Category: Modern North Korean Armor

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Late 2000s-Present)
Armored Personnel Carrier – Unknown Number Built

North Korea has, since the 1960s, developed and expanded its military vehicles industry quite considerably. Starting out by locally assembling Soviet vehicles, the country progressively moved onto creating and manufacturing its own vehicles, more and more distinct from original Russian or Chinese inspirations. A key stepstone in this direction was the Cold War-era M1981 light tank, which, while it took inspiration from several Chinese and Soviet designs, was a clear copy or even derivative of none. Though several decades old by this point, a development on the hull of this light tank was first observed by the American Department of Defence in 2009 and given the designation of M2009. Also known as the Chunma-D, this is an armored personnel carrier development of the old light tank – a fairly ironic turn of the affair, as the M1981 itself was based on the chassis of the 323 APC.

Designation

The M2009 designation follows the standard naming scheme of the US Department of Defence for North Korean vehicles, referring to the year in which the vehicle was first observed in service. In North Korea, the vehicle appears to be known as the “Chunma-D” or, in other transliterations, “Junma-Lee”, with the meaning being the same. Chunma/Junma stands for racehorse, with Lee or D is a transliteration of the fourth letter of the Korean alphabet.

Supposed Origins

As pretty much systematic with North Korean vehicles, the development process of the M2009 is a mystery, with awareness of the vehicle coinciding with its appearance in service of the Korean People’s Army during military parades. Nonetheless, one can at least theorize the potential origins of such a vehicle.

The M2009 is a derivative of the M1981 light tank. Though already not state-of-the-art by the late 1970s/early 1980s when it was first introduced, this light tank has become progressively more obsolete over the decades. As the Republic of Korea Army supplemented its M48 Pattons tank with more and more of the K1, outclassing anything fielded by North Korea, the range of targets that could be engaged with hopes of destruction from the M1981’s 85 mm gun decreased accordingly. As such, it has been theorized the M2009 may have been introduced as a way to repurpose the M1981 assembly chain in order to produce a vehicle, in this case an armored personnel carrier, that would remain relevant – at least to an extent, as the M2009 is still far from a reasonably modern vehicle – and be less hopelessly outdated.

General Characteristics

The M2009 is directly based upon the hull of the M1981, and maintains many of its components with little to no apparent changes. This is notably the case of the suspension and engine deck. The hull was originally inspired by the one used in the 323 APC, but lengthened. It uses a six road wheels design, with these road wheels being fairly similar in design to those used on the Soviet PT-76, and generally, Eastern Block amphibious tracked vehicles. The tank uses torsion bars suspension. As for the powerplant, its exact model is unknown, with both 320 and 240 hp engines of various origins having been mentioned. The vehicle notably features a couple of hydrojets, similar in design to the PT-76’s, in order to provide improved amphibious capacities. This feature goes all the way back to the 323, which introduced this to a hull based on the Chinese YW531A that moved on water thanks to the motion of its tracks. The only noticeable changes to the engine deck are the introduction of what appears to be a box – stowage of the Igla anti-air missile has been theorized – and changes to the engine cooling, with a single central grille instead of separate ones. The dimensions of the hull are likely about the same as the M1981, however, the new turret likely changes the height and overall length of the vehicle, and as such only the width can be estimated at about 3.10 m.

Where the vehicle differs from the M1981 is in terms of turret and combat compartment, these having been modified to transform the light tank into an armored personnel carrier. That being said, one may question whether these modifications were enough to create a viable vehicle of this type due to several questionable features.

Combat Compartment

In comparison to the M1981, the M2009 appears to have a slightly heightened combat compartment. This modification was likely introduced to give more space inside for the dismounts. The hull roof, notably, appears to continue to rise slightly upward, with the turret at its highest point, and not be perfectly flat.

The combat and crew compartment of the M2009 are located to the front. The rear engine configuration of the M1981 was retained on the APC, likely due to the additional costs and delays which would be caused by a deeper transformation of the hull. As a result, the infantry compartment appears to be located just under the turret of the M2009. Two firing ports are present on each side of the vehicle, under the turret. Behind these are what appear to be the main point where the dismounts enter and leave the vehicle, a square-shaped side door of fairly diminutive size. The engine compartment is located just behind, suggesting a limited infantry-carrying capacity, likely not exceeding four to six crew members. In front of the turret, hatches for the driver and either another crew member or perhaps a dismount are present.

The infantry accommodations on the M2009 can be described as fairly questionable at best. The vehicle does not feature rear doors, which is already a fairly archaic feature in modern personnel carriers. Rear doors allow for much easier and less risky evacuation of the vehicle, particularly under fire. In comparison, the side doors of the M1981 would typically provide significantly less protection, and exiting the vehicle under fire, in case of an ambush, for example, would be even riskier than on most other APCs. Not only that, but the diminutive size of the doors would also make the evacuation of the vehicle by soldiers in full gear much harder than on a vehicle with large opening rear doors.

The small space allocated for dismounts means the vehicle almost certainly has a lower infantry carrying capacity than the older 323, which also has the advantage of featuring rear doors. In short, in its primary role of carrying infantry, the 2000s Chunma-D proves inferior to the early 1970s 323. The latter has space for ten (according to North Korean sources even twelve) dismounts that can exit the vehicle from the rear, even though the rear door on the 323 has a fairly small size that can already be considered a fairly lackluster feature.

Turret

The other obvious change the M2009 has in comparison to the M1981 is the replacement of the 85 mm armed turret by another design. The M2009 features a cylindrical turret with two 14.5 mm KPV machine guns as main armament, as with the 323. However, the turret is of a different design. Though some inspiration was likely taken from the old APC’s turret, the M2009 ones introduces a variety of new features.

Though conical, the turret of the M2009 is of a wider type. It appears to retain a single crewmember, with a command cupola located to the rear of the turret. A large boxy bustle, likely for stowage, is also present.

Though the main armament of the turret remains the same two 14.5 mm KPV machine guns of the 323 – an armament which was quite heavy for an APC in the early 1970s, but of which the power is now more moderate, as more heavily protected armored personnel carriers tend to become the norm – the design also introduces a coaxial 7.62 mm. While it may seem a little redundant, this may allow for fire on less important and lighter targets to consume less ammunition. Another addition in comparison to the 323 turret is an external infrared searchlight, likely linked to the main armament by braces, as is often the case on North Korean vehicles. Also included are smoke dischargers, three on each side of the turret, a feature that started being observed on M1981s from 2015 onward.

Similar, though not identical turret designs to the M2009 have been observed on the M2010, a series of 8×8 and 6×6 wheeled armored personnel carriers based on the BTR-80 and introduced around the same time in the Korean People’s Army.

North Korean Classic: The Igla

North Korean vehicles, for a long time, but especially in recent years, have very often been observed with man-portable anti-aircraft defense systems (MANPADS) stuck onto the vehicles, from the turret of tanks and APCs to even the fixed superstructure of closed or even open-topped self-propelled artillery pieces. Though some of these have been speculated to be only for show, for example, the large Igla battery present on some 323s during a 1992 parade, some may be functional. It ought to be noted that footage of North Korean armored vehicles in training, outside of parade, often shows the vehicles with the missiles omitted.

The M2009 was first seen without an Igla. However, the vehicle always had some sort of rectangular box just rear of the turret, which has been theorized to actually be storage for the Igla missile launcher. The vehicle quickly appeared with an Igla mounted, as early as 2013 and perhaps even earlier. The missile is fixed to the rear of the turret bustle, which raises questions as to its operation, as it likely is hard to access it from the commander cupola, which is located further forward. A single photo tends to suggest a more forward mount is possible though.

Conclusion – A Questionable Armored Personnel Carrier

The M2009 is, as of today, the most recent tracked armored personnel carrier which has been spotted in the ranks of the KPA. However, it could easily be described as a fairly questionable design.

Though the turret of the vehicle is likely more advanced than the old 323, the vehicle itself appears to be a far worse platform when it comes to carrying infantry. With a dismount compartment located just under the turret, the infantry complement of the vehicle is likely very moderate. With the engine to the rear being retained, the only option to exit the vehicle for the infantry appears to be small side doors – a very inefficient exit means, and one which is likely very dangerous if the vehicle were ever to fall victim to an ambush. Though the numbers of M2009 produced are obviously unknown, the vehicle has little chance of ever coming close to replacing the ubiquitous 323 armored personnel carrier – which is likely for the better. While it may fare better than the 323 if given, for example, purely reconnaissance or infantry support tasks, the M2009 appears far worse as an infantry carrying platform, with the improved combat capacities likely far too little to justify the vehicle’s defects, particularly as South Korean infantry fighting vehicles such as the K21 and the small fleet of BMP-3 provide massively superior combat features.

M2009 Chunma-D specifications (estimations)
Width	3.10 m (estimation)
Weight	Between the 323 (~15 tonnes) and the M1981 (~20 tonnes)
Engine	Unknown (Perhaps a 320 hp 8-cylinders air-cooled diesel engine or a 6-cylinders water-cooled 240 hp diesel engine)
Suspension	Torsion bars
Maximum speed (road)	~60 km/h (estimation from M1981)
Maximum speed (water)	~10 km/h (estimation from M1981)
Range	500 km (estimation from M1981)
Crew	Observation suggests 3 (commander, driver, co-driver), perhaps 2 if co-driver is in fact just a dismount
Dismounts	Estimated at 4 to 6
Main Armament	Dual 14.5 mm KPV machine guns
Secondary armament	Coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun Igla MANPADS
Armor	Most likely 10 to 25 mm (estimation from M1981)

Sources

THE ARMED FORCES OF NORTH KOREA, On The Path Of Songun, Stijn Mitzer, Joost Oliemans
http://www.massimotessitori.altervista.org/armoursite/nkindigenoustanks/pt-85/chunma-d.htm
Small arms review
Oryx Blog – North Korean vehicles

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2009-Present)
Main Battle Tank – Unknown Number Built

North Korea, or officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), stands as one, if not the most isolated major tank manufacturer in the world. Sometimes thought of as a relic of the Cold War desperately clinging onto existence, the country, sometimes known as the Hermit Kingdom, has long wanted to assert its independence from the Soviet Union and China when it comes to its military equipment, long before the Soviet Union even collapsed.

The country’s military industry started becoming increasingly independent in the late 1960s. Since then, it has put out vehicles differing more and more significantly from their Soviet or Chinese ancestors. Despite the harsh interruption of the 1990s crisis and famine, the 2000s have seen a significant renewal for North Korea’s tank industry, with a large variety of new vehicles introduced since the start of the 21st century.

One of the most significant and iconic of these developments is the Songun-Ho main battle tank, unveiled during the 65th anniversary of the Worker’s Party of Korea military parade. When unveiled, it was one of, if not the North Korean MBT that appeared to differ the most from the T-62 on which the Hermit Kingdom based its Chonma-Ho series of main battle tanks.

Roots of a new tank: The quest for a T-72 and upgrades to the Chonma

North Korea started local production of Soviet tanks, first in the form of the PT-76 and T-55, in the second half of the 1960s. These first production runs were not entirely accomplished by North Korea in isolation. A high degree of Soviet involvement was noted, but exactly how deep this was is unclear. It could range anywhere from the North Koreans just assembling vehicles from Soviet-made parts all the way to the Soviet Union delivering just the plans and critical elements. This first North Korean experience in armored vehicles manufacturing proved crucial for the nation, allowing it to be in possession of facilities able to manufacture armored vehicles, in the form of the Sinhung and Kusong tank plants. The Sinhung plant was mainly involved in manufacturing light and amphibious vehicles, whilst the Kusong plant is the producer of North Korea’s MBTs.

In the late 1970s, North Korea started the production of its Chonma-Ho series of main battle tanks, at first a mere slightly modified model of the Soviet T-62. These vehicles would become the mainstay of North Korea’s armored force, despite no large quantities of T-62s ever having been acquired from the Soviet Union. As early as the 1980s, the North Koreans started to upgrade the vehicles, giving them at first laser rangefinders (first observed in 1985) and later explosive reactive armor, welded turrets, and smoke grenades dischargers (M1992 & Chonma-92, first observed in 1992)

However, at the same time as upgrading the existing T-62s, it quickly became evident the technology of the T-62 would not be sufficient forever. The tank was actually superior to the M48 fielded by the South Korean Army (Republic of Korea Army, ROKA) for several years after its introduction in 1978. However, developments in the USA and South Korea, which would result in the M1 and K1, would quickly make the Chonma obsolete. The result was that North Korea was in dire need of more advanced components. With relations having considerably worsened with the Soviet Union ever since the Sino-Soviet split, acquiring highly modern and critical technology from them was not a possibility. North Korea therefore needed to find a way to acquire a tank more modern than its T-62-based Chonma-Ho if it wanted to not be completely superseded technologically.

A solution would appear in the form of the geographically distant but diplomatically close Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran and the DPRK had quite close diplomatic bonds, with the North Koreans having supplied about 150 Chonma-Ho tanks to Iran during the early phases of the Iran-Iraq War beginning in 1980. As a result, when the Iranians managed to capture some T-72s Ural tanks from the Iraqi Army, it is no surprise that a battle-damaged vehicle ended up being shipped to North Korea in the early-to-mid 1980s. The existence of this tank is confirmed by some partial footage from the era.

Whilst the T-72 Ural was far from the most advanced model of T-72, it at least provided North Korea with a 125 mm gun and, to a moderate extent, a more advanced engine, suspension, and armor arrangement to study. Despite rumors of North Korea acquiring T-72Ms from the Soviet Union or even T-90MS from Russia in the 1990s, this T-72 Ural acquired from Iran appears to actually be the only T-72 North Korea ever got its hands on.

Droplets of T-72 dropped onto T-62s: The later Chonma-Hos

The acquisition of a T-72, even if it was a fairly primitive model, was a major step in the evolution of North Korea’s main battle tanks. It significantly helped North Korean engineers in developing components more advanced than those found on the original T-62 to use in the Chonma-Ho series.

While North Korea appeared on its way to considerably upgrade the Chonma-Ho in the early 1990s, in the form of the M1992 & Chonma-92 notably, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its consequences for North Korea (with a famine) put a tragic halt to these developments. In 1994, as Supreme Leader Kim Il-Sung passed away, a tragic famine that would last until 1998 touched North Korea, resulting in 500,000 to 600,000 excess deaths and stopping new military developments pretty much completely. Only a fairly modest new model of the Chonma made its appearance in the later half of the decade and was known as the Chonma-98. In comparison to the Chonma-92, the Chonma-98 featured little more than a lower ERA coverage and slight modifications to the turret and side-skirts.

The first signs of influence taken from the T-72 and other modern Soviet MBTs would appear in the Chonma-214, first seen in 2001. This tank replaced the ERA with applique armor on the turret and additional bolted-on armor on the upper front plate and steel plates on the hull sides. It also included front rubber flaps covering the lower front plate, in a fashion similar to the much more advanced T-80U. A new front drive wheel inspired by the T-72’s design was also featured. Finally, while the exact nature of these additions is pretty much impossible to assess, seeing as it would require much more direct access to the North Korean vehicles, the Chonma-214 likely features a more advanced fire control system and its predecessors – the influence of the T-72 likely being significant in its design.

The T-72-influenced features of the Chonma-214 would be conserved and expanded upon by two subsequent models of the Chonma; the Chonma-215, of which production started in 2003, and the Chonma-216, of which the production started in 2004. The Chonma-215’s most significant modification was switching the original chassis from five to six road wheels, as on the T-72. The length of the tank had, however, not been significantly lengthened in adding this new wheel. Whilst the wheels retained a ‘starfish’ style similar to the T-62 and earlier Soviet tanks, they had been reduced in size by about 10%, making them somewhat more reminiscent of T-72 wheels in comparison to the original configuration. The vehicle also featured considerable additional applique armor and elements suggest its fire control system was considerably improved – a wind sensor notably appearing to have been added.

The Chonma-215 would be fairly elusive and short-lived though, being very quickly followed up by the Chonma-216. For this vehicle, the North Korean engineers took the six-road wheel base of the 215 and used it to extensively modify the chassis, which was somewhat lengthened; the engine compartment, notably, was considerably redesigned and appeared much more similar to the T-72’s, suggesting a similar engine may have been adopted for the vehicle. The suspension was also redesigned to resemble the one featured on the more modern Soviet tank; the arrangement of the smoke grenade dischargers was altered to resemble the one of more modern Soviet tanks more closely. Lastly, it has occasionally been theorized the vehicle may feature a 125 mm-gun based on the T-72’s 2A46, but it appears more likely the Chonma-216 retained the original 115 mm U-5TS. It would, however, be the last North Korean main battle tank to retain this armament.

On the path of Songun…-Ho

The various evolutions of the Chonma-Ho in the 2000s show increasing influence from Soviet designs of the late Cold War on North Korean tank designs. This is likely out of an effort to try and at least somewhat compensate for the technological advantage South Korea had acquired in the late 1980s and 1990s thanks to its K1 main battle tank and its subsequent models. Although it appears beyond doubt that vehicles such as the Chonma-214 or Chonma-216 improved the combat values of the Chonma-Ho and were quite significantly superior to the original T-62, they still had no chance of realistically competing with South Korea’s K1. In order to at least try and compensate for the technological gap, a considerable jump would have to be performed from the base of the T-62. This jump would be unveiled to the eyes of the world in 2010, during the 65th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea military parade, in the form of the new Songun-Ho or Songun-915 main battle tank, a type of tank which appears to have entered production in 2009.

As always with North Korean vehicles, the development of the Songun-Ho is more than nebulous and its history is best derived from an analysis of the observable elements of the tank, and attempts to try and find or at least theorize on their origin. The tank was likely designed after the Chonma-216, and serves as a logical conclusion to North Korea’s experience taking inspiration from the T-72 and other late Soviet tank designs: designing a new, or at least mostly new tank on the basis of experience gained by studying those designs.

Design

The New Tank’s Hull

The new Songun-Ho features a vastly modified hull in comparison to the previous Chonma-216. Though it is still based on the Chonma, to an extent, it incorporates more changes than any individual model of the previous series ever has.

The change that is perhaps the most indicative of the considerable structural evolutions the Songun-Ho has undertaken is the driver’s position. On all models of the Chonma-Ho, the driver sat to the front left of the hull, as on the T-62. The Songun-Ho instead uses a central driver’s position, a layout similar to the one of the T-72.

The hull of the Songun-Ho appears to have been widened in comparison to its predecessors, sitting at about 3.50 m in width, in comparison to 3.30 m on the T-62 and likely all Chonma-Ho models. The vehicle, however, appears to retain the same 58 cm-wide OMSh metallic hinge track as found on Chonma-Ho and T-62s. Although those tracks are fairly outdated and somewhat primitive by modern standards, they allow for commonality with older models and allow North Korea’s industry not to have to do a fairly hard and expensive switch to a new set of components. Those tracks can also be fitted with rubber pads in order not to cause damage in urban areas during parades.

In terms of length, the distance between the first and last axles of the road wheels present on the Songun-Ho appears to be of about 4.06 m, a value similar to the T-62, and those road wheels are separated by 30 track links, as on the old Soviet tank. This makes it obvious that the size of the Songun-Ho’s wheels has been reduced, seeing as it maintains the 6 road wheels configuration of the Chonma-216. The vehicle still uses ‘starfish’-type road wheels, as on previous tanks and, just as with track links, this part commonality likely is a significant factor in the decision to maintain old components. The tank uses torsion bar suspension, and photos of the vehicle without side skirts during military exercises have revealed it has 3 return rollers. The vehicle features thick rubber side skirts covering the upper suspension, like previous North Korean tanks; its fenders slope downward, as on the T-62, but feature a rubber covering, as on the T-72.

The overall length of the Songun-Ho’s hull is about 6.75 m, with the engine compartment overhanging further than the rear idler wheel by several decimetres. This is only slightly longer than on the old T-62, which was about 6.63 m long. Nonetheless, the engine compartment of the Songun-Ho appears quite different from previous vehicles. Interestingly, it includes grills not only on top of the engine, but also on the rear of the right mudguard. North Korean sources claim the Songun-Ho uses a 1,200 hp engine that propels it at 70 km/h. This claim of the vehicle featuring such a powerful engine is likely an overestimation done for propaganda purposes, but the Songun-Ho does quite likely feature an engine developed from the T-72’s, likely quite more powerful than those used on previous Chonma-Hos. Considering the vehicle has a fairly moderate estimated weight of about 44 tonnes, it may still have a very decent mobility.

The Songun-Ho’s upper front plate has always been seen under a cover of explosive reactive armor plates. Two headlamps are present on the front-sides of this ERA covering. The lower front plate is hidden by a thick rubber sheet, as on the T-80U and later models of the Chonma-Ho. Behind the ERA covering, the Songun-Ho is thought to have some form of basic composite armor, though likely simplistic and dated in its composition. Again, the assumption would be that this composite would be derived from the T-72 Ural.

An Odd Return to Cast Turrets

Though it has some new features, the hull of the Songun-Ho differs much less significantly from previous North Korean tanks when it is compared with the tank’s very peculiar turret.

While new North Korean tanks had been using welded turrets ever since the early 1990s, the Songun-Ho saw a return to a cast turret. It is a design somewhat similar to the T-62 in general appearance, but much taller and more bulbous. A number of reasons can be found to justify this increase in size.

Firstly, the Songun-Ho is the first North Korean tank that is certified to feature a 125 mm gun. The most likely inspiration for this gun came from the 2A26M2 or 2A46 present in the T-72 Ural, however, the external appearance of the gun shows it is not an identical copy. The gun is very likely compatible with most, though not all Soviet and Chinese ammunition, and North Korea very likely produces local shells as well, although how advanced they are is a question to which an answer is unlikely to be forthcoming. It is, however, fairly certain that the North Korean 125 mm gun is not able to fire gun-launched anti-tank missiles. The larger size of this gun is a reason to accomodate a larger turret and the higher roof of the Songun-Ho’s turret may be to allow for more depression as well. Unlike the vast majority of Soviet and Chinese 125 mm-armed tanks, the Songun-Ho has not opted for an autoloader, which may have been too complex to manufacture and fit into a hull still based on the Chonma-Ho. Instead, the tank has a human loader, meaning the turret houses three men, an oddity in modern designs that take their roots in Soviet principles. With the gun included, the vehicle appears to be around 10.40 m long.

The Songun-Ho’s turret features a laser rangefinder (LRF) on top of the gun. It is smaller and likely more modern than previous North Korean LRFs, but remains external, an archaic feature in modern tank design. An infrared spotlight is mounted on the right of the gun, linked to it via braces in order to accomodate elevation. This is a very common feature in North Korean tanks. The loader sits to the right, the gunner to the front left, and the commander to the rear left.

The vehicle has another commonly-found feature in the form of the 14.5 mm KPV machine gun mounted on top of the turret. Its presence on the right side suggests it is operated by the loader. This machine gun very likely is not remotely operated, meaning the loader has to open the hatch and make himself vulnerable to small arms fire in order to operate it. Another secondary weapon that has been present since the first parade of the Songun-Ho is an Igla man-portable anti-aircraft missile, installed to the left of the turret and likely operated by the commander; this is once again a common feature in North Korean vehicles. However, footage of the Songun-Ho during exercises seems to suggest this missile is rarely if ever used in the field. A coaxial 7.62 m machine-gun of unknown model (perhaps a PKT) is very likely present as well.

Though cast, the Songun-Ho’s turret features a fairly large rectangular turret basket, with two storage rails encompassing its surface. The nature of this basket is not exactly known – it may serve to house ammunition or provide more internal space. The most likely theory is that it actually contains storage boxes that can be accessed from outside the vehicle. The tank’s smoke dischargers are installed on the turret sides, in front of the basket, with a bank of four dischargers on each side. A cross-wind sensor is also installed seemingly on top of the turret basket.

A drawback of cast turrets is that they typically are a lot harder to fit with composite armor. This does not deter North Korean sources from claiming the Songun-Ho’s turret offers “900 mm of protection”, though they do not specify whether this is against APFSDS of HEAT projectiles. In any case, it is very unlikely the turret actually provides this amount of protection. While it is reasonable to expect the Songun-Ho to have some form of composite armor array in the turret, the combination of cast turret and, in general, likely fairly primitive composite armor technology in use by North Korea does not bode well for the turret’s capacity to withstand modern anti-tank ammunition.

Modifications to the Songun-Ho

After it was first unveiled in 2010, the Songun-Ho has been shown in a couple of other configurations which differ from the one first seen in 2010 by the presence of turret ERA as well as secondary armaments.

The first modified version, which may have been seen as early as 2010, differed from the original by the presence of ERA blocks on the turret. These ERA blocks are placed on the turret front and front-top, providing additional protection on the frontal arc of the turret. Curiously, the blocks present on both sides of the mantlet appear to be double-stacked. The ability for ERA to work while double-stacked is one which is far from present in all ERA blocks, typically present only in some more modern blocks, and it is quite surprising North Korea has already developed such a type of ERA blocks (though some sometimes claim the only reason while North Korea uses double-stack ERA is for deception purposes). Vehicles using this double-stack ERA have been seen in both the single-color camouflage used in the 2010 parade as well as a more colorful yellow and green camouflage seen in later parades, particularly in 2017. North Korean sources claim their turret ERA provides an additional protection that would be valued at 500 mm, in addition to the 900 mm that would already be provided to the turret, giving it a protection value of around 1,400 mm. Once again, this is very likely an exaggeration, and the type of ammunition that would be used is not even mentioned.

Another early configuration of the Songun-Ho, seen in a military exhibition, featured the above mentioned ERA package, as well as two Konkurs Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) present on the right front of the turret. The use of external ATGMs on the Songun-Ho, which re-occurred at a later date, is thought of as a proof the North Korean 125 mm is not able to fire any gun-launched missile, and likely indicate the penetration capacities of the gun are limited to an extent, seeing the need for missiles that likely improve the penetration of enemy armor quite significantly. The same configuration also sports two other missiles, which appear to be an unidentified type of man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS).

Another form of early configuration the Songun-Ho has been shown in is an amphibious crossing configuration, in which the vehicle is fitted with a snorkel for river crossing operations; the turret-mounted machine-gun is also covered by a protective cover in this form.

The most visually impressive configuration that the Songun-Ho has been shown in, and which brings far more additional armaments than the previous, is the new weapons package that has been seen on some tanks in 2018.

This was first seen during the parade for the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the DPRK. On the right of the turret, the 14.5 mm KPV machine-gun has been replaced by a dual 30 mm automatic grenade-launcher, a weapon of North Korean design. Instead of a single Igla missile, two were mounted on a tall, mast-like superstructure at the center rear of the turret. Lastly, a new anti-tank missile launcher can be seen on the right hand side. Cleaner than previous launchers in designs, it appears the missiles it launches are North Korea’s Bulsae 3. Claimed to be similar to the powerful Russian 9M133 Kornet in capacities, some other sources indicate than the Bulsae 3 likely is an improved model of the old Fagot ATGM, which North Korea has copied as the Bulsae-2.

The main modification of the Bulsae-3 would be the replacement of wire guidance by laser guidance, based on technology indeed taken from Kornet missiles that North Korea would have received not from Russia but from Syria, with which the Hermit Kingdom maintains some significant military ties. However, recent evidence has mostly ruled out the roots between the Bulsae-3 and the Fagot, and the missile indeed appears some form of local Kornet copy. Their addition to this armament package likely indicates they are thought of as superior to the Konkurs missiles in any case.

The operation of the weapons present in this package is somewhat questionable. The weapons do not appear to be remotely operated, which means their operation in active combat would likely be a considerable risk for the crew. It has been suggested the package may be present purely for show – and would not actually be used in exercises or active operations. It is indeed not that uncommon to see North Korean tanks in exercise footage field none of the missile armament they may have been seen with in parades, although this could be for the far simpler reason of avoiding damage to things not essential during training.

At the same time, it appears that this armament package was only fitted to newly produced vehicles, showing that Songun-Ho production has continued through the 2010s. It is known the Kusong tank factory has known some considerable slow-downs in Chonma-216 and Songun-Ho production at times though, due to the factory also being involved in production of hulls for ballistic missile launchers or self-propelled artillery. How many Songun-Ho have been manufactured is therefore very much unknown, but likely either in the high tens or low hundreds. The vehicles are very likely operated by some of the best equipped and trained North Korean armor regiments operating near the DMZ, the so-called “demilitarized zone”. This is, in practice, the very-much militarized border between the two Koreas, where the most well-trained and equipped troops of both armies tend to be located.

Meaning of the Name

The “Songun” name of the tank is a reference to the policy of Songun, which roughly translates to “military first”. Though North Korea has been a particularly militarized state ever since the 1960s, this policy has been an official component of the ruling Juche ideology only since the 1990s. It has become a major aspect of it, as North Korea continues to upscale and invest as much as it can into its military – seemingly its only way to obtain some find of leverage and assurance of its survival. The name of what was, in 2010, North Korea’s newest tank and first member of a line of new models ever since the Chonma-Ho introduced in 1978, is therefore “Songun”. As for the -Ho suffix, it is the standard North Korean designation for a tank model.

Conclusion – The future of the Songun-Ho

Overall, the Songun-Ho is a particularly interesting vehicle. A significant jump forward from the previous Chonma-216, it is still likely highly inferior to the newest South Korean tanks, the K1A1, K1A2, and K2 Black Panther. Still, the improvements it brings to North Korean armor are not to be ignored and it should be remembered that the ROKA still operates a considerable number of M48A3K and M48A5K/K1/K2. Against these tanks, the Songun-Ho likely has both a firepower and protection advantage. Against perhaps even the first K1 model, which notably retained a 105 mm gun, the Songun-Ho may very well have a chance, although its fire control system likely is not as advanced. While the tank is certainly not as advanced as contemporary MBTs, the step forward formed by the Songun-Ho should not be underestimated. After all, just 10 years prior to the type being introduced, North Korea fielded nothing better than the Chonma-92 or 98, which were little more than T-62s with laser rangefinders, smoke dischargers, and ERA. As such, the Songun-Ho marks a substantial increase in military capability for North Korea.

Recent developments have shown that North Korea likely is very much aware of the Songun-Ho’s inferiority. On October 10th 2020, a new model of main battle tank appeared during the 75th Workers’ Party of Korea anniversary parade. While how many of this tank’s features are real and how many are fake is very much still in debate, the vehicle appears to take the base of the Songun-Ho tank and to considerably expand on it – a manifestation of North Korea’s wishes to try and close the technological gap in particular with South Korean and American tanks. While this new type now enters service, it is very likely the Songun-Ho may still be in production for a while, remaining one of the most modern tanks in the Korean People’s Army’s arsenal.

Songun-Ho specifications (estimations)
Dimensions (L-W-H)	~6.75 m (hull only) or 10.40m (hull and gun)/3.50 m/unknown (estimations)
Total Weight, Battle Ready	~44 tonnes
Engine	1,200 hp engine (North Korean claim); likely a derivative of the T-72’s V-12 diesel engine
Suspension	Torsion bars
Maximum speed (road)	70 km/h (claimed)
Crew	4 (driver, commander, gunner, loader)
Main gun	Local 125 mm gun derived from the 2A46M, with laser rangefinder, IR searchlight, crosswind sensor
Secondary armament	Likely a 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun (all configurations), 14.5 mm KPV & Igla missile (original configuration), AT-5 Sprandel/Konkurs & unknown MANPADS (first known other configuration), Dual 30 mm AGS, Dual Igla missiles, dual Bulsae-3 launcher (2018 configuration), a single 14.5 mm KPV machine gun (exercise configuration)
Armor	Composite array & ERA claimed to be equivalent to 1,400 mm (turret); hull armor unknown
Total Production	Unknow, about 500 sometimes mentioned

Sources

THE ARMED FORCES OF NORTH KOREA, On The Path Of Songun, Stijn Mitzer, Joost Oliemans
Oryx Blog – North Korean vehicles
https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace.com/2020/05/03/north-korea-builds-very-powerful-outdated-battle-tanks/

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2020)
Main Battle Tank – At Least 9 Built, Probably More

10th October 2020 marked the 75th Anniversary of the foundation of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), the far-left party of the totalitarian one-party Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This took place in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, through Kim Il-sung Street. During this parade, new and very powerful nuclear Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), which shocked the North Korean population and the whole world, as well as a new Main Battle Tank (MBT) that has intrigued many military analysts, have been shown for the first time, arousing great interest.

Development

Unfortunately, not much is known about this vehicle yet. The Chosŏn-inmin’gun, or Korean People’s Army (KPA), has not yet officially presented the new tank or given a precise name, as it does for each vehicle of its arsenal due to the North Korean strategy of not revealing any details about their military equipment. Thus, throughout this article, the vehicle will be referred to as “New North Korean MBT”.

However, it is an almost completely new design that seems to have very little in common with previous MBTs developed in North Korea. It is also the first vehicle developed after the Songun-Ho was presented in a parade, in the same place, in 2010.

North Korean tanks

In the very last phases of the Second World War, between August and September 1945, Iosif Stalin’s Soviet Union occupied, in agreement with the United States, the northern part of the Korean peninsula, going as far down as the 38th parallel.

Because of the Soviet occupation, which lasted for three years and three months, the charismatic Kim Il-sung, who had been a guerrilla fighter against the Japanese during the occupation of Korea in the ’30s, and then continued to fight the Japanese during their invasion of China, became captain of the Red Army in 1941, and, with this title, in September 1945, he entered Pyongyang.

Under his leadership, the newly formed country quickly broke off all relations with South Korea, under U.S. control, and became increasingly close to the two communist superpowers, the Soviet Union and the newly formed People’s Republic of China, which had recently ended its bloody civil war.

Most of the North Korean military’s early equipment was of Soviet origin, with thousands of weapons and ammunition and hundreds of T-34/76s, T-34/85s, SU-76s and IS-2s and Soviet-made aircraft arriving in North Korea.

The outbreak of the Korean War, which lasted from June 1950 to July 1953, completely broke any relationship with South Korea, pushing North Korea to become even closer to the two communist regimes, even if, after Stalin’s death, the ties with the Soviet Union began to deteriorate.

The Kim family’s MBTs

In the following years, North Korean armored formations’s core of T-34s started being largely supplemented by T-54 and T-55s. In the case of the T-55, as well as the PT-76, local assembly at least, if not full production, was initiated in North Korea from the late 1960s onward, giving a head start to the country’s armored vehicles industry. Bolstered by those Soviet deliveries, as well as Type 59, 62 and 63 from China, North Korea built a large armored force from the 1960s and 1970s onward.

Towards the late 1970s, North Korea began the production of its first “indegenous” main battle tank. The first tank produced by the North Korean nation was the Ch’ŏnma-ho (Eng: Pegasus), which started as a mere T-62 copy with minor and obscure modifications. Interestingly enough, despite some rumors of the contrary, North Korea is not known to have acquired any significant number of T-62s from abroad.

The Ch’ŏnma-ho went through a large number of evolutions and versions from its introduction to this day; in the west, those are often rationalized under the designations of I, II, III, IV, V and VI, but in truth those are nebulous, with quite a lot more than six configurations and variants existing (for example, both the Ch’ŏnma-ho 98 and Ch’ŏnma-ho 214 could be described as Ch’ŏnma-ho V, while on the other hand the vehicle described as the Ch’ŏnma-ho III has never been photographed and is not actually known to exist).

The Ch’ŏnma-ho have been in service since the last years of the 1970s, and while the obscure nature of North Korea means an estimation of their numbers is hard to come by, the tanks have obviously been produced in very large numbers (with some early models even being exported to Ethiopia and Iran) and have formed the backbone of North Korea’s armored force in the last decades. They have known considerable evolutions, which have often confused enthusiasts; the most notable example of this being the so-called “P’okp’ung-ho”, in fact the later models of the Ch’ŏnma-ho (215 and 216, first observed around 2002, which has led them to sometimes be called “M2002” as well), which, despite having added another roadwheel and numerous new internal and external components, remains Ch’ŏnma-hos. This has lead to considerable confusion when North Korea actually introduced a tank that was mostly new, the Songun-Ho, first seen in 2010, which featured a large cast turret with a 125 mm gun (whereas late Ch’ŏnma-hos had adopted welded turrets which appear to have mostly retained 115 mm guns) and a new hull with a central driving position. It ought to be noted that the later models of the Ch’ŏnma-ho as well as the Songun-Ho are often seen with additional, turret-mounted armaments; anti-tank guided missiles such as the Bulsae-3, light anti-aircraft missiles, such as locally-produced variants of the Igla, 14.5 mm KPV machine-guns, and even dual 30 mm automatic grenade launchers.

All of these vehicles have a clear visual, design and technological descendance from Soviet-style vehicles; it ought to be noted, however, that particularly in the last twenty years, the North Koreans vehicles have evolved quite considerably from their roots, and can hardly be called mere copies of vintage Soviet armor anymore.

Design of Kim’s new tank

The layout of the new North Korean MBT is, at first glance, reminiscent of standard Western MBTs, deviating significantly from previous tanks produced in North Korea. These older vehicles have obvious similarities to Soviet or Chinese tanks from which they are derived, such as the T-62 and T-72. In general, these tanks are of a smaller size compared to Western MBTs, designed above else to contain costs and for rapid transport by rail or air, while NATO MBTs are, as a rule, more expensive and larger providing a greater comfort to the crew.

The three-tone light sand, yellow, and light brown camouflage is also very unusual for a North Korean vehicle, reminding of the camouflage patterns used on armored vehicles during Operation Desert Storm in 1990. Recently, North Korean armor has had standard one tone camouflage of a shade really similar to the Russian one and a three camouflage, brown and khaki on a green base.

Analyzing the vehicle in detail, however, shows that, in reality, not all is what it seems.

Hull

The hull of the new tank is completely different from previous North Korean MBTs and is very similar to the modern Russian T-14 Armata MBT presented for the first time during the parade for the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Great Patriotic War on 9th May 2015.

The driver is placed centrally at the front of the hull, and has a pivoting hatch with two episcopes.

The running gear is composed, as on the T-14, of seven large diameter road wheels protected not only by usual side skirts, but also by a polymer skirt (the black one that can be seen in the picture), both present in the Armata. On the North Korean tank, the polymer skirt almost completely covers the wheels, obscuring most of the running gear.

As on nearly all the modern MBTs, the sprocket wheel is at the rear, while the idler is at the front.

The tracks are of new style for a North Korean tank. In fact, they seem to be a double pin rubber padded type of western derivation, whereas in the past, these single-pin tracks with rubber-bushed pins like the Soviet and Chinese ones.

The rear of the hull is protected by slat-armor. This type of armor, which protects the sides of the engine compartment, is often used on modern military vehicles and is effective against infantry anti-tank weapons with HEAT (High-Explosive Anti-Tank) warheads that have piezo-electric fusing, such as the RPG-7.

On the left side, the slat-armor has a hole to access the muffler, just like on the T-14. The only difference between the two tanks’ slat-armor is that, on the T-14, there are two mufflers, one on each side.

In the parade videos, at a certain point, one of the vehicles passes over a camera and it can be seen that the vehicle has torsion bar suspension.

The rear of the vehicle also reminds of the T-14 one, being higher than the front. This was probably done to increase the space available in the engine bay, probably in order to house an upgraded version of the 12-cylinders P’okp’ung-ho engine delivering, according to estimates from 1000 to 1200 hp.

Obviously, specifications such as maximum speed, range, or weight of the new MBT are unknown.

Turret

If the hull, in its shape, reminds the T-14 Armata, the most modern MBT in the Russian Army, the turret vaguely reminds of that of the M1 Abrams, the standard MBT of the U.S. Army or the Chinese MBT-3000 export tank, also known as the VT-4.

Structurally, the turret is very different from that of an Abrams. In fact, the lower part of the turret has four holes for some grenade launcher tubes.

It can therefore be assumed that the turret is made of welded iron and equipped with composite spaced armor mounted on it, as on many modern MBTs (for example the Merkava IV or Leopard 2). Consequently, its internal structure is different from the external appearance. The armor of some modern tanks, such as the M1 Abrams and Challenger 2, is made of composite materials that cannot be removed.

A detail that hints at this is the evident step that is visible between the sloped armor at the front and the roof, where there are the two cupolas for the vehicle commander and the loader.

On the right side of the turret is mounted a support for two missile launcher tubes. These can probably fire a copy of the 9M133 Kornet Russian Anti-Tank missiles or some anti-aircraft missile.

On the roof of the turret, there is what looks like a Commander’s Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV) on the right, in front of the commander’s cupola, a Gunner’s Sight just below it, a Remote Weapon System (RWS) armed with an automatic grenade launcher in the center and, on the left, another cupola with a fixed front episcope.

Above the cannon is a laser rangefinder, already present in that position on previous North Korean vehicles. On its left is what looks like a night vision camera.

There is also another fixed episcope on the right of the commander’s cupola, an anemometer, a radio antenna on the right and, on the left side, what may look like a cross-wind sensor.

On the rear, there is a space to put the crew’s gear or something else that covers the sides and rear of the turret and four smoke launchers for each side. On the rear and on the sides are three hooks to lift the turret.

Armament

We can deduce that the main armament is, like in the case of the Songun-Ho, the North Korean copy of the 125 mm Russian 2A46 tank gun and not the 115 mm North Korean copy of the Soviet 115 mm 2A20 cannon. The dimensions are obviously larger and it is also unlikely that the North Koreans would have mounted an older generation cannon on what appears to be such a technologically advanced vehicle.

From the photos, we can also logically assume that the cannon is not capable of firing ATGMs (Anti-Tank Guided Missiles), which Russian 125 mm guns can do, because the vehicle is equipped with an external missile launcher.

On the barrel of the gun, in addition to the smoke extractor, like on the C1 Ariete or the M1 Abrams, is mounted an MRS (Muzzle Reference System) that constantly verifies the linearity of the main gun barrel with the gunner’s sight and if the barrel has distortions.

Another assumption that can be made is that the cannon is not equipped with an automatic loader system because there are three crew members inside the turret. The tank commander is behind the gunner, on the right side of the turret, and the loader on the left side. This can be assumed due to the fact that the CITV and gunner’s sight are one in front of the other on the right side, as on the Italian C1 Ariete, where the commander is seated behind the gunner and has similar positions for the optics.

The loader is seated on the left of the turret and has his personal cupola above him.

The secondary armament is composed of a coaxial machine gun, probably a 7.62 mm, mounted not in the gun mantlet but on the side of the turret, and an automatic grenade launcher on the turret, probably 40 mm caliber, controlled from inside the vehicle.

Protection

The vehicle appears to have ERA (Explosive Reactive Armor) on the side skirts, as on the T-14 Armata and composite spaced armor covering the front and side of the turret.

There are a total of 12 grenade launcher tubes on the lower sides of the turret, in groups of three, six frontal and six lateral.

These systems are probably a copy of the anti-missile subsystem of the Afghanit APS (Active Protection System) of Russian production mounted on the T-14 Armata and on the T-15 Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle (HIFV).

The Russian Afganit is composed of two subsystems, a generic one consisting of small charges mounted on the roof of the turret, covering a 360° arc, that shoot small fragmentation grenades against rockets and tank shells, and an anti-missile one consisting of 10 large fixed grenade launchers mounted (5 per side) on the lower part of the turret.

Connected to the twelve grenade launchers, there are at least four radars, probably of the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) type. Two are mounted on the frontal composite armor and two on the sides. These are meant to detect incoming AT missiles aimed at the vehicle. If an AT missile is detected by the radars, the system automatically activates the APS that fires one or perhaps more grenades in the direction of the target.

There are also two devices mounted on the turret sides. These could be Laser Alarm Receivers used on the modern AFV or other sensors for the Active Protection System. If these are actually LARs, their purpose is to detect laser beams from enemy rangefinders mounted on tanks or AT weapons that are aiming at the vehicle and automatically activate the rear smoke grenades to hide the vehicle from the opposing optical systems.

The Starving Tiger

Communist North Korea is one of the most peculiar countries in the world, with an army to match. The country, often called the Hermit Kingdom, is currently subject to almost worldwide sanctions due to its ongoing nuclear program and nuclear bomb tests. This has largely deprived the country not only of the economic benefits of trade but also of many resources required for tank construction, most importantly foreign weapons, weapon systems, and minerals which the country cannot extract from its limited resources.

While North Korea has found ways of circumventing these sanctions and engaging in limited trade (including selling weapons to foreign countries), the country has an annual GDP of only 18 billion dollars (2019), more than 100 times smaller than that of South Korea (2320 billion dollars in 2019). The GDP of North Korea is close to that of such war-torn countries as Syria (16.6 billion dollars, 2019), Afghanistan (20.5 billion dollars, 2019), and Yemen (26.6 billion dollars, 2019).

In terms of GDP per capita, the situation is similar. At $1,700 per person (Purchasing Power Parity, 2015), the country is overtaken by such powerhouses as Haiti ($1,800, 2017), Afghanistan ($2000, 2017), and Ethiopia ($2,200, 2017).

Nonetheless, despite these worrying economic indicators, North Korea spends a massive 23% of its GDP (2016) on defense, which amounts to $4 billion. This is closer to more developed countries, such as South Africa ($3.64 billion, 2018), Argentina ($4.14 billion, 2018), Chile ($5.57 billion, 2018), Romania ($4.61 billion, 2018), and Belgium ($4.96 billion, 2018). It must be noted that none of the countries listed in this comparison are capable of developing a brand new MBT able to compete with the most modern Russian and American tanks.

North Korea is a massive weapons manufacturer, proving able to build thousands of MBTs, APCs, SPGs, and many other weapon types. They have also made many improvements and adaptations of foreign designs. While it is clear that the North Korean versions are definite improvements over the originals, the originals are usually half a century old. No serious institution, except, of course, the North Korean propaganda machine, can claim that the North Korean vehicles are superior or even comparable to the most modern vehicles from other countries.

Furthermore, the North Korean electronics industry is not in a position to produce the expensive and technologically complicated electronics systems (and their associated software) needed by modern MBTs. Even the local production of LCD screens involves acquiring many components and parts directly from China and then assembling them in North Korea, if not buying them whole from China and just stamping them with North Korean logos.

Given all these factors, it is rather curious that the otherwise feeble North Korean economy and military industry could develop, design, and construct an MBT with comparable characteristics and systems as the most modern and powerful vehicles from the United States and Russia.

The Soviet Afghanit system which the New North Korean MBT is trying to emulate was based on decades of Soviet experience in the field starting from the late 1970’s Drozd and going through the 1990s Arena. Similarly, the first American MBT to field APS protection is the M1A2C from 2015, which uses the Israeli Trophy system which entered production in 2017. Given that the USA, the largest economy in the world and the largest military spender in the world, did not develop its own APS system, it is extremely unlikely that the North Koreans were able to do so and emulate a highly advanced system such as Afghanit. While there is a chance that North Korea might have acquired this system from Russia, there is nothing to indicate that the Russians would be willing to sell this highly advanced system, let alone to a pariah state such as North Korea. A more likely import source would be China, which also has locally developed hard-kill APS.

Similar arguments can be made for the New North Korean MBT’s Remote Weapons Station, Advanced Infrared Camera, advanced composite armor, and main sights. It is highly unlikely that North Korea was able to develop and build these systems on its own. This leaves only two possible options: either these systems were acquired from abroad, most likely from China, which does seem improbable nonetheless, or that they are simple fakes meant to deceive its enemies.

The Lying Tiger

As in most nationalist-communist countries, propaganda plays a very important role in the ongoing functioning and perpetuation of the North Korean regime. It is spearheaded by the cult of personality for the current leader, Kim Jong-un, and for his forefathers, Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung, and of Korean exceptionalism. North Korean propaganda makes full use of the full censorship of information from the outside to paint all the rest of the world as a barbaric and monstrous place, from which the North Koreans are sheltered by the ruling Kim family and the North Korean state.

While North Korean propaganda plays an important role in perpetuating the North Korean regime internally through the vilification of the rest of the world, constant lying about the achievements of North Korea, and some outright fantastic claims (such that North Korea is the second happiest country in the world), its annual military parades are becoming more and more targeted to the outside, projecting North Korea’s power and dangerousness to its enemies.

These military parades have become a nearly yearly occurrence under the new leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un. Furthermore, they are broadcast live through the Korean Central Television, one of the state-owned broadcasters in North Korea. Furthermore, the television channel is broadcast for free outside North Korea’s borders. This is how the world found out so quickly about the new North Korean MBT presented in the 2020 parade.

However, this has allowed the military parades to become more than just an internal show of strength and military power. They are now also a way for North Korea to publicly broadcast its capabilities and intimidate any potential enemies.

What must be remembered at all times is that a military parade is not an accurate representation of the military power of a country nor of the capabilities of the vehicles presented. It is a show meant to present the army, its units, and its equipment in the best and most impressive light. The equipment presented does not have to be in use, fully developed, or even real to appear on a parade.
North Korea has a long history of being accused of presenting fake weapons on its parades. In 2012, a team of German military experts claimed that the North Korean KN-08 ICBMs presented at a parade in Pyongyang were just mock-ups. They also mentioned that the Musudan and Nodong missiles presented in a 2010 parade were just mock-ups and not the real thing.

Similar accusations emerged in 2017 from former military intelligence officer Michael Pregend, who claimed the North Korean equipment presented during a parade that year was unfit for combat, highlighting the AK-47 rifles with attached grenade launchers.

However, the fact of the matter is that it can not be proven either way. There is no way for actual military researchers to get access to North Korean technology and the North Koreans refuse to publicly release any information on their equipment. With parades being the only way to get a look at the newest North Korean military technology, it must be kept in mind that there is no guarantee that the systems shown are operational or fully developed or that they have all the capabilities that are presented. The information that can be gleaned from a parade is superficial, with most details that are crucial to understanding the capabilities of a modern weapon system being either inaccessible or obscured.

Recent Appearences

On 25th April 2022, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung organized a parade for the 90th anniversary of the foundation of the Korean People’s Army. Other have pointed out that it was also to celebrate the 100th birthday of Kim Il-sung, founder of the nation. At the parade, the 8 pre series M2020 appeared for the fourth official time.

Externally they were unmodified. It is possible that some of the expected development and modifications have been delayed by the Covid-19 pandemic and its financial impact, in spite of the regime’s best efforts to prevent the virus entering the country and stopping its spread. Similarly, development and modifications may have been affected by the main focus missile tests over the last two years.
In the period of January to April 2022 alone, North Korea has launch tested 20 missiles.

However, they had a new three tone drown, dark green, and light green spots camouflage, more suitable for the North Korean terrain than the original yellow camouflage. Hwasŏng-17 missiles, already seen in the 2020 parade and which recently completed a successful launch test on 24th March 2022, were also at the parade.

Conclusion

As with all new North Korean vehicles, it was immediately assumed that the vehicle was a fake to arouse astonishment and confuse Western analysts and armies. According to some, this is actually a Songun-Ho modified to fit new tracks and a seventh wheel in the running gear, but with a dummy superstructure.

Others claim it really is a vehicle of a new conception, but with the more advanced systems being fakes, either to deceive or to act as stand-ins until the real things are developed, like the remote weapon turret with a grenade launcher, the APS and its radars. In fact, these systems would be a big upgrade for North Korea, which has never showcased anything like this before.

With the entry into service in 2014 of the K2 Black Panther, North Korea also had to present a new vehicle that would be able to cope with the new South Korean MBT.

It could therefore be a mock-up to “scare” their southern brothers and show the world that they can militarily match more developed NATO armies.

The vehicle presented by Kim Jong-un, the supreme leader of North Korea, seems like a very modern and technologically advanced vehicle. If Western analysts are not mistaken, it will be able to effectively confront, in a hypothetical conflict against NATO nations, the most modern Western vehicles.

Its profile is completely different from previous North Korean vehicles, showing that even North Korea, perhaps with the help of the People’s Republic of China, is able to develop and build a modern MBT.

However, it must be considered that, no matter how advanced the vehicle may be, North Korea will never be able to produce enough of them to be a threat to world security. The real threat from North Korea comes from its nuclear weapons and its vast conventional arsenal of artillery and missiles. The new tanks will be used as a deterrent against a possible South Korean attack.

A detail not to be underestimated is that the nine models presented on 10th October 2020 are probably pre-series models and that, in the coming months, production vehicles should be expected if this vehicle is really meant to see service.

Sources

Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans – The Armed Forces of North Korea: On the Path of Songun

topwar.ru
armyrecognition.com
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