modification retained its old designation, BT-2.
The BT-4 was developed in July 1932 by the same design team at KhPZ. The main difference of the project from the BT-2 and BT-3 tanks was the use of a welded hull instead of a riveted one. The BT-4 also got side towing hooks and a mechanism that allowed the driver to open and close engine louvers from his seat. Additionally, the engineers changed the design of the hull and running gear, allowing easy access to the side springs. In the autumn of 1932, three prototypes were built, but as opposed to the planned welded hull, they had a combined riveted-welded construction.
The BT-6 was another experimental model developed in 1932. It was mainly based on the BT-4 prototypes, but its turret and armament were taken from the BT-5. Other improvements included restoring the BT-2-like towing hooks and a different design of the driver’s hatch, which now had a lock and ensured protection from splinters. The BT-6 also had redesigned rear armor and the protection of the reduction gear. Work on the BT-6 was discontinued in late 1932.
All these experimental works were discontinued in 1932-33 due to the introduction of the improved version of the fast tank – the BT-5.
Artillery support tank project (D-38)
Following the introduction of the BT-2, several different projects were initiated with the aim of increasing its firepower. In 1931-33, a few design bureaus proposed designs with new armament and turret designs for the BT-2. These included the tank department of the KhPZ, NATI, the design bureau of the UMM RKKA led by Dyrenkov, the design bureau of the “Krasny Proletary” factory, and the design bureau of the “Krasny Putilovets” factory. Numerous variants of armament, including 37 mm, 45 mm, 76.2 mm Syachentov’s gun, and 76.2 mm Garford ‘anti-storm’ gun were suggested.
In 1931, Dyrenkov’s bureau proposed a variant armed with a 37 mm gun in a rotating turret and a 76.2 mm gun in the hull. The same idea was being utilized in the design of the French B1 tank. This design was rejected due to the insufficient space in the fighting compartment and the poor design of the transmission. As this was just a design proposal, no mock-ups or prototypes of this vehicle were built.
After the first design was rejected, Dyrenkov developed another one, which was more successful and subsequently was named D-38. In January 1932, the first prototype was built. This D-38 project had two variants of the turret. The first was welded, made of flat armor plates, whilst the second variant was cupola-shaped and made of pressed steel. Initially, Dyrenkov wanted to install two guns, a 76.2 mm ‘anti-storm’ Garford gun and a 37 mm tank gun, but then dropped that idea and used a PS-3 76.2 mm gun. Ultimately, the project was rejected and only one prototype was built.
Flamethrowing BT-2 (KhBT-2)
At least one BT-2 was tested with a flamethrowing system. The vehicle, known as KhBT-2 (Kh-Khimicheskiy means chemical), but also as KhBT-II and BKhM-2, had its main gun replaced with a KS-23 flamethrower. Possibly (but it is not clear in the sources) only one was built. At least one vehicle was also tested with smoke emitting equipment, but no production order was given. This flamethrowing idea was also trialed on the BT-5 and BT-7.
Amphibious tank project (PT-1)
During 1931-33, Soviet Army officials were interested in the idea of adapting the BT-2 tank as an amphibious vehicle and the industry responded. The first prototype, the PT-1 amphibious tank, was developed in 1931-32 at the technical department of the EKU OGPU (The Economic Directorate of the OGPU) and built at the ‘Krasny Proletary’ (Red Proletarian) factory. In Autumn 1932, the PT-1 was demonstrated to the Soviet leadership and Stalin himself, who approved the design, albeit admitted that it was quite unusual.
The second prototype, PT-1A (actually there were two of them, but the second prototype was never finished) was built and tested in 1934 at Kirov’s factory (No 185) in Leningrad. The PT tanks proved themselves surprisingly good. According to Russian sources, there existed plans to continue the development of the PT-1 in two directions — amphibious and non-amphibious tanks. Moreover, in 1933, there existed a plan to alter the system of armaments and replace older BT tanks with PT-1 tanks.
The project ended in 1935 when the USSR Council for Labor and Defence (STO – Sovet Truda i Oborony) decided to leave BT tanks in serial production.
Engineer version (SBT)
Probably the only successful adaptation of the BT-2 was the SBT (Saperniy bystrokhodnoy tank – engineering fast tank). During 1934, one BT-2 was modified by removing its turret and replacing it with an armored box-shaped casemate. Additional bridge-carrying equipment was also added to the hull.
In 1936, the project was modernized by adding a small turret, initially taken from the T-26 twin-turret version tank, which was replaced with a T-38 light tank turret. It also received improved bridge-caring equipment. According to S. J. Zaloga (BT Fast Tank), some 51 BT-2 tanks would be used in this configuration. But, according to Russian authors Solyankin, Pavlov and Zheltov, only two prototypes were ever built.
BT-2 with underwater tank driving equipment (BT-2 PKh)
Generally, the BT-2 PKh (PKh or ПХ in Russian stands for ‘podvodnogo hozdeniya’) was not a modification of the serial BT-2 tank, but an experimental optionally mounted equipment which allowed for deep fording.
The BT-2 PKh was developed in 1933-34 at Factory No 183. The equipment was tested in the Belorussian military district. The testbed BT tank managed to cross a 4 m deep ford. It took 1.5 hours to prepare the tank for the deep fording by the crew of three.
The fording equipment was not adopted into service with the RKKA or approved for serial production. However, it was tested and served as a basis for future experiments with other models, such as the T-26, T-28, and others.
The BT-2 PKh tank differed from the serial BT-2 due to the special devices that ensured the hermetic sealing of the hull, as well as provided the air supply and the removal of exhaust gases.
BT-2-IS early prototype
In the spring of 1934, a group of enthusiastic engineers led by Nikolai Tsiganov started working on a new tank, the BT-2-IS (IS stood for Iosif Stalin). The major goals of the project were to improve its driving performance, survivability, and cross-country capability.
The main feature of the BT-2-IS tank was its completely redesigned running gear. The first pair of wheels remained steered, but the pairs from second to fourth became driving wheels. As a result, the turning radius was halved to 5-6 meters, and cross-country ability on wheels was increased four to five times. Only one prototype was built and tested in 1935, with generally positive results. Tsiganov continued to work on the BT-5-IS.
Surviving tanks
Today, there are no complete BT-2 vehicles left. In Russia, there are at least three surviving turrets that were used as stationary bunker emplacements. One can be found in the Museum of Military Archeology Petrovsky Island at St. Petersburg. A second is at the Siege of Leningrad Museum. The third turret was placed on a BT-5 chassis and can be seen at the Kubinka Military Museum. Some 5 turrets that were used on the Finnish Salpa defense line also survive to this day.
Conclusion
The BT-2 is often criticized by historians for its poor design, mechanical unreliability, a multitude of technical deficiencies, and flawed performance on the battlefield. While the majority of these problems may seem really significant, historians frequently ignore the fact that the positive factors outweigh the negative ones.
First of all, the early BTs were an off-the-shelf weapon system ready to be quickly put into serial production. Secondly, the BT-2 became a valuable asset for the Red Army as a testbed for the new generation of Russian engineers and technicians. The experience gained while working on the BT-2 tanks was really invaluable. It gave the Soviet engineers the necessary experience in tank design, which would eventually lead to the development of far more sophisticated and successful models like the BT-5, BT-7, and T-34 series.
Moreover, having a relatively simple armored vehicle helped to train hundreds of Soviet tankers in the early 1930s. When the newer models started arriving in the Red Army in increasing numbers, there were trained instructors able to share their knowledge and experience.
Perhaps the most outstanding fact concerning the BT-2 is that an armored vehicle with such capabilities or ‘fast tank’ had not even been considered by Soviet theoreticians during the early stages of the Deep Battle doctrine evolution. Adoption of the BT-2 gave impetus to the further development of the Deep Battle. Eventually, combat units armed with fast moving tanks became striking arms of the large mechanized formations and, to some extent, could be considered as a benchmark of the novel Russian doctrine in general.
One could easily conclude that the BT-2 became one of the armored vehicles that determined the way Soviet and ultimately Russian tank-building schools developed, as well as the priceless part of the learning process for the whole army.
From its first actions in Poland in 1939 to fighting in fierce battles during the Great Patriotic War between 1941 and 1943, the BT-2 has proven itself as a versatile and effective weapon system that passed the test of time. Despite all the criticism coming from modern researchers, the BT-2 indeed has earned its place among other legendary armored combat vehicles of the Red Army.
Technical Specifications
All specifications are given for gun and machine gun versions of the BT-2 tank with a cylindrical turret (without a bustle) as of June 1939.
BT-2 specifications
Gun version
Machine gun version
Dimensions (L-W-H), m
5.5 x 2.23 x 2.17
Full weight (combat ready), tons
11
Loading weight, tons, without crew, fuel, oil, water and ammunition
10.4
Road Clearance, m
0.35
Crew
3
2
Armament
1 x 37 mm gun;
1 x 7.62 mm DT machine gun in a ball mount;
2 x 7.62 mm DT machine guns in a twin-mount
1 x 7.62 mm DT machine gun in a ball mount;
Ammunition
92 AP and HE rounds, 2,709 rounds of MG ammunition in 82 drums
30-60 depending on road conditions and type of terrain
Gearbox
Christie type, 4 forward and one reverse gears
Maximum speed on tracks, km/h (road)
50
Maximum speed on wheels, km/h (road)
70
Sources
The Author of this article wants to thank the co-author Alex Tarasov, without whose help this article would have been impossible. Additional thanks to Patryk Cichy for some translation work and to Francis Pulham for allowing to use some of his BT-2 pictures.
BT-2 model 1932, 37 mm (1.46 in) gun only.
A BT-2 1932 model, twin machine-gun variant.
BT-2 of the reserve force, 1940.
Winter war, Karelian front in eastern Finland, December 1939.
A BT-2 during the battle of Moscow, winter 1941/42.
Pavlov, M.V., Pavlov, I.V., Zheltov, I.T. BT Tanks , M. Eksprint, 2001 – 184 p. War Museum series.
Ken ON. Mobilization Planning and Political Decisions (late 1920 – mid-1930s). Sankt-Peterburg: Izd-vo Evropeiskogo universiteta v Sankt-Peterburge Publ.; 2002. 472 p. (In Russian)
Hofmann G.F. A Yankee Inventor and the Military Establishment: The Christie Tank Controversy // Military Affairs. 1975, February. Vol. 39. № 1. P.
Mikhail Svirin, Tanks of the Stalin’s Era. Encyclopedia ‘The Golden Age of the Soviet Tank Building’, Moscow. Yauza, Eksmo, 2012, Page 108 [Russian: Танки Сталинской эпохи. Суперэнциклопедия. «Золотая эра советского танкостроения»]
A. Shirokorad. ‘Encyclopedia of the Domestic Artillery’, Minsk, Harvest, 2000
Сборник – KhKBM, 2007
Magazine Bronekollektsiya No 1, 1996. Light tanks BT-2 and BT-5. [Russian: Бронеколлекция №1 1996. Легкие танки БТ-2 и БТ-5]
Igor Shmelev. The History of a Tank (1919-1996) An Illustrated Encyclopedia. [Russian: История танка. 1916-1996. Энциклопедия техники. Шмелев Игорь Павлович]
Archives
RGAE. F. 4372, Op. 91, D. 519, L. 67—42, 39. Signed copy.
RGAE. F. 2097, Op. 1, D. 1073, LL. 9—10 (with rev.). Original.
RGVA F. 31811, Op.1, D.1, ll. 11-12
RGVA, F. 31811, Op. 1, D. 7, LL. 1–2 s ob. Protokol #29, ‘O sisteme tanko-traktoro-avtobrone-vooruzhenija RKKA, 1 avgusta 1929 goda’ [Minute #29, ‘On the system of tank-tractor-auto-armoured weapons of RKKA’, 1 August 1929].
RGVA F 31811, O 1, D. 107, LL 5-7 [Russian: Справка об организации и применении высших механизированных соединений в армиях иностранных государств]
RGVA F. 31811, O. 1, D. 38, L. 236
RGVA F.4, O.1, d. 761, ll. 232-33, “Protokol No.16 zakrytogo zasedaniya RVS SSR”, 9 March 1928”
GA RF. F. R-8418, Op. 6, D. 45. LL. 141—145. Original
RGVA F. 31811, O. 2, D. 1141
TsAMO F. 81, O. 12040, D. 372
RGVA F. 34014 O.2 D.858. Отчет по весовым данным танкового вооружения.
RGVA, F. 4, O. 14, D. 2631, LL. 138–45. Document is dated 27 May 1940. Sistema vooruzhenij 1940 – Postanovlenija Glavnogo voennogo soveta RKKA o sistemah vooruzhenija RKKA [The system of armaments 1940 – Resolutions of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on systems of armaments of the Red Army].
TsAMO, F. 229, O. 0000157, D. 0014, P 718
RGVA, F. 4, Op. 14, D. 628, LL. 8-16. Original. – 10 May 1932. — A Summary of the Headquarters of the Red Army based on the materials of the Directorate for Motorization and Mechanization of the Red Army on the progress of the implementation of the armored weapon system. [Russian: Заключение Штаба РККА по материалам Управления по моторизации и механизации РККА о ходе реализации бронетанковой системы вооружения]
RGVA, F. 31811, O. 2, D. 1083. A report on all tanks received from industrial plants for the period from 1931 to March 1, 1940
T-34 Shock: The Soviet Legend in Pictures by Francis Pulham and Will Kerrs
‘T-34 Shock: The Soviet Legend in Pictures’ is the latest must have book on the T-34 tank. The book was authored by Francis Pulham and Will Kerrs, two veterans of Tank Encyclopedia. ‘T-34 Shock’ is the epic story of the T-34’s journey from humble prototype to so-called ‘war-winning legend’. Despite the tank’s fame, little has been written about its design changes. While most tank enthusiasts can differentiate between the ‘T-34/76’ and the ‘T-34-85’, identifying different factory production batches has proven more elusive. Until now.
‘T-34 Shock’ contains 614 photographs, 48 technical drawings, and 28 color plates. The book begins with the antecedents of the T-34, the ill-fated BT ‘fast tank’ series, and the influence of the traumatic Spanish Civil War before moving to an in-depth look at the T-34’s prototypes. After this, every factory production change is cataloged and contextualized, with never-before-seen photographs and stunning technical drawings. Furthermore, four battle stories are also integrated to explain the changing battle context when major production changes take place. The production story is completed with sections on the T-34’s postwar production (and modification) by Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the People’s Republic of China, as well as T-34 variants.
The book price is a very reasonable £40 ($55) for 560 pages, 135,000 words, and of course, the 614 never-before-seen photographs from the author’s personal photograph collection. The book will be a superb tool for both the modeler and the tank nut alike! Do not miss this epic book, available from Amazon.com and all military book stores! Buy this book on Amazon!
Red Army Auxiliary Armoured Vehicles, 1930–1945 (Images of War), by Alex Tarasov
If you ever wanted to learn about probably the most obscure parts of the Soviet tank forces during the Interwar and WW2 – this book is for you.
The book tells the story of the Soviet auxiliary armor, from the conceptual and doctrinal developments of the 1930s to the fierce battles of the Great Patriotic War.
The author not only pays attention to the technical side, but also examines organizational and doctrinal questions, as well as the role and place of the auxiliary armor, as it was seen by the Soviet pioneers of armored warfare Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Vladimir Triandafillov and Konstantin Kalinovsky.
A significant part of the book is dedicated to real battlefield experiences taken from Soviet combat reports. The author analyses the question of how the lack of auxiliary armor affected the combat efficacy of the Soviet tank troops during the most significant operations of the Great Patriotic War, including:
– the South-Western Front, January 1942
– the 3rd Guards Tank Army in the battles for Kharkov in December 1942–March 1943
– the 2nd Tank Army in January–February 1944, during the battles of the Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive
– the 6th Guards Tank Army in the Manchurian operation in August–September 1945
The book also explores the question of engineering support from 1930 to the Battle of Berlin. The research is based mainly on archival documents never published before and it will be very useful for scholars and researchers. Buy this book on Amazon!
This website uses cookies to improve your experience. We'll assume you're ok with this, but you can opt-out if you wish. Cookie settingsACCEPT
Privacy & Cookies Policy
Privacy Overview
This website uses cookies to improve your experience while you navigate through the website. Out of these cookies, the cookies that are categorized as necessary are stored on your browser as they are essential for the working of basic functionalities of the website. We also use third-party cookies that help us analyze and understand how you use this website. These cookies will be stored in your browser only with your consent. You also have the option to opt-out of these cookies. But opting out of some of these cookies may have an effect on your browsing experience.
Necessary cookies are absolutely essential for the website to function properly. This category only includes cookies that ensures basic functionalities and security features of the website. These cookies do not store any personal information.
Any cookies that may not be particularly necessary for the website to function and is used specifically to collect user personal data via analytics, ads, other embedded contents are termed as non-necessary cookies. It is mandatory to procure user consent prior to running these cookies on your website.