Independent State of Croatia (1942)
Light Tank – 4 Operated
With the fall of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941, the Nezavisna Država Hrvatska (NDH) (Eng: Independent State of Croatia), was created. While theoretically independent, it was actually a German puppet state created to act as a buffer zone from parts of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The harsh occupation policy of Axis forces led to the formation of two resistance movements that began to attack various military installations, personnel, and infrastructure. The mass deportations carried out by the NDH to concentration camps and the execution of civilians were often met with vengeful Partisan attacks. To combat these, the NDH leadership urged the Germans to send them armored vehicles. The Germans were initially unwilling to do so, but finally, at the end of 1941, they began the delivery of four aging Panzer I Ausf.A tanks.
History
After the fruitless invasion of Greece by Italian forces, Benito Mussolini was forced to ask for help from his German ally. Adolf Hitler agreed to assist, fearing a possible Allied attack through the Balkans would reach Romania and its oil fields, which were vital for the Germans. On the path of German advance towards Greece stood Yugoslavia, whose government initially agreed to join the Axis. This agreement was short-lived, as the Yugoslavian government was overthrown by a military coup at the end of March 1941. Hitler immediately gave an order for the preparation of the Invasion of Yugoslavia. The war that began on 6th April 1941 was a short one and ended with a total Yugoslavian defeat and the division of its territory between the Axis powers.
Even as the Yugoslavian Army was desperately trying to put up any form of armed resistance, the Croatian Ustaše, under the leadership of Ante Pavelić, declared the creation of the NDH on the 10th of April 1941. Croatia received a significant territorial expansion, annexing most of western Yugoslavia, including Bosnia, parts of Serbia, and Montenegro. The Adriatic coast, while nominally part of the NDH, was actually controlled by the Italians up to 1943. The creation of this state was initially an Italian idea, which the Germans reluctantly accepted. The Germans did not fully trust the NDH leadership, but given the expected invasion of the Soviet Union, they did not want to reserve many men and materiel for security forces in Yugoslavia, and they left this role mainly to their Allies, including NDH forces.
Almost from the start, the new NDH regime began the persecution of all the non-Croatian population. The Serbian, Roma, and Jewish populations were especially targeted, with numerous atrocities and arrests. Death camps, similar to those used by the Germans, were also established, In response to the NDH’s actions against Yugoslavian civilians, resistance movements began to emerge on its territory. Initially, these were spontaneous resistance groups formed around villages and small communities. However, these would rapidly expand to include much more important Communist and Royalist movements.
As its forces proved incapable of fighting these insurgents, the NDH requested some of the captured ex-Yugoslavian armored vehicles from their German overlords. Expecting a positive reply from the Germans, the NDH Army High Command issued a decree (1st July 1941) which required that all available personnel that were part of pre-war Yugoslavian armored units be relocated to the capital of Zagreb. Once there, they were to serve as a foundation for the newly formed 1st Automobilski Bataljon (Eng. Car/Mechanized Battalion). It was to serve as a base for further expansion of armored formations that were to support the standard NDH Army, known as the Hrvatsko Domobranstvo (Eng: Croatian Home Guard/Defence), and the Ustaška Vojnica (Eng: Militia) political-military organization, which was similar to the German Waffen SS formation. At this point, the NDH armored formation only consisted of a few FT and one R35 tank (all ex-Yugoslavian vehicles).
Unfortunately for the Croatians, the Germans only delivered promises with no real intention of actually supplying armored vehicles to them. However, after months of begging for such vehicles, the Germans finally gave in and delivered four obsolete Panzer I Ausf.A tanks to the NDH at the end of 1941 and the start of 1942.
Panzer I Brief History
The Panzer I Ausf.A was the first German mass-produced tank, entering service in the mid-1930s. This rather simple design was developed by Krupp in response to the German Army’s request for a cheap and mass-produced vehicle. Earlier German tank designs, while better armed, were unnecessarily complicated and not suited for large-scale production. The Panzer I Ausf.A was, on the other hand, only lightly protected and armed with two machine guns. It also had only two crew members, with the driver located in the hull and the commander /gunner seated in the turret. While of limited combat value, the Panzer I was an important stepping stone in German tank development, as it provided necessary experience for both the tank crews and the designers. Between 1934 and 1936, over 1,000 such tanks were built. Given the lack of anything better, they remained in use as frontline tanks up to 1941. Due to their obsolescence, the surviving vehicles were allocated to secondary roles, mostly being reused either as training or ammunition supply duties.
In NDH Service
By late 1941, when these vehicles began to arrive in the NDH, the Panzer I Ausf.A was a rare sight. Most vehicles were over 5 years old (depending on the year of production), mostly worn out, and allocated to other auxiliary tasks. It is not surprising that either the Germans only managed to find four fully operational vehicles, or that they were unwilling to give more than that. In either case, these were a welcome addition to the meager NDH armored vehicle arsenal. In NDH service, these were often referred to simply as ‘Krup’, the Croatian writing of the manufacturer’s name. In addition, these received new registration numbers ranging from 2501 to 2504. All four tanks were allocated to the Domobranstvo and were used to form a tank platoon. Interestingly, the Panzer I was extensively used for propaganda purposes during 1942. The German Panzer gray camouflage was left unchanged. On the superstructure sides, a large Croatian white and red chessboard was painted.
The first combat use of these four vehicles is unclear. There is an indication that one such vehicle saw action against the Partisan forces at Ozren in December 1941. On the 4th of December, this vehicle supported the NDH 4th Infantry Division. Due to a lack of coordination and poor planning, the vehicle was easily captured by the Partisans. While the tank was in working condition, none of the Partisans knew how to operate it, so they removed its two machine guns (which were reported to be of German origin) and sabotaged the tank. The mention of two machine guns being removed is a clear indication that this must have been a Panzer I. At that time, the NDH forces did not have any other armored vehicle that was of German origin. While the fate of its crew is unknown, the vehicle was recaptured by the NDH forces and possibly sent back to the rear in the hope of putting it back into action. If this was achieved is unspecified in the sources. During the Summer of 1942, at least two Panzer Is saw action against the Partisans in Bosnia. Unfortunately, a more precise combat record of these vehicles is not mentioned in the available sources.
By 1943, the Domobranstvo had only one armored unit, the Laka oklopna satnija (Eng. Light Armored Company). It was stationed at Daruvar and was part of the 1st Infantry (Mountain) Division. In its inventory, it had some 16 to 18 Polish TKS tankettes (supplied by the Germans the previous year) and an unknown number of Panzer Is. While there were plans to expand this unit’s strength, not much came of this. In May 1943, this unit was still reported to have had Panzer I tanks in its inventory. After May, the unit was moved to the capital, Zagreb, for recuperation and reforming. The fate of the Panzer Is after this point is unclear. They were either lost at some point in the later stages of the war or reused as training vehicles given the limited availability of spare parts.
Interestingly, at the end of September 1944, the Partisan forces in Slovenia had in their inventory one tank marked as Krup. It is unclear if this was a captured NDH Panzer I or a vehicle operated by the Germans, who also used this type of tank in Yugoslavia, albeit in limited numbers.
Conclusion
While obviously obsolete vehicles, the Panzer Is were probably some of the best-armored vehicles in NDH inventory (not including the single R35 tank) in the early stages of the war. The various tankettes that were in use by the NDH forces were more numerous, but they lacked a turret, which limited their combat effectiveness. In the end, despite their small numbers and general obsolescence, the Panzer I was surely a welcome addition to the NDH’s armored vehicle inventory.
Panzer I Ausf.A Specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
4.02 x 2.06 x 1.72 m
Weight
5.4 tonnes
Crew
2 (commander/gunner, driver)
Speed
max.: 37.5 km/h, roads: 20 km/h, cross-country: 12 km/h
Range
roads: 140 km, cross-country: 93 km
Armament
2x 7.92 mm MG 13/MG 13k
Armor
8-13 mm
Engine
Krupp M 305 4-cylinder air-cooled
Sources
B. B. Dimitrijević and D. Savić (2011) Oklopne Jedinice na Jugoslovenskom ratištu 1941-1945, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd.
D. Predoević (2008) Oklopna vozila i oklopne postrojbe u drugom svjetskom ratu u Hrvatskoj, Digital Point Tiskara Armored units and vehicles in Croatia during WW II, part I, Allied armored vehicles, Digital Point Rijeka
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2002) Panzer Tracts No.1-1 Panzerkampfwagen I
S. J. Zaloga (2013) Tanks of Hitler’s Eastern Allies 1941-45, Osprey Publishing
Kingdom of Hungary (1942)
Heavy Tank – 22 Operated
Hungary, under the leadership of Admiral Miklós Horthy, aligned itself with Nazi Germany before the war and during the early stages of World War II. This alliance was partially motivated by Hungary’s territorial ambitions and a desire to regain lost territories. As such, Hungarian forces, including their meager armored units, were part of the Axis coalition that invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. As the invasion progressed, the Hungarian armored units suffered heavy losses and, by the end of the year, nearly all AFVs were lost. The Germans had to intervene in order to keep the Hungarians in the war. To somewhat rebuild the shattered Hungarian armored forces that would be needed in the 1942 offensive toward the Caucasus, the Germans provided them with over 100 tanks. These included 22 Panzer IV Ausf.Fs. In 1942, these were the best tanks that the Hungarian Army operated on this front. By the end of the year, due to heavy fighting, all would be lost.
History
Following the end of the First World War, Hungary was stripped of most of its territories. It was left a shattered country that began a slow path of rebuilding its economy and army. The Honvéd (Eng. Hungarian Army) was particularly keen to one day be able to take back some of its lost territories. But, for that, it would need to rebuild and rearm its military forces. Armored formations were also needed. Their development was slowed down by various factors, not to mention the fact that Hungary was actually prohibited by the Treaty of Trianon (signed on 4th June 1920) from developing and using tanks and other armored vehicles. Nevertheless, during the mid-1930s, they purchased over 100 Italian CV.33 fast tanks, known in Hungarian service as 35M Ansaldo. In addition, the Hungarians obtained a license from Sweden for the production of the L-60 light tank, which would be known in Hungary as the Toldi. From April 1940 to December 1942, 190 such vehicles were locally produced.
While the Hungarians were not eager to wage war with the Soviets, they nevertheless joined the Axis forces during Operation Barbarossa. The Hungarians officially declared war on the USSR on 27th June, after Soviet air raids into Hungary occurred the previous day. For the Invasion of the Soviet Union, the Hungarians could muster 81 Toldis and 60 35M Ansaldos. By the end of 1941, nearly all of these were lost either in combat or due to mechanical breakdowns.
Even at the end of 1941, the Hungarians fielded only light tanks, which were of little use against the newer Soviet tanks. To rebuild its shattered force, the Hungarian High Command tried to implement the ‘Huba II’ military plan. This plan involved the formation of two new units, the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions.
Given the raging war in Europe, purchasing new equipment was impossible. To make matters even harder, the Hungarian High Command was hard-pressed by the Germans to send additional forces to the Eastern Front. Thus, the 2nd Army (with 250,000 men in total) was chosen to support the German operation with the aim of capturing the vital city of Stalingrad and the oil-rich Caucasus. This army consisted of nine light divisions supported by the 1st Armored Division. The major problem for the Hungarians was finding tanks to outfit this division. Despite German promises of modern equipment, the Hungarians were instead supplied with over 100 Panzer 38(t) (known in Hungarian service as the T-38) and 22 better-armed Panzer IV Ausf.F. In Hungarian service, the former was classified as a medium tank and the latter as a heavy tank.
A Brief Panzer IV History
After Germany’s defeat in the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles imposed strict limitations on the German military, including restrictions on the development of new weapons, like tanks. However, Germany secretly began developing tanks in violation of the treaty. In 1935, the Heereswaffenamt (Eng: Army Weapons Department) requested the development of specialized tanks, including the Begleitwagen (BW), designed for fire support roles.
The Begleitwagen evolved into the Panzer IV tank armed with a 7.5 cm gun. Production began in October 1937 with the Panzer IV Ausf.A, which served as a test bed to refine the design. Subsequent series were introduced with improvements. In April 1941, the last version with a short-barreled gun, the Panzer IV Ausf.F, was introduced to service. The Panzer IV Ausf.F production lasted from April 1941 to February 1942, and during this period, some 471 vehicles were built in total.
While the Panzer IV was modern, its short-barreled gun had limited anti-tank effectiveness due to its low velocity. After 1942, the Panzer IV was re-armed with longer guns, significantly improving its anti-tank capabilities. However, the short-barreled version continued to be used until the end of the war.
Forming the Hungarian 30th Tank Regiment
The formation of the Hungarian 1st Armored Division was done on a rather ad hoc basis. Any available mobile units were allocated to the formation of this division. While it was in short supply of equipment and weapons, it also lacked tanks. For this reason, in December of 1941, Germany sent a delegation to Hungary to discuss the situation regarding the acquisition of tanks and crew training. It was agreed that the Germans would sell tanks to Hungary. In addition, they would provide necessary crew training. At the start of 1942, the Honvéd dispatched a group of 40 officers and 144 men (drivers, radio operators, maintenance crew, etc.) to Germany. The nine-week course officially began on the 10th of January 1942. This course was carried out at the Wünsdorf military school. There, the Germans provided Panzer 38(t), Panzer IV, and even a few older Panzer I tanks. All these were used for training and familiarization with the new equipment. In addition, in Hungary, another training center was organized at Esztergom-Tábor. The promised vehicles finally began to arrive during February and March 1942. These were used to equip the 30th Tank Regiment, which was officially formed on the 8th of April 1942. While the Germans delivered these tanks, they were less generous in regard to spare parts delivery, which would come to haunt the unit later when it saw service on the Eastern Front.
Organization
Despite the influx of new equipment, it was only possible to form one tank regiment, which was divided into two battalions. In theory, this regiment was to have a third battalion, but there were never enough tanks, so it was never formed. The regiment’s command unit was supplied with three T-38s, two Toldis, and six command vehicles (possibly based on the Panzer I). The battalions were divided into one heavy (3rd and 6th) and two medium companies. The heavy company consisted of 11 Panzer IVs, 3 T-38s, and 1 Toldi. Each of the two medium companies was equipped with 20 T-38 tanks. Additional T-38 tanks were allocated to the battalion command staff and reserve platoon. In total, each battalion had in its inventory 52 T-38s, 11 Panzer IVs, and three Toldi tanks.
Additional elements equipped with Hungarian vehicles were attached to this division. This included the 1st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion with 14 Csaba armored cars and 17 Toldi tanks. The Toldi tanks were given auxiliary roles such as medical evacuation, command, or liaison. In addition, there was the 51st Tank Hunter Battalion, which was equipped with 18-19 Nimród anti-tank/aircraft vehicles.
Markings
In Hungarian service, the Panzer IV received three-digit identification numbers, which were painted on the turret’s rear side (on the storage box) and occasionally on the turret’s left and right sides. The first tank battalion (30/I) had numbers from 0 to 3. ‘0’ was used for the command company, while ‘1’ to ‘3’ were allocated to each of the three companies. The second digit also went from ‘0’ to ‘3’, with a similar purpose (instead of companies, it indicated the platoon). The last digit represented each vehicle’s individual number. The second battalion (30/II) used the same system but with the first number from 4 to 7.
On the rear side of the superstructure (engine compartment), the Hungarians added registration number plates. For the Panzer IV, these consisted of the number ‘1’ next to a capital ‘H’ (Honvéd) followed by the Hungarian flag (in the shape of a shield). Above them, a three-digit number (starting from 800) was added.
Regarding military markings, the Hungarians added their own variant of the Balkenkreuz which was usually painted on the superstructure sides. It consisted of a green central cross painted on a red background. The original German panzer gray paint was left unchanged.
In Hungarian Service
Elements of the Hungarian 2nd Army began to reach the Eastern Front in May 1942. Part of this Army also participated in the German Operation Blau (Eng. Operation Blue) and was tasked with defending over 200 km wide frontlines at the River Don in July 1942. Given the rather poor railway infrastructure in this part of the Soviet Union, the relocation of the 1st Armored Division took months. The transportation of tanks directly to the frontline was not possible. The Hungarians were forced to unload their tanks and drive over 300 km to finally reach their destination at the Uryw-Storozhevoye (Урыв-Сторожевое) area west of the river Don in early July. There, the Axis forces were already engaged with the Soviet 24th Tank Corps.
The first combat action of the 1st Armored Division against the Soviet western bridgeheads was generally successful. It began on the 18th of July with one Panzer IV commanded by Captain Laszlo Maklary destroying a T-34 tank. It is important to mention that the Panzer IV’s short-barrel gun was almost useless against the armor of the T-34. This engagement either took place at a close range or the Germans had provided the Hungarians with hollow charge rounds that could penetrate a T-34 armor, although the sources do not specify if this ammunition was actually given to the Hungarians. This kill and later successes against the T-34 suggested that this may have been the case. Regardless, by mid-day, the Hungarians managed to eliminate the Soviet forces. During this engagement, the Soviets lost 21 tanks, of which 12 fell victim to the Panzer IVs. Two more light tanks were destroyed by the Panzer IV during the Soviet retreat over the river Don. By the end of the day, the Hungarians were reported to have taken out 35 tanks. This number also included a few M3 Stuart light tanks which were captured. During this engagement, one Panzer IV commanded by Lance-Corporal Janos Roszik was credited with destroying four enemy tanks. The 1st Armored Division only had two damaged T-38 tanks. Unfortunately for the Hungarians, the Soviets made a night-time counterattack and managed to drive the Hungarians out, re-establishing their bridgehead. Hungarian attempts to push them back were unsuccessful.
The Soviets had established two well-defended positions west of River Don at the villages of Uryv and Korotoyak. This posed a serious threat to the Hungarians, who decided to deal with them. The 1st Armored Division was to play a crucial part in this operation. It mustered a force of 103 T-38, 20 Panzer IV, 12 Nimród, and 7 Toldi tanks. The offensive began on the 7th of August 1942. The advance was slowed down by the extensive Soviet defense line, artillery, and air support. Due to these obstacles, it was not possible to use a mass tank attack in one concentrated push. Instead, the Hungarians used their tanks to support the infantry. By 9th August, they managed to clean up many of the Soviet defensive positions, but suffered heavy losses in return. The 1st Armored Division had suffered the losses of 38 T-38, 2 Toldi, and 2 Panzer IV tanks, including nearly 400 men killed. The commander of the 2nd Battalion was also killed. The same day, Panzer IVs from the 1st Battalion were ordered to move to Uryv to counter-attack Soviet forces that were reported to have assembled there. This proved to be a false alarm and the Panzer IVs returned.
The following day, Hungarian tanks from the 2nd Battalion attacked the hill position held by the Soviets near Storozhevoye. Despite being supported by infantry, the Hungarians had to cancel the offensive. One Panzer IV was reported to have been damaged.
On the 13th of August, the 1st Armored Division attacked the Soviet positions at Korotoyak. By this time, the division strength was reduced to 44 T-38s, 4 Panzer IVs, and five Toldi tanks. During the fighting, the Hungarian tanks managed to destroy 10 Soviet tanks, the majority of them being M3 light tanks. One Panzer IV commanded by Lajos Hegedus managed to take out four M3 tanks. When his tank ran out of ammunition, Hegedus ordered the driver to drive into the rear for resupplying. Eventually, they hit a Soviet mine and the tank became immobilized. Ironically, one of the “destroyed” M3 tanks (taken out by the same Panzer IV) opened fire. The M3, while heavily damaged, had an operational gun, and the Soviets noticed this and prepared an ambush. After receiving several hits, Hegedus’ Panzer IV eventually exploded. The radio operator and the driver were killed, while the rest of the crew survived and escaped to friendly lines.
By the 18th, the intensity of the battle slowly died out due to losses sustained by both sides. The Hungarian 1st Armored Division had lost over 1700 men. In regard to armored strength, it only had 55 T-38 and 15 Panzer IV tanks combat-ready. This division was then pulled back for rest and recuperation. To help rebuild the Hungarian armored forces (yet again), the Germans supplied them with four Panzer IV Ausf.G tanks armed with the longer L/43 gun. By the end of August, the Hungarians managed to rebuild their tank pool to 22 Panzer IV (including long barrel versions), 85 T-38, and 5 Toldi tanks.
The 1st Armored Division was once again at the frontline at the start of September. Its task was to support the attack on the Uryv-Storozhevoye bridgehead. The Soviets, in the hope of shortening their line, focused on defending only this area and completely abandoned Korotoyak in the process. The Soviets fortified their lines with thousands of mines and dug in T-34 tanks. The Hungarian tanks attacked the Soviet positions on the 9th of September. The following day, Panzer IVs managed to destroy two T-34s and a more heavily protected KV-1 tank. Two of these were destroyed by Corporal Janos Roszik. Following that engagement, Corporal Janos Roszik’s Panzer IV tried to advance alone. The tank was spotted by a Soviet anti-tank crew. They soon fired their 7.62 cm gun, hitting the Panzer IV at close range. The round likely hit the Panzer’s ammunition storage, completely destroying the tank in the process. By the 11th of September, the Soviet defense was finally breached.
On the 12th, the Axis forces proceeded to attack the Soviet line near Storozhevoye. They succeeded in this and began to fortify their new line. The following day, the Soviets made a counterattack spearheaded by T-34 and KV-1 tanks and drove off the defending Germans. The Hungarian armor was sent to try to stop the Soviets. During the following engagement, the Hungarians suffered heavy losses, their tanks being almost useless against the armor of the KV-1. At nightfall, the Hungarian 1st Armored Division was left with 4 Panzer IVs and 22 T-38s. They managed to destroy eight Soviet tanks and damage two KV-1s. The battle lasted until 16th September and ended with a Soviet defeat. That day, they lost 22 tanks taken out by tank and anti-tank fire, mines, and German StuG IIIs. The 1st Armored Division was left with only two Panzer IV Ausf.F and 12 T-38s.
By October, an uneasy stalemate took hold, which the Hungarians used to reinforce its division with new tank crews. During the same month, an additional 6 Panzer IV Ausf.G and 10 Panzer III (due to slow crew training, these vehicles were operated by German crews) tanks were given to this unit. On the 19th of October, Hungarian Panzer IVs managed to destroy 4 additional Soviet tanks.
At the start of 1943, the Soviets made massive preparations to overwhelm the Axis defenses around Stalingrad, including the Hungarian forces. The 1st Armored Division, at that point, had 8 Panzer IV Ausf.F and 8 Ausf.G, 41 T–38, 9 Panzer III, 2 Toldi tanks, and 5 Marder II tank-destroyers which were temporarily given to them by the Germans. The attack began in mid-January and inflicted great losses on the defenders. On the 17th of January 1943, some 4 Panzer IV and 8 Panzer III tried to counterattack in the region of Dolschik-Ostrogosshk. The attack was eventually called back, but one Panzer IV had to be blown up when it broke down. Two more Panzer IVs were blown up when they ran out of fuel. By early February, what was left of the division managed to reach Krakow and was withdrawn from the frontlines.
According to P. Mujzer (Operational History of the Hungarian Armored Troops in World War II), the Division was left with only 9 T-38s, 1 Panzer IV Ausf.G, 2 Marders, 1 Nimród and a few Csaba armored cars. The same author in another book (Hungarian Arms And Armor of Wolrd War Two) mentioned that one Panzer IV Ausf.F survived the Soviet Winter Offensive of 1943. S. J. Zaloga (Tanks of Hitler’s Eastern Allies 1941-45), on the other hand, mentions that only 3 Toldis and 3 Nimróds survived 1942.
Conclusion
The Panzer IV Ausf.F was a huge boost to the Hungarian armored inventory, despite the rather limited number allocated by the Germans. It was the best protected and armed Hungarian tank at that point in the war. Despite having the short barrel gun, it played a crucial part in the fighting done by the Hungarians on the Eastern Front on many occasions. The crews of the Panzer IVs managed to destroy over a dozen or more Soviet tanks, including the dreaded T-34 and KV-1. However, the Panzer IVs were simply too few in number to have made any major impact on the war for the Hungarians.
Panzer IV Ausf.F in Hungarian Service Specifications
Dimensions (l-w-h)
5.92 x 2.88 x 2.68 m (19.4 x 9.44 x 8.79 ft)
Total weight, battle-ready
22.3 tonnes
Crew
5 (Commander, Gunner, Loader, Radio Operator, and Driver)
Propulsion
Maybach HL 120 TR(M) 265 HP @ 2600 rpm
Speed (road/off-road)
42 km/h, 25 km/h (cross-country)
Range (road/off-road)
210 km, 130 km (cross-country)
Primary Armament
7.5 cm KwK L/24
Secondary Armament
Two 7.92 mm MG 34
Elevation
-10° to +20°
Turret Armor
Front 50 mm, sides 30 mm, rear 30, and top 8-10 mm
Hull Armor
Front 30-50 mm, sides 20-30 mm, rear 14.5-20 mm, and the top and bottom 10-11 mm.
Sources
P. Mujzer (2017) Operational History Of The Hungarian Armored Troops in World War II, Kagero
E. M. G. Martinez (2019) Images of War Hungarian Armored Fighting Vehicles, Pen & Sword
C. Bescze (2007) Magyar Steel Hungarian Armour in WW II, STRATUS.
B. Adam, E. Miklos, S. Gyula (2006) A Magyar Királyi Honvédség külföldi gyártású páncélos harcjárművei 1920-1945, Petit R
S. J. Zaloga (2913) Tanks Of Hitler’s Eastern Allies 1941-45 Osprey Publishing
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (1997) Panzer Tracts No.4 Panzerkampfwagen IV
One of the most recognizable tanks of the Third Reich was the Panzerkampfwagen V “Panther”. Created as a replacement for the medium Panzer III and Panzer IV tanks and as a “response” to the Soviet KV and T-34, the Panther was a formidable opponent on the battlefield. A powerful and rapid-firing gun, good aiming devices for the crew, and strong frontal armor made the vehicle excellent in both defensive and offensive operations. Panthers captured by the Red Army were highly valued. During the war, Soviet troops captured a significant number of serviceable or damaged, but recoverable Pz.Kpfw.Vs, and even combat units of the Red Army were created on their basis. The option of rearming them with “domestic” guns was also considered, however, the T-V-85 appeared too late, and the end of the war left it no chance of appearing in reality.
The Medium Cat of the Wehrmacht
The first considerations for a new medium tank which could replace the Panzer III and Panzer IV appeared in 1938, with the VK20 project series, a fully tracked vehicle weighing ~20 tonnes. Design proposals by Daimler Benz, Krupp, and MAN ensued, but soon, these designs were abandoned and Krupp dropped out of the competition entirely. The requirements increased to a vehicle weighing 30 tonnes as a reaction to the encounters with the Soviet T-34 and KV-1 tanks.
At the insistence of General Heinz Guderian, a special tank commission was created to assess the T-34. Among the features of the Soviet tank considered most significant were the sloping armor, which gave much improved shot deflection and also increased the effective armor thickness against penetration that could be achieved with thinner plates, the wide tracks, which improved mobility over soft ground; and the 76 mm gun, which had good armor penetration and also fired an effective high-explosive round. All this outclassed the existing models of the German Panzer III and IV. Daimler-Benz (DB), which had designed the successful Panzer III and StuG III, and Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg AG (MAN) were given the task of designing a new 30- to 35-tonne tank, designated VK 30, by April 1942.
MAN’s design won the competition, despite DB’s one having several advantages and having the admiration of the Reich’s Ministers for Armaments and Munitions, Fritz Todd and his successor, Albert Speer. One of the principal reasons given for this decision was that the MAN design used an existing turret designed by Rheinmetall-Borsig, while the DB design would have required a brand new turret and engine to be designed and produced, delaying the mass production of the vehicle.
The initial production target was 250 tanks per month at the MAN plant at Nuremberg. The first production Panther tanks were designated Panther Ausf.D, not Ausf.A. Later production targets were increased to 600 per month in January 1943. Despite determined efforts, this figure was never reached due to disruption by Allied bombing, and manufacturing and resource bottlenecks. Production in 1943 averaged 148 tanks per month. In 1944, it averaged 315 a month, with 3,777 built throughout the year. Monthly production peaked at 380 in July 1944. Production ended around the end of March 1945, with at least 6,000 built in total. A Panther tank cost 117,100 Reichsmark (~US$60 mln in 2022) to produce.
Panther in Soviet Use
By the middle of 1943, the Red Army already had experience in operating the PzKpfw.38 (t), PzKpfw.II, PzKpfw.III, and PzKpfw.IV, as well as self-propelled guns based on them. However, the use of Pz.Kpfw.V was a very difficult task, requiring appropriate training of crews and the availability of a repair base. Soviet tankers, lacking necessary experience in operating such complex and foreign equipment, often disabled Panthers after driving 15–20 km, and then could not repair them due to the lack of necessary spare parts, tools, and the experience in repairing such vehicles.
The headquarters of the 4th Guards Tank Army reported to the GBTU of the Red Army:
“These tanks (Pz.Kpfw.V) are difficult to operate and repair. There are no spare parts for them, which leaves no chance for their maintenance.
To fuel the tanks, it is necessary to provide for an uninterrupted supply of high-quality aviation gasoline. In addition, there are big problems with ammunition for the German 75 mm tank gun mod. 1942 (Kw.K. 42), since the ammunition from the gun mod. 1940 (Kw.K.40) is unsuitable for the Panther tank.
We believe that a German tank of the Pz.Kpfw. IV type is more suitable for carrying out offensive operations, as it has a simpler layout, is easy to operate and repair, and is also widely used in the German army.”
However, since the Pz.Kpfw.V was armed with a gun with excellent ballistic characteristics, it had the ability to fight enemy armored vehicles at distances exceeding the effective firing range of Soviet 76 and 85 mm tank guns, which partially compensated for the complexity of its combat operation. In addition, the excellent, by the standards of that time, radio and aiming devices made the Panther a good command vehicle.
In the first half of 1944, the GBTU KA considered the use of serviceable captured Panthers as tank destroyers. In March 1944, a “Short Guide of Using the Captured T-V (‘Pantera’) Tank” was released.
In January 1944, by order of the Deputy Commander of the 3rd Guards Tank Army, Major General Solovyov, one platoon of the most experienced repair engineers was created in the 41st and 148th Separate Repair and Restoration Battalions, which were later involved in the repair and maintenance of the captured Panthers. The 991st Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (46th Army of the 3rd Ukrainian Front) had 16 SU-76Ms and 3 Panthers, which were used as command vehicles. In spring 1945, in addition to heavy ISU-152 self-propelled guns and several captured Hummels and Nashorns, there were 5 Pz.Kpfw.V and one Pz.Kpfw.IV in use in the unit.
It is worth noting that the drivers of the Pz.Kpfw.V had to choose their route very carefully. In places where the light SU-76M passed freely, the heavy Panther could get stuck. Overcoming water barriers was also a major issue. Not all bridges could sustain a tank weighing 45 tonnes, and after fording a river, there were almost always difficulties in getting the Pz.Kpfw.V onto a steep bank.
T-V-85
On 28th November 1944, the Artillery Committee at the Main Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR (AK GAU) issued tactical and technical requirements No. 2820 “For the installation of domestic weapons in the turrets of captured German tanks T-IV, T-V, T-VI and the Royal Tiger” (due to the lack of a full-scale model of the Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger II turret, the study of the change of armament on this tank with a domestic gun was not carried out), including the adaptation of these turrets as stationary firing structures. Simply put, OKB-43 needed to take the turrets from captured tanks, replace the German guns with Soviet ones, along with sights, and further adapt them for installation on armored vehicles.
In January 1945, GSOKB (рус. Государственное Союзное Особое Конструкторское бюро – State Union Special Design Bureau) No. 43 at the NKV (рус. Народный Комиссариат Вооружения СССР – Ministry of Armaments of the USSR) presented a project for installing the latest 100 mm D-10T tank gun, which in the future would become the main armament of the T-54 medium tank, with the Soviet TSh-17 sight, in the turret of the T-VI tank (how “trophy” “Tigers” were designated in the USSR) while retaining its gun mantlet. This conversion process was estimated at 90 hours of work. The conversion provided for the installation of a shell casing removal system, which simplified the work of the turret crew.
Another conversion that had to take place at that time was replacing the German 7.5 cm KwK 42 gun on the Pz.Kpfw.V Panther tank with the 85 mm Soviet one. Not many details are known about this project. The whole process of gun replacement was estimated at 120 hours of work. More than that, it is highly likely that the vehicle could also gain new Soviet sights and 7.62 mm machine guns instead of German Maschinengewehr 34 (MG 34).
№
Works
T-IV-76 with F-34
T-V-85
T-VI-100
T-IV-76 with ZiS-5
I
Lathing
18.0
40.0
15.0
9.0
II
Gouging and milling
4.0
7.0
4.0
5.0
III
Drilling
10.0
10.0
9.0
9.0
IV
Welding
16.0
22.0
12.0
12.0
V
Gas cutting
8.0
8.0
7.0
8.0
VI
Forging, pressing and bending works
4.0
6.0
6.0
4.0
Summary
60.0
93.0
53.0
47.0
Fitter and assemblyman hours, 5 people per team
80.0
120.0
90.0
80.0
Head of Special Design Bureau (OKB-43) – Salin;
Senior technologist – Petrov;
January 3, 1945
New gun: ZiS-S-53
The exact model of the 85 mm gun is not mentioned in any of the known documents. Fortunately, it can easily be deduced. Firstly, a new gun was not an option, as in this case, rearming the Panthers would not fulfill the tasks set of a cheap and easily-made conversion. Secondly, the new gun should not have differed significantly from the 7.5 cm KwK 42 and allow the Panther to continue to perform as usual, without any impact on its mobility and other specifications. Hence, two main candidates appear: the 85 mm D-5T and the 85 mm ZiS-S-53.
85 mm D-5T
APHE
APCR
HE
BR-365A
BR-365K
BR-365P
OF-365K
9.2 kg
4.99 kg
9.54 kg
792 m/s
1050 m/s
793 m/s
0.164 kg TNT
0.048 kg charge
(0.07392 kg TNT eq.)
–
0.66 kg TNT
142 mm pen
145 mm pen
194 mm pen
–
6-7 rpm
Parameters of penetration are given for 0 m and 0°.
85 mm D-5T parameters. (source — ZA DB, Pablo Escobar’s gun table)
The history of the 85 mm D-5T gun dates back to May 1943, when the Design Bureau of Plant No. 9 reworked the design of the U-12 gun and offered its own version of the 85 mm tank gun. The new product received the D-5T (or D-5T-85) index and differed from the U-12 by a semi-automatic breech mechanism borrowed from the ZIS-5 gun, as well as some recoil brake and recoil system assemblies. The tight layout of the gun and the short length of its rollback allowed it to be installed in the turret of any existing heavy tank without altering the turret. The gun compared favorably to the S-18 and S-31, with a small recoil length and breech mass, but had a large number of small details and parts, which required precise processing.
Four tanks were tested together (two IS and two KV-1S tanks), armed with S-31 and D-5T guns. Trials demonstrated the great operational advantages of the D-5T gun, which was adopted by the Soviet Army. At the same time, Plant No. 9 was preparing for the mass production of new guns. The peculiarities of the D-5T resulted in difficulties in production for the plant. The plan for the production of 85 mm tank guns for the KV-85 and IS-85 was hardly fulfilled by Plant No. 9, but its capacity was clearly not enough for another gun order for the T-34-85. Factories No. 8 and No. 13 involved in the production could not build this new gun, as they were unprepared for such a complex device. From 1st March 1944, the production of the 85 mm tank gun D-5T ceased.
85 mm ZiS-S-53
APHE
APCR
HE
BR-365A
BR-365K
BR-365P
OF-365K
9.2 kg
4.99 kg
9.54 kg
792 m/s
1050 m/s
793 m/s
0.164 kg TNT
0.048 kg charge
(0.07392 kg TNT eq.)
–
0.66 kg TNT
142 mm pen
145 mm pen
194 mm pen
–
7-8 rpm
Parameters of penetration are given for 0 m and 0°.
85 mm ZiS-S-53 ammunition parameters. Note they were almost identical to D-5T’s. (source — ZA DB, Pablo Escobar’s gun table)
Fulfilling the order of the NKVD (rus. for ‘People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs’) to create an 85 mm cannon for the T-34, TsAKB, alongside plant No. 92, quickly carried out complex design work and, by 10th December 1943, two 85 mm artillery systems, the S-50 and the S-53, were tested at the TSLKB firing range.
The S-50 gun (developed by V. Meshchaninov, L. Boglevsky, and V. Tyurin), which had improved ballistics (the initial velocity of the BB projectile was 920 m/s), was not so successful.
The S-53 differed from other similar guns in its simple design and reliability. It was created by the group consisting of I. Ivanov, G. Shabirov, and G. Sergeev. The recoil brake and the recoil system were moved under the base of the breechlock, which made it possible to reduce the height of the firing line and increase the distance between the breech section and the rear wall of the turret. The metal usage coefficient (the ratio of the mass of a part to the standard metal consumption for that part) in the S-53 was very high, and its cost was lower than those of the F-34 and the D-5T. Within 2 months, all the necessary design and technological documentation was prepared for the production of the gun, and on 5th February 1944, the gun went into mass production.
Considering all the factors, the ZiS-S-53 seems to have been the most optimal choice for rearming captured German Panthers. It had a simple design, compact size, and was rather reliable. Moreover, in spring 1945, a version with stabilizer was developed, the ZiS-S-54, which could possibly have been installed later.
Project Description – Comparison with the Panther Ausf.G
The Soviet military command liked the proposal to instal the Soviet ZiS-S-53 gun, which had proven itself on T-34-85 medium tanks, in the turret of the German Panther tank. Its breech took the same amount of space as the German KwK 42, despite the larger caliber.
75 mm KwK 42 L/70
APHEBC
APCR
HE
PzGr 39/42
PzGr 40/42
SprGr 42
6.8 kg
4.75 kg
5.74 kg
935 m/s
1120 m/s
700 m/s
17 g charge
(28.9 TNT eq.)
–
725 g TNT
187 mm pen
226 mm pen
–
6-8 rpm
Parameters of penetration are given for 0 m and 0°.
The 75 mm KwK 42’s ammunition parameters (source — ZA DB, Pablo Escobar’s gun table)
APHEBC – Armor-Piercing High Explosive with Ballistic Cap;
APCR – Armour-Piercing Composite Rigid
HE – High Explosive
All in all, the new Soviet gun was significantly worse than the German original in penetration and shell flight speed. On the other hand, the ZiS-S-53 was adopted by the Soviet Army in 1944, almost a year before T-V-85 was developed, hence its mass production was well organized by then, and soldiers were used to it.
Like the T-VI-100 project, the T-V-85 would most likely have had similar changes. The German 7.92 mm MG 34 would have been replaced by the Soviet 7.62 mm DT and the TSh-17 sights (later used on the IS-2 and IS-3 Soviet tanks) would replace the original TFZ-12A sights. It can be assumed that the machine gun in the hull would also have been replaced by a DT, although there is no documentary substantiation of this hypothesis.
Unlike in the T-VI-100, the space inside the T-V-85’s turret would have remained almost the same as on the Panther. As a result, elevation arcs would have been nearly identical (-8°/+18° in the frontal part and -4°/+18° in the rear).
However, just like for the T-VI-100 proposal, many other problems would remain unresolved on the T-V-85. There were no considerations on replacing the transmission, engine, and other hull components with Soviet ones, which means that repairing the tanks would have been problematic. Obviously, had the T-V-85 been converted from Panthers, in field use, all the challenges associated in using captured German vehicles by the Red Army would have been preserved, to the great displeasure of crews and mechanics.
The Fate and Prospects of the Project
In general, the project was judged positively and was approved by the High Command, but things did not move beyond the project documentation. By spring 1945, the need for such projects had disappeared due to the proximity of the end of the war in Europe.
The Panther itself was outdated by 1945 when compared to the newest medium tanks of that time, the Soviet T-44/T-54, the British Cromwell, Comet, and Centurion, or the American M26 Pershing. Its armor could no longer “surprise” anyone, but almost 50 tonnes of mass was a serious drawback. All this indicates that had the T-V-85 been conceived, it would have hardly been able to perform well, even as a tank destroyer.
It seems, however, that there was another possible option for using the developments on the project, selling a “modified” version to third countries. However, the logic behind this seems flawed, as for most of these, especially those that never operated such a medium tank before, the “Panther”, even with a 85 mm gun (even with stabilizer and newest post-war ammunition), would probably not have been needed. Germany itself was not allowed to have its own army for some years. For the emerging Soviet Bloc countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, or Poland, especially those bordering what would become NATO, the T-V-85 might have been a good temporary stopgap for their weakened armies until Soviet supplies of T-34-85s, T-54s, etc. would have become the norm. It is important to keep in mind that plans including Operation Unthinkable, a British invasion of East Germany, were actively developed, and tremendously dangerous for the weakened and war-torn USSR and its satellites at that time. The first frontlines of a hypothetical Third World War would surely have been in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, it is doubtful that rearming an outdated, and difficult to maintain captured tank type was easier and more useful for the aforementioned countries than waiting for the mass-produced T-34 or T-54.
Conclusion
The T-V-85 tank project, like many of its counterparts, belongs to the category of “the war ended too soon”. Although this was a fairly reasonable alternative to the simple disposal of captured vehicles, serious improvements were still required for its full-fledged and practical implementation, especially to the hull.
T-V-85 specifications table
Dimensions (L-W-H)
Length: 8.86 m
Length (without gun): 6.866 m
Width: 3.42 m
Height: 2.917 m
Total weight, battle ready
45.5 tonnes
Crew
5 men (commander, gunner, loader, radio operator, and driver)
Propulsion
Water-cooled, gasoline Maybach HL 230 P30 V12 motor producing 600 hp at 2500 rpm
coupled to a ZF A.K.7/200 transmission
Max speed
46 km/h (28.6 mph)
Range (road)
On road: 200 km
Cross-country: 100 km
Primary Armament
85 mm ZiS-S-53
Elevation Arc
-8°/+18° (frontal part), -4°/+18° (rear part)
Secondary Armament
2 x 7.62 mm DT
Hull Armor
85 mm (55°) upper frontal
65 mm (55°) lower frontal
50 mm (29°) upper side
40 (vertically flat) lower side
40 mm (30°) rear
40-15 mm (horizontally flat) roof
17 mm (horizontally flat) engine deck
30 mm (horizontally flat) frontward belly
17 mm (horizontally flat) rearward belly
17 mm (horizontally flat) pannier
Turret armor
110 mm (10°) frontal
45 mm (25°) side and rear
30 mm roof
№ built
0, blueprints only;
Special author’s thanks to his colleagues: Andrej Sinyukovich and Pablo Escobar.
The Panzerkampfwagen VI “Tiger” Ausführung E is one of the most outstanding and iconic vehicles in the history of tank building. The Tiger caused significant problems for the Allies when it first appeared at the front. Fortunately for the Allies, shortly after, several vehicles were captured by the Red Army and tested. In the Soviet Union, designers even worked on the option of re-equipping this German heavy tank with ‘domestic’ Soviet guns. However, this project appeared too late, and the imminent end of the war did not give this proposal any chance to materialize.
The Heavy Cat of the Wehrmacht
The Tiger I, or ‘Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausführung E’ (Pz.Kpfw.Tiger Ausf.E), was born in May 1942, but its conception and development can be traced directly back to 1936 and 1937, with work on a 30-33 tonne tank by the firm of Henschel und Sohn in Kassel. Just like other German tank projects, the development was very complex, overlapping with dozens of other projects, and has been the subject of a large number of books and movies. The name ‘Tiger’ itself has a no less complex history. It was first used in February 1942, when the project “Pz.Kpfw.VI (VK45.01/H) Ausf.H1 (Tiger)” was approved. The design was clearly identified as the Pz.Kpfw.VI or Tiger, with “Tiger I” first used on 15th October 1942, followed by “Pz.Kpfw.VI H Ausf.H1 (Tiger H1)” on 1st December 1942 and then “Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.E” in March 1943.
The Tiger I had a crew of five: commander (back left), gunner (front left), and loader (right) in the turret, and the driver and radio operator in the front left and right of the hull, respectively.
The main armament consisted of the 8.8 cm Kw.K. 36 L/56 gun in the turret. This gun was derived from the 8.8 cm Flak 18 and Flak 36 AA guns and delivered similar ballistic performance. It was combined with the excellent T.Z.F.9b 2.5 x magnification binocular telescope for the gunner. This T.Z.F.9b binocular sight was later replaced by the cheaper but no less effective T.Z.F.9c monocular sight, a change identifiable by the switch to a single hole in the left side of the mantlet. The Tiger carried 92 rounds of Armor-Piercing (AP) and High Explosive (HE) ammunition. Where available, the Pz.Gr.40 (high velocity, sub-caliber, tungsten core, with no explosive filler) round was also carried for use against heavy enemy armor.
Secondary armament consisted of a 7.92 mm MG.34 machine gun mounted coaxially with the main gun. This weapon had a maximum elevation of -8º to +15º. A second machine gun, a ball-mounted MG.34, was located in the right-hand side of the driver’s plate. This second machine gun was capable of 15º traverse to either side (total arc of 30º) and an elevation of -7º to +20º. It was fitted with a K.Z.F.2 episcopic sighting telescope with a magnification of x1.75. For these machine guns, 4,500 rounds of ammunition were carried. Another M.G.34 anti-aircraft machine gun (Flieger-M.G.) could also be carried on the turret (also fitted to the Befehlswagen-Tiger).
After June 1942, six 95 mm diameter smoke grenade launchers (in two sets of three) were approved for mounting on the turret, a process which started in August 1942. The launchers could fire the Nb.K.39 90 mm smoke generator grenades but, following combat reports of gunfire setting them off and blinding the crews, these were dropped in June 1943.
The Tiger was powered in the early production runs by the HL 210 TRM P45 21-liter V-12 Maybach petrol engine producing 650 hp at 3,000 rpm. Due to problems with the reliability of this engine, the maximum performance could not be achieved, restricting mobility for this heavy tank. As a result of the poor performance, the more powerful HL 230 TRM P45 23 liter V-12 Maybach engine producing 700 hp was introduced in its place from May 1943 onwards.
The Tiger’s suspension consisted of 55 mm diameter torsion bars (Stabfedern), which ran the complete width of the tank’s hull, with splined heads, although the two front and rearmost two bars were wider than the rest, at 58 mm diameter. The bars were connected to the road wheel arms (Laufrad-Kurbel), each of which had three road wheels. Their arrangement overlapped wheels from adjacent road wheel-arms, creating an interleaved pattern to spread the load of the tank onto the track. Hydraulic shock absorbers were fitted to the inside of the front and rear road-wheel arms which, combined with the damping effect of the torsion bar, created a very smooth ride.
Unsuccessful Debut
On 29th August 1942, the first batch of Tigers from the 502nd Heavy Tank Battalion, consisting of four Pz.Kpfw. VI, advanced to combat positions from the railway station Mga, near Leningrad. Three vehicles suffered serious breakdowns leaving the station, and, in general, were not so successful. Later, during the battles to break the blockade of Leningrad, on 16th January 1943, Soviet troops captured a Tiger which was previously hit by artillery. This was followed by a practically intact one on 17th January. The crew left it without destroying even a brand-new technical passport, different tools, and weapons. Both tanks were evacuated from the combat area and sent to the Kubinka Proving Ground for studies.
Studying the «Wild Beast»
Initially, the captured tanks appeared in the correspondence as “captured tanks of the HENSHEL type”, later called T-VI. The tanks that arrived aroused great interest among the Soviet military command. By that time, the “Tigers” were actively used by the Germans both on the Soviet-German front and in North Africa. These vehicles were used for the first time on a truly massive scale during the battle for Kharkov, making a significant contribution to the defeat of the Red Army on this sector of the war front. Around the same time, the Tigers fought in Tunisia against American, British and Commonwealth troops, inflicting serious losses on them.
By April 1943, the two tanks, with turret numbers 100 and 121, were already at the proving ground. It was decided to test ‘121’ for armor durability and use ‘100’ for testing the gun against the armor of Soviet tanks.
The armor on the side of the Tiger’s hull managed to withstand the Soviet 45 mm guns. However, 57 mm guns of the ZiS-2 type overcame the 80 mm side armor with ease even from a long distance (up to 1 km). The frontal armor of the tank could not be penetrated by the 76 mm F-34 gun, the main Soviet tank gun at that time. The 85 mm “anti-aircraft gun” 52-K performed much better in this regard, penetrating the “Tiger” in the front from a distance of 1 km. The 122 mm A-19 gun performed the best at this. Until that moment, it had not yet been considered as a possible tank cannon. After two hits fired from it, the once formidable German heavy tank turned into a pile of scrap metal.
The tests of the German 88 mm tank gun were much more impressive. It was used to fire at Soviet T-34 and KV tanks. The main Soviet heavy tank of that time was easily penetrated from a distance of 1.5 km. Even the uparmored version with additional protection was also penetrated. For the T-34, the very first shot, from a distance of 1.5 km, “decapitated” the tank. Its turret was “knocked off” the hull, while significant damage to the frontal part of the hull was caused by further shelling. It is worth noting that the aforementioned Soviet anti-aircraft gun 52-K showed similar results in tests.
Tests of the new German heavy tanks showed the Soviet military command the need to gradually abandon 76 mm tank guns in favor of larger calibers, such as 85 mm and 122 mm. At around the same time, accelerated work began on self-propelled guns, such as the SU-85 and SU-152, as well as on the KV-85 and IS-1 heavy tanks.
A Stranger Amongst Us
The sporadic capture of workable versions of the Tiger tank by the Red Army was the main reason for the episodic nature of its combat use on the side of the USSR. In addition, Soviet tankers, in an effort to get a high reward, almost always destroyed the rare Pz.Kpfw. VI.
The first reliable case of the use of a captured “Tiger” in battle was recorded only at the very end of 1943, with the crew under the command of Lieutenant N.I. Revyakin from the 28th Guards Tank Brigade. On 27th December 1943, one of the “Tigers” of the 501st Tank Battalion got stuck in a crater, its crew ran away, and the tank itself was captured. On the next day, the tank was assigned to the 28th Brigade. Revyakin was appointed commander of the captured heavy tank because he already had extensive combat experience and military awards, two Orders of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree and the Order of the Red Star. On January 5th, the captured tank, with red stars painted on the sides of the turret and with the writing “Tiger” added as well, went into battle.
The operational service of this vehicle with Soviet units looked quite typical for German heavy tanks. It almost always required repairs. The matter was greatly complicated by the lack of spare parts. But this was on the battlefield. In the bowels of the Soviet design bureaus, there had been several projects developed to re-equip captured German vehicles with Soviet guns since 1942. Similar proposals were made for the Tiger, but they started much later, at the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945.
T-VI-100: Unrealized “Frankenstank”
On 28th November 1944, the Artillery Committee at the Main Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR (AK GAU) issued tactical and technical requirements No. 2820 “For the installation of domestic weapons in the turrets of captured German tanks T-IV, T-V, T-VI and the Royal Tiger” (due to the lack of a full-scale model of the Pz.Kpfw. VIB Tiger II turret, the study of the change of armament of this tank with a domestic gun was not carried out), including the adaptation of these turrets as stationary firing structures. Simply put, OKB-43 needed to take the turrets from captured tanks, replace the German guns with Soviet ones, along with sights, and further adapt them for installation on armored vehicles.
In January 1945, GSOKB (рус. Государственное Союзное Особое Конструкторское бюро – State Union Special Design Bureau) No. 43 at the NKV (рус. Народный Комиссариат Вооружения СССР – Ministry of Armaments of the USSR) presented a project for installing the latest 100 mm D-10T tank gun, which in the future would become the main armament of the T-54 medium tank, with the Soviet TSh-17 sight, in the turret of the T-VI tank (how trophy “Tigers” were designated in the USSR) while retaining its gun mantlet. This conversion process was estimated at 90 hours of work. The conversion provided for the installation of a shell casing removal system, which simplified the work of the turret crew.
At the end of 1943, on an initiative basis and in the shortest possible time, the team of designers of Design Bureau of Plant No. 9, headed by F.F. Petrov, developed a 100 mm gun system designed for installation in the SU-100 tank destroyer. The cannon, the lead designer of which was M.E. Bezusov, received the designation D-10. The barrel length was 56 calibers (5,610 mm), and the initial velocity of the projectile was 900 m/s. The rollback length of the D-10S turned out to be longer than that of its competitors and was about 510-560 mm. Structurally, the gun system was a logical successor of the Design Bureau of Plant No. 9’s earlier projects, and when it was created, maximum unification with them was achieved. For example, cradle, lifting and turning mechanisms were taken from the D-25T 122 mm gun.
The history of the 100 mm D-10 gun did not end with the SU-100 tank destroyer. It would also appear on such Soviet late-war prototypes as the T-34-100 and SU-101 (a.k.a. Uralmash-1). After the war, it would be modified many times (hence versions like D-10T, D-10T2, M-63, D-33, 2A48, etc.) and become the main gun of the Soviet medium tanks of that period, the T-54 and T-55. It would also be proposed for some Cold War Soviet tank destroyers, such as the SU-100P and the Obj. 416, for Chinese medium tank Type 59 (WZ-120), and for light amphibious tanks prototypes, such as the Obj. 685 and the Obj. 934.
Project Description. Comparison with Tiger I Ausf. E
The Soviet military command liked the proposal of the installation of the Soviet D-10 gun, which had proven itself on SU-100 self-propelled guns, in the turret of the German Tiger tank. Indeed, the 88 mm KwK 36 tank gun, so formidable in the early stages of the war, was no longer that impressive by 1945. This was understood by the Germans themselves, who managed to design a lot of self-propelled guns armed with a 128 mm KwK 44 gun, and one of them, the JagdTiger, was even built and used in battle.
8,8 cm KwK 36
APHEBC
APCR
HEAT
HE
PzGr
PzGr 39
PzGr 40
HIGr 39
SprGr
9.5 kg
10.2 kg
7.3 kg
810 m/s
773 m/s
930 m/s
600 m/s
820 m/s
168 g charge
(285.6 g TNT eq.)
64 g charge
(108.8 g TNT eq.)
–
0.646 kg charge
(1.1 kg TNT eq.)
689 g TNT
146 mm pen
165 mm pen
210 mm pen
110 mm pen
–
7-8 rpm
Parameters of penetration are given for 0 m and 0°.
Original T-VI gun… (source — ZA DB, Pablo Escobar’s gun table)
100 mm D-10T
APHE
HE
BR-412
BR-412B
OF-412
16 kg
15.2 kg
895 m/s
880 m/s
65 g charge
(100.1 g TNT eq.)
1.46 kg TNT
210 mm pen
215 mm pen
–
7-8 rpm
Parameters of penetration are given for 0 m and 0°.
… and a Soviet “replacement” for the T-VI-100 proposal (source — ZA DB, Pablo Escobar’s gun table)
The Soviet gun significantly surpassed the KwK 36 in terms of firepower. With comparable accuracy, it had higher penetration, muzzle velocity, and much more powerful HE shells. With all the ‘pluses’, it was only slightly inferior to the German gun in terms of rate of fire.
The larger caliber affected two technical characteristics of the vehicle, the elevation arc and the amount of ammunition. According to the author’s estimates, instead of 92 shells of 88 mm caliber in the German original, the T-VI-100 could carry only about 50 shells of 100 mm caliber. The dimensions of the breech and the shape of the barrel influenced the downward elevation arc of the gun: instead of -8° in the frontal part and -3° in the rear in the Tiger I Ausf. E, the maximum depression became -4° all around. The upward elevation arc of the gun remained the same at +15°.
Inside the turret, space became much tighter. The breech of the new gun would now occupy ~75% of the turret length instead of 50% previously.
The cannon was not the only German component replaced with a domestic one in the proposal, with the coaxial machine gun as well as the sight being changed. The German 7.92 mm MG-34 was substituted with the Soviet 7.62 mm DT with a disk magazine, while the German TFZ-9 sight was replaced by the Soviet TSh-17. In the future, the same sight would be used on IS-2 and IS-3 Soviet tanks. It can be assumed that the machine gun in the hull would also have been replaced by a DT. Although there is no documentary substantiation of this hypothesis, such a decision would have been logical.
However, many other problems remained unresolved. There was no talk of replacing the transmission, engine, and other hull components with Soviet ones, which means that repairing them would have been problematic. Obviously, if the T-VI-100 was built in metal, in field use, all the ‘charms’ of exploiting captured German vehicles by the Red Army would have been preserved to the great displeasure of the crews and mechanics.
The Fate and Prospects of the Project
In general, the project was judged positively and was approved by the High Command, but things did not move beyond the project documentation. By spring 1945, the need for such projects had disappeared due to the proximity of the end of the war in Europe.
The Tiger I itself was outdated by 1945. Its armor could no longer ‘surprise’ anyone. All this indicates that the T-VI-100, if built, could not fulfill the previous role of “heavy tank for breakthroughs”, which was performed by the Tiger I in the first years after its appearance at the front.
It seems, however, that there was another possible option for using the developments on the project, selling a “modified” version to third countries. However, the logic behind this seems flawed, as most of these, especially those that never operated such a heavy tank before, the “Tiger”, even with a 100 mm gun, would probably not have been needed (and Germany itself was already not allowed to have its own army). For the emerging Soviet-bloc countries, such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary or Poland, especially ones bordering what would in the future become NATO, the T-VI-100 might have been a good temporary stopgap for their weakened armies until Soviet supplies of T-34-85s, IS-2s, T-54s, etc. would have become the norm. It is important to keep in mind that plans including Operation Unthinkable, a British invasion of East Germany, were actively developed, and tremendously dangerous for the weakened and war-torn USSR and its satellites at that time. Moreover, the first frontier of the possible Third World War would surely have been in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, it is doubtful that rearming a quite rare and outdated captured tank type was easier and more useful for the aforementioned countries rather than waiting for the mass-produced T-34 or IS-2.
Conclusion
The project of the T-VI-100 tank, like many of its analogs, belongs to the category of “the war ended too soon”. On the one hand, although this was a fairly reasonable alternative to the simple disposal of captured vehicles, serious improvements were still required for its full-fledged and practical implementation, especially to the hull. On the other hand, for one of the tasks of the project (the aforementioned possibility of using turrets with a new gun system as stationary firing points), the existing level of development was more than enough. But such defensive systems would have also hardly been needed by the Soviet Union after 1945.
Instead of an Afterword: T-VIB-100
As mentioned above, captured King Tigers were also considered for rearming with domestic (Soviet) weapons, but these proposals were not worked on due to the lack of turrets and data on them.
Still, it can be speculated what exactly may have been included in the hypothetical ‘domestication’ of the “Tiger-B” (or “T-VIB”), as it was called in the USSR. TZF-9 sights, just like on T-VI-100, would likely have been replaced by the TSh-17. The 7.62 mm DT machine gun would have likely taken the place of the MG 34.
A more difficult question is which Soviet weapon could have replaced the German 8.8 cm KwK 43. The choice would probably have been between the 100 mm D-10 and the 122 mm D-25 tank guns (there is no sense in replacing KwK 43 with less powerful guns of smaller caliber). Since the second variant, due to its large caliber, would require a large amount of space (for the breech, counter-recoil mechanism, and ammunition), the D-10 seems to have been the most optimal alternative to the German gun.
The vehicle itself would probably have been named similarly to the T-VI-100: T-VIB-100, but “Tiger-B 100” variant is also possible. However, all this is just a hypothetical conception and speculative thought of “what-could-have-been”, and was never actually developed.
Special thanks from the author to his colleagues Andrej Sinyukovich, Pavel “Carpaticus” Alexe and Pablo Escobar.
T-VI-100 specifications table
Dimensions (L-W-H)
8.45 x 3.547 x 3 m
Total weight, battle ready
~57 tonnes
Crew
5 (commander, gunner, loader, driver, and radio operator)
Propulsion
Maybach HL 210 P.30 petrol engine (650 hp) or
Maybach HL 230 P.45 petrol engine (700 hp)
Performance
45 km/h (road max.), 30 km/h (road sustained) or
40 km/h, 20-25 km/h (firm ground sustained)
Fuel
348 liters, sufficient for a range of up to 120 km road, 85 km firm ground. Two spare 200-liter fuel drums could be carried on the back deck for long road marches.
Primary Armament
100 mm D-10T
Secondary Armament
2x 7.62 mm DT
Gunner’s sight
TSh-17
Ammunition
~50 rounds 100 mm,
~4,500 7.62 mm ammunition
Hull Armor
Driver’s plate – 100 mm @ 9º
Nose – 100 mm @ 25º
Glacis 60 mm glacis @ 80º
Hull Sides Upper – 80 mm @ 0º
Hull Sides Lower – 60 mm @ 0º
Rear – 80 mm @ 9º
Roof and Belly – 25 mm
Turret armor
Mantlet – 120 mm @ 0º
Front – 100 mm @ 5º
Sides and Rear – 80 mm @ 0º
Kingdom of Hungary (1944)
Heavy Tank – Up To 15 Received
During WWII, Hungary was one of Germany’s allies with a significant domestic production of armored vehicles. While these locally produced vehicles were fine by the standards of the early war, unfortunately for the Hungarians, by the time these were fielded in larger numbers, they were already obsolete. To bolster their ally’s firepower, during the war, the Germans supplied the Hungarians with a selection of armored vehicles, including a small number of the famed Tiger tanks in 1944.
History
By 1944, it was obvious that the Axis were on the losing side of the war, and due to the huge losses sustained while fighting on the Eastern Front, the overall military and political situation for Hungry was dire. In an attempt to leave the war, the Hungarian Regent Vice-Admiral Miklós Horthy secretly began negotiations with the Allies. It seems that this was not kept a secret, as the Germans found out about it and launched the Margarethe Operation. This was the German secret contention plan to deal with Hungary in the case its government attempted to change sides during the war. Horty was arrested and a puppet government was formed under the leadership of Dome Sztojay instead. This way, the Germans managed to force Hungarians to stay active on the Eastern Front.
The Hungarians deployed their 1st Army in support of the German front line in eastern Galicia. The 2nd Armored Division (which was part of the 1st Army) was equipped with obsolete Hungarian-built vehicles such as the Turan I and II tanks. During its first engagement with the Soviet Armor, the Turan II tanks claimed to have destroyed two T-34/85 tanks. During a short Axis offensive in this area in April, despite having a disadvantage in armor and firepower, the Hungarian tanks claimed to have destroyed 27 Soviet tanks (26 T-34/85 and 1 Sherman) with the loss of 22 of their own vehicles (8 Turan I, 9 Turan II, 4 Nimrods, 1 Toldi, and 1 Csaba armored car).
It appears that the bravery of the Hungarian tank crews was noted by the Germans. By the direct orders of General Walter Model, the Hungarian 2nd Armored Division was to be reinforced with 10 to 12 (depending on the source) Panzer IV Ausf. H, a smaller number of StuG III and even with a group of Tiger tanks.
Panzerkampfwagen ‘Tiger’ Ausf. E
The German Tiger tank is one of the most iconic tanks in history. While the development of a heavy tank began in Germany prior to the war, only after encountering the advanced Soviet tanks in 1941 was the whole program sped up. Two firms, Porsche and Henschel, were involved in designing the chassis of the new heavy tank, with Krupp being responsible for the turret and gun. While the Porsche design was favored, in the end, due to mechanical problems, the Henschel design would be adopted. The heavy tank that would be known as the Tiger was an immense vehicle, armed with the deadly 8.8 cm gun and well protected by a 100 mm thick frontal and 80 mm side armor. With its weight of 57 tonnes, it was also a fairly mobile vehicle thanks to its strong 650 hp engine and wide tracks. By the time of its introduction in 1942, few enemy weapons were able to do anything against it and, with its gun, it could efficiently destroy any enemy tank type. Its production began in August 1942 and ended in August 1944. By that time, only slightly more than 1,340 vehicles had been built.
While certainly a terrifying tank to be encountered on the battlefields, it was far from perfect and was plagued with many problems. The cost to build one was significant and this was one of the reasons why only small numbers were built. As there were never enough of them, they were allocated to separate special units that would be, depending on the need, attached to other units. The maintenance of these vehicles was time-consuming. The suspension system, while providing good drive, was overly complicated. Despite these issues, the Tiger tanks remained a potent threat to Allied tanks right up to the war’s end. Due to the small numbers available, they were regarded as elite vehicles reserved only for the German Panzerwaffe, but surprisingly few would be supplied to Germany’s allies.
Origin of the Hungarian Tigers
It is common to find information that the supplied Tiger tanks belonged to the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion (schwere Panzerabteilung, s.Pz.Abt. 503). The 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion was created in late 1942 and was initially equipped with 20 Tigers and 25 Panzer III Ausf. N. From early 1943 until April 1944, this unit was mainly engaged on the Eastern Front. Then, it was transferred to France for recuperation and conversion to Tiger II tanks. By that time, only 12 Tiger IIs were available for this unit. In order to fully equip it, 33 additional Tiger Is were allocated to this unit.
According to T. Jentz and H. Doyle (Tiger I Heavy Tank 1942-45), three Tiger tanks from the ordnance depot were delivered to the Hungarian Army on 22nd July 1944. In addition, an unknown number of Tigers were acquired from the 503rd and 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion. The 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion was formed in September 1943 and had 45 Tiger tanks. It was engaged on the Eastern Front up to September 1944, before being sent back to Germany to be reequipped with the Tiger II.
Number supplied
The total number of supplied tanks is not clear, but most sources give a number of around 10 vehicles. For example, authors C. Bescze (Magyar Steel, Hungarian Armour in WWII) and S.J.Zaloga (Tanks of Hitler’s Eastern Allies 1941-45) mention that 10 vehicles were supplied.
But, according to Dr. M. Durden (Leopard’s guide: The Tiger I tank), between 6 and 12 Tigers were used by the Hungarians. Authors C. K. Kliment and D. Bernard (Maďarská armáda 1919-1945) note that up to 15 Tiger were supplied.
To complicate matters more, authors F.W. Lochmann, R. Freiherr Von Rosen and A. Runnel (The Combat History of German Tiger Tank Battalion 503 in World War II) noted that no Tigers were ever supplied to the Hungarians! They also state that the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion gave all its surviving Tiger tanks to the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion on 14th May 1944. While they state that Hungarian crew members were trained, due to a shortage of tanks, no Tigers were given to the Hungarians. They were instead issued with Panzer IV vehicles.
Interestingly, author G. Finizio (Wheels and Tracks No.27) suggests the possibility that some Hungarian tank crews operated Tiger tanks but in German units. This significant disagreement between different authors shows how difficult finding accurate and precise information can be.
Another issue is which type of Tigers were provided by the Germans. As it was late in the war, we can assume that any Tiger that was available was used for this purpose. So it would not be a surprise if this was a mix of early to late production types.
Training
Regardless of how many vehicles were supplied by the Germans, it was essential for the Hungarian crews to receive necessary training before they could even see combat. For this reason, some members of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion served as instructors for their allies. While the majority of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion was repositioned in France, the 3rd Company was chosen for this task.
What was available of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion’s vehicles and equipment (including the 3rd Company) was therefore renamed to the 1st Tiger Demonstration Company of the 1st Panzer Demonstration Group North Ukraine. The main base of this unit was Nadworna near Stanislau in South Poland. The Hungarians provided a group of tank crew members to be trained there. The training only lasted from 6th to 14th May 1944, before the unit was disbanded. Interestingly, while it appears that during this occasion, the Hungarians did not receive any Tigers, their High Command awarded several German instructors with high military recommendations. These include Feldwebels Fritz Großmann and Herbert Schünrock, Obergefreiters Ernst Reinhardt, Gotthold Wunderlichn and Gefreiter Hans Bartels. Ironically, while the information about these recommendations was found in Hungarian archives, these awards were never actually given to the Germans instructors due to political machinations.
In combat
The Hungarian Tigers, alongside the remaining German supplied vehicles, were allocated to the 2nd Armored Division, 3rd Battalion. They were divided into two Tank Squadrons. The 2nd Tank Squadron was commanded by First Lieutenant Ervin Tarszay, probably the most famous Hungarian tank commander, and the 3rd by Captain Janos Verdess. Besides the German vehicles, the 2nd Armored Division also had some 40 Turan I and 20 Turan II tanks.
Unfortunately, information about the Hungarian Tigers’ performance in combat is hard to find. The following information is from C. Bescze (Magyar Steel Hungarian Armour in WWII) supplemented with Russian archive documents. The Hungarian Tigers’ first combat engagement took place on 26th July 1944 near Nadvornaya. It was a triumph. A single Hungarian Tiger ambushed a Soviet armored column, destroying 8 Soviet tanks, several guns, and several transport trucks. For this successful action, the Tiger’s gunner, Istvan Lavrencsik, was awarded with the Gold Medal for Bravery.
According to Russian archive sources, elements of the 1448th self-propelled artillery regiment (Samokhodno-Artilleriyskiy Polk) were caught in this ambush. A group of 5 self-propelled guns, which was supported with a reconnaissance detachment of the 985th Infantry Regiment, after leaving Nadvornaya, were on 26th July advancing toward Bogorodchany.
The Hungarians forces prepare an ambush just before the position recorded as Hill 386. After letting the infantry support pass by, they waited for the advance of the Soviet armor. When the advancing Soviet armored vehicles approached at a distance of about 200 m, the Hungarian tanks opened fire. In the ensuing engagement, the Soviets lost 2 self-propelled guns which were burned, and 2 which were knocked out, with the loss of 4 men dead and 5 more wounded. The fate of the fifth Soviet self-propelled vehicle is not clear. It could have already passed by with the reconnaissance detachment of the 985th Infantry Regiment or was left behind for some reason, but these are only speculation.
The war diary of the 1448th self-propelled artillery regiment mentioned that there were 5 enemy tanks (3 of them were Tigers) supported by an infantry company. The precise type of the Soviet vehicles participating in this encounter is not clear, but it is likely that these were the SU-122, as the Hungarians could easily misidentified them as T-34 tanks (the SU-122 was based on the T-34 chassis).
The Hungarians attempted a counterattack against the Soviets near the Ostre region. The counterattack failed and the Hungarians were forced to abandon two Tigers and one Turan II tanks at the intersection of the road in Lyakhovitsa. In total, the Soviets reported to have lost 4 self-propelled guns with 4 men dead and 8 wounded. The Soviets also reported to have burned down two enemy tanks in the Banya district. In addition, they captured 4 enemy tanks, with one Panzer IV in working condition (which was used against the enemy), destroyed 12 machine guns and 3 mortars, killed up to 150 soldiers and officers, and captured 75 enemy soldiers.
The question remains which sources to trust. For both sides it was in their interest to falsify the data for propaganda reasons.
The Hungarians Tigers are also claimed to have managed, during a 30-minute long fight, to take out around 14 Soviet tanks near “Hill 514” (possibly near Dolina), but the precise location and date of this action are not specified in the source, unfortunately. If these numbers of destroyed tanks were real or exaggerated for propaganda purposes is almost impossible to tell.
In the following days, despite these short term successes, the few Tigers could not change the overall war situation for the Hungarians. By the middle of August 1944, the Axis forces, including the Hungarian 1st Army, were pushed back to the Carpathian Mountains. It seems that, by this time, the Hungarians had lost at least 7 Tigers. While not all were combat losses, some were lost due to a general lack of fuel and spare parts. The Hungarians did not have any kind of towing vehicle capable of moving the huge Tigers, which also presented a problem with recovering any damaged vehicle. From this point on, it seems that the surviving Tiger were probably pulled back to Hungary. They may have been also returned to the Germans as author Dr. M. Durden (Leopard’s guide: The Tiger I tank) suggests, but once again the sources are conflicting.
In late August 1944, the Romanians changed sides and joined the Soviet Union and almost immediately engaged with the Hungarians in combat. The 2nd Armored Division was part of the Hungarian offensive toward Romania. If the Tigers were used there is unknown, but it is unlikely. Due to the increasing presence of the Soviet Army, the Hungarians were beaten back.
The 2nd Armored Division would be reinforced with new German vehicles, including Panther tanks. The Panthers were used by the 2nd Tank Squadron commanded by First Lieutenant Ervin Tarszay. The majority of the 2nd Armored Division would be destroyed during the siege of Budapest. The few elements that avoided destruction managed to reach Slovakia, where the last armored vehicles were blown up by their crews.
The final fate of the Hungarian Tigers is not clear. Author C. Bescze (Magyar Steel Hungarian Armour in WWII) notes that the last three vehicles were lost in Transylvania due to a lack of fuel and supplies.
Author G. Finizio (Wheels and Tracks No.27) claims that at least 4 Tigers were reported to be in repair in December 1944. By the end of January 1945, one Tiger was reported to be still operational.
Conclusion
The Tigers were the strongest armored vehicles that the Hungarian tank armored force operated during the war. While certainly deadly, it was supplied in too small numbers and too late to really have an influence on the war’s development. Despite fielding obsolete tanks, the Hungarians managed to destroy many Soviet tanks. This shows that, while the Hungarians lacked modern equipment, they did not lack effective tank crews. Had the Germans supplied them much earlier in the war with more modern equipment, the Hungarian tank force may have been a more important element in the war in the East.
Hungarian Tiger Ausf.E from the 3rd Regiment, Ukraine, near Nadvirna, May 1944
Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger Sd.Kfz.181, ‘Tiger I’ specifications
Dimensions
Height: 8.45 m Long x 3.23 m Wide (rail transport) x 3.547 m Wide (normal tracks) x 3 m Height
Weight
54 tonnes (combat), 57 tonnes by February 1944
Crew
5 (commander, gunner, loader, driver, and radio operator)
Engine
Maybach model HL 210 TRM P45 21-litre V-12 petrol engine producing 650 hp at 3000 rpm (early production vehicles), Maybach model HL 230 TRM P45 V-12 700 hp petrol engine (later production vehicles)
Ford
1.5 m without preparation – submersible to 4.5 m with preparation (vehicles prior to August 1942)
Performance
45 km/h (road max.), 30 km/h (road sustained), after February 1944 this was 40 km/h, 20-25 km/h (firm ground sustained)
Fuel
348 litres sufficient for a range of up to 120 km road, 85 km firm ground. Two spare 200-litre fuel drum could be carried on the back deck for long road marches.
Armament
8.8 cm Kw.K. 36 L/56 gun, coaxial 7.92 mm M.G. 34, hull mounted M.G. 34, roof mounted anti-aircraft M.G. 34
Ammunition
92 rounds 8.8 cm, ~4,500 – 4,800 rounds 7.92 mm ammunition
After the invasions of September 1939, Poland was occupied and split between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, the occupation did not stop the Polish people from continuing to resist. Soon after the occupation, the Home Army (Polish: Armia Krajowa) was established, an underground resistance group.
Their most notable action would be during the Warsaw Uprising, which started on August 1st 1944 at 5 PM. The organizers of the Uprising hoped that the Soviets, who were near Warsaw, would help them, but the Red Army stopped just 10 km from the city. The first days of the Uprising went well for the Home Army, thanks, in part, to the capture of German vehicles, including two Panthers and a Jagdpanzer 38(t).
The Uprising tragically ended on October 2nd, 1944, leaving tens of thousands of civilians and thousands of troops on both sides dead. The city was razed to the ground by the Germans as a way to punish the Poles who had rebelled against them. The city would be rebuilt after the War by a new pro-Soviet Communist government.
In contrast to the insurgents, the occupying German soldiers were well equipped. German tanks, although not designed for urban combat, were powerful and terrifying weapons that were able not only to crush the insurgent’s barricades but also weaken morale by their mere presence on the battlefield. The anti-tank weapons available to the insurgents were scarce, although they did use grenades and Molotov cocktails in their attempt to destroy the enemy’s tanks.
For the Polish forces of the Uprising, the most treasured vehicles were full-armored troop carriers, such as the famous “Kubuś” armored car or captured German Sd.Kfz.251 half-tracks. One of these captured half-tracks, later known as “Szary Wilk” (eng. Gray Wolf) was additionally armored. At this time, even the German Army had no heavy vehicle specialized for urban warfare, as even the Sturmtiger, two of which were used against the Insurgents, was only in its troop trials phase as a vehicle.
The Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger, built in August 1942, is one of the most famous tanks in the world. Its powerful 88 mm KwK 36 L/56 cannon and strong armor had allowed Tiger to dominate the battlefield and overwhelm Allied tanks until late in the war. The participation of Tigers in the Warsaw Uprising is disputed.
Some Polish sources mention that the Germans used about 5 to 11 Tiger I’s, but other sources deny the use of Tiger I’s in the Warsaw Uprising altogether. It seems that the Tiger I would have been of little use in the built-up areas, as these slow and massive juggernauts were designed mainly for longer-range engagements. What is more, Tiger I losses during the Uprising are also disputed, with some sources mentioning a few destroyed tanks, while other sources claim that no Tiger I was destroyed and some were merely damaged and fixed soon after.
This confusing set of Polish sources is contradicted by the diaries of Tiger units, none of them were involved in the fight against the Insurgents. Heavy Panzer Battalions in Eastern front (509th, 507th, 505th, 501st, 502nd) were fighting in different locations during the Uprising, so it is almost assured that the only Tigers that participated in the Warsaw Uprising were two Sturmtigers.
Some Polish sources even mention that one Tiger I was captured although it does not claim it saw combat. This particular version of the story of this captured “Tiger” tank is peculiar and contradictory, which raises questions about whether the insurgents really captured such a heavy tank or they mistook another vehicle for a Tiger.
The Insurgent Tiger of Ochota District
The capture
On August 4th (3 days after the Uprising began), a German convoy composed of two tanks and a few armored cars and half-tracks was moving eastwards from the area of Narutowicz Square toward Okęcie. Insurgents attacked the convoy and succeeded in isolating the two tanks from the rest of the vehicles in the convoy. These tanks turned onto Barska Street and then onto Kaliska Street. The insurgents were already waiting for them equipped with Panzerfausts that had been seized a few days earlier during an engagement with the Germans in the school near Radomska Street. One of the ambushers, Sergeant Jan Ostrowski “Osa” (“eng. Wasp”), was hiding behind the fence of 9 Kaliska Street and attacked the first tank with his Panzerfaust.
The rocket missed its target and instead struck a telephone pole, or, according to other sources, a street lamp which fell on the advancing tank. The crew of the German tank panicked and attempted to evacuate to the second tank, but only one man of the crew would manage this, with the others being killed by the insurgents’ fire. The second tank retreated to Narutowicz Square, allegedly being damaged. This is the vehicle identified in the story as a Tiger and it is this abandoned vehicle that was seized by the Insurgents.
Examination of the new weapon
In the captured tank, the insurgents found a few thousand rounds of 7.92 mm ammo, three machine pistols, 25 grenades, and a number of shells claimed to be of 8.8 cm caliber. As the tank itself was a rare and valuable prize, the insurgents planned to use it against the Germans. Lieutenant Jerzy Kołodziejski “Nieczuja” started the ‘Tiger’ and drove it into the safe area of Barska Street. The insurgents also chose the crew for the captured tank – the only known one is senior ogniomistrz (firemaster) Stefan Czapiński/Czapliński “Bór” (“Thicket”), who took up the position of gunner.
The insurgents, excited by their capture of an intact tank, planned to use it to break out from Ochota to the Śródmieście district, where other units were fighting. They also planned to use it to recapture the Warsaw University of Technology which had been captured by the Germans. However, their plans were shattered by the tomfoolery of one young man.
A powerful tank vs. one overly enthusiastic boy
Unfortunately, during dinner time, a young guard (who apparently was not even a fighting insurgent, just a Polish scout) climbed into the tank and started it in an attempt to drive the vehicle. According to other sources, one young insurgent was playing with the tank’s cannon, accidentally firing it, as a result destroying several captured cars. During this short ride, the unlucky ‘driver’ damaged the tank’s controls, which disabled the whole vehicle.
As a result, the tank was abandoned after dismounting all the machine guns and ammunition (propellant from the cannon’s shells was still useful for grenades). The alleged ‘Tiger’ was eventually blown up by the Germans on August 9th. To do this, the Germans used a self-propelled Sd.Kfz.302 (or 303) Goliath remote-control mine, but the Insurgents managed to cut the control cable of the first Goliath. The second Goliath fulfilled the task and blew the tank up – as well as a big part of a nearby home.
The doubts: was it a Tiger?
Even without the contradictions mentioned above, some details make the whole story about the Pz.Kpfw.VI Tiger captured by Warsaw Insurgents doubtful:
Sources generally deny a Tiger’s usefulness in urban counter-insurgency operations. Also, no Heavy Tank Battalions were engaged in the Warsaw region.
Barska Street was very narrow and it would be dangerous and difficult for such a heavy tank to drive through. One of the most questionable points of the story is that the collision with a wooden telephone pole made a skilled German tank crew to abandon their tank and run through enemy fire.
The Panzer VI Tiger was a very advanced and complex tank, with a crew of 5 men. The story states that one young untrained insurgent managed to not only start the engine, but also drive the tank and even fire the heavy 88 mm cannon. This is probably too much of a stretch to believe.
Some insurgents mention that this tank was indeed a Panzer V Panther but these look nothing like the much more ‘square’ Tiger. Panthers were, however, used by the Germans against the Warsaw Insurgents. Also, the insurgents captured and used two of these tanks in another part of Warsaw, so the capture of a third one is plausible.
Conclusion
The story of the captured and, unfortunately for the insurgents, unused tank is presented in a lot of sources, but the exact type of tank is questionable at best. Warsaw Insurgents – as many WWII soldiers on the Eastern and Western European fronts – used ‘Tiger’ many different types of German tanks. Due to its powerful armor and armament (but also thanks to the Nazi propaganda), the Panzer VI Tiger was very famous in its time – as it is famous today.
It is possible therefore that this captured tank was not a famous ‘Tiger’, but something more commonly encountered, such as a Panzerkampfwagen IV or a Panther. On the day of the mentioned tank capture, a convoy of such tanks was traveling through the Ochota District and fought against the Insurgents. Also, the additional ‘Schürzen’ armor made the Panzer IV look similar to the Tiger to the untrained eye, increasing its apparent size. The Warsaw Insurgents may just have mistaken the famous tank with an upgraded Panzerkampfwagen IV. With no photographs to support the ‘Tiger’ claim and with no records of any Tiger-equipped units in the vicinity it is highly unlikely that the tank captured on Barska Street was a Tiger. The capture of a tank is not disputed but what tank it was may never be known.
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Kingdom of Hungary (1942)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 5 Supplied
Hungary was after Italy, Germany’s European ally with the most significant domestic production of armored vehicles. While these vehicles were fine by the standards of the early war, unfortunately for the Hungarians, by the time these were fielded in larger numbers, they were already obsolete. To bolster their ally’s firepower, in 1942, the Germans supplied the Hungarians with a group of five Marder II tank destroyers.
History
The Hungarians officially signed the Tripartite Pact to join the Axis forces on 27th September 1940. By the time of the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the Hungarians had the largest armored force of all German allies on this front. By the end of 1941, their armored formations had been decimated by the more advanced Soviet T-34 and KV tanks. The Hungarian mostly fielded lightly armed tanks, such as the Toldi and T-38, which were almost useless against the Soviet tanks. To rebuild its shattered force, the Hungarian high command tried to implement the ‘Huba II’ military plan. This plan involved the formation of two new units, the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions.
Despite being unprepared, having suffered heavy losses and losing most of its armored formations, the Hungarian high command was hard-pressed by the Germans to send additional forces to the Eastern Front. The Hungarian high command chose to send the 2nd Army, which consisted of 9 light divisions and the 1st Field Armored Division. As there was a general lack of modern equipment, especially tanks, the formation of the 1st Field Armored Division was too slow. Despite German promises of modern equipment, the Hungarian were instead supplied with 102-108 (depending on the source) Panzer 38(t)’s (known in Hungarian service as T-38) and 22 better armed Panzer IV Ausf. F1’s. These vehicles were attached to the 30th Tank Regiment. The 1st Field Armored Division was also supplied with 19 Nimrod anti-tank/aircraft vehicles, 14 Csaba armored cars and 17 Toldi light tanks, with 4 rebuilt Toldi tanks that were used for medical roles.
By October 1942, due to heavy losses, only 4 Panzer IV and 22 T-38 were reported to be operational. To reinforce the Hungarian allies, the Germans provided them with 10 Panzer III Ausf. N’s, and a small number of Panzer IV Ausf. F2’s and G’s. In December (September and even January 1943 depending on the source) 1942, the Germans supplied the Hungarians with five Marder II vehicles.
Marder II
The Marder II was a tank destroyer (panzer jager – tank hunter) based on a modified Panzer II Ausf. F tank chassis. The Panzer II was developed to overcome the many shortcomings of the previous Panzer I model. While the Germans would eventually develop more powerful and advanced vehicles, such as the Panzer III and IV, due to their initial slow production, the Panzer II served as the backbone of the Panzer formations in the early stages of the war. By 1942, due to attrition and obsolescence, Panzer II numbers began to dwindle and the surviving vehicles were reused for other purposes, most notably for the Marder II and Wespe self-propelled guns.
The Panzer II could be easily converted into Marder II by simply removing most of the upper superstructure and the tank turret. In its place, a 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun with a three-sided shield was placed instead. In total, some 531-576 new Marder II would be built, but smaller numbers (68-75) would be built by converting older and damaged vehicles and few would even be built by frontline troops. While the Marder II had many issues, it did solve the problem of the lack of mobility of the strong but heavy 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun. While this vehicle had several different official names, like Pz.Kpfw.II als Sfl. mit 7.5 cm PaK 40 (Sd.KFz.131), it is generally best known today simply as the ‘Marder II’.
In combat
The Marder IIs supplied to the Hungarians were used to form an 1. Önálló páncélvadász század (1st independent tank-destroyer company) under the command of Captain Pál Zergényi. This unit base of operation was near Pushkino (Пушкино), where few German officers were present to help with the necessary crew training.
At the start of 1943, the Hungarian 1st Armored Division was put under direct German command as part of the Cramer-Corps. At that time, the total armored strength of this unit consisted of 9 Panzer III Ausf. N’s, 8 Panzer Ausf. IV F2’s and G’s, 8 Panzer IV Ausf. F1’s, 41 T-38’s and the 5 Marder II’s. The Cramer-Corps, beside the Hungarian Armored Division, consisted of the 26th and 168th Infantry Divisions, the German 190th Assault Gun Detachment and 700th Armor Detachment. The commander of the Cramer-Corps was Major General Hans Cramer.
In mid-January 1943, the Soviets launched an offensive against the Hungarian positions and, after heavy losses, forced them to retreat. The fighting was extensive around the city of Alekseyevka (west of the Don River, between Voronezh and Kharkov), which the Hungarian 1st Armored Division, with the help of the German 559th Anti-Tank Battalion, were ordered to take back. The attack began on 18th January 1943 and, during this attack, a Hungarian Marder II managed to destroy a Soviet T-60 tank. The next day, the Soviets made a counter-attack which was repelled with the loss of a T-34 destroyed by a Marder II and a T-60 destroyed by a Panzer IV. But, despite their success, the Axis forces were forced to retreat out of Alekseyevka.
On 21st January, the Axis forces again managed to enter the western parts of Alekseyevka. The Soviet attempts to drive them out were unsuccessful, with the loss of 150 to 200 men and one armored car destroyed by a German Marder II. The next day, the Hungarian Marder II’s managed to destroy one T-34 and a T-60 tank and stop the Soviet counter-attack. During the period of late January and early February 1943, the Hungarian 1st Armored Division saw extensive combat action against the advancing Soviet Forces. By 9th February 1943, three Marder II were lost, and only two were left operational. These were one of the last armored vehicles that the 1st Armored Division still had as it was withdrawn from the front in February 1943.
The remaining Marder IIs were returned to Germany in the summer of 1943. Their usage between their withdrawal from the front and their return to the Germans is unknown. At least one was used for evaluation purposes by the Hungarians. This may suggest that the two surviving vehicles may have been withdrawn from the front.
Other Marder series vehicles in Hungarian service
According to some internet sources, it appears that the Germans also provided the Hungarian with at least one (or more) 7.62 cm PaK 36(r) auf Fgst. PzKpfw.II(F) (Sfl.) (Sd.KFz. 132) Marder II, which was based on the Panzer II flamm tank chassis. This vehicle had a completely different suspension system and was armed with modified captured Soviet 7.62 cm field guns. This was probably supplied with the other Marder IIs at the end of 1942. It is not clear if this vehicle is included in the five previously mentioned Marder II. Sadly there is no more information about this vehicle in Hungarian service.
Tank historian S. J. Zaloga (Tanks of the Hitler’s Eastern Allies 1941-45) also mentions that, in August 1944, the Germans reinforced the Hungarian 1st Cavalry Division with a battery of Marder vehicles. While he does not mention precisely which Marder version is in question.
Toldi páncélvadász
During 1943, while the two surviving Marder II were transported back to Germany, at least one of them was instead sent to the Haditechnikai Intézet (Hungarian Institution of Military Technology) for further studying and evaluation. Very soon, an idea to mount the German 7.5 cm PaK 40 on an obsolete Toldi tank chassis was formed. One prototype would be built, which greatly resembled the Marder II. While it appears that this project did not receive any official designation, it is referred to as Toldi páncélvadász (Toldi tank hunter). The Toldi turret and most parts of the upper structure were removed and, in their place, a new three-sided armored superstructure was added. The 7.5 cm gun was then placed on top of the Toldi hull, with the ammunition bin stored in the back, on top of the engine compartment. The one prototype would be tested but the results were probably unsatisfactory and the project was never implemented.
Conclusion
The Marder IIs provided the Hungarian with a means to effectively fight the Soviet Armor. But, as only a few were supplied, their impact on the overall poor condition of the Hungarian Armored Formations in the Soviet Union was essentially imperceptible. The Hungarian attempts to develop and build their own self-propelled anti-tank vehicles based on the Marder II did not take them anywhere.
Kingdom of Hungary (1942)
Medium Tank – 105-111 Supplied
During WWII, the Hungarians were one of Germany’s allies which had a significant domestic production of armored vehicles. While these locally produced vehicles were fine by the standards of the early war, unfortunately for the Hungarians, by the time they were fielded in larger numbers, they were already obsolete. To bolster their ally’s firepower, in 1942, the Germans supplied the Hungarians with a selection of armored vehicles, including over 100 Panzer 38(t) tanks.
History
The Hungarians officially signed the Tripartite Pact to join the Axis forces on 27th September 1940. By the time of the Invasion of the Soviet Union, in June 1941, the Hungarian Army (Honvéd) had the largest armored force of all the German allies on this front. By the end of 1941, the Hungarians fielded light tanks, which were of little use against the newer Soviet tanks. To rebuild its shattered force, the Hungarian High Command tried to implement the ‘Huba II’ military plan. This plan involved the formation of two new units, the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions.
Despite being unprepared and having suffered heavy losses, including much of its armored formations, the Hungarian High Command was hard-pressed by the Germans to send additional forces to the Eastern Front. The Hungarian High Command chose to send the 2nd Army, which consisted of 9 light divisions and the 1st Field Armored Division (1.páncélos hadosztály). As there was a general lack of modern equipment, especially tanks, the formation of the 1st Field Armored Division was too slow. Despite German promises of modern equipment, the Hungarians were instead supplied with 102-108 (depending on the source) Panzer 38(t) Ausf. F and G (known in Hungarian service as the T-38, but also classified as a medium tank) and 22 better armed Panzer IV Ausf. F1 (classified as a heavy tank in Hungarian service). Among the acquired T-38s, some 38 were command vehicles with better radio equipment (Fu 2 radio receiver which was standard for all T-38 and a Fu 5 transmitter) and reduced secondary armament of one machine gun. The Germans also provided the Hungarians crews with necessary training at the Wünsdorf military school.
In Hungarian service, the T-38s received three-digit numbers, which was painted on the turret rear side. In addition, on the hull, a slightly modified German Balkenkreuz was painted. The difference is the color of the central cross was painted in green (instead of the original black) on a red background.
The 1st Field Armored Division had, in total, 89 T-38s and all the 22 Panzer IVs, which were allocated to the 30th Tank Regiment. The 1st Armored Reconnaissance Battalion of this division was equipped with 14 Csaba armored cars and 17 Toldi light tanks, with 4 rebuilt Toldi tanks being used for medical support roles. In addition, there was the 51st Armored Autocannon Battalion, also known as the 51st Tank Hunter Battalion, which was equipped with 18-19 Nimrod anti-tank/aircraft vehicles. The Hungarian 2nd Army was tasked with supporting the German left flank advancing toward Stalingrad.
The Panzer 38(t)
The TNH – LT vz. 38 tank was developed and built by the Czech ČKD company (Českomoravska Kolben Danek) in the second half of the nineteen-thirties. Production of the vz. 38 began in late 1938 but, by the time of the German annexation of Czech territory, not a single tank had been taken over by the Czech Army. Germany captured many brand new vz.38 tanks and, in May 1939, a delegation was sent to the ČKD factory to examine their operational potential. The Germans were so impressed with this tank that they were quickly introduced into Wehrmacht service under the name Pz.Kpfw.38(t) or simply Panzer 38(t). The ČKD factory was completely taken over for the needs of the German Army under the new name BMM (Bohmisch-Mahrische Maschinenfabrik).
The Panzer 38(t) was built in relatively large numbers, saw combat action from Poland to the end of the war and was considered an effective tank for its class. But, from late 1941 on, it became obvious that it was becoming obsolete as a first-line combat tank. The Panzer 38(t) chassis, on the other hand, was mechanically reliable and was highly suitable for use for other purposes, a fact which the Germans exploited to the maximum. Over 100 Panzer 38(t) Ausf. F and G tanks, which had stronger 50 mm armor, were supplied by the Germans to their Hungarian allies in an attempt to rebuild their armored formation.
In combat
The majority of the Hungarian 2nd Army was engaged in the advance toward the city of Stalingrad, ‘Operation Blau’, in May 1942. The 1st Armored Division was not involved in these initial combat operations, as its elements did not reach the front line until June and July. The reason for this delay was the general lack of fuel and transport vehicles.
The 1st Armored Division’s initial position was in the Uryv-Pokrovka, Storozhevoye area, on the western banks of the Don River. Its first orders were to crush a Soviet bridgehead defended by the 130th Tank Brigade. The Hungarian attack, which began on 18th July, was spearheaded by elements of the 30th Tank Regiment and 51st Tank Hunter Battalion. The Hungarian Panzer IVs managed to destroy a Soviet T-34, followed by more Soviet tank losses, mostly T-34s and American supplied M3 Stuart tanks. Being lightly armored, the M3 Stuart tanks could be destroyed by the T-38’s 3.7 cm guns. A Hungarian correspondent who was in one of the T-38s during this offensive later wrote down in his memories:
“… We carried on and entered the light of a burning farm just at the worst moment. A stack stirred and approached us. As the straw fell behind a Soviet tank appeared in front of us…. It was a medium tank (a M3 Stuart tank) firing two shots at us. None of them got us, we were still alive! But our second shot did hit it! … As I spied out of the turret I couldn’t see any Hungarian tank losses. But my joy was too early: my headphones asked for a doctor. ‘Tank number 591 got hit. We need a doctor!’ I could see through my binoculars that a major from the staff reached the damaged vehicle and lifted the injured men over into his tank under heavy fire. Quite a few enemy tanks opened fire on them and we tried to cover them as well as we could from the distance. We were much relieved when the doctor’s tank arrived and that the damaged tank hadn’t fallen into enemy hands. It didn’t catch fire either and was towed away. ”
The Soviet bridgehead was eventually destroyed by the afternoon. The Soviet losses were 21 destroyed tanks. The majority of these were destroyed by the Panzer IVs. The Nimrod vehicles destroyed 6 tanks and the remaining 3 were destroyed by the T-38s. During the Soviet retreat, their losses climbed to 35 tanks, with at least 4 captured M3 light tanks. The Hungarian losses were minimal, with only two damaged but recovered T-38 tanks. Of the 4 captured M3s, one was sent back to Hungary for evaluation and the remaining were used to tow the damaged T-38’s.
By the end of July, the Hungarians were confronted by the 261st and the 260th Tank Battalions (both belonging to the 130th Tank Brigade). The 260th Tank Battalion had organized two centers of resistance. The first ,supported with 3 M3 and 5 T-60 tanks, was located 1.2 km northwards from the forest which lies 2 km northwards from the village of Miginevo. It was intended to support the actions of the composite battalion of the 24th Motor Rifle Brigade. The second point of resistance was supported with 7 T-34, positioned in the North-Western outskirts of Miginevo, ready to provide fire support in the direction of Titchiha – Selyavnoe. The total armored strength of the 260th Tank Battalion was 3 M3, 5 T-60 and 7 T-34 tanks. The 261st Tank Battalion had its 10 T-60 concentrated at the North-Eastern edge of the wood 2 km westwards from the village of Davydovka. Another 17 T-60 tanks were concentrated in the woods 500 m to the South-East from the village of Drakino. In total, this unit had 27 T-60 tanks.
Some elements of the 1st Armored Division were engaged in the battle for Storozhevoye on 10th August. There, a poorly prepared attack led to the loss of 10 T-38s, of which 3 could not be recovered. Interestingly, these three abandoned Hungarian T-38 tanks (known by the Soviets as 38T) would be evacuated during the night of 10/11 August by the Soviet 260th Tank Battalion. The 1st Armored Division’s next action was the attempt to stop the Soviet attack near the city of Korotoyak. For this, elements from the 1st Armored Division were sent to support the Hungarian defensive.
The battle against Soviet forces resumed on 15th August, when the Hungarian forces managed to inflict on the Soviets the following losses: 3 knocked out M3 Stuarts, 3 burned and 3 knocked out T-60s, 1 knocked out 38T (reused by the Soviets) and one T-34, which took severe damage including a jammed turret and bent gun barrel.
The Hungarians also lost a Panzer IV and at least three T-38s. One of these T-38s was destroyed by a Soviet Sergeant, V. Panganis, who, after his 45 mm anti-tank gun was destroyed, took a few AT grenades and jumped under the tank, blowing himself and the Hungarian vehicle up. Two more Soviet tanks were destroyed by the end of the day, with the loss of three additional T-38s. One was destroyed by a Soviet T-34 and the remaining two, ironically, by German anti-tank fire. In the following days of harsh battle for Korotoyak, the Hungarian losses increased to 55 T-38s and 15 Panzer IVs. Of these numbers, some 35 vehicles were under maintenance and repairable. The 1st Armored Division was eventually pulled back from Korotoyak due to increased losses. The Germans provided the Hungarians with four Panzer Ausf. F2 tanks fitted with the longer 7.5 cm gun. By the end of August, the 1st Armored Division total strength was around 85 T-38s, 22 Panzer IVs and at least 5 Toldi tanks.
T-38 destroyed a T-34
At the start of September, the Hungarians made another attempt to crush the Soviet positions around Uryv-Korotoyak. The attack began on 9th September, supported by the German 168th Infantry Division and the 201st Assault Gun Detachment. As the Soviet positions were well defended, the attack was proceeding at a slow pace. A Hungarian Tank Battalion was sent to support the attack on the Soviet positions at Storozhevoye, which were defended by T-34 tanks. During the fighting, a T-38 commanded by Sergeant Janos Csizmadia came across a T-34 that was attacking the German rear positions. Sergeant Janos Csizmadia reacted quickly and fired at the T-34 at close range. The T-38’s 3.7 cm armor-piercing round managed to pierce the T-34’s rear armor and the tank exploded. This was one of the few occasions where the T-38’s weak gun managed to destroy a T-34. By the end of the day, Sergeant Janos Csizmadia, encouraged by this success, managed to personally destroy two enemy bunkers with hand grenades but also to capture at least 30 demoralized Soviet soldiers. For his action, he was awarded the Great Silver Medal for Bravery.
Continuous battle for Uryv and Korotoyak
After two days of hard fighting, the Axis forces finally managed to capture the entirety of Storozhevoye on 11th September, with the further loss of two Hungarian T-38s. The Axis attacked the Soviet bunker positions in the Otitchiha hamlet.
Because they were too well defended, the first attack was repulsed, with many Hungarian tanks being damaged or put out of action. The next day, the Axis forces attacked from another direction. As the heavy Soviet bunkers were immune to the 3.7 cm guns, the crews would often destroy these bunkers by using hand grenades. The attack eventually succeeded and the German 168th Infantry Division set up defensive positions there. The Soviets made a counter-attack supported by heavy KV-1 and T-34 tanks. The Hungarian tanks were ordered to resist this attack. The following engagement was mostly one-sided, as the Hungarian 3.7 cm guns proved useless during this combat. The desperate situation was later described by Corporal Moker in his diary.
“ …. We pushed ahead until we reached the Headquarters of the German Infantry… A Russian tank (KV-1C) appeared ahead of us from the wheat-field and opened heavy fire on us. Yet comrade Nyerges, our gunner, was quick to answer. He managed to gun superbly and we watched his moves trustfully. We retired a few meters and so did the enemy. Nyerges sent one tank-grenade after the other. He shook his head, something must have been wrong. He kept on loading and firing and we were stifling from the smoke. It seemed that we were unable to break the armor of that tank, its thick and slanting skin resisted everything, thus all our efforts were in vain. Nyerges stopped for a moment and took a deep breath. He was dripping with sweat. This helplessness was terrible! … In the meantime, the enemy tank retired. We started to hope. I could hear a terrible detonation and felt as if I was rising. I was struggling desperately to stand up and open the roof but my throat microphone’s cord held me back. Helping hands rescued me from my imprisonment, pulling me out by the arm. I fell in front of the vehicle. I felt a burning pain at the back of my head but I didn’t pay attention to it… “
The same KV-1 destroyed another T-38 which was nearby. By the end of the day, the Hungarian losses were extensive and only 22 T-38s and 4 Panzer IVs were still operational. The Soviets lost 8 T-34 tanks and two KV-1s were damaged. Between 14th to 16th September, all Soviet counter-attacks were repulsed with losses of 18 T-34 and 6 KV-1 tanks. Some fell victim to Hungarian fire, but also to the firepower of German supporting assault guns. Nevertheless, on 16th September, the Hungarian 30th Tank Regiment had only 12 T-38s and 2 Panzer IVs operational.
By October 1942, in order to reinforce their Hungarian allies, the Germans provided them with 10 Panzer III Ausf. N tanks and 6 Panzer IV Ausf. F2 and G. The next larger engagement of the Hungarian armor with the Soviet happened on 19th October near Storozhevoye. The Hungarian tankers managed to destroy 4 Soviet tanks.
From that point on, the 1st Armored Division was put into reserve for rest and refurbishment. In December (or September depending on the source) 1942, the Germans supplied the Hungarians with five Marder II vehicles and at least three more Panzer 38(t) Ausf. C tanks. At the start of 1943, the Hungarian 1st Armored Division was put under direct German command, under the Cramer-Corps. At that time, the total armored strength of this unit consisted of 9 Panzer III Ausf. N, 8 Panzer Ausf. F2 and G, 8 Panzer IV Ausf. F1, 41 T-38s and the 5 Marder II tank destroyers. The Cramer-Corps, beside the Hungarian Armored Division, consisted of the 26th and 168th Infantry Divisions, the German 190th Assault Gun Detachment and 700th Armor Detachment. The commander of the Cramer-Corps was Major General Hans Cramer.
The Soviet Winter offensive
In mid-January 1943, the Soviets launched an offensive against the Hungarian positions and, after heavy losses, forced them to retreat. The Soviet tanks caused chaos in the Hungarian lines. The German 700th Armored Detachment (equipped with Panzer 38(t) tanks) was also decimated on the way. The Soviets then engaged the Hungarian 12th Field Artillery Regiment, which they destroyed, but the Soviets lost 9 tanks in the process. The low temperatures of -20 to -30°C also caused important losses to the Hungarians. Nevertheless, the Soviets were forced to stop their attack due to significant tank losses. During the Soviet offensive, many T-38s were blown up by their crews due to a general lack of fuel and breakdowns. For example, the 1st Tank Brigade alone had to blow up 17 T-38 tanks.
The fighting was extensive around the city of Alekseyevka (west of the Don river), which the Hungarian 1st Armored Division, with the help of the German 559th Anti-Tank Battalion, were ordered to take back. The attack began on 18th January 1943, and after heavy fighting, Alekseyevka was taken by the Axis forces. The next day, the Soviets made a counter-attack which was repelled with the loss of a T-34 destroyed by a Marder II and a T-60 destroyed by a Panzer IV. Despite their success, the Axis forces were forced to retreat out of Alekseyevka. On 21st January 1943, the Axis forces again managed to enter the western parts of the city of Alekseyevka. But the 1st Armored Division had to retreat and, on 25th January, reached Noviy Oskol. For the remainder of January and early February, the 1st Armored Division fought many hard battles with the advancing Soviets. During the fighting around the city of Korocha, the last operational T-38 was lost. Without ammunition, it was attacked by two T-60s and one T-34. By 9th February, the 1st Armored Division reached the river Donets and eventually reached Kharkov. Due to extensive losses, this division had to be pulled back from the front. The last remaining operational vehicles were two Marder II tank destroyers.
The remaining T-38s that managed to avoid destruction were mostly used in Hungary for crew training. They may have seen some more action during the Soviet advance towards Hungary by the war’s end, but in any case, these were already obsolete.
In Russian hands
It appears that the Soviet 130th Tank Brigade, during their fighting with the Hungarian armed forces, managed to capture at least three T-38s tanks. The war diary of the Soviet 260th Tank Battalion (which was part of the 130th Tank Brigade) stated that, on 9th August 1942, the unit had three T-34, three M3 Light and fifteen T-60 tanks (21 operational tanks in total). On the same day, the battalion took up a defensive position at the edge of the forest northwards from Hills 171,6 and 195,5. By 18:00, the battalion, including tanks, was ‘fully entrenched’. Three T-34 tanks were allocated to defend the village of Miginevo. On the next day, 10 August, at 5:30 in the morning, the battle started with heavy shelling. At 9:00, the enemy put into action 27 tanks, but after losing 16 of them, the enemy was forced to retreat. The 260th Tank Battalion reported no losses during this engagement.
On the 10th August 1942, the Axis forces advanced in the area Storozhevoye – Hill 186,6. Multiple tank-infantry attacks were repulsed. The 260th Tank Battalion, acting as a part of the 24th Motor Rifle Brigade, defended an area in the South-Western part of the forest to West of the hamlet of Titchiha (Otitchiha). As a result of the engagement, the 260th Tank Battalion reported 1 enemy tank knocked out and 1 burned. Also, 25 enemy soldiers were reported as casualties.
The report also noted that First Lieutenant HOMENKO (originally ‘HOMENK’, one letter probably missing), commander of the tank company of the 260th Tank Battalion, ‘organized defense right’, which eventually helped to hold the ground. On the same day (10th August), the I/130 MSPB (Motostrelkovo-Pulemyotnyj Bataljon, Motor-Rifle Machine-Gun Battalion) took up a defensive position near the Hill 187,7 and also fought as a part of 24 Motor Rifle Brigade.
On the night of 10/11 August, the 260th Tank Battalion managed to evacuate from the battlefield 3 knocked-out 38T tanks. Two of them were repaired during the next day (11 August 1942) and put into Soviet service. On the 13th August, the 260th Tank Battalion had three T-34, three M3 Light, 15 T-60 and 2 captured 38T tanks (one of the 38Ts finished repair by 18:00 on the same day).
The Soviet forces on the 14th August received a verbal order to move during the night and concentrate in the area south-west of the village of Goldayevka. The task was to advance in the direction of Hill 160,2 – Goldayevka. The force allocated to that attack consisted of one T-34, three M3 Light, ten T-60 and the two captured 38Ts.
On the next day, 15th August, at 5:00, the 260th Tank Battalion arrived at the area of operations and reconnoitered it. At 6:00, the Battalion started to advance in the direction of Hill 160,2 keeping the line formation. After heavy fighting, the battalion commander reported that the enemy lost 4 anti-tank guns, 3 machine guns, 2 mortars and at least 25 soldiers and officers.
The 260th Battalion had lost two T-60 tanks, with one completely burned out. The second tank was recovered and repaired. The 260th Battalion managed to eventually capture Hill 160,2, but was later forced to retreat as it was lacking infantry support.
Another attack started at 15:30. The Battalion still possessed one damaged T-34, three M3, eight T-60 and one captured 38T. Again, the commander reported enemy losses as follows: 6 anti-tank guns, 2 mortars, 3 cars, and up to 100 enemy soldiers and officers. Soviet losses included at that time three knocked-out M3 (all later recovered), one knocked out 38T and one destroyed T-60 which was left on the battlefield. In the following attack, despite having infantry support, Hill 160,2 was not captured and Soviet forces fell back. At 18:00, the Battalion withdrew from the battle. Its War Diary mentioned another one 38T “destroyed and left on the battlefield” as well as stress, that ‘T-60s don’t fit to be used in the first line of attack’.
This information could be corroborated with the 130th Tank Brigade report. According to that document, on the 15th August, the 260th Tank Battalion lost one of two operational 38T tanks during the first attack on Hill 160,2 which commenced at 7:00. The second 38T was lost during the next attack initiated at 15:30 in order to recapture the same hill.
Total claimed enemy losses at the end of the 15th August were 12 AT-guns, 3 cars, 4 mortars, 6 machine guns and more than 160 men and officers. Total Soviet losses were 5 men and officers killed in action, 1 severely damaged T-34, 3 knocked out M3 Light, 2 knocked out 38T and 6 T-60, of which 3 burned and 3 knocked out.
On 16 August, the 260th Tank Battalion had 5 T-34 (3 tanks in Migenevo) and 12 T-60 tanks. Most of them did not take part in the attacks on the previous day.
According to the 130th Tank Brigade report, on 16th August, the 260th Tank Battalion formed a Tank Company from remaining operational tanks. The Company had five T-34s, ten T-60s, three M3 Light and one 38T. Three days later, the Brigade still had one 38T but with a jammed turret.
According to the 6th Army report dated from 21st September 1942, one 38T (previously belonging to the 260th Tank Battalion) was to be allocated to the 3rd Barrier Troop (in essence an anti-retreat unit) Detachment which was stationed at Davidovska. In total, it seems that the Soviet units engaged in this area operated around three captured 38Ts captured from the Hungarian forces.
While the 260th Tank Battalion had three 38T tanks, only two were ever used. The fate of the last vehicle is unknown but it was either unusable or more likely simply cannibalized to get spare parts.
Conclusion
The T-38s provided the Hungarians with means to equip their shattered armored forces after the hard battles of 1941. Over 100 were acquired but their performance was inadequate by the standards of 1942. While they did achieve some success, they simply did not have any chance against more modern Soviet armor.
Panzer 38(t) Ausf.G, Royal Hungarian Army, 30th Tank Regiment, 6th Company – 1942, Don area, Russia.
Kingdom of Norway (1948-1953)
Medium Tank – 61 Operated
Assault Gun – 10 Operated
Norway was left battered and bruised by a 5-year long German occupation (April 1940 – May 1945) that only ended with the capitulation of German forces at the end of the Second World War in Europe. Retreating German forces left a large quantity of equipment in their wake. Rifles, machine guns, anti-tank guns, tools, and even some aircraft were left behind and claimed by the now free and rebuilding Norwegian Military (Forsvaret, Eng: “The Defence”). Many armored vehicles were also left behind, mostly consisting of various types of the Panzerkampfwagen III medium tanks (both long-barrelled 50 mm and short-barreled 75 mm gun-armed models) and a few Sturmgeschütz III assault guns.
Eager to protect their newfound freedom, the Forsvaret adopted these surplus vehicles. They would sit in storage for a few years until 1948 , when the Norwegian Military – preparing for a possible Soviet invasion – devised a defensive plan for Norway’s strategic airfields. Not wanting to relegate their small M24 Chaffee force to guard duty, the Army activated the obsolete Panzers.
The ex-Wehrmacht Panzers and StuGs, which were renamed Stridsvogn KW-III and Stormkanon KW-III respectively, filled this role until the early 1950s, when they started to be replaced by an increasing number of M24 Chaffees donated by the United States.
The Vehicles
Stridsvogn KW-III (Panzer III)
The Panzerkampfwagen III (Sd.Kfz. 141) medium tank was developed in the mid-1930s and was designed to fight enemy tanks alongside its larger brother, the Panzer IV, which was originally intended to support the Panzer III and friendly infantry.
The Panzer III had very good mobility for its time. It was powered by a 12-cylinder Maybach HL 120 TRM 300 PS, producing 296 hp. This propelled the 23-tonne vehicle to a top speed of 40 km/h (25 mph). A running gear consisting of 6-road wheels per side supported the tank’s weight. The road wheels were attached to a torsion bar suspension. The drive sprocket was at the front, while the idler was at the rear. The return of the track was supported by 3-rollers.
The tank was operated by a 5-man crew consisting of a Commander, Gunner, and Loader in the turret, with the Driver and Radio Operator/Bow Machine Gunner in the hull.
Two main types of Panzer III were left behind and reused by the Norwegians. These were both later model Panzers, being the Ausführung N and mix of Ausführung J, L, & Ms. The N was the last model of Panzer III. Armed with a short 7.5 cm KwK 37 L/24 gun, it was intended to act as an infantry support vehicle firing mostly High-Explosive (HE) shells. It could also fire Armor Piercing (AP), High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) and Smoke shells. The Ausf. J, L, and Ms were all armed with the 5 cm KwK 39 L/60. This was a tank-killing gun, and could penetrate up to 130 mm (5.11 in) of armor firing an Armor-Piercing Composite Rigid (APCR) shell. All of these variants were equipped with a coaxial and bow-mounted 7.92 mm MG 34 machine gun.
As later model Panzer IIIs, the majority of the tanks were equipped with an add-on armor kit known as ‘Vorpanzer’. This consisted of armor plates being added on the upper hull plate and gun mantlet. This boosted the original armor thickness of 15 mm to 50 mm. A few of the vehicles were also equipped with Schürzen add-on armor on the turret and hull sides.
Stormkanon KW-III (StuG III)
The Sturmgeschütz were a series of assault guns that found a successful role as tank destroyers. The StuG IIIs were based on the chassis of the Panzerkampfwagen III medium tank. The Panzer III’s turret and superstructure were removed from the hull and were replaced with an armored casemate. Armor on the vehicle was 16 to 80 mm (.62 to 3.15 in) thick.
The StuG was powered by the same 12-cylinder Maybach HL 120 TRM as the Panzer III, which propelled the 24-tonne (26 ton) vehicle to 25 mph (40 km/h). The StuG was manned by a crew of 4, consisting of a Commander, Gunner, Loader, and Driver.
At least 2 types of StuG III were reused by the Norwegians. These were the Ausführung F/8 and the Ausführung G. There were only minor differences between the two, with the Ausf. G being based on Panzer III Ausf. M hull with a redesigned (and widened) superstructure. Both StuGs were armed with the 7.5 cm StuK 40 L/48 (an anti-tank gun derived from the PaK 40). This was a powerful anti-tank gun, with a maximum penetration of 176 mm (6.9 in) firing an APCR shell.
Origin
The first Panzer IIIs to see deployment in Norway were from the Panzer-Abteilung z.b.V. 40. This unit had been originally created for the invasion of Norway and was originally equipped with Panzer I, Panzer II, and Neubaufahrzeug tanks. However, during the invasion, it lost several tanks during the fighting against the Norwegian and British forces, including multiple Panzer Is and one of the Neubaufahrzeugs. To replace these losses, the last five production Panzer III Ausf. Ds were sent from Germany. Later on, the unit was further reinforced with around 15 more Panzer IIIs of Ausf. G and Ausf. H variety. These tanks arrived after the Invasion of Norway and didn’t partake in any fighting. They did, however, get their baptism of fire in June 1941 when the Pz.Abt.z.b.V. 40 was sent to secure the Finnish Lapland front as the Continuation War began with German and Finnish Forces fighting against the Soviets.
The Pz.Abt did not leave Finland until December of 1942, when they were re-deployed in Norway, leaving some of their obsolete equipment behind. Amongst other things, 16 Panzer Is and the three remaining Panzer III Ausf. Ds were left in Finland for the newly formed Panzer-kompanie 40 to use. Pz.Abt. z.b.V. 40 itself saw no further action and was disbanded on June 10th, 1943. It is then believed that its remaining equipment and personnel were passed on to the 25th Panzer Division (Wehrmacht) which was, at the time, based in Oslo.
The 25th Panzer Division had originally been formed as the “Schützenverband Oslo”. Early on, it operated mainly captured French Somua S35 and Hotchkiss H35 tanks but later received Panzer III and IV tanks as well as a few StuG III assault guns. Its original intended purpose was to serve as a potential rapid response force for the invasion of Sweden. However, as the war with the Soviet Union dragged on, it was decided that most of the 25th Panzer division would depart from Norway in the fall of 1943 and be moved to the Eastern Front. Those parts of the 25th that would stay in Norway would form a new unit called the “Panzer Division Norway ”. This arrangement, however, would not last for long as, in May 1944, it was transferred to Denmark in order to reinforce the 25th Pz. division. What remained in Norway was briefly reorganized into the Panzerabteilung Norwegen. This however, would also not last long as the unit again went through several restructurings before finally ending up as the Panzerbrigade Norwegen. The unit remained in this form until the end of the war. At the moment of its surrender to the British forces in May 1945, it had 25 Panzer IIIs with the 5 cm KwK 39, 36 Panzer III Ausf. Ns, and 10 StuG III assault guns of Ausf. F/8 and Ausf.G variety. How most of these tanks ended up in Norway is, however, a bit of a mystery.
Fahrgestell Numbers
Fahrgestell Numbers – meaning chassis numbers – help us track the unique history of German vehicles. Thanks to these, we know the specific history of 4 Panzer IIIs, as they survive today in Norway. These are Fahrgestell 66158, 73651, 74352 and 76219. 66158 was an Ausf. H, built by Motorenwerke Augsburg Nuremberg (MAN) in 1941 and would have been equipped with the short 5 cm KwK 39 L/42 gun. At some point, however, its turret was replaced with an Ausf. N or M turret with the short 75 mm. 73651 is an Ausf. J, originally built by Henschel und Sohn in May, 1941 before being upgraded. 74352 had an interesting history. It served with the infamous SS Division “Das Reich” between 1942 and 1943 in France and on the Eastern Front. Lastly, 76219 was built by MAN in 1943. It was part of one of the first batches of Ausf. Ms produced and was deployed by Panzer-Grenadier Division “Grossdeutschland” on the Eastern Front in 1943. The number 76149 is also recorded in relation to one of the Pz.Kpfw III, Fgst.Nr 73651. This has led to some confusion as 76149 is actually one of the StuGs, an Ausführung G.
Thanks to the Fahrgestell numbers, this information is known to us, but quite how these things ended up in Norway by the war’s end is currently a mystery. After 1943, many of these units were re-equipped with more powerful and newer tanks, so it is possible that these tanks were sent to Norway as it was a less crucial part of Germany’s war effort, ergo, units stationed there were not in need of the latest armored vehicles. It is also possible that these vehicles were damaged during fighting, sent back to Germany for capital repair and refurbishment and then allocated to quieter sectors. This would explain the fact that some of the known vehicles are older models that had been upgraded.
The origin of the StuGs is less well documented, unfortunately. It is unknown how many of the 10 StuGs remained operable, and what their origins were. At least 4 StuG III Ausf. F/8s were operated in Norway during the War by Panzerjäger-Abteilungen 14, 14th Luftwaffen-Felddivision, so this may be where at least 4 came from. There were at least two Ausf. Gs handed over, but their origins are unknown.
Adoption by Norway
The Panzers that were adopted into the Norwegian Army were of varying quality, some of them had even been sabotaged by the Allies. Like the majority of Panzer IIIs that were still in service at war’s end, many of them were upgraded older models, having been upgunned or up-armored. Many were also equipped with Schürzen armor and/or Zimmerit anti-magnetic mine paste. A vast majority of them were handed over as the Germans surrendered. For example, at least 15 Panzer IIIs of various types were handed over with the surrender of Panzer-Brigade “Norwegen” at Trandum, southeast Norway, in May 1945.
With the mysterious origin of the StuG, it is unclear as to what condition the vehicles were in upon adoption. Assuming 4 Ausf. F/8s came from Pz.Jg.Abt 14, and taking into account the two known Ausf. Gs, that accounts for 6 StuGs. The stories of the 4 outstanding vehicles are unknown also, though, as with the Panzers, it is possible that these were simply kept as donors for spare parts.
Norsk Service
With the end of the Second World War, Norway was once again facing the possibility of invasion, this time from the Soviet Union with which it shared a northern border. In 1945, Norway began to receive aid under the US-led ‘MAP’. The ‘Military Aid Program’ benefited the war-ravaged countries of the Second World War by providing them the means to rebuild their military and defenses. In the case of Norway, this meant the delivery of the M24 Chaffee light tank, starting in 1946. The Chaffee would give the military their first taste of operating a relatively modern armored vehicle, having not had a tank since the L-120 ‘Rikstanken’ of the late 1930s.
In 1948, with the perceived threat from the USSR, the Norwegian Military decided that it was crucial to keep its major air bases protected. It was decided that the most important of these were Gardermoen, Eggemoen, Sola, Fornebu, Værnes, and Bardufoss. To give an idea of the strategic importance of some of these airports, Gardermoen was located near Oslo, the capital of Norway, and was the main base of the Luftforsvaret (Royal Norwegian Airforce). Sola, located on Norway’s south-eastern coast, was an important link with the western Allies. Værnes, located roughly in central Norway, allowed transit to the North and South of the country.
It was decided that each airport would need its own unit consisting of armored vehicles and platoons of troops. At this time, however, Norway only had 17 Chaffees to its name, and the Army was not going to allocate its only ‘modern’ tank to guard duty. With the surplus Panzers in storage, it was decided that it was time for them to fill a role.
Only around 25 of the Panzers IIIs were in operable condition. The remaining 36 vehicles were mostly used as donors for spare parts. The best of these were themselves repaired and rearmed as best as possible. This work was carried out at Trandum, an Army base just north-east of Oslo. It is unknown how many of the Panzer IIIs with the short 7.5 cm KwK 37 guns were true Ausf. Ns. With the recycling of various parts from the stock of spare tanks, it is highly likely that many of them were artificial, being older models with later guns. This may also be true for some of the 5 cm KwK 39 L/60 gun-armed tanks. One detail to mention is that the Norwegian crews kept an MG42 7.62 mm machine gun mounted on the Commander’s cupola. Another unknown is if the tanks were re-painted, and if so, what color. At this time, the tanks would have remained in their original, Wehrmacht colors.
Understanding fully that the Panzers and StuGs – now renamed the Stridsvogn KW-III and Stormkanon KW-III, respectively – were all but obsolete at this point, they were not going to field them as front line tanks, but rather keep them as defensive vehicles. The 25 Strv KW-IIIs and 10 Stkn KW-IIIs were divided between the newly created Airport Defense regiments. These regiments were raised between November and December 1948. They consisted of the 1st Dragoon Regiment (raised at Akershus) stationed at Sola and Fornebu, the 2nd Dragoon Regiment (raised at Oppland) assigned to Gardermoen and Eggemoen, and the 3rd Dragoon Regiment (raised at Trøndelag) assigned to Værnes and Bardufoss. The Norwegian army found the 5 cm gun of the Strvs to be lacking in tank-killing power, so each unit was equipped with at least one StKn KW-III or a towed 7.5 cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun. These guns also came from ex-Wehrmacht stocks adopted at the end of WW2. In October 1949, the Dragoon Regiments officially began to garrison the airports. The tank crews consisted of 22 men. Also at their disposal were motorcycles, Willys Jeeps, and Fordson ¾-ton (.68 tonne) trucks.
Also in 1949, Norway and the west became an even more united front. In April, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed, and NATO was born with Norway a founding member. As it shared a border with the USSR, it was seen as a crucial partner. Thanks to this, Norway began to receive more military aid, and the number of M24 Chaffees available to the Army vastly increased. By 1951, the entire KW-III force had been replaced by the 125 Chaffees Norway now had. By 1949, it would appear, the vehicles seem to have been painted in the same basic olive green used on the Chaffees. For winter, they were covered in a rough white-wash haphazardly lashed on by hand. This method of whitewashing lasted into the 1980s.
With more Chaffees at their disposal, the Army began to phase out the recycled KW-IIIs. Both the Stridsvogn and the Stormkanon stayed on in service at Bardufoss as training vehicles for future Norwegian tankers. We know that Fgst.Nr 74352 – known as ‘Yellow 3’, Fgst.Nr 66158 – known as ‘Yellow 2’, and Fgst.Nr 76219 – known as ‘Yellow 1’ were among them*. The tanks served here until 1953, when the Army found a rather unique role for them to fill…
*These tanks are known by these names due to the fact that they had large yellow numbers painted on the sides of their turrets. The function of these numbers is unknown, however.
Fort Bjørnåsen
In 1953, the garrison of Bardufoss Airfield began to dig their 7.5 cm gun-armed Stridsvogns into static defensive positions connected to Fort Bjørnåsen, ‘Yellow 3’, ‘2’, and ‘1’ amongst them. This fort was located in the grounds of the airfield, and was a system of former Luftwaffe bunkers built during WW2. For the defense of the airfield, the Norwegians expanded upon it. The purpose of the bunker and the static tanks was to cover the airfield from as many angles as possible, should an enemy attempt to storm it. The priority target of the 7.5 cm guns would be any aircraft that attempted to land. The tanks were dug into pits roughly 4 meters (13.1 ft) wide, 5.5 meters (18 ft) long with a 3.25 meter ramp, and 1.5 meters (4.9 ft) deep, leaving just their turrets above the ground. A simple wooden shelter was constructed over them. Inside, the tanks were completely stripped. The engine, transmission, driveshaft and other components housed in the hull were completely removed. With all power-providing components removed, the turrets would have been traversed manually. A hole was cut into the hull of the tanks, to which a concrete tunnel was connected, which allowed direct access to the fort, provided a protected entranceway for the crew, and allowed a direct means of ammunition resupply.
The KW-III turrets remained in place into the 1960s, by which time they became obsolete. The turrets were replaced with 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns. For these, new concrete emplacements were built beside the buried tanks. A new hole was cut into the side of the buried tanks to connect them to the new structures to allow the use of the old ammunition tunnels. Earth was then built up around the new emplacements, completely burying the tanks.
Rather frustratingly, despite extensive searches and inquiries by both writers, no pictures can currently be found of the Panzer turrets in situ during their time in operation.
Fate
The majority of the Stridsvogn and Stormkanon KW-III fleet was retired by 1953. Much of the fleet was scrapped with the rest ‘sentenced to death’ as targets on various ranges. The Strvs that were dug into the bunker complex at Fort Bjørnåsen were simply forgotten once they were buried.
From 1943, Finland, Norway’s eastern Scandinavian Neighbour, had operated a fleet of StuG IIIs. These were initially bought from Nazi Germany, but they remained in service post-war. By the late 1950s, however, there was a severe spare parts shortage. In 1958, the inspector of the Finnish Army’s tank section and member of the Ordnance Division, Aaro Manskinen, traveled to the Norwegian Fjords on leave. While there, he by chance happened upon a stock pile of Panzers in various states of disrepair. It soon became clear that the Norwegian Ministry of Defense was looking to sell this pile of – what was then considered – scrap. After some initial troubles due to the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty – which blocked Finland from purchasing equipment from or of German origin – a deal was agreed. 20 Panzer IIIs, 1 StuG, 10 Maybach engines, and a pile of spare parts were sold to Finland. Upon arriving in Finland, the tanks were disassembled and all useful parts were stored for later use. This kept Finland’s StuG fleet in operation well into the 1960s.
It wasn’t until November 2007 that the first Fort Bjørnåsen Panzers (Fgst.Nr 74352, 66158, 76219) began to be excavated, with a second two being uncovered in August 2007.
Today, just 7 of the Panzer IIIs (of various types) and 2 of the StuG III Ausf. Gs survive. Panzer IIIs Fgst.Nr 74352 (‘Yellow 3’), Fgst.Nr 66158 (‘Yellow 2’), and Fgst.Nr 76219 (‘Yellow 1’) are among them. ‘Yellow 3’ currently resides at Troms Forsvarsmuseum, Setermoen, awaiting restoration. ‘Yellow 2’ is currently undergoing full-scale restoration at Muzeum Broni Pancernej, Poznań in Poland, where it has been since 2013. ‘Yellow 1’ was transferred to Finland in 2013.
Fgst.Nr 73651, a Panzer III Ausf. J, was put into storage at the Oslo Defence Museum in 1964. In 1988, it was loaned to Memorial de Caen, Normandy. It was recently returned to Norway. A ‘Tankenstein’ Panzer III consisting of a Ausf. G/H hull and an Ausf. N turret can be found at the André Becker Collection in Belgium. The vehicle left Norway in the late 1940s and was located in Sweden until the 1980s. The others, an Ausf. N and an Ausf. M, can be found at Rena Military Camp, Norway, and the Wheatcroft Collection, UK, respectively.
As for the two StuG III Gs, Fgst.Nr 76149 has been cosmetically restored and currently resides in storage at the Forsvarsmuseet, Trandum. Another, which is simply the remains of a rusting hulk, can be found at Rogaland Krigshistorisk Museum.
Conclusion
Norway’s use of the Panzer III and StuG III is a prime example of ‘make do and mend’. Eager to defend themselves from the increasingly threatening Soviet Union, they activated equipment that was obsolete years before the Second World came to an end. What effect these vehicles could have had on Soviet Tanks is debatable. This, however, was not their intended role. Being assigned to airport garrison forces, their primary role was to engage troops and aircraft attempting to land.
The use of the Panzers and StuGs allowed the recovering Norwegian army to train their first batch of tank crews and allowed them to practise and train on a scale that would have been impossible with only the initial number of M24s. This allowed Norway to build up its fleet of more modern M24 Chaffees, and save them for active duty in a combat scenario, should the need have arisen.
An article by Mark Nash and Konsta Pylkkönen.
Illustration of Stridsvogn KW-III ‘Yellow 1’ (Fgst.Nr 76219). Originally built as an Ausf. M, it was later brought to Ausf. N standard and fitted with the short 7.5cm KwK 37. ‘Yellow 1’ was also one of the tanks buried at Bardufoss airfield.
Illustration of one of the 10 Stormkanon KW-IIIs (StuG IIIs) operated by Norway, this example being a StuG III Ausf. F/8. The vehicle is covered in the roughly painted white-wash camouflage pattern. This type of winter camouflage was used by the Norwegian Army well into the 1980s.
These illustrations were produced by Ardhya Anargha, funded by our Patreon campaign.
Stridsvogn KW-III (Pz.Kpfw.III Ausf. N)
Dimensions
5.49 m x 2.95 m x 2.50 m
(18ft x 9ft 8in x 8ft 2in)
Armament
7.5 cm KwK 37
Machine Guns
2 × 7.92 mm MG34
Armor
Up to 50mm (2 in)
Weight
23 tonnes
Crew
5 (commander, gunner, loader, driver, radio operator/bow machine-gunner)
Kingdom of Sweden (1947-1951)
Heavy Tank – 1 Tested
Not many tanks in history have achieved the legendary status of the Panzerkampfwagen Tiger Ausf.B or ‘Königstiger’. Despite all the research on this tank, not many know that after the war, several nations, among them Sweden, acquired examples to evaluate and test.
The Swedish Mission
During World War Two, Sweden had declared neutrality but was sandwiched between the invading Germans in Norway and the Soviet offensive in Finland, the latter probably being of more concern to Swedish authorities. Sweden aided both the Axis and the Allied powers during the conflict. For example, Germany was allowed to transport the whole 163rd Infantry Division, along with all its equipment and supplies, from Norway to Finland across Sweden to fight the Soviets in June-July 1941 and iron reserves continued to be sold all the way up to 1944. On the other hand, military intelligence was passed on to the Allies, and Danish and Norwegian clandestine resistance groups were trained on Swedish soil. From 1944 onward, Swedish air bases were open to Allied aircraft. In spite of its neutrality, Sweden was always afraid of a potential invasion, and as a result had developed a number of indigenous tanks in the period leading up to the war and during the war itself. Along with this, Sweden possessed a powerful navy which could have discouraged an invasion.
After the end of the war, sometime between 1946 and 1947, Swedish military authorities sent personnel across Europe to acquire intact or semi-intact German tanks for the purpose of testing. One of the main aims of these tests were to see how anti-tank mines and other weaponry in the Swedish arsenal fared against heavily armored tanks.
The first tank they acquired was a single Panzer V Panther at a tank depot outside Versailles, with a Königstiger as their next objective. Finding one of these famed tanks proved to be harder than anticipated until August 1947, when one was found in Gien, south of Paris.
Another burnt-out example, allegedly having belonged to sPz.Abt. 503, 1.Kompanie, was found near the town of Vimontiere (Normandy) and was rejected in October 1946, as it did not meet the requirements of the Swedish authorities. Both the Panther and the Gien Königstiger were handed to the Swedish by the French authorities free of charge.
Skandinavisk Express was commissioned to provide transport for the tank to Stockholm as soon as possible. However, it would not be until 27th November 1947 that the Königstiger would be unloaded at Stockholm docks.
Initial Testing and its Journey
The Königstiger was transferred to the P 4 Regiment, also known as Skaraborgs regemente, in Skövde, 265 km (164.7 miles) west of Stockholm. There is no indication as to how the vehicle was transported to Skövde. After some time in which the tank was left in poor condition outside a workshop, work began to put the tank in running order, during which a German grenade was found within its hull. It would seem that the German crew or personnel in charge of the vehicle had in mind to destroy it rather than allow it to fall into Allied hands when they abandoned their tank. Once the engine was re-assembled, a short test run around the workshop grounds proved the vehicle was still capable of moving.
The vehicle was further tested in Skövde, being subjected to several terrain driving tests. In one of them, the swing arm of one of the end-wheels broke. It was soon welded back together, but the testing team had to be more careful in subsequent tests.
After its restoration, some sources suggest that the L/71 KwK 43 8.8 cm gun was removed for testing, provided that suitable ammunition could be found. However, later photographic evidence suggests otherwise, and that unless the gun was removed, then re-fitted and then removed for one last time, the gun remained attached until early 1949.
In late 1948, it was decided to move the tank to the Karlsborg testing area, roughly 60 km to the east. There, the Königstiger would fulfill its intended role as a guinea pig for gun tests. This operation proved to be of a gargantuan scale and full of complications. The transport had originally been planned for between 24th and 29th September 1948, but the swing arm incident postponed the transport indefinitely. Due to the weight of the vehicle, the easy option, to transport it by train directly to Karlsborg and then tow it to the facilities, was not plausible, as the line crossed a canal bridge which would not support the extra weight of the tank. In the end, the tank was transported by train to Finnerödja and then transported by a convoy to its final destination in Karlsborg, 60 km away. The convoy needed to transport it was made up of a turretless M4A4 Sherman, the tractor unit of an M26 Dragon Wagon, a terrängdragbil (tdgb) m/46 (a Swedish Brockway B666), a 10-tonne (11 tons) recovery vehicle, a fuel truck, two cars for personnel and four motorbikes. The roads, not having been built to take this kind of weight, and the abundance of forest meant that the journey took between November 10th and 15th and cost a staggering SEK10,000 and a total consumption of 6,000 liters of gasoline. Once in Karlsborg, testing could resume.
Tests in Karlsborg
Throughout 1949 and up until 1951, the vehicle was subject to mine detonations and barrage tests to gauge the strength of the Königstiger’s armor and the effectiveness of Swedish ammunition. As far as can be confirmed, there were seven tests:
Tests no. 1, 1st-2nd December 1948: The Königstiger and Sherman armor were fired upon by a variety of weapons and calibres, among which were: a 8 cm raketgevär m/49 bazooka, 8.4 cm granatgevär m/48 ‘Carl Gustaf’ recoilless rifle, 10.5 cm pansarskott m/45 and m/46 disposable recoilless rifles, 10.5 cm infanterikanon m/45 and 7.5 cm pvkan m/43 onboard a pvkv m/43. The Könisgstiger was fired upon seventeen times and it was found that the majority of weapons could not penetrate it frontally, with the exception of the disposable recoilless rifles, which could disable the tank with just one or two hits. However, when fired upon from the side, the damage was noteworthy. After this first test, the engine and gearbox were removed.
Test No. 2, 7th-21st November 1949: The vehicle was shot at 26 times to test different 8 cm and 12 cm HEAT ammunition and 10.5 cm ‘Wallburster’ HESH rounds. The latter rounds were discarded for future tests due to their limited success, despite creating some splits in the hull.
Test No. 3, 25th-27th January 1950: This test studied the effects of sub-calibre projectiles on heavy armor and were overall disappointing, with several projectiles breaking on impact. This was attributed to the use of sub-standard materials in their construction and production method.
Test No. 4, 1st-2nd March 1950: Artillery pieces firing HE, two 10.5 cm and one 15 cm, were tested against the front of the vehicle and the side and front of the turret. HEAT mines were also tested. The 15 cm rounds caused ‘considerable but not serious’ damage to the welds, though this was put down to faulty construction, not to the merits of the gun firing. Some sources suggest that, after this test, the main gun was removed.
Test No. 5: No details are known.
Test No. 6, 12th December 1950: This test was carried out to assess the damage different shells, grenades and launched projectiles had on a vehicle’s mobility from which the testing crew could calculate the average repair time. They found that, of the weapons, at the very least, a 57 mm HE round from a 57 mm pvkan m/43 was useful for stopping a vehicle such as the Königstiger, as long as the detonation happened near the tracks or at the front.
Test No. 7, 10th-11th May 1951: Again, for this test, a Sherman was used alongside the Königstiger to test different ammunition of the 7.5 cm lvkan m/37 anti-aircraft gun and the 15.2 cm fältpjäs M/37 coastal artillery cannon.
By the end of testing, this intense firepower turned the vehicle into a small pile of scrap that would have fitted into “the backseat of a Volkswagen Beetle” and what was left of the hull was scrapped.
The turret was sent to the firing range in Kråk to be used as target practice, becoming a popular target for the crews of the newly arrived Strv 81 (Centurion Mk. 3). It was common to use training rounds for the 20 pdr (84 mm) gun armed Strv 81 which penetrated the turret all the time.
Final Fate
The gun was kept for some time in Karlsborg until it was sent to the Bofors HQ in Karlskoga, where it remained until eventually being scrapped in the late 80s. Unfortunately, two weeks later a member of the Swedish Armor Historical Society arrived enquiring about the gun. Had they arrived a fortnight earlier, the Kwk 43 would quite likely be found today at Arsenalen. The only pieces remaining are the original engine, the gearbox and the rear hatch, which was found lying about Kråk firing range in the 1970s. The engine and gearbox can now be found at the Swedish Tank Museum, though they have an exciting yet mysterious and confused story themselves. Allegedly, after having been removed and stored at the Garrison Museum Skaraborg in the tiny town of Axvall, under dodgy circumstances and poor communication, the engine and gearbox were lent to Kevin Wheatcroft, a collector in the UK. When the return package from the UK arrived, a shell and a scrap engine were found inside. Eventually, the original engine and gearbox were found by British police in 2010 in the workshop of Mr Wheatcroft, who denies any wrongdoing and has collaborated with the authorities. Contrary to what some internet sources have claimed, Mr Wheatcroft has at no point been trialed or convicted of any crime. The intermediary between the museum and the collector, Daniel Misik, was convicted of fraud and embezzlement.
Origins
It is unusual to have an origins story after the fate section. For decades, there was a debate over which German unit the Swedish Königstiger had previously belonged to or what exact model it was and there was no general consensus in the historiography.
It would not be until the excellent work of Herbert Ackermans and Per Sonnervik that the mystery would finally be solved, finding that the Swedish Königstiger was a test vehicle marked 211 from Kummersdorf, which was the sixth series-produced King Tiger tank with chassis number ‘280 006’.
The Swedish Königstiger had three main characteristics:
It had a pre-production turret: The first 50 vehicles were produced with the pre-production turret (the incorrectly termed ‘Porsche turret’), while the subsequent tanks were equipped with the production turret (again, often incorrectly referred to as the ‘Henschel turret’).
The gun was a single-piece barrel tube: The first version of 8.8 cm KwK 43 (L/ 71) consisted of an integral one-piece barrel tube with a larger muzzle brake (taken from the Tiger I). In May 1944, it was replaced by a two-piece barrel tube, which was easier to produce in quantity without deteriorating firing capabilities. According to production statistics, eleven tanks were produced before the barrel was changed and during the month when the barrel tubes were changed, 19 tanks were manufactured, so it is possible that some of these also had the single-piece barrel. So between 11 and 30 King Tigers had the early barrel.
The turret had ‘two-eyed’ sights: The Swedish Königstiger had the early ‘two-eyed’ Turmzielfernrohr 9b/1 sight. This type of sight was changed in May 1944 to a newer model, the type Turmzielfernrohr 9d, which used only one opening in the frontal turret armor.
This allows the identification of the Swedish Königstiger as one of the first 50 tanks with the pre-production turret. With a one-piece gun barrel, the number of potential tank individuals is further reduced and production time can be set to May 1944 at the very latest.
Additionally, the Swedish Königstiger had eleven details which make it such a fascinating example:
Two Flammenvernichter mit AbsatzKrümmer (flame suppressor with a bend): One of the most striking features at first glance on this tank are the horizontally placed flame suppressors, as these, on the Panther, were placed vertically.
‘Kgs 73/800/152’ track links and the 4th version drive sprockets: sPz. Abt. 506 unit had tested these new track links in the Winter of 1944-45 before they were standardized in March 1945. It is also likely that pre-production turret tanks in Germany could have been modified in a similar way. The drive sprocket is of the version 4 variant which was not introduced until March 1945, meaning that it was replaced from the original version 1 at some point.
Armor protection over the snorkel: this was only seen in the first 11 vehicles before February 1944.
Rain drainage at the loader’s hatch: a common feature in the first series vehicles.
Zimmerit on both turret and chassis.
Pistol ports on both sides of the turret (welded shut) but not the port for discarding empty shells.
No turret ring protection.
No opening for the pre-heating of the engine cooling system: This featured in tanks built after February 1944, so cannot be found in the first eleven vehicles.
No fittings to lock the front flat track guards: Prototypes V1, V2, and V3 featured this, so this is firm evidence the Swedish Königstiger was not one of the three prototypes.
No center mount on rearmost side mudguard: the prototypes and some early production vehicles lacked this feature.
No recess in the front armor on the right hand side at the machine gunner’s periscope: There is evidence this featured on vehicle ‘no. 280 009’, so the Swedish Königstiger predates this.
A combination of all these details means a few long-held theories on the origin of this vehicle can be discarded.
One such theory is that the vehicle had belonged to s.Pz.Abt. 503 (schwere Panzerabteilung 503 [trans. 503rd Heavy Panzer Battalion]) which was equipped with Königstigers and had fought in Normandy during Operation Overlord and the subsequent Allied push inland. However, this can easily be discounted as the unit would not have had access to the late tracks, gear ring, and muzzle brake because these had not been manufactured at that time. It is unlikely that, for some bizarre reason, French military authorities would have made these modifications on an abandoned vehicle. For similar reasons, the theory suggesting it belonged to Fkl 316 (PanzerKompanie Funklenk 316) can be rejected
Another theory suggests that it had belonged to s.Pz.Abt. 506 (schwere Panzerabteilung 506 [trans. 506th Heavy Panzer Battalion]), a unit that never fought in France. It is unlikely that a vehicle from this unit would have been moved to Gien from either the Netherlands or Germany. Even so, the muzzle brake could hardly have been in the field at the time when s.Pz.Abt. 506 was active with these tanks as the muzzle brakes had only just been fitted to the factory tanks.
Lastly, one theory points out that it was of the prototype (V1-3) tanks, though, as has been explained, this is not possible as it lacked an opening for pre-heating of the engine cooling system and it did not have the fittings to lock the front flat track guards.
A combination of factors sets this Königstiger as an early vehicle (pre-production turret, single-piece barrel, ‘two-eyed’ sights, etcetera) with some late modifications (version 4 sprocket and late-war track links). This means the vehicle was an early vehicle kept in Germany throughout the war for tests and modifications which explains the late-war features. As a result, it is safe to conclude that the Swedish Königstiger was a test tank marked with number 211 from Kummersdorf which was the sixth series-produced tank with chassis number ‘280 006’. The vehicle was sent to the winter testing facility in Sankt Johann (Austria) at some point, probably late-1944.
After the end of the war in Europe, the vehicle was transported to a ‘gathering place’ in Gien.
Conclusion
Unfortunately, the Swedish Königstiger is a product of a bygone era when the heritage of armored vehicles was hardly at the forefront of anyone’s agenda. Despite its peculiarities, the vehicle did not stand out among the scores of destroyed and abandoned vehicles and debris which occupied most of Europe in 1945. The vehicle served its purpose: first as a German fighting vehicle, and secondly, as a target for Sweden to test its weapons.
Swedish Königstiger based on the tank shown in the available photos. Illustration by Tank Encyclopedia’s own David Bocquelet.
Yugoslav Partisans/Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1944-1952)
Tank Destroyer – 20+ Captured
During the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia (1941-1945) and the struggle for liberation, the resistance movements employed a collection of different armored vehicles from the USA, Germany, France, Great Britain, Poland, Soviet Union, and Italy. The Yugoslav Communist partisans used tanks and other vehicles that were given to them by the Western Allies and the Soviets, but also managed to capture a number of different Axis armored vehicles. Among these was the Jagdpanzer 38(t) which the Germans were using by the end of the war in small numbers on this front. The captured Jagdpanzer 38(t) would be used during the war in limited numbers and would also serve after the war by the new JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) army.
The Jagdpanzer 38(t)
When the Germans occupied what remained of Czechoslovakia in March 1939, they came into possession of two well-known weapon manufacturers: CKD (Ceskomoravska-Kolben-Danek) and Škoda. The CKD factory (renamed BMM by the Germans) was tasked with the production of the Panzer 38(t) for the Germans. The production of this tank would be terminated during the second half of the war, as it proved to be ineffective as a combat vehicle by that stage of the war.
The BMM factory continued production of different combat designs (mostly anti-tank) based on the Panzer 38(t)’s chassis. By late 1943, the BMM factory was involved in designing and building a light and relatively cheap tank destroyer vehicle based on some components from the Panzer 38(t). The result of this work would be the Jagdpanzer 38(t) tank destroyer. It was armed with the 7.5 cm PaK 39 and was fully enclosed and protected with well-angled 60 mm thick front armor. While not a perfect design, it would prove to be an effective anti-tank killer and during the war around 2,824 such vehicles were built by BMM and Škoda. It would be used on all fronts in Europe including in small numbers on the Balkans.
A brand new Jagdpanzer 38(t). Produced in August 1944 at the BMM factory. Source
In the Balkans
The quick defeat of Yugoslavia in April 1941 by the Axis forces created the wrong impression that there would be no more need for engagement of larger occupation force, but an uprising that began only a few months later forced the Germans to re-introduce some armored units in this region. At the start of the uprising, the Germans had only one armored company of old and captured tanks in the whole territory of occupied Yugoslavia. The Germans hastily rushed reinforcements including a tank battalion equipped with mostly captured French tanks ‘Beutepanzers’.
During the later part of the war, especially from 1943 onwards, the communist resistance movement, the National Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ) (Народноослободилачка војска Југославије), known today as the ‘Partisans’, began to increase in numbers. This was possible due to cooperation with the Allies which began supplying them with weapons, equipment and personnel. To combat the ever-increasing Partisan movement, the Germans were forced to send any available reinforcements, including some armored elements.
As most modern German armored vehicles were produced in relatively small numbers (in comparison to the Western Allies and Soviets) and were deemed too valuable, usually only older or captured vehicles would be sent to Yugoslavia. These were mostly French but included some Italian, Soviet, and a few British vehicles also. By 1944/45, some relatively modern vehicles, such as the Jagdpanzer 38, in small numbers, were present on this front with different units, including the 181st and 41st Infantry Divisions, 31st SS Volunteer Grenadier Division, 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS, and Panzer Abteilung 202.
The 181st Infantry Division was engaged fighting Partisan forces in Montenegro and Herzegovina during the second half of 1944. In October, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 222 was reinforced with 14 Jagdpanzer 38s and with another 10 in January 1945. During the German withdrawal from Yugoslavia in early Spring 1945, this Division would see some heavy action around Zagorje in Croatia. During the battle for the Sermian Front in early April 1945, the 41st Infantry Division was reinforced with 10 of these vehicles. Both these Division surrendered to the Partisans by 12th May 1945.
The 31st SS Volunteer Grenadier Division since November 1944 had operated 14 Jagdpanzer 38 vehicles. This unit was for a short time used to fight Yugoslav Partisans before being deployed to Hungary to fight the Soviets. The much depleted 14th SS Grenadier Division “Galizische” was used to fight the Partisans in Slovenia during March, but shortly afterward was pulled out from this front. Panzer Abteilung 202 had been engaged in heavy fighting in Yugoslavia for years, its combat strength on 1st April 1945 was reported to be 23 Italian tanks, 2 Semovente 75/18, and 10 Jagdpanzers 38.
In Partisans hands
Precise information regarding the circumstances of when or how the Jagdpanzer 38 vehicles were captured is hard to find. The problem with Partisan documentation is that due to the poor knowledge of precise military designation, too often, wrong names or just simply the term tank (without any context or explanation of the type) were used. Sometimes Partisans units that did manage to capture enemy vehicles immediately put them into their service without reporting them to the High Command. Due to this, it is difficult to determine which vehicles were captured or if they were used in combat.
One of the first Jagdpanzers 38(t)s captured was during the German unsuccessful offensive action near Baranya that lasted from 6th to 19th March 1945. During the heavy fighting, the Partisans forced the Germans to withdraw and on that occasion, an unknown number (possibly only one or two) of Jagdpanzers 38(t)s were captured. The following month, another one was captured near Našice in North-East Croatia. Additionally, a number of these vehicles were also captured as they were left behind by the fleeing German forces. This is the case of Panzer Abteilung 202, as nearly all its armored vehicles (Jagdpanzers 38(t), M.15/42, Sd. Kfz. 251, etcetera) were found abandoned loaded on a train on the railroad from Ljubljana to Kranj. On top of that, a few were captured during the liberation of Maribor from 10th to 15th May 1945. The majority of the Jagdpanzers 38(t)s were captured with the final surrender of the 181st and 41st Infantry Divisions in May 1945.
According to researcher Dragan Savić, who investigated the Partisan archive of captured vehicles and equipment, a total of around 20 Jagdpanzer 38(t)s in various conditions were captured. Due to the lack of proper documentation, this number may be higher but it is hard to tell.
This vehicle was captured by the 16th Vojvodina Division (Vojvođanska Divizija) near the region of Baranya in March of 1945. Source
Another (or the same vehicle) with the 16th Vojvodina Division near the region of Baranya. Source
The use of these vehicles by the Partisan during the war is not well known due to the lack of documentation. The vehicles captured in Vojvodina (where the Jagdpanzers 38s were used) were often employed in combat, but only in small numbers.
There is a possibility that some Jagdpanzer 38(t)s were used by the specially formed Partisan auto-school (school for armored vehicle crew training) near the capital city of Belgrade in late 1944. If this school was independent or part of the larger school (possibly located, but there is no documentation to prove this) in the city of Kragujevac (Serbia) is also unknown. Allegedly, the Belgrade school in May 1945 had in its inventory: four R35, two-to-three M.15/42, L.6, one Semovente (possibly 75/18), two Semovente 47/32, a Hotchkiss (unknown type and numbers, probably a H35) StuG III, one Ferdinand (possibly a Jagdpanzer 38(t)) and a few armored cars.
One of the Jagdpanzer 38(t)s captured by the Yugoslavs and put into service, during training exercises at Bela Crkva after the war. Illustration by David Bocquelet, modified by Leander Jobse.
The name
During the war, the Yugoslav Partisans managed to capture a number of Axis armored combat vehicles. As the majority of the Partisan fighters who managed to capture these vehicles had no knowledge of the precise military designation for these vehicles, they called them by different and mostly wrong names. For example, the German-used T-34s (captured by the Soviet Union) were often called ‘Panther’, despite the fact that this vehicle was never used on this front.
The same is true in the case with the Jagdpanzer 38(t) (and, in some cases, for the StuG III, which also complicates the identification process), which was known under the name “Ferdinand” by some of its crew during and after the war. The origin of this name is not clear, but it is highly likely that name was taken from Soviet troops during the battle for Belgrade in late 1944.
After the war, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) never officially designated the Jagdpanzer 38(t) as Ferdinand. This is likely a result of the better understanding of the equipment captured during the war. In order to avoid any confusion and as the later JNA never gave any other designation, this article has and will use the original German designation for this vehicle.
After the war
The Jagdpanzers 38(t) in the JNA after the war were used mainly to equip combat units and as training vehicles. It was used for a short time to equip the 2nd Tank Brigade (equipped with the Soviet T-34-85) with two battalions of 8 Jagdpanzer 38(t)s during 1946. Some were given to the independent self-propelled anti-tank brigade.
A group of four or five such vehicles was given to the newly formed Tenkovsko Vojno Učilište (TVU) [Tank Military School] in November of 1945. The TVU was formed by the order of the Ministry of the National Committee in June 1945. The TVU had the aim to train a new generation of tank officers and was based on the Soviet model of schooling. It was first located at Banjica, but was relocated to Bela Crkva in 1946. In 1948, due to the Tito-Stalin split, Yugoslavia refused to join the Eastern communist bloc, and due to this decision, they were in real danger of a war with the Soviet Union. As the TVU was stationed near the Romanian border, it was put on high alert during this crisis. As this led to a slow crew training process, the TVU was again moved to Banja Luka far away from the eastern borders. From 1948 onwards, in the hope to keep the T-34-85s in good condition, the older and captured vehicles were mainly used for training.
A Jagdpanzer 38(t) during training exercises at Bela Crkva after the war. All captured vehicles received a three-digit label after the war. Source
Another photograph during training exercises after the war. Source
During its use as a training vehicle, the Jagdpanzer 38(t) was not much liked by its crews. There were a few reasons for this: cramped interior; unusual crew positions (with three crew member located on the right side); and during training, these vehicles were always marked as enemy vehicles, which was unpopular with its crews. The Jagdpanzer 38 would remain in operational service up to 1952 when the remaining vehicles were withdrawn from service as they were being replaced with more modern Western vehicles. Unfortunately, no Yugoslav Jagdpanzer 38(t) vehicles survive to this day.
Markings and paint scheme
After the war, there was no effective registration numbering system for the available armored vehicles of the JNA. Captured vehicles, regardless of origin, received a white three digits label which was simply painted with a paintbrush. The German vehicles were painted in the Dunkel Gelb with the combination of dark green and brown-red.
Yugoslav Jagdpanzer 38s in Albania
After the war, in Albania, a new communist regime established good but brief relations with Yugoslavia. As a result of these good relations, the JNA provided the Albanians with a number of different items of military equipment, supplies, personnel, and instructors. With training, a group of 21 tanks and other armored vehicles (including few Jagdpanzer 38(t)s) were also sent in September 1946. The instructors and other personnel were stationed there during 1947-48 and helped to train the Albanian crews.
Conclusion
The Jagdpanzer 38(t) did not have any influence on the future development of armored vehicles in JNA. It was important for two things: first, it helped build up the JNA strength after WWII at times the need for any armored vehicle was great, and it did help training first generations of new crew and officers.
Sources
Terry J. G. (2004), Tanks in Detail JgdPz IV, V, VI and Hetzer, Ian Allan Publishing
Duško Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
Bojan B. D. and Dragan S.(2011) Oklopne jedinice na Jugoslovenskom ratištu 1941-1945, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd.
Bojan B. D. (2010) Modernizacija i intervencija, Jugoslovenske oklopne jedinice 1945-2006, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Beograd.
Velimir V. (2003), Tito’s Partisans 1941-45, Osprey publishing.
Samuel W. and Mitcham J.R. (2007), The German Order Of The Battle, Stackpole Books.
https://www.srpskioklop.paluba.info/ratniplen/hetzer.htm
https://znaci.net/arhiv/odrednica/16-vojvodjanska-divizija-novj
Jagdpanzer 38(t) specifications
Dimensions
6.38 x 2.63 x 2.17 m
Total weight, battle-ready
15.7 tonnes
Crew
4 (Gunner, loader, driver and commander)
Propulsion
Six-cylinder Praga AE water-cooled 150 hp
Speed
42 km/h, 15 km/h (cross-country)
Range
177 km
Armament
75 mm PaK 39 and one MG 34 or MG 42 machine gun
Armor
60-8 mm
For information about abbreviations check the Lexical Index
Polish Underground State (1944)
Medium Tank – 2 Captured
After the September Campaign in 1939, Poland was occupied and split between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, the occupation didn’t stop the Polish people from continuing the struggle. Soon after the occupation, the Home Army (Polish: Armia Krajowa) was established, an underground resistance group.
Their biggest employment would be the Warsaw Uprising which started on August 1st, 1944 at 5 PM. The organizers of the Uprising hoped that the Soviets, who were near Warsaw, would help them, but the Red Army stopped just 10 km from the city. The first days of the Uprising went pretty well for the Home Army, especially when they captured two tanks of the German enemy.
The Uprising tragically ended on October 2nd, 1944 with over a hundred thousand dead civilians and thousands of troops on both sides. The city was razed by the Germans to the ground to punish the Poles who rebelled against the occupier. The city would be rebuilt after the War by a new pro-Soviet Communist Government.
Capture
The Ausf. G was the most produced model of the famous Panzer V Panther. It is estimated that around 2,961 tanks of this type were built. Some of these were used by the 27th Panzer Regiment of the 19th Panzer-Division. The unit was moved to Warsaw from the Western Front and resupplied with the brand new Panther Ausf.G tanks’s. In the morning of August 2nd, three Panther Ausf.G tanks’s were moving without infantry support through the following streets; Górczewska, Młynarska, Smętna, Powązkowska, and the Okopowa street, where the group of three tanks got ambushed by the Polish rebels. One of the Panthers was burned out by Molotov cocktails thrown by the Resistance. However, the crew escaped in time and moved to another Panther. They turned to the Mirecki street where the tank was first attacked with hand grenades, then with a No. 82 grenade commonly known as the ‘Gammon bomb’. There is also a second version of the story. According to it, the tank wasn’t hit by a ‘Gammon’ but by a PIAT (Projector, Infantry, Anti-Tank). Either way, the tank’s turret was damaged, making the tank swerve violently off the street and crashing into a wooden house which was nearby. Then, finally, the tank and its crew were captured. The captured Germans agreed to train the Poles in using the tank in exchange for their lives. The third tank that was left at Okopowa was also damaged by hand grenades and immobilized. Its crew escaped and left it in almost perfect condition.
The crew taking the first Panther in Okopowa Street on August 4th, 1944. Source: Valka.cz
Under the Polish Flag
Since the two tanks were in almost perfect working order, the rebels decided to fix the mechanical issues and use them in urban combat although this was not done until the next day, August 3rd. At the same time, two crews were formed, with 6 members in each. The Independent Armored Platoon of the Zośka Battalion (Polish: Samodzielny Pluton Pancerny Batalionu Zośka) was thus formed under the command of Wacław Micuta. The crews had 6 members instead of regular 5 because the tank commanders also had other command duties at the same time. So, the commanders wanted to have the tanks fully operational even when they were tied down with other tasks.
Wacław Micuta (pseudonym: Wacek) on a captured Panther, somewhere near the Okopowa Street. Source: Wikimedia Commons
When the repair work started, a captured German put to work repairing the tanks discovered that one of the tank’s fuel pump had been damaged. The crew could not deal with the problem until Jan Lumieński showed up. He was a skilled mechanic who had worked in a German tank plant before. He made the captured Panther work by fixing the air filter and tweaking the ignition. The captured Panther was used either in the evening hours of August 3rd or in the early hours of August 4th. This Polish Panther moved to a nearby street to test its gun by destroying a German machine-gun nest which was located on the tower of the St. Augustine Church. The target was knocked out with two shots.
In the meantime, the second Panther was still stuck in the wooden house and the Polish fighters were trying to free it. They first tried to tow it out using the first Panther, but this attempt, unfortunately, failed because the tracks were sliding on the ground. In the end, Polish soldiers had to disassemble the house manually to get the tank unstuck.
The second Panther had a big Polish flag painted on the left and right of the turret. ‘WP’ was painted in large letters on the rear of the turret. This was the abbreviation for Wojsko Polskie (the Polish Army). This was done to avoid friendly because the Germans also used the Panthers Ausf.G tank’s during the Warsaw Uprising. Source: odkrywca.pl
When the tank was finally freed, an inspection was made and it was discovered that, like the first tank, it had only minor damage and it was decided to put it in combat as well. However, it had a destroyed rear turret plate and this needed fixing. It was repaired at some point during the following days. These tanks also received nicknames; the first Panther was nicknamed ‘Pudel’ in honor of an officer, Tadeusz Tyczyński, who had died in combat. However, the crew gave it the unofficial nickname ‘Magda’. The other one was nicknamed ‘Felek’, however, it is also referred to in modern bibliography as ‘WP’ (the abbreviation for the Polish Army; Wojsko Polskie).
‘Pudel’/’Magda’ and soldiers of the Independent Armored Platoon of the Zośka Battalion near the Okopowa Street. From left to right: Zdzisław Moszczeński “Ryk”, unknown, Jan Lumieński, Lumeński”, Mieczysław Kijewski “Jordan”, Jan Myszkowski Bagiński “Bajan” and Jan Zenka “Walek”. SOURCE
‘Felek’ in the process of renovation. The key figure of this project was Jan Lumieński (in the middle, he is also incorrectly called Jan Łuniewski) who had worked with German tanks before. SOURCE
Pudel saw action for the second time during the liberation of the St. Sophia Hospital, the attack on the Gęsiówka concentration camp and the raid on the Police Academy. The tank especially proved its effectiveness in the liberation of the camp, where only one soldier died. However, the two other actions were much more bloody because of a terrible coordination mistake. Felek was ordered to support the attack on the Police Academy which was heavily fortified. However, the captured Panther did not receive permission to open fire before the entire attack was underway. Because of this mistake, many Polish soldiers were killed by machine-gun fire even before the Panther arrived and turned the tide. In the end, the operation was successful, although it was a Pyrrhic victory because of critical casualties.
‘Pudel’ in action. The tannery of Pfeiffer is visible in the background. SOURCE
The two Panthers went into action once again on August 8th, 1944 to support the troops fighting the Germans in Karolkowa Street. When ‘Magda’ arrived from Mirecki Street to Karolkowa, it was hit by three 75 mm tank shells. It is unknown what hit the Panther, either a Jagdpanzer 38(t) or a Panzer IV Ausf.H. The tank suffered minor damage and some of the crew were wounded. The vehicle was repaired on August 9th and, on the next day, it knocked out a German Sd.Kfz. 263 8-Rad. In the afternoon, ‘Pudel’ knocked out another machine-gun nest in the St. Charles Borromeo Church.
Fate
In the meantime, the situation in the Old Town was critical for the Home Army. Moreover, ‘Felek’ had a problem with a battery and it was decided to destroy the tank. Felek’s ammunition got transferred to the ‘Pudel‘. On August 11th, ‘Pudel’ engaged its last fight covering the Polish counterattack, however, it was damaged and abandoned by the crew. The crew decided to burn it out to avoid the German re-capture of the tank.
Panther specifications
Dimensions (L-w-h)
6.87/8.66 x3.27 x2.99 m (22.54/28.41 x10.73 x9.81 ft)
Total weight, battle-ready
44.8 tons max. (98,767 lbs)
Armament
Main: 75 mm (2.95 in) KwK 42 L/70, 82 rounds
Sec: 2x 7.9 mm (0.31 in) MG 34, 5100 rounds
For information about abbreviations check the Lexical Index
Resources & Links
J.Ledwoch – PzKpfw V Sd Kfz 171 “Panther” Czesć I
Krzysztof Mucha – “Militaria XX wieku”, nr 2 – 4 www.info-pc.home.pl forum.valka.cz
Pudel: The tank was covered with various insignias representing the Polish nation such as the red-white-red rectangle and the lily of the Scouts. The German Balkenkreuz was painted over with a white circle.
‘Felek’: This tank had two large Polish flags painted on the left side of the turret to avoid friendly fire. Unlike the Pudel, the Balkenkreuz was not painted over.
These illustrations were produced by Andrei ‘Octo10’ Kirushkin, funded by our Patron Golum by our Patreon campaign.
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Polish Underground State (1944)
Tank Destroyer – 1 Captured
After the September Campaign of 1939, Poland was occupied and split between Germany and the Soviet Union. However, the occupation did not stop the Polish people from continuing to resist. Soon after the occupation, the Home Army (Polish: Armia Krajowa) was established, an underground resistance group.
Their most notable action would be during the Warsaw Uprising, which started on August 1st 1944 at 5 PM. The organizers of the Uprising hoped that the Soviets, who were near Warsaw, would help them, but the Red Army stopped just 10 km from the city. The first days of the Uprising went well for the Home Army, thanks, in part, to the capture of German vehicles, including two Panthers and a Jagdpanzer 38(t).
The Uprising tragically ended on October 2nd, 1944, leaving tens of thousands of civilians and thousands of troops on both sides dead. The city was razed to the ground by the Germans as a way to punish the Poles who rebelled against them. The city would be rebuilt after the War by a new pro-Soviet Communist government.
Polish rebels, fascinated by their bounty took many photos, and took every chance to scramble over the vehicle. Photo. Photo: SOURCE
Capture
In the morning hours of August 2nd, between 6 AM and 7 AM, two Jagdpanzers 38(t)s of the 2nd Company of the Heeres-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 743 were moving through the New World and Świętokrzyska streets to Napoleon Square without any infantry support. Their task was to support the German troops fighting against the Polish Home Army for the Post Office in Napoleon Square.
Map showing the German attack. Photo: SOURCE
One of the vehicles turned to Moniuszko Street, while the other one went to Hospital Street where it was attacked by Polish fighters using Molotov cocktails and hand grenades which they were throwing from a nearby apartment house. The vehicle was mostly burned out and disabled. Three out of its four crewmembers died as a result. The other Jagdpanzer 38(t), returned to the Square by turning to Jasna and Sienkiewicz streets. The vehicle escaped through Warecka Street towards New World Street.
Polish rebels work on the vehicle in preperation for action. The name ‘Chwat’ can be seen on the upper glacis. There were plans for this to be changed to either ‘Szare Szeregi’ or ‘Kiliński’in refernece to the units captured the Jagdpanzer. This never happened, however. Photo: SOURCE
Illustration of the ‘Chwat’ (meaning ‘Daredevil’) by Tank Encyclopedia’s own David Bocquelet.
Under the Polish Flag
After the capture of the Post Office by Polish Home Army fighters in the late afternoon hours, the ‘Kiliński’ Battalion was ordered to erect barricades in every street in the northeast area of central Warsaw. This was done to prevent further German armored attacks. During the night the vehicle was positioned into the barricade which splitting Napoleon square and Hospital street. The barricade itself was located between Sienkiewicz and Boduen streets.
The captured Jagdpanzer was first used as part of a road block on Hospital Street. Photo: SOURCE
Three days later, the tank destroyer was towed out of a barricade with a captured truck. When the ‘Chwats’ (Daredevils), a unit of soldiers from the Division of the Propaganda Department of the Bureau of Information and Propaganda, towed out the vehicle, it was discovered that the captured Jagdpanzer 38(t) was damaged. Although the captured vehicle was critically damaged, the Polish rebels decided to at least try and repair it with parts from a nearby abandoned German car plant because they lacked any military vehicles of their own.
Polish personel tow away the ‘Chwat’ with a truck. Photo: SOURCE
After a few days, the Jagdpanzer 38(t) was back in running conditions. The mechanics nicknamed it ‘Chwat’ (Daredevil) and it was ready to take part in the urban combat on August 14th which required the removal of the barricades which was decided against by the commanding Colonel of the Polish for fear of a German counter-attack.
The ‘Chwat’ was instead put in reserve should the Germans achieve a breakthrough.
Fate
On September 4th, 1944, the Post Office was heavily bombed by the Germans which resulted in the destruction of nearby buildings which covered the ‘Chwat’ in rubble No attempt was made to retrieve the ‘Chwat’. It was only in 1946 that the ‘Chwat’ was uncovered and subsequently moved to the Polish Army Museum in Warsaw.
However, the vehicle was only exhibited for a short time. In 1950, during the Stalinist era, the Main Political Directorate of the Polish Army ordered to scrap the captured vehicle even though it was the only known Jagdpanzer 38(t) in Poland at the time. Today, only one roadwheel survives.
The only remaining part of the Chwat is one of its road-wheels. The wheel can be seen in the Polish Army Museum in the Czerniaków Fort, Warsaw. Photo: SOURCE
Jagdpanzer 38(t) specifications
Dimensions (L W H)
4.83m (without gun) x 2.59m x 1.87 m (15’10” x 8’6″ x 6’1″ ft.in)
Total weight, battle ready
15.75 metric tonnes (34,722 lbs)
Armament
75 mm (2.95 in) PaK 39 L/48, 41 rounds
7.92 mm (0.31 in) MG 34, 1,200 rounds
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Kingdom of Italy (1942-1943)
Heavy Tank – None Built
Having been somewhat opportunistic in joining in the war on the side of Germany against her First World War allies, Britain and France, Italy had come into a new long conflict ill-prepared. Hoping for a quick victory and share of the spoils, Italy found herself at war while its army was still not fully modernized. Their stock of tanks was outdated and ill-suited for the coming war. The primary tank for Italy was the diminutive CV3 series vehicle.
On top of this ill-timed entry, Italy had major problems with tank production. The army (Regio Esercito, RE) had little money with which to develop such vehicles, as the majority of government money for the military went to the Italian Navy. What tanks they did possess were intended for use in colonial wars in Africa or for fighting in the mountainous Italian north, much along the lines of the fighting in WW1. Consequently, Italy had little experience with large, heavy tanks. Fighting in mountains required small tanks, narrow enough for mountain tracks, light enough to cross small wooden or stone bridges, or even capable of being recovered with rudimentary tools by troops. For this, light tanks like the CV3 series or the L6 were ideal.
Italian CV3 (left) next to a wooden mockup of the Panther tank to same scale (right)
In North Africa, the quick victory which had awaited Italy in 1940 over the numerically inferior British forces had not transpired. Despite the numerical advantages they possessed over the British forces in those early months of WW2, the Italian command squandered their opportunity to attack when their enemy was weak and instead took very little offensive action, allowing the British to build up their forces. When the war in North Africa did start in earnest, the Italian armor was outclassed by the faster and more maneuverable British Cruiser tanks and the armor of the British A.12 Matilda II. The response from Italy was slow and came too late. This was the Italian’s own desert cruiser; the ‘Sahariano’. A well-designed machine with well-angled armor, good maneuverability, and decent firepower, but it was too late for the North African war in which it was needed. After losing North Africa to the Allies, work was eventually stopped on that project and the focus was moved to protecting mainland Italy and Sicily.
Hunting for a Heavy Tank
By April 1942, the Ansaldo company had already begun construction of a self-propelled gun mounting the 149/40 cannon with the intention of mounting it on a vehicle based on the P40 hull. At the same time, a study was started on the use of a 105mm howitzer on the hull of a heavy tank. This latter project was abandoned in favor of using the hull of the M15/42 medium tank which was already in production. The 149/40 self-propelled gun project ended up using the M15/42 chassis as well, with the engine originally planned for the Sahariano instead, which does at least demonstrate a good level of interchangeability between the engines in Italian hulls. It did not though, solve the problem of the complete lack of a production heavy, or for that matter effective medium tank on a par with a contemporary enemy or allied vehicle.
Crisis
Italy in 1942 was in a bad state of affairs. The war was not going well for them and back home Italian industry was in a crisis of production. Despite having the spare industrial capacity and large stockpiles (in 1943, after the Germans audited Italian stocks they found 3 years worth of steel supply had been hoarded) of material the Italians were still requesting materials from Germany. They could not meet the demands from the Regio Esercito for their own tanks, engines, or guns. The Italians had had formal authorization from the Germans to produce the Panzer III in Italy since the 5th of August 1941 and a license for production of the Panzer IV in 1942. Even the Skoda T.21 which at one point had been considered wasn’t going to be produced despite being seen as favorable, simply because production would have had to include companies like Alfa, Reggiane, OTO, and Lancia. The duopoly that existed between FIAT and Ansaldo wasn’t going to be broken easily. So, none of these perfectly acceptable vehicles would ever enter production in Italy and at that time the first P40 was still not complete and ready for examination as there were significant problems with the original petrol engine.
The P40 was a well thought out design in its own right but it appears that the actual orders for it were delayed because the Italian High Command (Commando Supremo) had favored local production of the Panzer IV instead. A lead engineer at Ansaldo remarked in December 1943 that, despite opening a new production plant to increase capacity, the manufacture of tanks for the Italian army was taking too long and in his opinion, this shortfall should be addressed by the purchase of large numbers of Panzer IV tanks instead. This presumably was an idea to take the pressure off production to allow the plants to convert to new production lines but it did not take place. Regardless though, while the P26/40 (P40) heavy tank, (which was supposed to have already been in service by 1942) was still in development hell, the Germans were already putting the Pz.Kpfw. V Panther into production. With more armor and a bigger gun, the Panther was clearly a far more impressive tank on paper.
An Offer Rejected then Accepted
The Italians were still wedded to their own anemic tank construction program and perhaps as an attempt to spur development, on the 6th December 1942 General (Generalmajor), Ernst Von Horstig contacted General Ugo Cavallero. General Von Horstig (1893-1969) was the head of the German Economic Office at the German Embassy in Rome (since November 1941), and the head of the Italian Army Office (HWA) (from the 1st March 1942). General Ugo Cavallero (1880-1943), was the Chief of the Italian Defence Staff.
Out of the blue, General Horstig offered General Cavellero the possibility of construction of the German Panther tank in Italy. At 0945 hours that day, Gen. Cavellero formally turned down the offer from Gen. Horstig on the basis that he thought the ‘equivalent’ (the P40 was far from equivalent to the Panther but Gen. Cavellero seems to have considered it as such) Italian P40 tank was enough. The P40 was still classed as a heavy tank ( ‘P’ being ‘Pesante’ for the ‘heavy’ tank) despite only weighing 26 tonnes and Gen. Cavellero had believed this vehicle to already be in a “programme of construction” only to find out from General Pietro Ago an hour later that “in reality the P40 does not exist” because it was not in production at all. This was a stunning lapse in oversight by the Italian Chief of Staff. Whatever the reason for the oversight was, the plan now would be to obtain Maybach engines as used in the Panzer IV for the P40 program to spur that project into life.
Left to right: General Pietro Ago (1872-1966), General Ugo Cavellero (1880-1943), General Luigi Efisio Marras (1888-1981). Photos: composite image compiled from biographies at it.wikipedia.org
Faced now with the reality that Italy wasn’t producing any ‘heavy’ tanks at all, it seems that Gen. Cavellero then rescinded his previous rejection of Gen. Horstig’s offer and agreed to some production although the nature of the deal remains unclear.
Negotiations were made regarding this contract for production at the Ministry of War between the 13th and 24th of February and the idea of constructing the Panther in Italy would have solved some large problems for Italy. It would almost certainly have resulted in abandoning the M15/42 tank design, which was still in production, admitting the failure of the P40 project (it was late), and abandoning other plans to focus on a single more capable platform. This new vehicle would likely have to be capable of fulfilling the medium and heavy tank duties the army wanted as well as having the flexibility to be used for the Semovente conversion to fulfill support, artillery and tank destroyer duties. The Germans would end up doing exactly this, using the Panther tank as a basis for numerous types of vehicles.
What is known is that, following the phone call between Generals Cavellero and Horstig, Gen. Cavellero went on to state that if they (Italy) were given certain (unspecified) equipment and a Panther tank to work from that it would significantly speed up Panther tank production. This was agreed to by Gen. Von Horstig, who invited Gen. Cavallero to Berlin to discuss the matter.
The Germans, however, expected production of the Panther to begin just one year after receipt of the drawings in Italy. Plans which would take three months to prepare in Italian. Combined together this would mean an expectation of starting Panther production in Italy by the Ansaldo-FIAT consortium no earlier than March 1944. On the plus side, unlike the licence for production of the Panzer IV, there would be no licence fee due.
Hitler had ordered, a month earlier, in January 1943, that Panther production was to take place in Italy without any licence fee payable. The firm of Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg (MAN) was also (per the directive) to supply not one, but four complete Panther tanks to Italy. As it happened though, MAN was unable to comply due to their own manufacturing problems. A further directive from Hitler came on the 16th February 1943 on the subject as to whether Italy should build the Panther or Panther II tank. However, Italy did not seem to have had expressed an interest in the Panther II although the Italians were generally in agreement with the German proposals. From the Italian end though it was clear that due to a complete change in manufacturing that production of Panthers ‘from scratch’ could not start in Italy before 1945.
Likely as a result of trying to speed up the production of the Panther and to examine the tooling needed, an exchange of technical experts was agreed to by General Luigi Marras (Italian Military Attache in Berlin). Two engineers from each country would jointly examine the Italian P40 and the German Panther, the small problem being that the P40 wasn’t actually finished.
Allied bombing of Italian industry, including engine factories, had helped to grind Italian tank production to a near standstill. Gen. Cavellero subsequently contacted Gen. Von Horstig about the sale of Maybach engines for the P40 and more about the Panther. In order to expedite tests, a request was made for a 12 cylinder Maybach HL-120 TRM V12 296hp petrol engine supplied from Germany to be installed in the P40. Around this time too (early 1943), license production of the Maybach engine was approved in Italy. Following examination of the P40 fitted with the German engine the tank was approved, although it was noted that improvements would be needed to the armor.
For the Panther though, a tentative (and optimistic) production schedule was organized that in the first 18 months of production the Italians were to produce 50 tanks a month. Half of that production was to be supplied back to Germany (presumably in lieu of the payment of the waved license fee), leaving Italy with 25 per month for their own use. On the 22nd February 1943, the testing of the Maybach in the P40 probably still had not happened. The Germans were offering to supply major components of Panther tanks directly to Italy working on the contingency that if Italian industry could not start production until 1945, Panther tanks would have been supplied directly from Germany without guns, sheet metal work and probably other fittings such as radios.
If this option was to be selected, then Germany would supply just 10 nearly complete Panther tanks to Italy per month starting in December 1943 and let the Italians finish the vehicles there. The fact that the Germans would make this contingency would suggest that they expected it to take a long time to get Italian production up to speed.
The historian Jonathan Steinberg recounts that the problems with production really lay not in actual manufacturing but gross corruption within the Italian regime. Either way though, a second Ansaldo plant being built at Pozzuoli could have been ready by the middle of 1943 for Panther production, presumably with the tooling required.
Construction of this plant, however, would have necessitated taking off the short-term pressure from the factory production lines which were producing Italian vehicles, and instead purchasing Panzer IV’s, as had been suggested. As this was not done, the plant for local Panther production was delayed and therefore so was the Italian Panther.
It is confusing that so much effort was made to get the Panther into production considering the Army High Command preferred the Panzer IV, which was much closer to the tank requirements for a new medium tank for Italy. Presumably, the failure of their own heavy tank program to provide a suitable design forced the decision to select the Panther to fill both roles.
In hindsight, this was a poor choice, as a production license was already in place for the Panzer IV and could have been started by Spring 1943 with an estimated 130 tanks producible each month, compared to just 50 Panthers per month. Regarding Panzer IV production the first five months would have been solely for Italy after which half of the tanks would have been supplied to Germany which in comparison would mean that one year of Panzer IV production would have theoretically produced 1,560 Panzer IV’s (1,105 for Italy and 455 for Germany) compared to just 600 Panthers (300 each for Italy and Germany). Italy could, therefore, under ideal circumstances have had over three times the number of Panzer IV’s compared to Panthers. Given the state of Italian manufacturing, Allied bombing, and corruption, such figures are extremely optimistic but nonetheless, Panzer IV production was better suited to Italian capabilities than the Panther.
As an added confusion to the production of the Panther tank in Italy they would also have to produce the special Pmx series rail cars for moving the tanks, just yet another complication their industry was not going to be able to manage. Even so, a license for their production was also arranged.
Illustration by David Bocquelet – Artist impression of the Italian panther
How Different Would an Italian Panther be From a German One?
Assuming the Panther entered production in Italy, then certainly the radios would have been changed and so would the machine guns. It is logical to assume that the Breda 7.7mm machine gun would have been adopted for the hull and coaxial mounts, as well as another on the Italian anti-aircraft mount. The historian Walter Spielberger confirms that, as part of the February 1943 negotiations at the Ministry of War (which took place between the 13th and 24th February), it was agreed that the German team would be responsible for optics and electrical equipment. It is not known if this refers to simple optical devices like periscopes which could simply have been substituted in Italy or for the telescopic sights to ballistically match the guns.
A question still remains if German-built Panthers supplied to Italy would have included engines. Bearing in mind contracts had already been exchanged for Maybach engine production in Italy it is logical to assume that some or all of the engines would also be manufactured in Italy and be Maybachs.
Designers model line up of P26/40 (left), P43 (centre), and Panther (right) showing the size and suspension differences to good effect.
There is no mention at all in the licensing discussion about the production of the guns so the working assumption is that the Italians would fit a gun which they had on hand, likely to have been a 75mm gun like on the P40 given the inability of the industry to supply other guns in the quantity required. Fitting any guns other than the German 7.5cm or something very closely balanced to it would have necessitated additional changes to the mounting in the turret – work that would have only slowed down production.
The complexity of the entire Panther deal was further deepened by the separate licenses for the Maybach engine production and the desire to use the Maybach in the P40 design which was a direct competitor to the Panther for production contracts. With production problems especially with tank engines in short supply the option to use the German engines in the P40 program was a very desirable option. It is possible that the license was only given to Italy with the hope or intention that it be used to make Maybach HL-230 engines for Panther tanks rather than for the P40. Possibly to avoid this problem, FIAT-SPA produced their Model 344 700 hp engine, which was essentially a straight copy of the HL-230 rather than a license-built version. The preceding model, the Model 343, was an exact duplicate and license-built a copy of the Maybach HL-120 (for the German Panzer IV and Italian P40 program). With the HL-120 licensed for production back in early 1943 for the P40 but with a limitation on a license for the HL-230 limiting it to use in Panther tanks it is possible that the goal was simply to produce the copy of the more powerful engine without having to build the German tank.
Comparisons between the German Panther and the Italian P26 and P43 designs showing how much more compact the Italian designs were to their German rival albeit at a price of less armor and firepower.
Licences to produce Maybach engines had been provided from Germany to Italy in early 1943 and there could have been issues relating to payments leading to this renaming confusion but information is lacking in this area. The confusion over licenses is additionally complicated by Field Marshal Kesselring. When he returned to Rome on the 8th June 1943, he was clear that his instruction, coming directly from Hitler, was that whatever Italy wanted, they just had to ask for, whether it was tanks, troops, or self-propelled guns with no discussion over licensing or reciprocal manufacturing agreements.
Conclusion
Regardless though of existing plans, September 1943 turned everything upside down and Italy became split in half politically with a cobelligerent force fighting with the allies on one side and other troops continuing to fight on the side of the Axis under German control. The Germans after the September 1943 capitulation took over control of northern Italy including the armaments manufacturing plants. The Italians were no longer in charge of their own manufacturing after that point and ideas of producing the Panther in Italy seems to have been forgotten about, although some sources state that component parts were manufactured. It may have been a moot point anyway as a different design was ready at the time to replace the P26 which had barely begun to roll out of the factories. Just two months after the capitulation the Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen reported by November 1943, that “The firm of Ansaldo-Fossati in Genoa planned to produce a Heavy Tank Model 1943 armed with a Kanone 90/42, weighing 35 tons with 80mm frontal and 60 mm side armor (imitating the Panther). The engine and wooden model are not yet available.” That replacement tank was never built but the existence of this planned project perhaps gives an idea as to why the Italians had tried to get the engine for the Panther and not the Panther itself – they had something better planned.
The story of the Italian Panther then is a drawn out and complicated one.
A combination of Italian bureaucracy and the industrial oligarchies of Breda, FIAT, and Ansaldo, had managed to ensure that relatively little in terms of license production of engines or tanks had been achieved since the summer of 1940.
Negotiations over Italian production of various tanks had taken place between June 1941 and April 1943 with licenses agreed on 5th August 1941 (Panzer III), in 1942 (Panzer IV), and in 1943 for the Panzer V Panther. None of these plans ever came to fruition and no finished vehicles were actually produced though.
The Italians had at least gotten as far as being able to produce the HL-120 and HL-230 engines for their own heavy tank projects through which while slow was at least still in development. The final note on the matter is that just prior to the capitulation in September 1943, “several PzKpfw V Panther tanks were… to be purchased from Germany, while a P43 tank armed with a 90mm gun was under development”
Had Italy ever fielded the Panther it would have been expected to fulfill their needs until at least 1947-8 if the war had continued. It was likely the better long-term choice than the Panzer IV production in such a ‘what-if’ scenario, even though the Panzer IV made more sense numerically and logistically as well as being far better suited to the abilities of Italian industry at the time. As it turned out though, the Italians never got to put a Panther tank into combat and the only such vehicles seeing action in Italy were German vehicles or one of the 37 Panther turrets installed as fixed defenses.
Mussolini inspecting a brand new Panzer turret defensive bunker somewhere in Northern Italy. The concrete is still held in place by shuttering which would then be removed and backfilled with dirt
Panther specifications
Dimensions (L-w-h)
6.87/8.66 x3.27 x2.99 m (22.54/28.41 x10.73 x9.81 ft)
Total weight, battle ready
44.8 tons max. (98,767 lbs)
Armament
Main: 75 mm (2.95 in) KwK 42 L/70, 79 rounds
Sec: 2x 7.9 mm (0.31 in) MG 34, 5100 rounds
Nationalist Spain (1937-1939)
Light Tank Destroyer – 4 Converted
The Nationalists Strike Back
The Panzer I ‘Breda’ (an unofficial name) is a rare conversion from the mid-Spanish Civil War. It was intended as a means of countering the Republican army’s Soviet-supplied vehicles (mainly the T-26 and BA-6). Nationalist forces only typically had CV-35s and Panzer Is armed with machine guns, which were not able to perform AT (anti-tank duties), and as a result, a proposal to mount a 20mm gun onto a tank chassis was put forward. However, as large numbers of captured Soviet-supplied material became available to the Nationalist forces, the Panzer I Breda was no longer required, and only four vehicles were converted. Two are known to have been knocked out before the end of the war, and it is quite possible that the other two did not survive either due to gun barrel damage.
Panzer I Breda “351” of the 3a Compañia (3rd Company, Command). Undated, unlocated. Usually, a black ‘M’ would denote ‘Mando’ (Command), but this vehicle has an ‘E’, believed to still indicate that it belonged to the Command unit. Artemio Mortera Perez, however, believes that this indicates it belongs to the 3a Sección (not least because it is sometimes pictured with a T-26 M1936 of 3a Compañia/3a Sección. The black ‘E’ in the white diamond may mean ‘Especial’ (Special), but this is not proven. This vehicle suffered a broken piston connecting rod on 26th January 1939, and on 28th March, the engine set on fire. The righthand side exhaust is also missing.
Context: First Nationalist encounter with a T-26
Even the most generalist histories on the Spanish Civil War remind the reader that with their 45mm guns, Soviet-built Republican vehicles were able to outfight Nationalist vehicles, which were armed with only machine guns. Moreover, Republican armored forces were also able to outfight Nationalist/Nationalist-allied forces at a basic level leading to unnecessary Nationalist losses, even despite losing the initiative, suffering significant losses to Condor Legion aerial attacks, and engaging in suicidal offensives (examples including the Battle of Brunete, 1937, and the Ebro Offensive, 1938).
Soviet military hardware for the Republicans arrived in Spain on October 4th, 1936, and the first Nationalist encounter with a T-26 tank is reported as taking place during one of two Republican counterattacks as late as late-October or early December 1936 at Seseña (situated south of Madrid, and northeast of Toledo). Nationalist forces also had to rely on towed artillery or exceptionally brave soldiers armed with local variants of the Molotov cocktail (as in this case) for AT duties, which was not considered viable.
Subsequently, the Nationalists had to develop an AFV that was able to provide significant AT duties that was at least on par with the Republican T-26 and BT-5. As a result, a proposal to mount a gun capable of AT duties onto an existing tank chassis was put forward.
The early design stages
Two 20mm guns were put forward for the conversion. These were the Flak 30 and the Breda Model 1935. Whilst both guns were capable of destroying armored vehicles from reasonable distances, the Breda was likely chosen because it was simpler in design and had fewer moving parts, meaning that the gun would be more reliable, and maintenance would be substantially easier.
In summer, 1937, a request was made to a delegation of the CTV (Corpo Truppe Volontarie, an Italian unit) to donate a CV-35 and a 20mm Breda Modelo 1935 gun to the Nationalist army for tests. CV-35 chassis number 2694 was eventually handed over and work began on installing the new gun.
Before the work was complete, Spanish Generals involved in the project decided that the developments seemed very promising, and as a result, General HQ ordered 40 more CV-35s to be modified. However, this order amounted to nothing because General García Pallasar wrote to General HQ about the possibility of having a 20mm gun mounted on a Panzer I, which he thought would be better as it is a much larger vehicle. This was accepted, and a request was made to a German delegation to transfer over a Panzer I for modification.
The Panzer I Breda is born
A Panzer I Ausf.A was transferred and modified with the new gun at some point before late September 1937. Importantly, the new Breda gun was given a gas protection shield, in order to prevent gas from leaking into the tank and harming the crew, and a gun shield for additional armor. The Panzer I’s turret had to be modified in order to mount the large 20mm gun, specifically to allow vertical aiming for its intended AT duties.
The turret of the Panzer I was enlarged for the purposes of mounting the new, larger gun by welding a new superstructure to the existing turret. The original gun mantlet was also removed and replaced by bolting on a much larger, curved mantlet. The original turret hatch was even retained and mounted on the new superstructure. A viewport was also cut into the structure which allowed the gun to be aimed.
By late September 1937, both the modified CV-35 and Panzer I were ready for trials and were then brought to the recently-captured city of Bilbao via lorries (as many tanks were transported in Spain). Results of the tests showed that the modified Panzer I was the superior vehicle, likely owing to it having a traversable turret and more internal space. Shortly after tests ended, three more Panzer I Ausf.As were converted in the Fábrica de Armas in Seville, and other conversion tests on the Panzer I were later attempted (see sidenote below).
However, a spanner was thrown into the works by General Von Thoma, commander of the ground elements of the Condor Legion. The aforementioned viewport was simply just a hole and was therefore totally unarmored. As a result, it became the subject of significant criticism.
Condemnation from Von Thoma
One commonly mentioned reason as to why only four vehicles were built is that by 1938, the Nationalists had captured significant numbers of T-26s and BA-3/6s, which were being incorporated into the army. With their 45mm guns, these were superior in design to the Panzer I Breda, and therefore the vehicle was effectively redundant. The basic facts of this are correct – the Panzer I Breda was, indeed, made redundant, but this is not the real reason for the project’s termination. The suggestion in contemporary documentary evidence is clear in that Von Thoma was strongly opposed to the conversion because of the poor crew safety resulting from the unarmored viewport, and as a result, he was able to convince the Cuartel General del Generalissimo to cancel the order for more vehicles.
On 6th January 1938, General Pallasar ordered Tentiente Coronel Pujales, the commander of Agrupación de Tanques del Legion Española to deliver six more Panzer I Breda tanks. Two days later on 8th January, Von Thoma penned a letter with significant criticisms, stating: “The people who built it call it the ‘Death Car’“, suggesting that the vehicle’s aiming port, being just a hole, was insufficiently protected with no apparent solution. Von Thoma even reported that crew members refused to even get in the vehicles because they considered them so dangerously unprotected. He also stated, as a final nail in the coffin, that there were simply not enough tanks to go around, and the vehicles could not be spared for the conversion. As a result of this letter, the order for more conversions was canceled the following day by the Cuartel General of the Generalissimo.
General Pallasar was clearly unhappy with the decision and responded to Von Thoma’s complaint by asking General HQ a simple question. He asked whether it would be better to remove the only highly mobile AT duty tank they had, or to run the risk of some tank crewmen receiving injuries inside the tank because of a lucky rifle shot through the aiming port (which he even suggested should be closed until aiming was necessary in order to prevent this minuscule danger).
The Cuartel General del Generalissimo gave their reply on 24th January, suggesting that Von Thoma and Pallasar should see if mounting bulletproof glass over the hole, supplied by the Germans, would resolve the issue. It seems as though on 25th January, Pallasar agreed. The glass must have eventually been fitted, as Lucas Molina Franco (a modern scholar) reports an invoice for “Bullet-proof glass for tanks” costing a total of 4861.08 Reichsmarks.
Despite the effort to improve the safety of the crew, it seems as though no more vehicles were modified thanks to Von Thoma’s successful complaint campaign.
There is, indeed, a question to be asked on how genuine Von Thoma’s fears for crew safety were. An enemy rifleman being accurate or lucky enough to shoot through the small unarmored aiming port seems quite unlikely. It is entirely possible, given Von Thoma’s hint towards an insufficient number of German AFVs, that he was potentially trying to sell the Spanish more tanks – something which may not have happened due to the capture and integration of Soviet-supplied vehicles into the Nationalist army.
Operational organization of the Panzer I Breda
On 1st October 1937, the vehicles were supplied to Primer Batallón de Carros de Combate. On 1st March 1938, they were reassigned into Bandera de Carros de Combate de la Legión (which existed between 12th February 1938 and 31st November 1938). The Bandera de Carros de Combate de la Legión was formed by two Grupos which were subdivided into Compañias. 1a Compañia, 2a, and 3a were in 1er Grupo, and 4a, 5a, and 6a were in 2o Grupo. The Panzer I Bredas are believed to have been divided into these four Compañias:
1a Compañia (Primera – First)
2a Compañia (Segunda – Second) Note: It is possible that this may actually have been 5a, according to combat reports, see below.
3a Compañia (Tercera – Third)
4a Compañia (Cuarta – Fourth)
On 1st October 1938, the vehicles were reassigned to Agrupación de Carros de Combate de la Legión – apparently their final user.
Operational Colours and Identifying Individual Vehicles
The camouflage scheme of the Panzer I Breda has been the subject of significant speculation. The original chassis of the vehicle would have been the usual three-tone Buntfarbenanstrich – Panzer grey was not instituted until July 1940.
Over time, it is known that the vehicles would have their new turret superstructures painted (and the rest of the turret would also likely be homogenized). This means that there is quite a variety in camouflage schemes between all four vehicles, some of which are closer to the original Buntfarbenanstrich scheme than others. In any case, all of the vehicles appear to have used a three-tone scheme similar to Buntfarbenanstrich, using roughly the same colors (in reality, likely local Spanish military grade paints that were not quite the same shades as German paints).
Tactical / unit / operational markings also changed at least two or three times. Prior to December 1938, Spanish tanks used a letters system, whereby they would be given a letter of the alphabet to distinguish their units. After December 1938, a standardized system was put into place, whereby each tank had unit markings based on shapes – diamonds and circles, and were given a Spanish Legion marking in white. However, not all vehicles can be accounted for in both of these systems due to a lack of photographic evidence.
Regardless of the changes in camouflage and markings, by breaking them down into the Compañias system of Bandera de Carros de Combate de la Legión (for a standardization of reference), the following can be used as a general guide for differentiation between vehicles (attempting, as best as possible, to keep in mind that some vehicles may have changed Compañias):
1a Compañia’s Panzer I Breda’s markings are unclear because of a lack of photos. According to one photo (far too grainy to be conclusive), there might have been a large ‘H’ in white on the upper glacis plate. There was also a Nationalist flag painted a few inches to the right of the driver’s viewport. It may generally be assumed that, like the other Panzer I Bredas, this tank was painted in a three-tone scheme of some sort.
2a Compañia’s Panzer I Breda is shown in the little available photographs to have had a (faded) white ‘L’ on the lower glacis plate, and a Nationalist flag a few inches to the right of the driver’s viewport, with a small, white circle painted next to the flag. The ‘L’ indicates that these are the vehicle’s markings before December 1938, as from that date, the markings of Nationalist armor was being standardized from the original letters system into a numbers system. This tank is also believed to have had a three tone camouflage, painted on locally. The colors are likely to have been similar to Buntfarbenanstricht, but much more radiant. The new turret superstructure, for example, appears to have been painted with a very dark color (possibly dark green), whereas the rest of the vehicle is likely to be lighter green or sand and brown. In fact, one photo seems to indicate the hull to have retained the original Buntfarbenanstrich.
3a Compañia’s Panzer I Breda is shown in extant photos to have had a white Spanish Legion symbol (a halberd and crown crossed with a crossbow, and blunderbuss) on the right hand side of the driver’s port, and a white diamond with a black letter ‘E’ in the middle of the diamond (possibly meaning ‘Especial’) on the right of the Spanish Legion symbol. It also had the number 531 in white on the upper glacis plate behind the central headlamp. These markings were painted on from any point after December 1938, and the vehicle likely had fewer markings before that date.
The colour scheme visible in most photographs (likely painted also painted after December 1938) appears to be very close to the original Buntfarbenanstricht, except the white (or very light brown, as colour footage seems to indicate) stripes are much more radiant (most evidently on the turret and side of the hull). The turret also appears to have been painted darker. This may be an optical illusion caused by the painting of the same paint onto two different metal types (IE the original turret and the new superstructure), or perhaps even an effect caused (or exacerbated) by shadows resulting from the slight outwards sloping of the new superstructure.
The vehicle is also missing its right-hand side exhaust pipe.
4a Compañia’s Panzer I Breda had a large white cross on the hull below the driver’s port. Whilst it might seem to be an aerial recognition Saint Andrew’s Cross, it is actually more likely a unit marking pre-December, 1938. A Nationalist flag was also painted directly on the right of the driver’s port.
The turret appears to be painted with a sort of ‘globular’ or ‘amoeba’ paint scheme, whereas the hull looks to be kept in its original Buntfarbenanstrich.
According to one photograph, after transfer into Bandera de Carros de Combate de la Legión in March 1938, the tank had a crudely painted Cruz de Borgoña on the right side of the hull, (a red cross with a white background) indicating that the crew were Carlists. Carlist crews are known to often display their own insignia on their vehicles, even despite General Franco’s official orders for unity among the Nationalist. The photo also shows that the tank had a long Spanish Nationalist flag painted on the rear of the hull (above the engine deck, but below the turret). The only evidence for the vehicle with the Cruz painted on being from 4a Compañia’s is that Mortera Perez reports this vehicle to belongs to 2o Grupo de la Bandera de Carros (thus, if he is correct, it must belong to 4a Compañia, because 4a was the only Compañia in 2o Grupo with a Panzer I Breda). He also reports that the photo was taken after fighting at Vinaroz, thus on, or shortly after, April 15th, 1938, thus allowing us to date Cruz’s painting to around March 1938, when the tank was transferred into Bandera de Carros de Combate de la Legión.
Extant photos clearly do not show the full history of their paint schemes and markings, and it is probable that as more photos show up, it will become even more evident that as the vehicles saw more combat, additional lines, dots, and dashes may have been added to the paint scheme by the crew.
Consider also that photos may show the vehicles after long marches, from which sometimes a significant amount of dust would gather onto the hull, thus creating the appearance of the tanks being repainted. However, this is not always the case, and often, Buntfarbenanstricht is mistaken for dirt and dust, leading to many tanks being painted a dusty panzer grey by illustrators, scale modelers, and even Spanish museums such as at El Goloso.
Combat
Specific combat data on the Panzer I Breda is lacking. Whilst the vehicles undoubtedly saw combat, the majority of what can be ascertained is roughly where and when the vehicle was fielded, and with which units.
Some photos seem to indicate that the vehicle was sometimes dug into a position, camouflaged in shrubbery, and used as an ambush tank, but specific tactics are not recorded in any literary primary sources.
Panzer I Breda (believed to be of 2a Compañia but there are not enough identification details), camouflaged by shrubbery, likely for an ambush attack. Unknown date and location. As taken from “La Maquina y la Historia No. 2: Blindados en España: 1a. parte: La Guerra Civil 1936-1939” by Javier de Mazarrasa.
They were apparently first photographed in Guadalajara, and Soria, in December 1937, at which point, they would have been operated by Primer Batallón de Carros de Combate.
4a Compañia’s vehicle belonging to served throughout and survived the Aragon Offensive (March-April, 1938), as photos show one during the offensive, and at the end after fighting in Vinaroz.
Fate of the vehicles
None of the vehicles are believed to have survived the war due to their destruction or faulty guns. 2a/5a Compañia’s: One vehicle was fielded at the Battle of the Ebro (July-November, 1938), reportedly with the 5a Grupo de Bandera de Carros de Combate de la Legión (this is where the possibility of 2a Compañia’s Panzer I Breda actually being 5a Compañia comes from, or the probability of vehicles changing Compañia). During the Nationalist counter-offensive, on 6th August, three armored groups were formed under two Tentiente Coroneles (Lieutenant Colonels), Linos Lage, and Torrente y Moreno, who controlled sixteen vehicles consisting of T-26s and Panzer Is (one of which was a Panzer I Breda) belonging to the 2a, 3a, 5a, and 6a Compañias de Bandera de Carros de Combate de la Legión. The offensive started at the Vesecri Plateu and eventually reached the River Ebro. During this counteroffensive, the Nationalists suffered four casualties – two wounded (one Captain, and one Legionary), and two dead (two Legionaries), resulting from the Panzer I Breda being “struck by an enemy projectile“. It is unclear if the vehicle was left operational or not. 4a Compañia’s (and likely 1a Compañia’s): On 19th November 1938, the gun of the Panzer I Breda from 4a Compañia (then fielded with 2a Batallón de Agrupación de Carros de Combate) was reported as having suffered an internal explosion. Two new guns were requested in a note of the Staff of the Jefatura de M.I.R. addressed to the Cuartel General del Generalissimo (dated in Burgos, 11th November 1938 – meaning either the date of the internal explosion or the date of the note is wrong). The chassis of multiple Panzer I Breda tanks were reported as in perfect condition. Two days later, General Pallasar replied that there were no more Breda Modelo 1935s available and that the broken guns on the vehicles should be sent to the artillery arsenal at Saragossa for repairs. No further information is available on this, but it seems to imply that two vehicles had broken guns, which was likely to be 4a and 1a Compañia’s, by deduction. 3a Compañia’s: On 26th January 1939, a piston connecting rod broke on the 3a Compañia’s Panzer I Breda in unreported circumstances. On 28th March, the engine caught fire, and the vehicle was disabled, also in unreported circumstances.
Conclusion
The Panzer I Breda, whilst quite a sound idea on paper, was evidently flawed because of the limitations of the chassis it was based on, and a handful of problems are apparent in the design. The Panzer I, without any modification to the armor, was clearly vulnerable to the guns of the Republican army’s Soviet-supplied vehicles. The Panzer I Breda’s turret was, even with the new superstructure, too small for the purpose, also. The somewhat feeble 20mm gun was also simply not on par with the 45mm gun of Soviet-supplied vehicles, and it seems apparent that there were not enough spare parts for the Panzer I Breda to be viable in the long term. Whether the aiming sight, even with the bulletproof glass, also made the conversions hazardous to the crew or not is debatable. Indeed, the capture and integration of Soviet-supplied tanks made the need for more vehicles redundant anyway.
With only four Panzer I Breda tanks built, the extent of the photographic evidence of the tank is quite surprising – an estimated thirty photos of the vehicle are known. Many of these are private photos taken by Condor Legion soldiers. It is quite probable, if not certain, that more Condor Legion private photos exist in other private collections which will reveal more on the still somewhat mysterious tanks.
Panzer I Breda of 4a Compañia with a Cruz de Borgoña. The other side of the vehicle is shown in photos to have the Cruz, but it is possible that this side also had one. The camouflage scheme appears to be a locally painted amoeba pattern on the turret, painted over the original Buntfarbenanstrich, still visible in photos on the hull. A depiction of 4a Compañía’s Panzer I Breda fictionally illustrated in a two-tone livery. The correct scheme should be three tone. This three tone scheme was, as indicated above, probably a mix of the usual three-tone Buntfarbenanstrich of pre-WWII Panzers on the hull, and a new scheme on the turret. The Cruz de Borgoña has also been mistaken for a typical aerial ID cross in this depiction.
Panzer I Breda, illustrated here in another fictional livery, likely based on 3a Compañía’s vehicle. The Panzergrey base is particularly anachronistic, but the sand stripes are in fact quite accurate. In reality, the scheme should, in fact, look more like this, with green, dark-grey-ish brown, and sand stripes.
Panzer I Breda “351” of the 3a Compañia (3rd Company) with a T-26 M1936 of the 3a Compañia/3a Sección, dated to some time between 1st December 1938, and 28th December 1939. Usually, a black ‘M’ would denote ‘Mando’ (Command), but this vehicle has an ‘E’, believed to still indicate it belonged to the Command unit. The ‘E’ in the white diamond may mean ‘Especial’ (Special), but this is not proven. Weld beads are also visible where the original turret meets the new superstructure.
A different view of the above, along with a Panzer I Ausf.B of 3a Compañia, Mando. From this angle, the white (or, again, very light brown) stripes and dots on the Panzer I Breda’s hull side and turret are clearly visible. As taken from “Los Medios Blindados en la Guerra Civil Española: Teatro de Operaciones de Levante, Aragón, y Cataluña, 36/39 1a parte” by Artemio Mortera Pérez.
Panzer I Breda, undated, unlocated. There is a flag on the vehicle’s mantlet, likely a signal flag. The vehicle is missing its right-hand side exhaust, indicating it to belong to 3a Compañia. This is likely from before December 1938, as the new camo scheme and markings seen in other photos are not visible in this photo. Source: Author’s collection.
A different view of the above. Source: Author’s collection.
Panzer I Breda from 2a Compañia, apparently marked with the letter ‘L’ on the lower glacis plate. at Guadalajara or Soria, December, 1937. As taken from “Los Medios Blindados en la Guerra Civil Española: Teatro de Operaciones de Levante, Aragón, y Cataluña, 36/39 1a parte” by Artemio Mortera Pérez.
Panzer I Breda reportedly of 2a Compañia, with the turret clearly showing a three-tone camouflage. This was almost certainly Buntfarbenanstrich, or, more likely a Buntfarbenanstrich scheme in non-standard and more radiant tones (as evidenced by the turret). The hull appears to have remained in the original Buntfarbenanstrich. Unknown date and location – possibly at the Battle of the Ebro (July-November, 1938).
Panzer I Breda reportedly of 2a Compañia. Unknown date, unknown location – possibly at, or just after (based on the soldier’s overcoat) the Battle of the Ebro (July-November, 1938).
Panzer I Breda of 4a Compañia with a Cruz de Borgoña on the right side of the vehicle (a red cross with a white background). The tank also had a long Spanish Nationalist flag painted on the rear of the hull (above the engine deck, but below the turret). “Los Medios Blindados en la Guerra Civil Española: Teatro de Operaciones de Levante, Aragón, y Cataluña, 36/39 2a parte” by Artemio Mortera Pérez reports this to belong to 2o Grupo de la Bandera de Carros (if correct, this vehicle can only belong to 4a Compañia, as this is the only unit in 2o Grupo that had a Panzer I Breda). The photo was taken after fighting at Vinaroz, thus on, or shortly after, April 15th, 1938.
Panzer I Breda of 4a Compañia, likely at an earlier point in time to the above, with a large white cross on the hull (likely a unit marking). The turret hatch is also open in this picture, apparently the Panzer I’s original hatch. Credit: Museo del Ejercito.
One of few photos available believed to show 1a Compañia’s Panzer I Breda. The hull is apparently marked with a large, white ‘H’, but this is unclear.
A different view of 1a Compañia’s Panzer I Breda. Even in this poor resolution image, the white ‘H’ (indicating this to be 1a) is clear, as is the Nationalist flag on the hull. To the left of the flag may be a small white dot, similar to 2a Compañia’s Panzer I Breda, but the image is too poor resolution to be sure.
Unidentified Panzer I Breda (more likely 4a Compañia, but possibly 2a – although there are no useful identification details visible), at the Aragon Offensive, 1938. As taken from “Los Medios Blindados en la Guerra Civil Española: Teatro de Operaciones de Levante, Aragón, y Cataluña, 36/39 2a parte” by Artemio Mortera Pérez.
A still from some original color footage of a Spanish Panzer I Ausf.A (belonging to 2a Compañia/1a Sección). This clearly shows the type of Buntfarbenanstricht three-tone camouflage used on Spanish Panzer Is. Note: This particular vehicle may have additional camouflage markings, as it appears as though it has been repainted since it was supplied by the Germans (beyond the addition of unit markings).
Nationalist Spain (1936-1939?)
Light Flamethrower Tank – 2 Converted
The Civil War Heats Up
Panzer I ‘Lanzallamas’ is an unofficial name for two Panzer Is which were converted into flamethrower tanks during the early Spanish Civil War. Little is known about the vehicles due to a lack of primary sources, and as a result, there are significant discrepancies between modern sources on their history. Two different modifications of Flammenwerfer 35s were mounted onto a Panzer I Ausf.A and an Ausf.B respectively, but it seems as though neither design saw combat. The Both Panzer I ‘Lanzallamas’ were most probably only used for testing and training, likely being dismantled before the war’s end.
Brief Context: The Spanish Civil War
The Spanish Civil War is said to have officially begun on 17th July, 1936 with a rebellion from right-wing / conservative / monarchist officers in the Spanish army (who would later become known as the Nationalists) against the left-wing / anti-Catholic / pro-Soviet Republican government. However, as Stanley G. Payne notes that only by late July or early October was this uprising to become a civil war, as Franco was able to airlift (with German and Italian assistance) the Army of Africa (essentially seasoned Moroccan colonial soldiers) into mainland Spain, where the rebels began to face significant Republican and Republican-allied resistance, thus starting the Spanish Civil War.
The Gruppe Von Thoma supplied eighteen flamethrowers of three types to the Nationalists: nine standard, four light (known to be Flammenwerfer 35 models), and five heavy ‘trench’ (i.e. improvised) types. As early as mid-October, 1936, (barely three months after the initial Nationalist uprising) the Nationalists began training of flamethrower infantrymen under the direction of Commander Peter Jansa (Chief of the Condor Legion’s anti-tank artillery instructors).
The orders for flamethrower training were issued by telegram to General Varela on 17th October, 1936 and read: “… with the utmost urgency, make the arrangements so that an officer and thirty soldiers chosen among the Banderas from those columns are sent to Caceres to be dispatched to Arguijuela [sic – Las Arguijuelas Castle] where they will be trained in the use of flamethrowers. Training timetables will be established by Mr. Thoma. Once the training is finished, they will join their units to operate these devices.”
Despite what the telegram asserts, soldiers from the Tercio (an elite unit) are reported to have actually been sent to Oropesa, Toledo (roughly 100 miles east of Caceres) for this flamethrower training. Nine days after the initial telegram, on 26th October, having apparently received their training, these soldiers were sent to the Talavera front along with their flamethrowers.
Flamethrower training was likely initiated primarily for anti-fortification (and possibly anti-infantry) purposes, as the Nationalists were acutely aware of the need to quickly and efficiently destroy any Republican fortifications, probably with the potential for a Republican version of the Siege of the Alcázar (July-September, 1936) taking place kept firmly in mind.
The use of flamethrowers was unlikely to have been conceived for AT duties, as Soviet military hardware for the Republicans arrived in Spain only from October 4th, 1936, and the first Nationalist encounter with a T-26 tank is reported as taking place during one of two Republican counterattacks as late as late-October or early December at Seseña (situated south of Madrid, and northeast of Toledo). Thus, the order for flamethrower training actually predates the Nationalists encountering serious Republican armored forces.
However, it must be remembered that there are no actual combat records of any flamethrowers in the Spanish Civil War. Although, as a point of interest, flame-based weapons (primarily local forms of Molotov cocktails, but some others including what can only be described as trench lighters known in Spain as Chisqueros) were used against the T-26 throughout the Spanish Civil War to great effect.
History of the Panzer I ‘Lanzallamas’
Two of the four Flammenwerfer 35s supplied to Spain were given to General Varela (the other two are supposedly accounted for by the Tercio). Photos (which cannot be reproduced in this article for copyright reasons) clearly show that Varela’s two Flammenwerfer 35s were different from each other – one had a short, fat barrel, and the other had a long, thin barrel. Both appear to have been, at one point or another, mounted onto a Panzer I, but from this point there is a significant discrepancy in sources regarding the fitting of flamethrowers to Panzer Is.
One account on the Panzer I ‘Lanzallamas’ comes from “Soldiers of Von Thoma: Legion Condor Ground Forces in the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939” by Lucas Molina Franco, José Mª Manrique García, and Raúl Arias Ramos. The book states that only a Panzer I Ausf.A had a flamethrower, but this is known to be untrue because of the photographic evidence.
Lucas Molina Franco (et al) then suggest that the sole vehicle was sent to the Talavera front on 27th October 1936, along with two tank companies and some anti-tank guns. However, in an earlier work by Lucas Molina Franco, “AFV Collection No. 1: Panzer I: Beginning of a Dynasty“, he actually states that the vehicle was kept at the Escuela de Carros in Casarrubuelos and never saw combat. As mentioned earlier, there is no combat data available on the use of flamethrowers in combat in Spain, and these claims cannot be confirmed.
However, another account on the Panzer I ‘Lanzallamas’ comes from “Los Medios Blindados en la Guerra Civil Española: Teatro de Operaciones de Levante, Aragón, y Cataluña, 36/39 1a parte” by Artemio Mortera Pérez. This book states that two Panzer Is had Flammenwerfer 35s installed on them in October 1936, and also states that both vehicles stayed in Las Arguijuelas Castle for training, Crucially, there is no mention of them being sent to Talavera with the soldiers from the Tercio.
To complicate matters even more, another discrepancy occurs here because footage showing the Panzer I Ausf.A. ‘Lanzallamas’ during training is reported to be at Cubas, in the north of Spain, 1937. However, this is reported by other sources to be at Oropesa, Toledo, south of Madrid.
Many of the discrepancies here cannot be resolved with current sources. Moreover, there are apparently no primary sources (such as photographs, military inventories, or even an interview with a veteran) which suggest that either of the two Panzer I ‘Lanzallamas’ models saw combat or were issued to a fighting (i.e. non-training) unit. Despite this, a general description of the vehicles can be ascertained from the few extant sources.
Panzer I ‘Lanzallamas’ Designs
Panzer I Ausf.A ‘Lanzallamas’
The Panzer I Ausf.A ‘Lanzallamas’ had the Flammenwerfer 35 which had the longer barrel. Unlike with the Ausf.B ‘Lanzallamas’, the vehicle mounted a machine gun in the turret (in the left side port). On the rear of the hull, a white ‘2’ was painted on.
The vehicle was a Panzer I Ausf.A, and therefore had turret hooks either side and had four road wheels on either side. Panzer I Ausf.B ‘Lanzallamas’ Only one photo is known to show the Panzer I Ausf.B ‘Lanzallamas’. This might be explained by it being sent to Talavera with the Tercio, but whether or not it was actually sent with them is, again, unsubstantiated.
This vehicle had a Flammenwerfer 35, modified with a short and fat armored cover with some ventilation slots to avoid overheating. This was mounted in the right MG port, which could apparently not close due to the barrel being too thick (see below).
The tank’s left machine gun port appears to have been welded shut, meaning a machine gun could not be used. This was likely done as a safety feature, because the machine gun would otherwise be too close to the flames, and might suffer damage.
Another detail is the small white ‘2’ on the vehicle’s hull near the vision hatch.
The vehicle was a Panzer I Ausf.B and therefore had no turret hooks on the sides of the turret (as with a Panzer I Ausf.A, had five road wheels on either side, and did not have the additional engine deck protection (no Panzer I Ausf.Bs in Spain had this feature).
Design History
Due to the lack of primary sources, the design history of the vehicles is unclear, and as such, details about the decisions made around the project are also unknown. However, it could be argued that the conversion of the Panzer I Ausf.B came first, as the Ausf.A-based conversion appears to improve on two issues that the Ausf.B-based conversion suffered from.
Firstly, the flamethrower on the Ausf.B-based design appears to have been too short, so the opposite MG port appears to have been welded shut in order to prevent an MG being mounted and subsequently damaged by the flames. The Ausf.A-based design had a much longer barrel, which seems to mean that an MG could be mounted in the opposite port, and thus it may follow that the design is an improvement on the Ausf.B-based design.
Secondly, the Ausf.B-based design appears as though it could not have the MG port closed around the flamethrower (whether this is actually the case or not is difficult to ascertain, but the sole photograph seems to suggest this to be the case), whereas the Ausf.A design definitely could have all of its hatches closed. The open hatch might endanger the crew, a criticism which actually made von Thoma try to shut down the Panzer I con 20mm Breda Modelo 1935 project.
It is also entirely possible that the vehicles were built at the same time – their designs different only out of what equipment was available, as opposed to what was desired by the designers.
Fate of the Panzer I ‘Lanzallamas’
Aforementioned sources all suggest that the range of the Flammenwerfer 35 (around 20-25 meters) was considered insufficient, and this likely meant that the project was discontinued. Installation of heavier flamethrowers (of which, there was a number in Spanish hands as mentioned earlier) is thought by Mortera Pérez to have been impossible due to them not fitting in a Panzer I without the use of an external fuel tank. This can be confirmed as it is known that these were used on Bilbao Modelo 1932s (referred to in ‘Soldiers of Von Thoma‘ as “some armored trucks”), and were apparently more successful flamethrower conversions, also likely adding another reason to discontinue the Panzer I ‘Lanzallamas’ project.
The fate of the Panzer I ‘Lanzallamas’ is unknown – as stated, it is unclear whether or not either design even saw combat. According to photos, the Panzer I Ausf.A ‘Lanzallamas’ was seen as late as November 1937 during joint infantry and mechanized flamethrower training. It is unclear if the Panzer I Ausf.B ‘Lanzallamas’ was still in service as late as November 1937 because of a lack of evidence.
After November 1937, there are no more sources available regarding the vehicles, literary or photographic, and it seems as though they were most likely dismantled, if not retired, scrapped, or wrecked beyond repair.
Panzer I Ausf.A. ‘Lanzallamas’, illustrated in a Buntfarbenanstrich camouflage scheme – the colour all Panzers would have been supplied in to the Nationalists.
Panzer I Ausf.B. ‘Lanzallamas’. Both Illustrations by Tank Encyclopedia’s own David Bocquelet. Panzer I Ausf.B based ‘Lanzallamas’ equipped with a modified Flammenwerfer 35. The left MG port appears to be welded shut, and it seems as though the right port with the flamethrower could not be closed properly because the flamethrower’s barrel is too thick. The turret is clearly marked with a Saint Andrew’s aerial recognition cross, and the hull is marked with a two-tone Nationalist flag and a small white ‘2’. The turret appears to be an Ausf.B turret, as there are no turret hooks. Source: Private collection of Ruy Aballe, as taken from “AFV Collection No. 1: Panzer I: Beginning of a Dynasty” by Lucas Molina Franco. This image also appears in “Los Medios Blindados en la Guerra Civil Española: Teatro de Operaciones de Levante, Aragón, y Cataluña, 36/39 1a parte” by Artemio Mortera Pérez.
Panzer I Ausf.A ‘Lanzallamas’. The number ‘2’ in white is visible on the lower rear of the hull. The much longer barrel for the flamethrower can be seen, along with a machine gun in the left port. A pig is apparently stowed on the engine deck. As taken from “Soldiers of Von Thoma: Legion Condor Ground Forces in the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939” by Lucas Molina Franco, José Mª Manrique García, and Raúl Arias Ramos.
Still from footage of the Panzer I Ausf.A ‘Lanzallamas’ during training at Cubas, 1937. In this photo, the vehicle (especially the turret) is clearly painted in a usual three-tone Buntfarbenanstrich scheme. The turret appears to be an Ausf.A, as a turret hook can be seen.
Different view of the above, discharging flames at around 20-25 meters.
Footage showing flamethrower training at Cubas, along with the Panzer I Ausf.A ‘Lanzallamas’ from 1937.
Sources
Private correspondence with Guillem Martí Pujol and Francisco Javier Cabeza Martinez regarding the Panzer I ‘Lanzallamas’.
“Los Medios Blindados en la Guerra Civil Española: Teatro de Operaciones de Levante, Aragón, y Cataluña, 36/39 1a parte” by Artemio Mortera Pérez
“La Base Alemana de Carros de Combate en Las Arguijuelas, Caceres (1936-1937)” by Antonio Rodríguez González
“Soldiers of Von Thoma: Legion Condor Ground Forces in the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939” by Lucas Molina Franco, José Mª Manrique García, and Raúl Arias Ramos
“AFV Collection No. 1: Panzer I: Beginning of a Dynasty” by Lucas Molina Franco
“Camion Blindado Bilbao Mod. 1932 “Lanzallamas”” by Ángel P. Heras
“The Spanish Civil War” by Stanley G. Payne
Facing a number of external threats in the 1930’s, the Chinese began to procure weapons from abroad in order to modernize their army. One of the many vehicles that Chiang Kai-shek’s government obtained was the Panzer I Ausf.A from Germany. Fifteen arrived in June 1937, with barely enough time to train the Chinese crews for them to take part in the defense against the Japanese that began a month later. Outnumbered, outgunned, and out-performed, the Chinese Panzer I’s served at the Battle of Nanjing (Nanking) in December 1937, but were either destroyed or abandoned during the short battle.
Context: Arming the Chinese
The Chinese had an army that was inferior to foreign counterparts such as Japan, the UK, USSR, and USA for almost a century – it had needed modernization since the First Opium War (1839-1842). Following various attempts since then, in the 1930s, the Nationalists began a major military modernization campaign as they were beginning to see that a war with Japan was almost inevitable. One particular problem that China faced was its lack of AFV’s.
Provincial governments had some improvised AFV’s (some also had a handful imported from abroad), but the Nationalist’s National Revolutionary Army only had some Renault FT’s bought from France during the Northern Expedition, and some captured from the independent warlord Zhang Zuolin or, perhaps, inherited from his son, Zhang Xueliang, who secretly swore allegiance to the KMT after Zuolin’s assassination in 1928. The exact circumstances are unclear.
Some of these FT’s were armed with Manchurian 37 mm (1.46 in) guns which might have been able to destroy Japanese light tanks, but not the Type 89 Yi-Go medium tank, as used in the Battle of Shanghai. Essentially, these FT’s were outdated compared to Japanese tanks, and they were certainly not numerous enough (let alone potent enough) to defend against a possible Japanese onslaught.
As part of a broader military modernization campaign, the KMT hired German military advisors headed by General Hans von Seekt. These advisors convinced Chiang Kai-shek to buy as many arms as possible from Europe – no doubt, a money-making scheme by the German advisors, as China bought plenty of German-produced equipment including Panzer I’s, Sd.Kfz.221s and 222s, field guns and artillery pieces, and even large numbers of the Stalhelm helmet.
Characteristics
Fifteen Panzer I Ausf.A’s were sold to the Kuomintang in mid or late 1936, but they only arrived in June 1937 because the Chinese ordnance department was so poorly organized. The Chinese paid 1.03 million Reichsmarks for the tanks (about US$25 million in today’s money), but they were shipped poorly and were not protected from the elements.
The damage was reported by a Krupp representative, Herr Habermas, from Nanjing, 26th November, 1937:
Water, 2-4cm deep, had collected in the hull of the tanks.
Lots of parts had rusted, including the gun mounts, the telescopic gun sights, and steering brakes.
The electrical components were heavily damaged by the warm and humid air.
The cooling fans for the brakes were non-operational without serious cleaning.
The batteries for the electrical components were ruined due to heavy oxidization. A representative from Bosch in Shanghai stated that the contact material on the magnetos and voltage regulators was not suitable for tropical environments.
Some tool boxes, cloth components, and operation manuals were also partially ruined.
Japanese photo of Panzer I #312 showing the engine. Even from such a poor quality image, the state of disrepair of the tanks is obvious.
As a result, the KMT accused the Germans of selling used models, which is not what they agreed, but there was little time to dispute this, as war with Japan broke out only a month after the arrival of the Panzer I’s.
Paint Scheme
Regarding their paint schemes, the Panzer I’s were almost certainly pre-war three-tone as they would have been painted by the Germans, as opposed to the later Panzer gray scheme. Photos seem to show them to be a single color, but this is likely due to the paint fading / being worn, the tank being very dirty, or an inherent problem with black and white photos – especially poor quality prints or digital renderings of them.
A three-digit serial number was added on the front and rear of the hull.
A small KMT emblem is often depicted on the side rear of the vehicle, just below a viewport, but this might be a Japanese addition or an apocryphal post-war artist’s addition.
Combat Performance
The tanks were highly unsuitable to the Chinese climate when they were operational. Herr Habermas also reports:
The tanks were very prone to overheating, and temperatures inside the tank could get as high as 60 degrees Celsius in the summer, even with all hatches open.
Hand and foot levers could hardly be operated as a result of the intense heat, making driving even more hazardous.
On a march of any length, the front of the tank had to be ventilated by opening the brake adjustment hatch.
Due to the threat of the electrical equipment overheating, the engine compartment had to be ventilated during long marches.
Due to the overheating issue, after a long march the gunner could not fire the machine guns when the tank was buttoned-down (IE with all hatches closed).
Off-road use of the tanks was unimaginable because the tracks were not wide enough for muddy rice fields (especially anywhere north of the Yangtze River). Essentially, the tracks got stuck in the mud, and the tank threw the track. Off-roading on completely dry fields was possible if the driver was careful.
Even in suitable fields, often the dykes that separated rice fields were around 1.5 meters tall, and the Panzer I had trouble clearing those.
The only positive for the Panzer I was that it was considered rather roomy when compared to the Vickers tanks sold from Britain 1933-1936.
According to some photos, some Panzer I’s were rearmed with Soviet DP-29 machine guns. Herr Habermas suggests that the Chinese felt that a tank weighing over 5 tons should have an armament consisting of a 20 mm (0.79 in) or 37 mm (1.46 in) gun, or, at very least, a powerful belt-fed machine gun (like the Vickers Mark E Type B and Vickers-Carden-Loyd Light Amphibious Tanks), which may go some way to explain this replacement. It may also be the case that the German machine guns were damaged beyond repair, or that the Chinese felt there was only sufficient ammunition to arm a handful of Panzer Is with German machine guns. In any case, photos seem to show more Panzer Is with DP-29s than any other gun.
Interior of a Chinese Panzer I after the Japanese had captured it, as viewed from the turret ring, following the turret’s removal. Various parts have been removed, including the original generator for the radio.
Context: The Battle of Nanjing, 1937
The Japanese had successfully taken Shanghai by late November 1937, and thus moved onto nearby Nanjing. Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Chinese government, decided that it would be better to try to defend Nanjing than performing a tactical retreat on the basis that if the Chinese could show that they could defend the city, then they might receive aid from the ‘great powers’ (France, UK, USA, etc). Thus, from 20th November, the Chinese began preparing the city’s defense by barricading and bolstering the city’s Ming-era wall, and preparing lines of defense outside the city.
On paper, the Chinese seemed to have an advantage, with an estimated 100,000-150,000 defenders, including three elite divisions which had been trained by the Germans, compared to only 50,000 Japanese attackers. However, the bulk of these defenders had just retreated from the Battle of Shanghai, and were exhausted, low on morale, and low on supplies. Worse still, the Japanese had tanks superior in quality and in number, and they had also enjoyed air superiority since September 1937.
The Japanese march on Nanjing started in late November, and they managed to reach the last line of defense before the city by 9th December. The Japanese were only slowed by overstretched supply lines. Similarly, as a result of the rapid Japanese advance, the Chinese defense was not properly prepared in time and could, therefore, be smashed with ease.
10th December saw fierce fighting at the Nanjing’s walls, and by the evening, Japanese engineers had breached a hole in the Guanghau Gate in the east of the city but were pinned down by Chinese counter-attacks which included tanks (which were, presumably, but not certainly, Panzer I’s).
On 11th December, Chiang Kai-shek ordered the city’s defense to be abandoned, unbeknownst to the Japanese.
Fate of the Panzer I’s
Most of the Panzer Is appear to have been destroyed in Nanjing, with some few being sent to Japan for testing or propaganda displays. Thanks to interviews with former soldiers, the story of vehicles in Nanjing has become somewhat less unclear.
Du Yuming’s account
The following is based on an interview with Du Yuming (Du Lu Ming), a KMT general who would later make a name for himself in the Burma Campaigns (1942-1945), and later in the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949). After the war, Du Yuming was captured in the Chinese Civil War, and released ten years later. He then found a position in the Communist government. On November 9th, 1937, the Shanghai defense army suffered great losses on all fronts. My army only had one motorized unit, which was the Army Motorized Corps. Inside the Army Motorized Corps, we had three battalions consisting of tanks, recon vehicles, and armored cars. We were given the order to retreat to Hunan. The three battalions all fought atShanghai, and now retreated to Nanking. At the time, we decided to follow the road from Nanking leading to Hunan. The AFVs were transported via trains to Changsha (the capital of Hunan). However, Chang Kai-shek did not have a retreat plan. Therefore, there weren’t enough trains and fuel to transport the AFVs. As a result of this, all 3 battalions stayed in Nanking. Just before the Japanese army reached them, they managed to get a bit of fuel. They sent what they could away while the rest stayed. Some vehicles were disassembled and put onto the trains. While awaiting orders (approximately at 10PM on November 20th), He Ying Xing (another commander) suddenly told me: “It’s now decided that Tang Sheng Zhe [another commander] will stay in Nanking. The chairman [Chiang Kai-shek] orders that all German AFVs stay in Nanking to defend.” Although the German AFVs were excellent, we had nearly no ammunition, and only had 15 vehicles [thus, these were presumably the 15 Panzer I’s]. So, I disagreed with the order. I believed that it would be better if we left the British amphibious vehicles and artillery vehicles in Nanking instead. I thought that because first, Nanking was near water; therefore the amphibious vehicles would have better use here, and if the battle here was lost, they can simply swim across the river and head to North. He Ying Xing said “Don’t even think about retreating to the North. You will defend Nanking to death.” He was adamant about the order to leave the Germany AFVs here instead. Seeing how angry he was, I wouldn’t dare speak out against him again. I was still pretty confused as to why we are using the German vehicles instead of the British. The Defeated Armored Company The armored car battalion sent out its last vehicles out of Nanking on December 4th [these were likely the Sd.Kfz.221s and 222s]. The other two companies that stayed in Nanking were all wiped out by the Japanese. On December 13th, Nanking completely fell to the Japanese. But what fate did the vehicles and men belonging to the two Companies meet? It was only until the 20th December did we see some survivors of the two companies. They told us that from the 5th onward, their orders was to join in on the battle. They told us that most of the men were killed in the fight and that all the German AFVs were lost. It was only a few survivors that made it out of the city. [The following lines refer to events in Liushu Wan’s account – see below]. When the survivors made it to Xiaguan harbor, they saw that the 36th Group were about to leave. When they tried to board the boats, they were denied. Because of that, they tried to swim across the river. Most of the survivors died while trying to swim across, and that is the fate of the Armored Company. Two True Heroes The Chinese forces were ill-prepared for the Battle of Nanjing. They had no retreat plan so they were doomed. Knowing this, the morale and motivation of the Chinese forces reached the lowest point possible. One of the survivors [of the Battle of Nanjing, whom Du Yuming presumably met after the battle] told his story about Nanjing. He said that he and another soldier (he described himself and the other soldier as the sons of China) couldn’t handle the shame of losing the battle. [According to the soldier’s story, their] company commander already retreated from the front lines, so they had no leader. [Thus], they took it upon themselves to hide in a destroyed vehicle. They did so until 4PM, when the Japs came. Seeing the Japanese forces approach, they came out of the tank and threw grenades at the Japanese soldiers. The survivor recounted hearing his friend shout “Motherfuckers! I will trade my life for 10 of yours!” while throwing grenades. They then quickly scavenged the Japanese soldiers for their guns and held their positions for many hours. Around dusk, the two soldiers exhausted all their ammunition and decided to escape. One of the soldiers, unfortunately, died during the escape and the other soldier escaped successfully and told his story to me. After I heard his story, I simply congratulated him. I was still doubting the authenticity of his story. However on November 15th, 1939, during the battle of Kunlun Pass, we wiped out an entire Japanese company headed by Zhongcun Zheng Xiong. While looting the defeated company, we found a Japanese war log. Inside the war logs, it accounted the details of the Battle of Nanjing. While I was reading the logs, I stumbled upon a detailed accounting of an ambush of Japanese troops by two Chinese soldiers hiding in a destroyed AFV. This was the time when I realized that these two soldiers were truly heroes of China [and that the survivor’s story was true]. I set out to look for the surviving soldier who told me the story. However, I learned that he had sacrificed himself in action during the Battle of Kunlun Pass while attacking an enemy position. These two heroes are truly the sons of China. With overwhelming odds, they held their grounds to fight the more well trained, well equipped Japanese forces. They are the roses and pride of the country and a true son to the people of China.
Liushu Wan’s account
Liushu Wan was a soldier serving with the Second Battalion. On the afternoon of December 12th, 1937, I retreated with the armored company down the Xiaguan riverside. The right side of the pier was stacked with the armored company’s 5 gallon gas tanks along with other supplies. Because everyone had the “Ke Luo Mi” medal (unique to the company), they naturally stuck together. The platoon leader told me “We are currently negotiating with the ferry to let us cross.” Because of the fact that I was the highest ranking there, everyone was willing to be under my command. Around 9PM, dozens of houses in Xiaguan were on fire. The only thing we could do was rally near the docks. Around this time, the ferry towed some smaller boats near the docks. We began negotiating with the owner of the ferry. What we did was we tied two of the smaller boats together and put planks of woods onto them. We then drove the armored vehicles onto the boat. Because the boats were so small, they were unbalanced, and thus they would tip over in the water when the armored vehicles drove on them. We tried many times, but weren’t able to get the tanks onto the boats. Not even the smaller vehicles would work. It was about midnight when the tow ferry started to rush us. The only thing I could do now was to gather up the tankers and discuss how to get rid of the armored vehicles and cars. Some of the ideas included blowing them up or placing grenades under the motor (so when the enemy steps on the gas pedal, they would blow up). After a bit more discussing, we chose the second option. After we loaded what we could onto the boats, we all embarked. Before we disembarked, two drivers and two tankers approached me. They told me “We four have decided to stay and fight the Jap devils.” I replied with “Our mission from Command was to head to Puzhen.” “No! We’re here to fight Jap devils! The enemy is here – we should fight them first.”, the driver insistently said. At the same time, the two tankers also said “We still have weapons on our armored vehicles. We might as well give the Japs a good fight if we’re going to destroy the vehicles.” “Where is your platoon leader? Go ask them. I cannot make this decision.” I replied. I wanted them to go with us, but the two drivers became impatient and said “We will take responsibility. We’re leaving.” I then said hastily “Alright. Choose your weapons, and enough ammo. But your main duty is to make sure all these vehicles get destroyed.” I then told my superiors to leave them 10 days worth of food, some money and two Mauser rifles. They then jumped off of the boat and disappeared into the dark.
Other accounts
According to a Japanese newspaper report, on 9th December, four Panzer I’s engaged four Japanese war correspondents from Ashahi News, but were rescued by the Japanese Army in a battle that lasted twenty minutes. Three of the Chinese tanks were destroyed, and one retreated.
As the memoirs tell us, and according to Benny Tsang (a Chinese armor historian), the remaining Panzer I’s (possibly around ten) were abandoned in Xiaguan District (in the south of Nanjing) at night time on 12th December. Crowds of civilians and soldiers went to Xiaguan’s harbor in order to escape the Japanese and abandon the city. They were blockaded by barrier troops (who were there to stop mass desertions), but a tank unit made up of Panzer Is burst through them and drove onto the harbor. When they arrived, they found that there were few ships in the harbor to escape in, and the tanks were subsequently abandoned.
Civilians and deserting military personnel alike tried to board the last ships, but these last few ships were so overcrowded that they sank in the Yangtze River. Japanese gunboats had been sailing up the river in order to surround the city as part of the Japanese invasion plan, and as a result, further river-borne retreats were made impossible.
After 9th December, there was little chance of escape for those left in Nanjing. Realising this, tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers left in the city began removing their uniforms and deserted en masse.
The Rape of Nanjing, also known as the Nanjing Massacre, commenced the following day.
Panzer I’s sent to Japan
From 8th to 15th of January 1939, a display of Japanese tanks and captured Chinese weapons was put on in Tokyo. Several Panzer I’s were put on display, but were recorded on plaques as being Soviet-made, for political reasons. These were presumably the ones abandoned in Nanjing, as opposed to any of the destroyed vehicles.
At least two Panzer I’s (possibly from the aforementioned three) were put on display at Hanshin Koshien Stadium in Nishinomiya, Japan around February 1939. These are likely to have been also used for performance testing by the Japanese.
Conclusion
The Chinese Panzer Is were inevitably going to see a short service life. When they arrived, they were in poor condition, and regardless of their condition, their Chinese crews were poorly trained and facing a superior Japanese force at Nanjing. Some German-supplied vehicles (namely Sd.Kfz.221s and 222s) managed to escape the battle and went on to form part of the 200th Division in late 1937 (or, officially, January 1938) – the first formal mechanized division of the NRA. The KMT procured weapons from the USSR to replace their losses at Shanghai and Nanjing, and to fill up the ranks of the 200th Division (most of the AFVs were T-26s). In any case, Chiang Kai-shek’s flirtation with German military hardware had come to an end.
Panzer I Ausf.A in KMT service, Battle of Nanjing, 1937. The vehicles would have been sent in tri-color camouflage, but photos show that the paint appears to have faded.
Chinese Panzer I Ausf.A’s with DP machine guns, abandoned in Nanjing, December 1937. Chinese Panzer I Ausf.A’s with DP machine guns, abandoned in Nanjing, December 1937. The soldiers do not seem to fit with the rest of the photo, meaning that this is likely to be a contemporary propaganda photo based on this original image.
Chinese Panzer I, reportedly captured on December 9th, 1937. According to one source, this tank, along with three others, engaged four Japanese war correspondents for Ashahi News, but these were rescued by the Japanese Army in a battle that lasted twenty minutes. Three of the Chinese tanks were destroyed, and one retreated. This particular tank is armed with Soviet DP-29 machine guns.
A Nationalist Renault FT, two Panzer I’s (armed with Soviet machine guns), two T-26s (missing their armaments and mantlets), and just in shot, a Vickers Mark E Type B on display in Hanshin Koshien Stadium in Nishinomiya, Japan, February 1939.
A photo taken by the US Army showing a Chinese Panzer I bogged down during training around June 1937.
Undated and unlocated image of a Chinese Panzer I, having been captured by the Japanese.
Different view of the Panzer I’s captured at the harbor, circa December 13th. Japanese flags have now been attached to the tanks.
Several Chinese Panzer I’s on display in Tokyo, January 1939.
Panzer I on display in Japan, January 1939. The KMT Sun on the hull is likely a Japanese addition to make it clear that the tank was captured and is not Japanese.
Panzer I during Japanese testing. Note the new Japanese Imperial star added next to the driver’s vision hatch.
Panzer I during Japanese testing. Note the new Japanese number plate.
A Japanese assessment of the Panzer I turret interior.
Different view of the above, showing the gun sights.
Different view of the above.
Different view of the above.
Japanese newspaper, showing an article regarding the Battle of Nanjing.
Sources
Benny Tsang provided many documents relating to Panzer I’s in China that can be reproduced upon request.
Correspondence with Guillem Martí Pujol regarding the camouflage scheme of exported Panzer I’s.
“Defense of Nanking – The Diary of the RoC’s Battle Against the Japanese (南京保衛戰—原國民黨將領抗日戰爭親歷記)” edited by the Committee of Historical Material of the People’s Republic of China (載中國人民政治協商會議全國委員會文史資料硏究委員會), 1987. Special thanks to Leo Guo for translating and interpreting the text.
“Panzer Tracts No.1-2 Panzerkampfwagen I” by Thomas L. Jentz.
“AFV Collection No. 1: Panzer I: Beginning of a Dynasty” by Lucas Molina Franco
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