Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1946-1957)
Self-Propelled Gun – 87 Operated
During the 1950s, the Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, or JNA (Eng. Yugoslav People’s Army, YPA) acquired a series of different armored vehicles from the Soviet Union. While some of this equipment would remain in use up to the 2000s, others were only operated for a short period until more modern replacements were acquired. This is the case of the SU-76M, of which some 87 were operated by the JNA up to 1957, before being scrapped.
The SU-76M
The SU-76 was developed as a Soviet attempt to increase the mobility of its 7.62 cm guns. To speed up the development time, it was decided to reuse components that were already in production. For this purpose, the T-70 light tank chassis and its suspension were reused. The new vehicle, designated as SU-76, had a forward-positioned driver, central engine, and rear fighting compartment. Unusually for Soviet vehicles, it used two engines placed side by side. Initially, the rear fighting compartment was fully enclosed. During the initial production run, some problems with the engine and the enclosed fighting compartment were noted. To resolve these, slightly stronger engines were reconfigured into a linear position while the fighting compartment was opened at the top and partially to the rear. This version received the SU-76M designation. While it was built in huge numbers, over 12,000 vehicles, it was not a particularly competent vehicle given its poor armor protection and insufficient firepower. Regardless, this vehicle would see extensive action with the Soviet Army from 1943 until the end of the Second World War. Obsolete, the Soviets exported the SU-76M to a number of Soviet-aligned countries around the world, including Yugoslavia.
The SU-76M in Yugoslavia
The SU-76M was used in Yugoslavia for the first time by the advancing Soviet 3rd Ukraine Front. These supported the Yugoslav Partisans, helping them liberate many towns in Serbia, including the capital, Belgrade. A rather limited number of them, fewer than 30, were used. Despite the small quantities used, they likely would have seen extensive combat action, especially during the fighting for the capital Belgrade. After their objectives were completed, the 3rd Ukraine Front began moving toward Hungary to continue fighting the remaining Axis forces there.
After the Second World War
Following the end of the Second World War, the Partisan forces became the nucleus of the JNA. Initially, the main armored forces consisted mainly of captured or supplied Allied vehicles. Due to the shattered industry and infrastructure across Yugoslavia, the production of new vehicles and equipment was not possible. Thus, the rearmament of this new army was heavily based on foreign imports. In the first few years after the war, the main Yugoslav arms and weapons supplier was the Soviet Union. Given that both countries were led by Communist parties and had cooperated during the war, this was not surprising. From 1946 on, the JNA received great quantities of weapons, equipment, and armored vehicles. While the majority of them were T-34-85s some 52 SU-76M were also acquired. Not all these Soviet vehicles were donated, as the majority were actually purchased from the Soviets. Each of the 52 SU-76Ms cost US$14,320. The SU-76Ms arrived at the Yugoslav-Hungarian border on 27th April 1947. From there, they were transported by rail to Subotica in Vojvodina. Additionally, a further 35 SU-76Ms were gifted by the Soviet Union in September 1947.
While these two countries were nominally friendly toward each other, the Soviet tank shipment quality was less so. The majority of the tanks received lacked any kind of documentation of their previous use or their mechanical life. Information, such as their age or usage, was also unknown. Some even had completely unusable engines. In the case of the SU-76, they appeared to be in much better shape, especially the second batch, which had undergone a general overhaul and received new parts.
While the JNA was still in its early development phase, political tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and, more precisely, between Tito and Stalin, began to arise. Stalin wanted to impose more direct Soviet control over Yugoslavia, something that Tito fiercely objected to. This led to the famous so-called Tito-Stalin Split in 1948, which basically isolated Yugoslavia from the Eastern Bloc. This meant that all further shipment of military equipment and vehicles was discontinued.
Modification
The JNA did not attempt any major modifications on the SU-76M. In the photographs of them, the 7.62 mm DT machine gun usually mounted inside the vehicle can instead be seen placed on an improvised mount on top of the main gun barrel. The available sources do not specify why this was done. Given that one of the crew would have had to go out to operate it and expose themselves to enemy fire, this would have been a questionable design choice. In addition, this crew member that operated the outside-positioned machine gun could be injured from the main gun’s recoil. A possible explanation for this outside machine gun position is that it was used for crew training. Possibly to preserve main gun ammunition, the machine gun may have been used to simulate the firing of the 7.62 cm gun. It is not clear on how many SU-76Ms such modifications were made on, but given the available photographic evidence, at least two. Both of these had completely different mounts. One was placed above the gun, while on the other, the machine gun was placed above the protected recoil cylinder.
In Service
The first available SU-76Ms were grouped into two Mehanizovana Artiljerijska Diviziona (Eng. Mechanized Artillery Division/Battalion). The 1st Tank Division received 12 SU-76Ms while the 2nd Tank Division, which had US-supplied 105 mm armed M7 vehicles in its inventory, received only 8 SU-76Ms. The JNA was quite aware that the SU-76Ms were outdated vehicles, and their combat value was deemed insufficient. Given that nothing else was available, they remained in use. As a result of the rising tensions with the Eastern Bloc, the SU-76M was used in a series of military exercises that simulated attacks from the east. As the war with the Soviet Union did not occur, the JNA’s SU-76Ms would never see action. They were occasionally used in military parades, though.
In 1950s, through the MDAP (Mutual Defence Aid Program) that Yugoslavia signed with the Western Allies, plenty of new military equipment was obtained between 1951 and 1958. This included 240 M18 Hellcats and 399 M36 Jacksons. As these were deemed far superior, the SU-76M was quickly removed from frontline units. By 1957, due to wear and lack of spare parts, the number of operational SU-76M was reduced to 46. Some 20 more vehicles, of which only 4 were operational, were present in reserve.
Lack of spare parts often leads to the cannibalization of damaged vehicles. At the same time, the JNA’s officials requested that a study be made about whether it was possible and worthwhile to maintain these vehicles at all. The remaining 46 vehicles were in a such a poor state of repair that their further use was questionable. Some attempts were made to locally produce spare parts, but this proved to be too costly and was quickly abandoned. In the end, it was decided that due to their poor combat effectiveness and mechanical wear down, to remove these vehicles from the JNA’s inventory.
The M-60 Project
With the JNA, the SU-76M saw only limited service. Nevertheless, some elements of its design, such as the suspension, would later be reused for the M-60 armored personnel carrier. It was developed by the Yugoslav military industry and pressed into service in the late 1960s. While it too proved to be a flawed design, it was an important vehicle for gaining valuable experience in designing such a vehicle. With further improvements, this eventually would lead to the creation of the much more successful M-80.
The Surviving JNA SU-76M
Not surprisingly, due to its extensive use and limited numbers, only one JNA SU-76M has survived to this day. It is now displayed at the Military Barracks Kozara, in Bosnia.
Conclusion
The SU-76M was simply used by the JNA until a proper replacement was found. It was quickly delegated to second-line units before being completely phased out after only a decade in service. Most notably, some of its design elements would be reused for the later M-60 APC project.
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1945-2000)
Medium Tank – 1,000+ Operated
After the Second World War, the Jugoslovenska Armija (JA, English: Yugoslav Army), better known as the Jugoslovenska Narodna Atmiija (JNA, English: Yugoslav People’s Army), was created. Initially, it was equipped with armored vehicles of various origins. Most had been captured by the enemy during the war. Besides them, the JNA operated a number of vehicles given to them by the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. This included the T-34-85 tanks that formed the Second Tank Brigade. While, later, more advanced tank designs would be acquired, the T-34-85 would remain in use up to 2000.
The T-34-85 in Yugoslavia
The first T-34-76 tanks that appeared in Yugoslavia were operated by the German SS Polizei Regiment 10 (English: 10th SS Police Regiment), which had 10 such vehicles in late 1944. These were used to protect Trieste and saw service against the Yugoslav Partisans. Out of 10 German T-34-76s, the Partisans managed to capture between 5 or 6 before and at the end of the war. These remained in use after the war and one has even been preserved to this day.
The improved T-34-85 version was used in Yugoslavia for the first time by the advancing Soviet 3rd Ukraine Front. These supported the Yugoslav Partisans, helping them liberate many towns in Serbia, including the capital, Belgrade. After their mission was completed, the 3rd Ukraine Front began moving toward Hungary to continue fighting the remaining Axis forces there.
The Yugoslav Partisans got their chance to operate the newer T-34-85 tanks in late 1944. On the order of Stalin, a tank brigade operated by Partisan crews trained in the Soviet Union was formed. This unit would be known as the Second Tank Brigade and was formed on 8th March 1945. The Brigade was organized according to the Red Army model of the Tank Brigade. As far as equipment is concerned, this brigade was equipped with 65 T-34/85 tanks and 3 BA-64 armored cars.
The Unit arrived in Topčider (Serbia) on 26th March. After a military parade held in Belgrade on 27th March, it was sent to the Syrmian Front (21st October 1944 – 12th April 1945), where this Brigade participated in the heavy fight that lasted until the final collapse of the German forces there. The Second Tank Brigade also participated in the fighting for Slavonia and during the liberation of Zagreb. Besides the T-34-85 tanks supplied to the Second Tank Brigade, the Partisans managed to salvage a few abandoned Soviet T-34-85 tanks left in Yugoslavia.
First Years after the War
After the war, the Partisan forces became the nucleus of the JNA. Initially, the main armored forces consisted mainly of captured or supplied Allied vehicles. The captured vehicles, in reality, had little combat value given their obsolescence and lack of spare parts. Their more important role was to provide the necessary crew training. Due to the shattered industry and infrastructure across Yugoslavia, the production of new vehicles and equipment was not possible. Thus, the rearmament of this new army was heavily based on foreign imports. In the first few years after the war, the main Yugoslav arms and weapons supplier was the Soviet Union. Given that both countries were led by Communist parties and had cooperated during the war, this was not surprising. Through them, the JNA received great quantities of weapons and equipment, including tanks. The Soviets also sent a number of tank instructors to Yugoslavia. While the documentary records of these early years are somewhat lacking, it is known that Yugoslavia received some 66 tanks in 1946 and 308 in 1947. By that time, the JNA had in its inventory some 425 T-34-85 (including a few T-34-76) tanks. This number also included vehicles that had been operated during the war.
While these two countries were nominally friendly toward each other, the Soviet tank shipment quality was less so. The majority of tanks received lacked any kind of documentation of their previous use or their mechanical life. Information, such as their age or usage, was also unknown. Some even had completely unusable engines. Moreover, great numbers of the spare barrels supplied were of the 76 mm caliber which the JNA did not need in large numbers.
While the JNA was still in its early development phase, political tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and, more precisely, between Tito and Stalin, began to arise. Stalin wanted to impose a more direct Soviet control over Yugoslavia, something that Tito fiercely objected to. This led to the famous so-called Tito-Stalin Split in 1948, which basically isolated Yugoslavia from the Eastern Bloc.
The situation became even more critical, as Yugoslavia’s eastern borders were surrounded by Soviet allies. The possibility of a Soviet invasion was a real threat to Yugoslavia at that time. The problem was not only the lack of equipment and tanks, but also attempts of desertion by at least two generals. They tried to escape to Romania using a training tank (type not specified, but a T-34-85 highly likely) from a tank school in Bela Crkva, which was close to the border. The escape attempt failed and one of the deserters was killed in the process.
Fear of sabotage was also present. Most accidents or negligence in properly operating tanks were often placed under investigation as possible sabotage. The majority of these could simply be attributed to poor maintenance or the inexperience of the crews. Still, there were cases of deliberate sabotage. For example, one T-34-85 was sabotaged by throwing a metal plate inside its driving gears.
The Tito-Stalin Split caused huge economic and political strain on Yugoslavia, but in the long run, proved arguably beneficial. Yugoslavia turned more towards the west. This would lead to a more liberal variant of communism, Titoism, which improved living conditions significantly more than those of other European Communist countries in the following decades.
The First Domestic Attempt to Develop an Improved T-34-85
In the meantime, the JNA found itself in a critical situation. The army was in the process of reorganization and rearmament and was heavily dependent on Soviet military supplies. The problem also resided in the fact that the Western world initially refused to deliver any military support to Communist countries. One way to resolve the dependence on foreign aid was to introduce domestic tank production. The production of domestically developed tanks was something that the JNA was obsessed with. This was, at that time, an almost impossible task. It required a well-developed industry, experienced engineering staff, and probably most importantly, time, all of which Yugoslavia lacked at that point. The industry and its infrastructure had been destroyed almost beyond repair during the war.
Nevertheless, in 1948, work on such a vehicle was initiated. The Petar Drapšin workshop was instructed to produce 5 prototype vehicles. The new tank was designated simply as Vozilo A (English: Vehicle A), also sometimes referred to as Tip A (English: Type A). In essence, it was to be based on the Soviet T-34-85 tank with improved overall characteristics. While it used the same gun and suspension, the superstructure and turret design were significantly changed. While the 5 prototypes were completed, they quickly showed a number of deficiencies. Mostly due to inexperience, lack of adequate production capacity, and more importantly, that there were no design plans, all five tanks were generally different in detail from each other. For example, some were heavier by a few hundred kilograms or were built using different materials. When the JNA field-tested these vehicles, it was not possible to make an accurate conclusion as to whether they were successful or not. They could not be considered as prototype vehicles for possible future production and, in order to get any useful information, it was necessary to produce several more vehicles, which was too expensive. This led to the cancellation of his project.
Stalin’s Death a New Light in the Tunnel
In the years that followed Stalin’s death in 1952, the relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union gradually warmed. This was also the case with military cooperation, thanks to which the JNA was able to acquire new equipment during the 1960s. This came at the right time, as the JNA was in great need of armored vehicles given the global political turmoil regarding the Cuban crisis in 1961 and 1962. The previous acquisition of Western armored vehicles also came to an end. Through the Soviets and other Eastern Bloc states, the JNA acquired vast quantities of new equipment, such as T-54 and T-55 tanks, which were far superior to the aging T-34-85.
In 1966, during negotiations with the Soviets, the JNA’s experts were interested in purchasing the improved T-34-85 model 1960. It is not quite completely clear why this decision was made. Prior to the purchase, the JNA’s hierarchy debated whether it was worth buying this obsolete tank at all. Some ten arguments were made against it, while only two were made in support of the idea. The arguments for its acquisition revolved around the fact that most parts of these tanks could be domestically produced by this point. The 1960 version of the T-34 had several improvements in comparison to those that were already in service within the JNA. It was, among other things, powered by a new V-2-34M-11 engine, had better sights and periscopes, the suspension was strengthened, it used the new ‘Starfish’ drive wheels, and had a new communication system for the crew. Before any deal with the Soviets was made, the JNA asked that these tanks should be delivered either as a free donation or at a simple symbolic price. The JNA officials proposed a price of US$8,000, while the Soviets gave a counteroffer of nearly US$40,000 per piece. The deal was done in US dollars for some unclear reasons. A deal would be eventually made for the acquisition of 600 improved T-34-85 tanks, including some 140 of the command version. These arrived in three batches of 200 tanks each from 1966 to 1968. With them, a vital supply of some 24,380 HEAT rounds also arrived. These were in high demand by the JNA, which tried to find a means to increase the older 85 mm gun’s anti-tank capabilities. The demand for improved ammunition was such that the Yugoslav negotiators asked for these to be delivered before the actual tanks. The new T-34-85 tanks were marked with white tactical numbers located on the turrets: 99– (for tanks received in 1966), 18— (1967), and 19— (1968).
The new T-34-85 vehicles were intended to completely replace the M4 tanks. Interestingly, besides the received T-34-85 tanks, the JNA officials asked the Soviets for the delivery of T-34s armed with 100 mm guns. It is not quite clear, but it appears the JNA was not aware that this vehicle was not produced by the Soviets. The confusion with it lay in the fact that the JNA wrongly thought that the Romanian armed forces possessed 100 mm-armed T-34-85s, which, according to them, were likely imported from the Soviet Union. Romania possessed no such thing, the closest thing being the SU-100 tank destroyer.
Designation
A number of authors, including B. B. Dimitrijević (Modernizacija i Intervencija Jugoslovenske Oklopne Jedinice 1945-2006), describe this tank as the T-34B. The origin of this designation is not clear. but it is possible that it was given in order to differentiate them from the older versions. These sources do not specify if the older T-34-76 or even the unimproved T-34-84 were marked as T-34A as they do not even use this designation in any context. On the other hand, sources, such as F. Pulham and W. Kerrs (T-34 Shock: The Soviet Legend in Pictures), mention that the T-34B designation referred to the older T-34-85 and not the later improved vehicles used by the JNA. To avoid any potential confusion, this article will use the simple T-34-85 designation.
Further Attempts for Improvements and Standardization
While the Vehicle A project was canceled, experiments on improving the T-34 continued for some time after that. With the arrival of Western equipment, such as the M4 and M47 tanks, there was an issue regarding available spare parts. The production of parts for Soviet vehicles would be adopted in time. On the other hand, the JNA officials decided not to adopt the production of spare parts for Western vehicles. These were to be acquired from abroad instead. During the 1950s, a series of experiments and testing was undertaken in order to see if improving the performance and standardization of parts and weapons was possible. The JNA was especially interested in replacing the M4’s engine with the one from the T-34-85. In addition, the armament of these two tanks was to be replaced with 90 mm caliber weapons. Another small standardization effort included reboring the Browning machine guns from 7.62 mm to 7.92 mm caliber.
Most of these modifications were undertaken at the Machine Bureau in Belgrade, formed in 1950. Most of the manpower at this bureau was relocated to the Famos factory, where production of the V-2 engine and the gearbox began in 1954 and 1957 respectively. In addition, at Famos, the idea of a self-propelled vehicle armed with a 90 mm gun, known as Vozilo B (English Vehicle B), possibly using components of the T-34-85, was proposed, but nothing came from it.
In 1955, after testing two French AMX-13 tanks, which were rejected, mostly due to their price, the idea of domestically-built tanks was once again considered. In 1956, this led to the M-320 proposal. The project would be rejected due to its price and because it did not utilize components taken from the T-34-85 tank. It was replaced with a new proposal, the M-628 Galeb (English: Seagull), which was in essence an improved T-34-85 tank. There were two versions of this vehicle. The AC-version was to be armed with the standard 85 mm gun but equipped with M-53 domestically produced machine guns, new radios, a new V-2-32 engine, etc. The second proposal was the AR-version, armed with a 90 mm gun and a 12.7 mm machine gun.
At the end of 1958 and early 1959, one T-34-85 armed with a 90 mm gun was tested. During the firing trials, it was noted that, firing at a range of 500 m, it could not penetrate 100 mm of armor plate angled at 30o. The firing rate was reduced to only four rounds per minute, in comparison to the original T-34-85, which had a firing rate of 7 to 8 rounds per minute. Due to the larger rounds, the ammunition load had to be reduced from 55 to 47 rounds. Despite these deficiencies, in April 1959 a small pre-prototype series was meant to be built. Additional changes were to be tested, such as the installation of a 12.7 or 20 mm anti-aircraft gun mounted on top of the turret, improving electrical installations, control systems, etc. Several different workshops were to be included in the realization of this project. For example, the turret was developed and tested by Železara Ravne, Bratstvo was responsible for the installation of the gun inside the turret, and the final assembly was to be done by Famos. Due to a lack of experienced engineers to lead the project, large quantities of newly produced parts could not be used due to poor quality.
In 1960, attempts to improve (or reuse some of its parts for other projects) the T-34-85’s performance continued. This led to the M-636 Kondor (English Condor), which incorporated some components from the T-34-85.
In 1965, the so-called Adaptirani (English Adapted) T-34-85 was tested. These received a number of modifications, including the installation of a 12.7 anti-aircraft machine gun, smoke dischargers, improved hydraulic steering, etc. Other projects, such as using a 2 cm anti-aircraft gun and improved nuclear protection, were discarded early on. The Adapted and the previously mentioned T-34 armed with the 90 mm gun were used for testing the added and modified equipment.
Besides the installation of the 90 mm gun, other larger weapons were also considered for the T-34-85. These included the 100 and 122 mm caliber guns. Interestingly, the 122 mm gun was tested on an M4 with a modified turret. While a production order for some 100 vehicles was given, it was ultimately rejected. The project was briefly revived, using the T-34-85 tank for the conversion.
The year 1966 was crucial for the older JNA tanks (the M4 and T-34-85). By this time, the more modern equipment, including improved T-34-85 tanks, were arriving in larger numbers. For this reason, it was decided to slowly remove the M4 from service but also stop any attempt at modifying either of the tanks. This year basically marked the end of any project that involved improving or changing the design of the T-34-85.
The two modified T-34-85 tanks were found in a military warehouse in Banja Luka (BiH) in 1969. Given the rather slow and ineffective Yugoslav bureaucracy, it is not a surprise that these two tanks appear to have been stored and ‘lost’. After a dilemma about what to do with them, a decision was made to use them as basic training tanks (with the guns non-operational). Later, it was ordered to switch the main gun back to the original 85 mm gun.
Of all previously mentioned modifications, only a few would be adopted for service. The most obvious modification was adding a 12.7 mm Browning heavy machine gun on top of the turret. These were mainly reused from the obsolete M4 tanks. The standard handrails from the turret were replaced with new ones. Probably the most important change was the installation of the M-68 infrared device.
In 1967, two army technical overhaul plants (TRZ 1 Čačak and TRZ 3 Đorđe Petrov) made an analysis of opportunities for improvement of these older models to T-34-85 1960 standards. These analyses showed that it was feasible to upgrade them, even within the scope of the existing military industry. All older T-34-85s were to be modified to the new standards, adding a more powerful engine, an anti-aircraft gun, installing new drive wheels when the old ones wore out, improved night vision systems for night driving, etc.
The process of modernization began in 1969 and was undertaken by the technical overhaul plant Čačak. In early 1970, the installation of four series of night vision systems began. The problem was the slow upgrading process of older engines to the new standard. For this reason, delegations were sent to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union, in order to buy more engines. In 1972, 150 new engines were bought. In 1973, new engines were fitted into the tanks while the older engines were used for training by battalions armed with this type of vehicle. The delegations were especially keen on engines from Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Poles offered 100 revamped engines. However, they also could produce new engines if a deal was made. A year later, 120 V-34M-11s were bought. Another innovation was the introduction of the R-113 and R-123 radios, which were to replace the outdated SET 19 radio.
Besides these improvements, a number of T-34-85s were modified to be used as training tanks. In essence, only a firing imitator device was added above the gun. Interestingly, during the winter of 1969/1970, a small prototype series of T-34-85 tanks were modified, receiving a 2 cm gun (taken from old captured German Flak AA pieces), which was installed inside the 85 mm gun. This was done to help during firing training. This was successfully tested by the 211th Armored Brigade.
Non-Combat Modifications
For a long time, the JNA had planned to convert some T-34-85s into mine-clearing vehicles. On one prototype, the turret was removed and, in its place, a crane was installed. The results were not satisfactory and the project was canceled. The single prototype remained in use up to 1999, when it was abandoned in Kosovo and Metohija by the VJ (Vojska Jugoslavije, post-1992 Army of Yugoslavia).
Another proposal to develop a recovery vehicle based on the T-34-85 was also examined. This vehicle was designated M-67, but as newer improved ammunition arrived from the Soviet Union for the T-34-85, it was deemed wasteful to use the tank chassis in this manner, so the project was rejected. Projects including a bridge-carrying version were also tested, but they too were canceled.
Ordinary T-34-85 tanks could be equipped with an M-67 military plow to help dig trenches and shelters. In addition, every third tank would have a PT-55 anti-mine device and every fifth a dozer.
Export
A lesser-known fact is that Yugoslav T-34-85 tanks were exported, but precise information is still somewhat lacking. While not completely clear, there is a chance that the JNA supplied a few T-34-85 tanks to the Cypriot Army during the 1970s. While no documentation was ever found of this alleged transfer of these tanks, authors such as B. B. Dimitrijević (Modernizacija i Intervencija Jugoslovenske Oklopne Jedinice 1945-2006) mention that there is some photographic evidence suggesting that some Cypriot vehicles were equipped similarly to the T-34-85s that were in JNA service (night vision equipment and 12.7 mm anti-aircraft machine guns).
It is known that, during 1970, some 10 tanks with ammunition and personnel were delivered to the Angolese Communist guerilla MPLA. The retired tanks of the 51st Motorized Brigade were sent from the port of Ploče, Croatia. All costs for the transport were paid by the Yugoimport-SDPR company. According to some sources, Yugoslav tanks were also in the hands of Middle Eastern and other African countries.
Service in Yugoslavia
In service, the T-34-85s were used in various military exercises and parades. Despite the cooperation with the Soviet Union (except for the period from 1948 to Stalin’s death) regarding the acquisition of spare parts, the JNA had trouble doing effective mechanical maintenance of these tanks. This was due to many reasons. The first problem was the rather poor mechanical condition of many vehicles supplied prior to 1948. They lacked proper documentation, so the JNA engineers simply did not know about their use and mechanical maintenance history. Another major problem was the prolonged delay in starting the domestic production of spare parts and equipment. During the early 1950s, some 30% of available T-34-85s were out of service for various reasons, but mostly due to mechanical breakdowns.
In order to resolve this issue, during this time, at least 5 technical repair institutes were formed. These proved insufficient for the job and the number of inoperative T-34-85 tanks began to rise, reaching half of the available tanks in 1956. A huge problem was the inability of the domestic industry to begin producing spare parts. The problem with domestic production of spare parts took more than a decade to be resolved to some extent. Production of these in the civilian industry proved problematic and too expensive. This forced the JNA to use the technical repair institutes for this role. This, of course, was another problem, as these rarely communicated with each other, which led to them producing spare parts for their own demands. Relocation of spare parts from storage to the designated units was slow and usually needed between 6 to 20 months to arrive.
Trieste Crisis
After the end of the war, the political tensions between the Western Allies and Yugoslavia began to rise. The focal point of this growing crisis was the Italian city of Trieste, which the Yugoslav officials wanted to occupy. The negotiations for resolving this issue and avoiding possible conflict lasted several days. Finally, on 9th June 1945, an agreement was signed between the Yugoslav and Western Allied representatives. The Yugoslav Army was to evacuate Trieste. The city and its surroundings were divided into two spheres of influence. Zone A was controlled by the Allies and included the city itself and its surrounding. Zone B included the city of Istra and part of the Slovenian coast. Both the First and Second Tank Brigades (equipped with the T-34-85 tanks) were present during this crisis.
At the end of 1945 and the start of 1946, the Allies began repositioning additional Polish units to the area of Trieste. This caused great concern to the Yugoslav hierarchy, which followed these new developments with interest. The Yugoslav build-up of additional forces began shortly after, as the Second Tank Brigade was repositioning to this area. After a series of peace negotiations, an agreement was signed in September 1947. This allowed Yugoslavia to take some of the disputed territories in Slovenia. This was actually the first usage of tanks after World War Two ended.
In October 1953, the Western powers authorized the Italians to position their forces in the city of Trieste. This move caught the Yugoslav military and political authorities completely unprepared. They immediately responded by concentrating additional forces, with the aim of expelling the Italians in case they entered the city. First to respond was the 265th Tank Brigade equipped with M4 tanks. Due to political reasons, this unit was to be replaced with the 252nd Tank Brigade equipped with T-34-85 tanks, which was previously positioned in the eastern part of Yugoslavia for an anticipated Soviet attack. Luckily for all sides, despite the great confusion and stubbornness on both sides, no actual combat occurred. Political negotiation began shortly and a final agreement was signed. Yugoslavia agreed to stop attempts to annex this area.
Prior to the Yugoslav Wars
The T-34-85 represented a great portion of the JNA’s armored forces. For example, in 1972, there were 1,018 T-34-85 tanks in service within the JNA, which was 40% of Yugoslav armored forces in total. They served in armored units such as the 5th Armored Brigade, including the 14th, 16th, 19th, 21st, 24th, 25th, 41st, and 42nd Armored Regiments. The vehicles were also used in motorized units, such as the 36th and 51st Motorized Brigades, and rifle units, for example, the 12nd Rifle Brigade. The tanks were used in training units and educational centers, among others, at Zalužani, as well.
During the 1980s, the process of withdrawing the T-34-85 tanks from service began. They were moved from armored units to motorized and even to infantry units in the independent armored battalions. A huge number of this type of vehicle was transferred to warehouses, where they remained until the early 1990s. By 1988, there were around 1,003 T-34-85 tanks in the JNA’s inventory. In the early 1990s, T-34-85 tanks were in service with at least 17 armored battalions of various motorized brigades.
The Yugoslav Civil Wars
The political and economical crisis of the late 1980s, together with ever-rising nationalism in all federal entities in Yugoslavia, would ultimately lead to a bloody and costly civil war. These events are still politically and historically controversial, especially in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The reasons why it started, who started it, when and even its name are still ferociously debated to this day. Unfortunately, the war was accompanied by great suffering and crimes committed by all warring parties.
The authors of this article seek to be neutral and to write only about the participation of this vehicle during the wars without any involvement in current-day politics.
By the early 1990s, the JNA, despite the obsolescence of the T-34-85 tanks, still had fairly large numbers of them. The majority were, by this point, stored in various military warehouses across the country. All warring parties would manage to get their hands on them. They would see extensive action simply as they were available in sufficient numbers and relatively simple to use.
Slovenia
The tensions that would eventually lead to open war, began in late 1990. By 25th June 1991, both the Croatian and Slovene parliaments unilaterally declared independence. The remaining Yugoslav government issued orders to the JNA to begin military action against these two republics. In late June 1991, in Slovenia, a short and the least bloody conflict in the breakup of Yugoslavia took place. Even though the T-34-85 tanks were present in Slovenia, it is likely that the vehicles were not used in this conflict.
After the war and retreat of Yugoslav forces, the tanks were returned to warehouses, located in Vipava and Pivka. According to some sources, over a dozen were sold to Croatia, while the rest were either sent to museums or scrapped.
Croatia
Soon after the end of the war in Slovenia, clashes started in Croatia. Prior to this event, there had been some minor skirmishes between Croatian and Serbian paramilitary forces. After June 1991, the JNA took a more aggressive stance. At first, the JNA also used units equipped with T-34-85 tanks against the Croatian forces. It is known that the 16th Rifle Brigade used them, which participated in the fighting in Western Slavonia. The tanks were also used during the battles near Dubrovnik and Konavle.
Several units operated vehicles of this type: the 5th Proletarian Brigade, 145th Rifle Brigade, and the 316th Motorized Brigade. The 9th Corps, stationed near the city of Knin, also operated T-34-85 tanks. Some of the tanks were transferred from the island of Vis a year before.
At the moment when the war broke out, Croatian forces did not have a single T-34-85 tank. However, they managed to capture some and, after doing necessary repairs, the tanks were sent to Croatian units. Some sources also imply that Slovenia delivered over a dozen tanks to Croatia.
In the late Autumn of 1991, units of the 2nd Titograd Corps started blocking and shelling Dubrovnik. The main goal of this attack was either to annex the city to Montenegro or declare the separatist Republic of Dubrovnik. The fierce clashes ended in May 1992 with the JNA’s defeat.
An important role in the defense of Dubrovnik was played in the Croatian 163rd Dubrovnik Brigade. One of the T-34-85 tanks became a true legend within Croatian forces, nicknamed Malo bijelo (English: Little White). Allegedly, during the battle, it survived two shots from 9M14 Malyutka anti-tank guided missiles. The tank also managed to destroy several enemy vehicles. At least two armored personnel carriers, one T-55, and a truck were claimed to have been destroyed.
The characteristic feature of vehicles that belonged to the Croatian 136rd Brigade was the sandbags added to the hull and around the turret. Even though this kind of protection was primitive, it may have been somewhat effective, as the Malo bijelo story could indicate.
Moreover, this kind of protection was also used by other Croatian units in the region of Dubrovnik between 1991 and 1992. In 1992, Croatian forces started pushing the Serbs back. During this period, the Croats captured over a dozen T-34-85 tanks. After some months, they were sent to armored battalions of various brigades of the Zbor narodne garde – ZNG (English: Croatian National Guard), later renamed to the Hrvatska vojska (HV, English: Croatian Army).
In August 1992, Croatian tanks of the 114th, 115th, and 163th Brigades participated in Operation Tigar (English: Tiger) and then in Operation Medački džep (English: Medak Pocket) during September 1993.
The T-34-85 tanks also participated in Operacija Bljesak (English: Operation Flash) during May 1995 in Slavonia, and in Oluja (English: Operation Storm). These two operations basically marked the end of the war in Croatia. However, the T-34-85 tanks were not used in the first line, but rather in infantry support tasks.
It is not known how many tanks survived the war but it is known that, after the war ended, they were retired and gradually scrapped. An interesting fact is that some vehicles were still in a military base in Benkovac between the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. The state of the vehicles shows that it was some kind of warehouse.
Croatian tanks used various types of improvised protection. In addition to the already mentioned sandbags, rubber was also used. They also strongly differed from Yugoslav tanks in the paint job. While some kept their original olive green color, some were painted with camouflage. The first type of camouflage consisted of brown stains on the standard olive green, while the second type had three colors – light green and brown stains on the base olive green. The fourth type had the most colors – light green, brown and black stains on the base olive green. A lot of vehicles had a painted red and white Croatian checkerboard and their nicknames as well (Belaj bager, Demon, Mungos, Malo bijelo, Leopard, Pas, Sv. Kata, and Živac) on the hull and turret.
While the Croatian forces often managed to take over equipment from the now disintegrating JNA, some military units managed to repel the attacks using their manpower and equipment. One such event occurred during the JNA break out of the Stjepan Milanšić-Šiljo military barracks near Logorište. This barrack, which was meant to house fairly large units, was guarded by only a skeletal crew of 40 soldiers. These had the responsibility of guarding some 63 T-34-85 and T-55 tanks and other equipment. The encirclement of this JNA point began to tighten in August 1991. Due to the poor organization of the attacking Croatian units, this could not be fully implemented and the JNA could slowly reinforce its beleaguered garrison. The situation escalated when the Croatian soldiers killed 17 previously disarmed JNA soldiers. On 4th November 1991, the trapped garrison launched a general breakout with all available equipment. After two days of heavy fighting, the previously trapped JNA units managed to escape. They managed to evacuate 21 T-55 and 9 T-34-85 tanks. During the harsh fighting, the JNA forces lost between 8 to 10 tanks, many of which were T-34-85s. The Stjepan Milanšić-Šiljo military barracks was previously set on fire and were shelled by the JNA artillery, destroying much of its pre-war inventory.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
In spring 1992, another war broke out, this time in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Territorial Defense Force of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina managed to capture 19 T-34-85 tanks in Zenica at the beginning of the conflict. Later, they were assigned to various units, where armored battalions (platoons) were formed.
Later, the Bosniaks (known before as the Bosnian Muslims) captured more vehicles of this type, and after repairs, the tanks were sent to units of the Armija Bosne i Hercegovine (English: Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
It is assessed that the total number of T-34-85 tanks operated by Bosnia and Herzegovina was around 45. Some sources also state that a part of these vehicles were imported from other countries, with the West turning a blind eye. This is rather interesting as, officially, there was an embargo on exporting arms to warring countries in the Balkan region.
After the beginning of the war, the T-34-85 tanks were intensively used by the JNA, mainly in the regions of Posavina, Herzegovina, and central and eastern Bosnia. They were also used during the Siege of Sarajevo to support infantry and as entrenched firing points.
In May 1992, the JNA (which also changed its name to the Vojska Jugoslavije (VJ, English: Army of Yugoslavia) withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina, while huge numbers of heavy equipment left behind, including T-34-85 tanks. They were sent into service with the Vosjka Republike Sprske (English: Army of the Republika Srpska) including personnel that had decided to stay. At first, armored equipment was stationed in the region of Banja Luka, then being split between individual units for infantry support tasks.
Besides Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats within the Hrvatsko Vijeće Odbrane – (HVO, English: Croatian Council of Defense) also operated T-34-85 tanks. They were used against the two other groups, mainly in 1993.
During the war, there were also attacks on international peace forces. On 3rd May 1995, Bosnian Serb forces attacked a checkpoint of the UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) in Maglaj, where soldiers of the 21st Regiment of the Royal Engineers were stationed. On the Serbian side was at least one T-34. Even though the attack was repulsed, six British soldiers were injured because of the tank’s fire.
Many tanks used during the war were equipped with improvised protection in order to protect the crew. According to available photos, the protection was made from thick sheets of rubber. However, a universal scheme of up-armoring did not exist, so, in reality, every tank had its protection made in a different way. Still, many tanks had this kind of protection on the hull and on the turret as well. It is not known if this kind of protection was effective, especially against modern anti-tank weapons.
The war ended in 1995, when the Dayton Peace Treaty was signed. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the last post-Yugoslav operator of the T-34-85 tanks, as the last 23 tanks were sent to be scrapped in 2000.
Macedonia
Meanwhile, Macedonia became independent in the Autumn 1991. There were either 4 or 5 T-34-85 tanks that were operated by the JNA in the area, but they were not evacuated from Macedonia in time. The Macedonian Army operated them for a short time. They were retired and probably used as monuments and sent to museums. However, it is not known when this happened and some sources state they were repaired and entered service in the Summer of 1993. This means they could have stayed in service for a bit longer.
In the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
The Savezna Republika Jugoslavija (SRJ, English: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was the union between Serbia and Montenegro. At the beginning of 1993, its army had some 393 T-34-85 tanks. The end of the T-34-85 tanks in VJ service came to an end in 1996 due to the armament regulations instituted by the Dayton Agreement (late 1995). The former Yugoslav countries had to reduce their numbers of military armored vehicles. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia retained the right to have around 1,875 armored vehicles, of which 1,025 were tanks). Following these restrictions, a large number of older vehicles were removed from service. All VJ T-34 tanks were removed and sent for scrap metal, with the exception of those few which were given to museums. One can be seen at the Kalemegdan military museum in Belgrade.
Given the rather large number of used T-34-85, it should not be surprising that over a dozen or so vehicles survived the Yugoslav wars. They are exhibited in various museums, storehouses, or even in private collections.
JNA T-34-85 on the Movie Screen
The Yugoslav film industry often made films with the theme of the Partisan’s exploits during the Second World War. The JNA often provided the necessary military equipment to portray enemy armored vehicles. One example was the movie Battle of Neretva from 1969. In it, some T-34-85 were modified to resemble the German Tiger tanks, even though these tanks were never actually used in Yugoslavia during the war. The creators of this movie went for a much more imposing visual effect than historical accuracy.
The JNA’s T-34-85s were also used to portray German Tiger tanks in the 1970 classic Kelly’s Heroes. The film featured Hollywood greats, such as Clint Eastwood, Telly Savalas, and Donald Sutherland. Three modified T-34-85 were used in this movie. The film was a US-Yugoslav co-production, filmed mainly in the Croatian village of Vižinada, on the Istria peninsula
Conclusion
Despite being obsolete, the T-34-85 was an important armored vehicle in the JNA arsenal. It represented over 40% of all available tank models. Even though the JNA acquired more modern tanks, and despite many mechanical and maintenance issues, the T-34-85 persisted in service up to the 1990s. Unfortunately for a weapon intended to protect Yugoslavia, it helped tear it apart during the civil wars in the 1990s. After those wars, nearly all would be removed from service and sent to be scrapped, with the last vehicles finally being sent to the scrapyard in 2000, several decades after they first entered service.
An article by John Stevenson and Marko Pantelic. The authors of this article would also like to thank Discord user HrcAk47#2345 for providing data related to ammunition.
T-34-85 specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
6.68 x 3 x 2.45 m
Total Weight, Battle Ready
32 tonnes
Crew
5 (driver, radio operator, gunner, loader and commander)
Propulsion
500 hp
Speed
60 km/h (road)
Range
300-400 km (road), 230-320 (off-road)
Armament
85 mm ZiS-S-53 gun, with two 7.62 mm DT machine guns and one 12.7 mm Browning M2 heavy machine gun.
Yugoslav Partisans (1944-1945)
Medium Tank – 5 to 6 T-34 and 65+ T-34-85 Operated
During the Second World War, Yugoslavia was a frontline where all kinds of mostly obsolete armor and rare prototypes were used. In some instances, more advanced and modern tanks also saw service, as was the case with the Soviet T-34-76 and the improved T-34-85 medium tanks. Initially used by the Germans in limited numbers, these tanks would see more extensive action with the Soviets, especially during the liberation of Belgrade. The Partisans also had a chance to operate these vehicles, either captured by the Germans or supplied directly by the Soviets.
Axis Invasion of the Balkans
After Italy’s unsuccessful invasion of Greece, Benito Mussolini was forced to ask his German ally for help. Adolf Hitler agreed to provide assistance, fearing that a possible Allied attack through the Balkans would reach Romania and its vital oil fields. In the path of the German advance towards Greece stood Yugoslavia, whose government initially agreed to join the Axis side. This agreement was short-lived, as the Yugoslav government was overthrown by an anti-Axis pro-Allied military coup at the end of March 1941. Hitler immediately gave an order for the preparation of the invasion of Yugoslavia. The war that began on 6th April 1941, sometimes called April War, was a short one and ended with a Yugoslav defeat and the division of its territory between the Axis powers.
The T-34-76 and the T-34-85 Medium Tanks, the Most Iconic Soviet Tanks
The T-34 became the standard medium tank of the Soviet Red Army during the Second World War. It was produced in two main variants, the T-34 (often labeled the ‘T-34-76’) armed with a 76.2 mm gun (initially the L-11 76.2 mm gun but replaced in 1941 with a F-34 76.2 mm gun) main gun in a two-man turret, while the later T-34-85 was armed with an 85 mm gun (initially a D-5T 85 mm gun in a two-man turret, and quickly replaced by the S-53 and ZiS-53 85 mm gun in a three-man turret).
The T-34 was produced between 1940 and 1944 in some 35 different sub-variants. These variants of the T-34 suffered from a variety of issues.
The early T-34s manufactured before the German invasion of the USSR were well-made tanks with good fittings and quality of life items such as air filters and adequate head and tail lights. The T-34 design however was imperfect, the suspension being a major issue causing internal space issues and structural failures. The early T-34s suffered from gearbox issues due to improper manufacturing, however overall these vehicles were of high quality.
Shortly after the war’s onset, production quotas were increased and manufacturing sped up. Therefore the tank’s quality fell greatly, losing items such as the air filters, tow hooks were simplified, along with the external storage. The number of parts needed to make the T-34 fell, as almost every item within the tank was simplified and often non-essential parts were scrapped. One of the main drawbacks of the T-34, and many other pre-war tank designs, was the two-man turret. This forced the commander to perform too many different tasks, such as being the gunner, giving orders to the rest of the crew, battlefield observation, and using the radio. The initial production T-34s had turret-mounted radios, but due to the overworking of the commander, the radio was moved to the hull for the engineer to use.
As the Great Patriotic War (the Soviet name for WWII) progressed, the T-34s main armaments became weaker and less effective on the battlefield. While the L-11 and F-34 guns were more than capable of dealing with the early German tanks such as the Panzer III, Panzer 38(t), and Panzer IV, the new German ‘heavies’ with armor thicknesses above 100 mm became fearsome counterparts for the T-34s, often requiring combat ranges to close to as little as 50 m. Regardless of these problems, some 35,853 T-34-76 tanks would be built. A precise number is almost impossible to know. One of the reasons for this was the fact that the Soviets added new chassis numbers to rebuild vehicles.
The T-34-85 was the latter version of the famous Soviet T-34 medium tanks. Thanks to a sufficiently large turret ring it was possible to mount a new turret equipped with an 85 mm L/55.2 D-5T or the more common L/54.6 ZIS-S-53 guns. This gun was able to penetrate the frontal armor of the Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger at a distance of about 1,000 m. The ammunition load consisted of some 60 rounds.
Most T-34 (except for around 2,000 T-34-76s manufactured at 112 and STZ that used the older M-17F engine that powered the BT tanks with an output of 450 hp) were powered by a V-2-34, 38.8-liter V12 diesel with an output of 500 hp. This propelled the tank to a maximum speed of 55 km/h and a range of 350 km on-road thanks to the 556 liters internal fuel tanks. With additional external fuel drums (the number of used drums varied depending on the period of the war) with 50 liters each, increasing the maximum range to around 550 km.
Between the period 1944 to 1946, some 25,914 would be produced. Other tanks were produced by Communist Bloc countries after the war. For example, some 2,376 were produced by Czechoslovakia from 1950 to 1956 and 685 by Poland from 1951 to 1955. Just above 95,000 (sources vary widely) vehicles of all kinds (medium tanks, self-propelled guns, armored recovery vehicles, etc.) were produced on the T-34 chassis.
First Appearance of the T-34 in Yugoslavia
Following the quick conquest of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during the April War (6th to 18th April 1941), its territories were divided between the victorious Axis forces. Due to the harsh and brutal occupation by the Axis troops stationed in Yugoslavia, by the second half of 1941, two resistance groups started a rebellion against the occupiers. These proved difficult to defeat, forcing the enemy to send more and more troops and material. In the case of the Germans, they employed whatever they had at hand. These were mostly older or captured enemy equipment. In rarer cases, more modern equipment was also available in limited numbers. During the summer of 1944, the SS Polizei Regiment 10 (English: 10th SS Police Regiment) was transferred from Ukraine to Trieste in Northern Italy. Once there, it was tasked with defending the vital transport lines against the Partisans. This unit would be used in this role up to the end of the war. In its inventory, this unit had around 10 T-34-76 tanks of various types.
The Soviet T-34-76and T-34-85 Tanks in Yugoslavia
During autumn 1944, the Soviet 3rd Ukraine Front was ordered to proceed toward Yugoslavia and help the Partisans to eliminate German forces that were occupying Serbia. This formation was supported by large armored elements, which consisted of 358 T-34-76 and T-34-85 tanks and self-propelled guns. These saw extensive action against the German-held Serbian towns, such as Kruševac, which was liberated on 14th October 1944. Some 50 T-34-76 and 110 T-34-85 tanks were allocated for the liberation of the capital Belgrade. After successfully defeating the Germans in Serbia, the Soviets moved north toward Hungary.
The T-34-76 in Partisan Hands
The German T-34-76 tanks from the 10th SS Police Regiment were employed against the advancing Partisan 4th Army in Spring 1945. The Partisan forces were supported by the First Tank Brigade, which was equipped with British-supplied M3A1/A3 tanks and AEC Mk.II armored cars. While the M3’s 37 mm gun could do little against the armor of the T-34, the Partisans instead used the AEC’s 57 mm gun, which was more effective in dealing with enemy armor. The Partisans also operated at least one 7.5 cm PaK 40 armed Stuart tank which was modified in early 1945.
During the fighting near Ilirska Bistrica at the end of April, one German T-34-76 tank was destroyed by a modified 7.5 cm armed M3 tank. On 30th April 1945, the Partisans liberated Bazovica but were pushed back by German T-34-76 tanks. These were counterattacked with the Partisans’ own armored units. Inside the small town, the Partisan AECs engaged the advancing T-34-76s. One AEC armored car crew fired at least 8 rounds at the leading T-34-76. The German armored unit was eventually shattered and its T-34-76 tanks were either destroyed or captured. Between 5 or 6 tanks were captured by the Partisans, with 3 or 4 being captured at Ilirska Bistrica and 2 more in Bazovica. Those that were fully operational were immediately put back into service. One was even used to enter Trieste at the end of the war. After the war, these were used with the later improved version for some time before being removed from service. One T-34-76 does survive and is now located in Banja Luka.
Creation of the Second Tank Brigade
As previously mentioned, the best trained and equipped Partisan armored formation was the First Tank Brigade. It was organized and equipped by Western standards. While the Partisans provided the Allies with sufficient crews to form an even larger formation, this was never realized. The Allies, for various reasons, did not want to provide additional armored vehicles to the Partisans. On the other hand, the Soviets were quite willing to help but were prevented from doing so by the distance between these two forces at that point. In order to not waste time, the remaining 600 Partisans that were stationed in Italy were transported by air to the Soviet Union by the Soviet Sokolov Group from the Italian city of Bari to Kyiv in Ukraine. Once all were assembled, they were transported to Moscow, before finally reaching their final destination in Tehnicko, a village near Tula.
Additional personnel were recruited in various ways, including people of Yugoslav origin that were being held in Soviet camps. A Partisan delegation was even sent to the Grozny prison camp, where additional manpower was recruited from the German Legionary Units. Interestingly, the Partisan officials that visited this prison were strictly forbidden from recruiting any former Croatian Ustaše soldiers. Yugoslav soldiers that were in service prior to the war and had been schooled in the Soviet Union also joined this unit.
This was the first step in the creation of the unit later known as the Second Tank Brigade. The order for the creation of such a unit to support the Yugoslav Partisans was issued by Stalin himself in order from 7th September 1944. In comparison to the First Tank Brigade, this unit was to be solely organized based on Soviet equipment and training. Initial plans for the Tank Brigade T-34, as this unit was initially designated, included that it had to be formed by 1st November 1944, something which was not achieved.
The organizational structure of this unit was based on the Soviet model. It would have three tank battalions with two (some sources mention three) tank companies each, each with three platoons. The platoon’s strength was 3 tanks with 1 additional for the platoon commander. In addition, the Brigade’s command unit was equipped with 2 tanks. In total, this unit was supplied with 65 T-34/85 tanks and 3 BA-64 armored cars. No further shipment of additional tanks was made by the Soviets during the war. At least one (possibly more) T-34-85 tank would be recovered from abandoned Soviet equipment. These would be salvaged by the Partisans during the winter of 1944/45.
While such a unit in the Soviet Army would have been supported by a mechanized infantry battalion, the Partisan unit did not have this support. Instead, the Partisans were to provide their own units for this role. These would be trained in Yugoslavia. The purpose of the mechanized infantry battalion was to provide the tanks with close infantry support elements. Ideally, the battalion was to be equipped with trucks for transport, but the Partisans lacked these, and the soldiers had to use the tanks themselves for transport. Additional auxiliary units, such as reconnaissance, a medical platoon, and one anti-aircraft company were also used. Similar to the Soviet Army, the Second Tank Brigade also had a political commissar in it.
The unit was officially formed on 6th October 1944. To train the Partisan’s crews, the Soviets had to provide 16 T-34 tanks. Due to the harsh weather, with temperatures reaching -40 °C, the Partisans had trouble adapting to the climate. There were often cases of frostbite and some soldiers had to be sent back to Yugoslavia for medical reasons.
After the completion of crew training, the Brigade was finally fully formed on 8th March 1945 and was temporarily named First Tank Brigade, but this would be shortly changed to Second Tank Brigade. During the same month, the Brigade was slowly relocated to Yugoslavia. It was transported by rail from the Soviet Union through Romania and Bulgaria and finally reached Topčider (Serbia) on 26th March 1945. The following day, it participated in a military parade in the capital of Belgrade. On 28th March, the 1st and 3rd battalions were transferred to the Syrmian Front. Initially, the Brigade was positioned at Erdeviku, where the mechanized infantry battalion was being formed. Elements of the 2nd Battalion were slightly delayed before they too were sent to the front. Its 2nd Tank Company was stationed in Belgrade to provide protection for the city and the Partisan High Command.
In Combat
The Syrmian Front was a vital German defense line in the area of Srem and Slavonija. The Germans fortified their positions using extensive trench lines, vast minefields, and entrenched firing points. This line was vital for them, as it protected the retreating units from Greece and Yugoslavia. The Partisans were poorly adapted to this kind of combat and had significant issues penetrating enemy defense positions.
On 12th April 1945, the Second Tank Brigade was split to provide firing support for the advancing Partisans. The 1st Battalion was attached to the 1st Proletarian Infantry Division and the 3rd Battalion to the 21st Serbian Infantry Division in the region of Vinkovci. Opposing them were elements of the German 34th Corps supported by Croatian forces. The attack began on the same day, with the Partisans advancing toward Vukovar supported by artillery. The baptism of fire of the Second Tank Brigade started chaotically. Despite having the mechanized infantry battalion as support, possibly due to poor coordination, the two units attacked independently. Due to heavy German and Croatian resistance and poor leadership of the Second Tank Brigade, great losses could not be avoided. The unit lost 8 vehicles, with two badly damaged, five lightly damaged tanks, and one BA-64 armored car completely written off. The mechanized infantry battalion lost a third of its personnel. The commander of this unit forbade the infantry from disembarking from the tanks that carried them until the enemy line was reached. Most were killed before this actually happened and the tanks were left with no infantry support. Despite these heavy losses, the unit managed to reach the city of Vukovar that day.
The following day, under heavy German anti-tank fire, two more tanks were lost. These were taken out by 7.5 cm PaK 40 fire. One of them received a hit between the turret and the upper hull. Although the turret was severely damaged, the tank was not completely destroyed. At this point, the Partisans were forced to abandon damaged tanks regardless of the extent of the damage. The Brigade’s engineers simply lacked the experience and probably even equipment to tow these to safety.
In the meantime, the absent 2nd Tank Battalion advanced toward the front line. It was initially sent to Bosnia to help liberate Brčko. Due to delays in crossing the Drina river, it did not participate in the liberation of its target and instead was ordered to move toward Županja, in Croatia. On 13th April, it came into contact with the retreating enemy. The enemy forces simply began retreating faster than the Partisan’s tank could follow. Finally, the enemies were cornered near the village of Gudinci. Unfortunately for the Partisans, the Germans blew up the bridges, preventing the Partisans from following them. Attempts to build improvised crossing bridges were abandoned after two Partisans soldiers were killed by German fire. Instead, the 2nd Tank Battalion managed to find another crossing. They immediately began attacking the German positions supported by only a single infantry battalion from the 5th Infantry Division. Partisans expected the resistance to be weak and that the enemy would simply retreat, as they had done before. The enemy’s resistance was heavier than expected. While providing firing support for the infantry, two T-34-85 tanks became bogged down in a canal that the Partisans failed to spot in time. One of them had its barrel digging into the ground. The Partisans abandoned the attack but successfully evacuated the two tanks during the night. The following day, another attack was launched. This time, the Partisans attacked the village from a distance with tank fire. After several rounds were fired, the tanks rushed toward the village expecting that their fire had weakened the defenders. When the two lead tanks reached the village, they were instead met with Panzerfaust fire. Both were taken out, with the last tank managing to pull back. Under heavier Partisan pressure, by the end of the day, the enemy was beaten back.
On 16th and 17th April, other elements of the Second Tank Brigade were positioned at Vinkoci, awaiting necessary repairs and the arrival of the 2nd Tank Battalion. In addition, the damaged tanks were finally recovered and gathered there for repairs. On 18th April, the Second Tank Brigade was meant to begin attacking Axis positions near the village of Pleternica. Once again, inadequate leadership and poor assessment of the enemy’s defensive line lead to a failed attack. One tank was taken out, likely hit by a Panzerfaust. The whole unit had to retreat after an Axis counterattack. The Axis counterattack was spearheaded by one Hotchkiss and three FIAT (possibly L6/40s, which was a common German-used tank by this time) tanks. The following day, another attack was launched by the Partisans. This time, they systematically began demolishing houses in order to take away any possible cover from the enemy. The enemy armor was not used against the Partisan tanks, as they really could do little against them. The fighting for this village lasted up to 20th April. While the Partisans finally managed to take it, they failed in their objective to cut off the elite German 7. SS-Freiwilligen-Gebirgs-Division “Prinz Eugen” (English: 7th SS Prince EugenVolunteer Mountain Division), which managed to escape. The Brigade lost two more tanks, with one destroyed and the other damaged. Any further breach was not possible, as the T-34-85s came under strong enemy fire. The Brigade was instead pulled back to its starting positions.
On 22nd April, elements from the Second Tank Brigade supported the advance of the 21st Infantry Division in their advance in the area of Brod–Batrina-Novska. This attack was more successful and the enemy was driven off. The pursuit was not possible, as the Germans blew up the bridges over the River Orljava.
After this, the Brigade was positioned in the village of Oriovici. From 23rd April to 4th (or 5th, depending on the source) May, this unit was inactive due to a general lack of spare parts, fuel, and ammunition. The greatest problem was the lack of summer lubricants. The Second Tank Brigade commander simply failed to request these from the Soviets on time. For this reason, the T-34-85 engines often overheated. During this time, the unit’s commanders came under criticism from the Partisan High Command. Due to their poor leadership, the brigade suffered unnecessary losses. In addition, the unit as a whole was rarely used. Instead, smaller groups of tanks were used to support the infantry, which greatly affected their performance. How many tanks were lost by this point is not known precisely. According to the Partisans’ own documentation, dated 25th April 1945, they had 50 fully operational tanks. Croatian documents from the war listed 34 destroyed Partisan tanks during April 1945. Both of these factions had reasons to present figures that may not have been completely true. For the Croatians, by this point, any kind of success could be used for propaganda purposes. The Partisans, on the other hand, may have downplayed their losses to hide the Brigade’s rather poor leadership.
Once the necessary supplies reached the Brigade, the march to the west continued on 4th May. By this point, the enemy resistance was collapsing. The enemy was now desperate, trying to reach the Allies in Italy to avoid surrendering to the Partisans. On 6th May, while crossing a bridge over the Ilova river, the bridge collapsed under the weight of the tank, taking the tank with it. Luckily, the driver survived the fall, and the tank was quickly salvaged from the river but was so badly damaged it could only be repaired after the war. The Partisans simply failed to properly test the bridge’s stability before crossing. On 8th May, as the Brigade was approaching Zagreb, they came under fire and one tank was lost. The city was fully liberated on the following day. On the 10th, elements from this Brigade, supported by the mechanized infantry, attacked enemy positions at Šestina. Once again, the infantry was forbidden from disembarking from the tanks, leading to heavy losses. Finally, with the capture of Zagreb and the larger workshop located in it, the Partisans managed to seize a variety of trucks they provided to the infantry. The tanks entered Ljubljana shortly and they would be sent to Trieste, where they awaited the end of the war.
After the War
After the war, the surviving T-34 tanks would be used as the main fighting force of the newly created Jugoslovenske Narodne Armije (English: Yugoslav People’s Army) for years to come. Despite their obsolescence, they would remain in service up to the early 2000s.
Conclusion
The T-34-76 saw quite limited service with both Partisans and the Germans in the final months of the war. It’s later improved version, T-34-85, was also present in the closing months of the war. Nevertheless, it saw heavy action, albeit mostly in the Soviet’s hand, especially during the liberation of Serbia where the enemy resistance was strong. While the formation of the first Partisans unit equipped with this tank was initiated back in September 1944, the unit did not reach Yugoslavia until March 1945. The Second Tank Brigade would still see some action, but in comparison to the First Tank Brigade, it performed quite poorly. Despite being equipped with the best available tank that was used in Yugoslavia, they were often outperformed by the enemy. This was mostly due to the unit commanders’ poor tactical decisions and general lack of experience. Nevertheless, the T-34-85 contributed to the final liberation of Yugoslavia. It would remain one of the most available tanks in post-war Yugoslavia up to its collapse in the 1990s.
T-34-85 specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
6.68 x 3 x 2.45 m
Total Weight, Battle Ready
32 tonnes
Crew
5 (driver, radio operator, gunner, loader, and commander)
Propulsion
V-2-34, 38.8-liter V12 diesel 500 hp
Speed
Road Speed: 60 km/h
Range
300 km (road), 230 km (off-road)
Armament
85 mm ZiS-S-53 gun, with two 7.62 mm DT machine guns
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (1949-1980s)
Light Reconnaissance Armored Car – Unknown Number Built
After the birth of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on September 8th, 1948, the Soviet Union, which supported the small communist nation on the Korean peninsula, began to provide several thousand military vehicles to form the Korean People’s Army – Ground Force (KPA-GF). Among these vehicles, there were some BA-64 light armored reconnaissance all drive armored cars. These had proven themselves during the Second World War when used appropriately.
Used by the KPA during the Korean War, the BA-64 still proved to be valuable, even if the weapons of war had changed and the limitations of this 1942 armored car began to be evident.
Despite the moderate performances of the BA-64 during the three years of war, the Korean People’s Army kept the armored car in service for several decades, finally withdrawing them from service in the 1980s.
Soviet Armored Car Genesis
The first domestically-built armored cars to be used by the Russians date back to 1913, when the Russian Empire ordered 15 light armored cars and 3 trucks armed with machine guns from the Russo-Balt Wagon Factory. In 1914, the Russian Imperial Army created the first Automobile Corp, with a company of Russo-Balt armored cars that had their baptism of fire in mid-October 1914.
During the First World War, the Russians used armored cars of various makes and qualities extensively, with soldiers and generals having the opportunity to appreciate their characteristics.
During the Russian Civil War (7 November 1917 – 16 June 1923) and the Polish-Soviet War (14 February 1919 – 18 March 1921), the armored cars produced in Russia or purchased from abroad during WW1 were used extensively with good results, satisfying the expectations of the Soviet generals. The Soviet High Command decided to continue the development of armored wheeled vehicles.
In the 1920s, the only model of Soviet armored car in production was the BA-27 (BA stands for ‘БронеAвтомобиль’, Armored Car in Russian). It was built by the Avtomobilnoe Moskovskoe Obshchestvo, AMO (Eng: Moscow Automobile Plant), on the chassis of the AMO-F-15 truck. This was a license production version of the Italian FIAT F-15 truck.
Other projects included the FAI and FAI-M, BA-20, and BA-I, the last of which gave birth to the powerful series of Soviet Heavy Armored Cars, from the BA-3 to the more modern BA-11.
The BA-64 Light Armored Car
After the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army High Command realized that the older light armored cars in service were no longer adequate for the Eastern Front. Thus, less than a month after the start of the German invasion, the development of a new light reconnaissance armored car began at the Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod or GAZ (Eng: Gorky Automobile Plant).
After an attempt to modernize the BA-20, the GAZ Bureau designers resumed the design of the LB-62, a light armored car based on the GAZ-62 chassis with a T-40 light tank turret. This was developed after analyzing a captured German Sd.Kfz. 221. The new vehicle had an armored structure with fully welded plates, mounted on the chassis of the new all-drive GAZ-64 which had just gone into production at the Gorkovsky Avtomobilny Zavod.
By January 9th, 1942, the first prototype was ready. On February 17th, evaluation tests began, and on March 8th, 1942, it was presented to Stalin at the Kremlin. Finally, on March 14th, 1942, after due modifications, the armored car was accepted into service.
The new octagonal turret was open-top, so that the machine gun could also be fired at aerial targets.
The armament consisted of a Degtyaryova Tankovy (English: Degtyaryov Tank – DT) gas-operated, flapper blocking light machine gun chambered for the standard Soviet 7.62 x 54 mm R cartridge with a firing rate of 550 rounds per minute. This type of machine gun was the tank version of the famous Degtyaryova Pekhotny (Degtyaryov Infantry – DP) Model 1927, developed by Vasily Degtyaryov in 1927. The DP had entered service with the Red Army in 1928.
The version for armored vehicles was developed and entered service in 1929 starting from the base of Degtyaryova Aviatsionny (Degtyaryov Aeronautica – DA), also being named DT-29.
The machine gun did not have a wooden stock but an adjustable metal stock, so as to occupy less space when not in use. The ammunition consisted of 20 round-shaped 63-round magazines, for a total of 1,260 rounds. The vehicles fitted with RP-12 radios (about 40% of the vehicles produced) had only 17 magazines, for a total of 1,071 rounds.
The crew consisted of only two, a driver and a commander/machine gunner/radio operator. The interior of the armored car was very basic. Eleven magazines for the machine gun were stowed on the right, with 9 on the left. On the left side was a medical kit, an engine ignition battery, a fire extinguisher and, on the vehicles on which it was mounted, a radio.
The driver had a steering wheel, a dashboard with a speedometer and other dials and a gear shift lever, clutch, accelerator, and brake as well as 4 spare vision blocks in a rack on the right side.
There were two access doors, one on either side of the driver. There was also a large frontal armored slot to see where to drive. On mid-production vehicles, two vision slits were added, allowing a driver to see towards the sides of the vehicle and use their personal weapon for close defense.
A commander could exit the top of the turret and had two side slits from which to observe the battlefield. In addition to the DT-29 machine gun, the crew could also rely on their personal automatic weapons and 6 to 8 F-1 fragmentation hand grenades (depending on the model of BA-64) stowed on the sides of the armored car.
The motor was the GAZ-MM (sometimes called GAZ-64-6004) in-line 4-cylinder liquid-cooled 3,280 cm³ engine delivering 50 hp at 2,800 rpm. This guaranteed a top speed on-road of almost 80 km/h. The fuel tank was mounted at the rear, behind the gunner, holding 90 liters of fuel and offering a 560 km range, adequate for a 2.4 tonnes vehicle.
The BA-64B version was based on the chassis of the GAZ-67, which was almost identical to the GAZ-64, but with new K-23 carburetors (and later K-23B carburetors). These increased the maximum power of the engine to 54 hp. This engine is sometimes called GAZ-64-6004-B.
The gearbox had four forward and one reverse gears. The drive to the front-wheels could be disengaged by the driver to consume less fuel. The front suspension consisted of two elliptical springs and one hydraulic shock absorber for each wheel. The suspension of each of the rear wheels consisted of one semi-elliptical spring and two hydraulic shock absorbers. From February 1943 onward, two additional shock absorbers were added to the suspension on the front wheels and the springs were strengthened.
The wheels of the armored car were of the size 7.00-16″ and were of two types: ‘GK’ or ‘Combat’, filled with spongy rubber that resisted bullets but limited the maximum speed to 40 km/h; or conventional tires of the same size, that guaranteed a maximum speed of almost 80 km/h on the road.
A total of 9,069 BA-64 armored cars were produced between April 1942 and 1946, of which 6 were prototypes of various experimental models, 3,903 BA-64s, and 5,160 BA-64Bs.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Exactly 3 months after the end of the hostilities in Europe, on August 8th, 1945, Stalin declared war on Japan. On August 15th, the troops of the Soviet Red Army crossed the border that separated the Soviet Union from Korea, advancing without meeting Japanese resistance and entering Pyongyang on August 24th.
As previously agreed with the Western Allies, the Soviet troops ended their advance about halfway down the Korean peninsula, at the 38th parallel. There, they waited for the US troops that landed on the southern part of the peninsula on September 8th.
After an attempt to unify the two states failed, on August 15th, 1948, the Republic of Korea was proclaimed in the south, with its capital at Seoul and presided over by Syngman Rhee. On September 9th, 1948, the birth of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was proclaimed in the north, with its capital at Pyongyang. This embryonic Stalinist state was guided by the first of a dynasty, the ‘Great Leader’, Kim Il-sung.
The BA-64 during the Korean War
At the outbreak of the Korean War, on June 25th, 1950, the forces of the Korean People’s Army were divided into two armies. The 1st Army, under the command of General Kim Ch’aek, consisted of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 6th Infantry Divisions, and the 105th Armored Brigade. They were ordered to take the Ongjin Peninsula and Seoul, the capital of the ROK.
The 2nd Army, commanded by General Kim Kwang-hyop, was instead composed of the 2nd, 5th, and 7th Infantry Divisions, with the task of invading the central-eastern part of South Korea, in the direction of Inje. In total, there were 54 BA-64 and BA-64B armored cars in the KPA’s ranks, which had arrived from the Soviet Union before the war.
The BA-64 reconnaissance armored cars played a secondary role to the SU-76Ms and T-34sof the Korean People’s Army, the only other armored vehicles in service with Kim Il-sung’s army.
Along with a few GAZ-AA trucks equipped with DShK heavy machine guns, the armored cars were used in the early stages of the war as infantry support vehicles, a task not suitable on a vehicle with such limited protection and armament.
During the fighting of the early days of the war, the BA-64s encountered many difficulties. Although the ROKA had no armored vehicles, apart from 200 M8 Greyhounds donated by the US Army before the war, the poorly organized ROKA forces made extensive use of anti-tank weapons such as 57 mm M1 cannons, M1 Bazookas and derivatives, and 57 mm and 75 mm M18 and M20 recoilless rifles. These were not very effective against the mighty T-34-85s, in large part, due to their technical limitations and the training and inexperience of their operators, but could deal with the lighter and far less protected BA-64.
At about 1800 hrs of June 26th, 1950, around 20 junks and less than 10 motor gunboats and motor torpedo boats of the Korean People’s Navy approached Gangnyeongpo, the northern tip of the Gimpo peninsula, controlled by the Republic of Korea Army. The 5th Company of the 2nd Battalion of the 12th ROKA Regiment opened fire and annihilated the KPA troops that were landing, as well as sinking a platoon of armored vehicles. These were probably BA-64 light armored cars or simple trucks mistaken for armored vehicles. They were aboard a junk that was hit by several 37 mm Armor-Piercing (AP) shells from an M8 Greyhound armored car.
As the offensive continued, the BA-64s became increasingly rare. After the first phase of the Korean advance there was a counter-attack by UN troops, led by a daring landing at Inchon, 40 km southeast of Seoul. This amphibious operation, planned by General MacArthur and executed on September 15th, 1950, led to the almost total annihilation of the Korean People’s Army troops south of Seoul.
To avoid being surrounded, the North Korean soldiers had to flee north, abandoning some intact BA-64s due to a lack of fuel. In some cases, some BA-64s were ditched during the replacement of a blown tire or other minor repairs, not due to a lack of spare parts, but due to a lack of time. One of these, abandoned down to a lack of fuel, was the BA-64B of the 603rd Reconnaissance Battalion assigned to the 105th ‘Seoul’ Armored Division. It was captured together with the GAZ-67 staff car of some North Korean officer near Busan in September 1950.
In Incheon, after the landing of the Marines of the X Corps, composed of the 1st Division supported by the 1st Marine Tank Battalion, 7th Marine Division, and the 73rd Tank Battalion, no DPRK tanks were encountered. The only armored vehicle that engaged the U.S. troops was a BA-64, which was hit and destroyed by a 90 mm shell fired from M26 Pershing number 34, commanded by Sergeant Cecil Fullerton, of the 1st Marine Tank Battalion.
During the Second Battle of Seoul, fought between September 22nd and 27th, 1950, some BA-64s of the Korean People’s Army 43rd Tank Regiment were destroyed, but there is no more information.
During this initial part of the war, several tens of BA-64 and BA-64B armored cars were lost. By late December 1950, the time of the arrival of some replacements from the Soviet Union and China, the KPA had only 60 BA-64 armored vehicles in service.
As the fighting progressed, the number of BA-64s on the frontlines diminished, being relegated to patrolling the conquered areas and maintaining law and order in cities such as Seoul.
As the war progressed, they returned to their reconnaissance role, patrolling areas where there was a possibility of encountering enemy units. If they sighted enemy troops, the armored cars would turn around and return to friendly positions.
While this tactic worked during World War II when German patrols were armed at most with automatic weapons, it could not work in the 1950s. UN troops almost always patrolled with the support of an anti-tank squad armed with Bazookas or recoilless rifles which could easily destroy BA-64s even at long range. M20 75 mm recoilless rifles, for example, could easily destroy BA-64s before they were even in range of the DT-29 machine gun.
The People’s Republic of China received around 50 BA-64s in 1945 during the Chinese Civil War, left behind by Soviet soldiers in Manchuria. Some sources report that, after the victory of Mao Tse Tung’s troops, the People’s Republic of China received a number of BA-64 in 1949 from the Soviet Union. This is not confirmed by Soviet records, which state that they started to arm the People’s Liberation Army in 1950. Of the 50 BA-64s that arrived in China during the Civil War, some, which survived the fighting, may have ended up in the Korean peninsula fighting alongside communist units.
After the initial phases of the war, there was a long stalemate that lasted from July 1951 to July 1953. At this period, the few BA-64s still in service returned to a reconnaissance role and no longer undertook offensive or support roles. Nine years after its development, the small reconnaissance armored car was still effective while being vulnerable to any anti-tank weapon or reconnaissance vehicles of the UN troops, such as the South Korean M8 Greyhound armored cars, M24 Chaffee light tanks used by various nations, and British Humber medium scout cars.
Some vehicles were allegedly modified by crews on the battlefields, as Soviet crews did in World War II, with 12.7 x 108 mm DShK heavy machine guns and 14.5 x 114 mm PTRD-41 and PTRS-41 anti-tank guns. These weapons created ergonomic problems for the crew and made the armored car heavier and more unstable, but provided some additional offensive options against the more powerful UN vehicles.
Captured BA-64s
During the war, at least half a dozen BA-64 and BA-64B armored cars were captured by UN troops. Two unit numbers are known, the BA-64B numbered ‘718’ and the BA-64B numbered ‘749’, which was captured together with another armored car, two Soviet M72 motorcycles and other equipment on a North Korean train on July 7th, 1950.
‘718’ and another BA-64, captured in September 1950, were packed up and shipped to the Aberdeen Proving Ground in the United States of America. Another BA-64B was modified by the mechanics of the 24th US Infantry Division by removing the turret, front plate, fenders, and headlights for better visibility. They used it with new US markings as a staff car for the 21st Infantry Regiment until spare parts ran out.
In recent years, BA-64B number ‘718’ has been restored at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, undergoing a long and laborious restoration process. It should have been on display at the Southern New England Military Museum, but that does not appear to have happened yet. The fate of the second BA-64 that arrived in the USA is unknown.
Post-War DPRK Service
After the Korean war, the BA-64 and BA-64B armored cars were kept in service in the reconnaissance units of some mechanized and armored divisions of the Korean People’s Army for another ten years.
The exact number of BA-64 and BA-64Bs used by the Korean People’s Army – Ground Force is not known, but it is possible that the DPRK received around 200 and 300 before, during, and after the Korean War.
From the experiences gained during the war, Korean commanders realized that the presence of vehicles so limited in armament and protection was not necessary. This led subsequent developments to focus on heavier and more powerfully armed tracked vehicles.
In the 1960s, the remaining BA-64s were passed on to second-line units and to the Workers-Peasants Red Guards, a paramilitary force in the DPRK, which kept them in service until the mid-1980s.
In 2013, Adam Åberg of the Blekinge Institute of Technology wrote a paper entitled “Vehicle Design – The Concept of Recontextualization” in which he made the claim that the BA-64s were still in service in the DPRK at the time.
If this was true, the DPRK was the only nation to keep this obsolete vehicle in service up to the 2010s. It can be supposed that, if this were true, the BA-64s were only used for training or ceremonial purposes. Their only value today would be their ease of maintenance.
Conclusions
The BA-64 was an outdated light reconnaissance armored car by the time of the Korean War, suffering a very revealing number of losses during the early stages of the war, when it was employed as an infantry support vehicle.
As the war went on, the BA-64 and BA-64B armored cars still in service were used for reconnaissance, a task that they could still perform fairly well. They would remain in service even after the war’s end, although the date they were taken out of service is unknown.
BA-64 specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
3.66 x 1.53 x 1.90 m
Total Weight, Battle Ready
2.42 tonnes
Crew
2 (commander/radio operator/machine gunner and driver)
Propulsion
GAZ-64-6004 in-line 4-cylinder liquid-cooled 3,280 cm³ engine delivering 50 hp
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (1948-Present)
Medium Tank – ~2,000 Purchased
After fighting during the final stages of World War II, from the spring of 1944 until May 1945, the T-34-85 was then supplied to states under the influence of the Soviet Union, such as Poland, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Thanks to these supplies, by 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and its army, the Korean People’s Army (KPA), were able to equip themselves with relatively modern medium armored vehicles capable of far outclassing the troops of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) of the southern Republic of Korea (ROK).
The T-34-85s were used extensively in the first phases of the Korean War, where they were the only medium tanks used by the Chinese and North Koreans along with a few T-34-76s.
Foundation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
Exactly 3 months after the end of the hostilities in Europe, on August 8th, 1945, Stalin declared war on Japan. On August 15th, the troops of the Soviet Red Army crossed the border that separated the Soviet Union from Korea, advancing without meeting Japanese resistance and entering victoriously into Pyongyang on August 24th.
As previously agreed with the Western Allies, the Soviet troops ended their advance about halfway down the Korean peninsula, where the 38th parallel passes through. There, they waited for the US troops that landed on the peninsula on September 8th.
After an attempt to reunify the two states failed, on August 15th, 1948, the Republic of Korea was proclaimed in the south, with its capital at Seoul and president Syngman Rhee. On September 9th, 1948, the birth of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was proclaimed in the north, with its capital at Pyongyang. This embryonic Stalinist state was guided by the first of a dynasty, the ‘Great Leader’, Kim Il-sung.
The Korean People’s Army
The T-34-85
The T-34 was the standard medium tank of the Red Army in World War II and was produced in two major versions, the T-34 and T-34-85. The first version, armed with a 76 mm gun, had 35,120 units produced between 1941 and 1944, but during operational use, some defects were found. Chief among them were ergonomic problems with the initial two-man turret, clutch, gearbox, suspension and the fact that the 76 mm guns were eventually outmatched and deemed ineffective against the new German tanks.
The T-34-85 was the latter version of the famous Soviet T-34 medium tank, the most produced WW2-era design. 44,380 units were produced from January 1944 to early 1950. Another 3,185 were produced by Czechoslovakia from 1952 to 1958, 1,980 by Poland from 1953 to 1955, and 7 by Yugoslavia after 1950, for a total of 48,952 T-34-85 produced. About 95,855 vehicles were produced on the T-34 chassis.
The new model had a turret ring diameter of 1,600 mm, compared to the 1,425 mm of the previous models. This allowed it to mount a larger and wider turret that housed three crewmen and a new 85 mm D-5T cannon (later ZIS-S-53) which greatly increased the anti-tank characteristics. It was, for example, able to penetrate the frontal armor of the Panzerkampfwagen VI Tiger at a distance of about 1,000 meters.
This cannon could fire four different types of ammunition.
Penetration at 90° of a Ballistic Steel Plate (mm)
Name
Type
Muzzle Velocity (m/s)
Projectile Mass (kg)
Explosive Mass of TNT filler (g)
100 meters
1,000 meters
2,000 meters
BR-365P
APCR
1,030
5
//
187
120
74
BR-365K
APHE
792
9,2
7,4
143
106
77
BR-365A
APHEBC
792
9,3
165
133
115
97
O-365K
HE-Frag
793
9,53
775
//
//
//
The engine was a V-2-34 38.8-liter V12 diesel with an output of 500 hp. This propelled the tank to a maximum speed of 55 km/h and a range of 300 km, thanks to the 556-liter internal fuel tanks. With the 5 external fuel drum-tanks with 95 liters each, this reached a total of about 1,030 liters of fuel, increasing the maximum range to around 550 kilometers.
The armor was of adequate thickness for a medium tank of the era.
Armor of the T-34-85*
Hull Armor
Turret
Front upper
Front lower
Driver’s Hatch
Machinegun support
Sides
Rear
Floor
Shield
Front
Side
Rear
Cupola Front
Roof
47 mm at 60°
46 mm at 60°
75 mm at 60°
65 mm rounded
46 mm at 40°
48 mm at 45°
20 mm at 0°
90 mm rounded
90 mm rounded
75 mm at 20°
52 mm at 10°
90 mm at 0°
20 mm at 0°
Brinell Hardness Number
444
418
444
460
427
432
448
454
413
*Values taken from Engineering analysis of the Russian T-34/85
During World War II, the Soviet Union began developing new armored vehicles to replace the T-34-85 as the main medium tank in the ranks of the Red Army. The first design was the T-44, which retained the turret fitted with an 85 mm gun, but had a new hull with torsion bar suspension and thick, well-sloped frontal armor. However, mechanical problems and the inability of mounting a new turret armed with a 100 mm cannon that would increase anti-tank performance meant that the project was abandoned after only 1,800 units were produced.
The second vehicle on which the Soviet Union focused was the T-54. This entered production in 1946, although, due to the defects found, by the end of 1947, only 25 had been made. In 1948, production of the T-54-1 began, but this was once again interrupted due to the defects of the vehicle and the low quality of materials used to make it. In 1949, the production started again, this time with the T-54-2, with 423 units produced by the end of 1950. This was not enough to be supplied to Korea or China for the Korean War. In fact, these started arriving in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1958.
CIA Analysis
According to a CIA analysis titled Engineering analysis of the Russian T-34/85 written in September 1951 and made public on April 18th, 2000, some T-34-85s and engines which had been captured in Korea and arrived in the United States in late March 1951. The T-34s were considered good vehicles by their American reviewers, even if not without defects.
One of the vehicles in question, called ‘G812’, was analyzed in detail. It was produced in the Soviet Union in late 1945 and captured in Korea in mid-1950. During the analysis, some defects were found, such as the gears being hard to shift, a lot of noise in the crew compartment, the lack of a turret basket, and the quality of the armor fabrication. Specifically, the welds between the plates of armor were criticized, even if it should be noted that the same CIA report states that some are not critical defects, but simply that some features were not up to the minimum standards required by the US Army.
The same report, however, praised the armor, stating that it was composed of materials that were, in some cases, better than those of US armor. Also, it was noted that it was forged by unskilled workers and turned out to be harder than U.S. armor, at 413-460 BHN for Soviet steel compared to 280-320 BHN for US steel.
The abbreviation BHN – Brinell Hardness Number (unit of measurement kg/mm²) is a figure used to determine the hardness of a material from a hardness test. The harder a steel is, the better it will be at resisting shell impacts, but would also be more vulnerable to shattering. In this case, the two values were adequate for ballistic steel, even if, obviously, the T-34 armor had less ductility.
On the battlefield, this increased the crew’s chances of survival against certain types of impacts at the expense of the vehicle’s structural integrity.
The same report emphasized that, despite the less malleable armor, the lower quality, and more fragile welds, Soviet vehicles should not be underestimated. With a well-trained crew, they could be very difficult targets.
Another detail to be mentioned was the cost and time of production. In 1945, a T-34-85 cost 142,000 rubles. During World War II, this was equivalent to about US$26,000 dollars. Considering that an American M4 Sherman cost between US$45,000 and US$64,000 dollars and that the T-34 was produced in about half the time of an M4 Sherman, the T-34 was both quicker and substantially cheaper to manufacture. However, given the disparity between the economic and industrial powers of the US and USSR, the US could still outproduce the Soviets, which they did during WW2, during which time there were more Shermans built than T-34s.
Most of the T-34-85s that arrived before and during the Korean War were late production versions. Most had been produced in the months immediately after World War II, between May 1945 and August 1946, when it was no longer necessary to produce vehicles in the shortest possible time and save on money and raw materials. This increased the quality of the armor and the strength of the welds.
Before being sent to the DPRK in 1948, the worn-out engines, automotive components, and guns in the vehicles were replaced with newly manufactured parts, thus providing the Korean People’s Army with an efficient and almost brand new vehicle.
With the KPA’s coat of arms
Before the Korean War
At the end of the 1940s, the Soviet Union supplied the DPRK with several thousands of tanks, including a batch of about 170 SU-76M self-propelled artillery vehicles, an unknown number of T-34-76s, and 258 T-34-85s. These T-34-85s were mostly late production vehicles of the latest batch, produced between late 1945 and early 1948.
While the first Korean People’s Army Ground Force (KPA-GF) soldiers were training at the KPA School No. 2 for Officers in Pyongyang and the KPA Military Academy for the education of both political and military officers, the first North Korean tankers were trained in North Korea. After 1949, they were also trained in China on US and Japanese-made tanks, and on some T-34-85s from the Soviet Union.
In 1948, before Soviet vehicles arrived, the Soviets helped form the 15th Tank Training Regiment under the command of Tu Lying Su, a former Korean Red Army Lieutenant and the brother-in-law of Kim Il-Sung. The regiment was stationed in the village of Sadong, near the DPRK capital of Pyongyang.
This training unit was equipped with only two T-34-85s and consisted of a squad of 30 veteran Soviet volunteer tank officers. Of these, most did not speak Korean and needed to be constantly followed by interpreters, which were in short supply.
All of the recruits had previously served in Korea’s anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, while the officers and NCOs had served in the Red Army or the Chinese Liberation Army as volunteers.
In May 1949, the regiment was reorganized and the cadets were all promoted to officers and NCOs of the newly formed 105th Armored Brigade, the first armored unit of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.
In the original plans, the 105th Armored Brigade was to serve as a breakthrough unit against South Korea and was (and still is) considered the elite armored unit of the Korean People’s Army. It is still equipped with the best vehicles in the possession of the KPA and the best training.
At its founding, the brigade consisted of five regiments, of which the 107th, 109th, and 203rd Tank Regiments were equipped (grades were not completed until October 1949) with 40 T-34-85s each. The 206th Motorized Infantry Regiment was equipped with Soviet-made trucks. The 303rd Motorcycle Reconnaissance Battalion and the 308th Armored Battalion had 16 SU-76Ms self-propelled assault guns. This gave a total of 120 medium tanks, 16 self-propelled guns and, according to Soviet and US documents, a total of 12 ZIS-3 76 mm field guns, 28 M42 45 mm Anti-Tank guns, 18 82 mm mortars, 12 37 mm K-61 Anti-Aircraft cannons, 12 DShK and DShKM heavy machine guns, 59 trucks, 201 cars and artillery tractors, 218 motorcycles and 8,442 officers, NCOs, and soldiers.
Prior to the war, the ranks of an armored regiment consisted of 40 T-34-85 tanks divided into three battalions, with one command tank and 13 tanks per battalion. Each battalion was then divided into three companies of four tanks plus one command tank.
Some sources state that the ranks of the armored battalion of an infantry division or a mechanized division would contain a minimum of 25 up to a maximum of 33 tanks. It is not specified if these were formed by T-34-85s only and what their structure was.
Thanks to the training of experienced Soviet veterans, at least at the beginning of the war, the North Korean tanks tended to fight in pairs, so that they could support each other in case of an attack by enemy soldiers.
From what is reported, however, only the 105th Armored Brigade had formed such ranks. In fact, due to the immediate need for vehicles and soldiers at the front, the crews of the other brigades received little training, often no more than one month per crew. Before being sent to the front, the full personnel complement was not completed.
At the outbreak of the war, the 41st, 42nd, 43rd, 45th, and 46th Armored Regiments were in training, but they did not receive more than 15 T-34s tanks each. Two other tank brigades were formed, the 16th and the 17th Armored Brigades, but they were formed only on 23rd June 1950, two days before the start of the war, and could not take part in the first battles.
A very interesting fact about the organization of a Korean Armored Brigade was discovered through documentation captured from the enemy during the war. The unit in question was the 17th Armored Brigade, which never received its full complement of T-34-85s.
Formed on June 23rd, 1950 at Sŭngho-ri, 19 km east of Pyongyang, it had only 43 T-34-85s and 16 SU-76Ms in its ranks. Of the 280 tankers, only 20 (promoted to officers) had 8 months of training and the rest barely exceeded 2 months. The brigade commander was Senior Colonel Chong Pir-u, who had served in the Red Army as a tanker, participating in the Battle of Berlin. For the first 2 months of the war, until August 23rd, the unit continued to train with the help of four Soviet trainers. Essentially, the 16th and 17th Tank Brigades were formed only to free up space in training camps where new tankers could be trained to replace losses.
At the end of August, the brigade (now renamed 17th Tank Division) had a staff of 4,200 soldiers under the command of a Headquarters commanded by the now promoted Major General Chong Pir-u. The change from rifle to tank division neither increased nor changed the number of T-34s and SU-76Ms available to the unit. It kept the 1st Tank Battalion with 21 T-34-85s and the 2nd Tank Battalion with 21 T-34-85s. There were also the 1st and 2nd Infantry Regiments, a Self-propelled Artillery Battalion with 16 SU-76Ms, an Artillery Battalion with 16 ZIS-3 76 mm cannons and 4 122 mm M30 mortars, an Anti-tank Battalion equipped with 16 45 mm guns and 18 PTRD-41 Anti-Tank rifles, and an Anti-Aircraft Battery with 18 DShK machine guns.
The 1st Tank Battalion, commanded by Major Kang Hui-il, had, in addition to 21 tanks, 141 tankers, and 8 trucks, just like the 2nd Tank Battalion of Major U Pong-hak. The numbers painted on the T-34-85s were progressive and ranged from 700 to 742. T-34-85 number 700 was that of General Chong Pir-u, 701 was that of the 1st Tank Battalion Commander, Major Kang Hui-il, 702 was the T-34-85 of the 1st Company commander, and 703 was that of the 1st Platoon leader. T-34 number 705 was that of the 2nd Platoon leader and 707 was that of the 2nd Company commander.
Following this reasoning, the 722 was the T-34 of the 2nd Battalion commander, Major U Pong-hak, and 723 was the tank of the 1st Company commander of the 2nd Battalion.
The training unit was equipped with 30 T-34s and renamed the 208th Tank Training Regiment. Colonel Kim Choi Won, a veteran of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, was put in charge.
The Korean War
North Korean Attack
At the outbreak of the Korean War, on June 25th, 1950, the forces of the Korean People’s Army were divided into two armies. The 1st Army, under the command of General Kim Ch’aek, consisted of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 6th Infantry Divisions, and the 105th Armored Brigade. They were ordered to take the Ongjin Peninsula and Seoul, the capital of the ROK.
The 2nd Army, commanded by General Kim Kwang-hyop, was instead composed of the 2nd, 5th, and 7th Infantry Divisions, with the task of invading the central-eastern part of South Korea, in the direction of Inje.
The 208th Tank Training Regiment was assigned to the 7th Infantry Division with its full complement of 30 T-34 tanks.
In total, in the first phase of the invasion, there were about 150,000-200,000 KPA soldiers, 150 T-34-85s (120 from the 105th Armored Brigade), and 120 SU-76M assault guns. In addition to these units, there were another 30,000 soldiers and 105 T-34s available in reserve. Thus, at the outbreak of the war, the KPA had in its ranks 255 T-34-85s out of 258 delivered by the Soviets.
At the beginning of the war, the North Korean vehicles were unrivaled, as the ROKA had no tanks and only a few 2.36 in (60 mm) Bazookas and some 57 mm anti-tank guns. These turned out to be useless against the T-34s because of the poor training of the servants, who in some cases had never fired a single shot before the war.
The only vehicles the ROKA was equipped with were around 200 M8 Greyhound armored reconnaissance cars, some Dodge WC54 ¾ ton truck-based technicals armed with 57 and 75 mm recoilless rifles and some M3 and M5 Half-tracks.
Moreover, the lack of training of ROK Army troops in fighting armored vehicles allowed the T-34s to act practically undisturbed in the early stages of the war.
The 105th Armored Brigade divided its regiments to support the infantry units in the assault. Under the command of General Choe U Sik, the 107th Tank Regiment, supporting the troops of the 4th Infantry Division, attacked to the west, along the lines controlled by the 12th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division of the ROKA at Kaesong. Kaesong would be conquered at 0930 hrs in the morning, after only five and a half hours from the start of the war. The ROKA 13th Infantry Regiment was stationed near a ford on the Imjin River, near Korangpo. During these battles, many US military advisers were captured before the South Koreans were able to organize a defense.
The troops of the ROKA 13th Infantry Regiment claimed to have destroyed a total of 11 T-34-85s during the battle, but it was later discovered through the testimony of captured North Korean tankers that no T-34s were destroyed that day, although several were damaged.
Although the offensive in Korea was immense in scale, US Ambassador in Seoul John Muccio phoned the White House only at 0900 hrs, catching everyone unprepared. Some US generals did not believe the Korean People’s Army would be a problem and took the attack lightly.
Meanwhile, two Yak-9s from the Korean People’s Army Air and Anti-Air Force (KPAAF) attacked the residence of South Korean President Syngman Rhee, who decided it was time to leave Seoul. John Muccio managed to convince him that if he left Seoul, the ROKA would be demoralized and collapse in less than a day. Together they began to organize the evacuation of politicians, foreign citizens and others.
To counter the T-34s, TNT charges and improvised demolition charges were used. These did not provide the desired effects, not destroying a single T-34 and costing the 1st Infantry Division 90 soldiers. According to some unconfirmed sources, the high number of losses was also due to the attempt to destroy the tanks using improvised suicide teams. According to Joseph C. Goulden‘s book Korea, the Untold Story of the War, the anti-tank suicide teams were created because South Korean soldiers were so poorly trained that they did not even know how to use the simple anti-tank mines of US origin.
Despite the ineffectiveness of ROKA’s anti-tank weapons and tactics, Radio Seoul continued to read made-up war bulletins throughout the day, claiming that President Syngman Rhee‘s troops were advancing north of the 38th Parallel towards Pyongyang.
Between 25th and 27th June, the KPA 107th Tank Regiment destroyed most of the South Korean 7th Infantry Division and advanced eastwards, meeting up with the 109th Tank Regiment in Uijeongbu, 20 km north of Seoul. From Uijongbu, the attack towards the South Korean capital started that same day.
On June 26th at 0900 hrs, Kim Il-sung sent a message to his citizens stating that the war they were fighting was necessary to unify the Korean peninsula. At 1100 hrs, Radio Seoul stated that the “Fierce Tiger” unit commanded by Maengho Dae (belonging to the 17th Infantry Regiment commanded by Colonel Kim Chong Won, a former sergeant of the Japanese Imperial Army, who fled North Korea in 1945) liberated the city of Haeju north of the 38th Parallel and continued its advance, having killed 1,580 soldiers of North Korea.
Some of the South Korean regiments were commanded by Korean soldiers who had participated in the Second World War as soldiers or NCOs for the Japanese Imperial Army. They were, therefore, well organized and trained, but not even they could do much against the communist T-34-85s.
On June 26th, 700 American civilians were embarked on a Norwegian ship at the port of Incheon under Ambassador Muccio’s supervision. That night, President Rhee, his collaborators, and their families fled from Seoul on a train without saying anything to the Americans.
General Douglas MacArthur still believed that the ROKA could repel the KPA, even though Ambassador Muccio informed him that North Korean cannon explosions could be heard from Seoul.
On June 27th, Muccio also fled the city trying to get to President Rhee in his Jeep. Panic was rampant in Seoul, even though Radio Seoul claimed that ROKA troops were besieging Pyongyang. Refugees and soldiers fled Seoul on the Han River bridges that were rigged with explosives 2 days earlier by Republic of Korea Army troops.
US war advisors and South Korean General Chae wanted to wait before detonating the charges. Due to his refusal to blow up the bridge, General Chae was replaced by General Jung Il Kwon, a former captain of the Japanese Imperial Army. He obeyed the command to blow up the bridge at 0215 hrs, killing several hundred soldiers and refugees and trapping some 10,000 ROK 5th Infantry Division troops.
For this reason, the engineer who detonated the charges was executed. General Chae died a few days later in unclear circumstances. Kim Paik, the Minister of Defense who issued the order, never received any blame.
On June 29th, after very light fighting, the troops of the Korean People’s Army conquered Seoul, even though Radio Seoul continued to report ROKA victories north of the 38th Parallel.
Not everyone in Seoul was desperate. Some civilians cheerfully welcomed the communist troops. General Song Ho Song, commander of ROKA’s 2nd Infantry Division, offered to create a volunteer army with South Korean POWs, while many young students and workers volunteered for the Korean People’s Army.
The vehicle that first entered Seoul, the T-34-85 312 of the Commander of the 3rd Company of the 1st Battalion of the 105th Armored Brigade, is still preserved at the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum in Pyongyang. It is treated as a valuable relic (like the T-54 that first entered Saigon, Vietnam in 1975) together with the DPRK flag that the soldiers hoisted on the Seoul government building and the Korean flag with 105th Armored Brigade’s colors.
After the excellent work done in liberating Seoul, the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions were renamed “Seoul”, while the 105th Armored Brigade was promoted to the 105th “Seoul” Tank Division.
In only five days of war, the ROKA lost 70,000 soldiers dead, wounded, prisoners, or which had deserted. It still had only 22,000 men who managed to resist until the American intervention.
US intervention
Two days after the beginning of hostilities, on June 27th, the United States entered the war on the side of South Korea by sending a contingent of the 24th Infantry Division, Task Force Smith (named after commander Charles Smith) by ship from Japan.
Their armored component consisted of only M24 Chaffee light tanks. In fact, the U.S. occupation forces in Japan was equipped almost exclusively with M24s, as heavier vehicles could not transit the Asian nation’s bridges and roads.
After the intervention started, M4 Shermans and M26 Pershings arrived in the Pacific. These had been rusting for 5 years in warehouses or used as gate guardians in front of barracks. They were hastily put back into service and sent to Korea in the following weeks.
The Republic of Korea Army troops were so unprepared for war and demoralized that, according to some US officers, they abandoned their positions without even fighting. On some occasions, however, they resisted to the last, such as at the Battle of Suwon.
After the capture of Seoul, the Republic of Korea Army tried to maintain a line along the Han river. This was broken through by the Korean People’s Army between 3rd and 4th July 1950, as they resumed the advance towards the South.
In order to continue to slow down the lightning advance, ROKA General Jeong Il-kwon ordered the 1st Infantry Division to defend Pungdeokcheong, 5 kilometers north of Suwon, where the rest of the ROKA was attempting to create a defensive perimeter.
After exhausting the ammunition that had arrived in the previous days, the troops of the 1st Infantry Division, commanded by Kim Hong-il, tried to slow down the T-34-85s of the KPA with tree trunks laid along the road, but with little success.
Sensing the failure of the plan, Jeong Il-kwon withdrew with the bulk of his troops and headquarters from Suwon to Pyeontaek, leaving a small contingent in Suwon. These barricaded themselves in the Hwaseong Fortress built in 1796.
US warplanes bombed the ROKA army headquarters in Suwon, along with ROKA armored vehicles and trains loaded with ammunition that were still in the hands of the South Korean Army in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Communists in the following hours or days. Korean police committed mass killings in Suwon with the connivance of United States Air Force intelligence officer Donald Nichols and US troops.
About 1,800 political prisoners were shot dead by the retreating ROK Military Police. After the massacre, two US bulldozers buried the victims.
At the Hwaseong Fortress, in the beginning, commander Choi Chang-sik ordered that the North Gate, called Janganmun, be blown up. Later, thanks to the intervention of Colonel Lee Jong-chan, the destruction of this historical relic was avoided by creating a defensive perimeter along the North Gate.
Instead of undermining the north gate, it was decided to place 20 M15 Anti-Tank blast mines that had arrived from Japan a few days before.
In the afternoon of 4th July, the troops of the Korean People’s Army arrived in Suwon and began the attack. During the attack, 2 T-34-85s were destroyed because of the mines. One was Number 208 of the Commander of the 1st Company of the 1st Battalion of the 105th ‘Seoul’ Armored Division, while the second is unknown.
ROKA sources state that another T-34 was destroyed by a 57 mm anti-tank gun. However, in his report, Vladimir Nikolaevich Razuvaev, a Soviet military advisor in the DPRK, did not mention any T-34s destroyed by anti-tank weapons. It is possible the vehicle was only damaged. The use by the ROKA of anti-tank guns in Suwon is not certain. Despite great effort, the fortress was abandoned at 1700 and the north gate was destroyed either by manually placed explosives or by T-34-85 fire.
Ascertaining that the two vehicles could not be repaired after the battle, the KPA removed the tracks and other parts that could be reused and abandoned them.
The citizens of Suwon later went to retrieve other parts of the tanks at night and used them in various contexts. Some parts of the engine deck, for example, were used by the town blacksmith.
Unfortunately for the civilians, the ROK Military Police considered that the possession of tank parts, cannon shells casings (used as lanterns), helmets (used as bowls), or other kitchen or work utensils made from vehicle parts or parts of military equipment, equated to being leftist subversives, communists, or worse, supporters of the North Korean regime. Those found in possession of such items could even face summary execution without trial.
The first battle between the KPA and the US Army was fought on July 5th, 1950 at Osan, 50 kilometers south of Seoul. Two regiments of the KPA 4th Infantry Division (about 5,000 men) and the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th ‘Seoul’ Tank Division (36 T-34-85s, although some sources claim 33) attacked the 406 soldiers and 136 servants of Task Force Smith. The Americans were equipped with a battery of 105 mm howitzers, some 60 mm mortars, a 75 mm M20 recoilless rifle with 12 rounds, and 6 60 mm bazookas, the latter of which fired 22 rockets without effect.
The outcome of the battle, which lasted more than 3 hours, was a foregone conclusion. Before retreating due to the exhaustion of ammunition, the Americans managed to inflict losses on the North Korean tanks. Thanks to the 105 mm cannons and their six High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) projectiles, the US troops succeeded in destroying a T-34-85, damaging 1 other and stopping the other 2, as well as killing 42 Korean soldiers and wounding 85 more. This was in exchange for the loss of 60 American soldiers, the wounding of 21, and the capture of 82 others.
The North Korean army advanced further. Under the command of Lee Kwon Mu, the 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments of the 4th Infantry Division and the 107th Tank Regiment of the 105th Armored Division defeated the South Korean 34th Infantry Regiment in the Battles of Pyeongtaek and Chonan. During a battle in a district of the city, the commander of the US 34th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Bob Martin, was killed after hitting a T-34-85 with a Bazooka rocket that did not penetrate.
By July 9th, the 105th ‘Seoul’ Armored Division had lost only four T-34-85s, two by mines and two more during the previous battles with Task Force Smith. It also lost 7 SU-76Ms during the Chunchon Battle.
In the Battle of Chochiwon, the Americans put up a strenuous resistance. On the mornings of July 9th and 10th, a series of air attacks succeeded in destroying some vehicles approaching the city of Chonjui.
The Koreans did not give up the offensive and, on July 10th, they attacked the village of Chonjui, where some US mortars were positioned. The Americans requested an air attack. However, due to the fog, this attack did not destroy a single T-34 but accidentally destroyed A Company’s radios. The soldiers on the front line of Company A of the 21st Infantry Regiment that were under attack could no longer request the support of 155 mm guns. These instead began shooting blindly, hitting allied positions.
Also on July 10th, the North Korean 2nd Corps, led by General Mu Jong, advanced south along the west coast of Korea without encountering much resistance. The 6th Infantry Division commanded by Pang Ho San conquered Chinju.
Before the war, there had been communist uprisings against the government in that region. The guerrillas who had escaped the ROKA massacres came out of their hiding places and joined Kim Il-sung’s troops.
In the afternoon of the same day, during a counterattack, the first tank vs tank battle of the Korean War was fought. Three M24 Chaffee light tanks of Company A of the 78th Heavy Tank Battalion fought against some T-34-85s, probably of the 107th Tank Regiment. The small and fast US reconnaissance vehicles were inadequate for fighting against the Soviet-made medium tanks and two of them were destroyed, in turn knocking out one T-34.
The fighting continued throughout the afternoon and night, and, by the morning of July 11th, the North Koreans were only 3 kilometers from Chochiwon. In the morning, an attack was launched by 4 T-34-85s of the 107th Regiment and about 1,000 soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Division against the US 3rd Battalion, which was almost totally annihilated, together with 3 other M24 Chaffees.
On July 12th, 2,000 North Koreans attacked the US positions at Chochiwon, forcing them to retreat towards Taejeon, destroying another 3 M24 Chaffees. By August, of the 14 M24 Chaffee tanks of Company A of the 78th Heavy Tank Battalion, only 2 remained operational. Some had also been knocked out by 14 x 114 mm PTRS-41 Soviet anti-tank rifles.
The other two tank companies in Korea at the time, Company A of the 71st Tank Battalion and Company A of the 79th Tank Battalion, had similar losses by August, causing a fall in morale for the troops who could not stop the advance of the Korean’s People Army.
During the Battle of Kum River, fought between July 14th and 15th, 1950, the KPA troops were not supported by tanks. After July 16th, T-34s of the 107th Tank Regiment took part in the fighting.
On July 19th, the North Korean 3rd and 4th “Seoul” Infantry Divisions and the 105th “Seoul” Tank Division, with a strength of about 20,000 men and about 50 tanks attacked Taejeon. They captured about 80 vehicles and several artillery pieces of the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion on the first day alone.
The plan was to encircle the city. Despite continuous attempts to break the attack, even with the support of M24 Chaffees, the North Koreans managed to encircle the US units. They destroyed most of the enemy’s food and ammunition stores rapidly thanks to the suggestions of South Korean citizens and their own agents, who continually sabotaged US units by mixing with the civilian population.
On July 20th, while the US troops of the 24th Infantry Division engaged the Korean People’s Army on the north and west defensive lines, some T-34s penetrated a point in the lines, entering the city.
At six o’clock in the morning, General Willian F. Dean was awakened by his orderly, Lieutenant Clarke, who informed him that some enemy tanks were advancing isolated towards the city. The General, his interpreter, and Lieutenant Clarke decided to join an Anti-Tank team to destroy those tanks.
When the general arrived in the area of operations, two T-34s lay destroyed, along with a U.S. ammunition truck, in the intersection in the center of town. A third tank lay motionless in an open field near housing built for US soldiers during the occupation between 1945 and 1948.
Dean’s team, with a ¾ ton truck, probably a Dodge WC64, equipped with a 75 mm M20 recoilless rifle, fired 4 or 5 rounds at the T-34 without hitting it once. Fortunately for them, the vehicle was already knocked down or abandoned.
In the afternoon, Dean and his two comrades joined an anti-tank team with a Bazooka that had only one rocket left. Two more T-34s were positioned in the same street where lay the previous two-tank wrecks destroyed in the morning and the ammunition carrier were still burning because of the white phosphorus rounds it carried.
After being targeted by machine guns, without casualties, the team went around the two tanks, passing behind the houses, coming to only 15 meters from the two tanks. The crews of the vehicles, probably sensing the danger, retreated and the shot fired by the soldier armed with the Bazooka did not hit. At that point, General Dean drew his .45 caliber pistol, firing at the two retreating vehicles.
In the evening, a T-34 that had bypassed the US defenses from the left side entered the city from the south and passed at low speed through the main street of Taejeon. It passed in front of the headquarters where General Dean was and in front of some artillery positions without firing a single shot and without the shocked American soldiers shooting at it.
At the northern edge of the city, the vehicle turned around and drove back, passing again in front of the headquarters. It then positioned itself about 800 meters from the headquarters, in a street, protected by some riflemen, probably North Korean agents infiltrated in the city with civilian clothes.
After several attempts to get around the vehicle, William Dean, the Bazooka man, and the rest of the group (consisting of cooks, messengers, and radio operators) entered a house that was right in front of the tank.
The General, in his book, General Dean’s Story, tells that he was only a few centimeters from the cannon barrel when he leaned out of a window to tell the Bazooka man where to hit the tank.
Three shots were fired against the T-34. The first one hit the turret ring. It did not set the vehicle on fire, even if the chilling screams of the crew were heard. The second and the third shots hit the turret ring again, making the screams inside the tank stop and starting a fire.
By July 21st, the withdrawal of US and ROKA troops from the city was being organized, but sabotage by North Korean infiltrators slowed it down. A locomotive connected to wagons loaded with ammunition was stolen. When a second locomotive was brought to Taejeon, rifle shots killed the train drivers.
Eventually, a third locomotive, protected by riflemen along with a few M24 Chaffee light tanks of the A Company of the 78th Tank Battalion, arrived. The tanks were not used for a counterattack, but to escort the convoy of trucks and guns out of the city.
This column, however, was ambushed by elements of the 3rd “Seoul” Infantry Division, which were hidden in the houses next to the street. Several trucks and jeeps were destroyed. General Dean, who was among the last to retreat, managed to escape from the city aboard his jeep but was still captured sometime later, after rescuing some wounded soldiers.
The city was occupied by the North Koreans after losing a total of 15 T-34-85s (the highest number since the beginning of the war). 7 of these were destroyed by American anti-tank teams. This battle cost the US Army a high price, with the 24th Division losing 30% of its soldiers, some M24s, and losing almost 3,000 prisoners, including General William Dean.
After the battle, KPA troops exhumed the corpses of 7,000 political prisoners and former guerrillas captured in the years or months before the war. These had been executed by the ROK Military Police before the North Korean’s arrival.
It was now clear that the North Koreans could no longer be pushed back. Thus, on July 20th, it was decided to hold them back as long as possible in order to create a defensive perimeter on the southeastern tip of the peninsula, the ‘Pusan Perimeter’. This 230 km long defensive line along the Naktong River defended the extreme south-eastern tip of the Korean peninsula.
During this period, due to the poor quality of the roads, the T-34-85s of the KPA began to suffer wear and tear of the mechanical parts after almost a month of intense use.
The 105th ‘Seoul’ Armored Division had to cannibalize some of its running T-34s for spare parts.
On July 22nd, the Battle of Yongdong began, where US Army troops, with their M20 rocket launchers, managed to disable at least 3 T-34s and others were lost in the minefields. The battle, which lasted until July 25th, cost the lives of about 300 U.S. soldiers, another 700 who were taken prisoners, and 11 M24 Chaffees who were captured or destroyed.
The North Koreans were slowed down quite a bit by the Battle of Hwanggan, fought until July 29th, which cost the US Army nearly 500 dead, wounded, and prisoners. On the other side, 3,000 North Koreans were dead, wounded and missing, as well as 6 T-34-85s damaged or destroyed. Five of these destroyed T-34-85s were lost as a result of air attacks with napalm and missiles.
The first use of the M26 Pershing during the Korean War was on June 28th, in Chinju. 3 M26s that had been recovered from a US Army depot in Tokyo were put in operational condition and shipped. The platoon that used them, along with some M24s, was forced to abandon them on June 28th. It is not clear if all three broke down irreparably during the fighting against the 6th Infantry Division of the KPA or if they were destroyed by T-34-85 fire.
Between the end of July and the beginning of August, the KPA continued to push back the ROKA and US Army troops as far as the Pusan Perimeter but suffered many losses. Of the 120 T-34-85s in service at the beginning of the war in the 105th Division, at the beginning of August, only about 40 remained, although some others were waiting for repairs in the rear.
On August 4th, 1950, a very fortunate event happened for the US Army. A 230 kg bomb accidentally dropped by a US fighter exploded on the roof of an abandoned factory 25 km from Pusan.
The headquarters of the Korean People’s Army was placed in that abandoned factory. The explosion injured General Kang Kon, Chief of Staff, and almost killed General Kim Chaik. The equipment was less fortunate. The bomb destroyed the radio room and left only a single radio still working. This slowed down the attack on Pusan, losing the golden opportunity to oust the US and its allies from the peninsula.
Between August 19th and 23rd, 1950, the 17th Tank Division was finally ordered into action.nThe 43 T-34-85s of the 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions, plus that of Major General Chong Pir-u, went from Sungho-ri. There, they were stationed at the Mirim-ni railway station near Pyongyang, where they were supplied with extra ammunition and fuel and loaded onto flatcars to await departure for the front.
Because of continuous air attacks, the division, in order to avoid losses, moved slowly at night, hiding during the day inside railway tunnels. The Division repaired the rails when they were damaged by air attacks by itself or with the help of the civilian population. They arrived in Seoul only between 23rd and 27th August (the tanks arrived first, then it was the turn of the other regiments of the division).
Regrouping in Seoul, the division left by train and crossed the Pyongjomgo-ri railway bridge at night. From there, it went to Wonju and then to Yongju under the command of Lieutenant General Mu Chong. There it was finally attached to the 8th Infantry Division under the command of II Corps, with headquarters in Mun’gyong.
The 1st Tank Battalion, under the command of Major Kang Hui-il, together with part of the division’s anti-aircraft battery, arrived in Yongju on August 28th, unloading its tanks and moving at night and moving towards Andong, Uisong and, finally, Uihung. During the last leg, between September 1st and 2nd, the battalion lost 3 T-34-85s to an air attack.
For the 2nd Tank Battalion, under the command of Major U Pong-hak, more precise data is available thanks to the testimonies of some prisoners of war that were interrogated.
It arrived in Yongju between the 29th and 30th of August 1950. In the evening, all the T-34s were unloaded from the flatcars and moved about 8 km away to Pyongun-ni, and parked on the sides of the road and camouflaged within 0600 hrs. At 1800 hrs the unit resumed its march, following the 1st Tank Battalion, arriving at Uihung on 1st September with only 6 T-34-85s. 5 were destroyed by airstrikes or had mechanical failures along the way.
On September 2nd, 4 more late T-34s arrived, followed by others, but the total number is unknown. Moving towards Sinnyong to support the 8th KPA Infantry Division’s attacks against the 6th ROKA Infantry Division, the unit arrived at 0300 hrs on September 3rd.
Three T-34-85s crossed a 10-meter long bridge while the fourth collapsed the bridge under its 32 tons of weight. This incident slowed down the attack, forcing the three tanks on the south bank of the river and the six on the north bank to camouflage themselves for the day. After a ROKA artillery bombardment that lasted for half a day, until 1500 hours, ROKA troops of the 6th Infantry Division captured the four tank crews that were south of the river, while the other six tanks fled north and were damaged in an air attack launched against them at 1600 hours.
It can be supposed that the data provided to the UN intelligence about this unit came from the tankers of the 4 tanks captured on September 3rd. From hereon, the information becomes fragmentary. It is known for sure that, between September 3rd and 15th, the 1st and 2nd Tank Battalions supported the attacks of the 1st and 8th Infantry Divisions of the 2nd Corps.
UN defense and counterattacks
In the Battle of Masan, a series of skirmishes that lasted from August 5th to September 19th, 1950, North Korea lost at least twenty T-34-85s and about 11,000 men, including dead, wounded, missing, prisoners, and deserters.
The situation remained in a stalemate, as every attempt by the KPA to break through the perimeter was in vain thanks to the arrival of new US and British troops. The USAF (US Air Force) destroyed most of the bridges, refineries, fuel depots, harbors, ammunition depots, etc. in DPRK territory between August and September. It also reduced daytime traffic of supplies to the KPA soldiers on the front lines to practically nil.
The damage to the logistic lines of the KPA was so serious that some prisoners later told that the soldiers had to move at night riding bicycles full of ammunition and hand grenades or fishing boats armed as best they could and loaded with ammunition if they were in areas near the coasts. These actions were needed in order to supply the North Korean soldiers on the front line. In other cases, weapons and equipment captured from ROKA troops or the US Army were used.
In addition to destroying North Korean supply lines, the USAF, available 24 hours a day, was called in to repel any attack attempted by the KPA on the UN lines. The North Korean lack of supplies during the Battle for the Pusan Perimeter was a great advantage for the UN troops, which were able to overwhelm the KPA. The North Koreans suffered losses of about 63,000 dead, wounded, missing, and 3,300 prisoners.
The UN forces, for their part, lost about 60,000 soldiers (40,000 of the ROKA) but managed to maintain their positions. In fact, thanks to continuous air support, from August 2nd, 1950 onwards, UN forces began to land in force. By the end of August, these reinforcements in the Pusan Perimeter came to about 500 tanks, split between M4A3 (76)W Shermans, M26 Pershings, and M46 Pattons. In September, the UN troops in the perimeter had risen to about 180,000 soldiers against the 90,000 of the Korean People’s Army.
By the end of 1950, U.S. troops had received 1,326 tanks, of which 138 M24 Chaffees, 679 M4A3 (76)W HVSS Shermans, 309 M26 Pershings, and 200 M46 Pattons.
The 105th ‘Seoul’ Armored Division crossed the Naktong river on August 12th. The next day, the 109th Tank Regiment, which remained in the rear, was targeted by several US airstrikes at Chonjui, losing over 200 vehicles, including 20 tanks, and many others damaged.
Another series of targeted airstrikes along the Naktong River dispersed the T-34-85s of the Korean People’s Army, which did not attack the Pusan Perimeter en masse, but in small tank units (more difficult to detect by scout planes) which attacked towns along the perimeter.
On 15th August, 21 T-34-85s from the Sadong Tank Training Center arrived to reinforce the units at the front and to replace the losses. It is not clear if they were the only replacements that arrived during the battle. During the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, the KPA received another 100 (some sources claim 150, due to the impossibility of checking North Korean sources, it is impossible to say which number is correct) T-34-85s from the Soviet Union. About eighty of those went to arm the 16th that had just finished the training phase of the crews and were still in North Korea, while the remaining twenty had to replace the losses of the 105th Armored Division. According to some sources, almost all were destroyed by U.S. airstrikes before reaching the front.
Battle of No Name Ridge
On the evening of 17th August 1950, thanks to the reinforcements received, the 2nd Battalion of the 109th Tank Regiment of the 105th ‘Seoul’ Armored Division launched an attack on the positions of the 9th Infantry Regiment, which was supported by a platoon of Company A of the 1st Marine Tank Battalion.
The 1st Marine Tank Battalion was called to duty on July 7th, 1950, but at the time it was equipped with only M4A3(105) HVSS for infantry support. An unknown number of M26 Pershings were recovered from a depot in Barstow, California, and shipped to San Diego, where the unit was quartered.
Due to the limited time available, while the majority of the M26s were unloaded from the trains, two were taken to Camp Joseph H. Pendleton, where the crews were briefly familiarized with the tanks.
On 11th July 1950, the 1st Marine Tank Battalion sailed aboard USS Fort Marion LSD-22 towards Korea. During the transfer, the crews serviced the M26s that had been lying in storage for a long time. Arriving in Pusan on 2nd August, they were deployed for a series of actions. They were not employed against T-34s during these.
The unit that took part in the Battle of No Name Ridge was commanded by Lt. Granville Sweet, who had under his command four M26 Pershing tanks at ‘No Name Ridge’, also known as the Obong-Ni ridge. These four tanks were supported by a company of M20 75 mm recoilless guns and some anti-tank teams.
The attack of four T-34-85s was first intercepted by the anti-tank teams on Hill 125, but they did not stop the advance. Their effect was limited to causing the burning of the external 90-liter tanks on the enemy tanks in some cases.
The T-34-85s advanced again until they reached a turn in the road covered by a hill. Sweet’s tanks were behind it. Three of them were lined up side by side so, in case the T-34s destroyed them, they could not pass further, and the fourth tank was behind them.
When they received the order to prepare to repel the Koreans, the tank crews were filling up their tanks. Alarmed, they hastily ended the operation, spilling fuel on the tanks. As soon as they saw the T-34-85s peeking out from behind the hill, M26 number 34, commanded by Sergeant Cecil Fullerton, fired the new Hyper Velocity Armor Piercing (HVAP) M304 ammunition. When the tank opened fire on T-34 Number 322 (2nd Battalion Commander), the spilled fuel on the M26’s engine deck caught fire without damaging the vehicle.
The US soldiers who witnessed the battle were astonished. The M26 Pershings were on fire and so were the T-34-85s and, yet, no vehicles had been knocked out.
After the first round, M26 number 34 fired two other rounds, one into the turret and two into the frontal armored plate, causing the T-34 to start burning.
M26 number 33 of Sergeant Gerald Swinicke opened fire on the second T-34, hitting it the first time with a HVAP round in the turret. The Korean tank did not stop, so tanks number 33 and 34 shot it with four APC (Armor-Piercing Capped) rounds, all piercing the frontal plate.
Surprisingly, the Korean tank was still advancing and opening fire. The two M26s shot it with another HVAP, 2 APC and 4 HE rounds, destroying the T-34-85 by detonating 85 mm rounds in the turret.
The last T-34-85, Number 314, managed to get away but was destroyed by fire from the same Bazookas that had set fire to its external tanks earlier.
On September 5th, the North Korean troops launched an attack on the same road, but with only two T-34-85 supported by two SU-76Ms. This time, the North Korean vehicles had more luck and destroyed two M26 Pershings that were caught unaware and had their turrets turned towards other targets. All four KPA vehicles were later knocked out or destroyed by fire from anti-tank teams.
During the Battle of Kyongju, which took place from August 27th to September 12th, 1950, the 17th Armoured Brigade of the KPA was employed. On the evening of September 3rd to 4th, when the threat of air attack was minimal, 3 T-34-85s succeeded in destroying an artillery battery and put to flight two battalions of the ROK at P’ohang-dong, managing to reoccupy the city during the night.
Later, while advancing towards Kyongju, other T-34-85s of the 17th Armored Brigade managed to hit and damage (apparently by breaking the tracks) three M46 Pattons before being destroyed by US artillery fire.
That same day, an airstrike hit the KPA positions, weakening them and forcing the North Korean forces to give up the attack on the city of Kyongju. However, some infantry attacks forced some ROK units to retreat.
The United Nation forces advanced with the support of some tanks up to the vicinity of P’ohang-dong, meeting a group of 5 SU-76Ms. In the clash that followed, one self-propelled gun was destroyed, while the others were destroyed during an air attack that occurred shortly after.
In the afternoon, other North Korean armored forces blocked the American advance in the city, allowing the KPA troops to evacuate ammunition and other material from the nearby Yonil airport.
In the area east of Yongsan on September 4th, the Marines M26s knocked out T-34s and found a fifth abandoned T-34.
During the night between September 5th and 6th, 1950, the city fell back into the hands of the KPA, which created defensive positions with which to resist the successive attacks of the Americans and the ROKA.
The bad weather conditions of those days did not allow significant use of airstrikes in the area, allowing for several days during which the KPA units were able to repel any attack.
Between September 11th and 12th, thanks to the improvement of the weather conditions, the UN units were able to drive the KPA out of P’ohang-dong, forcing the North Korean soldiers to retreat towards Kyongsang. The KPA lost 13 T-34-85s and 5 SU-76Ms during the battle.
The Incheon Landing
The Incheon Landing (Operation Chromite) consisted of a series of landings by the X Corps, composed of the 1st and 7th Marine Divisions, X Corps, aboard LVT Amtracs. They landed on three beaches. To the West, the 7th Division supported by the 73rd Tank Battalion landed on the Red and Green beaches and would then take possession of the Wolmi-do Peninsula and Blue Beach. This allowed the 1st Division, supported by the 1st Marine Tank Battalion, to take the Incheon Peninsula to cut off any supply to the North Koreans in the peninsula.
At 0633 hrs, the 3rd and 5th Battalion of the Marines landed at Green Beach on Wolmi-do Island. The armored detachment of 1st Marine Tank Battalion, equipped with two M4A3(105) HVSS with dozer blades, six M26 Pershings, a flamethrower tank and an M32A1B3 Armored Recovery Vehicle (ARV) from Company A, landed with the third wave on board of Landing Ship Utility (LSU).
During the Incheon Landings, no Korean armored vehicles were sighted, except for a BA-64 reconnaissance light armored car on Wolmi-do island. It was observed when the 1st Marine Tank Battalion had organized the defence on the causeway that connected the island to the Incheon harbor. Obviously, the armored car was rapidly obliterated by M26 Pershing Number 34 of Sergeant Fullerton.
In the Seoul area, on September 16th, 1950, the Korean People’s Army had only the 42nd Mechanized Regiment, a recently formed unit with very inexperienced crews. As soon as news of the landing was received, the High Command of the Korean People’s Army ordered the 43rd Tank Regiment, equipped with only 12 or 15 T-34-85s, to move to the area of operations from Wonsan in the north east, a distance of 180 km. The 105th ‘Seoul’ Armored Division was ordered to withdraw to the north to avoid being trapped by the troops of the X Marine Corps.
On September 16th, 1950, a company of 6 T-34-85s from the 42nd Mechanized Regiment, without knowing about the landing, was advancing on the Incheon-Seoul highway when it was ambushed by the M26 Pershings of the Marines.
The first tank was destroyed by a Bazooka team that also managed to damage the second one, while the M26s promptly finished the work. At the end of the skirmish, the bodies of 200 Koreans lay on the battlefield while, on the US part, only one Marine was wounded.
The same day, an F4U Corsair pilot claimed to have destroyed another six T-34s in a napalm airstrike.
Another 6 T-34-85s were destroyed on the morning of September 17th. The crews were taken by surprise while they were out of their vehicles, probably cooking breakfast. The last T-34s attempted a counter-attack when the US Marines were already advancing towards Seoul, but the anti-tank teams drove them back. Between September 16th and 20th, the KPA lost 24 T-34-85s to the X Marine Corps.
Many of the new 24 T-34-85s of the 42nd Mechanized Regiment were lost in the battles against Company A and Company B, equipped with M4A3(76)W HVSS Shermans of the 73rd Tank Battalion in support of the 7th Marine Division near the city of Suwon, 30 km south of Seoul.
On September 20th, in fact, B Company lost an M4 under North Korean tank fire but destroyed eight T-34s along the western road to Suwon.
Company B also destroyed three more T-34-85s during the battle for control of the city’s airport, losing only four Jeeps crushed by T-34s. Company A destroyed a total of 8 T-34-85s, four in Suwon and four on the road between Suwon and Osan.
On September 22nd, the attack on the South Korean capital began. It was poorly defended by KPA troops, mostly recruits, and T-34-85s of the 43rd Tank Regiment. The battle, which lasted until September 28th, saw the U.S. Marines victorious and cost the KPA an unknown total of casualties and 12 T-34s in the city, 7 of which were destroyed by Marine Corps tanks.
From the breakthrough from the Pusan Perimeter to the Second Battle of Seoul
The 17th Tank Division was involved in skirmishes against the 6th and 1st ROKA Infantry Divisions which launched several attacks after September 15th, 1950.
The 9 surviving T-34-85s of 1st Company of the 1st Battalion were deployed at Kusan-dong (3 tanks), Uihung (2 tanks), and Kunwi (4 tanks), while the 11 surviving tanks of 2nd Company were deployed in well-camouflaged hull-down positions along a defensive perimeter near Uisong.
Of the 2nd Tank Battalion, it is only known that its tanks were used for defensive purposes north of Sinnyong. After 17th September, however, the division was ordered to move as quickly as possible towards Seoul.
A document captured by the UN intelligence reports that, on September 18th, 1950, the 17th Tank Division had at its disposal 26 tanks, 18 trucks, 37 motorcycles, 1 car, 440 rifles, 519 submachine guns, 26 light machine guns, 3 heavy machine guns, 5 Anti-Aircraft machine guns, and 6 mortars.
The 1st Tank Battalion had only 14 T-34-85s capable of moving when it began to retreat. The retreat to Andong was hampered by continuous F-51 airstrikes that destroyed or immobilized 10 tanks.
According to the testimony of a prisoner of the KPA, the 4 surviving T-34s arrived in Andong on 25th September. On 26th September, along the road to P’unggi, another 2 T-34s were destroyed. The last two vehicles were hidden in a tunnel and the surviving tankers met with Major Kang Hui-il, who informed them that they would go to retrieve more tanks. The major left with about 80 men but never returned.
The 2 surviving vehicles plus two more T-34-85s, possibly two 1st Battalion tanks that had been repaired or two surviving T-34s from the 2nd Tank Battalion (which arrived in P’unggi that night along with the division headquarters), continued their retreat to the north. In the meantime, the T-34-85 of U pong-hak, now promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, remained to fight the UN troops and was subsequently killed in action.
The 7th Tank Division, or what remained of it, continued its retreat northward, never reaching Seoul. It had to divert towards the 38th Parallel, arriving there on September 28th and almost immediately taking defensive positions between the villages of Korangp’o-ri and Mojon-ni.
As already mentioned, on September 17th, the 105th ‘Seoul’ Armored Division began its retreat towards Seoul, together with the other KPA forces, including the 16th Armored Brigade that had suffered many losses in the previous days.
During the retreat, all the T-34-85s that had been stranded due to engine or suspension failures and had not been repaired due to lack of spare parts during the advance some months before were buried and camouflaged in strategic positions. They were used as bunkers to slow down the UN advance.
During the first day of the Pusan Perimeter Offensive, which began on September 16th, UN troops captured a total of 19 artillery pieces, 18 anti-tank guns, 9 mortars, and a self-propelled SU-76M gun that was fully operational.
On September 18th, after crossing the Naktong River, ROKA units, supported by some tanks, attacked Hill 268 south of Waegwan, which was defended by the forces of the 3rd Infantry Division of the KPA, together with some T-34-85s of the 105th Armored Division. During the evening, ROKA forces managed to capture the hill after repeated air attacks that dropped napalm and rockets on the North Korean units.
On September 19th, 1950, UN troops entered Waegwan after the North Koreans retreated. They had left on the field 22 45 mm cannons, 10 mortars, an unspecified number of small arms and 28 tanks. Those 28 tanks consisted of 27 T-34-85s destroyed or damaged and an M4A3E8 Sherman previously captured by the North Koreans and used against its former owners.
Between September 20th and 21st, the KPA lost several armored vehicles. Regiments of the North Korean 105th ‘Seoul’ Armored Division managed to cross the Naktong with only 23 T-34-85 and SU-76M tanks. The 107th Armored Regiment had only 14 tanks on the north bank, while the 203rd Armored Regiment had only 9 tanks. These few armored vehicles, along with a few anti-tank guns, covered the retreat of other KPA forces to Kumch’on.
On September 17th-18th, the US 70th Tank Battalion lost 10 tanks, six in minefields, two destroyed by T-34-85s, and two by Soviet-made 76 mm cannons. In one action, US tanks destroyed two out of three KPA hull-down tanks.
The fighting on Hill 351 around Tabu-dong saw another clash of armored vehicles that cost heavy losses for the US forces of the 70th Tank Battalion. On September 20th alone, this unit lost 7 armored vehicles, although North Korean losses are not known.
On September 22nd, the offensive ended with the complete defeat of the KPA units, which began a disorganized retreat towards the north.
The same day, the US Marines arrived near Seoul and began the occupation of the city on September 25th.
Before the war, Seoul was a city of about two million inhabitants, most of whom lived in shacks and huts on the outskirts of the city. The center was very modern, with concrete buildings worthy of the most famous European cities, especially along the Ma Po Boulevard, the main street of Seoul.
The approximately 20,000 Korean People’s Army soldiers of the 78th Independent Infantry Regiment, 70th Infantry Regiment, 42nd Tank Regiment, and the 107th Security Regiment, who were ordered to maintain the city, wasted no time. Before the US landing, they had created dozens, if not hundreds of barricades and anti-tank obstacles in the city’s streets to slow the advance of the UN troops.
Everything was used, bags filled with sand, stones, rubble, and, in some extreme cases, rice. Furniture and other furnishings and vehicle hulks These usually had a height of 2.5 meters and a depth of 1.5 meters. The distance between obstacles was about 200-300 meters.
The barricades were protected by barbed wire, mines and covered by 45 mm M1942 anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns. In some cases, these were M2 Brownings captured from UN troops during the advance.
The Marines arrived on the outskirts of Seoul on September 18th, starting the attack on the town of Yongdungpo west of the capital and Kimpo Airfield to the northwest. Communist resistance in Yongdungpo was heavy and only the airport was captured on 19th September.
On the night of September 19th-20th, the Marines launched a nocturnal amphibious assault from the south coast of the Han River, south of the city. Halfway through, the LVTs were hit by intense fire from the KPA troops barricaded on the fortress at Hill 125. The attack was canceled and the fortress was bombed until dawn.
At 0645 hrs, the 1st Company of the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines attacked the hill and conquered it after 3 hours of fighting. UN troops were now less than eight miles from downtown Seoul.
Also on the morning of September 20th, in Yongdungpo, the troops of the 1st Marines, commanded by Colonel Lewis B. Puller, repelled the attack of 5 T-34-85s and the 87th regiment of the 18th KPA Infantry Division, which lost 300 soldiers.
On 21st September, given the very strong resistance of the 87th North Korean Regiment, the Marines fired white phosphorus ammunition and their planes dropped napalm bombs, razing most of the barracks to the ground and testing the North Korean resistance. However, the North Koreans did not relent until the evening, when due to the losses suffered, the scarcity of ammunition, and the low morale of the troops, the commander of the regiment ordered an organized retreat to the north.
Taking the city of Yongdungpo, the 5th Marines was able to start advancing towards Seoul from the west, while the 1st Marines organized the landing on the north coast of the Han River.
The Communist soldiers, far from leaving their positions, had occupied Hill 296. Under the command of Colonel Chan Wil Ki of the 25th Infantry Brigade, they had created a defensive line defended by about 10,000 soldiers and blocked the 5th Marines‘ way.
This was an ideal defensive position. During the Second World War, the Japanese troops stationed in Korea had used the hill and the surrounding terrain for training, so the KPA troops also had the advantage of already prepared positions.
The 5th Marines began the attack on Hill 296 at 7 am on September 22nd, with the 3rd Battalion of the US Marines, the 1st Battalion of the ROKA Marines, and the 1st Battalion of the US Marines. The 2nd Battalion of the US Marines was in reserve.
After a full day of fighting, Company H had reached the crest of Hill 296, but Chan Wil Ki‘s forces continued to hold the line south and east of the hill. The ROK Marines and 1st US Marines Battalion had to advance over open ground. Constant air support of the Chance Vought F4U Corsairs of Marine Aircraft Group 33 continued to lead the way for the Marines throughout the day.
Some pilots, under the command of Major Arnold A. Lund, stationed on the escort carrier Badoeng Strait, flew up to four sorties per day per aircraft.
As night fell, due to the difficulty of releasing napalm on KPA positions without risking hitting the Marines, the planes stopped the bombing. This left room for the 11th Marines artillery that riddled the positions throughout the night, weakening the KPA troops. These surrendered only at the first light of dawn on September 22nd.
Before continuing the advance on Seoul, the hills to the northeast of the city were cleared. The conquest of the hills meant the Marines lost 2 days and almost 200 men. The Koreans lost an unknown number of soldiers. US troops counted 1,500, but this is a partial number.
Most of these men were killed by napalm or US artillery and were from the 25th Infantry Brigade or 78th Independent Infantry Regiment. Their officers and NCOs had participated in World War II or the Chinese Civil War.
On September 25th, a symbolic date marking 3 months since the start of the war, US troops began entering Seoul from the south and west, as the ROK 17th Regiment moved east in an attempt to outflank Kim Il-sung’s barricaded troops in the city.
It took the Marines an average of an hour to clear each barricade, armed with anti-tank guns, anti-tank rifles, and heavy machine guns and protected by barbed wire and mines, as well as a few sporadic T-34s and SU-76Ms.
The Marines were slowed down by continuous shooting from Korean snipers, Molotov cocktails thrown at tanks, PPSh-41 bursts from house roofs and trees. Some sources mention the use of North Korean “suicide squads” which jumped out from the corners of houses against US tanks, but this information is not confirmed. This could have been a one-off or a desperate defense technique that is not mentioned by other sources.
By the evening of September 25th, the Marines had advanced less than 2 km, albeit with the constant support of artillery and close airstrikes that destroyed entire blocks. Despite the little progress, at 1400 hrs, it was said on radios and TVs around the world that Seoul had been liberated.
On September 26th, at around 2000 hrs, the majority of the Korean People’s Army troops started to withdraw from the city. This had by now been 65% destroyed, with thousands of civilian deaths due to dozens of air and artillery attacks.
Not all the troops withdrew, however. Some launched a counterattack against the 5th Marines, 3rd Battalion on the hills to the west and against the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marines which was advancing towards the city center from Ma Po Boulevard.
The 25th Infantry Brigade had counterattacked in the city center with the last tanks and self-propelled guns available, managing to stop the Marines from advancing but losing 4 tanks, 2 SPGs, and 250 soldiers.
Before dawn on September 26th, KPA troops also counterattacked positions on Nam-san Hill south of Seoul, occupied by the US 32nd Division. Colonel Beauchamp‘s men remained on the hill and drove the Korean soldiers back with heavy casualties.
Throughout September 26th, there were clashes along the Ma Po Bulevard with the Marines. The Americans, despite continuous launches of napalm and white phosphorus on the positions of the Communists, advanced less than 1,000 meters.
Even though, by the morning of the 27th, the Marines controlled half of the city, the conquest of the heart of the city was still long and exhausting. The main city targets, such as the embassies, the city hall, and the seat of government were falling under the control of the United Nations forces one after another.
The 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, recaptured the French embassy at 11 am on the 27th. That afternoon, the Marines retook the US embassy, and the Seoul train station was also recaptured during the heavy fighting of that day. The 5th Marines took the Government building in the middle of the afternoon.
The clashes lasted until the evening of September 27th. By the next morning, almost all North Korean soldiers had been killed or taken prisoner, even though small pockets of resistance remained in the northeast.
On September 29th, when all was quiet, General MacArthur triumphantly arrived in the city with South Korean President Syngman Rhee, symbolically returning the city to him.
The casualties of the battle between 20th and 30th September 1950 were 1,716 dead and wounded between the US Marines and ROK, for an unknown number of North Koreans. The death toll of the Korean People’s Army between 15th and 30th September was 14,000 dead and 7,000 prisoners.
The loss bulletins did not count civilians killed by napalm, white phosphorus, and artillery fire and the ones executed by ROK Military Police on charges of being communists, without having taken part in the clashes.
In the subsequent counter-offensive of the UN troops, fought between September 23rd and 30th 1950, Task Force Dolvin (an elite unit organized ad hoc for the offensive) alone destroyed or captured 19 armored vehicles, 16 anti-tank guns, 65 tons of ammunition, and captured or killed 1,100 KPA soldiers, losing only 3 tanks to anti-tank mines.
In the same period, Task Force Lynch, created on September 21st, with 7 M4A3E8 Shermans of Company C of the 70th Tank Battalion, captured 4 T-34-85s, 50 US trucks (previously captured by KPA troops), about 20 artillery pieces, and a total of about 500 KPA prisoners, losing only two Shermans hit by a 76 mm gun at Naksong-dong.
During the night of September 26th, the 3rd Tank Platoon of Company C of the 70th Tank Battalion, under the command of Task Force Lynch, met the Marines of X Marines Corps south of Suwon, but lost contact with the other units of Task Force Lynch, which ended up under attack.
The 2nd Tank Platoon was attacked by 10 T-34-85s that had accidentally encountered the US troops. Two M4A3E8 Shermans were quickly knocked out by 2 T-34-85s but were later destroyed by a third M4. The first T-34-85 just happened to end up in the middle of the advancing column of US vehicles. The crew wasted no time and started to crush at least 15 vehicles, including Jeeps and trucks under the 32 tons of the vehicle, but they were stopped by a 105 mm howitzer which hit it at very close range, only 11 meters.
Four more T-34s were destroyed by the fire of anti-tank teams and the last three tanks fled, two of which were destroyed by tanks of the 70th Tank Battalion along the road between the villages of Habung-Ni and Pyeongtaek.
On September 23rd, the American 24th Division attacked towards Taejon-Seoul, but was ambushed by the 105th ‘Seoul’ Armoured Division, which cost the Americans three M46 Pattons. In the afternoon of the same day, the Koreans lost 3 T-34-85 in an air attack.
Between September 23rd and 24th, some North Korean reinforcements arrived from the north to Kumch’on along with some T-34s, and the battle for the control of the city began. Six M46 Pattons were lost during the battle, while the KPA lost 5 T-34s in an air attack and 3 during the clashes between armored vehicles.
In the city of Taejon, the fighting was very violent and US reports of North Korean losses were unclear and exaggerated. The US ground forces reported 13 tanks of the Korean People’s Army destroyed (3 by Bazooka fire) while the USAF reported 20 tanks destroyed.
On September 28th, 10 T-34-85s were encountered in the vicinity of the city of P’yongt’aek. 5 were destroyed by airstrikes and 2 by anti-tank ground fire.
Breakthrough the 38th parallel and Pyongyang conquest
On September 30th, the US and ROKA offensive against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea began with the crossing of the 38th parallel. The North Koreans put up a strenuous resistance by any means, even if the US advance seemed unstoppable.
On October 12th, a group of North Korean tanks attacked the positions of B Company of the 70th Tank Battalion near Songhyon-ni. Lieutenant D. Brewery, the tank commander of an M4A3E8 Sherman, reported that his vehicle fired at a T-34-85 at 50 m without penetrating it, then at 20 m again without penetrating it, then the Korean tank collided with the Sherman. As soon as they recovered from the collision, the driver of the Sherman reversed and moved back a few meters, allowing the gunner to fire a third shot, which surprisingly again did not penetrate the frontal armor of the tank but damaged the gun.
The North Korean crew did not lose heart and, although their vehicle was on fire, they accelerated again and hit the Sherman for a second time, but the fourth shot put it out of action.
On 11th October 1950, after a brief confrontation with the 1st ROKA Infantry Division, the 17th Tank Division was forced to retreat to the north again. The division arrived in Sinanju with stops in Pyongyang and Sukch’on. On October 18th, the unit was reorganized and shipped south to the banks of the Ch’ongch’on River.
After a joint US-Commonwealth attack on October 23rd, 1950, which led to the conquest of Sinanju and a brief firefight against the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, the 17th Division retreated again, crossing the Taeryong River and repositioning itself in Chongju to defend the Pakch’on-Chongju road.
According to documentation captured at the time, the Korean People’s Army17th Tank Division possessed 20 T-34-85s, 12 SU-76Ms and 7 76 mm ZIS-3 guns. 4 T-34s and some SU-76Ms were in a defensive position along the west bank of the Taeryong River, opposite the Pakch’on town.
The 2nd Infantry Battalion, with some SU-76Ms and some 76 mm cannons, defended the north bank of the Taeryong River.
The 3rd Infantry Battalion, with 10 T-34-85s, defended the coast near Chongju from possible amphibious landings. The Logistics Brigade, with the remaining SU-76Ms, defended Chongju and the headquarters. 6 reserve T-34-85s were positioned at a height halfway between the two cities.
The first clash took place on the night between 25th and 26th October, when the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade crossed the Taeryong River, meeting at 0400 hrs with a reconnaissance unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kim In-sik in the Battle of Broken Bridge. Companies A and B of the Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) were attacked by North Korean troops supported by two T-34-85s of the 17th Armored Brigade. The North Koreans managed to create havoc among the Australian units that could not counter the tanks because the rocket ignition system of their 2.6-inch Bazookas jammed due to poor maintenance. Despite the lack of bazookas, after several hours of fighting, the North Korean troops withdrew, losing 150 soldiers, of which 100 were killed and 50 taken prisoner.
UN sources report that, just south of Pyongyang, the Australians of the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, supported by D Company of the 70th Tank Battalion, encountered two T-34-85s and a SU-76M. One T-34 camouflaged in a haystack was destroyed by Sherman fire, while the other two vehicles were abandoned by their crews after the firefight.
In 5 days of fighting along the 32 km of the defensive line between Chongju in the west and Pakch’on in the east, the 17th Tank Division lost all 23 T-34-85s (some arrived in the following days to support the resistance) and six SU-76Ms. performing an excellent slowdown action of UN troops.
The 3rd RAR War Diary states that North Korean resistance in the region was admirable. The T-34-85 commanders were able to exploit the terrain to their advantage and camouflaged their vehicles so as not to be seen even a few hundred meters away in broad daylight.
The Battle of Chongju, fought between October 29th and 30th, 1950, saw fighting between the 3rd Royal Australian Regiment supported by the US 89th Tank Regiment equipped with M4A3E8 Shermans and the North Korean 17th Tank Brigade. The battle began at 1000 hours on November 29th. Due to the dense bush in which Korean tanks defended themselves, air support was immediately called in. By 1400 hours, F-51s of the No. 77 Squadron RAAF (Royal Australian Air Force) reported having destroyed 7 T-34-85s and 2 SU-76Ms, although these claims seem to have been exaggerated. A number of T-34s were destroyed by M4A3E8 Sherman tanks on the ground, one was destroyed by fire when the Australians hit its external fuel tank and three others were destroyed at short range by 3.5 in. Bazooka fire.
In total, that day, 11 T-34-85s and 2 SU-76M were destroyed.
On the evening of October 30th, the 21st Regimental Combat Team of the US 24th Infantry Division advanced west from Chongju. It got to about 2 km west from Kwaksan when it ended up in an ambush that soon turned into a skirmish that lasted all day and led to the destruction of 7 T -34-85s, 1 SU-76M, seven 76 mm guns, about 50 dead and 2 T-34-85 captured on flatcars along a railroad.
The 21st Regimental Combat Team continued the advance towards the coastal road going northwards, arriving at Ch’onggo-dong on 31st October.
On 1st November, the KPA counterattacked with approximately 500 troops and 7 T-34-85s. In the ensuing clash, all seven Korean tanks were destroyed or knocked out by US tanks, and about a fifth of the soldiers were lost to US fire.
The 21st Regimental Combat Team found it difficult to maintain the position and retreated further south, arriving north of the Ch’ongch’on River. The 17th Tank Division had managed to slow down and eventually stop the UN troops by denying them access to Sinuiju. There, the 105th “Seoul” Tank Division was re-equipping and retraining. All this came at the cost of 39 T-34-85s, 7 SU-76Ms, 7 ZIS-3s, and about 1,000 soldiers lost in 7 days.
During the defense of Pyongyang, between October 17th and 19th, only a few T-34-85s were encountered, some in hull-down positions outside the city and a few others inside the capital.
Company A of the 6th Tank Battalion, equipped with M46 Pattons, encountered 8 T-34-85s and a SU-76M on October 22nd, destroying them all in a short firefight and capturing 8 other T-34s abandoned by their crews shortly before.
On October 23rd, at Kunu-ri, the 6th Division of the Republic of Korea Army captured two KPA trains carrying ammunition, food and a total of eight tanks. A little further north, at Huich’on, that same night, the 6th Division captured 20 T-34s abandoned in a depot, almost all of them intact.
The Chinese intervention and the KPA counteroffensive
On the same day on which Pyongyang was conquered, the Chinese People’s Volunteers Army (PVA), commanded by General Peng Dehuai and 270,000 men strong, crossed the border between China and Korea, fording the Yalu River in great secrecy. On October 25th, the PVA clashed for the first time with UN troops, defeating the troops of the 10th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Infantry Division assigned to the ROK II Corps. Later, in the Battles of Unsan and Ch’ongch’on, it managed to defeat U.S. units and other UN forces.
In the Battle of the Ch’ongch’on River, the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, supported by the 17th Tank Division, defeated several UN units, forcing them to retreat. Some of them included the US 1st Cavalry Division, 24th Infantry Division (including the 21st Regimental Combat Team), 27th Commonwealth Brigade, the Turkish Brigade, and the 6th, 7th and 8th ROKA Infantry Divisions of the South Korean II Corps.
From this date onwards, while the armored forces of the Korean People’s Army took part in subsequent battles, the amount of vehicles used, their actual use, and losses in the field are not known exactly. Many sources report the numbers of tanks destroyed without mentioning whether they were Chinese or Korean.
On October 28th, during the Battle of Chongju, the 3rd RAR destroyed 3 T-34-85s with Bazookas. A fourth one was destroyed by Private John Stafford, who fired his Bren gun at the external tanks of the tank, setting them on fire.
On October 29th, it was reported that an armored regiment of the Korean People’s Army supported the actions of soldiers of the Chinese 124th Infantry Division. During the following days, “two North Korean tanks” (unsure if they were KPA or PVA vehicles) were destroyed by an F4U airstrike near the city of Kilchu that was just recaptured by the Communist troops.
On November 7th, a USAF pilot reported the destruction of 6 tanks, 3 BA-64 armored cars, and 45 unarmored vehicles near Pakchon. According to some sources, these were vehicles of the 105th ‘Seoul’ Armored Division.
By November 17th, it is reported that 7 more T-34s and two SU-76Ms were destroyed thanks to airstrikes and supporting fire from US ships anchored near the east coast of the Korean peninsula.
Not much information is available regarding North Korean use of other T-34-85s prior to the counteroffensive south of the 38th parallel.
Almost all the KPA units, thanks to the intervention of the PVA, could be reorganized. They were recalled to the fields of Sinuiju in the west, Kanggye in the center, and Hoeryong in the east of the DPRK for new training and re-equipment.
Offensive South of the 38th Parallel and Third Battle of Seoul
During the Battle of Ch’ongch’on River, fought between November 25th and December 2nd, 1950, the UN troops suffered a defeat and retreated south of the 38th parallel. Mao Zedong, leader of the People’s Republic of China, then became convinced that he could force the enemy troops to retreat to the coast of the South and ordered Peng Dehuai to cross the 38th parallel in pursuit of the enemy.
Between December 11th and 31st, there was a cease-fire that was interrupted by the Chinese offensive. The ROKA forces stationed on the 38th parallel suffered heavy losses and, by January 1st, 1951, they were all annihilated or forced to retreat.
In the third battle for Seoul, the fighting mostly took place against Chinese PVA troops and it is not clear whether the KPA forces that took part in the battle included armored regiments equipped with T-34-85s. Out of fear that the Chinese and Koreans could outflank the UN troops in the city, the evacuation began as early as January 1st.
The Communist troops managed to knock out or destroy several Cromwell Mk. VII tanks (even managing to capture some of them), and at least one Churchill Mk. VII of the 29th Infantry Brigade.
By January 4th, UN forces had been pushed back to a defensive line 9-12 km south of the Han River and the city of Seoul. The order was to hold out until the troops and ammunition were cleared from Incheon and then the engineers destroyed any remaining structures or equipment, including 6 million liters of fuel, 12 rail cars full of ammunition, and some tanks that could not be evacuated due to lack of space on ships docked in the harbor.
The conquest of Seoul was a great victory for the communist troops of the Korean People’s Army and the People’s Volunteer Army. It gave even more confidence to the Chinese generals, even if the supplies available were no longer enough to support an advance. In fact, at the end of January, the UN troops had stopped the communist advance, and, with Operation Thunderbolt launched on January 25th, they were able to advance again.
Between February 20th and March 6th, during Operation Killer, they were able to return to the banks of the Han River, even if Seoul remained firmly in the hands of the Chinese and the North Koreans.
In mid-November, the 17th Tank Division, which had until now followed the PVA, was recalled to Sinuiju to replace the losses. New recruits were assigned to the division, which was renamed 17th Mechanized Brigade, along with 20 new T-34-85s, 10 BA-64s, and some 82 mm mortars.
After a rest period in mid-January, the new 17th Mechanized Brigade was assigned to the 1st Corps and shipped south via Pyongyang and arrived in Seoul in February. It remained in Seoul until mid-March, acting as a reserve for the 1st Corps and being equipped with new material, becoming the 17th Mechanized Division, with only 20 T-34-85s, 6-12 SU-76Ms, and some 120 mm and 82 mm mortars.
In the furious battles of Operation Thunderbolt, Operation Killer, and the subsequent Operation Ripper between March 7th and April 4th, which led to the recapture of Seoul on March 16th, there are no precise numbers on how many armored vehicles were lost by PVA or KPA troops.
Obviously, the 17th Mechanized Division withdrew along with the rest of the Communist troops north of the Imjin River, being replaced in the first line by the 19th Infantry Division. It was then assigned to the IVth Corps, with anti-landing duties along the west coast of the peninsula. On 6th July 1951, the unit replaced the 19th Infantry Division in the 1st Corps but remained on its positions on the east coast.
The division was now under the command of Major General Chong Ch’ol-u. It maintained its positions, receiving few more materials. By November 1951, according to UN intelligence, it had risen to 6,600 men, but had few tanks and SPGs.
In the subsequent Chinese-Korean offensive between April 22nd and May 20th, 1951, which failed to recapture Seoul, tanks were rarely encountered by UN troops. In the few cases where they were encountered, they were under Chinese insignia and command. A notable exception to this was the Battle of the Injim River, where Centurion Mark III tanks of the 8th King’s Royal Irish Hussars and some M24 Chaffees of the 10th Battalion Combat Team of the Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea resisted the North Korean and Chinese attack supported by T-34-85s.
To this day, the battle is a source of contention. The UN troops were defeated with 158 casualties and approximately 1,000 prisoners but managed to slow the Chinese and North Korean troops enough to create a defensive line around Seoul.
On May 20th, the UN Counter Offensive began, which lasted until July 1st, 1951, and was the last major offensive of the Korean War before the two-year stalemate. During the Offensive, the 1st and 2nd Corps and the 5th Korean People’s Army Corps took part in the clashes. Within these corps, there were armored regiments equipped with T-34-85s, but due to previous defeats and the difficulty faced by the North Koreans in supplying fresh troops, none of these regiments had a complete staff. It is assumed that some of these units were not really equipped with armored vehicles but kept the name for propaganda purposes.
Period of stalemate
On July 1st, 1951 began the so-called phase of stalemate that lasted for two years, until July 1953. The front lines had arrived approximately where they were at the beginning of the war. In the east of the Korean peninsula, the front lines of the UN forces were north of the 38th parallel, but in the west of the peninsula, the communist troops held firmly a part south of the 38th parallel.
During the stalemate phase, US strategic bombing of the area north of the 38th parallel continued weakening the already exhausted armies of the Korean People’s Army and the People’s Volunteers Army, hitting supplies and any depot or factory that was detected.
In 1951, while waiting for the Soviets to re-equip them, the armored units of the KPA were reorganized. The 105th ‘Seoul’ Armored Division was renamed the 105th ‘Seoul’ Mechanized Division and the 10th Mechanized Division was formed, but it was not yet equipped with tanks.
According to a Soviet report from December 1951, the 17th Mechanized Division was dissolved and its materials transferred to the 105th “Seoul” Tank Division. According to UN intelligence, the unit remained active until February 1952, when its tank battalion was transferred to the 10th Mechanized Division. The rest of the division was then dissolved. It is more plausible that, after the removal of the armored unit, the division became the 17th Infantry Division.
The Soviet reinforcements were not as large as hoped and, in 1951, the KPA had only 77 T-34-85s and 63 SU-76Ms at its disposal. It was therefore decided to dissolve the divisions and create six tank regiments to be included in the ranks of six infantry divisions.
The Chinese could not supply many armored vehicles to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. In fact, by May 1950, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had only 300 T-34-85s, 60 IS-2s and 40 ISU-122s.
Most of the armored vehicles sent to the front were destroyed by bombing before they even arrived, so there was little fighting between armored vehicles between July 1951 and July 1953.
The only noteworthy battles in which KPA forces took part, probably supported by T-34-85s (even if western sources do not mention ‘tanks’), were the Battle of Bloody Ridge fought between August and September 1951, the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge between September and October 1951 and the Battle of Pork Chop Hill, one of the last battles fought between April and July 1953.
On 27th July 1953, the day of the end of the Korean War, the units of the armored forces of the Korean People’s Army had increased to 7 armored regiments, the 104th, 105th ‘Seoul’, 106th, 107th, 109th, 206th, and 208th, with a total of 255 T-34-85s and 127 SU-76Ms, and approximately the same personnel numbers as at the beginning of the war.
Comparisons Analysis between UN forces and North Korean T-34-85
Hull Armor
Turret Armor
Tank
Front
Side
Rear
Shield
Front
Side
Rear
Main Gun
Round Name
Penetration
At Distance
Muzzle Velocity
T-34-85
47 mm at 60°
46 mm at 40°
48 mm at 48°
90 mm rounded
90 mm rounded
75 mm at 20°
52 mm at 10°
85 mm ZiS-S-53
BR-365P
130 mm
1,000 m
1,030 m/s
M24 Chaffee
25 mm at 60°
25 mm at 12°
19 mm at 0°
38 mm
25 mm at 12° and 25°
25 mm at 12° and 25°
25 mm at 12° and 25°
75 mm M6
M61
80 mm
1,000 m
620 m/s
M4A3(76)W HVSS
63 mm at 47°
38 mm at 0°
38 mm at 22°
89 mm
76 mm at 30°
50 mm at 5°
50 mm at 0°
76 mm M1A2
M93
178 mm
1,000 m
1,036 m/s
M26 and M46
100 mm at 43°
76 mm at 0°
50 mm at 20°
115 mm
101 mm at 30°
76 mm at 0°
76 mm at 0°
90 mm M3 and M3A1
M304
250 mm
1,000 m
1,020 m/s
Cromwell Mark VII
64 mm at 0°
32 mm at 0°
25 mm at 0°
77 mm
77 mm at 0°
65 mm at 0°
57 mm at 0°
75 mm OQF Mark V
M61
80 mm
1,000 m
620 m/s
Churchill Mark VII
152 mm at 0°
95 mm at 0°
50 mm at 0°
152 mm
152 mm at 0°
95 mm at 0°
95 mm at 0°
75 mm OQF Mark V
M61
80 mm
1,000 m
620 m/s
Comet I
76 mm at 0°
64 mm at 0°
25 mm at 0°
102 mm
102 mm at 0°
64 mm at 0°
57 mm at 0°
77 mm OQF Mark II
Mark VIII
125 mm
1,000 m
754 m/s
Centurion Mark III
76 mm at 57°
51 mm at 12°
38 mm at 5°
152 mm
152 mm at 0°
89 mm at 5° and 12°
89 mm at 0°
20-pdr (84 mm) OQF Mark I
//
300 mm
1,000 m
1,020 m/s
According to this data, the T-34-85 was, at least in theory, superior to tanks such as the Cromwell Mark VIII and the M24 Chaffee, at about the same level as the M4A3E8 and the Comet and obviously inferior to other UN tanks, like the M26 and Centurion. The Churchill was an exception, because it was inferior to the T-34 in firepower, but its armor made it a tough opponent. In practice, the matters were very different. The tankers of the Korean People’s Army and the Volunteer People’s Army were poorly trained compared to their UN counterparts and this unbalanced every battle in favor of the UN troops.
Effectiveness of Tank Types in Korea against T-34-85 (from July 1950 to Yanuary 1951)
Type
Number Destroyed by T-34-85s
Number of T-34-85s destroyed by this Type
M24 Chaffee
5
1
M4A3(76)W HVSS
7
24
M26 Pershing
3
31
M46 Patton
1
18
To give an example, the possibility of hitting a target on the first shot for the KPA troops was 50% within 320 m, 23% within 680 m, 25% within 1,000 m, and nill over 1,000 m. For the Americans, the possibility of hitting a target on the first shot was 84% within 320 m and 16% over 1,000 m.
In some cases, the Chinese and Korean T-34 crews were so poorly trained that, during combat, they fired HE rounds instead of armor-piercing rounds at the enemy thanks they were engaging.
Obviously, there were other vehicles during the Korean War, such as the M4A2E8 Sherman and some 17-pdr. SP Achilles (M10 GMC rearmed with 17-pdr cannon) in service with the Canadian Army and the M36 Jackson in service with the ROKA, but the former had the same characteristics as the M4A3E8 Sherman and the latter did not participate in any major action in the war.
Data on Korean tank losses
After the UN Pusan Perimeter Offensive, in the period from September 26th to October 21st, 1950, seven teams traveled every road that could be traveled by armored vehicles from the Pusan Perimeter to the 38th parallel. This survey was meant to discover the number of armored vehicles lost by the Korean People’s Army between June 25th and October 21st, 1950. It revealed 239 destroyed or abandoned T-34-85s tanks and 74 self-propelled SU-76Ms guns since the war began. The same survey counted 136 U.S. tanks destroyed and unrecovered.
Abandoned (Cause unknown but no damage)5924,7*Note* The 60 lost to napalm bombs are 58,8 % of the total losses ascribed to air strikes and equivalent to 25,1 % of the total losses of T-34-85
DPRK T-34-85 Casualities
Cause
Number
% of Total
Air Strikes
All
102
42,7
Napalm Bombs
(60)*
(25,1)*
UN Tanks and Artillery
39
16,3
Bazooka Fire
13
5,4
Naval Gun Fire
12
5
Others (mines and those lost “not for military causes”
14
5,9
Total>
239
100
** Calculated figures based on total losses from all casuses minus total from all other causes combined
The survey found that airstrikes destroyed 102 T-34-85 tanks (43%). Of these, 60 (25%) were knocked out by napalm bombs. 59 T-34-85s were abandoned (25%) with no visible evidence of damage. 39 T-34-85s were destroyed by UN tanks or artillery (16%) and Bazooka fire destroyed 13 tanks (5%).
Of the remaining 26 (11%) T-34-85s destroyed, 12 (4.6%) were destroyed by cannon fire from US Navy ships, a very small number had been disabled or destroyed by mines, and the remainder were lost “not to military causes”.
By April 1952, another 57 hulls were identified, for a total of 296 T-34-85s known to have been destroyed in South Korea. It should be noted that the Bazooka fire had actually hit many more vehicles and put them out of action but, often, the UN armored forces on the battlefield mistook them for working vehicles, hitting them again, often destroying them completely.
In general, pilots of the United States Air Force (USAF) also often hit North Korean T-34-85s that had already been destroyed by infantry or tanks on the ground, mistaking them for working vehicles because of the speed at which they flew over the ground. This type of error was exacerbated by poor visibility on the ground, which could also cause pilots to mistake trucks or armored cars for tanks.
For these reasons, in 1950 alone, USAF pilots claimed to have destroyed 857 tanks, which became 1,256 destroyed and 1,298 damaged by June 1952. Marine Corps pilots claimed another 123 destructions and, finally, 163 tanks destroyed and 161 damaged were reported by US Navy pilots.
The credited number of UN tanks destroyed between July and September 1950 was 136, of which 95 (70%) were destroyed by Soviet-made North Korean anti-tank mines.
The number of armored vehicles destroyed during the UN Offensive in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is unclear, although some sources state that another 313 tanks were knocked out, destroyed, or captured and then blown up so as not to end up back in Communist hands. At first glance, this may seem like an overestimate or exaggeration, but when one considers that UN troops captured several North Korean depots where many T-34s lay intact and abandoned, this number is plausible.
A US Army report from 1954 states that, in total, there were 119 tank vs. tank actions, of which 104 involved US troops and 15 involved US Marine Corp armored vehicles against KPA and PVA forces during the Korean War. From these encounters, some 97 T-34-85 tanks were reported to have been knocked out and another 18 considered probable against 4 M24 Chaffees, 16 M4A3E8 Shermans, 6 M26 Pershings, and 8 M46 Patton tanks knocked out, of which only 15 were irreparable.
Of those 119 actions, only 24 were fought against more than 3 T-34-85s together. In terms of which UN tanks were most likely to engage in tank vs tank combat, the breakdown in the report was that 59 were fought with M4A3E8 Shermans (50%), 38 with M26 Pershings (32%), 12 with the more modern M46 Pattons (10%) and, finally, 10 with the light M24 Chaffees (8%), which proved too vulnerable.
The M4A3E8 was credited with destroying 41 T-34-85s between August and November 1950.
After the War
While the few ISU-122s received from China after the war were quickly decommissioned from service in the Korean People’s Army due to the few spare parts available and the small number in Korean possession, the T-34-85s, the few T-34-76s, and 12 IS-2s continued to serve in the ranks of Kim Il-Sung’s army.
In the years after the war, the Soviet Union supplied the DPRK with other batches of T-34-85s. It is estimated that, by the end of the 1950s, the Korean People’s Army had about 1,000 T-34-85s in service, remaining the main (and only) tank of the KPA. If this figure is true, it can be assumed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea received a total of about 1,800-1,900 T-34-85s in the decade between the late 40s and the late 50s.
This high number of vehicles was kept in service at least until the mid-1960s when large numbers of T-54s, T-55s, and Type 59s began arriving in the country. This allowed some T-34s to go into the second line, although a very high number remained in service into the 1970s, joining the more modern T-62s from 1971 and the Chonmas in 1978.
In 1985, there were still about ten armored battalions equipped with T-34-85s in the ranks of the Korean People’s Army, which means that about 400 tanks were still in service. Other sources mention 650 T-34-85s still in service in the mid-1980s.
Some sources claim that, in the years following the war, the Korean People’s Army converted some T-34s into Armored Recovery Vehicles (ARVs) by removing the turret. This theory could be another wrong one, exactly like the one that claims that the KPA owns 100 SU-100. It cannot be demonstrated with photographic evidence.
More modern times
After 1969, the same road wheels produced after the Second World War in the Soviet Union appeared on the T-34-85s, called ‘Starfish’ models, with a larger diameter. Apparently, the North Koreans produce an indigenous version without visible differences from the Chinese one.
In the last years of the ‘70s and early ‘80s, the few T-34-85s still in service were modified by the Korean People’s Army with all-steel tracks produced in Korea, also used on the North Korean copy of Soviet and Chinese Main Battle Tanks, along with new sprocket wheels. The hull and turret received slat-armor mounts to increase the tank’s protection against High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) projectiles and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM), also mounted on the T-54s and T-55s still in service.
The Soviet-era radio system was probably also replaced with a more modern one. A snorkel system that could be mounted on North Korean T-34-85s was also developed. Looking at the ball mount for the machine gun in the hull, it can be seen that the barrel does not look like the usual DT-27, so it can be assumed that the machine gun has been replaced with a more modern model to increase the rate of fire (as some KPA units still use DP-27, infantry version of DT) or that the machine gun has been removed and the barrel is fake.
As far as it is known, the KPA never developed a new range of 85 mm ammunition. It is still using or producing under license the same Soviet 85 mm ammunition that was almost certainly used on the M1981 Shin’heung light amphibious tank and on the tank destroyer variant of the 323 Armored Personnel Carrier.
In 1996, according to some sources, there were still about 250 T-34-85s in reserve. As of 2021, it seems that there are still some used for training, even if the exact number and location remain unknown.
Although in the collective imagination, ‘North Korea’ may seem an almost absurd nation, based on the most extreme nationalism and the cult of personality, its army is not devoid of common sense. It is hard to imagine that even the most indoctrinated of KPA generals do not know that T-34-85s are now more than obsolete for modern warfare and can envisage what would happen if they ever came face to face with an M1A2 Abrams or a K2 Black Panther. This begs the question as to why there are still a number of them in reserve in 2021?
There are many ways in which a T-34-85 can be used in the event of war. Firstly, for training duties, as they are cheap and easy to maintain. In the event that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea declares war on the Republic of Korea, thinking of T-34-85s crossing the Demilitarized Zone on the front lines supported by artillery fire is a bit anachronistic, but, using them to patrol newly conquered territories to keep any rebel groups at bay, escort convoys of supplies, in urban locations, for police duties, patrolling against paratroopers in the area north of the 38th parallel or for hypothetical support of more modern vehicles in some actions would not be so absurd.
Another plausible scenario is a possible defense of the peninsula north of the 38th parallel in case it is invaded. Taking advantage of the terrain of the peninsula, the T-34-85s could be positioned in well-camouflaged hull-down positions and ambush the assailant troops, forcing them to fight for every meter of land, thus leading to a kind of asymmetrical war that is often seen in the Middle East. A very clear idea of how this scenario could be is the Soviet-Afghan War fought between 1979 and 1989, where a well-organized militia managed to resist one of the best armies in the world using to its advantage the terrain and taking advantage of every possibility to inflict the greatest number of losses to the Soviets.
In the early years of the new millennium, North Korean T-34-85s were rarely seen. The last public appearance of an armored unit equipped with these vehicles was in 2009, when it participated in a military parade on Kim Il-sung Street in Pyongyang. In 2012, a T-34-76 was seen during a DPRK documentary during an urban combat exercise.
According to analysts, since 2017, the T-34-85 has been removed from service in the Korean People’s Army, although some examples will likely still be in service with the Worker-Peasant Red Guards (Paramilitary militia for civil defense founded in 1959) or in reserve.
The DPRK is not the only nation to have in service or to have withdrawn from service a few years ago the T-34-85. In fact, at least the following nations still have in service a certain amount: 45 are still used by the People’s Army of Vietnam for training, Guinea still has 30 operational, 10 are used by Guinea-Bissau Army, and Cuba also still has a certain number of them in active service. Other nations, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Namibia have a number of T-34-85s in reserve and finally, in Yemen and Syria, some T-34-85s have also been seen engaged in their ongoing and bloody civil wars.
Conclusions
Although the T-34-85 had a balanced speed/armament/armor ratio, the poorly trained Korean People’s Army did not know how to use it against their enemies during the Korean War, leading to the Western misconception that the vehicles were inferior to their US counterparts.
A key factor that affected North Korean losses was the almost constant threat from the air. Airstrikes by UN pilots proved to be very effective on almost every occasion. Kim Il-Sung’s Army was also forced by the scarce amount of tanks provided by the Soviets and the Chinese to use the T-34-85 in small assaults often composed of less than 3 tanks, canceling the advantages the tank had over some of the UN tanks it would go up against.
T-34-85 specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
8.15 x 3.00 x 2.72 m
Total Weight, Battle Ready
32 tonnes
Crew
5, driver, machine gunner, commander, gunner and loader
Propulsion
12 cylinders diesel engine V-2, 500 hp with 556 liters
Speed
55 km/h on road
Range
300 km
Armament
85 mm ZIS-S-53 L/54.6 with 60 rounds; 2x 7.62 mm DT machine guns
Armor
47 mm hull front, 46 mm sides and rear.
90 mm turret front, 75 mm sides and 52 mm rear.
20 mm roof and floor.
People’s Republic of China (1950-~1990)
Medium Tank – 1800+ Supplied (T-34-85), Unknown Number Converted (‘Type 58’)
The Chinese Upgrade of the T-34-85
‘Type 58’ is an unofficial name which refers to the mysterious Chinese upgrade package to the T-34-85. All T-34-85s in operational service with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) came to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from the USSR between 1950-1955, along with all types of military materiel as part of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (1950). These were briefly the PLA’s most numerous tank, but once license production of the T-54 MBT began in 1958 (I.e. the Type 59), the T-34-85 appears to have been relegated over time to lesser roles, especially in the late 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, seeing as though the majority were still in active service even by that time, it appears as though most T-34-85s were given an upgrade package which has come to be known as the ‘Type 58’. Little is known about the details of this package, and what is confirmed is only obtained through photographic evidence. What is evident, despite varying stories from different sources, is that the PRC never produced the T-34-85 or any sort of variant of the design. However, it is more than evident that the T-34-85 had a long and varied service life in the PRC.
Chinese T-34-85 ‘406’ in the Beijing Tank Museum, 2013. On the left are two IS-2s. Source: Wikipedia
Context: Tanks of the PLA as of 1st October 1949
The PLA held a major victory parade to mark the foundation of the PRC on 1st October 1949 in Beijing (with lesser parades in other major cities). All types of military materiel took part in this parade, including tanks. However, by 1949, most of these tanks were outdated and were in need of replacement. Perhaps the majority of these tanks were ex-Japanese which were mostly captured by the NRA (National Revolutionary Army – the army of the Nationalists – the Kuomintang / Guomindang, KMT / GMD) during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), and then captured by the PLA during the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949). Most of these Japanese tanks were the Chi-Ha, Chi-Ha Shinhoto, and the Ha-Go, but other types were in service in lesser numbers such as the Type 94 TK, Type 95 So-Ki, and so on.
The PLA also captured many of the NRA’s M3A3 and M5A1 Stuart tanks, along with other American vehicles such as the LVT(A)-4, LVT-4, M3A1 Scout Car, and many others. These were originally supplied via Lend-Lease to the Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) during the Burma Campaign (1942-1945) but were retained and used in the Civil War. The CEF’s M4A4 Shermans were all confiscated by the USA after the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War for fear that they may be used aggressively and not defensively, thus sparking a civil war (a war which came nonetheless).
The PLA also fielded some rarer vehicles, such as an M4A2 Sherman, and at least one T-26 M1937, to name just a couple of examples.
As such, one can understand just how desperate the Chinese PLA was to obtain new tanks. Therefore, the PRC turned to its Communist ‘ally’, the USSR, for aid. Despite ideological differences and a chequered history of relations between the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), under the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (1950), the USSR agreed to supply the PRC with all the assistance that a new Communist state would need to prosper (although this fell short of nuclear weapons technology, despite persistent Chinese demands).
Context: Soviet Arms Sales to the PRC, 1950-1955
In the years 1950-1955, the PRC purchased a huge variety of weapons and military equipment of all types from the USSR to replace their outdated weapons. Over 3000 vehicles are reported to have been supplied to the PLA from the USSR 1950-1955.
1950 – 300 T-34-85s, 60 IS-2s and 40 ISU-122s (to be clear, the original model armed with the 122mm A-19S, not the later ISU-122S with the 122mm D-25S), which were organized into 10 regiments (30 T-34-85, 6 IS-2 heavy tanks, and 5 ISU-122s in each).
1951 – 96 T-34-85s, and 64 SU-76s, which were organized into 4 regiments.
1952 – 312 T-34-85s, and 208 SU-76s, which were organized into 13 regiments.
1953 – 480 T-34-85s, and 320 SU-76s, which were organized into 13 regiments (based on a total number of 40 regiments at this point).
1954 – 649 T-34-85s, 320 SU-76s, 22 IS-2s, 99 SU-100s, 67 ISU-152s, and 9 ARVs (at least 2 of which were based on the ISU chassis, the others likely being based on the T-34).
1955 – No figures are available, but there were known shipments in 1955. Based on varying estimates for the number of T-34-85s in China, 127 T-34-85s might have been included in this shipment, but this is not confirmed.
72 additional ARVs and engineering vehicles were also supplied in this period.
Total 1950-1954: 1837 T-34-85s (some estimates suggest as many as 1964 by 1955), 82 IS-2s, 40 ISU-122s, 67 ISU-152s, 99 SU-100s, and 704 SU-76s. This gives a total of 2829 tanks, (excluding ARVs and engineering vehicles) organized into 67 regiments between 1950 and 1954, although some estimates suggest that 3000 armored vehicles were sold to the PRC between 1950 and 1955. No T-34/76s are known to have been supplied to the PRC, even though many were supplied to North Korea.
These T-34-85s were a huge mixture of tanks from different factories including Krasnoye Sormovo 112, Omsk 174, and UTZ 183. No Czechoslovak or Polish T-34s were supplied to the PRC via this set of programmes.
These arms sales were not without some controversy. If not from the outset, then from early on, the PRC’s leadership was aware that they were being sold outdated weapons at very high costs. This is typical behaviour of the USSR, as one need only look at Soviet arms deals to the Spanish Republicans (1936-1939) or the Chinese Nationalists (1937-1941) to see examples of this. In fact, the PRC’s leadership would later, during the Sino-Soviet Split in the mid-1950s / early 1960s allege that the USSR had scammed them.
Chinese Production of the T-34-85?
Whilst sources on early PRC tanks are sketchy (and likely untrustworthy), there is a story which circulates across various modern Chinese sources that suggests T-34-85 was intended for production in the PRC before the T-54 was accepted instead. This is not the same story as typically derived from western sources, which suggest the ‘Type 58’ was a Chinese copy of the T-34-85. There are multiple versions of this story, two of which will be reproduced below and then critiqued. One version of the story is as follows:
Story One
In 1954, the PRC asked the USSR for permission to produce the T-34-85 indigenously by 1958. This is because the Chinese leadership felt that the PRC should be self-sufficient in producing its own military materiel, as well as maintaining it. The USSR agreed to this request, seeing as though they had superior replacements for the Soviet Army in production anyway (namely the T-54 and its variants). The PRC had managed to translate all the documents of the vehicles provided to them and therefore began to organize license-production of the T-34-85 in the same year with the designation ‘Type 58’ [this is a highly dubious claim]. However, production was slow to start.
The simple fact is that the PRC was unprepared for any form of large scale industry in the years following the Communist victory in 1950 because industry across the country was heavily disrupted and damaged due to the war. In many respects, it was also never ready for serious tank production beyond a few workshop conversions.
Despite the poor state of the Chinese industry, some workshops had managed to produce a set of tracks in 1955. By May 1956, a gearbox was also successfully made. Finally, in February 1957, a prototype V2-34 diesel engine was made, meaning that the PRC was ready to organize production lines for the T-34-85 and was due to begin manufacture of the tank in 1958.
However, as the trials for manufacturing T-34 parts had gone on for so long, negotiations for the licenses and relevant documents to produce the T-54 had come to fruition and the T-54 was accepted for production instead. This is supposedly just shortly before a completely Chinese-made T-34-85 prototype was produced, OR just before trials of Chinese-made prototype T-34-85 were complete (evidence for which is lacking), OR just after a short production run of Chinese-made T-34-85s had been complete (evidence for which is certainly lacking). There is even a suggestion that ‘Type 58’ was to be the name for the indigenously produced T-34-85, but evidence for this is lacking. Whatever the case may be, once production of the T-54 (or more accurately, ‘Type 59’, as the locally-produced Chinese variant was known) began, Chinese production of the T-34-85 was abandoned and only replacement parts were made for their repair facilities.
Story Two
Another version of the story is thus (Source: Weibo):
The PRC began considering production of its own tanks in the years 1953-1954 but these were not fruitful experiments. As a result, the PRC decided, after long negotiations with the USSR, to produce the T-34-85 indigenously. It was expected that they would be able to fully produce the T-34-85 by 1956, with mass production able to commence by 1958. The PRC also began to assemble Soviet-produced spare parts, but into what is unclear seeing as though the USSR is unlikely to have supplied spare hulls.
In 1955, Plant 674 (a military factory in northeastern China) was able to fully overhaul T-34-85s. By 1956, the plant had produced the main components of the tank including the hull and turret. However, it became increasingly obvious that the T-34-85 was an obsolete design. From this, the PLA began to develop other designs based on the T-34-85 design. These, supposedly, include designs called the ‘T-34-1’, ‘T-34-2’, and ‘T-34-3’. Some redesigns of the turret and engine were proposed. However, these designs never left the drawing boards. These developments supposedly led to the ’59-16′ light tank (of which scale models existed, and possibly one full scale prototype), but development was scrapped when the USSR supplied the rights to produce the T-54A as license production, thus leading to the Type 59 MBT series.
Reality?
Whether these stories of the PRC producing T-34-85s are true or not remains a mystery. However, it is the author’s belief that sources with this story have, at best simply confused various true events, and at worst circulated pure rumors and inaccuracies. One could argue that the story of Chinese T-34-85 production has too many variations and inconsistencies between sources to be true – for example, there is dispute over whether a T-34-85 prototype was nearly produced, produced and partially trialed, or whether a short production run of T-34-85s was made. Nonetheless, it is the author’s belief that some reality can be salvaged.
Factory 674
It is certain that the Chinese wanted repair facilities for the T-34-85, and it is known that major repair centres were set up in Beijing, Baotou (in Inner Mongolia, where the Type 59 was later produced), and Plant 674 at Harbin (as referred to in Story Two) is also real. According to Engineering Communist China: One Man’s Story By Youli Sun and Dan Ling, in 1952, Harbin First Machinery Factory (Factory 674) (Heilongjiang Province, northeastern China) was organised to produce tanks (probably T-34-85s), with 3000 workers employed in the complex. Thirty Soviet Russian advisors, some ranking as high as Colonel (Polkovnik), were also stationed there and helped run the workshops on a day to day basis. They were apparently very arrogant, constantly chasing after Russian women in the town, and were much envied by locals. Despite being intended to produce tanks, all that the factory did at that time was repair T-34s damaged in Korea. The damage often concerned repairing large holes in the glacis plate. The Chinese workers at this factory sometimes only had two hours of sleep and worked overtime frequently, with tanks coming in and out at night, but did so willingly because they genuinely believed that they were building a new socialist society that would bring them prosperity. By contrast, Soviet advisors at the plant only worked eight hour shifts, which one worker believed was because they had already achieved communism in the USSR.
Repairs with Spares or Local Production?
These repair facilities would have needed spare parts to function. It is known that the USSR supplied most of these parts, although it is reported by Weibo, and proven through photographic evidence that some parts, such as radios, were locally produced. However, it is unclear just how many types of parts were produced locally. For full repairs, parts including replacement tracks, engines, lights, electronics, gearboxes, and so on, would need to be produced. This is close indigenous production of the T-34-85 but is, of course, not the same thing.
It is highly plausible that the production of these parts began as early as 1956, seeing as though some tanks would have been in service for over six years and would need replacements, especially those damaged in Korea. It is also likely that it took until 1956 or 1957 for all to be ready, seeing as though Chinese industry needed rebuilding after the civil war – something which took time. Thus, it is perfectly plausible that the PRC began producing its own replacement parts for the T-34-85. Thus, it is very believable, almost certainly true, that the PRC produced all kinds of its own spare parts for T-34-85s.
However, the question remains as to whether the PRC actually produced, or began consdering production of the T-34-85. These are separate points which must be dealt with.
Story Two is fairly plausible regarding the former, but only up to a certain point. Again, despite the PRC’s leadership being aware of the T-34-85 being outdated, it was, indeed, their best option for production. Local Chinese designs had, if they existed (see Sidenote II below), fallen flat. The difficulty with Story Two is that it refers to designs such as the ‘T-34-1’, ‘T-34-2’, and ‘T-34-3’ and accepts their historicity uncritically. If these are the designs presented in infamous videogame, World of Tanks, this detail can be immediately dismissed (see Sidenote II). In fact, the source makes many claims which are now widely rejected (see Sidenote V below). The result is that it is difficult to accept any assertion made in the story without corroborating evidence (such as contemporary photographs). Nonetheless, it is plausible that the PRC had locally produced a prototype hull and turret, but this remains to be proven by photographic or literary (such as an army document) evidence.
There are three key reasons to doubt the PRC ever produced a full T-34-85:
Most sources, both western and Chinese, suggest that an agreement with the USSR was made as early as 1956 to produce the T-54 in the PRC. The first batch of these ‘Type 59s’ was delivered in 1958 using Soviet-supplied kits, and was accepted into service in 1959, hence the designation ‘Type 59’. Thus, it makes no sense for any work on full-scale T-34-85 production to take place in the PRC as late as 1957. Whether the PRC intended to produce the T-34-85 back in 1954 or 1955 remains unclear, but plausible. If any work on the T-34-85 was taking place by 1958, it must have been stopped in favor of Type 59 assembly and production.
Yuri Pasholok, a famous Russian tank historian, reports that all the ‘Type 58s’ and T-34-85s he studied whilst in the PRC had Soviet serial numbers.
Stories of Chinese T-34-85 production proliferated in the post-World of Tanks era, which is a video-game full of historical inaccuracies. (See Sidenote II below).
Therefore, without further evidence, the story of Chinese T-34-85 production (beyond major overhauls using some indigenously produced designs) is perhaps best regarded as nothing more than a rumor until more evidence can be found. Nonetheless, the following is a reconstructed history of Chinese T-34-85 production:
Chinese T-34-85 Production: The Likely Story
At some point around 1952, the PRC had begun experimenting with its own tank production. The PLA had created its own armored cars during the Civil War, and there is some tentative evidence to suggest tank production was considered in the years following the Civil War. When these projects fell flat, the PRC decided, sometime around 1952 and 1954, that it would be best to produce its own T-34-85s. This was for a variety of reasons such as the sheer cost of Soviet imports, and the desire to be self-sufficient (as the Sino-Soviet relationship was largely expedient, and the two only had a veneer of ideological unity). The USSR agreed to allow the PRC to begin license production of the T-34-85, seeing as though they were producing more modern vehicles such as the T-54 MBT. It was thought that the PRC could produce their first prototype T-34-85 by 1956, and begin mass production by 1958.
However, production was plagued by teething problems. Whilst the PRC is likely to have produced parts such as tracks, wheels, and other smaller components at Factory 674 by 1956 it is unclear if they actually produced a turret and hull (although highly possible that they did). Factory 674, nonetheless, remained the most important repair station for T-34-85s, and chiefly made repairs using Soviet-supplied parts. However, all this progress was quickly dashed because in 1956, the PRC had reached an agreement with the USSR to produce the T-54 MBT, starting with assembly of Soviet parts (rather like kits), with a gradual shift towards indigenous production as the Type 59.
T-34-85s were repaired in the PRC even after the Type 59 entered production because the PRC did not produce enough modern MBTs or light tanks (such as the Type 62 light tank, starting officially from 1962, with prototyping taking place from 1958) to fully replace the T-34-85. The Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960s meant that the PRC no longer received Soviet-made spare parts and therefore, some components from the Type 59 and Type 62 are believed to have been used for repairs. This is likely where the idea of Chinese T-34-85s being given new diesel engines comes from, seeing as though the Type 62’s 12150L-3 V-12 was a diesel engine, although the use of this engine on T-34-85s is not confirmed.
The so-called ‘Type 58’ was a totally separate upgrade, to which this article now turns.
‘Type 58’ Upgrade Package
Photographic evidence clearly shows that Chinese T-34-85s were fitted with an upgrade package, perhaps beginning in 1958, although the exact date cannot be ascertained. In any case, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, this package, widely known as the ‘Type 58’, became increasingly common. The difficulty with understanding this upgrade is that no official military documents are available to corroborate stories told in Chinese internet sources, and it is difficult to discern what exactly the package consisted of, seeing as though period photos are too few and not detailed enough to show characteristics. It is also clear that some other upgrades took place on a local scale, meaning that these, too, must be separate from the ‘Type 58’ design. To complicate matters further, many ‘Type 58s’ in Chinese museums today have been modified and often inaccurately restored for display purposes, which means that some technical details are not original.
In any case, ‘Type 58’ does not refer to Chinese-produced T-34-85s because, as related above, such tanks did not exist.
Design Features
Photographic evidence suggests that this ‘Type 58’ package consisted of:
A hard point for stowing a Type 54 12.7mm machine gun, always on the right cheek of the turret, which appears to be a copy of the stowage mount as seen on the rear of the T-54 and Type 59 turret. The machine guns would be covered with a canvas for foul weather. The machine gun, when stowed, would face the rear.
A distinctive second ‘cupola’ in place of the original loader’s hatch. The original hatch was removed and a simple steel cylinder fitted over the hatch hole. Some of these cupolas had crudely made vision slits (apparently without optics or even simple glass) although others did not feature vision slits (meaning these are more accurately described as ‘superstructures’). On top was a crude hatch door, and a mount for a Type 54 machine gun, apparently a copy of the T-54’s mount. Some ‘Type 58s’ also had a small ‘V’ shape (as viewed from above) piece of metal welded at the front, connecting both cupolas, but not all have this feature.
A new rear transmission-rear hull plate hinge system. This was an exterior rod type, and essentially strengthened the joint when opening the rear of the tank for inspection, making it superior to the stock factory hinge system. Chinese SU-100s and T-34-based ARVs were also given this upgrade. However, the reader should note well that some seemingly non-upgraded T-34-85s (IE, non-‘Type 58s’) feature this hinge system also, possibly meaning that this hinge system was a separate but equally as popular upgrade. However, there do not appear to be any ‘Type 58s’ without the hinge system, casting doubts onto such a conclusion.
‘Type 58’ turret detail, showing the new 12.7mm Type 54 stowage hardpoints. The ‘8-1’ star was not often painted on this side of the turret, and the small size indicates it to be an inaccurate museum addition. Source: ‘T-34 Interest Group’ on Facebook.
‘Type 58’, with the new rear hinge detail. The exhaust pipes have been cut short, likely by museum staff. Source: chinesearmory.blogspot
Some internet sources also suggest that the ‘Type 58’ package included a new Chinese-produced diesel engine, but this cannot be confirmed. As related above, this is likely the result of using Type 62 parts to repair T-34-85s. Furthermore, it is reported that the ‘Type 58’ package included a new belly escape hatch, but photographic evidence for this is lacking.
There are other details which may have been included in the package, but are either internal (and therefore not noticeable with current photographic evidence) or are difficult to discern from inaccurate museum restorations. These features include: new optics (chiefly headlamps), removed Type 54 stowage hardpoints, new fenders, new fuel tanks, new or non-standard handrails, removed engine covers, and so on. Most of these changes appear to be museum conversions, but due to the mysterious nature of the package, not everything should be taken as totally confirmed. Local repairs, upgrades, and modifications to the T-34-85, likely taking place on a regional level are a certainty.
History
As explained above, the history of the package is incredibly sketchy. According to Weibo, the Jinan Military Region is believed to have been the first region to upgrade T-34-85s with the so-called ‘Type 58’ package. The reason was simple – it was felt that the vehicle needed greater anti-aircraft protection. As a result, work began to install a mount for a 12.7mm machine gun on a new cupola. The machine gun chosen was an upgraded version of the Type 54 featuring a set of high-altitude sights known as the Type 58 (although this remains unconfirmed). Is is believed by Weibo that this is where the unofficial name ‘Type 58’ comes from for upgraded T-34-85s, but others suggest that it is because the package was created in 1958. (See Sidenote I below).
What is believed to be an example of the ‘Type 58 12.7mm machine gun’, albeit in an infantry-use mount. Source: sadefensejournal.com
Only around forty or fifty T-34-85s in Jinan were upgraded with the package, but it is obvious that countless more T-34-85s, the majority of them outside Jinan, were upgraded, too. Weibo reports, and the author is inclined to agree, that the ‘Type 58’ package was copied over time by other military regions, perhaps taking place over a long time between the 1950s and 1970s. This accounts for many slight differences in the package, such as the style of hinges used, the cupola’s crudeness (some had vision blocks, others did not), and the use of joining plates on the cupolas on some but not all examples. This also accounts for the existence of some non-upgraded T-34-85s in the PRC in the 1960s and even preserved in museums today.
Operational History
1950 – 1966
Some question why no ‘Type 58’ was ever recorded or photographed as part of offensive units operating during the Korean War. The simple and straightforward answer is that they did not exist at this time. Many T-34-85s were fielded by the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (PVA), along with reports suggesting that SU-76s, and even IS-2s were fielded (the latter almost certainly did not see combat). The story of T-34-85 ‘215’ is, of course, mythical, and on par with CCP myths such as ‘Gongchen Tank’, or ‘Comrade Lei Feng’.
Regardless, by sheer numbers, the T-34-85 formed the bulk of the Chinese armored divisions until being replaced over time by the newly-built Type 59s and Type 62s starting from the 1960s. However, this was a process which took thirty years.
1966 – 1980
Photographic evidence seems to suggest that the ‘Type 58’ was gradually phased out, especially from the 1970s and were used instead as gate guardians, training vehicles, and in other lesser roles. This is likely due to the replacement of T-34-85s with Type 59s and Type 62s. However, it also reported that the ‘Type 58’ could not return to repair facilities at Baotou due to the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 (although no more specific reason is given), which might contribute to the abandonment of stocks of T-34-85s.
According to Weibo, during the 1960s the PLA transferred many of its WWII-era vehicles for militia anti-tank training purposes, and such efforts were accelerated in 1969 as a result of the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict. Despite this, dummy tanks – of varying quality (some were made from mud, some from scrap metal, some from real tank wrecks, and some were real tanks) – were more common for training purposes.
A Chinese anti-tank training booklet dated to 1965. Source: Weibo.
Whilst it is believed that the ‘Type 58’ never saw combat, although T-34-85s (or, possibly, ‘Type 58s’) were reportedly issued to the Tank Regiment attached to the 54th Army Corps (likely the 11th Armored Brigade) during the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). However, these T-34-85s are not believed to have seen active combat during the war. Weibo reports that the unit was the only unit equipped with T-34-85s at that time, but such a detail is unlikely.
1980 – 1990
In the 1980s, the PRC’s economy had significantly improved and it was able to produce more MBTs to replace the T-34-85. Weibo reports that in 1981, the 28th Army conducted exercises in Yuncheng, Shanxi Province, simulating a Soviet attack on the area. This exercise prompted major reforms of the PLA, with a desire for infantry fighting vehicles, gunship helicopters, and the need to retire older vehicles such as the T-34-85. As a result, most T-34-85s and SU-100s were retired shortly after.
The fate of a retired T-34-85 or ‘Type 58’ was one of the following:
Sent to a museum or memorial.
Cannibalised for parts for the few T-34-85s which remained in service.
Test vehicles for new technologies such as an automatic fire extinguisher, laser ranging devices, and night vision sights. The latter features would be used on the Type 69 MBT.
Sent to scrapyards and destroyed.
Abandoned on the spot.
Note that this T-34-85 (or ‘Type 58’) apparently was used to test laser sights, which can be seen above the gun barrel. Source: Weibo.
According to Weibo, in the 1980s, some T-34-85s belonging to the marines were placed on shore defence duties until they were replaced with the Type 59. These were likely the last T-34-85s in active service, although some sources report that the last to be retired were stationed on the Sino-Russian border.
1990 – Present Day
In May 1987, the so-called Black Dragon Wildfire broke out in the Greater Khinghan Range. This was the largest wildfire to hit China in over three-hundred years, and the flames spread into the USSR. A drought had caused dry vegetation around the Amur River, and due to a sparse population, the flames were left to spread at first, and Chinese reports suggest that the fire was caused by a careless worker who spilt oil from a brush cutter. Conventional firefighting vehicles could not be used to enter the area because the fire was so immense that the oxygen supply in the air was cut off, and burning projectiles were raining down across roads. Weibo repots that as a result, the Shenyang Military Region gave firefighters twenty T-34-85s, and water cannons were added to them in place of their main guns.
However, according to the Liaoshen evening news, the idea came later in 1994 from firefighting engineer and captain of Shenyang Firefighting Squadron (1969-1983), Chen Songhe. Chen was inspired by a chemical fire in the 1970s, saying:
“Once, a truck full of gas tanks was on fire, and two gas tanks exploded in the air. The heat radiation [forced] the firefighters to slam [onto] the ground. I saw with my own eyes that the fragments of the cylinder that exploded later would flatten trees more than three meters high [up to] twenty or thirty meters away. While fighting the oil fires, the firefighters generally could only stand outside the danger [zone] because of their outdated equipment. [However,] If a tank rushes into the sea of fire, you are not afraid.”
In 1994, Chen obtained permission for the project and went to a tank repair centre in Shijiazhuang (Heibei Province) where he found many old T-34-85s. The T-34-85 in the best condition was chosen, and testing showed that even this old vehicle could still reach 60 km/h. The vehicle was converted and tested by 1996. It features two 1.5m long water cannons, one 50mm and another 100mm in diameter, in place of the main gun. However, the tank did not have an internal water supply, so it had to have a support vehicle pump water into it. To control the worst effects of the heat, the tank tracks were sealed together, and water sprinkler systems were added to the side of the hulls in order to control the immediate outside temprature. A dozerblade was also added to the front of the tank to tackle obstacles and push down walls. Since then, more firefighting tanks have been built using more modern chassis such as the Type 69.
Another view of Chen Songhe’s firefighting T-34-85. Source: Liaoshen Evening News.
Some T-34-85s participated in flood fighting operations in the June-September floods. These were later handed over to Heilongjiang province and were replaced with Type 63 and Type 62-based firefighting vehicles. Some bulldozer conversions were reportedly used both militarily and commercially for construction projects.
The ‘Type 58’ and the remaining few T-34-85s are believed to have only been totally retired in the 1990s, when some were still stationed along the Soviet (later, Russian) border.
T-34-85s or ‘Type 58s’ being used in 2016 as target practice by the airforce for guided missiles. Source: Weibo.
Conclusions
The ‘Type 58’ appears to be nothing more than a fairly standardized upgrade package applied to most of the PLA’s Soviet-supplied T-34-85s. It probably originated shortly after the Type 59 entered production as a local upgrade which was copied by most regions operating the T-34-85. There is no concrete evidence to suggest that the PLA started work on producing the T-34-85 indigenously or any sort of copy or variant based on the chassis save for their own unique version of the SU-100T and the flamethrower-carrying prototype. Whilst many Chinese T-34-85s saw combat in the Korean War, the so-called ‘Type 58′ never saw combat and was likely retired by no later than the early 1990s, having mostly been in lesser roles for years. Evidence on the T-34-85 and ‘Type 58’s’ history in the PRC is scant, and many sources make dubious claims. Nonetheless, some historical fact can be tentatively pieced together.
‘Type 58’ ‘404’ in the Beijing Tank Museum. To its right is a Type 59, followed by two M3A3 Stuarts. Source: ‘T-34 Interest Group’ on Facebook.
Different view of the above. Source: ‘T-34 Interest Group’ on Facebook.
Chinese T-34-85s on a parade to mark the one year anniversary of the founding of the PRC, 1st October 1950. Source: Wikipedia
A mixture of Chinese tanks, unknown location. On the right is a ‘Type 58’, as discerned by the new ‘cupola’, but the tank on the far left is a T-34-85, as discerned by the lack of cupola and DShK stowage hardpoints. Source: chinesearmory.blogspot
‘Type 58’ cupola detail. This type does not feature vision slits in the new cupola (left), but does feature a ‘V’ shaped piece of armor connecting the two. Source: ‘T-34 Interest Group’ on Facebook.
A supposed ‘T-34-85’ at the Korean War Museum in Dandong, Liaoning Province. In reality, the museum has taken a ‘Type 58’ and reconverted it to look like a Korean War era T-34-85 by removing the new cupola and the turret DShK hardpoints. Tellingly, the upgraded torsion bar hatch has been kept on the engine access hatch. Source: ‘T-34 Interest Group’ on Facebook.
T-34-based ARV in the Beijing Tank Museum. Although not visible in this photo, the engine access hatch also had the improved torsion bar hinge system. Source: net-maquettes.com
T-34-85s, SU-76s, and a Type 62 in Nankou, 1964. Note that these vehicles appear to show no upgrades, thus suggesting that the ‘Type 58’ was, indeed, a local upgrade which spread out to other regions of the PRC over time. Note well that these vehicles have been fairly well-maintained, as discerned from the fresh coats of paint.
Most T-34-85s and ‘Type 58s’ had three-digit tactical markings in white, but these tanks from a women’s battalion in 1952 have four-digit ones. It is also noted that T-34-85s belonging to the marines had ‘H’ followed by a three-digit number. Source: Weibo.
A ‘Type 58’ with a 12.7mm machine gun stowed in the turret and tarp deployed to protect the machine guns. To see a machine gun stowed on a ‘Type 58’ is quite rare. Source: Weibo.
Splashboard Upgrade?
It is reported by Weibo that after the Korean War, many Chinese T-34-85s were damaged and needed major overhauls. From 1952, Plant 674 began organising their repairs using imported Soviet-made parts. By spring 1956, the factory began organising local production of the T-34-85 (supposedly – see earlier comments) and began to modify the design based on combat experience and Soviet consultancy.
One particular issue to be dealt with was adding a splashboard to protect the driver and DT machine gun from mud and water. This was essentially a thin strip of metal held in place by two mounts below the DT mount and driver’s hatch, but above the spare track fasteners.
It is reported that all T-34-85s in the PRC had this upgrade, but this does not appear to be the case. Only T-34-85s on the 1955 National Day Parade can be seen with this feature, so if true, it is likely that only T-34-85s of the Beijing military region were upgraded with this feature.
Another, more complicated difficulty with this assertion is that the addition of a splashboard was a standard Soviet post-war production feature as proven by photographic evidence. However, Soviet production ended in 1946, long before the addition of splashboards to the PRC’s tanks was raised, so one can rule out the splashboard development being a joint PRC-USSR development. Furthermore, whilst Soviet splashboards varied from tank to tank (indicating local, not national upgrades), none of the examples on Chinese T-34-85s look different from ones seen on Soviet T-34-85s.
Therefore, on the balance of evidence, one can rule out the idea that the Chinese upgraded all of their T-34-85s with a new splashboard design. The difficulty is working out if all of this story about splashboard upgrades is untrue or not. Additionally, this conclusion only casts more doubt on the validity of Weibo’s other claims.
Chinese T-34-85s on parade in Tiananmen Square in 1955. Note that all of these have splashboards, and are also a mixture of factory subtypes, as discerned from the turrets. Source: Weibo.
Exhaust System Changes
One serious problem with the T-34-85 is that owing to the Sino-Soviet Split, the PRC was unable to receive spare parts for repairs for the vehicle. The air filter and exhaust systems were in dire need of replacing by the mid-1960s. One problem was that the fighting compartment would fill with exhaust gases meaning that the crew would suffer from carbon monoxide poisoning. Another was that water would enter the tank, especially when fording rivers or other water obstacles.
According to Weibo, the Nanjing Military Region hit upon a crude but effective solution. The original exhaust system was removed entirely, welded over, and replaced with a new system at the top of the engine deck extending from the cooling grills. They also installed a set of water-fording equipment.
In 1967, one vehicle was successfully tested with this design, so by 1968 all their ‘Type 58s’ (and likely other T-34-based vehicles) had been modified. However, in September 1969, the region was transferred a batch of Type 62s, so their Type 58s were transferred to Wuhan.
This exhaust upgrade was apparently quite rare, with only a handful of examples of the type known to exist today. The design has also been seen on at least two SU-100s and an ARV T-34 at the Beijing Tank Museum.
A ‘Type 58’ with the replacement exhaust system. Source: Weibo.
SU-100 at the Beijing Tank Museum with the exhaust upgrade and the new torsion bar hinge system.
Sidenote I: ‘Type 58’ name
There is a debate as to whether the designation ‘Type 58’ is an unofficial name or not. Modern Chinese sources only use the name ‘T-34-85’ and state that it is difficult to declare with certainty that ‘Type 58’ was ever officially used. One source reports that the name came from the 12.7mm Type 54 machine gun being upgraded in the late 1950s to feature high-altitude sights, with such upgraded models being known as ‘Type 58’ (although this is unconfirmed), and these were installed as part of the ‘Type 58’ package. Other sources say that the name comes from the package being created in 1958. Others, still, suggest that it is because the T-34-85 was intended to be locally produced in the PRC in 1958.
Without any firm conclusion on the origin, if only for the sake of differentiation, tanks with the upgrade package will be referred to as ‘Type 58’, and those without as ‘T-34-85’.
Sidenote II: Supposed Chinese Variants
The video-game, World of Tanks, is infamous for featuring fake tanks and designs which have had serious creative liberties taken. Seeing as though the PRC is a major market for the game, Wargaming (the creators of World of Tanks) contracted a client company, Kongzhong, to do ‘historical research’ for them to help create tanks to put into the game. Unfortunately, it appears as though Kongzhong have invented many tanks for the game, some of which were based on the T-34 design.
It should be made clear that there is no evidence for the PRC ever experimenting with T-34-based designs such as the so-called ‘T-34-1’. With regards to the ‘T-34-1’, World of Tanks gives a very inconsistent historical synopsis:
“In 1954, the Chinese government considered the possibility of launching production of the T-34-85 in China. At the same time, Chinese engineers proposed an alternative project: the T-34-1. While based on the T-34-85, the T-34-1’s transmission compartment and suspension were to be rearranged, reducing the overall weight and lowering the hull. In 1954, several designs of the vehicle, with varying turrets and armament, were developed. However, a prototype was never built.”
Such a design is ludicrous because it would be impossible to lower the silhouette of the T-34-85 without giving it a much smaller engine. However, World of Tanks suggest it featured a Type 12150L engine (a copy of the T-54 engine), the same engine as used on the Type 59 – not only a much larger tank, but one which was produced four years later in 1958 – thus making the design impossible. The suggestion of a design featuring a Type 62-like turret as early as 1954 is also ludicrous.
It is likely that the so-called ‘T-34-1’ design was inspired by an inaccurate identification or training drawing which attempts to depict a T-34-85 but is squatter than in reality.
Sidenote III: The ‘Chinese OT-34-85’
According to Weibo, in November 1955, to test the PLA’s combat capabilities, especially regarding amphibious landings, the PRC organised a field exercise at the Liaodong Peninsula. Here, it was found that one of the greatest weaknesses of the T-34-85 was its inability to deal effectively with bunkers. A Soviet adviser offered to sell the PRC OT-34-85s, but this was rejected by Defence Minister Peng Dehuai. Instead, the PLA developed its own design. This featured twelve TPO-50 flamethrowers, with six mounted either side of the turret in boxes. Whilst it is reported that it passed trials, the design seems to have been rejected and prototype remains in tact at Oriental Oasis Park in Shanghai to this day.
This story is the only reported explanation of this mysterious tank and the reader should be careful of this claim, as there is no evidence that this it is true. (See Sidenote V below).
The only example of the experimental Chinese ‘OT-34-85’. Note well that the searchlight cage on the right side of the hull is likely a feature from a restoration. Source: reddit.
T-34-85s at the Liaodong Peninsula exercices, 1955. Source: Weibo.
Sidenote IV: A Chinese-made SU-100T ARV
According to Weibo, when the USSR handed over the Lushun base to PLA control it left behind three SU-100T ARVs and these vehicles were very popular with the PLA. At the Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing stands an SU-100 which has been converted into an ARV. Special features include winches, a redesigned radio station, replacement of the periscopes, and a firing port for Type 56 submachine guns. This vehicle appears to be a unique Chinese conversion of an SU-100.
The locally-produced Chinese ‘SU-100T’. Note at the top right of the superstructure the two pistol ports for the Type 56 machine guns. Source: Weibo.
Sidenote V: The Weibo Article’s Plausibility
The article by Weibo relates some exceptionally useful details about the T-34-85 in the PRC, but it also relates some fantastical details, too. These are as follows:
The uncritical acceptance of the story of T-34-85 ‘215’ from the Korean War, which is widely regarded as a PLA myth.
The ‘Type 63/65 SPAAG’ is reported to be a Chinese design, despite the current consensus being that it was a local NVA upgrade.
The apparently false assertion of the splashboard upgrade being a Chinese design.
The possible uncritical acceptance of tanks presented in World of Tanks as historical.
The apparent false reporting on the Chen Songhe’s firefighting tank.
The result is that one must engage hypercritically with any claim made in the article. Where Weibo was the source of a claim, this has been clearly stated in the article. Some details it relays are quite plausible, if not likely.
Sidenote VI: Polish T-34-85s in the PRC
The PRC captured at least one (but possibly two) Polish T-34-85 during the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). The PLA never operated any Polish or Czechoslovak-built T-34-85s, however.
A Polish-built T-34-85M1 formerly operated by the NVA on display at the Tank Museum, Beijing. This was captured by the PLA during the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). Fittingly, it is on display next to T-62 “545”, which was captured by the PLA during the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict (1969). Source: Zack Vincent Sex via the ‘T-34 Interest Group’ on Facebook.
Sidenote VII: T-34-85 “215” in the Korean War
The PRC make quite bold claims about their use of armour during the Korean War. Perhaps the most famous story is of T-34-85 “215”, of which variations exist, but is generally as follows: T-34-85 “215” and two other T-34-85 belonging to the 2nd Tank Division of the 2nd Tank Regiment (of the PVA) were deployed along with elements of the 200th Infantry Regiment on 6th July 1953. Their task was to fortify positions on Hill 346.6 (known as 石砚洞北山 to the Chinese) against the advancing American 7th Infantry Division. Upon arriving at the hill on 7th July, the T-34-85s were tasked to find and destroy three M46 Patton tanks reported in the area. The T-34-85s took up ambush positions around the hill but unfortunately the Americans were able to hear their engines roar as they were approaching, thus ruining the element of surprise for the PVA. The Americans began to barrage the Chinese positions with artillery and as a result, “215” was inadvertently entrenched between two artillery craters and was unable to get out. The Chinese were met with a serious dilemma. Would they abandon the tank and lose a large part of their firepower or would they concentrate manpower on digging the tank out? In the end, the crew of “215” spent half the day attempting to dig the tank out with help from infantry but were unsuccessful. It was only until the day got dark when the crew gave up and instead decided to make do with their current situation by camouflaging the tank with mud and foliage. The following day, the Chinese began their assault and three American M46 Pattons appeared to fend off the Chinese infantry. Upon revealing themselves the Pattons immediately came under fire from “215”. At a range of approximately 1,450m, the first Patton was reported to have been taken out with a single armour piercing shot which caused an ammo rack explosion. The second Patton was seemingly also reported to have been taken out with a single shot at approximately the same range. The third Patton, however, was taking cover behind a hill which prevented “215” from hitting it. As such, “215” fired twelve high explosive rounds at the hill which exposed the Patton. A couple of these shells supposedly hit the Patton and crippled it. Having somehow not attracted any attention, “215” waited for night to fall, at which point it began revving its engine in such a manner as to make it sound as though the tank was reversing away. A PVA artillery unit then rescued “215” from the crater and the tank escaped down a road. At this point, “215” encountered another column of three Pattons. Cunningly, the crew waited in a nearby woods until the column was close, and then somehow stealthily joined the column as the second tank. “215” stayed with the column until the convoy reached a US checkpoint, at which point “215” destroyed the Patton behind it (thus trapping the rearmost Patton), chased down and destroyed the leading Patton, and also proceeded to destroy a number of US bunkers and supply lorries. “215” escaped and the crew were celebrated as heroes, with the tank still standing today in the Tank Museum, Beijing. Undoubtedly, this story is untrue because there are no records of these Pattons being lost at this stage of the war (although in a private conversation with the authors, Steven Zaloga advises that US records were poorly kept). In fact, the story fits in well with other CCP myths such as ‘Gongchen Tank’ and the more famous (although non-tank related) story of ‘Comrade Lei Feng’ and should therefore be dismissed as fake.
Chinese volunteers with T-34-85 ‘215’ during the Korean War. This tank was famous for having reportedly destroyed five UN tanks, nine artillery pieces, a command post, a staff car, and twenty-six bunkers. This story, however, is regarded as somewhat fantastical and a typical piece of PLA propaganda. Source: ‘T-34 Interest Group’ on Facebook.
Sidenote VIII: Camouflage and Markings of Chinese T-34-85s
Chinese T-34-85s and ‘Type 58s’ appear to have had mostly standardized markings.
The first T-34-85s in the PRC appear to have been repainted by the PLA into a dark green (darker than Soviet 4BO), and were given what appear to be large stickers or decals on the turrets (although it is difficult to tell, they may have been painted on. These consist of a red and yellow 8-1 star with a broken border, and a three-digit tactical number in white behind it. Later photos show for certain painted emblems and tactical markings. These were apparently the most common and perhaps even standard marking system throughout the operational history of T-34-85s and ‘Type 58s’. Some repainting of tanks must have taken place multiple times throughout their service lives, so some variation in colours, dimensions of markings, and marking systems are certain. However, one must be cautious when using examples of T-34-85s or ‘Type 58s’ in museums as being painted in accurate military markings, as it is clear that many have been repainted by museums.
Most ‘Type 58s’ do not appear to have the 8-1 star painted onto the side with the machine gun stowage hard points, but some examples do. Chinese PVA T-34-85s in the Korean War did not have any 8-1 stars at all.
Some variation on the white three-digit marking system is noted. For example, a photograph, reproduced above, shows a T-34-85 in 1952 with a four-digit white tactical marking. ‘Type 58s’ belonging to the Marines had no 8-1 star, but had a white H preceding the three-digit tactical marking.
Some examples exist of T-34-85s and ‘Type 58s’ with no markings on them at all well until the 1960s and 1970s.
It is believed three-tone camouflage schemes seen on a few T-34-85s and ‘Type 58s’ were painted on after their retirement, especially ones used as museum exhibits or gate guardians. Such a three-tone scheme matches ones used by the PLA on its Japanese tanks during the 1949 founding of the PRC parade, and on other tanks such as the Type 59.
‘Type 58s’ of the Chinese Marines, circa 1980s. Note the tactical markings. Source: Weibo.
Additional Photographs
‘Type 58s’ which had been used for construction projects. Note that the vehicle in the foreground has been converted into a bulldozer. Source: Weibo.
Sources
“The Tank Division of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 1945-1949” by Zhang Zhiwei.
“Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950” by Odd Arne Westad
“Tuo Mao: the Operational History of the People’s Liberation Army“, PhD dissertation by Martin Andrew, submitted to Bond University, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 2008. Tieda.baidu.com Liaoshen Evening News weibo.com
The author also extends his tanks to the members of the ‘T-34 Interest Group’ on Facebook for their discussions with the author on the T-34-85 in the PRC and the ‘Type 58’, especially Francis Pulham, Tim Roberts, Yuri Pasholok, and Saúl García. Article originally published on 9th November 2014, rewritten by Will Kerrs on 3rd February 2019.
Type 58 illustration by Jaycee ‘Amazing Ace’ Davis, paid for by our Patreon campaign.
T-34 Shock: The Soviet Legend in Pictures by Francis Pulham and Will Kerrs
‘T-34 Shock: The Soviet Legend in Pictures’ is the latest must have book on the T-34 tank. The book was authored by Francis Pulham and Will Kerrs, two veterans of Tank Encyclopedia. ‘T-34 Shock’ is the epic story of the T-34’s journey from humble prototype to so-called ‘war-winning legend’. Despite the tank’s fame, little has been written about its design changes. While most tank enthusiasts can differentiate between the ‘T-34/76’ and the ‘T-34-85’, identifying different factory production batches has proven more elusive. Until now.
‘T-34 Shock’ contains 614 photographs, 48 technical drawings, and 28 color plates. The book begins with the antecedents of the T-34, the ill-fated BT ‘fast tank’ series, and the influence of the traumatic Spanish Civil War before moving to an in-depth look at the T-34’s prototypes. After this, every factory production change is cataloged and contextualized, with never-before-seen photographs and stunning technical drawings. Furthermore, four battle stories are also integrated to explain the changing battle context when major production changes take place. The production story is completed with sections on the T-34’s postwar production (and modification) by Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the People’s Republic of China, as well as T-34 variants.
The book price is a very reasonable £40 ($55) for 560 pages, 135,000 words, and of course, the 614 never-before-seen photographs from the author’s personal photograph collection. The book will be a superb tool for both the modeler and the tank nut alike! Do not miss this epic book, available from Amazon.com and all military book stores! Buy this book on Amazon!
Throughout the Second World War, the German Army captured hundreds of tanks and armored vehicles from countries it invaded. The same was true during the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Germans frequently made upgrades and modifications to fit their needs. This process spawned one of the larger armored vehicle enigmas to come out of the War.
This was the KV-1 that was captured and then re-armed with the 7.5cm KwK 40 gun. Not much is known about the history of this improvisation, and there is only one known photo to prove its existence.
It is not the only tank of the Second World War that was retrofitted in the field to accept a gun from another nation. Other examples include the Churchill NA 75 which was a British Churchill tank modified to accept the American 75mm Tank Gun and the Matilda II that was modified to accept the 76mm ZiS-5 gun. In both of these cases, of course, they were not captured vehicles.
The only known image of the modified KV-1.
Background, the KV-1
The KV-1 was the unsuspecting winner of a Soviet contract for a new heavy tank to replace the obsolete T-35A Multi Turreted Heavy Tank. The KV tank beat the SMK and T-100 to make it to mass production. Immediately prior to the invasion of the USSR in June 1941, roughly 508 KV-1 tanks were in Red Army service.
The KV-1 was an unpleasant surprise to the advancing Germans in June 1941, due to its excellent armor protection. The KV-1 quickly gained a fearsome reputation on the battlefield, being able to withstand point-blank shots from the standard 37mm anti tank guns fielded by Germany. Many KV-1s returned from combat peppered with dents and gouges from ricochets which had failed to penetrate its armor. However, the KV-1s made little impact on the actual fighting during the months of Operation Barbarossa with the exception of a small number of engagements. Poor crew training, poor logistical support and inept command and control meant that the Soviet tanks, including the mighty KV-1, where deployed in small packets that were easily swallowed and terminated by the better organized German units.
The KV-1 tank weighed 45 tonnes, and was powered by the 660hp V2K engine. The suspension was the first Soviet use of torsion bars, and it consisted of six road wheels, a rear drive wheel, a large front idler wheel and three return rollers. The tank had a crew of five. Soviet engineers constantly updated the tank and, between 1941 and 1942, the armor was thickened from 90mm to 200mm in places. The firepower was improved too, from the 30.2 calibre long F-32 76.2mm gun, to the 42.5 calibre long 76.2mm Zis-5 gun. The F-32 gun could penetrate 50mm of armor at 1,000m, whereas the Zis-5 gun could penetrate 60mm of armor at the same range. In 1942, this made the gun a significant threat to most German tanks. However, the gun was similar to the one on the T-34 medium tank, which was far more mobile and far cheaper to build.
KVs in German Service
When the Wehrmacht first encountered the KV-1, they were horrified and greatly impressed with its capability to take extreme punishment from the main German tank and anti-tank guns of the time. Contrary to popular belief, there were only a handful of KV-1 tanks that were ever pressed into German service. The captured tanks were known as ‘Beutepanzer’ or trophy tanks.
In 1941, the Germans had a categorizing system for those units captured from the enemy, this was an “Ebeuten” number. The number for KV tanks of all sub-types was “E I”. The overwhelming majority of these tanks were either dismantled at the roadside, or returned to the Reich for museums or testing. However, there were some KV tanks pressed into Wehrmacht service.
Beutepanzer KV-1 ‘1’ of the of the 8th Panzer Division. Photo: SOURCE
The earliest known Beutepanzer KV-1s, which in the German numbering system were known as the Pz.Kpfw KV-1A 753(r) (r = Russia) were deployed in the Autumn of 1941. German changes were minimal, with most Beutepanzer KV-1s retaining the original Soviet radio and equipment, however, occasionally German radios and tool sets were issued. The most interesting German acquisitions were the two OKV-1 tanks pressed into service. The Kirov works in Leningrad had manufactured six prototype flame throwing KV tanks, with a flame unit in the hull. All were used in combat, and two were subsequently pressed into Wehrmacht service after their capture.
Between 1941 and 1943, the German army likely dealt with thousands of lost KV tanks, of which perhaps several hundred were captured in working condition. It is thought however that less than 50 KV-1 tanks were pressed into German service. A multitude of factors can explain this, from lack of spare parts, to German overconfidence in their own tanks, to the Nazi ideological doctrine that viewed anything manufactured by a Slavic race to be inferior.
German Modification
The specific model of KV-1 that this conversion was based upon was a 1942 model, manufactured at Factory 100 Chelyabinsk (ChTZ) and was probably manufactured in the first or second quarter of 1942. It was fitted with the applique armor on the nose, and on the glacis plate which increased the armor up to 200mm (7.9 in) thick in places. It was equipped with the lightweight cast turret. Sometimes, this model also carried a heavyweight cast, or simplified welded turret. Standard armament remained the same, being the 76mm ZiS-5 gun. In German service, this was designated as the Pz.Kpfw KV-1B 755(r). This modified version was designated Pz.Kpfw KV-1B 756(r). The construction work was carried out by the maintenance battalion of Panzer Regiment 204 of the 22nd Panzer Division.
Gun
The most drastic modification to this single KV was the alteration made to the main armament. The original Soviet 76mm ZiS-5 gun was removed to make way for the German’s own 7.5cm KwK 40 L/43.
Diagram of the L/43 gun in its standard mounting, the Panzer IV
This gun was derived from the 7.5cm PaK 40, a towed anti-tank gun that entered service in 1942. In 1942-43, the gun was also mounted on Germany’s main medium tank, the Panzerkampfwagen IV, replacing the short barreled 7.5cm KwK 37 howitzer. Tanks with this new armament were designated as the Panzer IV Ausf.F2. It was a deadly weapon, with a range of ammunition types. These included Armour Piercing Capped Ballistic Cap (APCBC), Armor-Piercing Composite Rigid (APCR) and High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT). The APCBC was its most deadly round, able to penetrate a maximum of 99mm (3.9 in) of armor.
At this time, the 7.5cm KwK L/43 was a rare gun, as only 135 Panzers were equipped with it. One these tanks must have been irreparably damaged in action, but retained an operable gun that was able to be cannibalized. Though the ZiS gun was removed, the mantlet was retained. The new gun was posted through the void breach first and mounted into position, complete with its coaxial MG 34 machine gun. It is unknown as to what internal modifications took place concerning the placement of the trunnions and elevation/depression gears. Being the more powerful gun, the KwK 40 was larger in the breach than the ZiS. The 7.5cm shell was 100mm longer than the 76mm shell of the ZiS, meaning the breach was also 100mm longer. Recoil length would also have been longer, meaning there was even less room behind the gun.
Turret Changes
Minor modifications were also made to the turret. A salvaged commander’s cupola from either a Panzer III or Panzer IV (It is unclear which one it is) was added atop the turret. This was not added over the original commander’s hatch at the rear of the turret. A new hole was cut in the roof towards the right front of the turret, and the cupola added above it. This cupola gave the commander far better visibility, allowing him to spot targets, navigate terrain and observe friendly units easier.
On the left, an air filter was added, with a cover salvaged from a T-34.
But, Why?
A great deal of time was spent theorizing this matter by both authors of this article. The conversion of just this one vehicle would have been time and resource consuming. Other vehicles that were modified in such a way, such as the Churchill NA 75 and Matilda II with ZiS-5 which are mentioned in the introduction, had a designed purpose. The idea behind the Churchill NA 75 was to make use of guns from wrecked tanks, and give the poorly armed Churchill more Anti-Armor and High-Explosive firepower. The same was true for the Matilda, the original 2-Pounder gun of which was considered useless by the Soviets.
This KV, however, seems to lack any recorded intention. The German 7.5cm KwK 40 was a much better gun than the Soviet ZiS-5 76mm. At 1000 meters, the ZiS could only penetrate 61mm of armor, at the same distance, the 7.5cm could punch through 82mm. Ammunition may also have been a factor, as it would’ve been far easier for the Germans to resupply with 7.5cm ammunition than 76mm ammunition.
These are the only practical advantages of adding this gun to the KV. The KV, at this time, was one of the best heavy tanks in the war, and as already discussed, the Germans already had a number of captured examples in their arsenal. It may be that this was intended as somewhat of an ‘Anti-KV’ or ‘Anti-T-34’ vehicle. The Soviets’ own 76mm Gun could not penetrate the front of a standard KV-1 (without 200mm armor) or T-34 at 1000m. The German 7.5cm could handle both. Putting this gun on a chassis the 76mm could not penetrate would prove deadly to any Soviet vehicle facing it.
There is, however, an element of redundancy in the project worth highlighting. At the time this vehicle was built, German vehicles such as the Panzer IV (with long 75mm), Panzer V Panther, Panzer VI Tiger, and Panzerjager Tiger (P) were appearing. All of these, while still teething, were adequately armed so that the armor on the T-34 and KV-1 did not provide the advantage they had. With the 8.8cm gun or high velocity 7.5cm gun both the T34 and KV-1 were much more vulnerable.
The most logical conclusion as to why this KV was modified in this way is therefore that it was simply a culmination of spare parts and ingenuity.
This KV was apparently active at Kursk, but further details of this are scarce.
Kingdom of Romania (1942)
Light Tank – Proposal Only
Throughout World War II, the Kingdom of Romania captured various vehicles from their enemies, especially from the Soviet Union on the Eastern Front. These armored vehicles were either used in combat, used for training or scrapped for spare parts and material for the production of domestic armored vehicles.
Where these T-26s possibly came from
By 1942, Romania had already captured twenty-eight unspecified armored vehicles from the Soviet Union and ninety-one were being recovered. With ample amounts of armored vehicles being retrieved, a Commission of Captured Equipment was established. This commission was entrusted to sort out equipment coming from conquered territories and consisted of Iosif Nitescu, Lieutenant-Colonel Constantin Ghiulai, and other unnamed individuals.
Mr. Ghiulai was already developing the TACAM T-60 since late 1941 and would later commence development of the TACAM R-2 in December 1942. It is unclear if the Commission was also meant to get a closer study of the captured equipment More equipment was being found in March 1942 in Transnistria and Bessarabia. Sixty men from the 2nd Armored Regiment were sent to gather these vehicles.
Soviet T-26B in Bessarabia, 1940.- Source: oldpicz.com
From the tanks they salvaged, the Commission of Captured Equipment intended to send some to the 2nd Armored Regiment, to cover the losses they had suffered. The Regiment needed 22 more tanks to reach its full strength of 73 vehicles.
Of the vehicles they had captured, the Romanians thought the T-26s would be a good option for the 2nd Armored Regiment. Five T-26As (early, twin turreted variant), four T-26Bs (mid variant with a single cylindrical turret) and eight T-26Cs (late variant with a single semi-conical turret) were available and in good order at the time. The T-26 was seen to be on par or even superior to their R-35s and R-2s (Romanian LT vz. 35).
The T-26 designations stated above (T-26A, T-26B, and T-26C) are Romanian/German designations and do not reflect the Soviet naming system.
Soviet T-26C (front) and T-26B (back) parading in the streets in Bessarabia, 1940.- Source: oldpicz.com
T-26 Chassis Specification
Dimensions (L-W-H)
4.55 m x 2.31 m x 2.30 m
(14ft 11in x 7ft 7in x 7ft 7in)
Total weight, battle ready
9.6 tons
Crew
3
Propulsion
4-cyl gas flat air cooled Armstrong-Siddeley, 90 bhp
Speed (road/off-road)
31/16 km/h (19.3/9.9 mph)
Range (road/off road)
240/140 km (150/87 mi)
Armor
6 to 15 mm (0.24-0.59 in)
Track width
28 cm (11 inches)
Track link length
12.5 cm (4.9 inches)
Interpretation of the T-26/37mm by David Bocquelet
Modified T-26 proposal
On July 22, 1942, a proposal was suggested, it would exchange the armament of the captured T-26s, even though sufficient amount of ammunition for the 45mm 20K was available. A need to “unify” the guns used by the Romanian army was being felt. The proposal referred to a “Škoda” gun and a “ZB” machine gun. No specifics were given to what Škoda gun or ZB machine gun would’ve been used. At this time, Romania almost exclusively operated Škoda field guns, which were large caliber artillery guns. The only logical alternative is that they meant the 3.7 cm A3 gun which was also mounted on the R-2 tanks. The T-26 modification might’ve been a plan to salvage the 3.7 cm gun from destroyed R-2s. It’s also possible that the gun might’ve been part of a failed armament deal between Škoda or Germany and Romania being discussed around the time of this T-26 modification. However, there is no proof at all for this and it’s purely speculation.
The ZB machine gun is most likely the Czechoslovakian 7.92mm ZB-53 machine gun which would be mounted on some Maresal tank destroyers prototypes and proposed for the Vânătorul de Care R-35. This 7.92mm ZB-53 machine gun was supposed to replace the T-26’s coaxial 7.62 mm DT machine gun.
This proposal never materialized. The efforts of converting these vehicles, getting them into service and keeping them properly maintained were probably seen as too big for the small number of obsolete tanks it would have added to the Romanian tank force. The T-26s were sent to various Romanian units, where they were used for training. Later on, they were scrapped and their armor was used in the construction of the TACAM T-60 or TACAM R-2, while the guns were used for the Vânătorul de Care R-35 conversions.
The designation used in this article, “T-26/37mm”, is a fabricated designation since no historical alternative exists.
Possible implications
The smaller 3.7 cm A3 would have most likely had less destructive effect on its targets and its HE shells would have been of limited use against infantry and fortifications. However, the 3.7 cm shells were significantly smaller than the 45 mm ones, allowing more ammo to be carried. It is unknown if the mantlet would have required any kind of alterations.
Another theoretical advantage is the possible reduction of the reloading time of the main gun. Since the 3.7 cm A3’s shells are relatively small and weigh less compared to the 20K’s 45 mm shells, reloading the main gun would be easier and faster by comparison.
The 3.7 cm A3 with the 3,7cm Pzgr(t) umg APCBC shell could penetrate 37 mm of steel angled at 60 degrees from horizontal. According to one Soviet penetration test, the 45 mm 20K Model 1948 with an unspecified AP shell penetrates 43 mm of armor while angled at 60 degrees and 57 mm of armor at 90 degrees.
Other examples
Two T-34s were captured by Romania from the Soviets. One weighing 26 tons and the other weighing 33 tons (possibly referring to the T-34E STZ variant). It was proposed that an unnamed 120 mm and 150 mm gun were to be mounted on a different turret on the two T-34s. The proposal was later scrapped due to Romania’s inability to produce the necessary parts to handle the recoil of these large guns.
The Romanians modified the remaining R-35s with the T-26’s 45mm 20K. This conversion was named the Vânătorul de Care R35. These R35s received a modified mantlet and were used in the later stages of the war by the Romanian Army before and after they defected to the Allies.
Captured Romanian T-26C with painted aerial identification emblems.- Source: beutepanzer.ru Soviet penetration tests posted on Overlord’s blog “The Romanian Army and the Evolution of the Tank branch. Documents. 1919-1945” by Commander Doctor Marian Moşneagu, Doctor Lulian-Stelian Boţoghină, Professor Mariana-Daniela Manolescu, Doctor Leontin-Vasile Stoica, and Professor Mihai-Cosmin Şoitariu (Armata Română Şi Evoluția Armei Tancuri. Documente (1919 – 1945)) “Czechoslovak Armoured Fighting Vehicles 1918-1945” by H.C. Doyle and C.K. Kliment “Third Axis, Fourth Ally” by Mark Axworthy, Cornel Scafeș, and Cristian Craciunoiu
German Reich (Circa 1943)
Armored Car – 1 Converted
A little known conversion
Large numbers of Soviet vehicles were captured by the Wehrmacht during the war, and were pressed back into service, generally in lesser roles such as artillery observation, munitions transport, and anti-partisan duties. Some even had conversions done to them – the most well-known being new commander’s cupolas, or in the case of one famous KV-1 in 1943, a new KwK 40 L/43 gun was added (22nd Panzer Division, 204th Panzer Regiment). However, this BA-10M has been given more than just a new cupola – it has a Panzer II firing system and mantlet added to the turret.
Design
The designation “Beutespähwagen BA-10M mit 2 cm Kampfwagenkanone 30 L/55” is an unofficial name for the vehicle created by the TE team, but sums it up rather simply (from hereon, it will be referred to as “BA-10/Panzer II”, for simplicity). According to several known photos, it appears that the mantlet of a Panzer II was added to a BA-10M turret (that has had its original mantlet removed). The Panzer II mantlet also appears to have not been simply sliced off the original Panzer II turret, either. It appears as though the turret has had its sides cut off, making it look flat at either side, in order to make it narrow enough to fit the BA-10 turret.
It seems as though the vehicle was converted by expert engineers, with a lot of attention to detail, in what must have been a well-equipped workshop. Further modifications include: a new set of headlamps and a new fender/bumper. The radio above the hull DT has been removed (its original mount can still be seen), and in the center of the roof, a new, rectangular periscope has apparently been added, seen most clearly on the second photograph. On the left of the hull DT, it seems that a new, wider vision slit has been added, most likely because the original vision slit was deemed too small for purpose.
Possible explanations…
As with many field conversions, further details other than those seen in the photo are unknown. The vehicle belonged to the NSKK (Nationalist Socialist Motor Corps), as proven by writing on the side, which would suggest that it was likely a munitions carrier, or perhaps a convoy protection vehicle. The winged dagger on the vehicle’s engine hatches has not yet been identified, but is speculated to belong to a foreign SS division.
The soldiers, indeed, appear to be SS, perhaps from a foreign volunteer unit, and it appears as though the vehicle is traveling through a thick forest / shrubbery, meaning that the vehicle is more likely to be an anti-partisan / security vehicle. The presence of the dog, too, as seen in the third photo, would suggest that it was an anti-partisan unit, as it could have been used to track partisans.
The vehicle was possibly made during 1943 at FAMO’s Ursus Factory in Warsaw. This is because many Panzer II turrets would have been discarded during the production of the 676 Wespe SPGs at that factory. It is possible that a turret from a Panzer II (that was converted into a Wespe) was cannibalized for the conversion.
It is unclear why the original 45mm gun was removed. It is possible that the original BA-10 mantlet or gun was frontally damaged, there was insufficient 45mm munitions to have the gun operational, or perhaps the 2 cm autocannon was preferred for light convoy protection / anti-partisan duties because of its superior rate of fire.
Possible fake?
The vehicle has caused some debate among the Tanks Encyclopedia team as to whether the photos are photoshopped or not. It has been suggested that the vehicle appears to have characteristics of both the BA-10M and BA-6M (BA-10 original prototype). The hull DT does not appear to bulge out slightly beyond the driver’s slit like the BA-10M. A flat front plate was seen on all previous Soviet heavy armored cars, but was modified in the BA-10M to bulge out. The vehicle is unlikely to be a BA-3 or BA-6 because it does not have as many rivets on it, and, apart from which, the engine hatches have internal hinges, which is characteristic of the BA-6M and BA-10M. It does appear as though the bulge can, however, be seen, and poor lighting is the explanation for this illusion.
Another discrepancy is seen with the roof shape – the second and third photos are best for seeing this. The left side (facing) appears to be curved, like the BA-10M, but the right side appears to be flat, like a BA-6M. However, on the third photo, the right side is shown to be curved. Comparing the first and third photos shows that the commander is the same person, making it unlikely that there were two of these conversions. The BA-6M was also a prototype, and did not see mass production, so it is highly unlikely that this is an explanation. In the second photo, above the hull DT position, is a large, inexplicable bulge on the roof. It has been suggested that this is possibly a hatch, but the shape seems dubious.
The retort to those claims is that these discrepancies can be explained by a trick of the light, the low quality of the photos, and the camera angle. There are several photos, two of which appear to be taken almost at the same time, which means that it is highly unlikely to have been photoshopped, as it would be a very difficult job. The fact that the same commander can be seen in two different photos, and the sheer attention to detail with the commander’s hands on the turret’s hatch (1st and 2nd photo), would make this a very professional job, if fake.
Our reconstitution: It seems seems as though photos of this vehicle show that it was camouflaged, although we have no clue of the colors. However, it is also possible that an illusion of camouflage is also given from the sun casting shadows of leaves and branches onto the vehicle. It also most likely had a German radio, and the original whip antenna was removed.
The BA-10/Panzer II. The commander can be seen at the top with his hands on the hatch. A new fender/bumper and headlamps are apparent. The DT bulge appears to be visible in this photo, hence the shadow on the right of the DT mount. It is likely that this was an anti-partisan vehicle in Poland, 1943.
Seemingly taken shortly after the above photo, it reveals that the Panzer II turret has been made narrower (this the sides appear flat as opposed to sloped). On the left of the hull DT appears to be a new and wider vision slit. Above, the original periscope radio has been removed, and it appears as though a new, rectangular one has been added in a newly molded mount in the center of the roof. There is also an inexplicable bulge behind the original radio mount. The right side of the roof also appears flat as opposed to curved. The soldiers also appear to be the same as above, as their faces are the same. Their uniforms indicate that they are SS soldiers, likely a foreign volunteer unit.
A sideview of the BA-10/Panzer II. Unfortunately, the dog is directly covering the joint between the Panzer II mantlet and BA-10 turret. This photo reveals that this vehicle was with the NSKK. The commander appears to be the same person as in the above photo. The roof is curved, indicating that the vehicle is a BA-10M. Germans Tanks of ww2
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