Category: WW2 German SPGs

German Reich (1939)
Self-Propelled Artillery – 12 Built (2 Prototypes
+ 10 Pre-Production Vehicles)

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The development of the Panzer division concept in Germany during the 1930s played a significant role in creating an effective offensive force. The mass concentration of tanks within these divisions provided considerable firepower, allowing them to overcome most enemy opposition. However, engaging well-fortified defensive positions posed a challenge even for Panzer divisions. To address this issue, half-track towed artillery guns were attached to these divisions. These guns were mobile but required some time to set up for firing. Recognizing the need for more mobile and rapidly deployable artillery, Germany started developing self-propelled artillery vehicles. The first attempt to develop such a vehicle would lead to the Geschutzwagen IVb für 10.5 cm le.F.H.18/1.

History

To supplement the firepower of newly created Panzer divisions, an artillery regiment was attached to them. This allowed the divisions to have their own dedicated artillery support to provide firepower against fortified enemy positions. These regiments were equipped with 24 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18 and 12 larger 15 cm s.F.H. 18 field howitzers. Occasionally, the latter were replaced with one battery with four 10.5 cm K18 guns.

Given that mobility was a key part of the Panzer division concept, these had to be mobile to provide the necessary fire support against fortified enemy points. To maintain the required mobility, the German forces employed half-tracks to transport and support the artillery guns, which had good overall mobility. These half-tracks were capable of keeping up with the Panzers in various types of terrain. However, despite their mobility advantages, the half-tracks still required some time to properly set up for combat. When preparing to fire, the guns had to be uncoupled from the towing transport vehicles and the crew had to manually tow the guns to their designated firing positions. The time required for this preparation would depend on the crew’s training and the specific combat situation. It is worth noting that the crew operating these guns were exposed to the risk of enemy return fire during this process. Another drawback of this setup was that the transport vehicles were parked at a distance from the firing positions. In case of an emergency or the need to rapidly relocate, the guns could not be easily moved away. This limitation could potentially leave the artillery crews vulnerable if they were under direct enemy attack or if the situation required a quick change of position. Overall, while the addition of an artillery regiment with mobile half-tracks provided valuable firepower to the Panzer divisions, there were trade-offs in terms of setup time, crew exposure to enemy fire, and limited mobility once the guns were in position.

Increasing the mobility of these guns while offering some level of protection could only be achieved in the form of self-propelled artillery. Even before the war, German Army officials were aware that such a vehicle was desirable. In 1934, the early Panzer division concept was meant to include an artillery battalion equipped with 12 self-propelled artillery vehicles. Given the limitations of the German industry at that time, this was only wishful thinking.

The Germans partially addressed the need for close fire support with the introduction of the 7.5 cm armed Panzer IV. In 1935, Krupp was instructed by Wa Prw 6 (German Army’s Ordnance Department office responsible for designing tanks and other motorized vehicles, later renamed to Wa Prüf 6) to build a Panzer IV turret armed with a 10.5 cm L/16 gun. This test vehicle was designated as a 10.5 cm Panzerwagen Nebeltank (Eng. Fog tank). Its purpose was to fire either smoke or high-explosive rounds against enemy positions. The British used a similar concept in their early Cruiser tank designs. Krupp did complete a prototype with the 10.5 cm gun in 1938, but the project did not progress beyond that stage. The exact reasons for the cancellation are not well-documented, and it is unclear why the development of tanks with a 10.5 cm low-velocity gun did not proceed further. It is possible that the German Army’s focus shifted towards other priorities or that technical challenges and resource limitations played a role. In addition, there were some in the German Army who fiercely opposed this concept. Overall, while the Germans did experiment with the idea of mounting a 10.5 cm gun in a tank turret, such projects did not progress beyond the prototype stage.

Still, the idea of using self-propelled artillery was not fully discarded. Following a large military exercise undertaken by the 1st Panzer Division, a report (dated December 1935) was issued regarding the artillery support.

“ …During the rapidly increasing pace of the (mock) battles, it proved impossible to gather exact statistics for the possible deployment of a self-propelled gun battalion in combat. Principally, the missions presented to motorized artillery are comparable to those for towed artillery units in an infantry division. However, it must be demanded that ready-to-fire preparations must be made quicker and a change of position to be achieved more rapidly.
Any mission directed by the Panzer brigade to the supporting artillery cannot be fulfilled by horse-drawn units. After a successful breakthrough, the horse-drawn artillery is too slow in getting into position, which significantly reduces their ability to open supporting fire. Any artillery support for the Panzer brigade requires it to have the ability to immediately follow the tank advance, also the type must have high mobility over all terrain and protection against enemy fire: an armored fully tracked vehicle mounting an artillery piece…”

In addition, this report highlighted the importance of deciding which caliber should have been used for this role.

“…Furthermore, it must be decided as to whether this vehicle will be armed with a 7.5cm or 10.5cm gun. Trials using both weapons will have to be conducted in the near future. A 10.5cm gun will have a greater impact in the target, but inevitably will make the vehicle heavier and give it a conspicuous superstructure. Due to the size of the gun, ammunition storage will be considerably limited. Until trials with 10.5cm self-propelled guns have been completed, the tank brigade will have to continue to use the 7.5cm-armed tanks of the heavy companies. The crews will have to be trained on how to use this weapon as artillery…”

In 1936, several steps were taken to develop more suitable self-propelled artillery vehicles. However, the development of these vehicles faced consistent delays. One primary factor was the limited production capacity of the German industry, which was struggling to produce an adequate number of tanks and had little spare capacity for other projects. As a result, the development of self-propelled artillery vehicles languished.

Furthermore, there was a belief that the Luftwaffe, the German air force, would provide sufficient close operational fire support to the Panzer divisions. In the early years of the war, the Luftwaffe effectively fulfilled this role, which further diminished the immediate need for mobile artillery vehicles and alleviated some of the pressure for development.

Additionally, it should be noted that some officials within the German Army were against the concept of self-propelled artillery vehicles. They might have held the belief that traditional towed artillery and close air support were sufficient, or they had concerns about the feasibility or effectiveness of such vehicles. These differing opinions among army officials also contributed to the delays in developing self-propelled artillery vehicles.

It was not until 1939 that work on such a vehicle finally began to gain traction. That year, Krupp presented a drawing (designated W 1324) of such a vehicle to the Army. In contrast to the later designs built during the war, this vehicle was dedicated for this sole purpose. The engine was mounted to the rear, while the turret with the gun was placed in the central section of the hull. The Krupp engineers did not want to place the engine in the middle of the hull, as this would increase the overall vehicle height. Wa Prüf 6 was interested in this project but requested some structural changes. They agreed that the engine should be positioned to the rear. Other suggestions included that the traversing arc had to be increased without changing the traverse mechanism, the ammunition load was to consist of at least 40 rounds, the elevation of -10° to +15°, frontal armor protection had to be at least 20 mm, etc.

During a new meeting held in October 1939, further changes were requested. For example, it was ordered that the SSG 46 transmission had to be used. The pivoting point of the main weapon was proposed to be moved slightly to the rear and raised up. It was hoped that, by doing this, the elevation and traverse of the main gun would be improved. With these suggestions, the production of the first prototype known as Sfl.IVb was scheduled to be completed at the start of 1941.

In the meantime, another meeting was held in late January 1940 to discuss further details. During this meeting, great attention was focused on how to best use the limited turret interior space. Especially of great interest was if the elevation and traverse controls could be positioned on the left side of the main armament, as it would be the most effective in this arrangement. The possible use of a diesel engine was discussed.

A month later, Krupp informed Wa Prüf 6 that the wooden mock-up was ready for inspection. Obersltl. Olbrich was part of the first group that inspected the mock-up. He was one of the major opponents of mounting a 10.5 cm howitzer in a tank turret. While the overall design was deemed sufficient for the job, Olbrich requested some changes. First, he demanded that this vehicle should not have a fully rotating turret, as it would resemble a tank. This decision may seem absurd due to the benefits of having a fully rotating turret, however, during the early development of tanks, there were individuals in various countries, including Germany, who held obsolete or unrealistic notions about how tanks should function and their specific design. This backward and conflicting thinking was not unique to the German army but was present in other nations as well.

Obersltl. Olbrich’s opposition to a fully rotating turret might have stemmed from such notions or his personal beliefs. It is possible that he had concerns about the vulnerability of a fully rotating turret or the complexity it would add to the vehicle’s design. Without further information, it is difficult to ascertain his exact reasoning.

In any case, additional changes, including redesigning the turret were requested. The side armor would slope down toward the rear. The turret walls would be placed at an angle to provide additional protection. The Germans were quite aware of the benefits of using angled armor. Storage area and the radio would be placed in the turret rear to act as a counterweight to the main armament. Despite Olbrich’s reservations, the project was gaining enough interest within the German Army, and production orders for the first vehicles followed soon after the inspection of the wooden mock-up.

Name

The vehicle was initially designated as Sfl.IVb. Sfl was short for Selbstfahrlafetten (Enbg. Self-propelled). The Roman numeral IV was related to the Panzer IV chassis and the latter ’b’ served to distinguish it from other self-propelled projects, such as the Sfl. IVa, ahistorically better known as the Dicker Max. Sometimes in sources, it is also referred to as Selbstfahrlafetten mit Fahrgestell des Panzerkampfwagen IVb.

In August 1941, Krupp was informed that the designation was to be changed to le.F.H.18 (Sfl). In 1942, it was once again changed to Pz.Sfl.F.le.F.H.18 Ausf.A. This article will continue using the short Sfl.IVb designation for the sake of simplicity.

First Production Orders

Following the inspection of the wooden mock-up, Krupp received a production order for two prototype vehicles designated V1 and V2 in November 1940. Rheinmetall was awarded a contract for the delivery of four guns. Krupp then received another production order for 10 pre-production vehicles. The production schedule for these 10 vehicles was:

If these vehicles proved to be successful, a production order of 200 vehicles was to be awarded to Krupp. The estimated mass production was to commence in October 1941. Of course, as with many other projects, there were delays in the production of these vehicles. Krupp was reported to have finished the two prototypes at the start of 1942. These were then transported to the secret test center at Kummersdorf. One of the two prototypes received some damage, probably during firing trials, and was sent back to Krupp to be repaired. It was reported to be fully repaired by 4th February 1942.

As these two were being tested, the necessary components for the assembly of the 10 pre-production vehicles slowly arrived at Krupp. It was estimated that these would be completed by April 1942 and that serial production would start at the end of the year. These were once again delayed and Krupp finally completed them during the period of August to December 1942.

Krupp obviously lacked the proper production facilities to deliver all promised vehicles. It was instead decided to award the production order to Stahlindustrie GmbH from Mulheim-Ruhr.

Specifications

This vehicle shared a number of visual resemblances with the Panzer IV. In truth, many components were not interchangeable, for example, the suspension. It is not clear why these components were not taken directly from the Panzer IV production lines, as it would have made the construction of the whole vehicle much simpler and cheaper.

Chassis

The Sfl.IVb chassis shared its overall layout with other German tank designs. The front part of the hull served as a housing point for the transmission, followed by the crew compartment and the engine. The front hull, where the transmission and steering systems were located, was fully enclosed, providing protection to the vital components housed within. To allow access for repairs and maintenance, a square-shaped transmission hatch was positioned in the middle of the angled plate. This hatch would allow the crew to reach the transmission without having to dismantle the entire hull. Additionally, two rectangular steering brake inspection hatches were included in the design. The presence of these inspection hatches made it easier for the crew to check and service the steering system when needed.

The overall configuration of the Sfl.IVb‘s front hull was similar to that of the Panzer IV’s design. However, there was a difference in the size of the transmission hatch. The Panzer IV utilized a larger transmission hatch compared to the Sfl.IVb. This discrepancy in size could be attributed to the specific requirements and design choices made for each vehicle.

Suspension and Running Gear

The suspension was another element that was similar to that of the Panzer IV. Pairs of road wheels were placed on bogies. Only the last assembly was provided with a bump stop. These, in turn, were suspended using self-dampening leaf spring suspension. In contrast to the Panzer IV’s suspension, this vehicle had only six road wheels. In addition, these were somewhat larger, having a diameter of 520 mm in contrast to the Panzer IV’s 470 mm road wheels. The Sfl.IVb used three return rollers, a rear idler, and a front-mounted drive sprocket. The tracks were 40 cm wide. This suspension, while not perfect, had a simple design and was easy to build and maintain.

Engine and Transmission

For the engine, Krupp’s engineers decided to use the Maybach 6-cylinder HL 66P which produced 188 hp@3200 rpm. Why they used this weaker engine instead of an original Panzer IV engine is unclear. It is possible that this was done in order to reduce the height of the hull and, thus, the whole vehicle as much as possible. It is somewhat ironic that, for the anticipated mass production, this engine was to be replaced with the much stronger 320 Maybach HL 90 P20K engine, which actually never occurred.

With the HL 66P engine and a weight of 18 tonnes, this vehicle had a maximum speed of 35 km/h. The fuel load of 470 l provided an operational range of 210 km and 130 km cross-country. The engine was coupled to the front-mounted SSG 46 six-speed (and one reverse) transmission.

The engine itself was fully protected by armor. The rear part of the engine compartment curved down slightly. On top of it, there were two ventilation ports. Two more were positioned to the rear, with a large exhaust being placed in the middle. The engine was separated from the crew compartment by a fire-resistant wall. Spare equipment, such as road wheels, were stored on top of the engine compartment.

Superstructure

The vehicle superstructure was box-shaped and had a quite simple overall design. The front armor plate had two vision ports. The left one was used by the driver, while the right one was a fake port meant to confuse enemy gunners about the driver’s position. This tactic was also employed on other German vehicles, such as the Panzer II Ausf.F. On both sides of the superstructure armor, there were two smaller vision ports.

The driver accessed his position through a hatch located on top of the superstructure. The last noticeable features on the superstructure were the two turret rail extensions, with one on each side. These rails were used to mount and stabilize the turret.

Turret

The turret was open-topped. This had several advantages.

Firstly, it provided the crew with a good view of their surroundings, which was important for an artillery vehicle that needed to identify targets and adjust fire accurately. This increased situational awareness could enhance the effectiveness of the crew in engaging enemy targets within sight.

Secondly, the open-topped turret made ammunition resupply easier. Since the crew could access the ammunition storage directly from the top of the turret, reloading the artillery gun with additional rounds was simpler and more efficient. This could contribute to faster firing rates and sustained operations on the battlefield.

Lastly, removing the roof of the turret helped in reducing the overall weight of the vehicle. By eliminating the need for heavy armored roofing, the vehicle’s weight was reduced, which could have positive effects on its mobility and maneuverability.

The turret was constructed using eight angled armored plates that were welded together. The front plate featured a large opening where the gun assembly was bolted. The height of the side plates tapered downward towards the back. This design choice was not uncommon in German self-propelled vehicle designs of the time. By tapering the side armor, the weight of the turret was further reduced while still maintaining sufficient protection for the crew.

Inside the turret, the working space was rather cramped. To address this issue and provide more room, both the commander and gunner seats could be folded when not in use. This folding feature likely allowed the crew members to move around more comfortably and perform their duties effectively.

Observation ports were not placed on the turret since they were deemed unnecessary. Presumably, the open-topped design already provided the crew with sufficient visibility, eliminating the need for additional observation ports. This could have contributed to a simpler and more streamlined turret construction.

To serve as a counterbalance to the main armament, additional spare track links and other equipment were stored to the rear of the turret. This placement of equipment helped balance the weight distribution of the turret and the overall vehicle, maintaining stability during firing and movement.

Armament

The main armament for this vehicle was the 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18 light howitzer. This was the most common field artillery piece that the Germans employed during the war. It was designed by Rheinmetall and put into service in 1930. The designation “18” was intentionally misleading, as the Germans were prohibited from developing new artillery after World War I. By using designations that falsely implied it was a World War I design, they were able to bypass these restrictions. While a good overall design, it would be improved a few times during the war, mainly in order to increase its range and reduce the construction costs.

In order to fit inside this particular vehicle, the 10.5 cm howitzer had to undergo a redesign. The howitzer was removed from its carriage and placed on specially designed mounting points located on the front part of the turret. To accommodate the limited space, the original recoil cylinders and recuperators were replaced with smaller ones. These modified components were positioned farther back, located just above the breach block. To further reduce the recoil force during firing, a large muzzle brake was added. Thanks to these modifications, it was possible to use a much smaller armored gun mantlet. In order to avoid accidentally injuring the gunner on the left side of the breach block, a large protective gun shield was added. With these changes, the modified howitzer was designated as 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18/1.

In the turret, it had an elevation of -10° to +40°. The traverse of the whole turret was limited to 35° in both directions. The gunner operated the elevation of the main armament by hand. The manual traverse handwheel was located on the right side of the turret and operated by the loader. It was hoped that, on the production vehicles, a fully traversable turret would be used. The maximum firing range of 10,650 m could be achieved by using the 14.8 kg heavy high-explosive round. For aiming the 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18/1, the gunner would use the Z.E.34 and Rfl.F.36 gun sights. This vehicle did not use travel locks.

The two-part (round and propellant charge) ammunition was stored inside the hull. In total, the ammunition load capacity was 60 rounds and propellant charges.

While no secondary machine gun was incorporated, the crew members were equipped with 3 MP 40 submachine guns for close self-defense purposes. These submachine guns were s, accompanied by 18 32-round capacity magazines.

Armor

Given its specific role, this vehicle was only lightly protected. The front hull and superstructure armor was 20 mm thick. The sides were even less protected, being only 14.5 mm thick. The turret armor was mirrored, being the same armor thickness. The top armor was 8 mm thick, the same as the hull’s bottom. The driver’s protective vision port was 30 mm thick and, in addition, he was extra protected with a 90 mm thick armored glass.

Such self-propelled artillery vehicles were meant to provide long-range fire support. Thus, they would be, ideally, but combat conditions are not always predictable, firing from afar, without fear of enemy retaliation. For this reason, mobility had greater importance than armor thickness.

Crew

Given its relatively small size and cramped interior, the crew of the vehicle consisted of four members, namely the commander, driver, gunner, and loader. The driver enjoyed full protection, as he was situated in the front hull compartment. The commander occupied the position on the left side of the gun and was equipped with a doppelscheren Turmspaehfernrohr scissor periscope for observing the surroundings. The periscope offered a 3x magnification and a 20° field of view. As on all German armored combat vehicles, the gunner was seated to left of the gun. On the right of the gun sat the loader.

In Service

Once the 10 pre-production vehicles were fully completed, some of these were allocated to the Feldversuchs Batterie (Eng. Field trial battery) of the Artillerie Regiment 16 (Eng. Artillery regiment) in late 1942. The battery was part of the 16th Panzer Division. Six vehicles were used to form a single battery. The remaining four vehicles and the prototypes stayed behind to serve as training and replacement vehicles.

While these saw service on the Eastern Front, no record of their performance survived to this day. The 16th Panzer Division was almost completely destroyed at Stalingrad, so it is likely that the six vehicles were lost there too.

Further Plans and the End of the Project

The discovery that a modified Panzer II chassis could be reused for a similar purpose led to the decision to prioritize that option instead. By late 1942, due to the challenges faced by the German industry in producing enough tank chassis, introducing yet another completely new chassis would only cause additional delay and confusion. The Panzer II components were already available and were much easier to be reused. While the self-propelled vehicle based on the Panzer II chassis lacked a rotating turret, the urgency of the situation necessitated the use of available components.

However, the Sfl.IVb project was briefly revived when Krupp was instructed to test if a 15 cm s.F.H.18 could be used on the chassis. Despite the efforts of Krupp engineers, it was determined that the chassis was not suitable for the installation of such a large weapon. Consequently, the project was shut down in November 1942. Krupp then attempted to repurpose the Sfl.IVb chassis as an anti-tank vehicle similar to the Jagdpanzer IV project, known as Panzerjager IVb E39. However, it appears that these proposals also did not progress further.

The ultimate fate of the 12 vehicles remains unknown. At the end of the war, one of the vehicles (possibly one of the two prototypes) without a gun was discovered by the Allies at the Rheinmetall facility in Hillersleben.

Conclusion

The Sfl.IVb was part of Germany’s efforts to design a dedicated self-propelled artillery vehicle for their tank formations. The Sfl.IVb featured a partially rotating turret, which was considered a novel feature compared to later designs introduced by the Germans. The vehicle had a well-designed overall structure, and its ammunition storage was relatively large and somewhat protected. These features made it a potentially suitable option for meeting the artillery needs of the German Panzer divisions.

However, the Sfl.IVb faced significant drawbacks that led to the termination of the project. One major issue was the extended development and production time, which resulted in delays. Additionally, the design did not make effective use of components that were already in production. As a result, by the time it was planned to enter production, the Germans opted for a simpler but less sophisticated design: the Wespe self-propelled artillery gun, based on the Panzer II chassis.

The decision to switch to the Wespe was driven by the Germans’ lack of capacity for the introduction into production of yet another chassis, considering the demands of the war by 1942. Consequently, the Sfl.IVb project was effectively abandoned, and no combat reports or real-world performance data exist to evaluate how the vehicle performed on the battlefield.

Sources

D. Doyle (2019) The Complete Guide To German Armored Vehicles, Skyhorse Publishing books
T. Anderson (2019), Panzerartillerie, Osprey Publishing
D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2001) Panzer Tracts No. 10-1 Artillerie Selbstfahrlafetten
P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
S.J. Zaloga Panzers In The Gunsights

German Reich (1941-1942)
Heavy Tank Destroyer/Bunker Buster – 2 Built

The “10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.)” (Eng. 10.5 cm cannon (armored self-propelled gun)) or “10 cm K. Pz.Sfl.IVa” (Eng. 10 cm cannon self-propelled gun IVa), more commonly known as the “Dicker Max” (Eng. Fat Max), was a German self-propelled artillery gun. Development started in 1939, with the Army requesting a mobile “bunker buster” to destroy the fortifications on the French border. However, it would never fulfill that role, since the only two vehicles ever built were completed in early 1941, well after the end of the Battle of France.

The tank was based on the reliable Panzer IV chassis and used the standard K.18 German heavy artillery gun. The ammunition used consisted of Tungsten core rounds, which, in combination with the high velocity of the gun, had great penetration capabilities. Both vehicles were sent to the Eastern Front as tank destroyers, where one of the two would prove itself very successful, destroying a large number of Soviet tanks.

Context: The Need for a “Bunker Buster”

One of the main problems that the German High Command faced during preparation and planning for what would become the Second World War was how to defeat France. The German-French border was heavily fortified on both sides, with the French Maginot Line in the Alsace-Lorraine province and the German Siegfried Line mirroring it. In the end, two plans were prepared. The first plan was to revisit the Schlieffenplan that was already used during WW1. The idea was to invade the neutral Benelux states and invade France through the Belgian border.

The second plan was to power through the heavily fortified Maginot Line on the French-German border. However, this plan was only to be executed if the first plan failed. For this purpose alone, Germany started development of multiple heavy mortars, such as the 60 cm heavy mortar Gerät 40/41.

Beside this immense self propelled mortar, the Germans also intended to reuse the 8.8 cm Flak gun in this role. This gun was quite cumbersome to move, and in order to increase its mobility, two different proposals would be adopted.

The first would be created by placing the gun on a half-track chassis, creating the 8.8 cm Flak 18 Sfl. auf schwere Zugkraftwagen 12 t (Sd.Kfz.8) als Fahrgestell. The second variant was more orthodox in design, consisting of an armored half-track prime mover and a slightly modified 8.8 cm Flak 18 gun.

Both of these were built in limited numbers and saw use in their designated roles. Alongside the previously mentioned projects, the need arose for a much more compact self-propelled tracked chassis mounting a powerful gun that could deal with enemy concrete bunkers.

Development of the ‘Panzerselbstfahrlafette IVa’

Because Krupp had previously developed most German tanks, the Wa Prüf 6 (Eng. Army Design Office 6) once again contacted the firm in 1938. However, because Krupp had never designed a large caliber self-propelled gun, there were many different concepts and ideas on how this SPG would look. After having agreed on some specifications, Krupp started the development in 1939.

One of the first problems that occurred was where to place the engine. Krupp submitted two drawings in April 1939. In the first drawing, the engine was placed under the gun, in the front, which resulted in a shorter overhang, reduced by 800 mm compared to the second drawing, in which the engine was placed in the center. However, putting the engine below the gun resulted in numerous disadvantages that Krupp listed:

• poor access to the engine
• unfavorable installation of the radiator and cooling air fans
• crew encumbered by heat and fumes
• noise from the engine
• complicated operation of the transmission
• firing height increased to at least 2 m
• nose-heavy vehicle

On the other hand, placing the engine in the center of the hull would result in a lower firing height of 1.7 m and easier access to the engine. Additionally, the center of gravity would be better placed. In the end, the Wa Prüf 6 went with the first plan, because they thought that 800 mm of additional overhang with the second engine location was too much to handle for such an SPG.

Next, it was settled that a 180 hp V-6 engine would be installed instead of a 320 hp V-12 engine. However, the drawbacks were an increased height of 100 mm. By May 1939, Krupp had to design a new variant of the SPG with the engine below the gun, a torsion bar suspension, and a 6-cylinder engine. On May 2nd, 1939, Krupp presented their new design. This design included the V-12 Maybach HL 120 engine instead of the agreed V-6, because they thought the V-6 would not be powerful enough.

Additionally, it offered easier access to the cylinders. The problem was that the V-12 was heavier and was planned to go out of production. In addition, Krupp proposed that they would use the steering unit and transmission of the VK9.01, but with dry-pin tracks and not lubricated ones. Lastly, a muzzle brake was installed. This reduced the recoil from 1,000 mm to 800 mm, which meant the gun could be moved 200 mm more to the rear. It was also specified at this point that the 10.5 cm K 18 gun was to be installed in the new SPG.

On May 15th, 1939, Krupp again met up with the representatives of the Wa Prüf 6, who decided in favor of a new design with a 200 hp Maybach HL 66 placed in the middle of the hull, with an estimated total weight of 22 tonnes. Krupp added a radiator behind the engine for better cooling. Additionally, the Wa Prüf 6 requested the recoil cylinder and recuperator be moved back to save space in the armored housing. It was also at this point that it was settled that a regular panoramic gunsight was to be used for indirect firing and a new periscope gunsight would be added for direct firing. After this, approval for constructing a full-scale wooden mock-up model was given to Krupp.

Later, Krupp would inform the Wa Prüf 6 that a weight increase could not be avoided if they intended to use a torsion bar suspension. Because of this, Krupp suggested using the Panzer IV’s leaf spring suspension to save weight. This caused a problem, as the Wa Prüf 6 had originally planned to use the torsion bar interleaved suspension with lubricated tracks with rubber pads to achieve the maximum possible speed. However, the Design Office knew that the excess weight that came with the torsion bar suspension could not be reduced from anywhere else and that, due to this excess weight, lubricated tracks without rubber pads would not work due to ground pressure limitations. The Wa Prüf 6 then thought about simply using a regular torsion bar suspension with dry pin tracks, like on the Panzer II Ausf.D1/2.

On August 10th, 1939, when the wooden mock-up model was completed, Wa Prüf 6 suggested reducing the hull width to match the one of the Panzer IV. Later, the final decision was made to limit the weight to 20 tonnes by using the 8-wheel leaf suspension and chassis of the Panzer IV. The Panzer IV was chosen over the Panzer III because, at that time, it was more readily available and lighter.

On August 21st, 1939, the decision was made to use the Maybach HL 66 P engine together with the transmission and steering unit of the VK9.02, after previously being proven to be compatible. This was very important, because higher turning power was needed, as the Panzer IV normally had a width to length ratio of 1:1.46 compared to 1:1 for the VK9.02. A maximum speed of 35 km/h was requested.

Krupp was then awarded a contract to produce two trial vehicles, with all necessary equipment and real armor. The gun was to be provided by the Wa Prüf 4 (Department for Artillery). On September 4th, 1939, Krupp presented the construction drawings. The SPG did not have a turret and the hull and superstructure were constructed as one unit. The two trial vehicles were to be completed by May and June 1940, with the armor hulls completed eight weeks prior so the gun could be mounted in time.

On the same day, the final changes before production were made. These included minor changes to the gun sights, mounts for the periscopes, changes to the gun shield, and the gunner’s hatch being made to be rectangular and counter sunk. Additionally, the range finder was omitted.

Name

The designation for the “10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.)” is quite complicated. First off, this article is referring to the vehicle as an SPG, because that was its original intended role, even though it was eventually used and classified as a tank destroyer.

During the entirety of the development and production, it was referred to as “10 cm K. Pz.Sfl.IVa”, which stands for “10 cm Kanone Panzer Selbstfahrlafette IVa” (Eng. 10 cm canon self-propelled gun IVa). On August 13th, 1941, the name was changed to “10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.)” which stands for 10.5 cm Kanone (gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette) (Eng. 10.5 cm canon (armored self-propelled gun)). After the war, the name “Dicker Max” appeared, which is nowadays the most popular name for the vehicle, presumably due to its simplicity and funny connotations.

Interestingly, in a diary entry of the commander of the second SPG, Kurt Hildebrandt, he gives the vehicle’s nickname as “Brummbär”.

The article iwill use the original designation when referring to the development/production/design sections and the second description when referring to everything after August 1941.

Production

During production, on October 11th, 1939, Wa Prüf 6 again met up with Krupp. They informed Krupp that the transmission of the VK9.02 would not be installed and the regular SSG 46 transmission should be used instead. However, this significantly reduced the speed to 25 km/h, as the gear ratio was only 1:8 at 188 hp.

During a production report in April 1940, Krupp stated that they were working on the next generation of AFVs, which included the “10 cm K. Pz.Sfl.IVa”. The completion date was extended to August 1940, since the need for such an SPG was reduced after the invasion of France, as the Germans attacked around the heavy fortifications of the Maginot Line. However, Krupp would only complete the two SPGs in January 1941. During a demonstration for Hitler on March 31st, 1941, it was decided that serial production could begin in spring 1942. However, this was never implemented and only the two AFVs were ever produced.

Design

Hull

The 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.)’s hull was slightly redesigned in comparison to a standard Panzer IV hull. The forward-mounted transmission was unchanged. The difference was that it received a new angled top armor plate cover that completely enclosed it. The two hull frontal brake access hatches, including the large square-shaped bolted hatch, were retained. The engine and driver’s positions were moved to the center of the hull. The gun and its mount were placed directly above the enclosed engine. Lastly, to the rear, was the crew fighting compartment.

Suspension

Given that this vehicle was based on a Panzer IV chassis (unspecified version, but likely the Ausf.D or E), it used the same suspension. This consisted of eight small double wheels placed on each side, suspended in pairs, and placed on four bogie assemblies. The small road wheels were suspended by leaf-spring units. There were also four return rollers on each side. Finally, the drive sprocket was at the front and the idler at the rear.

The suspension was to be taken from the Panzer IV Ausf.E, while the drive sprocket appear to be taken from Ausf.D. The difference was in the covering caps. This basically changed nothing, as these were only minor mostly changes and performed the same. It also does not help that the Germans often mixed older and newer components on their vehicles.

In its early development phase, Wa Prüf. 6 and Krupp engineers often discussed what type of suspension to use. Several different proposals were made. This included the use of a torsion bar suspension and lubricated tracks without rubber pads. Ultimately, at the insistence of Krupp engineers and with the aim of saving weight and easing production, the use of the Panzer IV’s suspension was chosen. It weighed 430 kg less than a Panzer III’s torsion bar suspension. In addition, it provided more internal room and was generally easier to maintain. It was already in production, so there would be enough spare parts and it would also help save development time. Krupp still proposed that the Army should test a prototype that used a six-wheel bogie suspension. While Wa Prüf 6 considered and even issued a production order for a prototype equipped with this suspension for testing, it was eventually canceled, and no such vehicle was built.

Engine

For the construction of this vehicle, the Panzer IV’s original Maybach HL 120 TRM engine, giving out 265 hp@2,600 rpm, was replaced with a much weaker Maybach HL 66 P, providing 180 hp@3,200 rpm. The engine was then connected to a forward mounted SSG 46-type transmission. Initially, a MAN Cletrac-type steering unit was to be used. However, this was replaced with a standard Panzer IV steering unit to simplify production.
With these changes, the maximum speed dropped considerably to 27 km/h. Krupp engineers were alarmed by the reduction of speed and requested that the transmission be changed. A possible replacement was the A.K.6 S 55, but this was not yet properly tested. To avoid delaying the project, it was decided to keep the SSG 46 transmission despite the reduction in speed. The change of engine also reduced the overall operational range, which was 170 km on road and 120 km cross-country. The fuel tanks were located in the front part of the hull, but their capacity is not specified in the sources.

The engine itself was moved to the center of the hull in order to allow for the necessary room for the crew. The engine was placed in a fully enclosed casing. Two ventilation ports were placed above the engine compartment. This arrangement would later be used on many German vehicles adapted for various roles, including the 15 cm armed Hummel self-propelled artillery, which was also based on the Panzer IV.

The decision to replace the engine with a weaker one was mainly motivated by the need to keep the vehicle’s overall height as low as possible. This decision would greatly and negatively affect the overall drive performance of the 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.). Given the reduction of speed, the whole point of providing a mobile support vehicle was lost. In order to engage a target, the whole vehicle had to change positions often, and, together with a weaker engine, often led to overheating problems.

Superstructure

For the construction of the superstructure of this vehicle, the Germans especially wanted to avoid using complex-shaped armor plates. Instead, they went for the simplest design possible. Starting from the front, the Germans added an enclosed housing to the left of the gun, where the driver was positioned. It was a simple box-shaped compartment with a front mounted pivoting driver vision port, vision slit to the left, and a hatch on top. The driver’s protective visor, the Fahrersehklappe 50, was 50 mm thick. When the visor was closed, the driver would use a binocular periscope to see through two small round ports located just above the visor. Opposite this compartment, the Germans placed another fake one. It was meant to confuse enemy gunners, so that they had a harder time hitting the driver.

The front superstructure plate armor was made of one large piece with a hole in the center for the gun itself. The side armor consisted of four welded armor plates. The lower two were placed straight up, while the upper two were slightly angled toward the center of the vehicle. The upper part of the side armor was cut down as it went toward the rear part of the vehicle. This was done intentionally to reduce the weight of the vehicle and would appear commonly on many later German vehicles of similar design. The rear part of the vehicle was protected by one larger armor plate. Two escape hatches were placed there.

The top part of the vehicle was mostly open. The exception was the front part of the vehicle, where the gunner’s periscope was positioned. In front of it was a small bullet splash protector. The rear part of the vehicle was also lightly protected in order to provide the loaders with some level of protection against aerial attacks. The crew fighting compartment was left open to facilitate ventilation of the smoke created during gun firing. It also provided a good view of the surroundings, reduced production cost, and overall weight. The downside though is obvious, as the crew was exposed to enemy fire and the elements.

Armor Protection

The thickness of the armor, like many other components, was determined by the weight limitations of the vehicle. To prevent the vehicle from becoming too heavy, the armor was kept relatively light. To enhance protection, the front armor plates were face-hardened.

The front hull had a thickness of 50 mm, while the upper front superstructure armor measured 30 mm. The box-shaped gun mantlet had a thickness of 50 mm. In contrast, the side hull and superstructure armor were thinner, measuring only 20 mm. The rear armor was even lighter at 10 mm. The upper armor varied between 10 and 20 mm in thickness.

The Germans made an intriguing addition to the vehicle by including a thin armor cover for the ammunition bins, even though the crew compartment was open-top. This feature aimed to offer some protection against potential attacks from enemy aircraft. However, doubts remain regarding the actual effectiveness and practicality of this measure.

In general, the armor thickness of the vehicle was considered relatively insufficient when compared to the standards of 1941. Nonetheless, the presence of a powerful and long-range gun helped alleviate this concern to some extent. The vehicle had the ability to engage targets from a distance, potentially preventing them from mounting effective counterattacks, at least in theory.

Main Armament – The 10.5 cm K18 Gun

The main armament chosen for this vehicle was the 10.5 cm K18 gun, which had been developed in the late 1920s. The designation “K18” was intentionally misleading, as the Germans were prohibited from developing new artillery after World War I. By using designations that falsely implied it was a pre-World War I design, they were able to bypass these restrictions. The K18 gun incorporated elements from both Krupp (carriage) and Rheinmetall (gun), which were merged together into a single design. Production began in 1933 after a successful testing phase, following a standard pattern similar to other modern German artillery pieces.

The gun featured a split-trail carriage and was connected to two large leaf-spring-suspended solid rubber-rimmed wheels. The barrel, housed in a protective jacket, was a single-piece design connected to a horizontally sliding breech. The gun was designed for towing by trucks or half-tracks, and if necessary, it could also be towed by horses, although in this case, the barrel had to be removed and placed on another trailer. It had a traverse range of 64° and an elevation range of 0° to +48°. With the strongest charge, it had a maximum firing range of just over 19 km. The gun weighed 5,640 kg when in action.

Despite its relatively long-range capabilities, the 10.5 cm K18 gun was considered to have a small caliber, despite its large size. However, it remained in use until the end of the war. An interesting aspect is that in the early stages of the war and during the invasion of the Soviet Union, it was often employed in anti-tank roles.

In order to fit inside this particular vehicle, the 10.5 cm gun had to undergo redesign. The gun was removed from its carriage and placed on specially designed mounting points located on top of the engine compartment. To accommodate the limited space, smaller recoil cylinders and recuperators were utilized. These modifications allowed for the omission of a large gun mantlet. Despite the reduced size, the gun maintained a sustained rate of fire of 120 rounds per hour (2 rounds per minute). A large muzzle brake was incorporated into the design, although it was later replaced by a smaller one when the gun was deployed on the frontlines. Additionally, a large travel lock was added to the front of the gun to support its heavy weight and long barrel.

The design of the vehicle’s gun system had some shortcomings, particularly in terms of its limited traverse and elevation capabilities. The gun had a traverse of only 16° and an elevation range of -15° to +10°. To operate the gun, the control wheels for both elevation and traverse were positioned on the left side of the vehicle, ensuring convenient access for the gunner. Each full rotation of the traverse wheel resulted in a traverse speed of 0.7°, while the elevation speed ranged between 0.7° to 0.8° per wheel turn.

The 10.5 cm gun exhibited remarkable anti-tank capabilities that served as a notable strength despite its design limitations. With a muzzle velocity of around 822 m/s (this varies slightly in different sources), it could penetrate up to 155 mm of armor at a range of 500 m. At a distance of 1 km, it was capable of defeating 128 mm of armor, and at 1.5 km, it could pierce 111 mm of armor. These exceptional performance characteristics established it as one of the most effective anti-tank weapons during the early years of the war.

The 10.5 cm gun employed a two-part ammunition system, comprising a propellant and a round. Although this type of ammunition slightly reduced the firing rate, it offered several advantages. It facilitated convenient storage within the vehicle and allowed for loading regardless of the gun’s position. Additionally, during firing, the gunner had the flexibility to utilize one or more charges as required. The ammunition load for the vehicle consisted of a total of 26 rounds, which were stored both on the right side of the crew compartment and in close proximity to the driver’s position.

The gunner would employ the Selbstfahrlafetten-Zielfernrohr for direct firing, specifically targeting enemy armor. However, when fulfilling the role of mobile artillery for firing support at long distances, the Rundblickfernrohr 34 would be utilized instead. The effective range for direct firing was limited to 3 km, providing the 10.5 cm gun with substantial firepower to engage distant targets. Nevertheless, due to various factors such as poor visibility, adverse weather conditions, ammunition quality, or sheer luck, engaging enemy armor at longer ranges was infrequent.

While no secondary machine gun was incorporated, the crew members were equipped with 4 MP 40 submachine guns for close self-defense purposes alongside two magazine pouches for each weapon.

Crew

The crew of the vehicle consisted of five: commander, driver, gunner, and two loaders. The driver enjoyed full protection as he was situated in the small driver compartment. The commander occupied the position on the right side of the gun and was equipped with a doppelscheren Turmspaehfernrohr scissor periscope for observing the surroundings. The periscope offered a 3x magnification and a 20° field of vision. Positioned opposite the commander was the gunner, while the two loaders stood behind them, prepared to load the gun.

Organization and Doctrine

The two 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.) were assigned to one of the most famous German early to mid-war anti-tank units, Panzerjäger Abteilung 521 (Anti-Tank Battalion 521). This battalion fielded various anti-tank weapons, including the Panzerjäger I and the larger Panzerselbstfahrlafette für 12,8 cm Kanone 40. During Operation Barbarossa, the unit was initially part of the XXIV. Army Corps and later came under the command of the 3rd Panzer Division in September 1941. It was later incorporated into the XVII. Army Corps and participated in the Battle of Stalingrad, where it was ultimately destroyed as part of the 6th Army.

Within the Anti Tank Battalion, the two 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.) were organized into a new platoon, which consisted of a fighting column and an ammunition transport column. The fighting column included two 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.) vehicles, two Kfz.4 anti-air defense cars, and a Kfz.15 radio communication vehicle. This composition allowed for both direct and indirect fire capabilities, contributing to the battalion’s effectiveness in combat.

The primary purpose of this particular self-propelled gun was to engage and destroy heavily fortified concrete bunkers at long distances, all while maintaining its mobility on the battlefield. Additionally, it served as a formidable weapon against heavy tanks that were impervious to other anti-tank weapons. However, due to its delayed deployment, it did not have the opportunity to fulfill its original intended role during the events in France in 1940. Instead, when it was eventually sent into the Soviet Union in 1941, its focus shifted primarily to its secondary role of engaging and combating enemy tanks.

Combat Results

First stage – Operation Barbarossa and Early Losses

The following reports come from Panzerjäger Abteilung 521, which participated in the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22nd June 1941. The first operational report comes from 24th June 1941.

The platoon was employed in a vanguard in the fight around the area east of Kobryn, where it fired HE rounds at infantry positions. In the evening, the platoon was supporting an attack by motorcycle gunners that crossed over a river. The SPGs engaged open artillery at a range of 1,100 to 1,700 m and successfully disabled them.

During the advance on Slutsk on June 26th, 1941, an unfortunate incident occurred which resulted in the destruction of one of the self-propelled guns. Although the exact cause was not definitively determined, it is believed that the intense heat generated from the engine, combined with the exceptionally high temperatures outside on that day, led to a buildup of heat. Within the area, a small quantity of high-explosive (HE) grenades was stored, which likely ignited as a result.

Fortunately, the crew members were quick to react when they noticed a small burst of flame, allowing them to promptly evacuate the vehicle. All five crew members observed the SPG continuing to move for a short distance before coming to a halt. However, shortly thereafter, the flames spread and reached the main ammunition storage, causing a catastrophic fire. As a result, the vehicle was completely destroyed and had to be abandoned at the roadside. Remarkably, despite the loss of the vehicle, it was reported that the gun of the SPG remained intact and was still usable.

On June 30th, 1941, the final remaining self-propelled gun confronted a Soviet armored train but was unable to halt its escape to safety. The SPG encountered an internal problem with one of its components, specifically a broken bolt in the slide mechanism of the steering brakes. This malfunction significantly impeded the gun’s ability to aim accurately at the target. Consequently, the team lost approximately 5 minutes of crucial time, during which the armored train managed to elude capture and find a secure location.

On August 20th, 1941, the self-propelled gun found itself engaging an enemy column from a considerable distance of over 4,000 m. This was primarily due to the absence of a closer firing position that would ensure the SPG’s safety. As the enemy tanks opened fire, their long-range shots and the continuous movement of the column hindered their ability to aim accurately, providing relative safety for the SPG.

To engage the column, the SPG employed high-explosive (HE) grenades with delayed fuzes set to the maximum range of 2,400 m. Although the crew initially estimated the distance to be 3,000 m instead of the actual 4,000 m, they skillfully targeted the column with well-placed hits and multiple spotting shots. Following the German tank crew’s training protocol for column destruction, the gunner aimed at the first tank in the column using a pre-loaded HE grenade. While a direct hit was not achieved, subsequent observation revealed damage to the tank’s tracks.

Continuing the engagement, the SPG fired three additional rounds of regular armor-piercing ammunition at the same tank. However, none of the shots hit their mark, as the gunner had to rely on trial and error to adjust the gun’s elevation beyond the effective range of 2,400 m. Later, it was observed that the crew of the enemy tank, identified as a KV-1, intentionally destroyed their own tank and managed to escape.

In addition to the destruction of the first tank in the column, two more tanks, likely T-34/76 mod.1941s, met a similar fate. The rounds fired by the SPG caused damage to the suspension of these tanks, rendering them immobile. Subsequently, the crew of each tank took the decision to set their vehicles on fire, effectively destroying them.

During a defensive battle on August 29th and 30th, 1941, the Battalion encountered Soviet tanks. On the 29th, the gunner and commander of the SPG scouted the area to identify suitable defensive positions and gain a better sense of the distances to specific points, making the aiming process easier. Upon returning to the tank, a Soviet T-34 approached their position, unaware of the presence of the SPG. Exploiting this advantage, the crew successfully destroyed the tank at a close range of 100 m. Subsequently, they engaged a second T-34 at approximately 1,000 m, managing to immobilize it. However, the Soviets recovered the disabled tank under the cover of darkness later that night.

On August 30th, 1941, the SPG encountered a T-34 tank and two T-26 light tanks positioned approximately 1,200 m away. However, the SPG was unable to advance closer due to the presence of Soviet anti-tank positions in the area. Despite the challenging circumstances, the SPG successfully immobilized the T-34 tank but failed to hit the T-26 tanks, which managed to escape into a nearby forest.

Regrettably, the available records for the 10.5 cm, K (gp.Slf.) conclude at this point. Towards the end of 1941, the sole surviving vehicle was withdrawn from the frontlines.

Second stage – Into Stalingrad

After being withdrawn from the frontlines, the SPG underwent extensive repairs and maintenance at the Krupp facilities. The vehicle required significant repairs and was repainted, resulting in the loss of its kill markings. During this time, Krupp proposed using a new Panzer IV chassis, but the Army Design Office rejected the offer, stating that the existing suspension would suffice.

In spring 1942, the SPG was deployed back to the frontlines, once again assigned to Panzerjäger Abteilung (Sfl.) 521, which had survived the unsuccessful attack on Moscow in the winter of 1941. Alongside two similar vehicles, known as the Panzerselbstfahrlafette für 12,8 cm Kanone 40, the SPG was expected to be combat-ready by June 1st, 1942. It subsequently participated in operations such as Case Blue and the assault on Stalingrad, with the objective of capturing the oil fields near Stalingrad.

During this period, from spring to October 1942, the recorded history of the SPG is scarce, suggesting that the Army Design Office had less interest in its performance. It is likely that the vehicle was seen more as a reserve vehicle to plug equipment gaps in the Wehrmacht, rather than a subject for further testing or development. By this time, the Army Design Office had likely accumulated sufficient knowledge and experiences from previous operations, diminishing the need for detailed documentation of the SPG’s activities during this period.

The SPG met its demise in October 1942, as indicated by the absence of any mention of the vehicle in inventory reports from November and December of that year. The last known photograph of the tank was taken in December 1942 by Soviet soldiers. In the photo, the vehicle is seen in its original dark gray color with patches of sand yellow applied over it. Additionally, the tank underwent white washing, resulting in an interesting camouflage pattern. This type of camouflage was commonly employed by vehicles entering combat during the summer of 1942. The SPG featured a total of 18 kill rings and a small tank symbol painted on the barrel, reminiscent of the markings added by the crew in 1941.

Lessons Learnt

According to the Army Design Office’s request, the crews and unit were tasked with closely monitoring and describing the flaws and performance of the 10.5 cm, K (gp.Slf.) during combat. The following points are based on reports from July to September 1941, shortly before the second vehicle was sent back to Germany:

1. The vehicle’s effectiveness in the vanguard was limited due to its lack of maneuverability. With a combined traverse of only 18°, the entire tank needed to turn even for minor adjustments. This, combined with the vehicle’s weak engine and heavy weight, significantly slowed down the aiming process. Furthermore, since only the frontal armor provided adequate protection, the tank crew had to constantly be vigilant to avoid being flanked and always keep its front facing the enemy. The nature of vanguard operations demanded the ability to engage targets from any direction without encountering such challenges.
2. The tank had proven its effectiveness in providing support to infantry attacks from open positions through direct fire. However, a significant challenge arose from the large dust cloud generated in front of the gun, which hindered the observation of the tank’s own shots. To overcome this issue, it was deemed crucial to deploy an observation post or a dedicated team led by a fire control non-commissioned officer (NCO) who possessed knowledge of both the crew and the vehicle. This team’s role was to provide accurate observations and assist in adjusting fire, thereby maximizing the tank’s effectiveness in combat situations.
3. The tank had not yet been utilized in its intended role as a concrete bunker destroyer with direct fire. However, its large caliber and high penetration demonstrated in the destruction of medium tanks indicated its effectiveness.
4. The transmission and engine did not encounter any major issues. However, there were concerns regarding the overstressing of the steering brakes, leading to bolts in the steering slide tearing out.
5. Achieving direct hits on heavy tanks like the KV-1 at ranges of 4,000 m proved challenging. Destruction or damage to the suspension primarily resulted from shell fragments, which sometimes led the crew to abandon and destroy their tank. However, this occurrence was not consistent, with instances where the enemy crew managed to tow their tank away during nighttime.
6. Due to the gun’s capability in engaging soft skin targets up to 4,000 m, it was recommended to mark the range scale accordingly. However, most armored targets could only be effectively engaged at a range of 1,500 m.
7. Prior to each firefight, it was crucial to scout the terrain in order to identify an optimal firing position. This task could be carried out by either the commander or the gunner.
8. Engaging moving targets proved challenging, especially at longer distances. The limited traverse of 9º on either side was insufficient for pre-aiming at targets over large distances.
9. It was not recommended to engage heavy tanks directly at ranges exceeding 1,000 m, as achieving penetration became increasingly challenging. Additionally, there was limited visibility monitoring the impact location of projectiles. Therefore, it was advised to engage tanks only within a range of up to 1,000 m.
10. In order to facilitate indirect fire with high-explosive grenades, the inclusion of a rangefinder was seen as crucial, especially for ranges exceeding 1,000 m.
11. The commander’s observation periscope proved insufficient and had to be replaced with a standard Scherenfernrohr (scissor telescope) for improved observation capabilities.

The encountered challenges and experiences played a vital role in the development of subsequent German self-propelled guns (SPGs), such as the Wespe and Hummel. These vehicles incorporated several of the necessary upgrades derived from the lessons learnt.

Conclusion

The 10.5 cm, K (gp.Slf.) served as a well-conceived initial endeavor to create a specialized self-propelled gun (SPG) dedicated to the destruction of heavy bunker positions. However, like many first attempts, it exhibited several design flaws and performance concerns on the battlefield. Nonetheless, the project held significant importance for both Krupp and the Army Design Office, as it provided valuable insights and lessons in terms of combat performance. These experiences proved instrumental in the development of subsequent SPGs during the war. Moreover, the knowledge gained alone rendered the vehicle useful for the German Army, despite its imperfections.

Furthermore, the vehicle’s actual combat performance demonstrated its effectiveness as a tank destroyer, as the second vehicle showcased its capability by successfully destroying numerous Soviet medium tanks with its powerful gun. However, it is important not to overlook the negative aspects, which significantly impacted the vehicle’s mobility and overall performance. The design flaws, in particular, played a pivotal role in the destruction of the first vehicle, highlighting a potential recurring problem if larger numbers had been produced, akin to the issues faced by many Ferdinand tank destroyers in 1943.

Sources

D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
T. Anderson (2018) History of the Panzejager, Volume 1 Origin and evolution 1939-42, Osprey Publishing.
P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (1997) Panzer Tracts No.4 Panzerkampfwagen IV
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2004) Panzer Tracts No.7-1 Panzerjager

German Reich (1944)
SPG – 12+ Built

The 10.5cm Hummel-Wespe Artillery SPG

There is only one known photograph of a Hummel self-propelled gun (SPG) chassis and body fitted with an artillery 10.5cm le.F.H. 18/40 L/28 howitzer rather than the normal 15cm s.FH 18/1 L/30 howitzer. It was officially called the Hummel-Wespe. This name was used on the Stahlindustrie construction company’s documentation. It was also known as the 10.5cm le.F.H. 18/40 (Sf) auf Geschützwagen III/IV, or LeichtPanzerhaubitzen (lePzHaub – light armoured howitzer) or the the Ersatz-Wespe (Replacement Wasp). The photograph was taken after World War Two during the winter of 1945/46 at Košťaty near Teplice, Czechoslovakia, close to the factory that assembled the vehicle.

Hummel-Wespe 10.5 cm le.F.H 18 Artillerie Selbstfahrlafetten (Artillery SPG) – Photo: Petr Dolezal and Marek Solar
The Hummel SPG used an extended tank chassis called the Geschützwagen III/IV to mount the 15cm s.FH 18/1 L/30 howitzer. The engine was moved from the rear of the tank to the center of the vehicle to make room for the gun and the armored fighting compartment at the back of the SPG.
The 10.5cm leFH 18/2 (Sf) auf Geschützwagen II ‘Wespe’ (Sd.Kfz.124) artillery SPG used a Panzer II tank chassis. Production began in February 1943 and ceased in June 1944, when the main factory in Warsaw, Poland was captured by the Red Army. The German Army Panzer-Artillerie batteries still needed more self-propelled guns that could keep up with the Panzer Divisions, fitted with 10.5cm le.F.H. 18/40 howitzers.
The Geschützwagen III/IV was still in production and being used for the Nashorn 88mm anti-tank self-propelled gun as well as the 15cm Hummel SPG. A decision was made to mount the 10.5cm le.F.H. 18 howitzers gun used on the Wespe SPG onto the Geschützwagen III/IV chassis.
The German armaments company Deutsche Eisenwerke (D.E.W) were constructing Geschützwagen III/IV chassis at their assembly plant in Duisburg, Germany. Allied bombing was making production difficult. It was moved to the D.E.W plant Werke (Deutsche Eisenwerke AG Werk) Teplitz-Schönau in Czechoslovakia (now known as Teplice, Czech Republic). The building of armored vehicles for the German Army continued until the end of the war in May 1945.
Plans to fit a 10.5 cm Le.F.H 18/40 light field howitzer to the s.Pz.Haubitze Fahrgestell extended and modified Panzer III/IV tank chassis, as a stop-gap solution to send more 10.5 cm artillery SPGs on the battlefield, were discussed in a meeting on 2nd December 1944. The factory was expected to produce 40 in February, 50 in March and 80 in April. A further report documents the demand for a further 250 to be built in June 1945. That report was dated 9th January 1945.
A Stahlindustrie report dated 30th of August 1945 stated that one Hummel-Wespe artillery SPG had been built in December 1944, a further 9 in January 1945 and a further one before the end of the war, bringing the total to eleven. No German Army documents have been found that show these vehicles entering operational service or being used on the battlefield.

The anti-grenade screen

Another unusual feature visible in the photo of the Hummel/Wespe is the hand grenade protection screen that was added over the open fighting compartment on a metal hinged frame.

This is a photograph of an early version Hummel, not a Hummel/Wespe. It is fitted with the same wire mesh top screen to prevent grenades and mines from being thrown into the fighting compartment. Notice the large exhaust muffler/silencer box under the rear hatches. It was removed on the later version of the Geschützwagen III/IV chassis that was used on the 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18/40 Hummel-Wespe artillery SPG.

Proposed production figures – German Archives

A GenArt (General der Artillerie) report dated 11 December 1944, kept in the German Archives, reports that documentation for the 10.5 cm Hummel-Wespe design had been signed and a production order for 250 units for delivery in June 1945 issued.Production was to start in February 5. It was intended that 80 vehicles would be completed each month.
On 10 February 1945 the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKH – Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces) issued the following instructions, ” “Due to the drop in light field howitzer (LeFH) production, delivery of the 250 le Panzerhaubitze auf Fahrgestell Hummel is no longer anticipate. Instead of the 80 lePzHaub scheduled for February only 10 will be completed, followed by another 20 in March. To compensate, production of Panzerhaubitzen will proceed as follows.”
“In parallel with the highest possible output of lePzHaub, some 50 sPzHaub (15 cm sFH Hummel SPGS) will be produced. The available 80 sFH guns from the Hummel production wil be mounted on Beutelafetten (captured gun mounts). Production of lePzHaub (the 10.5 cm leFH Hummel-Wespe) will be fixed at 200 and not 250 units.”
Due to the end of the war being close, the continued bombing of German factories and supply routes, this production figure was never meet.

Proposed production figures – Russian Archives

A German document was captured by the Red Army. It showed predicted production numbers of vehicles like the Jagdpanther, Jagdtiger, Flakpanzer, Hummel and Hummel-Wespe from March 1945 to August 1945. It was translated by Senior Lieutenant Rubinshtein into Russian and kept in the Soviet archives.
On line 345, it shows that planned production of the heavily armed howitzer, the Hummel, was for 50 vehicles: 20 in March and 10 in April, May, June 1945 with production stopping in July. On line 346, it shows that planned production of the light armed howitzer, the Hummel-Wespe, was for 190 vehicles: 20 in March and 30 in April, May, June and 40 in July, August 1945.
There was a side note that an additional 10-20 new type Hummel/Wespe would be added to the number on April and May. This would have brought the planned production numbers of the 10.5cm Hummel-Wespe Artillery SPG to 220 vehicles by August 1945. Obviously, that did not happen as the war ended in May 1945.

Czechoslovakian Army 1948-54

Surviving Hummel-Wespe artillery self-propelled guns were used by the Czechoslovakian Army after WW2. They had twelve, but only eight vehicles underwent renovation and entered service in 1948. Between 1948-1949 they were officially called “Samohybné děla so 105 mm húfnicou”. Between 1949-1954 the official designation in army records changed to “105 mm samohybná húfnica vz.18/40”. They were withdrawn from Army service in 1954 and presumably scrapped. (Source – Vojenská história 4/2009 ISSN 1335-3314, VHÚ Bratislava)
Czechoslovakian Army records recorded the original German production chassis number (Fgst.Nr) of the eight Hummel-Wespe artillery SPGs that entered their service.
German Fahrgestellnummer 84407, date in service 4th May 1949,
Battery number R114, army registration number 79.651
German Fahrgestellnummer 84412, date in service 4th May 1949,
Battery number R107, army registration number 79.652
German Fahrgestellnummer 340003, date in service 4th May 1949,
Battery number R108, army registration number 79.653
German Fahrgestellnummer 84410, date in service 4th May 1949,
Battery number R3397, army registration number 79.654
German Fahrgestellnummer 84422, date in service 20th October 1949,
Battery number R113, army registration number 79.655
German Fahrgestellnummer 84419, date in service 20th October 1949,
Battery number R109, army registration number 79.656
German Fahrgestellnummer 84420, date in service 20th October 1949,
Battery number R106, army registration number 79.657
German Fahrgestellnummer 84421, date in service 20th October 1949,
Tactical unit number R105, army registration number 79.658

The German self-propelled howitzers

The full designation of this self-propelled artillery gun was Panzerfeldhaubitze 18M auf Geschützwagen III/IV (Sf) Hummel, Sd.Kfz.165. The German word ‘Hummel’ means bumblebee. This armored fighting vehicle had a nasty sting. There were two main types of self-propelled guns in the German Army during WW2. One was fitted with an anti-tank gun and the other with an artillery howitzer, like the Hummel. A vehicle fitted with an artillery field howitzer was called a ‘Geschüetzwagen’, which is literally translated as a ‘gun vehicle’. The letters ‘Sf’ stand for ‘Selbstfahrlafette’ – self-propelled carriage. ‘Panzerfeldhaubitze’ means armored field howitzer.
Self-propelled artillery guns were developed to enable fast moving attacks to have artillery support that could keep up with the speed of advancing Panzer Divisions. They could use direct fire mode at targets they could see or, more commonly, use indirect fire at targets plotted on a map.
They were not designed to be in the front line or engage in combat with tanks. They were motorized artillery guns that could fire high explosive HE shells over the heads of friendly troops. Most targets would have been given to the crew as map grid references by forward observation officers or infantry units under attack.
Quite often, the gun crews could not see where their shells landed, as the target was so far away. They would have to rely on the forward observer to tell them if adjustments had to be made.
The open-topped back design of these self-propelled guns had a number of advantages. The elevated commander’s position when standing in the crew compartment, behind the protective armored shield, meant that he had a good view on all sides. If there was the threat of enemy small arms fire, then the crew could use a twin lens range finder telescope that could peak over the top of the armored casement.
There was enough room for the crew to be transported towards the battlefield whilst protected from small arms fire and shell shrapnel. The vehicle had good mobility and could follow the infantry almost anywhere. The gun was quicker to get ready for action and fire on targets than towed artillery guns.
Putting the 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18/40 howitzer on top of a tank chassis was a more efficient use of manpower from the traditional form of German artillery battery transportation. Even in WW2, horse power was still widely used although tracked vehicles were also employed when available. Each field gun would require a six-horse team to pull the gun and limber. The ammunition, supplies and kit would be kept in the limber, which was a very large box on a pair of wheels with seats on the top. Three men would ride on the left-hand horse of each pair to control them. The remaining six men of the gun crew would ride on top of the limber. Only a relative few were towed by the 3-ton halftracks.
High explosive HE shells came in two parts. The explosive shell was loaded first, followed by the variable charge canister. This meant that the Hummel/Wespe could only carry 18 rounds of HE. It could fire armor-piercing AP rounds but they were only effective at short ranges and used in self defense. The Hummel/Wespe was not meant to be on the battlefield front line. It was a support vehicle that provided artillery support from behind the infantry and tanks.

The Geschützwagen III/IV chassis

The powerful 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18/40 light field howitzer was mounted on a specially designed Alkett/Rheinmetall-Borsig lengthened German tank chassis called the Geschützwagen III/IV. Components were adopted from both the Panzer III and Panzer IV tank chassis. The more robust final drive wheels, front drive wheels and steering units plus the Zahnradfabrik SSG 77 transmission gearbox were adopted from the Panzer III Ausf.J.
The Maybach HL 120 TRM engine with its cooling system, the suspension, and idler with track tension adjustment were adopted from the Panzer IV. The engine was moved from the rear of the tank to the center of the vehicle to make room for the gun and the armored fighting compartment at the back of the SPG.
On early versions of the Geschützwagen III/IV chassis, the front top of the hull had sloping armor with a raised armored compartment for the driver on the left of the vehicle. The front hull superstructure and driver’s armored compartment were redesigned in early 1944 and enlarged, covering the whole width of the vehicle. The radio operator and driver now had more space to work in. This design was used on all Hummel/Wespe artillery SPGs.
The exhaust system was also changed on the later model. It was moved from the original location below the rear double doors. The exhaust mufflers were dropped and the ends of the exhaust pipes were cut at a slant away from the tracks to avoid stirring up additional dust.
The Geschützwagen III/IV tank chassis did not have a hull mounted machine gun. Crews were issued with a single MG34 or MG42 machine gun, carried inside the fighting compartment, for self-defense.
The Hummel/Wespe was designed to be operated by a crew of six: commander, driver and four gunners. They were protected by an enclosed high silhouette armored fighting compartment. Although it was open topped, the crew were issued with a thick canvas tarpaulin cover that could be used in bad weather.
In front of the driver, a metal wire grid was fixed into position to aid the driver maneuvering the vehicle in the correct fire position. These were designed to prevent grenades and mines being thrown into the vehicle as it moved through towns and cities.
A metal louvered cover ventilated the engine, but many later versions were fitted with an angled shield that opened upward. On the photograph of the Hummel/Wespe the metal louvered engine vent can not be seen on the sides of the vehicle. It looks like it has been fitted with one of the armored angled shields.
Three aiming stake poles would have been carried in brackets below the rear door. The gunner would use a large ZE 34 sight. The top lens aperture would point to the rear of the vehicle. The gunner used this aperture of the sight to locate the aiming sticks that a member of the crew had pounded into the ground at the rear at a known bearing from the vehicle, having used a compass (compasses did not work inside a metal vehicle in 1943). By lining up the red and white fire aiming stake, subtracting 180 degrees, he would be able to work out the correct bearing the gun barrel is pointing towards.
The upper fighting compartment superstructure walls were constructed using 10 mm (0.39 in) thick E11 chrome-silicon armor plates hardened to 153 kg/mm2 for protection against shell fragments. The 30 mm (1.18 in) thick front hull was made using face-hardened FA32 armor plates. The rest of the hull was made out of cheaper rolled SM-Stahl (carbon steel) that was hardened to 75-90 kg/mm2. It took 20 mm (0.78 in) thick plates of SM-Stahl to provide equivalent protection against penetration by SmK (7.92 mm AP bullets) as 14.5 mm (0.57 in) of E11 armor plate.
The early Geschützwagen III/IV chassis used the standard 1943 38cm wide SK18 track that had three smooth metal pads visible on the front face of the track. In winter some vehicles were fitted with track width extenders called Winterketten (winter track). These triangular pieces of metal were bolted onto the outer edge of the track to extend the width of the track and help the vehicle move across snow and mud by spreading the load over a larger area. They were problematic: they fractured and often fell off. In 1944, vehicles started to be fitted with the wider Ostketten (east track) to cope with the conditions found on the Eastern Front. The Winterketten extensions made the SK18 tank track 55cm wide. The one-piece Ostketten was 56cm wide and did not have bits falling off it.

The Hummel-Wespe – Illustration by David Bocquelet

A regular Hummel SPG with the wire mesh protective cover

A Wespe SPG with its 10.5 cm gun.

A model of the 10.5cm Hummel-Wespe SPG made by Danis Stamatiadis

Hummel-Wespe artists impression of the SPG on the Eastern Front battlefield during 1945 (Art work – Cyber-Hobby)

The Hummel-Wespe 10.5 cm SPG had the louvered engine vents protected by an armored shaped cover (Photo – Cyber-Hobby)

The front hull superstructure and driver’s armored compartment were redesigned in early 1944 and enlarged, covering the whole width of the vehicle. The radio operator and driver now had more space to work in. (Photo – Cyber-Hobby)

The rear exhaust system was removed on the Hummel-Wespe SPG. The three aiming stake poles were stored below the rear hatch doors. (Photo – Cyber-Hobby)

Fighting compartment of the 10.5 cm le.F.H 18 Hummel-Wespe SPG. (Photo – Cyber-Hobby)

The 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18 light field howitzer

The 10.5 cm leFH 18 gun was a German light howitzer used in World War II. The abbreviation leFH stands for the German words ‘leichte FeldHaubitze’ which, translated, means light field howitzer. It was fitted with a ‘Mundungbremse’ muzzle brake to allow longer range charges to be fired and reduce the amount of recoil on the gun. This increased the operational life of the gun barrel.

German Army 10.5 cm le.F.H. 18 light field howitzer on display at the Finnish Artillery Museum, Finland
The 105 mm (4.13 in) high explosive HE shell weighed 14.81 kg (32.7 lb). The armor piercing shell weighed 14.25 kg (31.4lb). It had a muzzle velocity of 470 m/s (1,542 ft/s) and a maximum firing range of 10,675 m (11,675 yds). With a good gun crew, it had a rate of fire between 4-6 rounds per minute.
The 10.5cm leichte Feld Haubitze 18 gun was not very useful in the direct-fire mode against enemy armored vehicles. It could only penetrate 52 mm (2 in) of armor plate at a very short range of 500 meters.
The high explosive shell was in two pieces. It was a ‘separate loading’ or two part round. First, the high explosive HE projectile would be loaded and then the cartridge propellant case. Depending on the range of the target different sized bags of propellant were inserted into the cartridge. More bags were used for longer range targets.

German Reich (1942)
SPG – 16 Built

The Giant SPG

With the fall of France in May 1940, the German Army captured a lot of French Army tanks and vehicles. They called them Beutepanzer (trophy tanks). The approximate numbers of French AFVs captured by the German Wehrmacht are as follows: 300x Panhard-178; 3,000 Renault-UE; 350 to 360x Lorraine 37L and 38L; 1700x Renault FT Tanks (various versions); 843x Renault R35; 550 to 600x Hotchkiss H-35 and H-39; 50x FCM-36 tanks; 297x SOMUA S-35 tanks and 161x Char B1 bis tanks. More than 5,000 captured French army armoured fighting vehicles were repaired or converted in French factories. Vehicle manuals were translated into German and the vehicle spare part production initiated.
One such Beutepanzer trophy tank was the very large Char B1 bis heavy tank. Many of them had been abandoned by their crews after running out of ammunition or fuel. The French Army supply system was poorly organized in 1940. Very few of these monster tanks were knocked out by enemy action.

Factory fresh 10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf) auf Geschuetzwagen B2(f), having just been driven out of the workshop doors.
They were given the German designation Panzerkampfwagen B2 740(f) shortened to Pz.Kpfw. B2 740(f). The letter ‘f’ signified that it was a French built tank. Hitler issued a directive in March 1941 that sixteen of these tanks were to be converted to self-propelled artillery guns and used to support the Flammenwerfer auf Pz.Kpfw.B2(f) flamethrower tanks as they assaulted Soviet positions on the Eastern front.
It took longer than initially planned to convert the Char B1 tanks to self-propelled artillery guns. Lack of equipment, vehicles, guns and parts were blamed. The Flammenwerfer auf Pz.Kpfw.B2(f) flamethrower tanks went into action without supporting artillery SPGs in June 1941.
The Panzer-Abteilung (Flamm).103 was disbanded by mid-July 1941. The B2 Flammenwerfer tanks were a disappointment to the Germans. They kept on breaking down with mechanical problems. They were not reliable and could not be depended upon to get to an enemy strong point and neutralize it.

Livery

Most of the 10.5cm leFH 18/3 (Sf) auf Geschützwagen B2(f) artillery self-propelled artillery guns were painted ‘Panzergrey’ at the factory but a few were repainted in the standard late war paint scheme of sandy yellow ‘Dunkelgelb’ with brown and yellow mix.

10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf.) auf G.W.B2 in the Rheinmetall-Borsig factory with bad weather tarpaulin on the top painted in ‘Dunkelgelb’ sandy yellow not ‘Panzergrey’.
The following photograph ends the discussion as to what colour the 10.5cm leFH 18/3 (Sf) auf Geschützwagen B2(f) artillery self-propelled artillery guns were painted. The first vehicle is painted in the sandy yellow ‘Dunkelgelb’ and the one following it is painted in the earlier ‘Panzergrey’.

Design and Production

The design contract was given to Rheinmetall-Borsig, which was based in Dusseldorf. They created blueprints for a mount placed on top of the tank chassis that could take the 10.5 cm leFH 18/3 artillery howitzer. The gun crew would be protected from small arms fire by an open top armored casement. Its armor plate thickness ranged between 30–40 mm (1.18-1.57 in) thick at the front and 20–30 mm (0.79-1.18 in) at the sides. Tarpaulins would cover the open top to give the crew shelter from bad and hot weather.
It had a five-man crew: commander, driver and three gunners. The Char B1 main gun in the hull had been removed. It was not replaced with a hull mounted machine-gun. For self-defence, a 7.92 mm (0.31 in) MG 34 machine gun was available to be fitted to the top of the gun casement. The crew also had access to handheld 9 mm (0.35 in) machine pistols.
The Char B2 tanks already had a very high profile. With the mounting of the 10.5cm leFH 18/3 howitzer on the top, it was very tall. Its height was 3 m (9ft 11in). This made it easy for the enemy to spot, so it had to be deployed behind the initial front line of tanks.
The French army radios were replaced. Some could only send messages by Morse code. Modern German Fug.5 radios, that could provide voice communication, were fitted in the machines. The removal of the hull mounted 75 mm (2.95 in) gun increased the amount of room there was available for the storing of extra equipment and ammunition.

Operational Service

Five were produced by January 1942, five in the following February and six in March. The sixteen 10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf) auf G.W. B2(f) were issued to Artillerie-Regiment 93, 1.Abteilung (1st Battalion) of the 26.Panzer-Division which was in France. The 1st Battalion had three batteries with four self-propelled artillery guns in each battery. The four remaining vehicles were issued to the HQ battery on reserve. Reports stated that the vehicle was prone to frequent mechanical breakdowns.
An Artillerie-Regiment 93’s combat strength report dated 31st May 1943 reported that they had fifteen 10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf) auf G.W. B2(f) SPGs of which 14 were in an operational condition. This report also recorded that twelve Wespe 10.5cm SPGs had been issued to the 1.Abt./Artl.Rgt.93 as replacement vehicles for the mechanically unreliable 10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf) auf Geschuetzwagen B2(f) SPGs. These were then used as training vehicles to teach new tank drivers, gunners and mechanics their trade skills. The 26.Panzer-Division was sent to Italy in July 1943.
Orders had been issued to send these vehicles to Sardinia to be part of the strength of the 90.Panzergrenadier-Division. No records have been found to confirm that the fifteen remaining vehicles were transferred to Sardinia or what their ultimate fate was. The 90.Panzergrenadier-Division withdrew to Corsica from Sardinia and was then sent to northern Italy. It fought at Anzio, Rome, the Caesar and Gothic Lines and the Po River. It was destroyed near Bologna, Italy, April 1945.

The 10.5cm LeFH 18/3 howitzer

The 10.5 cm leFH 18 gun was a German light howitzer used in World War II. The abbreviation leFH stands for the German words ‘leichte FeldHaubitze’ which, translated, means light field howitzer. It was fitted with a ‘Mundungbremse’ muzzle brake to allow longer range charges to be fired and reduce the amount of recoil on the gun. This increased the operational life of the gun barrel.
The 105 mm (4.13 in) high explosive HE shell weighed 14.81 kg (32.7lb). The armor piercing shell weighed 14.25 kg (31.4 lb). It had a muzzle velocity of 470 m/s (1,542 ft/s) and a maximum firing range of 10,675 m (11,675 yds). With a good gun crew, it had a rate of fire between 4-6 rounds per minute.
The high explosive shell was in two pieces. It was a ‘separate loading’ or two-part round. First, the high explosive HE projectile would be loaded and then the cartridge propellant case. Depending on the range of the target different sized bags of propellant were inserted into the cartridge. More bags were used for longer range targets.
The 10.5cm leichte Feld Haubitze 18 gun was not very useful in the direct-fire mode against enemy armored vehicles. It could only penetrate 52 mm (2 in) of armor plate at a very short range of 500 meters (550 yd).
A HEAT-round for the 10.5cm leFH 18 was developed in June 1940. It went into service in a large number in winter 1941/42, probably as a reaction to the T-34s and KV-series tanks appearing on the Eastern Front. There were 3 different types of HEAT-rounds, the GR H1/A, GR H1/B and GR H1/C. The GR H1/A was the first one developed in June 1940, followed by the GR H1/B sometimes in 1941 and the final GR H1/C in 1942.

An article by Craig Moore

Geschützwagen B2(f) specifications
Dimensions (L,W,H)	7.62 x 2.4 x 3 m (25′ x 7’10” x 9’11”)
Total weight, battle ready	32.5 tons
Crew	5 (commander, driver, gunner, 2x loaders)
Propulsion	Renault 307 water cooled, 6-cylinder gasoline/petrol engine, 272 hp
Top road speed	28 km/h (17 mph)
Off road speed	21 km/h (13 mph)
Operational range (road)	135 km (84 miles)
Main Armament	10.5 cm (4.13 in) leFH 18/3 howitzer
Secondary Armament	7.92 mm (0.31 in) MG34 machine gun
Armor (chassis)	Front 40-60 mm (1.57-2.36 in) Sides and rear 55 mm (2.16 in)
Total production	16

Sources

Beute-Kraftfahrzeuge und panzer der deutschen Wehrmacht by Walter J. Spielberger
Beutepanzer der Wehrmacht by Alexander Lüdekes
Die Feldartillerie des Heeres in der Panzerabwehr 1939–1945 (Militärgeschichte” issue 1/1994, page 9–15) by Wolfgang Fleische.
Profile AFV Weapons 55 – German Self Propelled Weapons by Peter Chamberlain and H.L.Doyle.
German Heavy Field Artillery 1934-1945 by Joachim Engelmann
German Artillery at War 1939-45 Vol 1 vy Frank V. de Sisto.
German Army S.P. Weapons 1939-45 part 2. handbook No1 by by Peter Chamberlain and H.L.Doyle.
Panzer Tracts by Thomas L.Jentz and H.L.Doyle
Assistance of Marcus Hock and Steve Osfield

German Army 10.5cm leFH 18/3 (Sf) auf Geschuetzwagen B2(f) self-propelled artillery gun by David Bocquelet

10.5cm leFH 18/3 (Sf) auf Geschuetzwagen B2(f) in Dunkelgelb livery by David Bocquelet

Gallery

Two 10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf.) auf G.W.B2(f) self-propelled artillery guns on the move. They were designated alphabetically in capital letters (A – P).

Gun crew standing next to a 10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf) auf Geschuetzwagen B2(f)

The fighting compartment that surrounded the gun of 10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf) auf Geschuetzwagen B2(f) N had an open top. In bad or very hot weather, a tarpaulin covered the top.

Notice that 10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf) auf GW B2(f) SPG ‘D’ is carrying a large wooded box on the back.

10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf) auf GW B2(f) Artillery Self-propelled Gun, with vehicle identification letter D (source: ebay)

Here is a side view of another 10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf) auf GW B2(f) SPG carrying a large wooded box on the back.

The 75 mm (2.95 in) gun was removed from the Char B1 hull when the tank was converted into an artillery self-propelled gun.

Side view of 10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf) auf GW B2(f) Artillery Self-propelled Gun, with vehicle identification letter N, being inspected by senior officers (Giuseppe Bianco)

Front view of 10.5cm le.F.H.18/3 (Sf) auf GW B2(f) Artillery Self-propelled Gun, with vehicle identification letter N, being inspected by senior officers (Giuseppe Bianco)

Germans Tanks of ww2

German Self-Propelled Artillery Guns of the Second World War

By Craig Moore

One towed artillery gun required a team of six horses and nine men. WW2 German engineers came up with the idea of mounting an artillery gun on top of a tank chassis. This new technology reduced the amount of resources required to deploy one artillery gun. Artillery self-propelled guns only needed a four or five man crew. They could also be made ready to fire more quickly. This book covers the development and use of this new weapon between 1939 and 1945. One type was successfully used in the invasion of France in May 1940. More were used on the Eastern Front against Soviet forces from 1941 until the end of the war in 1945.

Buy this book on Amazon!

German Reich (1942)
SPG – 6 Built

The little SPG

With the fall of France in May 1940, after the German Blitzkrieg invasion, all British Army Expeditionary Force (BEF) tanks and vehicles had to be left behind as the soldiers escaped back to England via the beaches of Dunkirk. When the vehicles were abandoned the British troops tried to make them unusable so the German Army could not turn them against their previous owners.

The 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf Geschutzwagen Mk.VI(e) self-propelled artillery gun built on a Vickers Mk.VI light tank chassis
Not all their efforts were successful. A number of the captured tanks were in a repairable condition. Parts were taken from different vehicles to make one vehicle serviceable. The German mechanics managed to repair a number of British Vickers Mk.VIb and Mk.VIc light tanks.
These were known as Beutepanzers (trophy tanks) and given the official designation of Leichter Panzerkampfwagen Mk.VIB 735(e) or Leichter Panzerkampfwagen Mk.VIC 736(e). They were used for combat, reconnaissance, internal police security and tank crew training. The letter ‘e’ in brackets referred to the country of origin of the captured tank, in this case, England.
The German army needed artillery that could keep up with the tanks of the Panzer Division. A decision was made to use some of the captured tanks, including the Vickers Mk.VI light tanks, as self-propelled artillery guns and mount a howitzer on the tank chassis.

Fighting compartment showing the commander’s and gunner’s positions on the left of the SPG

Design and Production

A German engineer called Oberleutnant Becker, who had been attached to the tank producing factory of Alkett in Berlin, organized the mounting of six WW1 era 10.5cm le.F.H.16 howitzers on the top of captured Vickers Mk.VI tanks.
The gun crewmen were protected by an armored casement that surrounded the 10.5cm leFH 16 howitzer. Its armor thickness ranged from 11 to 22 mm (0.43-0.89 in). That was enough to protect the crew from small arms fire and shrapnel fragments from high explosive shells and mortar rounds.
This self-propelled gun was not designed to fight on the front line. It was an artillery self-propelled gun that would stay behind the main assault and fire high explosive HE shells over the heads of the troops and tanks at targets given to it as grid references on a map by forward observers.
It was not an anti-tank gun, though it did carry a few armor piercing AP rounds for self-defense at close quarters. A machine gun could be fitted to the front of the superstructure to the right of the gun. The crew had their own weapons that they could fire over the top of the fighting compartment if enemy troops got too close.
The fighting compartment was open topped, it did not have an armored roof. This kept the weight down and gave the commander all round vision. The crew would cover the top with a tarpaulin in bad weather and also in very hot weather, in order to provide shade.
To help deal with recoil from the gun when it was fired, the gun crew deployed a metal support frame attached to the rear of the vehicle. It was a square shaped metal frame that was strengthened by two cross bars and at the bottom had V-shaped ‘spades’ at the bottom that would dig into the earth.
The commander sat at the rear of the vehicle, on the left side, behind the gunner. He had access to a range finding periscope mounted to the side of the vehicle. The gunner’s gun sight poked out above the top of the forward gun shield and armor casement. The loader sat on the right side of the vehicle.

In June 1940, the prototype underwent firing trials at Le Harfleur, France. The gun crew protective armor casement had not been built around the gun at this stage – Photo: Dr Werner

The 10.5cm leFH 16 gun

The 10.5 cm leFH 16 gun was a German light howitzer used in World War I. It had a shorter range than the WW2 10.5 cm leFH 18 gun. Its maximum firing range was 9,225 m (10,089 yds). As it had the same caliber as the newer leFH 18, it could fire the same ammunition. Its muzzle velocity was 395 m/s (1,300 ft/s).
The 10.5 cm leFH 16 gun abbreviation leFH stands for the German words ‘leichte FeldHaubitze’ which, translated, means light field howitzer. It was not fitted with a ‘Mundungbremse’ muzzle brake.
The 10.5cm leichte Feld Haubitze 16 gun was not very useful in the direct-fire mode against enemy armored vehicles. It could only penetrate 52 mm (2 in) of armor plate at a very short range of 500 meters.
The high explosive shell was in two pieces. It was a ‘separate loading’ or two-part round. First, the high explosive HE projectile would be loaded and then the cartridge propellant case. Depending on the range of the target different sized bags of propellant were inserted into the cartridge. More bags were used for longer range targets.

Active Service

The six converted Vickers Mk.IV light tanks, now fitted with the long range 10.5cm leFH 16 artillery howitzer, were placed in the 15th battery of the Artillery Regiment, 227th Infantry Division. They were divided up into two platoons of three. The commanding officer was the same German Engineer Alfred Becker, now promoted to Captain, who had been involved in their construction.
The German documents refer to this unit as an assault battery. It was not used in that role. The armor on the front of these vehicles was not strong enough to take a direct hit from an enemy tank or anti-tank gun. These SPGs were used as artillery.
The 227th Infantry Division performed coastal defense and internal occupation security duties after the fall of France in Normandy, near the port of Le Havre, from July 1940 until late summer of 1941. The gun crews had time to train on their new vehicle before being posted to the Eastern Front and taking part in the heavy fighting in and around Leningrad (St Petersburg) Russia.
The 227th Infantry Division was transferred to the German Army Group North, arriving in the autumn. They relieved the 39th Motorised Corps who had been in position in the forests south of Ladoga.
At this part of the battle, the German commanders were expecting a Soviet counter attack to try and end the siege surrounding the city. The 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf Geschutzwagen Mk.VI(e) artillery SPGs of the 15th Battery took up defensive positions where they could fire on the routes it was believed the Red Army troops and tanks would take. They had time to zero in their guns, so as soon as the advancing Soviet forces were spotted by forward observers, they could cover the area in high explosive HE shells.
They were temporarily transferred to the nearby 254th Infantry Division and provided mobile artillery support when they took part in the 54th Army’s offensive of the 20th October 1941. The 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf GW Mk.VI(e) were used for numerous artillery fire missions between the 23rd and 24th October 1941, firing over 200 rounds. It appears that the 15th Battery was now divided into three platoons of two guns each.
The unit suffered its first casualties. Four men including Captain Becker were wounded when the SPGs were used for direct fire infantry support. This was a role not suitable for this artillery weapon due to the lack of heavy protective armor on these vehicles.
The two 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf Geschutzwagen Mk.VI(e) artillery SPGs of the 1st platoon were very active in late October. They were ordered to support the 11th Infantry Division as they attacked towards the villages of Volkhov and Pogostye. Soviet infantry surrounded the SPGs and the tank crews had to use their personal weapons and hand grenades to fight off the enemy troops.
On the 11th of November 1941, near the village of Khotovskaya Gorka, Soviet light tanks engaged the 1st Platoon Artillery SPGs. A German battle report confirmed the Soviet report that one of the vehicles was hit 16 times, but its armor was never penetrated. The tanks they confronted were Soviet T-40 light tanks of the 2nd Tank Brigade. Luckily for the German gun crews, the T-40 was only armed with machine guns.
Three men were killed on 15 November when the battery was ordered to act as assault guns whilst supporting an unsuccessful attack of the 223rd Infantry Division. One of the vehicles had to be left in no man’s land after being heavily damaged by a mine. It was recovered three days later.
The 15th Battery had fired over 1300 shells, which is just over 200 shells per gun crew, between November to mid-December 1941.
The 15th Battery conducted more artillery support fire missions during the winter and spring of 1942 as the 227th infantry Division continued to fight around the village of Pogostye.
Three of the six 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf Geschutzwagen Mk.VI(e) SPGs were knocked out on the 16th of February 1942, when KV-1 heavy tanks of the 124th tank battalion of the Soviet 54th Army attacked German units. The 10.5cm armor piercing ammunition given to the German gun crews failed to knock out the Red Army KV-1 tanks.
The three remaining vehicles provided close support as troops moved through forest roads near Pogostyle in March 1942. They used their HE shells to destroy a machine gun nest and fire on a Soviet infantry column they encountered in the woods.
One of the remaining three vehicles was reported not fit or active service and could not be repaired after the close quarters fighting during March. The 15th Battery now only had two vehicles. They were used to break through an enemy encirclement. One was knocked out by a Soviet anti-tank rifle.
The last remaining 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf GW Mk.VI(e) self-propelled gun was destroyed by a Red Army tank of the 98th Tank Brigade as it tried to provide protective covering fire for one of the German supply routes.

The post battle report evaluation

A German Army post-battle report dated November 1941 covered the role played by the 15th Batterie, Artillerie-Regiment 227 assault gun battery in the battle of Leningrad (St Petersburg) in October 1941 near the village of Mga south of the city.
The reporting officer was impressed with the high explosive shell performance of the 10.5cm LeFH 16 howitzer over the 7.5 cm HE shells. He judged it to be three times as powerful. It was found that the two-part ammunition used on the larger more modern guns, the 10.5cm LeFH 18, could be used up to canister charge 5. This helped in dealing with the logistics of ammunition supplies.
The overall evaluation of the 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf GW Mk.VI(e) in combat was positive as it was a good stable firing platform and it had good cross-country performance. Because of these findings, more self-propelled artillery guns were built although on different larger tank chassis.

Battery markings

On some photographs taken of 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf GW Mk.VI(e) on the Eastern Front there are numbers and letters on the side of the vehicle. The letters ‘Gp’ are an abbreviation for the word ‘Geschuetzpanzer’ which translated as gun tank or self-propelled gun. The number is the vehicle identification number given to the vehicle by the Regiment: Gp 4 would be gun tank number 4 in an artillery battery of 6 vehicles.

An article by Craig Moore

Gallery

Tanks Encyclopedia’s own illustrations of the 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf Geschutzwagen Mk.VI(e) by David Bocquelet.

There looks to be a machine gun mount at the front of the casement walls on the right of the main gun.


The driver would sit behind the loader on the right at the back when the gun was fired to assist with loading the gun.



Camouflaged 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf Geschutzwagen Mk.VI(e) SPG on the Eastern Front

A battery of three 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf Geschutzwagen Mk.VI(e) SPGs deployed for a fire mission. Notice the tracked ammunition carrier with a trailer in the background.

10.5cm LeFH 16 auf Geschutzwagen Mk.VI(e) SPG in winter camouflage.

Two 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf Geschutzwagen Mk.VI(e) SPGs in a revers slope firing position to avoid detection from the Soviet troops.

Beutepanzer SPG conversion 10.5cm LeFH 16 auf Geschutzwagen Mk.VI(e)

Sources

Beutepanzer unterm Balkenkreuz by Dr. Werner
Beute-Kraftfahrzeuge und panzer der deutschen Wehrmacht by Walter J. Spielberger
Warspot.ru by Vyachevlav Mosunov

Germans Tanks of ww2

German Self-Propelled Artillery Guns of the Second World War

By Craig Moore

One towed artillery gun required a team of six horses and nine men. WW2 German engineers came up with the idea of mounting an artillery gun on top of a tank chassis. This new technology reduced the amount of resources required to deploy one artillery gun. Artillery self-propelled guns only needed a four or five man crew. They could also be made ready to fire more quickly. This book covers the development and use of this new weapon between 1939 and 1945. One type was successfully used in the invasion of France in May 1940. More were used on the Eastern Front against Soviet forces from 1941 until the end of the war in 1945.

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German Reich (1942)
SPG – 12 Built

The German self-propelled howitzers

There were two main types of self-propelled guns in the German Army during WW2. One was fitted with an anti-tank gun and the other with an artillery howitzer, like the 10.5cm leFH 18 (Sf.) auf Geschützwagen FCM 36(f) self-propelled gun. The vehicle fitted with the artillery howitzer was called a ‘Geschuetzwagen’, which is literally translated as a ‘gun vehicle’. The letters ‘SF’ stand for ‘Selbstfahrlafette’ – self-propelled carriage. The letter (f) indicates that the chassis was of French origin.

Recently manufactured 10.5cm leFH 16 (Sf.) auf GW FCM 36(f) in factory fresh condition.
Improvised self-propelled artillery guns were developed to enable fast moving attacks to have artillery support that could keep up with the speed of advancing Panzer Divisions. They could use direct fire mode at targets they could see or, more commonly, use indirect fire at targets plotted on a map.
They were not designed to be in the front line or engage in combat with tanks. They were motorized artillery guns that could fire high explosive HE shells over the heads of friendly troops. Most targets would have been given to the crew as map grid references by forward observation officers or infantry units under attack.
Quite often, the gun crews could not see where their shells landed, as the target was so far away. They would have to rely on the forward observer to tell them if adjustments had to be made.
The open-topped back design of these self-propelled guns had a number of advantages. The elevated commanders position when standing in the crew compartment, behind the protective armored shield, meant that he had a good view on all sides. If there was the threat of enemy small arms fire, then the crew could use a twin lens range finder telescope that could peak over the top of the armored casement.
There was enough room for the crew to be transported towards the battlefield whilst protected from small arms fire and shell shrapnel. The vehicle had good mobility and could follow the infantry almost anywhere. The gun was quicker to get ready for action and fire on targets than towed artillery guns.
They were cheaper and faster to build than a new vehicle. They used the chassis of an obsolete captured French tank and an existing artillery howitzer.
Putting the 10.5cm leFH 18 howitzer on top of a captured French FCM 36 tank chassis was a more efficient use of manpower from the traditional form of German artillery battery transportation. Even in WW2, horse power was still widely used although tracked vehicles were also used when available.
Each field gun would require a six-horse team to pull the gun and limber. The ammunition, supplies and kit would be kept in the limber, which was a very large box on a pair of wheels with seats on the top. Three men would ride on the left hand horse of each pair to control them. The remaining six men of the gun crew would ride on top of the limber. Only a relative few were towed by the 3 ton halftracks.

10.5cm leFH 16 auf GW FCM 36(f) awaiting the gun shield to be fitted in the factory workshop run by Major Becker

The German FCM 36 artillery SPG

The total amount of 10.5cm leFH 16 (Sf) auf Geschützwagen FCM 36(f) built has not been confirmed. Some say only eight, whilst other sources say 12 or even 48. At present there is no documentary evidence to confirm the exact number. The reason why eight is the preferred number is because of a photograph taken inside the tank conversion factory workshop that shows six 10.5cm gun barrels on the floor waiting to be hoisted onto the new built SPG gun mounts and in the background there are two FCM 36 tank based artillery SPGs already fitted with their gun barrels.
There is good evidence that 12 were produced as German Army orders show eight being sent to an Artillery Battalion 31st October 1942 and later four more being sent to the same unit in early 1943.
There were a few disadvantages of an open topped vehicle. The crew was exposed to the elements and were also at risk of injury from enemy thrown hand grenades, mortars and shrapnel from air burst enemy shells. Rain covers were produced. They covered both the crew compartment and the gun. The canvas was attached to the upper protective armour using the small D shaped rings welded to the upper part of the structure.
Because the French FCM 36 tank chassis was small, there was limited space for the storage of ammunition. Only thirty six 10.5 cm HE two part shells could be carried. The propellant charges were kept on the left of the vehicle whilst the projectile shells were stored on the right.
A MG 34 machine gun was attached to top right side of the armor casement, on a swivel mount to the right of the main gun. 50 round drums of spare ammunition were stored underneath the mount. It fired 7.92 mm (0.31 in) bullets.
Only 100 French built FCM 36 tanks were completed by the time of the German invasion of France in May of 1940. In early 1939, the French Army 4e and 7e Tank Battalions were equipped with 50 tanks apiece. After the German invasion of Poland in September of 1939, the two battalions were consolidated under the banner of the 503e French Second Army reserve. The FCM 36 tanks saw active service when they attempted to counter the growing German presence at a bridgehead being set up along the Meuse River at Sedan
With the fall of France, it is believed that roughly 50 FCM 36 tanks remained in operational service. The Germans decided to use some of these French tanks to help strengthen their occupation forces around France. These captured tanks were known as Beutepanzers, trophy tanks. Thirty seven were used as tanks and give the German Army designation of Panzerkampfwagen FCM 737(f). The letter “f” indicate that the tank was of French origins. Ten FCM 36 tank chassis were used to mount 7.5cm PaK anti-tank guns. These tank destroyers were known as the Marder I.
It is not clear if Panzerkampfwagen FCM 737(f) tanks were withdrawn from internal security patrols and converted into self-propelled artillery and anti-tank guns or if the chassis came from knocked out or abandoned FCM 36 tanks that were recovered or captured on the battlefield .

Six 10.5cm leFH 16 gun barrels awaiting hoisting into the new gun mounts on top of the modified FCM 36 tanks. Two have already been fitted. This is why some sources say only eight 10.5cm le.F.H.16 auf GW FCM SPGs were built. Other documents state that 12 were built.

The 10.5cm gun

The 10.5 cm leFH 16 gun was a German light howitzer used in World War I. It had a shorter range than the WW2 10.5 cm leFH 18 gun. As the it had the same caliber as the newer leFH 18, it could fire the same ammunition. The abbreviation leFH stands for the German words ‘leichte FeldHaubitze’ which, translated, means light field howitzer. The number 16 refers to 1916, the year it was introduced into the Imperial German Army. They were produced by the German weapons manufacturer Krupp.

German 10.5cm LeFH 16 Howitzer preserved in a park, North Baltimore Street, Kirksville, MO, USA
It was fitted with a ‘Mundungbremse’ muzzle brake to allow longer range charges to be fired and reduce the amount of recoil on the gun. This increased the operational life of the gun barrel.
The 105 mm high explosive HE shell weighed 14.81 kg (32.7 lb). The armor piercing shell weighed 14.25 kg (31.4 lb). It had a muzzle velocity of 395 m/s (1,300 ft/s) and a maximum firing range of 9,225 m (10,089 yd). With a good gun crew, it had a rate of fire between 4-5 rounds per minute.
The 10.5cm leichte Feld Haubitze 16 gun was not very useful in the direct-fire mode against enemy armored vehicles. It could only penetrate 52 mm (2 in) of armor plate at a very short range of 500 meters.
The high explosive shell was in two pieces. It was a ‘separate loading’ or two part round. First, the projectile would be loaded and then the cartridge propellant case.

Fully loaded 10.5cm leFH 16 auf Geschützwagen FCM 36(f) with high explosive shells and charge canisters. The machine gun was mounted to the right of the gun.

Operational Deployment

Eight 10.5cm leFH 16 (Sf) auf GW FCM 36(f) artillery self-propelled guns were issued to the gepanzer Artillerie-Abteilung (Sfl.) z.b.V (Armored Artillery Battalion) on the Western Front through an order dated 31st October 1942 (K.St.N.430).
The letters z.b.V were the abbreviation for ‘zur besonderen Verwendung’. An English translation would be ‘for special deployment’ or ‘for special assignment’.
They were divided up between two self-propelled artillery batteries called 1.Batterie (Sfl.) and 2.Batterie (Sfl.). Four SPGs were in each battery. The abbreviation (Sfl.) roughly translates to gun carriage or self-propelled gun.
A further four were issued for deployment. They were put in the 3.Batterie (Sfl). This gives strength to the argument that twelve 10.5cm leFH 16 (Sf) auf GW FCM 36(f) were built.
On the side of the upper armor of one vehicle in one of the surviving photographs is the number 2 over a 6Gp. This means that this vehicle was the gun tank number 6 in the 2nd Battery. The 1st Battery would have SPGs numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4. The 2nd Battery would have SPGs numbered 5, 6, 7 and 8. The 3rd Battery would have SPGs numbered 9, 10, 11 and 12.
In March 1943 the unit was renamed. It was now called the Sturmgeschuetz-Abteilung 931 (931st Assault Gun Battalion). This unit’s long name is often abbreviated to Stu.Gesch.Abt. 931. This Battalion was also equipped with 7.5 cm Pak 40 auf FMC 36(f) anti-tank self-propelled guns and an anti-aircraft battery of 2cm Flak auf gep.Zgkw. P 107 vehicles for self-defence.
On 6th May 1943, Stu.Gesch.Abt. 931 was merged with Pz.Jg.Kp. 931 and renamed verst.Pz.Jg.Abt. and was now part of the Schnelle Division West. (Western fast response Division). The abbreviation ‘verst’ was for the word verstaerkte which means ‘reinforced’ (reinforced tank hunting battalion).
Pz.Jg.Kp. 931 was equipped with seven gep.Zgkw Somua MCG/MC 7.5 cm Pak 40 auf m SPW S307(f) anti-tank self-propelled guns. The abbrerviation  gep.Zgkw is short for Gepanzerte Zugkraftwagen (Armored Half-track)
A few weeks later, on June 27th 1943, the unit was renamed again. It was just called Sturmgeschuetz-Abteilung (Stu.Gesch.Abt.) but without a unit number. The Schnelle Division West was now called the 21.Panzer Division.
The rest of the men and equipment of the Pz.Jg.Kp. stayed part of the 21st Panzer Division, but they handed over their gep.Zgkw. Somua mit 7,5 cm Pak 40 halftracks and 2cm Flak auf gep.Zgkw. P 107 to one of the Division’s Panzer Grenadier Regiments.
On 15th July 1943 it was renamed again. This time it was called the Sturmgeschuetz-Abteilung 200 (200th Assault Gun Battalion) and was still part of 21.Panzer-Division.
In September 1943 the 4th battery was equipped with six 10.5cm leFH 18 (Sf.) auf Geschutzwagen 39H(f) artillery self-propelled guns. These had artillery guns that could fire high explosive shells over longer distances. The 4th Battery was also equipped with four 7.5cm Pak 40 (sf) auf GW 39H(f) anti-tank SPGs. To make the supply of spare parts and maintenance simple a decision was made in December 1943 that all the all FCM 36 tank chassis based SPGs were to be replaced with Hotchkiss tank chassis based SPGs.
German military units regularly sent reports to headquarters on how many soldiers and guns, tanks and SPGs were fit for action. In a battle strength report submitted by this unit dated 1st January 1944 there were no 10.5cm leFH 16 (Sf) auf GW FCM 36(f) listed.
It looks like they did not see action in Normandy fighting off the Allies invasion of France. At present it is not known what happened to them.

Identification

One of the easiest ways of telling the difference between a 10.5cm leFH 16 (Sf.) auf Geschutzwagen FCM 36H(f) self-propelled gun and a 7.5cm PaK 40 (Sf.) auf PzKpfw FCM 36(f) anti tank gun SPG is to look at the armored housing that surrounds the gun’s recoil recuperator mechanisms. A recuperator on an artillery gun is a device employing springs or pneumatic power to return a gun to the firing position after the recoil. On the 10.5cm leFH 16 it is long and is half the length of the gun. It is situated below the gun. The armored housing covering the 7.5cm Pak 40 gun’s recoil recuperator mechanisms is small and the gun barrel is thinner and much longer.
When looking at different German self-propelled guns the triangular road wheel armour covering between the tracks is very unique to the FCM 36 tank based SPGs and makes it easily identifiable.

An article by Craig Moore

10.5cm leFH 16 auf Geschützwagen FCM 36(f), having just come out of the tank conversion workshop.
10.5cm leFH 16 auf Geschützwagen FCM 36(f), 21st Panzerdivision, Normandy, summer 1944.

Gallery

10.5cm gun barrel being lifted by chain and rope hoist.

This 10.5cm LeFH 16 gun is being hoisted into position on its new self-propelled gun mount.

This 10.5cm leFH 16 auf Geschützwagen FCM 36(f) still needs its gun shield fitted before it can leave the tank conversion workshop.

10.5cm leFH 16 auf Geschützwagen FCM 36(f) artillery self-propelled gun with camouflage livery in France

Gun crews of the 10.5cm leFH 16 auf Geschützwagen FCM 36(f) being inspected in France by senior officers.

A member of the 10.5cm leFH 16 auf Geschützwagen FCM 36(f) gun crew posing for a photograph near his SPG.

10.5cm leFH 16 auf GW FCM 36(f) SPG being transported by rail to the front line.

Last surviving FCM 36 tank

The last preserved FCM 36 Char léger Modèle 1936 French WW2 light infantry tank at the Musée des Blindés, French Tank Museum, Saumur, France

Specifications
Dimensions (L x W x H)	4.60 (without gun 4.46) x 2.14 x 2.15 m (15’1″ (14’7″) x 7′ x 7′)
Total weight, battle ready	12.2 tonnes
Crew	4 (commander, driver, gunner, loader)
Propulsion	Berliet MDP V-4 diesel engine, 91 hp
Fuel capacity	260 liters
Top road speed	24 km/h (15 mph)
Operational range (road)	225 km (140 miles)
Main Armament	10.5 cm (4.13 in) leFH 16 howitzer with 37 rounds
Secondary Armament	7.92 mm (0.31 in) MG 34 machine gun
Hull Armor	Front 25-40 mm (0.98-1.57 in) Sides and Rear 20 mm (0.79 in)
Upper Armor	Front 15 mm (0.59 in) Sides 15 mm (0.59 in) Rear 15 mm (0.59 in)
Total production	12

Sources

Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two, Peter Chamberlain and Hilary Doyle, 1999
Panzer Tracts No.10 Artillerie Selbstfahrlafetten by Thanks L. Jentz
Profile AFV Weapons 55 German Self-Propelled Weapons by Peter Chamberlain and H.L.Doyle
Beute-Kraftfahrzeuge und panzer der deutschen Wehrmacht by Walter J. Spielberger
French Tanks of World War II by Steven J.Zaloga
French Infantry Tanks: part II by Major James Bingham
German Artillery at War 1939-45 vol.1 by Frank V.de Sisto.
Musée des Blindés, French Tank Museum, Saumur, France.
Special thanks to Marcus Hock
www.tank-hunter.com

Germans Tanks of ww2

German Self-Propelled Artillery Guns of the Second World War

By Craig Moore

One towed artillery gun required a team of six horses and nine men. WW2 German engineers came up with the idea of mounting an artillery gun on top of a tank chassis. This new technology reduced the amount of resources required to deploy one artillery gun. Artillery self-propelled guns only needed a four or five man crew. They could also be made ready to fire more quickly. This book covers the development and use of this new weapon between 1939 and 1945. One type was successfully used in the invasion of France in May 1940. More were used on the Eastern Front against Soviet forces from 1941 until the end of the war in 1945.

Buy this book on Amazon!

German Reich (1940-1941)
SPG – 12 Built

One of Rommel’s Funnies

To move a towed 15 cm artillery piece, the Germans needed a team of six horses and three men to control and look after the horses. The five or six man additional crew rode on a wheeled limber behind the horses. Attached to the limber was the heavy 15 cm artillery field howitzer.
In 1941, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel needed heavy artillery to support his advancing armored divisions in North Africa. Horse drawn artillery was impractical in the heat of the desert. The logistics of supplying these animals with enough feed and water was a nightmare. He demanded a solution be found.

The gun barrel on this 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) was fitted with a cover to stop dirt and sand getting inside. (photographer unknown)
The Panzer II tank had performed well in Poland in 1939, but it was out classed by some of the British and French tanks it encountered during the invasion of France in May 1940. This vehicle was considered obsolete by 1941 and was replaced by Panzer III tanks as soon as they came off the factory production line.
The German army now had a surplus of Panzer II tanks. The decision was taken to remove the tank’s turret and mount in its place a 15cm sIG 33 field howitzer with a gun shield to protect the crew. Rather than having to find a crew of 9 men and six horses to operate one artillery gun, the German army only needed to find four crewmen. It is sometimes called one of ‘Rommel’s Funnies’.

Driver’s escape hatch on the 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf). (photographer unknown)

The Name – Not a Sturmpanzer II or Bison II

The correct German Army designation for this self-propelled artillery gun is 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) Sd.Kfz.121/122 or 15cm s.l.G.33 auf Fahrgestell Pz.Kpfw.ll (Sf.).
While undergoing trials, it was sometimes referred to as the 15cm s.I.G.33 B (this was to show it was an upgrade from the prototype SPG, the 15cm s.I.G.33 A, that used the original five wheeled Panzer II tank chassis and had not yet been lengthened).
After World War II, a scale model kit company produced one of the first retail kits of this vehicle. They called it the ‘Bison II’, believing it to be the natural progression for the earlier Bison 1 self-propelled 15cm Artillery Gun based on a Panzer I tank chassis’.
This was wrong. It was never called the Bison II during the war but, after the war, the name Bison II stuck. Museums, historical books and other scale model kit companies continue to call this mobile artillery weapon the Bison II.
Some authors, museums and scale model kit companies also wrongly call it the Sturmpanzer II. A ‘Sturmpanzer’ is a heavily armored assault tank. It’s crew is protected in a fully armored box, that is enclosed on all four sides and has an armored roof. The front armor of this vehicle is thick to enable it to get close to enemy strong points before firing it’s weapon.
This description bears no resemblance to the function and appearance of the German 15 cm s.I.G. 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) SPG. This vehicle was not designed to advance towards heavily fortified gun emplacements and blow them up whilst under heavy fire. It is only thinly armored and the crew have very little protection.
This vehicle was designed to keep up with the advancing infantry and tanks, but remain behind them, out of harm’s way, and fire shells over their heads at enemy targets.

Notice the spare road wheels strapped to the top of the right track guard on the 15cm s.l.G.33 auf Fahrgestell Pz.Kpfw.ll (Sf.) on the left. (photographer unknown)

Production and Development

Before the first 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen I (Sf) (Bison I) had been tested in combat in May 1940, the German Army Waffenamt was already engaged in the development of an improved model based on the Panzer II Ausf.B tank chassis, rather than the Panzer I.
The prototype was successfully test fired at Kummersdorf on 13 June 1940. A 15cm s.I.G.33 B, without standard gun carriage wheels, had been fitted to a Panzer II tank chassis by Alkett, an engineering company near Berlin. As part of the trials, 120 rounds were fired.

This is a photograph of the 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) prototype. Notice the curved gun shield and five, not six road wheels.
The Panzer II tank chassis absorbed the 15cm gun’s highest recoil force of 9 tons firing at all settings and at a rapid rate of fire of up to three rounds per minute. The tracks didn’t noticeably sink into the ground while firing on sandy soil.
Several months earlier, a similar trial had been conducted by Alkett. The standard field gun carriage wheels had been mounted on the Panzer tank chassis. This meant it had to be mounted too far to the rear.

The engine hatches at the rear of the vehicle were left in the open position when driving to keep the engine cool. (photographer unknown)
Firing at the highest muzzle velocity of 240 meters/second at an elevation of about 15 degrees, the recoil force of 9 tons passed through the middle of the last road-wheels, resulting in the Pz.Kpfw.II tank chassis unacceptably tipping backward.
After this initial failure, the Alkett design team went back to the drawing board. They took the wheels off the gun carriage and devised new mounts. This meant that the 15 cm howitzer could be fitted considerably farther forward on the tank chassis, which made the vehicle significantly more stable when firing.
The Entwicklungsstueck (prototype development piece) was completed by Alkett in October 1940 using a normal length Pz.Kpfw.II chassis with five road-wheels. They only made one.
On 18th February 1941, General Halder commented in his diary: ‘Room inside the s.I.G. auf Pz.II is unacceptably small. New vehicles in four months. Mass production in one year. ‘
Alkett must have taken this criticism to heart because the Versuchsserie (trial series) of twelve 15cm s.l.G.33 auf Fahrgestell Pz.Kpfw.ll (Sf.) SPGs were produced with a lengthened and widened hull resulting in the addition of a sixth road wheel. Delivery was to start in August 1941. Overall length of the new vehicle was 5.48 m, width 2.60 m, and height 1.98 m (compared to the 4.81 m long by 2.28 m wide Panzer II Ausf.F light tank).
Additional space for the fighting compartment was also achieved by mounting the 150 metric horsepower Buessing-NAG L8V water-cooled gasoline petrol engine transversely across the rear. The gun had a 75-degree elevation, but only 10 rounds could be carried on-board.

15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) being loaded with supplies. (photographer unknown)

The 15cm sIG 33 gun

The Germany Army Infantry regiments could call on the support of a large 15 cm caliber towed artillery field howitzer called the 15cm schweres Infanterie Geschütz 33 (heavy infantry gun). They were designed by Rheinmetall in 1927 and were formally accepted introduced into the German military in 1933, hence the designation 33. This long name was shortened to 15 cm sIG 33 or 15 cm s.I.G. 33. About 4,600 were made between 1936 – 45.
This gun was not designed as an anti-tank gun. It was normally used to fire high explosive HE shells over the heads of advancing German troops at targets plotted on a map. This is called indirect fire. Occasionally it was called upon to fire at enemy positions it could see. This is called direct fire. The two part I Gr 33 HE shell was filled with 8.3 kg (18 lbs) of pressed TNT with smoke box and standard Zdlg. 36 exploder system. The total weight of the fused round was 38 kg (84 lbs).
Unlike anti-tank gun shells that came in one piece, artillery shells were loaded into the gun breach in two separate pieces. The high explosive HE shell was always loaded first and this was followed by the propellant cartridge.
The rimmed brass propellant cartridge case, with a c 12 n/A percussion primer was closed at the top by a cardboard closing cap and loaded after the HE shell had been rammed home into the gun. The gun crew had a range chart that told them what amount of explosive propellant to put into the empty brass cartridge case. More was added for longer range targets and less was used to hit targets closer to the gun.
The propellant consisted of six removable silk bags numbered 1 to 6 that contained Nitroglyzerin Blättchen Pulver (nitroglycerin flaked powder) or Diglykolnitrat Blättchen Pulver (diglycolnitrate flaked powder). For long distant targets all six bags would be put in the brass propellant cartridge case. For shorter distances fewer bags would be used.
The gun could also fire smoke rounds to cover the retreat or advance of an infantry or armored column. These shells were called 15-cm Igr. 38 Nebel and weighed 38.50 kg (85 lbs). These smoke shells were identified by the white letters ‘Nb’ on a field-gray projectile. The bursting charge consisted of picric acid, and the exploder system comprised of a detonator set in penthrite wax enclosed in an aluminium container. The shell produces a smoke cloud 50 meters (55 yards) thick.
It had an effective firing range of 4.7 km – 4,700 m (2.89 miles – 5,140 yd). When firing HE shells it had a muzzle velocity of 240 m/s (790 ft/s). A good gun crew could fire three rounds a minute. The shell fuze s.Igr.Z. 23 was a highly sensitive, nose-percussion fuze with an optional delay of .4 second. It operated on impact or graze. It fired two types of HE shells, the 15cm I.Gv.33 and the 15cm I.Gv.38. For all practical purposes they were identical.
The breach was a horizontal sliding block. The gun’s recoil was controlled by a hydropneumatic chamber. The gun was made by a number of different companies: Rheinmetall, AEG-Fabriken, Bohemisch and Waffenfabrik
The gun cradle was situated below the gun barrel. It was trough-shaped and is provided with guide ways, in which guides on the gun move as it recoiled and ran out. On either side at the front was a pad to receive the unabsorbed force of run-out. Between them was the expansion chamber which received the buffer fluid forced from the buffer by expansion as it became heated. Towards the rear were the two cradle arms to which the trunnions were fixed. Each trunnion was provided with a cranked compensator lever which compresses the compensator spring.

Abandoned 15cm s.l.G.33 auf Fahrgestell Pz.Kpfw.ll (Sf.) in North Africa 1941. (photographer unknown)

North Africa

On 15th September 1941, the German Army Organisations-Abteilung ordered the creation of two new independent heavy self-propelled infantry gun companies: 707.schwere Infanteriegeschütze-Kompanien. and 708. schwere Infanteriegeschütze-Kompanien. These units were sometimes abbreviated to s.I.G.Kp. (mot. S).
Alkett completed seven 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) in December 1941 and five in January 1942. Each company were issued with six of these new SPGs. The six vehicles in the 707 were assigned to the Schützen-Regiment 155 and the six vehicles in the 708 were assigned to the Schützen-Regiment 200. Both of these regiments were part of Rommel’s 90.leicht Afrika-Division and fought until the Axis surrender in Tunisia in May 1943. The 12 vehicles did get to Libya in time for Rommel’s assault on Tobruk, due to its postponement from November 1941 until June 1942.
On the 23 February 1942, the six vehicles belonging to 708 arrived in Tripoli. Three different ships were used, each carrying just two of the SPGs, just in case of a torpedo or bombing attack. The s.I.G.Kp.707 wasn’t transported to Libya until April 1942. Six different ships were used to transport the remaining six vehicles belonging to 707. The last vehicle was taken of the ship in Tripoli on 24 April 1941.
On 9 March, the 708 company commander reported at the division command post that they had arrived in Bengasi on 8 March, but they must remain there for two days to complete various engine repairs. Not enough spare parts had been shipped to North Africa. One of the units NCO’s flew back to Alkett in Berlin to arrange for replacement parts to be shipped out as soon as possible.
Mechanical problems were going to plague the deployment of these new self-propelled artillery guns in the desert. The engine had not been upgraded to take the additional weight and cope with the conditions encountered in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. The Panzer II 155 horsepower engine was too weak for the vehicle weight of 16 ton.
The engine cooling system was inefficient for conditions in Africa. In accordance with the driver’s manual, the cooler flaps must be opened while driving. The large amount of dust thrown up by the tracks fell through the open grating and plugged up parts of the radiator reducing the available surface area and its ability to cool the radiator fluid. Engine temperatures became too hot.
A report dated 16 May 1942 stated that, ‘During the 70 km journey to SegnaIi-Sued it soon became apparent that the new 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) of 708.schwere Infanteriegeschütze-Kompanien were unusable due to design faults. The same situation applied to the vehicles of 707. They were currently in Bengasi with two broken-down SPG’s without any resources to transport them to the front or repair them.’
The transmission and transfer boxes suffered from faults. After a very short running time, sometimes 15 minutes, the engines were so hot that they had to stop to cool them. The pressurized engine coolant reached 120 degrees Celsius after a short running time. Cracks appeared in the track and drive wheels due in part to poor material quality.
Panzer-Armee Afrika still listed eight 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) as available, but not how many were operational on 23 October. All eight were reported as having been lost by 2 December 1942. The British reported capturing six of them abandoned during the withdrawal, all in a dismantled condition in a tank workshop.

Rain & Sun protection

The crew could fit two metal bands across the middle of the open top fighting compartment. They provided similar support as tent poles in a tent. A large canvas tarpaulin tied down at the back of the vehicle could be hauled over these bands and lashed down to the front of the vehicle to give the crew protection from the sun, as well as rain and sand storms.

The prototype 15cm s.I.G. 33 A only had five wheels and the normal length Panzer II tank chassis.
The 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) in grey livery.

15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) ready for active service in North Africa, 1941.

15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) with tarpaulin frame erected and sun shade tarpaulin tied on.

Gallery

15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) with wet weather tarpaulin frame in place. (photographer unknown)

15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) with the tarpaulin pulled over the ridge frame to keep the crew in the shade – North Africa, 1941. (photographer unknown)

15cm s.l.G.33 auf Fahrgestell Pz.Kpfw.ll (Sf.) gun crew, driver and commander – North Africa, 1941. (photographer unknown)

Notice the stick leaning on the vehicle. It was painted red and white and hammered into the earth behind the vehicle to help the gunner work out firing angles. (photographer unknown)

German 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) parked in a North African street. (photographer unknown)

Waiting for the next target. (photographer unknown)

The driver’s side vision hatch is open on this photograph of a 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf). (photographer unknown)

Time for coffee out of sight of the enemy. (photographer unknown)

The rear engine hatch covers are in the up position. This was done to keep the engine cool. (photographer unknown)

The flap in the gun shield was opened to use the shorter periscope gun sight for direct fire targets. The taller gun sight was used for indirect fire targets. (photographer unknown)

15cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) ready for a bombardment (photographer unknown)

15cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) in North Africa with a six man crew? The driver hidden from view. (photographer unknown)

Why were only 12 built?

A German Army Waffenamt liaison officer assigned to Panzer-Armee Afrika filed a report dated 30th August 1942 about the use of the 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) in North Africa:
‘From the ballistic and destructive effectiveness standpoint, the gun is judged to be outstanding but the Panzer II chassis too underpowered and liable to mechanical breakdown. The troops’ propose that a more suitable tank chassis should be used. I do not agree. The range of this gun cannot be increased. The expenditure is not justified. It would be better to use the 15 cm s.F.H.13 Sfl heavy field howitzer, which has the same caliber but a considerably longer range, on a better tank chassis.
Operationally it is too risky to employ such a valuable self-propelled gun as a fixed location defensive weapon. As soon as it opens fire the gun will be knocked out by concentrated artillery fire. In this situation, the should be replaced with a 12 cm Werfer (mortar) that, with its increased rate of fire, lower weight and easier transport on a truck, has almost the same destructive effectiveness.’
Lessons learned from this vehicle, the 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II (Sf) Sd.Kfz.121/122 and earlier 15cm and 10.5cm self-propelled artillery guns resulted the design and development of the 10.5cm ‘Wespe’ self-propelled artillery infantry gun.

Post WW2 Service

The British Army recovered six 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II self-propelled artillery guns. They were left in Egypt. The Egyptians recovered one more. It is not known if any were repaired and used by the Egyptian Army against the Israeli Army in the 1948 war or what happened to them after that conflict. If you have any further information please contact us.

Recovered 15cm s.l.G.33 auf Fahrgestell Pz.Kpfw.ll (Sf.) in Egypt after WW2

A 15 cm sIG 33 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen II self-propelled artillery gun captured by Israeli forces in 1948

Sources

Ed Webster
German Infantry Weapons – US Military Intelligence Service, Special Series No. 14, May 25, 1943. U.S. War Department
Allied Expeditionary Force German Guns – Brief Notes and Range Tables for Allied Gunners – SHAEF/16527/2A/GCT July 1944
Chamberlain, Peter, and Hilary L. Doyle. Thomas L. Jentz (Technical Editor). Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War
A Complete Illustrated Directory of German Battle Tanks, Armoured Cars, Self-propelled Guns, and Semi-tracked Vehicles, 1933–1945 – Arms and Armour Press
Trojca, Waldemar and Jaugitz, Markus. Sturmtiger and Sturmpanzer in Combat. Katowice, Poland: Model Hobby,
Sturmpanzer II Bison. Achtung Panzer!.
Info on Wikipedia

Germans Tanks of ww2

German Self-Propelled Artillery Guns of the Second World War

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One towed artillery gun required a team of six horses and nine men. WW2 German engineers came up with the idea of mounting an artillery gun on top of a tank chassis. This new technology reduced the amount of resources required to deploy one artillery gun. Artillery self-propelled guns only needed a four or five man crew. They could also be made ready to fire more quickly. This book covers the development and use of this new weapon between 1939 and 1945. One type was successfully used in the invasion of France in May 1940. More were used on the Eastern Front against Soviet forces from 1941 until the end of the war in 1945.

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