Wan Cheng 2/萬乘二. Illustration done by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha, funded by our Patreon campaign.
Republic of China (Taiwan) (1975)
Fire Support Vehicle – 1 Prototype Built
The Republic of China (中華民國), exiled in Taiwan, was a key US ally in East Asia during the Cold War. Following the defeat in mainland China and Hainan during the Chinese Civil War, the Kuomintang political party and Republic of China were able to hold out in Taiwan. With mainland China now part of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国), the preservation of this strategic ally in the region meant that the Republic of China would receive large deliveries of American surplus equipment to build up the ROCA (中華民國陸軍/ Republic of China Army) and prevent a potential invasion attempt by the PLA (中国人民解放军/ People’s Liberation Army). Despite international setbacks, such as the international recognition of the PRC and exclusion of the ROC from the UN in October 1971, the republic remained a staunch US ally. From the mid-1970s onward, serious attempts at creating armored fighting vehicles would be started within Taiwan, likely due to the fear of weapons becoming more difficult to import due to the warming up of PRC-US relations. These attempts generally started by combining parts of different American vehicles. One of these would be the Wan Cheng 2 (萬乘二), combining a modified M113A1 hull with an M24 turret.
The ROC’s Imports of American Vehicles
Prior to the defeat and conclusion of most of the Chinese Civil War with the fall of mainland China and Hainan in 1949-1950, the Republic of China had already taken large deliveries of US equipment, notably due to the Second World War.
The first deliveries of American tanks to the now exiled ROC appear to have started with a batch of 25 second-hand M24 Chaffees in 1951, which marked the start of the light tank’s career in Taiwan. In the following years, the Republic of China Army would receive large numbers of M41 light tanks, with 550 second-hand vehicles ordered in 1953, which would be delivered from 1955 to 1959, and later be joined with a further 150 vehicles delivered in the late 1960s. Despite these deliveries of more modern light tanks, the ROCA also received more deliveries of light US armor dated from the Second World War, with a further 275 M24 Chaffees delivered in 1957-1959, as well as 400 M18 Hellcats.
Republic of China Army crews are trained on operation of the M24 Chaffee by an American officer, 1954. Source: https://zi.media/
As for armored personnel carriers, the ROCA would be within the large numbers of operators of the ubiquitous American M113 armored personnel carrier, purchasing 146 M113A1s in the late 1960s (which would be joined by 267 vehicles of the M113A2 variant in the 1980s, years after the Wan Cheng program was finished). In terms of heavier armor, the ROCA would only receive the first M48A1s in 1973, meaning it had to largely rely on lighter US Armor. After they were received, the M48A1s would form the base of heavier armored fighting vehicles developed in Taiwan in the same way lighter vehicles development would start with the M18, M24, M41 and M113.
The Wan Cheng Program
Though local field conversions had existed in the past, including prior to the Republic of China’s exile to Taiwan, local armored fighting development was kickstarted in 1975 by the Republic of China Joint Logistics Command (聯合後勤司令部). This department was in charge of engineering projects since the military engineering bureau of the ROC Ministry of National Defence (中華民國國防部) had been re-attached to it in 1968. This kickstart in activity was likely caused by the appointment of a new commander of the Joint Logistics Command, general Lu Youlun (羅友倫), on April 4th, 1975. Another general of the ROCA, You Shieshi (游傑士), is known to have been involved in military vehicle projects of the era, such as the Wan Cheng. He appears to have been Major Director of the Army Ordnance Development Center (陸軍兵工整備發展中心). This service includes the Armored Vehicles Development Center (戰甲車發展中心), which is the main organisation creating the ROCA’s armored vehicles. As such, You Shieshi was likely more hands-on with the project in comparison to Youlun.
ROCA General You Shieshi, Major Director of the Army Ordnance Development Center. Source: https://blog.xuite.net/ROCA General Lu Youlun, commander of the Republic of China Joint Logistics Command from April 4 1975 to March 31 1977. Source: https://blog.xuite.net/
The local development which would be undertaken from 1975 onward largely started with programs to overhaul or combine elements of American armored fighting vehicles to provide more useful platforms. The most well-known example of a vehicle from this era likely is the Type 64 light tank, combining the turret of an M18 Hellcat, of which the hull was likely very worn out and used up by this point, with the hull of an M42 Duster. Other early forms of indigenous armored fighting vehicle developments within Taiwan include the Type 65 light tank, an attempt to locally produce a copy of the M41 Walker Bulldog, and the diverse Wan Cheng program.
Wan Cheng (萬乘) is an old fashioned literary term which refers to the “Army of Ten Thousand Chariots’. This was a reference to the massive army and power of the Chinese Emperor in comparison to neighboring rulers in ancient China, who were said to rather have “Armies of a Thousand Chariots”. This type of references to old Chinese literature is quite common in the Republic of China.
The program consisted in armored fighting vehicles designs which were created on the base of American armored fighting vehicles, modified in order to improve their capacities or make them able to fulfill different roles on the battlefield. Wan Cheng 1 was an M113 modified to be a 120 mm mortar carrier; Wan Cheng 3 was an M113 modified to carry the indigenous Kung Feng IV (Bee Sting) 126 mm rocket (工蜂四型多管火箭), with two launchers of 20 tubes. Wan Cheng 4 was an attempt at modifying an M48A1 to M48A5 standard, with a 105 mm gun and a variety of other upgrades, though it was far from identical to the American-made M48A5 which the ROCA also operates.
The Wan Cheng 2: The ROCA’s M113 Fire-Support Vehicle
The Wan Cheng 2 was another M113A1-based vehicle.
A view of the Wan Cheng 2 being exhibited; the vehicle to its left appears to be a Wan Cheng 1. Source: War thunder forums
The vehicle can be summarily described as a modified M113A1 hull which was given the turret of an M24 light tank. This may appear an unlikely combination at first sight, but looking further, there are several reasons why such an upgrade may have interested the ROCA. The M24 Chaffee was, by this point, an aging tank, and the hulls in service with the ROCA were likely increasingly worn out and thus harder to maintain, but the turrets may still have been fully functional, and their armament, while obviously not up to the comparison with that of a modern tank, could still provide useful fire-support. Providing fire support on the widely-used M113 hull could be an useful tool to add means of mobile fire-support for M113-based units. Conversions created due to somewhat similar situations or needs have existed in other nations. During the Algerian War, France did fit turrets of mechanically worn out M24s to new AMX-13 hulls to retain their fire-support utility, creating the AMX-US light tank, while Australia would create the M113 Fire Support Vehicle (FSV) by combining the 76 mm-armed turret of the Saladin armored car to the M113A1 hull in the mid-1960s, with the vehicle being used in Vietnam. In the 1970s, at the same time as the ROCA was studying the Wan Cheng vehicles, Australia would double down with the M113A1 Medium Reconnaissance Vehicle (MRV), which used the more modern but similarly-armed turret of the Scorpion light tank on the M113A1 hull. The Australian vehicles are only some of the more professional M113 conversions, and over the years and continents, many different proposals and conversions have popped up to make the M113 hull able to perform fire support duties.
The M113A1 Hull and Modifications
The base M113A1 vehicle is an American armored personnel carrier which is best described as a welded aluminum box, with the shape designed to allow amphibious capacities, with movement in water assured by the movements of the track and no propeller or hydrojet system being present. The engine is installed on the front-right. The original M113 had a gasoline engine, but this had been supplanted by a diesel engine on the M113A1. This was the Detroit-Diesel 6V-53, producing 215 hp at 2,800 rotations per minute. The vehicle had a crew of two, a driver and a commander, who could operate a pintle-mounted M2HB .50 caliber machine gun, and the rear infantry compartment had space for 11 dismounts. Weight of the vehicle could differ from about 10 to 14 tonnes from the entirely empty to the maximum weight, with the standard combat weight being of about 12.3 tonnes.
The Wan Cheng 2’s hull was far from unmodified, with the ROCA’s engineers undertaking significant efforts to make the hull more adapted for a fire support vehicle.
The turret was to be mounted centrally on the vehicle. As such, the front-right mounting of the engine could not be retained, as the engine block would be directly below part of the turret ring. Therefore, the engine was moved to the rear of the Wan Cheng 2’s hull. Following this change in configuration, all the center and front of the hull was lowered, with only the rear of the Wan Cheng 2 hull, around where the engine was located, retaining the original height. The length of 4.86 m and width of 2.68 m were kept. This lowering, as well as the removal of the elements from the dismount compartment likely led to the Wan Cheng 2 hull being lightened by a non-negligible amount in comparison to a base M113A1. This would obviously be more than compensated once the turret was fitted. The armor layout was, in all likelihood, identical to the M113A1 for the hull. It was constructed using H32 rolled aluminum armor, with a thickness of 38 mm angled to 45° (upper front plate) or 30° (lower front plate) from the vertical at the front, 38 mm at the roof, 38 mm at 8 to 9° at the rear, 44.5 mm on the upper sides, 31.8 mm on the lower sides, and 28.6 mm on the floor.
A front view of the Wan Cheng 2. This photo shows the driver’s hatch is retained, how the front of the hull is lowered, and the red sign indicating the vehicle’s prototype status on the front glacis. Source: war thunder forums
With the engine being placed to the rear, the rear ramp was obviously no longer usable to exit or enter the vehicle, and the Wan Cheng 2 would have to be exited through different means. The hatch of the driver, to the front left, was retained, while the turret crew would likely enter and exit through the turret hatches already present on the M24 turret. The front removable cover for access of the engine was still present on the Wan Cheng 2, being pretty much a structural element of the M113A1’s hull construction, but it is unlikely that it would ever be used in anything but maintenance. On this cover, a rectangular sign was placed, with the characters 車試 (Che shi) written in white on red background. On this sign, they were likely to be read from right to left, where they describe an experimental, test or prototype vehicle.
The M24 Turret
On this modified M113A1 hull, the Wan Cheng 2 vehicle mounted a turret taken straight from an M24 light tank.
This turret used a 1,500 mm turret ring, which fit handily on the wide hull of the M113A1 armored personnel carrier. The turret was mounted centrally so as to allow for the driver’s hatch to be retained, while the turret would still sit in front of the higher rear part of the hull. The turret and its gun appear to still have been high enough that the turret could be able to rotate 360°, though there would be little to no gun depression over the rear arc.
The M24 Chaffee turret featured a three-men crew, with the gunner sitting to the left front, the commander behind him, and the loader to the right. The turret featured a large cupola for the commander to the left, and just to its right, a fairly large turret door/hatch. The gunner had no dedicated hatch to exit the turret.
Armor protection for this turret was 38 mm of cast armor to the front, with the cast mantlet also being 38 mm thick. The sides were 25 mm thick, angled at 25° on the right side and 20° on the left. The rear was 25 mm thick, with no angle from the vertical. The roof was 13 mm thick. These figures may seem deceptively similar or even thinner than the hull armor, but this was homogenous steel, which had heavier resistance in comparison to H32 aluminum – though it would also be considerably heavier for the same area and thickness. The turret was electrically rotated, with a turret motor installed towards the front of the turret basket.
The main armament of this turret was the 75 mm M6 gun, which was a lightened version of the M3 used in the M4 Sherman, with about identical performances. This gun could fire the M48 high-explosive round, containing an explosive charge of 680 grams of TNT, at a muzzle velocity of 625 m/s. This was still a quite capable weapon in the fire-support role, which would have deadly potential against recently landed troops which had not yet had the time to dig in deeply. Against armored targets, the gun could fire the M61 and M72 armor-piercing rounds. Both were fired at 618 m/s. Against rolled homogeneous armor, the M72 would penetrate 102 mm at 100 m, 99 mm at 250 m, 95 mm at 500 m and still 86 mm at 1,000 m, at 0° from the vertical. At the same ranges, the M72 could penetrate 190, 102, 92 and 76 mm, being more effective at close range but less at medium ranges and further. These values may seem very low for the 1970s – and if compared to a modern main battle tank, they certainly were – but it should be taken into account that, in case of a landing attempt by the PRC against Taiwan in the 1970s, the first waves’ armored vehicle fleets would overwhelmingly consist of lightly armored amphibious vehicles, such as the Type 63 light tank and Type 63A armored personnel carriers. The PRC was yet to have means to easily send over any significant quantity of heavier armored fighting vehicles in the first waves of an assault, and even the old 75 mm M6 would go through the armor of light amphibious vehicles without difficulty at any combat range.
The Wan Cheng 2 prototype in front of army officials during its trials. On this photo, both the .50 cal that was brought forward, and the .30 cal that replaced it in the turret basket mount can be observed. Source: war thunder forums
The ROCA did not appear to undertake any deep internal modification on the M24 turret, but did modify the external machine gun mount. On the original M24 turret, an M2HB .50 cal machine gun could be installed on the turret basket. It was meant to be used by a crewman standing on the engine deck for anti-air purposes. This configuration did not allow for the commander or loader to use it from his hatch, which was generally disliked by crews. On the Wan Cheng 2, the .50 cal machine gun mount was brought forward, in front of the cupola, which would highly improve the machine gun versatility and its ability to be used upon short notice, particularly against ground targets. It appears that the basket mount was not eliminated, but instead, curiously enough, appears to have been recycled to mount a 30-06 M1919A4 rifle-caliber machine gun. These machine guns were not systematically installed, and indeed, most photos of the Wan Cheng 2 show the vehicle without any.
Performances and Trials
Though many points can be guessed by the features of the M113A1 and M24, the exact specifics of the Wan Cheng 2 are not known, and for example the weight or maximum speed of the vehicle are anyone’s guess. The vehicle very likely had a crew of 4, with a driver in the hull, and a commander, a gunner, and a loader in the turret. Some considerable space would likely still be available inside the hull. The vehicle’s ammunition stowage is unknown but likely had the potential to be significant if the ROCA desired so.
Servicemen observe the Wan Cheng 2 during trials. Source: war thunder forums
The vehicle underwent some mobility and firing trials. During these, it was found that the vehicle could no longer be expected to be fully amphibious. This was likely a consequence of the vehicle being made heavier by the M24 turret – guessing the exact weight of the Wan Cheng 2 is not possible due to the changes which were made to the hull as well as the addition of the turret, but a weight of at least around 14-15 tonnes should likely be expected – as well as the changes in the center of buoyancy.
The Wan Cheng 2 was never adopted by the ROCA. A reason behind this lack of adoption could be that, by the 1970s, the number of M113A1s present in Taiwan was still moderate. As such, consuming part of the fleet in such a conversion, which unlike simpler conversions such as installing mortar or rocket armament, implied some extensive transformations of the hull that in all probability could not be reverted, was viewed as an uncertain venture. This was likely supported by the idea that the combat value of such a vehicle going into the future would be increasingly uncertain.
Conclusion – An Interesting Piece in the Start of Armored Vehicles Production in Taiwan
The Wan Cheng 2 is likely the instance of the Wan Cheng program that has been seen the most by Western armored vehicles enthusiasts, though many do not even know its name and merely consider the vehicle to be an odd M113-M24 Frankenstein’s monster from the Republic of China. In practice, the vehicle was integrated in a whole series of early armored vehicles development starting in the mid-1970s.
An M113A1 with Kung Feng IV rockets, likely considered to be a Wan Cheng 3. Chinese 126 mm rockets were mounted in this fashion on several M113s, though it is unknown if that was in the exact Wan Cheng 3 configuration. Source: https://www.bilibili.com/
These 1970s developments were far from entirely irrelevant. The similarly-dated Type 64 has entered service. Within the Wan Cheng program,the Wan Cheng 1 mortar carrier would evolve into the CM-22, which is still used operationally to this day, and work performed on the Wan Cheng 3 at least led to similar rocket launchers being mounted on some M113s. More significantly, the experience gained on these first attempts to modify American-designed M113s, but also M48s with the Wan Cheng 4, allowed for ROCA engineers to begin gaining experience, which they are known to have used further. The M113-based but modified CM-21 armored personnel carrier reached the prototype stage in 1979, and more than a thousand have been pressed into service since 1982. In the field of tanks, the CM-11 and CM-12, based on American technology from the M48s, M60s and even from the M1 Abrams, have been in ROCA service since around 1990.
Wan Cheng 2/萬乘二. Illustration done by Ardhya ‘Vesp’ Anargha, funded by our Patreon campaign.
Wan Cheng 2/萬乘二 Specifications
Length
4.86 m
Width
2.68 m
Weight
Likely around ~15 tonnes
Engine
Detroit-Diesel 6V-53 six-cylinders engine producing 215 hp at 2,800 rpm
Suspension
Torsion bars
Maximum speed (road)
Likely around 60 km/h
Crew
Likely 4 (Driver, commander, loader, gunner)
Main gun
75 mm M6
Secondary armament
Pintle-mounted (front of commander cupola) M2HB .50 cal machine gun
Pintle-mounted (turret basket) .30 cal M1919A4 machine gun
Coaxial .30 cal M1919A4 machine gun
Hull armor
H32 rolled aluminum armor
38 mm at 45° (upper front plate)
38 mm at 30° (lower front plate)
38 mm at 0° (roof)
38° at 8/9° (rear)
44.5 mm (upper sides)
31.8 mm (lower sides)
28.6 mm
Turret armor
Cast and welded steel homogeneous armor
38 mm (front and mantlet)
25 mm (sides and rear)
13 mm (roof)
Panzer IV Ausf.C “320”. Illustrations by Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.
German Reich (10th Panzer-Division, Infanterie-Regiment Großdeutschland, 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”) vs France (25th Senegalese Tirailleurs Regiment)
The crimes committed by German forces during the Second World War are a topic which has received a large amount of attention in the post-WW2 historiography. However, while much has been written, misconceptions still exist, perhaps most notably about which armed forces committed crimes, the Waffen SS, of course, but often also the Wehrmacht, and when and where. While the largest scale crimes took place in the East from 1941 onward, there were already significant atrocities performed earlier in the war, in 1939 and 1940, not just in Poland, but also in France. The Chasselay massacre is a particularly interesting, if very grim, case. An atrocity initially and for decades attributed to either the SS 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf” or the Wehrmacht’s highly politicized Infantry Regiment Großdeutschland. However, the uncovering of previously unknown pictures in 2019 demonstrated the real culprit was the Wehrmacht’s 10th Panzer Division, a unit previously viewed as a much more “regular” formation.
Le Vol Noir des Corbeaux: German Forces March Through France
The Second World War escalated when, beginning on May 10th 1940, German forces advanced through northeastern France and the previously neutral Netherlands and Belgium. The exact details of the early campaign, how German troops were able to encircle the British BEF, Belgian and Dutch armies, and much of the French Army, particularly the French cavalry divisions and much of the best equipped infantry ones, are very well known. However, after the pocket containing these units was closed at Dunkerque, the campaign did not immediately end. While the Allies had suffered a major loss that almost certainly doomed France’s ability to hold its mainland, there were efforts made from mid-May onward to re-establish a defensive line, mostly along the Somme. General Maxime Weygand, who had been the second-in-command to Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander in Chief of the Allied forces on the Western Front in 1918, replaced Maurice Gamelin as the commander of French forces organizing this defense.
A 1940 railway map of France for French schools. Note the location of Dijon and Lyon, as well as the wide-line going through them, marking the Paris to Marseille railway line. This was a major communication axis linking the French capital to the country’s largest Mediterranean port, going through Dijon and Lyon, meaning it visited the three largest French cities. It also was, and remains, a major transit axis by road as well. Source: Piclick FR
On June 5th 1940, after the Dunkerque pocket had been taken, German forces began Operation Fall Rot (Case Red), meant to pierce through the remaining French defensive line and occupy the rest of France. The earliest phases of Fall Rot caused heavy losses to German troops, which have often been forgotten in modern historiography. However, significantly outnumbered by German troops and having lost much of their best equipment at the Dunkerque pocket, French troops soon started to be overrun and encircled, as a lightning-fast German advance through France began. The Normand city of Rouen, and with it the Seine, the next large potential river obstacle after the Somme, were reached on June 9th. As the French government fled Paris, under pressure from municipal authorities, the city was declared open on June 11th to avoid fighting and destruction within the French capital. The German troops seized it on June 14th. German troops also spread to the southeast from the Somme area to the rear of the now useless Maginot Line. On June 16th, the Burgundian capital of Dijon was bombed, before being seized the next day. The troops advancing through Burgundy were those of Panzergruppe von Kleist (Kleist Armored Group), which comprised 4 German corps. At the forefront of German advance south were the Infanterie-Regiment “Großdeutschland” (a Wehrmacht unit, though a highly politicized one, being created from Berlin’s ceremonial guard by National-Socialist authorities following Hitler’s takeover and generally considered to be one of the Wehrmacht units most indoctrinated in National-Socialist ideology), the 10th Panzer Division, and the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”. At a glance, it seemed that within a couple days, German forces could hope to reach Lyon, about 200 km south of Dijon, unopposed, with a direct road (Nationale 6) linking the two cities. Lyon was (and still is) near the position of second largest French agglomeration, having historically competed with the Mediterranean city of Marseille for this position. The city and particularly its agglomeration counted a large amount of industrial, but also academic and cultural facilities.
On the Backline of Alpine Troops
On June 10th 1940, Italy declared war on France and Great Britain, evidently due to the imminent collapse of France, and began an offensive attempt on the French border. However, unlike in the northeast, French troops held Italian troops at bay, due to a combination of easily defensible terrain, significant defensive works already present (the Alpine Line), and good training of French alpine troops. However, the quick advance of German troops in eastern France, evident notably with the fall of Dijon, threatened to smash through the backlines and logistics that enabled the army of the Alps’s resistance against the Italians.
It is largely for this reason that the French High Command decided to attempt to organize a defensive line on River Rhone, with reconnaissance of potentially defensible areas beginning around June 15th. This defensive group was to be commanded by General Jean Tiburce de Mesmay, a veteran of the French cavalry who had served within the French High Command during the First World War. The objective was to establish a 32 km-long defensive line from Crépieux-La-Pape, on the northeast of Lyon’s urban area, to the more rural Tarare, more than a dozen kilometers from the Lyon urban area to the northwest.
A map of the area to the northwest of Lyon, where French troops attempted to establish a defensive line. Note Tarare, the western edge of this defensive line, far to the west on the Nationale 7 road, and Chasselay, near where the 1st Battalion of the 25th RTS is indicated on the map. Source: General François Lescel via the FARAC website.
To defend this frontline, Mesmay had a meager force under his orders: the “Lyon subdivision” as well as troops from a variety of units retreating before the German tide. It was composed of a number of old, retreating soldiers from northern France, conscripts from Lyon and the relatively close city of Saint-Etienne, some undertrained Foreign Legionnaires, and logistic and artillery troops from the Lyon area disorganized without a clear unit structure. Troops from one particular logistical depot which were called into the defensive forces, men of Saint-Etienne’s Depot 131, were reported to be armed with Modèle 1916 rifles (Berthier rifles with extended 5-round magazine), “old machine guns” (likely Hotchkiss model 1914s, still standard within the French Army), but quite shockingly, did not have any protective helmets. An officer of Clermont-Ferrand’s Depot 132, also called into the defensive line, described the state of his men as having “Very little armament, equipment almost nonexistent, apparel lacking”.
Artillery equipment included 10 anti-aircraft 75 mm pieces which had been taken out of their defensive mounts in Lyon and placed on improvised wooden carriages, and which had to be moved by hand without motorized tractors or seemingly even horses. The exact 75 mm gun model is unclear. These could have been modern pieces, such as the Schneider model 1930, 1932, 1933 or 1936, but they could also, and perhaps more likely, be older pieces, such as the model 1915, directly based on the 75 mm model 1897 field gun.
A Model 1932 Schneider 75mm anti-aircraft gun. The 1930s Schneider AA guns generally shared ballistic characteristics and differed in mounts; they were fairly modern, high rate of fire pieces with a muzzle velocity of around 700 m/s. Source: https://www.quartermastersection.com/A 75mm model 1915 anti-aircraft gun; this was a ballistically identical anti-aircraft adaptation of the ubiquitous French 75mm mle 1897 field gun. This older type was still very common by 1940. While definitely outdated against planes, it remains a medium-velocity, high rate of fire gun that could still be of decent use as an impromptu field gun, including against tanks fielded by German forces in 1940 if armor-piercing shells were available. Source: https://www.militaer-wissen.de/
More positively, 8 modern 47 mm SA 37 anti-tank guns were present, recently delivered to the Lyon train station. These were very potent pieces, though also very few when it came to defending a 32 km-long front against multiple armored units. They were delivered without any training, meaning the crews would have to familiarize themselves with the guns as they first used them.
Beyond these disorganized forces, two better organized ones were present. Elements (though evidently not the entire unit, as it was dispersed between varied locations in France, some elements having already fought Germans in Belgium a month prior) of the 405th Anti-Aircraft Artillery regiment (405th RADCA), and, likely the centerpiece of the French defense, the 25ème Régiment de Tirailleurs Sénégalais (ENG: 25th Senegalese Tirailleurs Regiment)/ 25e RTS.
De Mesmay described this regiment as “un bon régiment colonial, intact, frais, et bien armé” (ENG: a good colonial regiment, intact, fresh and well-armed). The unit had been formed in mid-April 1940 near Bordeaux, with battalions that had been shipped to France in late 1939. The regiment comprised three battalions
the 1st had been formed in Thiaroye, 30 km north of Dakar
the 2nd had been formed in Ouakam, in Dakar’s suburbs
the 3rd had been formed in Bamako, the capital of French Sudan, modern-day Mali
The regiment was about 3,000 strong, divided between 71% “indigenous” (black) troops, with the rest being European men in various positions of command, logistics, and organization. The unit was organized within the “Nord-Est” French regimental table. In short, this meant it had 3 fighting battalions, each comprising 3 companies of riflemen and a support company including a machine gun section, a mortar section outfitted with two 81 mm mortars, and an anti-tank section outfitted with two 25 mm SA 34 pieces. In total, and including some additional regimental assets part of three specialized companies (a command, a logistical “hors-rang”, and a heavy assets company) not part of the battalions themselves, the regiment’s noteworthy equipment included 48 heavy machine guns (typically 8 mm Hotchkiss model 1914s), 113 automatic rifles/light machine-guns (FM 24/29s), 9 60 mm mortars, 8 81 mm mortars, 12 25 mm anti-tank guns (SA 34 or SA-L 37), 146 rifles equipped with rifle-grenades, and 6 Renault UE logistical tankettes/tractors.
A likely Interwar era map of French colonial holdings in Western and Equatorial Africa. Note the border of French Occidental and French Equatorial Africa, near the current Niger-Chad border, as well as a number of modern-day borders not being in existence or not being identical, such as the Niger-Chad border or the Saharan borders of Mali and Mauritania. Source: senegal-online.com
It is worth noting here that the name of “Senegalese Tirailleurs” may be slightly misleading. While many of the men were indeed from Senegal, where French colonial authorities were most thoroughly implanted, with Dakar being one of, if not the largest center of French colonial authority in Sub Saharan Africa, recruitment was not limited to this specific subdivision. It extended to all of the AOF (Afrique Occidentale Française – ENG: French Occidental Africa), meaning modern-day Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. In total, by April 1940, about 180,000 Senegalese Tirailleurs were reported to be serving, which would likely have been far too much for Senegal alone to support.
The 25th RTS had been moved to the reserves of the Army of the Alps during spring 1940, being based in Montélimar, south of Lyon. On June 14th, the 3rd Battalion of the Regiment was separated to be given other orders, with the core of the unit given the order to move towards Lyon to take part in its defense, reaching Lyon on June 16th and taking defensive positions from June 17th to 19th. The unit commander was 50-years old WW1 veteran Colonel Bouriand, who had been gravely injured and captured in August 1914. During the Interwar, he had been deployed in Niger, but also Morocco and Syria, where fighting to “pacify” the French protectorates was still taking place.
Defenders Thrown Away in a Collapsing France
The establishment of the defensive line to the north of Lyon took place in particular circumstances, even by the standards of a France in nationwide collapse facing Fall Rot. The 25th RTS had not yet reached its defensive position as French Président du Conseil (ENG: Council President – A position roughly equivalent to a British prime minister, the French 3rd Republic being a parliamentary system where the President mostly had ceremonial power) Paul Reynaud resigned and was replaced by WW1 figure Philippe Pétain. The next day, on June 17th, Pétain transmitted to German authorities that he was seeking an agreement to ceasefire, and pronounced a speech heard on French radios nationwide in which he called for an armistice with words that would remain famous:
“C’est le cœur serré que je vous dis aujourd’hui qu’il faut cesser le combat.”
ENG: It is with the heart clenched that I tell you today that we must stop fighting.
Pétain’s speech hastened an already ongoing process of French troops mass surrendering or ceasing to fight, with the numbers of prisoners taken by German troops increasing dramatically from June 17th onward. In the case of the 25th RTS, this nationwide context of abandonment of fighting was supplemented by local efforts by the municipality of Lyon. On June 18th, Pétain approved a request from Edouard Herriot (the very popular mayor of Lyon, who had been leading the city since 1905, and would resume his role post-war from 1945 to 1957) to declare Lyon an open city, in a move similar to Paris, in order to avoid fighting and destruction within the agglomeration. General Weygang, current commander of French forces, gave the order not to destroy bridges on the Saône and Rhône, the two rivers which meet at Lyon. In practice, the troops preparing the defense of the line to the northwest of Lyon saw the city they were supposed to defend give up on its defense just behind them. There were also efforts by the mayors or officials of some of the smaller localities French troops were preparing to defend north of Lyon, for example in Tarare, to convince commanding French officers to surrender.
The Desperate Defense of Lyon’s Approaches
Despite Pétain’s speech and Lyon being declared an open city on June 18th, defensive preparations did not cease. It had become evident that the meager forces available to General Mesmay, essentially two thirds of a colonial regiment supplemented by a number of disparate soldiers from various sources, could never hope to defend the entire stretch of the 32 km-long frontline. It was instead decided to organize a limited number of defensive positions reinforced as much as possible within the short timeframe the defenders had to prepare, concentrated on the two nationale roads that linked Lyon to the north and west. Straight to the north, the 1st Battalion of the 25th RTS was to hold positions near Nationale Road 6, coming from the Dijon direction, within the localities of Chasselay, les Chères, Lessieu, Crépieu-La-Pape, Neuville-sur-Saône, and Montluzin. The 2nd Battalion was to hold positions along Nationale Road 7, coming from Orléans, to the northwest, notably including locaties such as Lentilly, L’Arbresle, Bully, Tarare, and Fleurieux-sur-l’Arbresle. Crossroads were blocked and fortified, individual foxholes were dug, and a few select bridges were mined. Notably, in Montluzin, around a hundred soldiers took positions within a convent.
Information began to spread on the morning of June 19th that the arrival of German troops was imminent. With defensive positions located on the nationale roads, a constant stream of refugees and soldiers who had lost their units passed through them.
The Nationale 6 Front on June 19th
A rough map of the Nationale 6 area defended by the 1st Battalion of the 25th RTS. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
The first fighting of the 25th RTS happened on positions on the Nationale 6 (1st Battalion, commanded by Commandant Alaury) at around 8 am on June 19th. At that moment, a German column of the Großdeutschland entered Villefranche-sur-Saône, a locality just slightly beyond the French defensive line. Alaury reports that a French motorcyclist arrived at the forefront of the French defensive line at 9:15 am, warning of the impending arrival of German forces. Minutes later, the first German reconnaissance troops arrived. At first a small number of soldiers progressed with a white flag and tried to convince the French that an armistice had been signed and that the fighting was over. French troops followed their orders and began firing on the German scouts, near Montluzin. A French adjutant reported that German troops that had reached the barrage immediately retaliated with submachine guns. The leading German car had been followed by armored cars and trucks loaded with infantry. These were first fired upon by the French, and quickly fired back. This specific location, Montluzin and its convent, included two of the 405th RADCA’s anti-aircraft 75 mm pieces, placed in the convent courtyard. French reports state their fire was very effective, though a piece was swiftly destroyed by opposing fire. Telephone communications with defensive positions on the Nationale 6 were reported as ruptured at around 1 pm. German progression continued, with increased infantry presence in the afternoon. French troops claimed to have destroyed several German armored vehicles. In the early afternoon, French troops were forced out of external positions and into the convent itself. At some locations, Commandant Alaury reported bayonet fighting.
The convent of Montluzin, hosting Sisters of Nevers, an important location of fighting on June 19th. Source: ebay
The Montluzin convent was overrun around 4pm, the vast majority of its defenders having been wounded during the fighting. After the position was overran and French troops surrendered, Senegalese wounded were “finished off” by German troops, the first of many executions on the Nationale 6 front. Casualties on the French side are reported to have been of 50 military and one civilian killed for the French, who claimed to have caused around 40 German casualties.
As the Montluzin convent offered significant resistance, German troops had attempted to circumvent it through the locality of Lissieu, on the other side of the Nationale 6, only to meet another French point of resistance in the small village and on neighboring hill 272. This defending location also sported two 75 mm guns. Fighting took place in Lissieu until the late afternoon of June 19th, when German troops overran French defensive positions around 5 pm, after having destroyed the two 75 mm guns. Executions of Senegalese prisoners were also reported there.
On another crossroad slightly further, German troops were again stopped, this time by the 47 mm anti-tank guns, though these were destroyed after some resistance. However, while progression around the Nationale 6 was slow, German troops managed to circumvent the French defenses by going eastward, where they were able to breakthrough in locations such as Neuville-sur-Saône and Fontaine-Sur-Saône, which were defended by disparate, poorly-trained and equipped Foreign Legion elements. German troops broke through at Neuville around 11 am. By mid-afternoon, German scouting elements were entering Lyon from the east, unopposed, and by 4 pm, they seized the Lyon prefecture in the city center. No resistance was met within the city of Lyon itself.
A Panzer III leading a column of Panzer II Ausf.A within the streets of Lyon, likely in 1940. Source: Le Progrès
However, somewhat paradoxically, while Lyon had fallen, the Nationale 6 segment in front of it was still partially held by the troops of the 25th RTS. Some positions, such as the one in front of Limosnet, encountered German troops but held. Crucially, a single fortified point, Chasselay, was not reached by German troops.
The Nationale 7 Front on June 19th and June 20th
The defensive sector on Route Nationale 7, to the west of Lyon, held by the 2nd Battalion of the 25th RTS, and surviving element of the 131st RI. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
Fighting on the Nationale 7, to the west of Nationale 6, also began on June 19th, but later during the day. In this area, the leading German formation was the 3rd SS Panzer Division “Totenkopf”, which had been following the Nationale 7 road from Nevers, taken on June 16th. The leading elements of Totenkopf reached the western edge of the northern Lyon defensive perimeter in the mid-afternoon at Tarare. The French positions there were held by remnants of the 131e Régiment D’Infanterie (ENG: 131st Infantry Regiment – a standard, European unit). Resistance there was unexpected and the SS troops took some losses, but were able to rapidly re-organize and use support from light armored vehicles and artillery to overrun 131st RI positions first in Tarare, and later in Pontcharra, forcing the remaining elements of the 131st RI to flee south.
Totenkopf troops reached the next major point of resistance at Arbresle. This position was held by the 2nd Battalion of the 25th RTS. The Tirailleurs did not occupy the town due to fears of causing civilian casualties, perhaps due to pressure from municipal authorities, but instead took position at a major crossroad located near the town. At around 6 pm on June 19th, Totenkopf troops entered Arbresle and found it empty, before coming under fire from French positions at the eastern exit of the town. Intense combat took place on the evening of June 19th and continued at a lowered intensity, but never completely stopped, during the night, seeing German troops stuck in Arbresle against the French position at the neighboring crossroad. French positions were subject to significant artillery fire which also spread into the town.
Orders to retreat were given to the entire 25th RTS from 4:32 pm onward, with more following during the evening and night, from June 19th to June 20th. However, with the unit already engaged, a complete retreat was found to be barely possible, and at best, the troops retreated to the next position still held within the defensive line.
Fighting resumed at high-intensity on the morning of June 20th, with SS troops having to finish taking the French positions at the Arbresle crossroad, then onto the directly neighboring villages of Fleurieux and Eveux, which had a commandeering position on the south of the Nationale 7 road. In the late morning, German troops faced the final resistance of two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 25th RTS at the entrance of Lentilly, on a plateau to the west of Lyon. Anecdotally, a French commander wrote that German troops assaulted the French marching and chanting, seemingly not expecting intense fighting this late in the campaign and perhaps having been informed of the fall of Lyon, and that losses were heavy for both sides. The last French troops there were overrun around 2 pm. The prisoners taken were grouped into three categories and treated accordingly. European officers were taken aboard trucks towards Tarare to be taken into custody. European men of the rank and NCOs were taken towards Tarare on foot. Lastly, the African prisoners, numbering 28, according to General François Lescel, were immediately shot.
The Nationale 6 Front on June 20th: The Battle of Castle Plantin
A historic postcard of Chasselay’s castle, more akin to a manor than a fortification. It still exists to this day. Source: PicClick FR
Back to the Nationale 6 front, to the east of the Nationale 7 and more directly north of Lyon, during the late afternoon and evening of June 19th, remaining elements of the 1st Battalion were regrouped under Captain Gouzy. Having taken very high losses during the day, with several defensive points overrun outright, Capt. Gouzy decided to regroup his troops within one last defensive point, rather than several dispersed ones, in order to resist for as long as possible. While the defensive line always had more of a delaying than a stopping role, with the fall of Lyon behind the defending troops, it was evident that the best they could do now was hold German units attacking them in place for as long as possible, and evidently this would be best done with a single, as strong as possible position, rather than a number of dispersed ones that would be too undermanned to hold for long.
French troops gathered in Chasselay. More precisely, they did not occupy the town of Chasselay, but rather the small castle of Plantin, within the municipal area of Chasselay but not within the town itself. The castle was hastily fortified as best as could be done by remaining troops during the night.
Fighting resumed in the mid-morning of June 20th, as a German reconnaissance patrol was spotted and fired upon by Tirailleurs. It appears German troops were once again not expecting resistance this late into the campaign and with Lyon having fallen behind the French defensive line. The main German assault on the castle of Plantin began around 1:30 pm, from the two localities of La Chère and Montluzin taken the previous day. German troops meticulously searched the town of Chasselay, unoccupied by French troops, before launching an infantry assault supported by armor on the castle of Plantin around 3 pm. The small position held for an hour. Around 4 pm, with most men out of ammunition, Capt. Gouzy ordered his last defenders to surrender. German troops entered the castle, and captured a total of three officers (including Gouzy), two European NCOs, three European men of the rank, and 51 African Tirailleurs.
A few remaining elements of the 25th RTS were able to escape the battles around the northern Lyon defensive line, and were located far to the south, in Ardèche, when the armistice signed on June 22nd entered in application on June 25th.
The Chasselay Massacre: Prisoners Executed by Tanks
(Warning: this section is by default collapsed due to photos in it, as their content can be very grim and graphic. Click to open.)
The most well known massacre of the Lyon region was undertaken on a road between Chasselay and Les Chères on June 20th. It was this well known in large part because it had French surviving witnesses, in the form of European prisoners. French Adjutant Rauquier wrote the following statement, which was kept in French military archives. This statement is here coupled with a number of photographs from the event.
“The next day, the 20th, around noon thirty, all personnel of the defensive position grouped themselves in the castle, German reconnaissance having entered Chasselay in the morning. Around 1:30pm, fighting began in Chasselay, lasting around two hours; then, faced with the number of German troops and the arrival of tanks; the captain gave orders to cease fire. The Germans gathered us on the small road next to the castle; at this moment, a German fired multiple shots, and Captain Gouzy was hit in the thigh [Note: it has been claimed that this was because Gouzy protested rough treatment of his men; it has been claimed at times that Gouzy was shot in the knee rather than the thigh, he in any case survived]. The three officers [Captain Gouzy, Lieutenant Bigois, and sous-lieutenant Paguer, the last of whom was wounded in the fighting] were separated from us and we departed, the blacks first, towards Les Chères. There were 16 European NCOs and men of the rank, and 57 or 58 indigenous men, who walked between two tanks.
German soldiers advancing and giving orders as the Tirailleurs walk by the side of a Panzer IV tank. Note German soldiers have bayonets fixed. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinAfrican Tirailleurs walking. In his conference, historian Julien. Fargettas noted the visible anguish, discomfort, and fear in their faces. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
Around 800 m away from Chasselay, on the road to Les Chères, the column was stopped and the indigenous (black) men led to a pasture that bordered the road, their backs towards said road.
The Tirailleurs are taken to a pasture bordering the road they were marching on. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
At this moment, a German, of whom I couldn’t make out the rank, gave the Tirailleurs a sign to flee into the countryside; The first few men had barely started moving when the machine guns of the tanks, still on the road, began to crackle and bring down our tirailleurs with no mercy.
One of the German tanks, a Panzer IV Ausf.C, opens fire into the pasture. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinTwo Germans tanks around the moment they opened fire into the pasture. Note the clearly identifiable Panzer IV Ausf.C “320”. Fargettas noted the apparent calm of the German men, with the tank’s commander and a crewmember seeming to converse with a soldier outside the tank. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinIn this exceptionally tragic photograph, African Tirailleurs are seen running while under fire from German tank machine guns. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
Along them, a few Germans fired with rifles on fleeing tirailleurs.
The pile of bodies left in the pasture after the execution. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinOne of the tanks pursues fleeing Tirailleurs. It has sometimes been claimed that it went over the pile of bodies, possibly crushing some, which does not seem improbable seeing its trajectory. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinA last, more focused picture showing some of the massacre’s victims. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
Finally, the tanks fired with their main gun into the pile of lying corpses. One of the tanks then left the road, pursuing the men who had managed to escape the massacre. I think only a few escaped. Some of the Germans also took photographs. Then, they took us to Les Chères, and on the way, I saw bodies that were still twitching”
For decades, this testimony of an European adjutant was the most detailed breakdown of the events that took place at Chasselay. His testimony provides some precious details, but tragically, does not clearly identify the unit which committed the crime. The crime was typically assumed to have either been committed by the SS Totenkopf Division, or the highly politicized Wehrmacht Großdeutschland Regiment. With no clear indicator, this was where most writing on this particular massacre ended, until 2019.
A Breakthrough Uncovering a Wehrmacht Crime
More information about the Chasselay massacre would emerge from a totally unexpected source in 2019. That year, a photograph enthusiast from Troyes, in Champagne, hundreds of kilometers from Chasselay or Lyon, purchased a photo album that had belonged to a German soldier, seeking pictures of Troyes from the occupation era. He ended up surprised to find previously unknown pictures that showed, in detail, the execution of a massacre. This would soon be linked to the Chasselay massacre, with a terrain feature being identified as a large hill that commandeers the town of Chasselay.
This photo, likely taken before the massacre, shows Panzer IV Ausf.C 320, present on later photos, entering the town of Chasselay. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinA following Panzer IV Ausf.D, as evident by the fenders not being bent in the same way, from almost the same position. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinA Panzer III Ausf.E or Ausf.F, part of the same series of photographs and likely taken within the town of Chasselay. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.Garin
Beyond just being identified as showing the Chasselay massacre, the pictures actually allowed for something that previously could not be done, identifying the German unit which committed the massacre. The markings of a particular German tank, Panzer IV Ausf.C 320, allowed it to be identified as a tank of the 2nd Section of the 3rd Company of Panzer-Regiment 8, part of the 10th Panzer-Division, a Wehrmacht unit, arguably the least overtly political of the three units known to have fought against the French defensive line.
The finding of these pictures made a lot of news, notably being on a front cover of Le Monde, one of the most read French newspapers. From what is known, the photographer was not actually part of the 10th Panzer-Division, but of a German rearguard, logistical unit. How exactly he found himself at the location of the massacre, or why precisely he decided to document it, is unknown, but his photographs have undoubtedly proved extremely valuable to historians studying the events of Chasselay.
Amidst a Nightmare of Crime: Attempting to List the Executions
In a 2022 conference on the fighting and executions in the Lyon area, French historian Julien Fargettas, who has long worked on the topic, attempted to establish a list of known executions:
“The first executions took place as early as the fall of the Montluzin defensive position on June 19th. One of the Sisters of Nevers, still there, describes a “furor” animating the German soldiers seizing the convent. All the buildings were searched, with wounded Tirailleurs being “finished off” on the convent’s terrace. The next day, several bodies with entry and exit holes through the skull were found in the convent. The corpses of four artillerymen (European men of the 405th RADCA, who manned the anti-aircraft guns) were found near the convent, by the side of a pond.
Progressively, the furor is replaced by “colder” crimes. Eight soldiers of French origins from the 25th RTS, including two officers, captured at the convent, were taken more than 400 m from the convent and shot against the wall of a garage, where their bodies were found days later. Executions followed on Nationale Road 6, towards Lyon where prisoners were to be taken. Two Tirailleurs were executed at Champagne-au-Mont-D’Or, at the meeting point of Louis Tourte Street and Lanessan Avenue. Five other Tirailleurs are executed at 2, Avenue Lanessan, in the same municipality. When exhumed, their bodies had their hands and feets impeded by iron wire. A bit further, towards Vaise, 27 Tirailleurs were shot against the wall of an orphanage on a small street. The next day, June 20th, summary executions followed on the other part of the front, near the Arbresle heights [the Nationale 7 front manned by the 2nd Battalion]. In Eveux, where tirailleurs resisted, three were found on a pile of manure. The civilian owner of the neighboring house was found dead, shot in the head. Fourteen corpses of Tirailleurs were found in the municipality of Eveux, without the circumstances of their death being clear. Five more tirailleurs were executed at Florieut, on the Arbresle. On the same day, 13 others were captured at a property in Lentilly; they were forced to stay lying on the town square until the late afternoon, and were then taken outside the town and shot in the unincorporated locality called La Rivoire. Three other Tirailleurs were shot within the town. In Lozanne, eight Tirailleurs were captured and immediately shot according to correspondence from the mayor of the time. Prisoners taken in this sector [Nationale 7] were taken towards Tarare. Other executions took place along this road. Two Tirailleurs in Bully; two others in Saint-Romain de Popey; four Tirailleurs at Pontcharra-sur-Turdine; a Tirailleur at the exit of Arbresle; finally, the same day, a Tirailleur is shot at Marcy-Les-Toiles
After describing these initial events, Fargettas switched to the northern front/Nationale 6, and described the previously mentioned massacre, for which he mentions around 50 victims, noting that 48 bodies can be counted in the field.
Three days later, three other Tirailleurs are executed in plains in the neighboring department of Loire. From 24th to 26th, a column of prisoners marched towards Dijon. On June 24th, six Tirailleurs of this column were shot in Fleurieu-sur-Saône. On the same day, a Tirailleur is executed in Guéreins. Finally, on June 26th, two Moroccan soldiers were shot.
This grim panorama couldn’t be complete without the mention of three civilians, two of whom were Algerians and the other a Black African, shot in the basement of the Rhone prefecture [in Lyon]. No one knows why they were arrested; they were taken to the basement on June 20th and shot under the eyes of French policemen who would later testify to the event.
Between June 19th and June 26th, at least 170 soldiers were executed by German troops in the Lyon region and neighboring departments; around 80% were African Tirailleurs. It is worth noting not all captured Tirailleurs were executed; some were taken to the German prisoner camps, the Frontstalags, within occupied France, as African prisoners were not to be taken into Germany proper. How many prisoners were taken into these camps is unknown, as the archives of the regiment [the 25th RTS] accidentally burned in 1944”
A memorial to the Tirailleurs shot by German troops in Lentilly. Notably, this memorial mentions 18 victims, while Fargettas only lists 16 in Lentilly. Source: Presentation by J.Fargettas and B.GarinThe Rhone departmental prefecture in Lyon, in the basement of which three civilians were shot by German troops after the city was occupied. 1901-1902 photo. Source: Wikimedia Commons
Fargettas notes that the deaths of Tirailleurs of the 25th RTS did not entirely stop after June 1940, as a small number of Tirailleurs died in German captivity or transit. He mentions that the last Tirailleurs of the 25th RTS to die in mainland France passed away on March 12th 1946. This Tirailleur, by the name of Guimelly Sené, died in a psychiatric hospital of the Lyon region, of pulmonary tuberculosis and “mental troubles”. His death was recognized as linked to his military service in 1953. This Tirailleur had been taken in 1940 to the German prisoner camps in Châlon-sur-Marne and Saumur, and was then transferred from one hospital to another, notably reported as in the mental hygiene center of Marseille in February 1944, before being taken to Brons, near Lyon, in March 1944. He was said to “show signs of divagation and persecution, and have attempted suicide several times”. His death was only found out by the French Army in January 1953, with the family informed in March, 13 years after Senné had left French Occidental Africa to fight in mainland France.
Known Numbers of the Chasselay Massacre
It is hard to have exact numbers with the victims of Chasselay and other executions and fighting around the Lyon area, especially as some executions might still remain unreported. In a 2022 presentation, Fargettas counted:
61 men executed on July 19th
61 men executed on July 19th
98 on July 20th
3 on July 23rd
7 on June 24th
2 on June 26th
In the same presentation, Fargettas presents an attempt at statistics with the victims of known executions. He established that:
84% of the victims were Senegalese Tirailleurs
8% were European troops
5% were North-African troops
3% were civilians.
Fargettas also attempted to differentiate between different types of executions. Notably, between immediate executions committed in the minutes or very few hours following the capture of a location, typically immediately at said location, out of “frustration” or anger (typically after having encountered unexpected resistance) and more organized executions, which took place in the hours to few days following the capture of prisoner and typically involved taking the prisoners to a secondary location where they were eliminated. He establishes that:
12% of executions were of the type committed immediately after the capture of a position
12% were undertaken between the capture and the transfer of prisoner to another location
72% were undertaken during the transfer of prisoners to another location
The last 4% were “marauders executions” committed on found stragglers or prisoners out of opportunity.
Interestingly, he also attempts to establish statistics on which branches of German forces committed the atrocities. He found that only 29% of executions were committed by troops of the SS (the Totenkopf Division, as well as some detached troops of the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler). A total of 71% could be blamed on the Wehrmacht, either in the form of the Großdeutschland or, as in the case of the Chasselay-Les Chères massacre, by the 10th Panzer-Division. At last, 70% of the bodies could be identified with the French equivalent of a military “dog tag”, with 30% staying unidentified.
French Historian Julien Fargettas promoting his book on Senegalese Tirailleurs. Julien Fargettas is considered the leading expert on the topic and has been instrumental in bringing new information to light on the massacre. Source: Booknode
The Reasons for Such a Massacre
Identifying why exactly German troops massacred Senegalese Tirailleurs in the numbers and with the regularity that they did in 1940 would be a complex task that would belong as much to sociology as history. Nonetheless, a number of key factors can be identified.
A first one is, quite obviously, widespread racism against Africans within German media and propaganda, arguably going earlier than even the National-Socialist regime itself. While its focus on Jews has been more thoroughly remembered, Blacks were also discriminated against in 1930s Germany, with elements of Black culture, such as Jazz or the works of black artists being labeled as “degenerate”, and Nazi race theory placing Africans, among others, near the bottom.
Beyond this general anti-black racism was a more focused hate specifically against French colonial troops. German propaganda during WW1 had already underlined the use of African troops by the French and assimilated them to barbarians. This was further extended upon during the 1923 occupation of the Ruhr by French troops, where the involvement of colonial troops in an occupation of Germany raised strong racial anger in the German press, with French African soldiers compared to savages pillaging Germany. The birth of about a hundred mixed German-African babies following this occupation did not ease things. While more than 15 years old by 1940, these episodes were still within German memory and had been widely used by German propaganda.
A German postcard, dated January 1923, showing an African and a Czech soldier of the French Army with the banner “Brutalité, Bestalité, Egalité!” (ENG: Brutality – Bestiality – Equality). Source: Wikimedia Commons
These elements of racial hatred were likely brought to a breaking point by the surprise of facing significant resistance after having made virtually unopposed progress for hundreds of kilometers. A number of executions are reported to have been committed by frustrated or outright angry German soldiers, before more calculated and planned out massacres could be carried out. While the number of European troops from colonial regiments killed was lesser, it is interesting to note that a particular disdain of German troops was sometimes noted against Europeans who fought by the side of Africans or commanded them within the same unit.
There were no orders from German command to massacre colonial troops, unlike massacres which would later be committed by Germans in the East. However, there were also no efforts ever made to punish the perpetrators of atrocities against colonial troops within the German army.
An African Grave in French Lands: the Chasselay Tata
In the days that followed the executions, German troops issued repeated warnings to the population not to touch or bury the dead. Despite this, most bodies would be buried by the local population, within a disparate amount of collective or individual graves in the various localities where executions were committed.
A necropolis would quickly be built, despite the peculiar political situation of occupation France. A WW1 veteran and leader of the departamental branch of the National Office for Veterans and Victims of War, Jen Marchiani, lobbied officials to allow the construction of a memorial site in the months that followed the massacre. When Vichy officials refused to fund the construction, he launched a funding campaign himself, resulting in the construction of the Chasselay tata which was inaugurated on November 8th 1942, days before German troops would occupy Lyon again on November 11th. The cemetery was built in a style inspired by the graveyards of French Sudan (modern-day Mali), with earth from Dakar being brought to Chasselay for the inauguration of the tata. The necropolis was built as close as possible to the location of the massacre on the road from Chasselay to Les Chères.
Surprisingly, the Chasselay Tata was able to be constructed under Vichy, and survived the war. After the liberation of France, the tata was visited on September 24th 1944 by Free French Senegalese Tirailleurs that had fought during the liberation of France. To this day, two yearly ceremonies are organized at the Chasselay Tata, one held by the French Army, and another by French-African students of the Lyon University alongside the families of victims.
A total of 196 soldiers are buried within the Chasselay tata. Of these, 188 belong to African Tirailleurs, six to colonial soldiers from North Africa, and the final two to Foreign Legionnaires, one Albanian and one Russian.
The ceremony in the Chasselay Tata on September 24th 1944. The Tirailleurs wield Enfield 1917 rifles, typical of American-equipped Free French troops. Source: La Tribune de Lyon.The entrance of the Chasselay Tata in recent times. It is interesting to note that, as early as its construction, the tata included not just a Cross and Christian graves, but also Muslim ones, as well as eight fetishist funerary masks sculpted on oak, on the entrance portal. Source: https://www.lesmotsjustes.org/
An Unprosecuted Massacre
For a long time, the exact perpetrators of the Chasselay massacre were not known. It appears that, as a whole, the large number of executions committed around Chasselay from June 19th to 26th were not committed solely by one unit, but rather by soldiers of the Totenkopf Division, Großdeutschland Regiment, and 10th Panzer-Division. Nonetheless, in the case of the execution of around 50 Tirailleurs on June 20th near Chasselay, the 10th Panzer-Division and its Panzer-Regiment 8 are clearly identified.
It is worth noting that the city of Lyon, close to Chasselay, has a very significant history in terms of war crimes trials in France. Most famous is likely the trial of Klaus Barbie, the leader of the Sido-SD’s 4th section – the “Gestapo” – of Lyon during the war. Arrested in Bolivia in 1983, Klaus Barbie was brought for trial in Lyon, where he was the first person to be found guilty of crimes against humanity in France in 1987, being condemned to life in prison and dying in 1991. Perhaps not as famous, but still very significant, was the trial of Paul Touvier, who had been the leader of the Vichy regime’s militia in Lyon. Touvier was found in 1989, after having been in hiding with his family within French evangelical circles, always in relative proximity to Lyon, for 44 years. Touvier was found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to life in prison in 1994, a sentence he served until his death in 1996. Touvier was the first Frenchman found guilty of crimes against humanity.
No individual from either the Totenkopf, Großdeutschland, or 10th Panzer-Division was ever prosecuted, even less convicted, for the war crimes committed around Chasselay. The commander of the 10th Panzer-Division during the campaign of France, Ferdinand Friedrich Schaal, is mostly remembered for taking part in the failed military coup of August 20th 1944. He was not, however, executed. After the war and in the following decades, participation in this event has become the aspect of his life most covered by historiography. Schaal died in Baden on October 9th 1962, aged 73. To this day, he is mostly known as a figure of German resistance, and not as the commander of a unit that committed a massacre.
The commander of Panzer-Regiment 8, Botho Henning Elster, has also mostly been portrayed in a positive light by historiography, after, in September 1944, in command of a significant contingent of German troops attempting to flee southern France and avoid encirclement, he refused orders to apply a scorched earth policy, and negotiated a surrender “with honor” of more than 20,000 German troops that took place at Beaugency, on the Loire, on September 14th 1944. In American captivity, an honorary council of other German officers found him clear of any “dishonorable conduct” after some ardent National-Socialist officers had criticized his surrender. Returning to Germany in 1947, Elster was later offered to help in the creation of the Bundesgrenzschtz (Federal Border Guard of the Federal German Republic), but declined. He is reported to have spent many efforts to rehabilitate his image during the denazification process, until he passed away on June 24th 1952, aged 58, due to a heart attack. As with Schaal, Elster’s image has been untarnished by the Chasselay massacre.
German General Ferdinand Schaal. Source: Mémoires de guerreBotho Henning Elster, by the end of the war, a general. Source: armedconflicts.com
Tragically, the Chasselay massacre would not be the only massacre of Senegalese Tirailleurs during the Second World War. First, executions of prisoners are known for every African unit which fought during the campaign of France. While the 25th RTS suffered the most documented atrocities, some estimations have gone as high as possibly up to 3,000 French colonial troops being executed during the campaign of France. Tragically, even the fall of France would not mean the end of massacres against African Tirailleurs. On December 1st 1944, at Thiaroye, in Senegal, recently repatriated Senegalese prisoners of war that had been liberated by the French staged a protest after they had remained unpaid, with signs the French were trying to underpay them. The protest was repressed by French gendarmerie and colonial troops. French estimates of the time claimed either 35 or 70 were killed, with more modern estimates by Senegalese historians ranging from 191 to several hundreds killed.
Conclusion
The Chasselay massacre, the defense of the northern Lyon defensive line and following executions as a whole, are some of the most tragic and horrifying episodes of the 1940 Battle of France. They saw the almost systematic murder of prisoners of after a town was taken. While some efforts to keep the memory of massacred Tirailleurs were seen just months after the war, the bloodbath has nonetheless been somewhat obscured by history, in the context of German troops committing more atrocities in the East, and in the context of Lyon, where later crimes would be more widely reported on and could be more easily prosecuted, such as the no less horrifying crimes of Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier.
Nonetheless, despite having been obscured for decades, the Chasselay massacre is also an example of how renewed historical interest and finds can still have an impact decades later. Obviously, it is almost certain the perpetrators of the massacre are now dead, with hopes of prosecuting them long gone. Nonetheless, French historian Julien Fargettas has reported how, after the renewed attention the massacre got following the finding of photos in 2019, he was able to identify a previously unknown victim, bringing closure to his daughter, who was born after the Tirailleur had departed for France and never got to know her father. Beyond this specific but noteworthy example, the identification of the perpetrators from photographs also showcases how new historical finds can shake previously assumed knowledge, in this case the massacre not being carried out by SS or highly politicized Großdeutschland troops, but rather by much more “regular” men of the 10th Panzer-Division. One could argue this demonstrates how the myth of a “clean Wehrmacht” had little relation to reality, not just after the invasion of the USSR, but starting from some of the first campaigns of the war.
Panzer IV Ausf.C “320”. Illustrations by Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.
Presentation by Julien Fargettas (Directeur du service départemental de la Loire de l’Office National des Anciens Combattants et victimes de guerre – ENG: Director of the Loire departemental service of the National Office of Veterans and Victims of War) and Baptise Garin (co-author of several works alongside Fargettas) via the CHRD (Centre d’histoire de la résistance et de la déportation – ENG: Center for the History of the Resistance and Deportation): https://www.chrd.lyon.fr/sites/chrd/files/content/medias/documents/2021-06/CHRDLyon_Conference_1940-MassacresRegionLyonnaise.pdf
Series of photographs from an unnamed German soldier
Collection of documents of the Rhone prefecture’s fund, prefect’s office, General department’s archives 1935-1964, made available by the departmental archives of the Rhone and Lyon métropole: https://archives.rhone.fr/document/le-tata-senegalais
William Robin-Detraz. Le Tata sénégalais de Chasselay : ancrage spatial et appropriations de la mémoire des tirailleurs sénégalais. Géographie. 2019: https://dumas.ccsd.cnrs.fr/dumas-02898135/document
Juin 1940: Combats et Massacres en Lyonnais, Julien Fargettas, Editions du putin, 2020
Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1947 with interleaved suspension. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.
France (1947-1951)
Light Tank – 1 Prototype Built
France was, in the 1930s, a major tank-producing nation in Europe, second only to the Soviet Union and Germany in output. This productive industry, which, while designing tanks that often followed archaic requirements, used modern technology, saw its abilities to continue evolving and producing new vehicles mutilated by the German invasion of France and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940. As part of the Compiègne armistice imposed on France, production and design of new tanks was strictly forbidden, and only a few designs, some covert and some designed for potential use by Axis nations, would prop up in the following years – most based on pre-existing technology and hulls which could not match newer vehicles developed by other countries.
France was liberated in 1944, with the new government, at this point under De Gaulle, adamant in its goal to recover French independence and self-sufficiency. Getting the military industry back up was one of several aspects of this policy. It was in this context that, in 1947, the French army would establish requirements for an airborne, 12-tonne light tank armed with a high-velocity 75 mm anti-tank gun with anti-armor capacities; a fairly ambitious prospect. Three manufacturers were approached to design such a vehicle, or at least its chassis: the state workshop of AMX, the old Mediterranean shipyard of FCM, and lastly, the locomotive-turned-tanks manufacturer Batignolle-Châtillons.
A Resurgent Tank Industry
Before the outbreak of the Second World War, France was one of the largest tank manufacturers on the European continent and in the world, second only to two nations which far outmatched France’s population and industrial potential, Germany and the Soviet Union. The defeat of France in 1940, of which inadequate tank designs and use is one of many culprits, led to the country being occupied all the way to the summer of 1944. Outside of a few covert projects undertaken by a secretive organisation of the Vichy regime, the CDM (Camouflage du Matériel/Equipment Camouflage), new developments were practically stopped. The few new designs considered, such as the SARL 42, largely took the basis of elements existing or already being studied in 1940. France was wholefully unable to keep up with the technological advancements that countries with intact or at least functioning tank industries were developing and fielding during the war.
The first ‘new’ French armored fighting vehicle to enter production following the liberation of France, the Panhard 178B, was, in practice, the combination of a hull and gun already in existence in 1940 with a new turret. Source: char-français
Following France’s liberation by the Western Allies and FFI (Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur – English: French Forces of the Interior) uprisings in the summer of 1944, the new French leadership, still under Charles de Gaulle, was very keen on ensuring France’s independence to the best of their capacities. This included resuming work on indigenous armaments projects as swiftly as possible. The first of the post-war designs would be worked on as early as 1944, largely based on pre-war designs and concepts or salvaged German equipment, adapted as best as possible to still be suitable for use in a postwar context. The two best examples of these first attempts at kicking a tank industry back on its feet, the ARL 44 and Panhard 178B, were neither revolutionary nor even truly modern vehicles, yet one could hardly say they were not successful in their roles. The ARL heavy tank was the first true French tank manufactured post-war, helping the industrials get back into shape, while the Panhard 178B not only did the same for France’s most important wheeled armored fighting vehicles manufacturer, Panhard, but also provided an indigenous vehicle to supplement the plethora of American and British types used to maintain a French colonial empire now at the brink of collapse, particularly in Indochina.
Work on these vehicles was well underway by the summer of 1946. The Panhard 178B had entered mass-production, while the ARL 44 at least had a functional vehicle completed, though it would eventually be a far fetch from the production standard. Following this, more ambitious and truly new vehicles could begin to be considered.
It is in this context that, in September 1946, the French EMA (Etat Major des Armées – English: Army General Staff) requested DEFA (Direction des études et fabrications d’armement – English: Armament Studies and Manufacturing Direction), the organism in charge of managing the production of French military equipment, to oversee the creation of an air-transportable reconnaissance vehicle which would weigh 12 tonnes at most. Within the French Army’s technical services, there was a preference for a light tank which would feature heavy armament for its weight, making it able to engage enemy armor, rather than be a more passive, lightly-armed reconnaissance vehicle. Mobility was also an important factor to compensate for the necessarily weak armor such a vehicle would possess. As such, one could describe the vehicle which was envisioned as the combination of a reconnaissance vehicle, a light tank and a tank destroyer. Furthermore, as early as January 1947, additional variants, in the shape of an anti-aircraft vehicle and a self-propelled artillery piece, which were to share a common chassis with the light tank, were being considered.
At this point, DEFA offered the STA (Service Technique des Armées – English: Technical Service of the Armies) the outline of three concepts. All would share an oscillating turret, a concept previously given only minimal attention, but which was viewed as potentially a good option to save weight. The concepts varied in the muzzle velocity of their 75 mm main guns, the goals being 600, 878, and 920 m/s. STA expressed interest in an oscillating turret fitted with the higher muzzle velocity main gun, a concept it accepted on 10th February 1947. By late February, the concept had been passed on to EMA, which set requirements for a 12 tonnes vehicle with a 75 mm gun that could reach at least 850 m/s, and optimally 1,100 m/s. At least 40 rounds were to be stowed within the vehicle. Fuel capacity was to be at least 300 l.
After these few months of back and forth and development of the concept by French Army structures, the requirements were eventually passed on to three manufacturers on 24th April 1947. These were the Atelier Mécaniques d’issy-Les-Moulineaux (AMX, English: Issy-Les-Moulineaux Mechanical Workshop), the Compagnie générale de Construction de locomotives Batignolles-Châtillon (English: Batignolles-Châtillon general locomotives Construction Company) and the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (English: Forges and Shipyards of the Mediterranean). All three had designed armored vehicles pre-war, though Batignolles-Châtillon did not have any production vehicles to its name. AMX had designed the R40, an evolution of the R35, and taken part in manufacturing the B1 Bis, while FCM had also had its own B1 Bis manufacturing chain as well as its own FCM 36 and FCM 2C designs.
The manufacturers were only requested to design the hull, as well as eventually the casemate for the self-propelled artillery version. The turrets for the light tank as well as anti-aircraft vehicles were to be procured from separate manufacturers.
A French Tank on a German-Style Suspension
The first known plans of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t are dated from 31st October 1947. These show a light tank with a more centrally-mounted turret, rather than the rear-mounted turret that was present on both the FCM 12t and the AMX-12t.
A side profile view of the interleaved-suspension 12t proposal. This variant differed very significantly from all other proposals of the program, not only because of its interleaved road wheels, but also because of its use of a centrally-mounted turret and rear engine. Source: char-françaisA top view of the 1947 design. With a driver to the front left and an engine to the rear, this was arguably the closest to classic tank architecture out of all the 12t proposals, but it also looked significantly larger than the other vehicles. Source: char-françaisAn approximately 1.80 m tall crewman standing aside the interleaved version of the 12t. In height at least, the vehicle was fairly low. Source: char-français.
The vehicle had a quite long hull for a light tank, with 5.050 m from the front to the rear of the track run. The height of the hull was of 1.240 m, and the width of the hull itself was 1.630 m, to which each 385 mm-wide set of track should be added, making the vehicle 2.4 m wide in total.
The vehicle’s suspension appears to have used, in this shape, a front-mounted sprocket and a rear-mounted idler. The most peculiar aspect of the suspension, though, would likely have been the road wheels. This early design used a set of seven interleaving road wheels on each side, a suspension-type typically present in late-war German designs, from which the French took heavy inspiration. The four outward wheels, each separated by a middle one, were doubled with another wheel on the inner side of the vehicle, while the middle wheels were single, but noticeably thicker. There was 2.8 m between the center of the first and last road wheel. The center of the first roadwheel was 1.140 m from the front of the track run, and the center of the last roadwheel 1.110 m from the rear of the track run.
Three unfortunately very blurry views of the schematics of the interleaved Batignolles-Châtillon 12T with the SAMM anti-aircraft turret. This turret was integrated into the design work from the very start. Source: Châtellerault archivesSet of plans of the artillery version of the interleaved road wheels Batignolles-Châtillon 12t. Source: Châtellerault archives, provided by Colasix
This 1947 set of plans show both the oscillating 75 mm-armed turret, still retaining the shorter gun that likely would have been the one with a 850 m/s velocity, and the anti-aircraft turret armed with a set of four MG 151/20 20 mm autocannons. The schematics of the 75 mm-armed vehicle, in particular, are very detailed when it comes to the internal arrangement of the hull. There were also schematics for an artillery version, which retained the centrally mounted armament; this vehicle used a casemate, with a small turret, likely some sort of commander’s cupola, armed with a 20mm autocannon.
The driver of the vehicle would have been seated at the front left, with seemingly the gearbox to his right and the transmission to his front. The combat compartment was to his immediate rear, with the commander sitting to the left of the gun and the gunner to its right. Hull ammunition stowage would be present immediately in front of them, at the front of the combat compartment and turret, where 26 rounds would be located. A further 8 rounds were present at the front left of the turret basket, and seemingly 4 rounds to the rear of the turret, in front of the engine compartment, giving a total of 38 rounds of ammunition stowage in addition to the 12 rounds already present in the two revolver-type magazines of the turret.
This detailed planview of the interleaved 12t’s arrangement shows, in great detail, the interior of the vehicle and features such as the ammunition stowage, but also the interleaving of the road wheels, doubled outward wheels and double-thickness inward wheels. Source: char-françaisA profile cutaway view of the same proposal showing the driver with the head out of his hatch, as expected when driving outside of a combat zone. Source: char-françaisThis cutaway view of the interleaved 12t, looking towards the rear, shows not only the engine block in great detail, but also the interleaved roadwheel and how the central roadwheel is two times thicker than the outward ones. Source: char-françaisThis cutaway view of the front of the vehicle, looking towards the front, shows the position of the driver and transmission. Source: char-français
Though this version of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t project is the first to be known, and appears in a quite detailed set of plans, the vehicle which would move further and reach prototype stage was vastly different from this one. It appears that the interleaved road wheels configuration was dropped early on and that the vehicle was deeply redesigned, with the overall dimensions of the hulls and tracks, for example, being changed as well. This was likely in an effort to reduce weight, seeing as the Batignolles-Châtillon project appeared, at this time, to have a larger volume than the FCM and AMX projects, in addition to interleaving road wheels which would typically add quite a lot of additional weight. Whether or not the vehicle would be able to remain below 12 tonnes was quite questionable.
Continuing Evolutions toward a Prototype
The set of projects from all three companies was approved by the STA on 24th May 1948 and cleared to continue. It appears that mock-ups were constructed by all manufacturers in the following months. However, the Batignolles-Châtillon project appears to have, around this point, started to accumulate delays. A formal order for a prototype appears to only have been passed on 14th February 1949, as order 18.211 – the same month the FCM prototype was completed. By December 1949, the FCM and AMX prototypes were compared to each other for a pre-production order of five vehicles. The AMX won and was picked for a pre-production run of five vehicles – basically setting it on the road to becoming the adopted vehicle. The Batignolles-Châtillon project did not take part in this comparison as a prototype was not yet completed.
Batignolles-Châtillon would only formally present the 12t vehicle in its facilities of Nantes on 13th June 1950. This was a very late date, and while AMX’s project would only formally be adopted in early 1951, it was clear at this point that it was picked in all but name – the Batignolles-Châtillon arrived too late to realistically have a chance to be picked. Trials were nonetheless run with the vehicle.
Design
Hull
The design of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t light tank in its final form is known mostly thanks to a set of plans dated from June of 1950. It appears that general ideas of the tank’s design had existed since about two years – we already know of schematics of a Batignolles-Châtillon 12t artillery vehicle dated from March 1948, which featured a similar suspension.
The March 1948 artillery Bat-Chat 12t schematics. This design already features the large individual road wheels and rear casemate/turret of the later design. Source: Châtellerault archives, provided by ColasixJune 1950 side profile of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t light tank. The vehicle’s arrangement has little to nothing in common with the previous interleaved design. Source: Châtellerault archives
As the two other proposals born out of the same program, the Batignolles-Châtillon vehicle had opted for a rear-mounted turret, an entire change of configuration in comparison to the earlier interleaving road wheels design. The hull had a length of 4.38 m, and a height of 1.280 m at the top of the driver’s position. With the gun, the length would reach a higher 6.472 m, and the height 2.170 m.
The 12t’s hull had been designed to be as thin and compact as possible, with the track width being, in comparison, designed to be fairly large. The idea was that the hull would be as thin as the turret ring diameter, powertrain and driver’s post would realistically fit in, and these mechanical organs would be designed to be as compact as possible. In practice, the turret even had some moderate extrusions, as it would otherwise have had overhang from the side of the hull. The Batignolles-Châtillon’s vehicle hull was 1.46 m wide, with 100 mm separating this hull from the 370 mm-wide pair of tracks. Overall, the vehicle would have a width of 2.4 m, at this point identical to the earlier design. Ground clearance was 31.5 cm.
A front view of the vehicle from the same set of plans; the overhang of the turret ring is noticeable. Source: char-françaisA plan view from the same set of plans. Source: Châtellerault archives
The hull was made of laminated steel plates assembled together by welding. The frontal protection of the hull was to be equivalent to 40 mm at a flat angle. In practice, this translated into the upper front plates being 25 mm thick angled at 15° and 27° degrees from the vertical. The lower front plate was 25 mm thick as well, angled 75° from the vertical. The front bottom was 15 mm thick, angled at 20°, while the rest of the vehicle appeared to have had a 10 mm-thick bottom. All three rear plates were 19 mm-thick, angled at 25°, 50° and 80° respectively. The roof was 10 mm thick, and the sides 20 mm. These values are taken from the trials report from 1951. The 1950 schematics are different in this regard, with the front reported to be 31 mm at its thickest point.
The armor layout of the 12t, from the October of 1951 trials report. It appears that, in June 1950, it was still planned to have a 31 mm thick frontal hull, though other aspects of the hull armor appear to have been identical between both documents. Source: Châtellerault archives
The driver of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t was installed to the front left of the vehicle. He sat on a seat with two positions: an upper position would have the driver’s head stick out from the driver’s post, when driving outside of combat. In combat, the seat would be lowered. The driver would then observe the outside from a periscope. To his front, the commands at his disposal would be, from left to right, a direction lever for the left track, a handbrake, hand-controlled clutch, followed by foot pedals in the same order as in a civilian car: the brakes, the clutch pedal and the accelerator. The gear-selecting lever, direction lever for the right track, and a reverser lever for the transmission were located towards the driver’s front right. The gear-selective lever was preselective, as would be found in a typical car, with the driving elements of the vehicle had been designed to be as similar as a classic road vehicle. The hand-clutch command would only be used when starting up the vehicle, with the foot clutch pedal taking its place when the vehicle was running. The instrument panel would be located just right of the driver’s head. The oil circuit for the gearbox was installed over the foot pedals, with the oil filter to their right, behind the gear selector from the driver’s point of view. Brakes, gear and direction were all hydraulic Lockheed controls.
A top view of the driver’s post on the prototype, looking towards the right. The driver’s seat, gear selector, direction lever, and inversor toggle can all be seen. Source: Châtellerault archivesThe 12t driver post’s dashboard, to the right of the lever. The gear selector on the bottom left can be seen. Source: Châtellerault archivesA photo of the driver’s post taken from the rear towards the front, showing the handbrake, clutch, and pedals. Source: Châtellerault archivesA view of the same driver’s post from slightly higher. The various pedals, and above them the gearbox oil circuits, with the oil filter to the right can be seen. Source: Châtellerault archives
Ammunition stowage within the hull at this point would have been of 22 rounds, a considerable reduction in comparison to the previous model.
Power train
The power train of the vehicle was located to the right of the driver, separated by a bulkhead. It was put together in a block which was designed so that the armor plating protecting it could easily be disassembled, in order to hasten maintenance or replacement work. This engine block sat on four mounts designed to prevent vibrations.
A view of the ventilation within the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t’s engine block. Source: Châtellerault archives
The vehicle appears to have been planned and tested with different engines. The first engine used in the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t was a Mathis 18 GZ 00 petrol aviation engine. This was a 4-stroke, 7-cylinders arranged in a ‘V’ , 6,827 litre engine. The vehicle later received a Mathis Type 8 GZ, which was an 8-cylinder engine. In order to reduce weight, it was decided that the vehicle would use air cooling. Air would enter from grills at the front of the engine block, go through two oil radiators (one for the engine and one for the gearbox), the cylinders, and be exhausted by a fan through another grill. The first engine and clutch mechanism had a weight of 365 kg together, including 20 l of oil. Later, the 8-cylinder engine had a weight of 327 kg, but it is unclear whether that was just the engine itself or also included the clutch mechanism and oil.
A front view of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype, showing the large air entry for the engine block. Source: Châtellerault archives
Clutch was assured by a singular disc. The Batignolles-Châtillon 12t used a gearbox with six gears. The first gear would multiply engine rotations by 22.5; the second by 6.23, third by 3.79, fourth by 2.38, fifth by 1.53, with the sixth rotating at the same rate as the engine. Direction was assured by a triple differential going through the gearbox. The gearbox was also relatively light, with merely 300 kg, including oiling systems.
The vehicle’s fuel tanks had a capacity of 300 litres and were located towards the rear of the vehicle, behind the turret ring.
A rear view of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype. The exhaust can be seen to the right; the port on the lower left is likely to fill the rear fuel tank. Source: Châtellerault archives
In general, the powertrain of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t was remarkable in the compactness and lightweight it offered. When breaking down how the volume was shared inside the vehicle, the engine block, including the transmission, comprised 30% of the internal space; the driver’s position comprised 20%, the fuel tanks 10%, and the combat compartment behind and around the turret ring the remaining 40%.
Suspension
This finalized version of the 12t had completely changed the whole suspension and mechanical arrangement of the vehicle, which no longer had anything in common with the previous interleaving road wheels.
A profile view of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype. The vehicle features two fairly large return rollers and two large shock absorbers. Source: Châtellerault archivesA close-up on two roadwheels of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype. Source: Châtellerault archives
The vehicle had now moved to using a torsion bar suspension with four large road wheels, with a diameter of 600 mm. Two large pneumatic shock absorbers were present on each side of the suspension, one at the front and one at the rear, each linked to two road wheels and guaranteeing a very smooth ride. These road wheels were not evenly spaced; the front one’s center was 830 mm from the second’s, which was 750 mm from the third’s, itself 690 mm from the fourth’s. The vehicle featured a large raised front sprocket, its center 778 mm from the first roadwheel’s, and a much smaller rear idler, its center 670 mm from the last roadwheel’s. Overall, the length between the centers of the first and last roadwheel was of 2,270 mm.
A photo of the 12t’s two-part track link. Source: Châtellerault Archives The same track link and the track pin. Source: Châtellerault archives
The vehicle’s tracks were 370 mm wide with a 135 mm pitch. The ground pressure they would apply was 0.685 kg/cm² on soft soil, and 10.2 kg/cm² on hard soil.
Turrets
The Batignolles-Châtillon 12t hull was designed to interchangeably mount two different turrets.
The first was the Fives-Lilles FL 4. This was an oscillating turret, the first known French post-war development in the field. It had been designed to mount a high-velocity 75 mm anti-tank gun. On the FCM 12t, it first appeared with a ‘short gun’ that was likely the projected weapon firing at 850 m/s, but the weapon that appears to have been durably retained would instead be the ‘1,000 m/s’ 75 mm gun, which would eventually be standardized as the 75 mm SA 50. The FL 4 oscillating turret allowed for an elevation of 13° and a depression of -6°.
This 75 mm SA 50 featured two armor-piercing shells. Both weighed 21 kg, with the projectile being 6.4 kg, and had a muzzle velocity of 1,000 m/s. The first, the POT modèle 1951/POT-51A (Perforant Ogive Traceur – English: Armor-Piercing Capped Tracer/ APC-T), would penetrate 110 mm at 90° and 60 mm at 30°, at a range of a kilometer. The second, PCOT modèle 1951/PCOT-51P (Perforant Coiffé Ogive Traceur – English: Armor-Piercing Capped Ballistic Cap Tracer / APCBC-T), would penetrate 170 mm at 90° and 40 mm at 30° at the same range of a kilometer. Lastly, a high-explosive shell existed, which had the same velocity but was slightly lighter (20.6 kg), with a projectile weight of 6.2 kg and an unknown explosive charge.
An AMX pre-production vehicle with the longer-barrelled 1,000 m/s 75 mm gun. The FL 4 turret which would have been mounted on the FCM 12t would have been closer to this one, rather than the one present in the September 1948 schematics. Source: flickr
The FL 4 was a two-man turret, with the commander to the left of the gun and the gunner to the right. The reason for this reduced crew was that the turret used a bustle autoloader system, with two 6-round revolver magazines located in the rear bustle of the turret. This solution took less space than a manual loader and, as such, helped lighten the vehicle, which was necessary for the air-transportability requirement. A total of 40 75 mm rounds would be stowed within the vehicle. The turret had a coaxial MAC 31 7.5 mm machine gun, with 1,050 rounds of ammunition stored. Frontal protection for the turret would be equivalent to 40 mm, while the sides and presumably rear were 16 mm thick and the roof 10 mm.
Observation devices included seven periscopes in the observation cupola for the commander, while the gunner could use an observation and targeting periscope as well as a gun sight. The turret featured an American SCR-508 radio, which would be shared by all versions of the vehicle. With the FL 4 turret, the vehicle was to be 2.170 m high.
The other turret which was to be featured in the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t was the SAMM S232 anti-aircraft turret. It was designed by the Société d’Application des Machines Motrices (English: Motor Machines Application Society) and was designed to be mounted on each of the three 12t light tanks projects. The first prototype was completed in May 1949.
A close-up of a SAMM S232 turret, this particular example mounted on an AMX-13 pre-production hull. Source: Les véhicules blindés Français 1944-1977
This turret’s armament consisted of four MG 151/20 20 mm autocannons of German origin. It was the standard 20 mm autocannon for Luftwaffe aircraft for most of the war. It fired 20×82 mm cartridges at a rate of up to 750 rounds per minute, with a muzzle velocity of up to 785 m/s. MG 151s, both in the 15 and 20 mm versions, were fairly widely used in post-war France, including in armored vehicles designs.
The S232 turret was 1.020 m high. As it was designed for anti-aircraft use, it had a high maximum elevation of 80°, with a more moderate depression of -5°. The turret used cast construction and was fully enclosed. The front had the same 40 mm of effective thickness as the FL 4, as did the sides at 16 mm. Likely in order to improve resistance to strafing, the roof armor was quite significantly thicker at 30 mm.
Weight Distribution and Expected Performances
The distribution of the weight in the 12t was to consist in:
2,180 kg of hull armor
3,630 kg from the suspension and wheels
365 kg from the engine, clutch, liaison between these, and 20 litre oil tank
300 kg for the gearbox and transmission including a 20 litre oil tank
70 kg for the radiator
55 kg for the controls
240 kg for the batteries
380 kg for miscellaneous elements such as the separations between the compartments, electric group and wiring, stowage, etc.
4,200 kg for the turret, including the two crewmen and 18 rounds of ammunition
80 kg from the driver
260 kg of fuel
300 kg from the 22 rounds of ammunition stored inside the hull
This would result in a vehicle weighing in at 12,060 kg, and as such almost perfectly equal to the expected 12 tonnes. When subtracting the two turret crewmen, all fuel and all ammunition, the weight would be of 11,340 kg; without the driver, it would logically be reduced to an empty weight of 11,260 kg.
The expected performances from this vehicle were to be a maximum speed of 3 km/h on the first gear, 12 on the second, 19 on the third, 31 on the fourth, 48 on the fifth, and finally, an impressive 73 km/h on the sixth gear. The average cruise speed on road was expected to be 40 km/h. Considering the reverse speed was assured by a gear inversor, the tank would be expected to reach the same speeds in reverse.
It was expected that, at ⅗ of the maximum engine power, the 300 litres fuel tanks would allow for 6 hours of continuous running, or a practical range of about 240 km. The vehicle was expected to climb a 70% slope, and be able to go down a slope of a similar degree while remaining controllable.
Artillery Version
In addition to the hull which would be used in the tank and anti-aircraft versions of the vehicle, Batignolles-Châtillon also designed an artillery version armed with a 105 mm in a fixed casemate. This version is known from a set of plans dated from June 1950, and it is not known if a version using the interleaved suspension design of the hull has ever been worked on.
A profile view of the artillery version; the hull was largely the same, but the turret was entirely replaced by a new fixed casemate. Source: Châtellerault archives
The casemate featured a sloped frontal plate and square sides; the front plate would have been 26 mm thick, with the sides and rear 20 mm thick. The casemate expanded beyond the rest of the hull and over the tracks, with a total width equal to the vehicle with tracks at 2.4 m, in order to increase the internal space allocated to the crew. At 2.175 m high, the vehicle would be only 5 mm higher than the tank version.
A front view of the artillery vehicle, showing the considerable overhang of the casemate over the tracks, necessary in order to increase internal space. Source: Châtellerault archivesA top view of the artillery version. The gun extended very little beyond the hull. Source: Châtellerault archives
The reason for a quite large casemate being needed was both the size of the 105 mm AU 50 gun and of the crew needed to operate it. The gun had a length of 3.096 m from the end of the muzzle brake to the breech. As such, it only had a very limited overhang in front of the hull, reducing the length of the vehicle to a mere 4.663 m. To operate it at a sufficient rate of fire, seeing as there was no autoloader, the casemate crew would be of four – a commander, a gunner, and two loaders – in comparison to the two-man crew of the tank version’s turret. Forty 105 mm rounds would be stowed within this casemate. Depression was reduced to a mere -3°, but elevation was a lot higher, at +67°, to allow for indirect fire.
Impressively, the additional weight was kept to a minimum in comparison to the tank. The vehicle’s weight without casemate crew, fuel and ammunition was noticeably lighter, at 10,730 kg, and even with the full crew, fuel and ammunition load, weight was expected to only reach 12,230 kg – in other words, only 170 kg more than the tank configuration. The engine, transmission and suspension were left unmodified, and the mobility was expected to largely be the same. Ground pressure was to be raised by a mere 10 grams per cm² on soft soil, reaching 0.695 kg/cm².
Prototype and Trials
The Batignolles-Châtillon light tank prototype was formally presented in June of 1950 in Nantes. Trials began at Satory in January of 1951. The vehicle was transferred to the STA in May 1951, with trials continuing until they were stopped in September.
A top view of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype without the turret test-weight present, with the turret ring empty and fully visible. A fueling port can also be seen on the rear right, as well as the ventilator on the front right. Source: Châtellerault archivesA side view of the same prototype, this time with the large, more than 3.5 tonne weight which was used to simulate a turret. Source: Châtellerault archives
In comparison to the vehicle on the plans, the prototype received another engine, a Mathis Type 8 GZ 8-cylinders aviation engine with 6,927 l. Its horsepower output is not known. The hull was not fitted with a turret, and instead received a 3,539 kg weight. The hull, without crew, ammunition or fuel, was weighed at 8,119 kg, giving the trial vehicle a total weight of 11,658 kg. It had a ground pressure of 0.640 kg/cm² on soft soil. The prototype also featured two return rollers, which were perhaps considered but not present on previous schematics.
The experimentation of the prototype was conducted by AMX, with a trials report produced in October of 1951. Sadly, only parts of this report have surfaced, and how exactly the Batignolles-Châtillon vehicle fared is unknown. The vehicle would, in all likelihood, have been the fastest out of all the 12t prototypes, and it appears it may have retained a fairly moderate weight even with the turret and full fuel and ammunition load. However, by this point, the AMX vehicle, which was highly satisfactory, was already adopted and entering production, and so it was highly unlikely the Batignolles-Châtillon vehicle would be ordered even if very high performing.
Conclusion – Too Late to the Party
The Batignolles-Châtillon 12t is notable in that it basically had two vastly different configurations during its life as a design, starting as a relatively large light tank with a centrally-mounted turret that was deeply modified, or likely even redesigned from the ground up, as a smaller and likely lighter vehicle with a turret mounted to the rear. The specifics of the design appeared to grant it an impressive maximum speed for the era, as well as a likely smooth drive. However, the vehicle was at least a year late, if not more, in comparison to the AMX and FCM vehicles, and with the AMX-12t already being a clear favorite by the time the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t was even completed, it had pretty much no chance of being adopted.
In recent years, the fairly obscure 12t has seen a regain of popularity in online circles, likely due to the popularity of the ‘Batignolles-Châtillon’ name due to the inclusion of first the 25t, and later some 12t-type vehicles in Wargaming’s popular online game ‘World of Tanks’. Two 12t-based vehicles exist in World of Tanks, the base Batignolles-Châtillon 12t and the ‘Bourrasque’ premium. Both are based on the interleaved road wheels, central-turret design, but while the 12t vehicle itself appears to at least somewhat try to replicate a realistic version of that configuration, the ‘Bourrasque’ is a fictional design combining this hull dated from 1947 to a modified version of the late 1970s TS 90 turret – one of the most egregious example of fake tanks present in Wargaming’s game.
Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1947 with interleaved suspension. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1947 with the SAMM anti-aircraft turret and interleaved suspension. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.Batignolles-Châtillon 12t prototype. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1950. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1950 with the SAMM anti-aircraft turret. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.Batignolles-Châtillon 12t 1950 artillery version. Illustration by Brian Gaydos.
75 mm gun (future 75 mm SA 50)/ 4x MG 151/20 autocannons (AA variant)
Ammunition stowage
12 already loaded + 38 rounds
Elevation & depression
+13° to -6°
Loading mechanism
2 x revolving automatic loading system with 6 rounds each
Secondary Armament
Coaxial 7.5 mm MAC 31 machine gun
7.5mm ammunition stowage
1,050 rounds
Hull Armor
40 mm equivalent (front), 20 mm (sides and rear), 10 mm (floor), uncertain but likely 10 mm (roof)
Turret Armor
40 mm equivalent (front), 16 mm (sides and rear), 10 mm (roof)
Produced
0
Finalized design (1950) Specifications
Dimensions (L x w x h)
6.472 x 2.40 x 2.17 m
Empty weight
11,26 0kg
Loaded weight
12,060 kg
Engine
Mathis 18 GZ 00 aviation engine
Fuel
Cylinders
V7, 7-cylinder 6,827 L
Horsepower output
210 hp
Power-to-weight ratio in hp/tonne
17.5
Gearbox
6 forward speed with inversor
Maximum speed
73 km/h
Cruise speed
40 km/h
Fuel tanks
300 L
Range
240 km
Autonomy at ⅗ of maximum engine power
6 hours of continuous operations
Transmission
Front
Suspension
Torsion bars
Road wheels
4
Track width
370mm
Track pitch
135mm
Ground pressure
0.685 kg/cm² (soft soil)
10.2 kg/cm² (hard soil)
Crew
Main Armament
75 mm gun (future 75 mm SA 50)
Ammunition stowage
40 rounds
Elevation & depression
+13° to -6°
Loading mechanism
2 x revolving automatic loading system with 6 rounds each
Muzzle velocity
1,000 m/s
Maximum armor penetration at 1,000m
170 mm at 90°
Secondary Armament
Coaxial 7.5 mm MAC 31 machine gun
7.5mm ammunition stowage
1,050 rounds
Hull Armor
25 mm at 27° and 15° (upper front plate)
25 mm at 75° (mid-lower front plate)
15 mm at 20° (lower front plate)
15 mm (front floor)
10 mm (most of the floor)
19 mm at 25, 50, and 80° (lower, mid, and higher rear plates)
20 mm (sides)
10 mm (roof)
Turret Armor
40 mm equivalent (front), 16 mm (sides and rear), 10 mm (roof)
Produced
0
Artillery version (1950) Specifications
Dimensions (L x w x h)
4.663 m x 2.40 x 2.175 m
Empty weight
10,650 kg
Loaded weight
12,230 kg
Engine
Mathis 18 GZ 00 aviation engine
Fuel
Petrol
Cylinders
V7, 7-cylinder, 6,827 L
Horsepower output
210 hp
Power-to-weight ratio in hp/tonne
17.2
Gearbox
6 forward speed with inversor
Maximum speed
73 km/h
Cruise speed
40 km/h
Fuel tanks
300 L
Range
240 km
Autonomy at ⅗ of maximum engine power
6 hours of continuous operations
Transmission
Front
Suspension
Torsion bars
Road wheels
4
Track width
370 mm
Track pitch
135 mm
Ground pressure
0.695 kg/cm² (soft soil)
10.2 kg/cm² (hard soil)
Crew
5 (Driver, Gunner, Commander/Radioman, two loaders)
Main Armament
105 mm AU 50
Ammunition stowage
40 rounds
Elevation & depression
-3° to +67°
Muzzle velocity
570 m/s
Hull Armor
25 mm at 27° and 15° (upper front plate)
25 mm at 75° (mid-lower front plate)
15 mm at 20° (lower front plate)
15 mm (front floor)
10 mm (most of the floor)
19 mm at 25, 50, and 80° (lower, mid, and higher rear plates)
10 mm (roof)
Casemate armor
26 mm sloped (front)
20 mm (sides and rear)
Likely 10 mm (roof)
Produced
0
Test vehicle (1950-1951) Specifications
Dimensions (L x w x h)
6.472 x 2.40 x 2.17 m
Empty hull weight
8,119 kg
Additional weight
3,539 kg
Total weight without driver or fuel
11,658 kg
Engine
Type 8 GZ aviation engine
Cylinders
8-cylinder 6,927 L engine
Gearbox
6 forward speed with inversor
Fuel tanks
300 L
Transmission
Front
Suspension
Torsion bars
Road wheels
4
Track width
370 mm
Track pitch
135 mm
Ground pressure
0.640 kg/cm²
Crew
1 (driver)
Hull Armor
25 mm at 27° and 15° (upper front plate)
25 mm at 75° (mid-lower front plate)
15 mm at 20° (lower front plate)
15 mm (front floor)
10 mm (most of the floor)
19 mm at 25, 50 and 80° (lower, mid, and higher rear plates)
10 mm (roof)
Produced
1
Sources
Les véhicules blindés français 1945-1977, Pierre Touzin, éditions EPA, 1978
Char-français: http://www.chars-francais.net/2015/index.php/2-archives/engins/2642-1947-batignolles-12
French military archives of Châtellerault, made available by Colasix: Service Historique de la Défense, Châtellerault 503 3H1 27 Service Historique de la Défense, Châtellerault 326 3H1 23 Service Historique de la Défense, Châtellerault 343 3H1 41
The Second World War left France’s tank industry in an uncertain state. One of Europe’s largest and most sophisticated tank manufacturers prior to the four year German occupation which mutilated France’s military industry while simultaneously very severely limiting design work on not only new tanks, but also engines and armaments. Whether France could recover and become a military-industrial powerhouse, or at least major player, was still uncertain.
It is in this context that, in 1947, the French Army would establish requirements for an airborne, 12-tonnes light tank armed with a high-velocity 75 mm anti-tank gun with anti-armor capacities, a fairly ambitious prospect. Three manufacturers were approached to design such a vehicle, or at least its chassis: the state workshop of AMX, the locomotive-turned-tank manufacturer Batignolle-Châtillon, and lastly, the old Mediterranean shipyard of Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (FCM).
Ambitions from Ashes
Before the outbreak of the Second World War, France was one of the largest tank manufacturers on the European continent and in the world, second only to two nations which far outmatched France’s population and industrial potential, Germany and the Soviet Union. The defeat of France in 1940, of which inadequate tank designs and use is one of many culprits, led to the country being occupied all the way to the summer of 1944. Outside of a few covert projects undertaken by a secretive organisation of the Vichy regime, the CDM, new developments were practically stopped. The few new designs considered, such as the SARL 42, largely took the basis of elements existing or already being studied in 1940. France was wholefully unable to keep up with the technological advancements that countries with intact or at least functioning tank industries were developing and fielding during the war.
The first ‘new’ French armored fighting vehicle to enter production following the liberation of France, the Panhard 178B, was in practice the combination of a hull and gun already in existence in 1940 with a new turret. Source: char-français
Following France’s liberation by the Western Allies and FFI (Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur – ENG: French Forces of the Interior) uprisings in the summer of 1944, the new French leadership, still under Charles de Gaulle, was very keen on ensuring France’s independence to the best of their capacities. This included resuming work on indigenous armaments projects as swiftly as possible. The first of the post-war designs would be worked on as early as 1944, largely based on pre-war designs and concepts or salvaged German equipment, adapted as best as possible to still be suitable for use in a postwar context. The two best examples of these first attempts at kicking a tank industry back on its feet, the ARL 44 and Panhard 178B, were neither revolutionary nor even truly modern vehicles, yet one could hardly say they were not successful in their roles. The ARL heavy tank was the first true French tank manufactured post-war, helping the industrials get back into shape, while the Panhard 178B not only did the same for France’s most important wheeled armored fighting vehicles manufacturer, Panhard, but also provided an indigenous vehicle to supplement the plethora of American and British types used to maintain a French colonial empire now at the brink of collapse, particularly in Indochina.
Work on these vehicles was well underway by the summer of 1946. The Panhard 178B had entered mass-production, while the ARL 44 at least had a functional vehicle completed, though it would eventually be a far fetch from the production standard. Following this, more ambitious and truly new vehicles could begin to be considered.
It is in this context that, in September 1946, the French EMA (Etat Major des Armées – ENG: Army General Staff) requested DEFA (Direction des Études et Fabrications d’Armement – ENG: Armament Studies and Manufacturing Direction), the organism in charge of managing the production of French military equipment, to oversee the creation of an air-transportable reconnaissance vehicle which would weigh 12 tonnes at most. Within the French Army’s technical services, there was a preference for a light tank which would feature heavy armament for its weight, making it able to engage enemy armor, rather than be a more passive, lightly-armed reconnaissance vehicle. Mobility was also an important factor to compensate for the necessarily weak armor such a vehicle would possess. As such, one could describe the vehicle which was envisioned as the combination of a reconnaissance vehicle, a light tank and a tank destroyer. Furthermore, as early as January 1947, additional variants, in the shape of an anti-aircraft vehicle and a self-propelled artillery piece which were to share a common chassis with the light tank, were being considered.
At this point, DEFA offered the STA (Service Technique des Armées – ENG: Armies Technical Service) the outline of three concepts. All would share an oscillating turret, a concept previously given only minimal attention, but which was viewed as potentially a good option to save weight. The concepts varied in the muzzle velocity of their 75 mm main guns, the goals being 600, 878 and 920 m/s. The STA expressed interest in an oscillating turret fitted with the higher muzzle velocity main gun, a concept it accepted on 10th February 1947. By late February, the concept had been passed on to the EMA, which set requirements for a 12 tonnes vehicle with a 75 mm gun that could reach at least 850 m/s, and optimally 1,100 m/s. At least 40 rounds were to be stowed within the vehicle. Fuel capacity was to be at least 300 l.
Schematics of the FCM 12t dated from September 1948. The vehicle featured a 75 mm gun shorter than the high-velocity 75 mm SA 50 which would eventually be adopted, likely a representation of a gun with a muzzle velocity of about 850 m/s. Source: French military archives
After these few months of back and forth and development of the concept by French Army structures, the requirements were eventually passed on to three manufacturers on 24th April 1947. These were the Atelier Mécaniques d’issy-Les-Moulineaux (AMX, ENG: Issy-Les-Moulineaux Mechanical Workshop), the Compagnie générale de Construction de locomotives Batignolles-Châtillon (ENG: Batignolles-Châtillon general locomotives Construction Company) and the Forges et Chantiers de la Méditerranée (ENG: Forges and Shipyards of the Mediterranean). All three had designed armored vehicles pre-war, though Batignolles-Châtillon did not have any production vehicles to its name. AMX had designed the R40, an evolution of the R35, and taken part in manufacturing the B1 Bis, while FCM had also had its own B1 Bis manufacturing chain as well as its own FCM 36 and FCM 2C designs.
The manufacturers were only requested to design the hull, as well as eventually the casemate for the self-propelled artillery version. The turrets for the light tank as well as anti-aircraft vehicles were to be procured from separate manufacturers.
The set of projects from all three companies were approved by the STA on 24th May 1948 and cleared to continue. It appears that mock-ups were constructed by all manufacturers in the following months, though no views of the FCM mock-up appear to have survived. The known set of plans of the vehicle is dated from 4th September 1948 and is indicated as “revised after inspection of the mock-up”. It features a shorter version of the gun that would eventually be used within the FL 4 turret, the future 75 mm SA 50. By this point, the FCM project was estimated to weigh 11,360 kg in combat conditions, still a fair bit under the 12 tonnes limit. In the meantime, in July 1948, the industrial company of Fives-Lilles presented its mock-up of the FL 4 oscillating turret which was to be fitted into the 12 tonnes light tank vehicles.
The FCM project progressed further and a prototype hull was completed in February 1949. After trials in Toulon in March, it was presented to the French Army’s technical services in July, the same month as its competitor from AMX, and a whole 11 months before Batignolles-Châtillon would submit their own.
Design
The FCM 12t’s Hull
The hull designed by FCM used a rear turret and placed the driver and powertrain at the front, as did the other two 12t proposals. The total length of the hull was to be 4.485 m. Including the gun mounted in the FL 4 turret, the tank would be 6.570 m long. 3.875 m separated the center of the sprocket from the center of the idler. The tank was 2.080 m tall with the FL 4 turret, with the hull itself being 1.130 m tall. The vehicle was 2.4 m wide, though this could be raised to 2.5 m with a different set of tracks. The hull itself was 1.7 m wide, while the ground clearance was 30 cm.
The FCM hull used welded construction. This had been a staple of FCM back in the 1930s, when this was very much a novelty in French tank design, the FCM 36 light tank being the only French mass-produced welded tank. By the late 1940s however, the Second World War had demonstrated the advantages of welding over casting and particularly bolting or riveting, and what was once an FCM specialty was now pretty standard. An interesting feature of the FCM design was that the frontal section of the hull was designed to be easily removable. This included most of the major mechanical components save for the engine itself: the preselective gearbox, transmission, and drive sprockets could be swiftly taken out for maintenance or even to be quickly replaced in this fashion.
Front schematic view of the FCM 12t dated from September 1948. The front section of the hull containing all major mechanical components outside of the engine was designed for swift removal and replacement or repairs. Source: French military archives
The driver sat to the left of the hull front, while the engine was installed to the right. The FCM 12t used a front transmission and a rear idler. The driver would maneuver the vehicle using either a steering wheel or a unique lever. The drive sprockets were linked to hydraulic brakes the driver would operate using pedals. Each sprocket could be braked independently, which would allow rotating the tank by using the movement of a single track. The cutch was also assured by a pedal while the gearbox was operated by a lever. Acceleration was also assured by a pedal, which was also associated with a hand-operated command. Overall, the FCM 12t was noted to be practically identical to a car in how it was driven. The driver had a periscope for vision.
A top view of the FCM 12t. The front-right of the hull was taken by the large radiator grills, while the driver’s post slightly stuck out of the hull on the front right. Source: French military archives
The armor was “30 mm equivalent” on the frontal arc, apparently differing in actual thickness depending on each exact section to match with 30 mm of effective thickness. The sides were 20 mm thick while the floor was 10 mm. The roof was of unknown thickness, but likely 10 mm as well, seeing as that thickness was also the one of the roof of the FL 4 turret.
Powerplant and Suspension
The FCM 12t’s engine was a Mathis 8 G X 00 8-cylinders 6,560L gasoline engine. At the nominal rotation rate of 3,000 rounds per minute, it would provide 210 hp. The engine was water-cooled. 415 l of gasoline could be stored within the FCM 12t’s fuel tanks. The radiator’s tanks contained 35 l of water. The brakes had a total of 10 l of oil in their fuel tanks, while the gearbox had 8, the engine 12 and the gearbox 40. The gearbox had four forward and a backward gear, but was coupled with a reduction system which increased the total of forward gears to eight.
The FCM 12t’s suspension has often been described as a ‘Christie-type’, and shared features present in vehicles using this type of suspension. Thanks to the use of large road wheels, it could be towed without its tracks, or in emergency situations, chains could even be put up linking the drive sprockets with the front road wheels, and the vehicle could then move at moderate speeds under its own power in such a configuration.
A close-up of the suspension from the September 1948 schematics. The front sprocket was somewhat raised in comparison to the rear idler, and the puncture-proof tires of the wheels are prominent, despite the prototype seemingly not featuring them in its first configuration. Source: French military archives
The FCM 12t used four large road wheels mounted on pneumatic springs. Both the 1948 schematics and the configuration the prototype adopted in 1950 used wheels with puncture-proof pneumatic rims. However, the initial configuration of the prototype’s road wheels differ from the schematics and this later configuration. Instead, it used fully metallic wheels. Even more curiously, the front road wheel appears to have been an entirely different design from the three to its rear. The reasoning behind such a configuration is unknown, however chances are it was just due to the adequate road wheels not being ready for one reason or another. The center of each roadwheel was separated by 81.5 cm. The vehicle lacked any return rollers. It used a front sprocket and a rear idler.
83 track links per side appear to be present on the schematics. The initial tracks of the FCM 12t were 30 cm wide, but provisions were made for 35 cm wide tracks which would increase the width of the tank by 10 cm, reaching 2.5 m. The tracks featured fairly prominent guide horns.
Turrets
The FCM 12t hull was designed to interchangeably mount two different turrets.
The first was the Fives-Lilles FL 4. This was an oscillating turret, the first known French post-war development in the field. It had been designed to mount a high-velocity 75 mm anti-tank gun. On the FCM 12t, it first appeared with a ‘short gun’ that was likely the projected weapon firing at 850 m/s, but the weapon that appears to have been durably retained would instead be the “1,000 m/s” 75 mm gun, which would eventually be standardized as the 75 mm SA 50. The FL 4 oscillating turret allowed for an elevation of 13° and a depression of -6°.
This 75 mm SA 50 featured two armor-piercing shells. Both weighed 21 kg, with the projectile being 6.4 kg, and had a muzzle velocity of 1,000 m/s. The first, the POT modèle 1951/POT-51A (Perforant Ogive Traceur – ENG: Armor-Piercing Capped Tracer/ APC-T), would penetrate 110 mm at 90° and 60 mm at 30°, at a range of a kilometer. The second, PCOT modèle 1951/PCOT-51P (Perforant Coiffé Ogive Traceur – ENG: Armor-Piercing Capped Ballistic Cap Tracer / APCBC-T), would penetrate 170 mm at 90° and 40 mm at 30° at the same range of a kilometer. Lastly, a high-explosive shell existed, which had the same velocity but was slightly lighter (20.6 kg), with a projectile weight of 6.2 kg and an unknown explosive charge.
An AMX pre-production vehicle with the longer-barrelled 1,000 m/s 75 mm gun. The FL 4 turret which would have been mounted on the FCM 12t would have been closer to this one, rather than the one present in the September 1948 schematics. Source: flickr
The FL 4 was a two-man turret, with the commander to the left of the gun and the gunner to the right. The reason for this reduced crew was that the turret used a bustle autoloader system, with two 6-round revolver magazines located in the rear bustle of the turret. This solution took less space than a manual loader and, as such, helped lighten the vehicle, which was necessary for the air-transportability requirement. A total of 45 75 mm rounds would be stowed within the vehicle. The turret had a coaxial MAC 31 7.5 mm machine gun, with 1,050 rounds of ammunition stored. Frontal protection for the turret would be equivalent to 40 mm, while the sides and presumably rear were 16 mm thick and the roof 10 mm.
Observation devices included seven periscopes in the observation cupola for the commander, while the gunner could use an observation and targeting periscope as well as a gun sight. The turret featured an American SCR-508 radio, which would be shared by all versions of the vehicle. With the FL 4 turret, the vehicle was to weigh around 12.5 tonnes and be 2.080 m high.
The other turret which was to be featured in the FCM 12t was the SAMM S232 anti-aircraft turret. It was designed by the Société d’Application des Machines Motrices (ENG: Motor Machines Application Society) and was designed to be mounted on each of the three 12t light tanks projects. The first prototype was completed in May 1949.
A close-up of a SAMM S232 turret, this particular example mounted on an AMX-13 pre-production hull. Source: Les véhicules blindés Français 1944-1977Top and side views of the interleaved road wheels version of the Batignolles-Châtillon 12t fitted with the SAMM S232 turret. Source: French military archives
This turret’s armament consisted of four MG 151/20 20 mm autocannons of German origin. It was the standard 20 mm autocannon for Luftwaffe aircraft for most of the war. It fired 20×82 mm cartridges at a rate of up to 750 rounds per minute, with a muzzle velocity of up to 785 m/s. MG 151s, both in the 15 and 20 mm versions, were fairly widely used in post-war France, including in armored vehicles designs. Ammunition stowage in the FCM 12t with the anti-aircraft turret was to be of 2,000 rounds.
The S232 turret was 1.020 m high. As it was designed for anti-aircraft use, it had a high maximum elevation of 80°, with a more moderate depression of -5°. The turret used cast construction and was fully enclosed. The front had the same 40 mm of effective thickness as the FL 4, as did the sides at 16 mm. Likely in order to improve resistance to strafing, the roof armor was quite significantly thicker at 30 mm.
Interestingly enough, the FL 4 turret appears to never actually have been mounted on the FCM 12t. The only known views of the prototype show it either without a turret, or with the S232 anti-aircraft turret, and the mobility trials were likely undertaken under these two configurations.
Artillery Version
As with the Bat-Chat and AMX, FCM designed a casemate artillery vehicle based on its 12t tank hull.
A side view of the artillery version of the FCM 12t, giving a view of the general silhouette of the vehicle, as well as the elevation and depression of the 105 mm artillery piece. Source: French military archives
This vehicle replaced the turret by a rear-mounted casemate which featured a centrally-mounted 105 mm modèle 1950 gun. The vehicle was meant for artillery use and, as such, elevation could go up to 67°, while depression went to -5°. The arc of fire was 40° forward.
A top view of the FCM 12t artillery vehicle, showing the lateral traverse of the main gun as well as the 10 rounds stowed within the rear compartment. Source: French military archives
The vehicle was to be 2.1 m high and 4.69 m long. Armor protection was of 30 mm frontally and 20 mm on the sides and roof. The weight was to be 12.5 tonnes.
The vehicle likely would have had a crew of five, as the 105 mm artillery piece on the AMX chassis eventually did, two loaders, a gunner, a commander and the driver. Ammunition stowage indicated on the schematics show 30 rounds stored towards the front of the vehicle, 15 on each side of the main fuel tank, while ten rounds were stored in the rear sides of the casemate, seven on the left and three on the right. The artillery model never reached prototype stage.
A front view of the FCM 12t artillery vehicle, showing the location of the fuel tanks and 30 frontally-stowed 105 mm rounds. Source: French military archives
Trials and Performances
The FCM 12t prototype was completed and first run by FCM in February 1949. The first preliminary trials were held in Toulon, on the Mediterranean coast, on 8th and 9th March 1949. In June 1949, a first trial concluded the vehicle provided a maximum speed of 60 km/h on-road, with a range of about 300 km. Ground pressure was of 750 g/cm² and the turning radius was of 5 meters. The tank could climb a 75% slope.
The FCM 12t in what was very likely its first configuration, with a weight taking the space of the turret, lacking pneumatic rims on its road wheels as well as having one different from the others. Source: char-français
The vehicle was transferred to the French Army’s trial center of Satory in November 1949, which led to more extensive trials being performed. On 17th November 1949, a 39 km trip was conducted between Satory and Raimbouillet to establish the performance of the vehicle. This trip began at 2:47 pm and was concluded by 5:40 pm. At 3:32 pm, after 28 km had been crossed, the vehicle stopped to assert the temperature of oil and water, which was at an adequate level. At 3:51 pm, a second stop was conducted, as a small leak of the radiator’s water tank was seen. Finally, a third stop was conducted at 4:26 pm as the water leak had, at this point, become very important.
During this trip, the FCM 12t was able to cross 1 km in 56 seconds, giving an average speed of 64 km/h. The quickest 2 km to be crossed by the vehicle were crossed in 2.15 minutes, giving an average speed of 53.5 km/h. 28 km were crossed in 45 minutes, giving an average cruise speed of 37 km/h. The vehicle was noted to be easy to pilot, with very good direction controls. The suspension was also noted to be highly satisfactory. The only real issue with the chassis were the water leaks within the radiator.
Modifications
The vehicle was handed back to FCM in early 1950 for modifications. It appears that it was at this point the vehicle received the pneumatic wheels rims and S232 anti-aircraft turret, though this cannot be certain.
French military officials observe the FCM 12t prototype, fitted with the S232 turret and four identical road wheels with pneumatics rims, during mobility trials. Source: French military archives
The vehicle was returned to the French Army for further experimentation in late 1950. However, by this point, the AMX vehicle had been picked for mass-production in December 1949. As such, while experimentation on the FCM hull continued to an extent, it was very unlikely this would result in any sort of production for the vehicle.
An accident of unknown nature interrupted the trials of the FCM 12t again in July 1951. This would practically be the end of the experimental career of the prototype. It was nonetheless restored to operational conditions by FCM and returned to the Army in 1952, but to no avail. Trials did not resume and the FCM 12t was de facto rejected. The prototype was likely scrapped in the following years, seeing as no trace of its existence appears to remain.
A side view of the FCM 12t in what was likely its final configuration. By late 1949, with the adoption of the future AMX-13, hope for the FCM vehicle to reach production was gone, but experimentation nonetheless continued in the following years. Source: Les véhicules blindés Français 1944-1977
Conclusion – One of the last FCMs
The FCM 12t was, in most regards, a decent light tank, quite comparable to its AMX or Batignolles-Châtillon competitors. While FCM only really developed the chassis, it appears to have been mostly satisfactory. Trials seem to report the vehicle provided an easy and smooth drive while the suspension was deemed very satisfactory. The only major issue with the vehicle appears to have been a leaking radiator. Nonetheless, AMX’s offering was solid as well, and would eventually be picked for mass-production, becoming what would be one of the most successful light tanks as well as French AFVs from the Cold War, the AMX-13.
For FCM, the 12t was one of the last forays into armored vehicles design, alongside a vehicle designed for the much heavier 50 tonnes tank program, the FCM 50t. The shipyard would fail to secure any orders for its first post-war designs, which was not too different from a death sentence, at least in the field of armored fighting vehicles manufacturing, seeing as the manufacturers had already been weakened by years of war. While the 12t tank program would play a major role into AMX becoming the de facto main producer of tracked armored fighting vehicles for the French Army, this was at the expense of the older FCM, of which the involvement in tank design had started all the way back in 1916 with the FCM 1A.
Side, top, front and rear views of the FCM 12t light tank
Sides, front and top views of the FCM 12t artillery vehicle
Sides, top, front and back view of the FCM 12t with the anti-aircraft turret. All illustrations created by Phanthom_25_Sniper and funded by our Patreon campaign
FCM 12t specifications (configuration with the FL 4 turret)
Dimensions (L x w x h)
6.57 x 2.40 (2.50 with wider tracks) x 2.08 m
Weight
12.5 metric tonnes
Engine
Mathis 8 G X 00
Cylinders
8 (6.560 L)
Standard rotation rate
3,000rpm
Horsepower output
210 hp
Power-to-weight ratio in hp/tonne
16.8
Gearbox
4 forward (8 with reductor) / 1 reverse
Maximum speed
64 km/h
Cruise speed
37 km/h
Fuel tanks
410 L
Range
300 km
Transmission
Front
Suspension
‘Christie-type’ with pneumatic springs
Road wheels
4
Track links
83 per side
Track width
30 cm or 35 cm depending on tracks
Crew
3 (Driver, Gunner,Commander)
Main armament
75 mm gun (future 75 mm SA 50)
Ammunition stowage
45 rounds
Elevation and depression
+13° to -6°
Loading mechanism
2x revolving automatic loading system with 6 rounds each /td>
Muzzle velocity
1,000 m/s
Maximum armor penetration at 1,000m
170 mm at 90°
Secondary armament
Coaxial 7.5 mm MAC 31 machine gun
Secondary armament
Coaxial 7.5 mm MAC 31 machine gun
7.5mm ammunition stowage
1,050 rounds
Hull armor
30 mm equivalent (front), 20 mm (sides and rear), 10 mm (floor), uncertain but likely 10 mm (roof)
Turret armor
40 mm equivalent (front), 16 mm (sides and rear), 10 mm (roof)
Number produced
1
Sources:
French military archives of Châtellerault, made available by Colasix:
Service Historique de la Défense, Châtellerault 326 3H1 27
Service Historique de la Défense, Châtellerault 326 3H1 23
Les véhicules blindés français 1945-1977, Pierre Touzin, éditions EPA, 1978 Char-français
Standard Pbv 501 in Swedish army camouflage, late 1990/early 2000s
Kingdom of Sweden (1994-2008)
Infantry Fighting Vehicle – 5 BMP-1s Purchased For Trials, 350 Purchased For Service And Modernized, 83 Purchased For Spare Parts (438 Total)
The Soviet BMP-1 was and remains a ubiquitous infantry fighting vehicle. The most produced vehicle of its type to this day, with almost 40,000 assembled by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia during the Cold War, the vehicle was, with a few exceptions, fielded by pretty much all of the Soviet Union’s allies.
With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, several of these Soviet allies and BMP-1 became much closer to the former Western bloc. The newly reunified Germany inherited the large weapons and armored vehicles stocks of East Germany, including a fleet of more than a thousand BMP-1s. Though a local upgrade program was carried out, in the form of the BMP-1A1 Ost, Germany quickly sold the vast majority of its BMP-1 fleet to European customers interested in acquiring large quantities of surplus infantry fighting vehicles, pretty much off-the-shelf. One of these buyers would be Sweden, which would run its own refit program for the BMP-1. The vehicle was designated Pbv 501 in Swedish Army service.
The Swedish Army and Mechanization in the Early 1990s
At the conclusion of the Cold War, the Swedish Army (Svenska Armén) had a relatively limited fleet of armored vehicles able to carry infantry sections. The only type in any significant service was the Pbv 302, with about 650 vehicles produced. Even then, the vehicle’s production stopped in 1971, and it really was only sufficient to outfit the infantry complement of some armored units.
A Swedish Army Pbv 302. The type would remain in service with the Swedish Army until 2014, being entirely replaced by the CV90 as of today. The Pbv 302 notably served in UN operations in Bosnia and in Kosovo (KFOR). Source: https://www.theworldwars.net/
In practice, the standard transport vehicles in Swedish infantry units were the Tgb 20 (Terrängbil 20) truck and the Bv 206 (Bandvagn 206) tracked articulated all-terrain carrier. In spite of the Bv 206’s positive features, which have resulted in the vehicle continuing in service and having had a successful export record, simply put, it could not fulfil the role of an infantry fighting vehicle The Tgb 20 was a simple truck, and the Bv 206, while tracked and able to mount a machine gun if need be, was not armored.
The Bv 206. It is a potent and capable vehicle able to carry up to 14 infantrymen, far more than the BMP-1’s 8, but it is in no way an infantry fighting vehicle or even an armored personnel carrier. Source: Wikimedia commons
At that time, there was ambition within the Swedish Army to mechanize more of its armored forces. The development of the Strf 9040/CV90 was underway, and the vehicle appeared as a promising future infantry fighting vehicle. However, back then, it had still not entered service, and the possibility of training crew and mechanics to the operation of infantry fighting vehicles before receiving this advanced new vehicle appeared attractive to the Swedish Army.
The German BMPs
A possibility for Sweden to purchase foreign infantry fighting vehicles at an incredibly cheap cost soon emerged from Germany.
NVA Schützenpanzer BMP-1s crossing a river during an exercise. Amphibious capacity was a major aspect of the BMP-1’s design. Source: Pinterest
When first pushed into service in the late 1960s, the BMP-1 was a major addition to the Soviet Red Army’s arsenal, and despite the existence of some previous vehicles, such as the West German HS.30, it is often considered to be the first truly modern Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) to be adopted in massive numbers, at least for the Eastern Bloc. The vehicle could be used to support armored assault in all types of terrains, thanks to its amphibious capacities, and was notably able to carry a section of infantry even in heavily contaminated terrain which would typically be expected after the use of NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical) weapons. Support for accompanying tanks as well as dismounting infantry would be provided by a 73 mm Grom infantry support gun and a Malyutka missile launcher, with four missiles stored in the vehicle.
More than 1,100 BMP-1s (of which a very significant part, or perhaps all, were Czechoslovakian-built) were acquired by the East German NVA (Nationale Volksarmee Eng. National People’s Army), and eventually ended up in the Western-aligned Federal Republic of Germany following German reunification.
Year
BMP-1
Version
1984
878
Sp 2
1986
58
Of them 12 K2 version
1987
85
BMP-1P of them 6 command version K1 and three K2
1988
92
BMP-1P including 12 command K1, three K2, and three K3
Total
1113
Source – https://bmpvsu.ru/gdr.php#1
In December 1990, the decision was taken to maintain a number of these in service, and to this end, the BMP-1 would be ‘westernized’. This resulted in the BMP-1A1 Ost, a BMP-1 which forfeited the missiles, removed toxic asbestos from the vehicle, added German-standard headlights, rear lights, wing mirrors and Leitkreuz low-light identification markers, locked the 5th gear, and added an additional handbrake. Around 580 vehicles werebe converted from 1991 to 1993. The majority of these modernized vehicles, around 500, were sold to Greece in 1994, but around 80 modernized vehicles as well as hundreds of unmodernized ones remained in Germany’s stocks.
BMP-1A1 Osts at the conclusion of their upgrade in the Neubrandenburg repair facility where it was performed. Source: bmpsvu.ru
Sweden Tests the BMP-1
With Sweden eager to purchase infantry fighting vehicles at a cheap cost, and Germany providing just that in the form of hundreds of BMP-1 offered at a bargain price, interest soon arose. In early 1994, interested in the German BMPs, Sweden purchased five vehicles to run trials of the type and see if it would meet the requirements for what the Swedish Army was looking for.
Out of the five trial vehicles, one was used in ballistic trials to estimate the protection of the vehicle. The other four were given Swedish registration plates and named after famous commanders from the Second World War: 204992 ‘Patton’, 204994 ‘Monty’, 204997 ‘Rommel’, and 204998 ‘Guderian’.
“Monty”, one of the four BMP-1s which were used in trials in early 1994. The vehicle sports an unusual infrared spotlight. Source: www.sphf.se
The trials were run pretty quickly. The BMP-1 was, in many ways, not a vehicle which could beadapted to western standards, as the Germans themselves had taken notice and attempted to correct with the BMP-1A1 Ost. If Sweden was interested in purchasing large numbers of vehicles, which would necessarily include some which had not been modernized, a new upgrade programme would have to be devised for the vehicle to be compliant with Swedish army regulations.
Nonetheless, the BMP-1 had some interesting qualities. It was thought to be highly mobile, notably thanks to its amphibious capacities, and as such was considered to outfit the Norrland brigades, infantry brigades operating in northern Sweden specialized in sub-arctic warfare, for which mechanization was desired. Sweden also took interest in German surplus MT-LB multipurpose lightly armored auxiliary vehicles, which would, on the other hand, be given to units operating in southern Sweden.
“Rommel”, another one of the BMP-1s which were trialed by Sweden before adoption of the type. Source: www.sphf.se
In June 1994, convinced that the BMP-1 was a worthwhile addition to the Swedish arsenal, Sweden decided to formally acquire 350 BMP-1s to enter service. A further 83 were also purchased for spare parts. These 433 BMP-1s comprised 81 BMP-1A1 Osts, all the leftovers which had not been purchased by Greece save for one or two examples kept by Germany, 60 BMP-1s which had been through the BMP-1P upgrade during the Cold War (which included a new ATGM and smoke launchers), and 292 BMP-1s which had not gone through the BMP-1P upgrade.
The cost of these BMPs was reportedly extremely cheap, at 33,000 Deutschmarks (or roughly €17,000, or US$19,000) a piece, or one tenth of the price of purchasing a new Bv 206, of which the Swedish Army had thousands. The reason for such a cheap price was that Germany was eager to rid itself of these BMP-1s because of newly put in place military restrictions and to recoup the financial cost of the BMP-1A1 Ost refit program.
*Two photos of a Pbv 501 during exercises of trials. The vehicle bears a Tank Gunnery Simulator System on the barrel and turret top, meant to simulate firing and hits during military exercises. Source: www.sphf.se
Turning BMPs Into Pbvs
As said, the BMP-1, as it was, would not satisfy Swedish standards and would have to go through a modernization process to be operated by the Swedish Army. This, however, would not be conducted in Sweden or by a Swedish company.
While 11 BMP-1s, seemingly of the modernized BMP-1A1 type, would be sent to Sweden to continue trials and experimentations, all others, which were to be modernized, would instead be sent to the Czech Republic. There, the Swedish Army contracted the VOP-026 repair workshop to conduct the modernization which the Swedish Army had decided to carry out.
The 83 IFVs bought for spare parts were also delivered to the Czech company, to cannibalize them if there was a need to replace damaged parts in vehicles which were to enter service. Contracting a Czech workshop was a logical decision. Czechoslovakia had been, by far, the second largest manufacturer of the BMP-1, locally designated as BVP-1. Around 18,000 had been manufactured, and as such, there was a large infrastructure and workforce which had good knowledge of the vehicle. At the same time, Czech companies offered their services at a very affordable cost. The deliveries of these modernized BMP-1s would start in 1996, at a rate of twelve vehicles a month. Once modernized and pressed into service with the Swedish Army, the vehicles would become known as the Pbv 501 (Pansarbandvagn 501).
The paint scheme given to Pbv 501s was either a unicolor green scheme or a bicolor green-and black scheme. The registration number would typically be inscribed on the rear right infantry door. Previously, when in German service, the vehicles had a typical Soviet khaki green paint scheme.
Bringing the Vehicle to Western Standards
The core of the Pbv 501 refit consisted of a large number of small upgrades which focused on bringing aspects of the Pbv 501’s ergonomics and safety to standards expected of Swedish Army vehicles.
A future Pbv 501 in VOP-026. The vehicle has received the side light but has yet to be fitted with the protective cap for the ventilation inlet and outlet. Source: https://bmpvsu.ru/
First would be the removal of asbestos. Some of this toxic element was found inside the BMP-1, notably brake and clutch linings, but it was found to be dangerous for humans after too much exposure, and was banned in most Western countries. Asbestos elements were purged from the vehicle and replaced by harmless materials. The Germans had done the same with their BMP-1A1 Ost refit.
On the outside, the vehicle received new external lighting which would conform to NATO standards. It notably received indicators to be able to pursue safer driving on roads. Two rectangular lights were also present on the side of the vehicle’s hull. Outlets were also added to start up the Pbv 501 from outside of the vehicle.
A rear view of Pbv 501 Nr501089 during exercises, with dismounts sticking out of the deck hatches. This photo provides a good view of the new rear lights and indicators which were present on the vehicle, as well as the black and green camouflage scheme used by the Swedish Army for the type. The crewmember appears to carry a Soviet communication helmet. Source: www.sphf.se
The exhaust pipe of the vehicle was improved, while a number of changes were made to the hull’s exterior so it could be easier to move around for soldiers. A number of patches of anti-slip coating were added. These were notably present around the hull sides and the center of the large hatches present on the deck.
The external change which allows for the easiest external identification of the Pbv 501, however, is likely a rectangular box present to the left of the turret. This is a protective cap over the outlet and inlet of the ventilation.
Internally, a number of changes were carried out to make the vehicle more comfortable for the crew. An autonomous heater was added to ease the life of crews and dismounts during the winter months. A fire detection and extinction system with possibility of automatic operation was installed inside to allow for the quick extinction of fires. The batteries were moved from their original place and isolated from the ventilated crew compartment inside the sealed box. Protective covers were added around the observation devices so the dismounts would not hurt themselves on the sharp corners, something the Germans had previously adopted on the BMP-1A1 Ost. The weapon holders were changed to be able to hold Swedish weapons, with the Ak 5 assault rifle also being able to be fired from the vehicle’s firing ports.
An internal view of a Pbv 501. The vehicle features a number of improvements in the dismount compartment, such as adding covers on the vision devices to prevent injuries. However the small size of the compartment could never have been fixed without a deep transformation of the vehicle. Source: www.sphf.se
Safety Features Limiting the Vehicle’s Armament
A few further modifications concerned the Pbv 501’s armament. Some of them significantly reduced the combat capability of the IFV, however it was a necessary evil needed to lower the operational risks.
First, the autoloading mechanism was removed outright, meaning the gunner present in the turret would have to manually load rounds into the breech. Additionally, the rail for the Malyutka ATGM and all control devices for the missile were removed as well. At last, a new safety mechanism was installed so that the 73 mm Grom and coaxial 7.62 mm PKT machine gun could not be fired when any of the vehicle’s hatches were open.
As such, when taking into account the combat capacities of the Pbv 501, it was likely one of the least capable BMP-1 models ever fielded. This was not an issue for the Swedish Army though. The Pbv 501 had not been purchased with the idea to field a large number of ex-Warsaw Pact infantry fighting vehicles as frontline combattants of the Swedish Army. Rather, the type was to form crews and mechanics around the operation of an infantry fighting vehicle, preparing for the entry of service of the infinitely more capable Strf 0940.
Stripbv 5011 Command Vehicles
Fifteen of the BMP-1s were not converted to be Pbv 501s, but rather Stripbv 5011 command vehicles. These went through the same upgrades as the Pbv 501, with the only changes being the addition of three Swedish radios: a single Ra 420 and two Ra 480, instead of the single Soviet R-123M which was retained in the Pbv 501. This heavier radio equipment took more space and meant the number of dismounts would be reduced from eight to six. Externally, the vehicle could be differentiated by the presence of three large radio antennas, in comparison to just one on the Pbv 501.
A Stripbv 5011. One can observe the three radio antennas on the vehicle. The open door and crewman inside also give an idea of the small size of these vehicles for the average Swedish soldier. Source: www.sphf.se
Deliveries and Disappointments
After deliveries of the Pbv 501s began in 1996, a number of plans the Swedish Army had to be modified because the vehicle had not lived up to all the expectations of the Army.
A Pbv 501 camouflaged with foliage during its short service in the Swedish Army. Source: www.sphf.se
First, the vehicle’s mobility, while generally being considered satisfactory in most conditions, actually struggled quite considerably in the snow, to the point where the vehicle was actually judged not sufficiently mobile to be fielded to the Norrland brigades. As such, the plans to outfit these with the Pbv 501 and brigades from the south with the MT-LB, now designated Pbv 401, were reversed, with the Pbv 501 instead being delivered to southern brigades, more precisely the 2nd, 4th, and 12th infantry brigades of the Swedish Army.
In service, the Pbv 501 proved to have a rather satisfying mobility in the south, but a significant number of issues, some of which could not be removed easily, were found with the vehicle. The first was with the ammunition, and was one which the vehicles shared in German service.
It was discovered that a certain amount of the nitrocellulose had been discharged into the air when firing the 73 mm Grom cannon. It was found potentially harmful to the health of the crew. Swedish trials seemingly found that this was an issue mostly with the PG-15V HEAT round, with the OG-15V high-explosive shell seeming safe in comparison, though the firing of all 73 mm shells appear to have been prohibited in peacetime. In the German Army, the issue of potential nitrocellulose poisoning was solved by restriction, meaning the crews were not allowed to fire the gun, at least not with potentially toxic rounds, in peacetime.
Sweden went even further though. No large stockpile of PG-15V was acquired, meaning even if the need was ever to arise, the Pbv 501 in Swedish service practically had no meansto deal with enemy armor. It appears a small amount of rounds was purchased for conversion into safe training rounds, but it is unclear if this ever took place. In addition to the problem of lack of anti-armor round, the Pbv 501 had removed the autoloader for the sake of safety. This made gunners overtasked, as they had to observe the outside of the vehicle to spot targets, aim and fire, and then reload the gun, a configuration one may cynically relate to be similar to pre-1940 French tanks. Furthermore, as found by the majority of Grom users, the gun was considered to be very inaccurate beyond practically very short range.
A Pbv 501 during maintenance, with the rear road wheel removed. The vehicle’s reliability was generally not too much of an issue, but if it was to break down, replacing the engine would be. Source: www.sphf.se
The vehicle was found to be rather reliable, however, if a mechanical issue was to arise, the removal and replacement of the engine block was found to be a long process, about 10 times longer than in the more modern Strf 9040 in fact. The radios were also a considerable disappointment; in comparison to Swedish models, as they were found to have a poor transmission quality and reduced range, and would require preheating for up to half an hour before functioning.
The limited internal space was found to be an issue for the majority of BMP-1 users. However, Swedish dismounts had probably the worst issues with the Pbv 501’s cramped interior, as Swedish males have an average height of 1.797 m, one of the tallest in the word. This is largely considered to already be in the range where sitting in the vehicle’s dismount compartment would be quite the uncomfortable experience, and finding servicemen who could comfortably operate inside a Pbv 501 was likely even harder for Swedish Army units in comparison to other BMP-1 operators.
Crewmembers and dismounts observe outside of a Pbv 501 during training exercises. Source: www.sphf.se
In and Out
All these issues with the Pbv, alongside the entry into service of the Strf 0940 and the reduction in size of European armies following the end of the Cold War and its tensions, played a large part in the vehicle being retired from active service. As such, it would appear that the Swedish Army took the decision to place the Pbv 501 into storage and stop operating vehicles of this type as early as 2000. This was before deliveries were even completed, which would continue into 2001. Some vehicles were placed directly into storage, without even being issued to Swedish Army units.
Pbv 501s in Swedish Army storage facilities in Hammar, southern Sweden. This photo is particularly useful to have a look at the disposition of anti-slip coated parts of the hull roof. Source: bmpvsu.ru
It appears that, in 2005, the decision was taken to phase the Pbv 501 from service and never issue them again. In practice, the vehicles remained in Swedish Army storage in the following years. In December of 2008, they found a buyer. This was actually the owner of the VOP-026 workshop which had carried the Pbv 501 modernization. The company, by that point known as EXCALIBUR, acquired the vast majority of the Pbv 501 fleet which Sweden had in its hands, with the vehicles being moved to its facilities in Czechia. The purchase price was 30 million Swedish Kronor (or roughly US$6 million) for the entire fleet.
It ought to be noted that apparently, the purchase was done under the cover of the Czech state, claiming that the vehicles would be used for the Czech Army, which still actively operates the BMP/BVP-1, and not purchased by a private company within Czechia. Jan Villaume, spokesperson of the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (Swedish: Försvarets materielverk, abbreviated as FMV), the state company tasked with weapon exports, said that when approached by EXCALIBUR:
“We were [at first] informed by them too that they were interested, and we told them that we cannot sell to them, since they are a private company”
When the Czech Republic later expressed interest, Jan Villaume described the position of FMV as:
“They were exchanging parts of their own fleet and were going to use the rest for spare parts […] They seemed serious. We had no reason not to believe them.”
Pieter Wiezeman, spokesperson for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), described Sweden’s side of the deal and the assumption that the vehicles would end up in Czech service after having first been approached by EXCALIBUR as naive:
“Realistically, I think that they should have known that these tanks probably were not meant for the Czech Republic. They should have investigated this more carefully, that would have been very easy to do.”
Iraq Unsheathes the EXCALIBUR Pbv 501s
The Czech company of EXCALIBUR Army continued storing of the Pbv 501s in its facilities at Přelouč, Czechia, waiting for a potential buyer. The vehicles were stored in particularly packed storage presumably in a climate-controlled environment, and seem to have been pretty regularly maintained, with some vehicles being rolled out quite regularly to show the Pbv 501 were still functional and ready for a buyer to take up the offer.
An EXCALIBUR Pbv 501 is driven around for a demonstration and photoshoot in 2012-2013. Other vehicles of the same type can be seen in the background. Source: bmpvsu.ruTightly-packed Pbv 501s in an EXCALIBUR warehouse, 2012-2013. Source: bmpvsu.ru Pbv 501s being refurbished at EXCALIBUR Army facilities, 2015-2016. Source: bmpvsu.ru
A buyer was finally found in the shape of Iraq, which in 2015 acquired a number of the Pbv 501s stored by EXCALIBUR. Several estimates for the number of Pbv 501s delivered to Iraq have varied between 45 and 70 depending on the source. A convoy was spotted heading to Iraq with at least 52 Pbv 501s. It appears a higher number of vehicles could have been purchased too, perhaps as many as 250. Not all EXCALIBUR Army Pbv 501s were sold to Iraq, as the company has continued to showcase some of the vehicles since.
Pbv 501s on trucks in Iraq, circa late 2015. Source: bmpvsu.ruA convoy of at least 52 Pbv 501s on trucks in Iraq.
This purchase was far from uncontroversial. The main issue was that the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration maintains a pretty strict list of countries which are embargoed from Swedish military sales for a number of reasons, notably regarding human rights or the possibility of the sold equipment to fall into the hands of terrorist groups. Iraq is one of the countries that feature on this list. But the purchase of the Pbv 501 by EXCALIBUR, and EXCALIBUR then selling the vehicles to the Iraqi government, circumvented the Swedish export regulations, which highly displeased some in Sweden. Former Swedish Army weapon systems ending in areas of the world where they did not want them, was exactly what the Swedish Defence Material Administration wanted to prevent.
An EXCALIBUR Pbv 501 is demonstrated in front of civilians in 2017, showing the sale to Iraq did not cover all vehicles and that the Pbv 501 is still on EXCALIBUR’s catalog. Source: bmpvsu.ru
Nonetheless, there was nothing in Sweden’s power to do about Pbv 501s being exported to Iraq. The vehicles ending up in EXCALIBUR’s hands was a shady process to begin with, with FMV and Sweden seemingly not entirely aware that they were selling their vehicles to a private company. Once the vehicles were in the hands and ownership of EXCALIBUR, Sweden had no means at its disposal to prevent the sale except complaints which had little to no hope of being received. Jan Villaume of FMV commented that: “We clearly wouldn’t have made the deal directly with Iraq, so it is now an indirect deal. It seems legal, but is not so good.” It is likely the deal somewhat soured Czech-Swedish relations at least in military matters, but it does not appear any measures or reforms were applied to Swedish export laws. Considering that the vehicles ended up in Iraq as a result of an under-handed process in which Sweden was misguided into selling the vehicles to what they believed to be a legitimate state actor, there may not be too much to even be done except enforcing already existing restrictions.
Into the Iraqi Army
The Pbv 501s were pressed into service into the 34th Mechanized Brigade of the 9th Armored Division of the Iraqi Army (الجيش العراقي). They joined a fleet of ex-Greek BMP-1A1 Ost which had been delivered to Iraq almost a decade prior.
A Pbv 501 in front of modified Humvees during the campaign for Mosul, November 2016. Source: bmpvsu.ru
The Pbv 501 were very heavily engaged in the Iraqi offensive to retake the city of Mosul from the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), and suffered considerable losses during this phase of the conflict. During the 2014 to 2017 period, out of 85 Iraqi BMP-1s spotted as destroyed, 35 were Pbv 501s, despite the vehicle most likely was introduced only in early 2016. It is possible that the Iraqis, while they may have appreciated the comfort upgrades brought by the modernization, were more displeased with the significant reductions in combat capacities it introduced, for example removing the autoloader and missile capacity.
A Pbv 501 destroyed during the battle for Mosul, 6th December 2016. Source: bmpvsu.ru
After the fall of Mosul, the Pbv 501s were engaged in further operations against ISIS, such as the reduction of the last ISIS stronghold in central Iraq, Hawija, in October 2017. The vehicles have notably been seen deployed near the Syrian border in November 2018, and remain in service of the Iraqi Army up to this day, and potentially for the foreseeable future.
Conclusion – The Convoluted Fate of German BMPs
The Pbv 501, alongside its MT-LB cousin, the Pbv 401, can appear as an anomaly in Swedish armored vehicles history, a Soviet vehicle operated by the army that has historically almost exclusively used western and indigenous designs.
When looking at the vehicle’s service life in Sweden, one may be tempted to say the purchase of BMP-1s from Germany was a total failure, with no proper use of the vehicle ever being found in Sweden. While that could be argued not to be far from the truth, at the same time, it ought to be remembered that Sweden was able to purchase ex-East German surplus BMP-1s at an incredibly cheap price, to the point where the investment that had to be placed to purchase 350 BMP-1s was in practice much less than what would be expected for such a large fleet of even outdated infantry fighting vehicles. Despite their very short service, therefore, it is not too far-fetched to say the Pbv 501s may, in the end, very well have been worth their price in the experience they gave to crews and mechanics who would later operate on the Strf 9040.
BMP-1/Pbv 501 as seen during the conversion process in a Czech factoryBMP-1A1 204997 ‘Rommel’ seen during trials in Sweden prior to the bulk purchase of former German BMP-1s, 1994Standard Pbv 501 in Swedish army camouflage, late 1990/early 2000s
Pansarbandvagn 501 Specifications
Dimensions ( L x w x h)
6.735 x 2.94 x 1.881 m
Weight
~13.5 tonnes
Engine
UTD-20 6-cylinders 300 hp diesel engine
Suspension
Torsion bars
Forward gears
5 (likely just 4 on BMP-1A1 Ost-based Pbv 501s)
Fuel capacity
462 L (perhaps just 330 L on BMP-1A1 Ost based vehicles due to rear door fuel tanks not being used)
Maximum speed (road)
65 (likely 40 km/h on BMP-1A1 Ost based vehicles)
Maximum speed (water)
7-8 km/h
Crew
3 (commander, driver, gunner/loader)
Dismounts
8
Radios
1 R-123M (Pbv 501), 1 Ra 420 & 2 Ra 480 (Stripbv 5011)
France (1931-1940)
Anti-tank Gun – Multiple Prototypes and 15 Pre-production Guns Built
The French Army started to experiment with armor-piercing weapons as early as the Great War. During the German offensive of 1914, a vastly overestimated armored car scare led to the French army mobilizing naval 47 mm guns for anti-armor work, notably creating the Autocanon de 47mm Renault. The entrenchment of both sides as 1914 morphed into 1915 put an end to this armored car scare. Later in the war, as tanks became an actively used weapon, countering them became a source of worry again. The vehicles were first employed by France’s ally, Britain, and then by the French themselves, before the Germans would be able to produce and employ their own. But the possibility remained there, and the German Army would also widely use captured British tanks. As such, a number of options were studied as early as 1917 or 1918. This included some infantry support guns which were hoped to also fulfil an anti-armor role, such as the ill-fated American-made 37 mm Bethlehem Steel gun, or the mounting of the ubiquitous 75 mm modèle 1897 gun on a wooden platform which guaranteed wide traverse. In the last weeks of the conflict, the French tested what appeared to be a more mature and potent solution to the problem of enemy tank, the 17 mm Filloux. This was a high-velocity (1,000 m/s) anti-tank gun firing a small caliber, 17×209 mm semi-rimmed cartridge, mounted on the carriage of the very common 37 mm TR modèle 1916 infantry support gun.
The conclusion of the Great War would result in the threat of enemy armored fighting vehicles being vastly less urgent, and likely due to less interest from a scaling-down military, the 17 mm Filloux would not go anywhere. Nonetheless, studies on the matter of anti-tank guns continued in France. While a curious Delaunay-Belleville DB20 20 mm weapon, seemingly sometimes called an “anti-tank machine gun”, was offered in a similar timeframe or soon after the Filloux, it was not adopted either.
In 1921, France launched a program which envisioned both a 10 to 15 mm dual-purpose anti-tank and anti-aircraft machine gun, as well as a dedicated high-velocity anti-tank gun of a caliber smaller than 37 mm. This program would fail to result in the adoption of an anti-tank gun. The machine gun requirement would result in a 13.5 mm MAC dual-purpose prototype and later the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss, which was used strictly in an anti-aircraft role. Meanwhile, in 1927, the state workshop of Atelier de Construction de Puteaux (APX) (Eng: Puteaux Construction Workshops, also known as Puteaux) offered a 20 mm anti-tank gun; but the caliber was found to be too small to result in sufficient armor-piercing capacities. New specifications were issued in 1928, this time clearly requesting a 25 mm semi-automatic gun.
Puteaux and the French Army’s Small-Caliber Anti-Tank Gun
As the requirements of the French army evolved, APX was heavily involved in attempting to design the anti-tank gun that was requested. The Atelier de Construction de Puteaux (Eng: Puteaux Construction Workshops) was set up in the second half of the 19th century and had, by the conclusion of the First World War, become a major artillery manufacturer for the French Army, housing the designers of many different types of artillery pieces.
In 1928, following the failure to adopt a workable dual anti-tank and anti-air machine gun, and the perceived lack of power of Puteaux’s 20 mm anti-tank gun prototype (of which no views have emerged, unfortunately), new requirements were issued by the French Army. Under the new program, the army now wanted a 25 mm anti-tank gun with a semi-automatic breech, firing a 350 gram projectile at a muzzle velocity of at least 700 m/s, and able to penetrate a 25 mm armor plate at an incidence of 20° and at a range of 600 m. The army notably placed very strict weight requirements on the gun, which should be no heavier than 180 kg. It was desired to have a gun that could be separated into four different parts for the sake of easy transportation. These weights and dismounting requirements would eventually be dropped as it became evident the designers could not design a gun that both met with the armor-piercing performances requested and have such light construction and good mobility.
APX was likely put to work on designing a 25 mm anti-tank gun as early as these new requirements were placed. The private company Hotchkiss also followed suit. Both manufacturers were able to present their first prototypes in 1931. These first designs are regrettably nebulous, and no views of them have emerged to this day. Neither were considered to have sufficiently adequate performances to be adopted. It is known, however, that the Puteaux gun’s general design was noted to follow the requirements, which was not the case of the Hotchkiss. The private manufacturer’s gun used wheels with a mixed iron and wooden construction, which was not judged as satisfactory by the evaluating commission.
The 1933 Prototype
Following the 1931 prototype’s rejection, engineers at APX went back to work and eventually submitted a new prototype in September 1933. This prototype is somewhat less obscure than the first, although no photos attributable to it are known to exist.
A prototype 25 mm APX anti-tank gun attached to a Renault UE armored tractor. Exactly what model of 25 mm APX gun this is is uncertain. It does not exactly match the known configurations of the later 1935 prototype and 1936 pre-production guns, and as such could perhaps be the 1933 prototype. This, however, should not be taken as a certainty, as this could also simply be either a 1935 or 1936 gun using different wheels. Source: CAAPC (Centre des Archives de l’Armement et du personnel)
The Puteaux gun fired a 25 mm armor-piercing projectile at a muzzle velocity of 950 m/s. This was not the same shell as the 25 mm Hotchkiss. Both guns used ammunition designed in-house. At 330 grams, the weight of the Puteaux projectile was 10 grams heavier than the Hotchkiss one. The APX prototype had a more archaic breech. Whereas the Hotchkiss design used a true semi-automatic action, the APX one is better described as a partial semi-automatic. When inserting a new shell into the breech, it would begin to close, but not all the way through; the loader would have to finish moving the breech into position with his thumb. Once fired, the action would eject the cartridge and put itself back into battery, breech open and ready for a new shell to be inserted.
Otherwise, the APX gun used a fairly classic split-trail design. Its wheels used a stamped sheet metal construction with filled out ribs. The gun weighed 398 kg and the barrel was reportedly 1.86 m long, making the gun an L/74. When adding a flash hider, the length of the barrel would be extended to 2.23 m.
The Puteaux and Hotchkiss designs were subjected to comparative trials in early 1934. According to an internal note of the French Ministry of War dated from January 1st, 1934, 20 of each design were to be experimented on. It is unclear if this batch of 20 APX gun was ever manufactured, Comparative trials between the two guns began in the Etablissement Techniques de Bourges (Eng: Bourges Technical Establishment, Bourges also being the location of another state artillery manufacturer, ABS) in March of 1934. They ended up very unfavorable for the APX design. Not only was the not fully semi-automatic action judged inferior to the Hotchkiss one, but the security of triggers, locking of the elevation and traverse control when in travel mode, and suspension of the carriage were all judged to require significant revisions on the APX design. Pretty much the only advantage it is known to have had over the Hotchkiss gun was being 80 kg lighter.
These trials led to an unsurprising conclusion. The Hotchkiss design was approved by the Minister of War on June 16th, 1934, and by decision of the Conseil Supérieur de la Guerre (Eng: Superior Council of War), was adopted by the French Army as the canon de 25 mm SA modèle 1934 (Eng: 25mm SA (semi-automatic) gun pattern 1934) on September 3rd.
An abandoned Hotchkiss 25 mm SA 34 during the campaign of France. The type was by far the most common anti-tank gun of the French Army by 1940. Source: http://www.materielsterrestres39-45.fr/
1935 Revision
One may have expected the adoption of the Hotchkiss gun to lead to development being concluded on the Puteaux design, seeing as its niche was now fulfilled within the French army. This was not, however, the case. Likely as soon as the trials proved to go south for the APX design, work began on an improved model of the Puteaux gun, with a reworked prototype being once again presented in January of 1935. This prototype is the first of which there exist clearly identified photos.
A front view of the 1935 prototype, likely at the APX factory. Source: GBM 101
Significant work had been performed in order to make the APX design competitive with the Hotchkiss. The gun abandoned its proprietary cartridge and was redesigned to fire the same 25 mm projectile as the Hotchkiss. Its action was also improved to now be truly semi-automatic, without a need for further movement of the breech by the loader after inserting a round. The barrel featured a large muzzle shroud. The gun used a one-piece shield, with an opening for the sight (likely the L.711) present on the top right of the barrel. The protection of the shield was actually supplemented by the carriage’s wheels. The wheels on this APX prototype were designed to move alongside the split trail, so that when the gun would be deployed, the wheels would be angled towards the front of the gun. Furthermore, they were likely to be made of armor quality steel. The consequence of that was a direct improvement of the gun’s frontal protection, as well as an increase in the space allocated to the crew operating the gun. Such a design had already been adopted for some other artillery pieces in the 1930s: notably, the 1933 carriage designed under such principles was adopted for some 75 mm model 1897 guns as well as eventually the model 1935 short 105 mm gun. Owing to their armor-quality steel construction, the wheels lacked any pneumatics or pneumatic rim, and due to their dual function as additional protection did not feature prominent ribs or openings. While this feature would typically make a gun heavier, at 400 kg, the revised 1935 prototype was still 80 kg lighter than the Hotchkiss gun adopted the year prior. The full length of the gun and carriage was 3.50 m.
A side view of the APX 25 mm SA prototype. The link between the movement of the wheels and split-trail can be observed here. Source: GBM 101
It is likely that this 1935 prototype presented a considerable improvement over the previous design, notably thanks to its truly semi-automatic action. By this point, however, a gun exactly in the same category as the 25 mm SA 34 was not what the French army was looking for. While satisfactory in terms of armor-piercing performances, the Hotchkiss gun proved too heavy, and a lighter gun which would prove more mobile on the field was desired. At only 80 kg lighter, this APX prototype was not judged as interesting to fulfill that role, and as such APX was requested to begin work on a lightened 25 mm gun. This design would take some inspiration from previous APX 25 mm anti-tank gun designs, but with deep changes in order to accommodate a lighter construction. A first prototype would be offered in 1936, and the lightened gun would be adopted as the APX SA-L 37 in 1937.
The 1936 prototype of the APX lightened 25 mm anti-tank gun. Though experience gained while working on the heavier type of 25 mm anti-tank gun was certainly re-used while designing the lighter model, it was a major departure from this previous type. Source: GBM 101The production model of the APX lightened 25 mm gun, designated as Canon de 25 mm SA-L 37 APX, seen in France’s Saumur Tank Museum. About a fifth of the French Army’s 25 mm anti-tank guns were of this type during the campaign of France, the others being the classic 25 mm SA 34 type. In comparison to the 480 kg SA 34, the SA-L 37 weighed in at 310 kg, but proved unable of motorized traction due to a much more fragile carriage. Source: flickr
Pre-Production of the “Heavy” APX Gun
One would once again expect the army’s request for APX to design a lightened 25 mm anti-tank gun to bury the heavier design. But once again, it somehow lingered on.
The French Direction de l’Infanterie (Eng: Infantry Directorate) formally decided to place an order for a small amount of the heavy 25 mm APX design for experimental use on March 13th 1936. The order was for 15 guns, which would each be delivered alongside 30 ordinary armor-piercing shells, 20 blank shells and 100 reduced range training shells. These guns were meant to be delivered in April, with the goal of conducting further comparative tests against the 25 mm SA 34, on a wider scale. They would be delivered to a varied set of units. It appears five infantry regiments received APX guns, these being the 60th, 67th and 95th infantry regiments, alongside the 8th Zouaves and the 21st African Tirailleurs regiments. Reportedly, eight cavalry units were also to be included in the list of units set to receive these guns.
While the guns were delivered for trials at first, they would be kept within the inventory of their units. They did not replace the 25 mm SA 34 guns, which were apparently present in their normal complement within these regiments, but instead served to supplement them. In effect, this meant the regiments experimenting the guns would have one or two additional pieces, which were not of the same model as their standard anti-tank gun but fired the same projectile. The guns were still known to be in service in May of 1938. At this date, the French Direction of Infantry suggested to make use of the guns within fortified positions in the 1st and 7th military regions (these being, respectively, centered around Lille and Besançon – both on France’s eastern border, but in the periphery of the area directly bordering Germany rather than on this part of the front). This was not necessarily a bad idea; the guns would likely see far less wear in forts than in the field, which would ease supply, as spare parts would be far harder to obtain for such a small complement of guns in comparison to the widespread 25 mm anti-tank projectile. However, it appears this suggestion was never carried out, or in any case it certainly did not include all the manufactured pieces.
Still Around by 1940
Despite their small production numbers, there is photographic evidence the pre-production 25 mm APX anti-tank guns were still in use by the Fall of France in 1940. Two known photos show a park of 25 mm anti-tank guns captured and gathered by German forces during or after the Fall of France. Most of these are 25 mm SA 34, as would be expected, but two 25 mm APX guns can be seen within the park, as well as some SA-L 37s.
A photo of the park in which the Puteaux guns were found: the gun circled in left and the one to its right are pre-production APX guns. Most of the other guns are Hotchkiss 25 mm SA 34, but some, such as the third gun in the row closest to the camera, are the 25 mm APX SA-L 37 lightened gun. Source: ebay via ATF 40 forumThe same captured guns storage park seen from another angle. The large barrel shroud of the Puteaux gun is easy to compare with the much thinner barrel of the SA 34 on this image. Source: ebay via ATF 40 forum
Unfortunately, the context and location behind these photographies remains unknown, but it confirms the guns were still around in 1940, and very likely in the field – German troops rarely if ever took the effort to move pieces from French fortifications. As such, it is even likely the APX gun may have seen some action during the campaign of France.
Conclusion – The Unlucky Competitor to the Hotchkiss Anti-Tank Gun
The original, full-weight model of APX 25 mm anti-tank gun remains an obscure curiosity in the arsenal of weapons developed and even used by the French army in the interwar era. Though apparently better suited to the requirements than the Hotchkiss at first, the design quickly failed to impress as the Hotchkiss gun swiftly improved and proved to offer better features. Nonetheless, the APX gun somewhat lingered on, likely due to some bias against private companies which was known to exist in pre-1940 France and resulted in the opportunity of a gun designed by a state-owned designer not being discarded even as an alternative was adopted. APX would eventually go on to design a lightened 25 mm anti-tank gun which was very loosely based on their previous design, and would finally see adoption. But even as this lightened gun was actively being developed, the heavier design curiously managed to secure a small pre-production order, which would result in a tiny amount of pieces being in service in 1940. Even for the unit operating them, this likely did not mean anything – the gun would likely offer similar performances to the 25 mm SA 34 overall, being perhaps easier to move around somewhat and better protected, but likely less ergonomic in their controls. They, however, remain an interesting curiosity and an extremely obscure part of France’s 1940 arsenal of anti-tank weaponry.
25mm SA APX. An illustration by AMX-13.
Specifications
Weight (Deployed)
398 kg (1933 prototype), 400 kg (1935 prototype)
Length (With Carriage)
3.50 m (1935 prototype)
Caliber
Unique 25 mm 330 grams cartridge fired at 950 m/s (1933 prototype)
25×193.5mmR Hotchkiss (1935 prototype)
Sight
Likely L.711
Numbers produced
Several prototypes, 15 pre-production guns
Sources
GBM n°97, Juillet-Août-Septembre 2011, “Les canons semi-automatiques antichars de 25 mm Première Partie: Le canon de 25 mm SA modèle 1934”, Eric Denis et François Vauvillier, pp 86-95
GBM n°101, Juillet-Août-Septembre 2012, “Le canon de 25 SA léger modèle 1937, le petit de Puteaux”, Eric Denis, pp 75-83
Renault VM concept as illustrated by Pavel Alexe, funded by our Patreon campaign.
France (1931)
Light Armored Reconnaissance Vehicle – Design Only
During the interwar years, the French Army’s cavalry service was a force actively seeking new types of vehicle to introduce to its forces, generally more so than the better-funded infantry. There were active doctrinal developments within the Cavalry which led to new roles being created, for which various manufacturers would offer designs. In the early 1930s, the concept of a very light vehicle tasked with reconnaissance duties and armed with a machine gun was gaining popularity within the Cavalry. The Citroën P28 was the first vehicle adopted, in 1931. Renault, the largest vehicle manufacturer in France, did not want to allow its competitor Citroën to gain the lead and be able to sell vehicles to the French Army uncontested. As Citroën had done, it began the design process based on a logistical armored vehicle it had recently designed. A turreted light tank/tankette model designed in this manner was already in existence by late 1931.
Reconnaissance Vehicles and Citroën’s Successes
The French Cavalry ended the First World War with a varied fleet of armored cars of various weights, sizes and armaments. In the interwar years, the need for new, more modern vehicles was apparent, including vehicles which could fulfil a reconnaissance role.
In July 1930, the French Army approved an ambitious program which was to lead to the creation of vehicles to fulfill a large variety of roles. This was the general motorisation program. It called for two types of vehicles which would fulfil a reconnaissance role: a voiture de reconnaissance tout terrain blindée (Eng: all-terrain reconnaissance armored car) and a Automitrailleuse légère tout terrain (Eng: all-terrain light armored car). “Automitrailleuse” is a term that, although often translated as armored car, when used in the context of interwar French Cavalry, is used to designate all armored combat vehicles, regardless of means of motion. In other words, a program that, in English, would be translated as an armored car program, could in fact refer to a half-track or fully tracked
The first requirement would eventually evolve into the Type L armored car specification, for which Renault would produce the ill-fated Renault URL armored car.
The armed Renault UE prototype. This was an experimental prototype created shortly after the early VM for demonstration purposes, with the only change from the original UE being a raised compartment for the co-driver, who was tasked with operating the machine gun. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
In comparison, the second set of requirements would quickly fall under the influence of a specification for a vehicle which would be ordered in much higher numbers – the Type N. The Type N was envisioned as a lightweight all-terrain, lightly armored infantry tractor and cargo vehicle. Three companies produced vehicles for this program: Latil offered a licence-built Carden-Loyd Mk.VI; Citroën offered the Citroën P28 chenillette, a half-tracked vehicle; and Renault offered a tankette, inspired by the general design features of the influential Carden-Loyd but by all means its own design. This was the Renault UE, a light (2.64 tonnes) and tiny (2.8 m long, 1.74 m wide, and 1.25 m high) tankette with a crew of two and protected by thin, bulletproof armor. It had a leaf spring suspension with three bogies containing two road wheels each, using a front sprocket and rear idler and supported by two return rollers.
Creating a Reconnaissance Vehicle Using the Renault UE as the Basis
The specifications of the Type N, which called for a lightweight, fairly mobile, bulletproof vehicle, co-incidentally proved to create designs which would provide a good basis for the kind of light reconnaissance vehicles the French Cavalry was seeking. Both Citroën and Renault would offer vehicles to fulfill such a role based on their logistical tankettes. Citroën offered a modified version of its P28, which was ordered in October 1931.
The Renault design was created around the same timeframe as the Citroën, in autumn 1931. The design would retain the same very short length of 2.8 m as the UE, and perhaps the same or at least a similar width of 1.74 m. However, there were major structural changes to the vehicle. Renault gave this modified design the internal code “Renault VM”.
Instead of retaining the front crew compartment, centrally-placed engine, and rear-mounted stowage area of the original UE, the VM’s crew compartment would instead be placed towards the left and rear of the vehicle, with an engine to the front and right.
A side schematic view of the early Renault VM, showing the similar drivetrain in comparison to the UE, as well as the turret and crew positions. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The largest difference in the vehicle design was the presence of a turreted armament. The early VM design featured a turret which was mounted on the left of the vehicle, behind the driver’s position, which was positioned in the same way as on an UE. The turret featured on the schematics of the vehicle was a fairly simplistic design. It would be armed with the new machine gun available for fortifications and armored vehicle designs, the 7.5 mm MAC 31. The MAC 31 Type E had a weight of 11.18 kg empty and 18.48 kg with a fully loaded 150-round drum magazine. The machine gun was gas-fed, and had a maximum cyclic rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute. It had a muzzle velocity of 775 m/s. The ammunition stowage present on the early Renault VM design is unknown. The turret would have housed a single crewmember, the gunner/commander. It appears that a small cupola would have been placed towards the rear of the turret, and would likely have had some sort of vision device, such as a panoramic periscope. From the design, the turret appears to have been very small overall, to the point it would have been quite cramped. It also appears that no reloads for the machine gun would be present in the turret, with all the magazines (the MAC 31 using 150-rounds drum magazines) having to be stowed inside the hull instead.
The other major structural change of the early VM design in comparison to the UE was the engine, with the early VM being designed to have a more powerful engine. Its potential horsepower output is unknown, as Renault used an alternative means of power measurement for it, CV. It would have been a 15 CV engine. In comparison, the original UE’s Renault 75 was a 10 CV engine producing 30 hp, while the AMR 33’s 24 CV engine would produce 84 hp. Unlike the centrally-mounted position on the UE, the engine was shifted to the right on the early VM design. This would have been a fairly uncommon feature at the time. As lateral space was quite limited, the radiator and ventilator would have had to be shifted at 90° and be installed to the rear of the engine, in a fairly distinct manner which would have also been quite rare at the time. The radiator, in particular, would have been installed as far to the back as the turret would have been, and the gunner would have effectively been sandwiched between the radiator on his right and the hull’s wall to the left.
A top view of the early VM design’s structural arrangement, showing the position of the crew as well as the engine block, which extended over the whole short 2.7 m length of the vehicle. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The suspension of the vehicle would have used the same components as the Renault UE, with three leaf springs bogies on which two small road wheels were mounted, a front sprocket and a rear idler. However, unlike on the UE, the sprocket and idler would have been placed higher. Though the return rollers are not seen on the schematics, they would very likely have been present.
Armor protection at this point in time would also very likely have been the same as the UE, with 9 mm on vertical surfaces and 6 mm on all other plates.
Rejection
Renault’s early VM design was submitted to the technical services of the French Cavalry at some point in autumn 1931. The vehicle was formally rejected by the French Cavalry on November 12th 1931.
A first review of the design by the French Cavalry was fairly negative. Several design choices of the vehicle were deemed subpar and proved unpopular, as some of the design features were quite unconventional for the time. Among which was the rear-turreted configuration, which the French Army would continue to object to on future evolutions of Renault’s light armored vehicle proposals. Another source of discontent was the engine’s offset mounting to the right. Furthemore, the engine was not thought to be powerful enough to allow for the vehicle to reach a high enough speed. This was further worsened by the use of a suspension almost identical to the UE, with six small road wheels mounted on leaf springs, which would generally favor cross-country mobility but make reaching higher maximum speeds harder. There were also issues with the proposed placement of the radiator all the way to the right, with the position of the commander, cramped between the radiator and the left wall of the vehicle.
During the same period, the French Cavalry had been somewhat pleased with the design of Citroën’s offer, the P28, and had ordered 50 vehicles of a modified version of the half-track tractor, now fulfilling a light reconnaissance vehicle role. As such, there was no immediate need for a swift replacement at this point in time, though the P28 was not viewed as a viable long-term solution but only as a stopgap.
Conclusion – A Failure which would Lead to Many Successes
The rejection of the early Renault VM in November 1931 would not be the end of Renault’s light reconnaissance vehicle designs, far from it. The P28 was considered to only be viable as a stopgap solution, and there was still a need for a more capable vehicle to offer a more durable reconnaissance platform. Formal specifications for such a vehicle would be formulated by the French Army on January 16th 1932.
One of the five Renault VM prototypes, n°79 756, is seen during the large French Army maneuvers of summer 1932. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
Renault would provide a modified version of its existing VM design, which would undergo many changes, most notably, a lengthened hull allowing for less tight and cramped spacing, a more powerful engine, and a new suspension and turret designs. Five prototypes of this design would be ordered in April 1932 and, in a true industrial feat at the time, completed in time to participate in large French Army maneuvers in the summer of 1932. These would eventually lead to the AMR 33, of which 118 new production vehicles would be manufactured in addition to the five prototypes. After this the even more produced AMR 35, a further evolution of the VM design, came. These were two success stories for Renault’s 1930s armored fighting vehicles design, despite the failure of the original VM design.
Renault VM concept as illustrated by Pavel Alexe, funded by our Patreon campaign.
AMR 35, equipped with the AVIS-1 turret (Batignolles-Châtillon) and the 7.5 mm (0.295 in) Reibel Châtellerault MAC31 machine gun. Illustration: Hadrien Barthélemy.
France (1933-1940)
Reconnaissance Vehicle (Light Tank/Tracked Armored Car) – 2 Converted, 1 Prototype, and 167 Production Vehicles Built
The AMR 35 was a tracked reconnaissance vehicle designed by Renault in the mid-1930s. Designed as a follow-up to issues the French Cavalry had with the AMR 33, it lengthened the vehicle and adopted a more standard configuration with a rear engine. Although it improved on its predecessor in some ways, the AMR 35 would prove particularly hard to get in proper working order once vehicles started rolling off the production line, the scale of delays and issues being a major cause between the whole class of AMR vehicles being basically discontinued.
An AMR 35 ZT-1 of the 3rd GAM in early 1937. The vehicle is here in its more recognizable form, sporting the Avis n°2 turret. Source: EPCA-D via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François Vauvillier
The French Cavalry’s Search for a Vehicle
In the decade that followed the end of the Great War, the French Cavalry found itself in a dire position when it came to acquiring new vehicles. Sidelined by the Infantry and Artillery branches during trench warfare, the Cavalry branch did see the potential armored vehicles offered for exploitation and considered mechanized formations to be an interesting prospect to study. However, without the funds necessary to acquire vehicles for such experiments, it largely had to rely on WW1 relics and ad hoc vehicles for most tasks, including close reconnaissance. Throughout the 1920s, purchases of armored fighting vehicles were few and far between. The purchase of 16 Citroën-Kégresse P4T-based half-track armored cars in 1923 and 96 Schneider P16 half-track later in the decade, though delivered in 1930-1931, was the most significant purchase throughout the decade. These vehicles were far from fast, agile armored reconnaissance vehicles one would imagine a cavalry force operating.
The beginning of the 1930s finally saw additional funding that allowed the Cavalry to look into vehicles to fulfill more roles. Following the spread of the concept of tiny tracked armored vehicles into France and the adoption by the Infantry of the Renault UE armed tractor, the Cavalry would look into a vehicle of this size to provide a small, close-reconnaissance vehicle.
First, 50 Citroën P28 were adopted. These half-tracked vehicles, based on a rejected armored tractor prototype, were constructed of mild steel and only considered as training vehicles. Renault would soon offer a design derived from its own Renault UE, though it would differ very significantly from the tractor design. Given the internal designation code VM, work on this vehicle would begin as early as late 1931. After a remarkably fast assembly, five prototypes would be experimented with during large scale maneuvers in September 1932. The VM was not a perfect design, but it had some notable advantages. Its speed was, at the time, unrivaled in a fully tracked armored vehicle, particularly in France. The vehicle’s weight remained limited, at around 5 tonnes, and it was also fairly low-profile. The use of a fully tracked configuration gave it superior cross-country performances in comparison to half-track or wheeled vehicles.
A Citroën P28 in the final configuration of the vehicle. Source: char-françaisVM prototype N°79756 is seen during the September 1932 maneuvers. Source: Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillie
After some aspects of the VM which had left to be desired at first, notably the suspension, were improved upon, the first order for what would now be designated the AMR 33 was placed on March 8th 1933. However, the French Army was majorly unhappy with the AMR 33’s engine configuration, and Renault could not easily fix it. The vehicle used an engine mounted to the right side, with the fighting compartment on the left side, instead of using a separate rear or even front engine compartment. As a result, the AMR 33 proved to be front-heavy. Beyond that, this somewhat unorthodox configuration was disliked by both crews and by fairly traditionalist officers within the Vincennes trials commission and procurement services.
Though criticism of the AMR 33’s engine placement appeared very soon in the design’s life, they would become particularly loud near the vehicle’s adoption in spring 1933. These reached the point where it appeared clear to Renault that designing a modified vehicle with a rear engine configuration was unavoidable if the company wanted to continue seeing its design adopted for the role of AMR, which other manufacturers, notably Citroën, could be interested in trying to fulfill. The new rear-engined design received the two-letter code of ZT, and work on designing it and modifying VM prototypes to prove the concept quickly started.
From VM To ZT
Though criticism of the configuration had been formulated before, requests for a rear-engined Renault AMR intensified in early 1933, as adoption of the VM neared and was finally carried out.
AMR 33s of the 2nd GAM in 1937. One can observe the asymmetrical configuration of the vehicle, with the engine to the right and the turret to the left. Source: Photo taken by Chaillan, Soyer Collection, via R.Potié, via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
At an unclear date, in quite early 1933, Renault received a request to design a rear-engined AMR from the STMAC (Section Technique du Matériel Automobile – ENG: Technical Section of Automotive Material). STMAC’s request reportedly included some basic schematics of how such a vehicle could be arranged, with the ambitious prospect of keeping the same overall dimensions. Renault responded by analyzing these schematics, and found that keeping the same dimensions was unrealistic. This was a quite reasonable conclusion. Having the separate crew and engine compartments not side-by-side would naturally lengthen the vehicle, even if each would be shorter on its own. On April 21st 1933, Renault’s technical services responded to STMAC by offering to slightly lengthen the AMR design (by that point, the VM had been adopted as the AMR 33 the previous month), but Renault appeared quite skeptical of the prospect. Evidently, the manufacturer was not enthusiastic about a deep redesign of its AMR, and this manifested in the wording of its answer to the STMAC:
“En résumé, si vos services le jugent utile, nous sommes disposés à étudier un véhicule avec un moteur à l’arrière, sans toutefois nous rendre compte des avantages de ce véhicule sur celui existant”
“To sum up, if your services judge it useful, we are ready to study a rear-engined vehicle, though however we do not realize how this vehicle would have advantages over the existing one [the AMR 33]” .
Nonetheless, as keeping with the VM design would evidently risk jeopardizing further orders, Renault started working on a rear-engined AMR in the following months. Renault’s work was two-fold, working both on the drawing board, but also trying to produce a prototype as soon as possible. This would not be an entirely newly-built vehicle. Back in 1932, Renault had produced five VM prototypes, in an effort to allow experimentation on the AMR on more of a platoon level instead of a single vehicle. As the VM had been adopted and experimentations were, overall, finalized, these VM prototypes became available for new projects. This included trying various accessories and suspensions, converting two of them to production standard in 1935, and even converting some to a rear-engined configuration. This new design would be given the internal two-letter code “ZT”, and as such, a VM prototype would actually also become the first ZT prototype.
The first prototype of the ZT was originally a VM. Notice the coil spring suspension, which on the ZT would only be found on the converted VM prototypes. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François Vauvillier
Work of the first VM-ZT conversion likely began in late 1933. Modifications were performed on prototype n°79 759, the second-to-last VM prototype in the registration order, though it ought to be noted all VM prototypes were identical when first made and produced in the same timeframe, and would only feature different configurations later, as different subsystems were tried on them. This conversion was reportedly quite ad hoc, as would be expected of a prototype modified to a largely different configuration.
Significantly modifying prototypes was quite common in 1930s France. Perhaps the most radical example was B1 n°101, the first prototype of the B1 tank, which would become an experimental ‘mule’, used initially for turret experiments, then as a weight testing vehicle for studies for what would become the B1 Bis, and eventually, deeply transformed into a sort of mock-up/proof-of-concept prototype for the B1 Ter.
A rear view of the first prototype, unique in many ways. Note the grille to the left and the one-part hatch to the right. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierA front view of the vehicle, which removed the radiator grille on the right. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François Vauvillier
The vehicle was lengthened, seemingly by the addition of a 20 cm-long section bolted on between the front and rear of the hull, around the level of the fourth road wheel. As requested, a transversely-mounted engine was fitted in a rear compartment. This was a new powerplant, the most powerful ever mounted on an AMR. It was an 8-cylinder Nerva Stella engine producing 28 CV (a French unit of measurement). It was likely still a design closely linked to the Reinestella 24 CV eight-cylinder engine of production AMR 33s, which, comparatively, produced 85 hp. The configuration of the rear glacis of the vehicle was switched around. A larger aeration grill was mounted to the left, and a smaller access door, a one-piece plate with a handle mounted on two hinges, on the right. The exhaust was mounted below the grille and door.
From the front, the vehicle was easy to differentiate from a standard VM due to the radiator grill being removed. At this point, the vehicle kept the coil spring suspension of the standard AMR 33, though a rubber block suspension had already been at prototype stage on VMs for about a year at this point. Though, when a prototype, the vehicle had mounted the ill-fated Renault turret, it received the standard Avis n°1 when serving as a ZT prototype. Oddly enough, at some point after it was experimented with, it would be refitted with its original turret, presumably to use its Avis n°1 turret on another vehicle. The vehicle was given a new provisional registration number of 5292W1.
This first deeply modified VM was completed by Renault and showcased in February 1934. A technical evaluation was first performed in Renault’s facilities, after which the vehicle was sent to the Vincennes trials commission in mid-February. The prototype would obviously be quite different from a newly-built rear-engined version of the AMR, and was mostly meant to act as a proof-of-concept to test out ergonomic aspects.
Soon after this prototype was presented, on February 27th, General Flavigny, the director of France’s Cavalry branch, addressed a letter to Renault higher-up François Lehideux. He expressed interest in the prototype, which he said would match with the Army’s goal to adopt a vehicle less tiring for its operators to crew in comparison to the AMR 33. Flavigny would go on to say a sort of official, privileged partnership between Renault and the French state would be beneficial, quoting the relationship between Vickers and the British government as a comparison. He later went on to mention technical characteristics which could prove interesting in the future. He notably expressed interest in a vehicle which would be less “blind”, and, curiously, in a cast steel version of the AMR in a few years from then, as the technology was being developed in France. The advantages he quoted for a cast vehicle were that it would be better sealed and require less maintenance in comparison to riveted or bolted construction. This hypothetical cast AMR would seemingly never go beyond this letter. It is interesting to note, however, that the elements inspired by the AMRs, notably in terms of suspension, would be mounted on a number of cast vehicles designed by Renault, namely the R35 light tank.
Another side view of the first ZT prototype, showing the irregularity of the bolting on the side. The vehicle was by no means comparable to a newly-made prototype. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierThe Renault R35 would receive the same suspension as the AMR 35, but its qualities would largely evaporate on a 10.6 tonnes infantry tank. The suspension is generally remembered as one of the many weaknesses of the R35. Source: char-français
Second Prototype
Results from the trials of the first ZT prototype were particularly interesting. The vehicle was experimented on by officers of the 3rd GAM (Groupement d’Automitrailleuses – Armored Car Group). The main goals of the ZT, improving the vehicle’s ergonomics and placating the French Army by pushing the engine to the rear, appear to have been met. But the prototype also proved able to reach even higher speeds than before thanks to the more powerful 28CV engine. On February 21st, it peaked at 72 km/h, the fastest French tracked AFV by far and one of the fastest in the world as well. The vehicle would be equalled by the M1 Combat Car, a vehicle which would be slightly under 3 tonnes heavier than the ZT, at 9.1 tonnes, but feature a much more powerful 250 hp engine, while the AMR 35’s 28CV would likely have been somewhere in the 90-100 hp range.
However, while the maximum speed the vehicle reached was certainly impressive, officers who experimented with the vehicle doubted the 28CV 8-cylinder engine truly was a good idea. Though indeed very powerful, it would also require extensive maintenance as well as careful and skilled operation. At this point, the idea of giving the ZT a 4-cylinder bus engine was brought up by officers. It was thought that an engine of this type would still be powerful enough to provide the ZT with a great mobility, while proving much more sturdy and easier to operate and to maintain.
This feedback was immediately taken by Renault. In March, the company worked on converting a second Renault VM prototype, n°79 760 (last in the registration order) to a ZT. This prototype, redesignated 5282W1, was showcased in early April 1934, being experimented on by the trials commissions from April 3rd to 11th. Though the vehicle had been lengthened in the same way as the first prototype, a number of changes had been brought in. Most significantly, as had been requested, it featured a 4-cylinder engine. It was indeed based on a bus engine, the Renault 408, but had been somewhat craft-modified to offer better performance, and was thus redesignated as the Renault 432. It produced 22CV. In trials, this second prototype was able to reach 64 km/h. This was still a very desirable maximum speed for a tracked vehicle at the time. To compensate for the small loss of maximum speed, the prototype proved not only much easier to operate and sturdier, but also less fuel-hungry, giving it a more extensive range.
Some smaller changes were also incorporated into this second prototype. The first prototype featured a stowage sponson to the left, but not to the right. The second incorporated a second one to the right, in order to increase internal space. It also featured significant changes to the rear. The one-part door was replaced by a two-part one, each part featuring a handle and mounted on two hinges. The exhaust was also modified, from a single-housing exhaust below the grille and door, to an exhaust housed in two distinct parts, on top of the grille and door.
A rear view of the second prototype. Note the new exhaust, on top of the grille and hatch, and the rear two-part hatch with handles around the center, instead of one part with the handle to the side. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierA front view of the second vehicle with all the driver’s hatches opened, this part still being identical on the AMR 33. Note the lack of fenders. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierA side view of the second conversion, presumably after some trials. The suspension, still identical to the VM besides being lengthened, has its coil springs covered in dirt. Note the hollow wheels, sprocket and idler. These will not be retained on the production model of the Renault ZT. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François Vauvillier
Overall, this second ZT prototype, despite still being a converted VM, proved promising for the French military, to the point where it managed to secure adoption and an order for 100 vehicles on May 15th 1934. It ought to be noted that this was by all means a quick adoption. No ZT prototype had yet been built from scratch, despite some components of the VM prototypes, the coil spring suspension, for example, being intended to be replaced by very different systems in the final ZT. As a caveat, the desired rubber block suspension was already at experimental stage on VM prototype n°79758. This fast adoption also largely hurt competition, notably Citroën, which had not yet had the time to present prototypes trying to outdo Renault at a fully tracked AMR. Citroën’s attempt, the P103, would only be presented in 1935, after the struggling company had filed for bankruptcy.
Citroën’s P103 prototype in the company’s facilities. This prototype marked a serious attempt by Citroën to retake the lead in the AMR field that it had gained with the P28 but later lost to Renault and its VM. Only being presented in 1935, it came too late. Source: char-français
The First ‘New’ ZT Prototype
Though Renault had managed to get its ZT design adopted before manufacturing an entirely new prototype, the production of one was still viewed as necessary. It was required in order to experiment on many components which would be featured on production vehicles but could not be fitted on the conversions. The pre-prototypes notably used the old coil spring suspension, and elements such as the gearbox and differentials, or even details of the internal arrangement, were far from complete.
Therefore, Renault produced a mild steel prototype of the ZT, which was completed in September 1934. By that point, there had been some evolutions in the desired engine for the ZT. Renault had put out a new bus engine, the 441, to replace the older 408. Therefore, it was decided to modify that new engine to create the AMR 35’s engine. This modified 441 would be designated 447, and replaced the 432. However, the Renault 447 engine was still on the drawing board by September 1934. Production would only be launched in November with the first 447 engine completed in April 1935. Therefore, the newly-built ZT prototype received the same Renault 432 engine as the previous converted vehicles.
A very good front photo of the new ZT prototype. The turret has received the machine gun mount, but no MAC 31. Also give the suspension a look. This is the first ZT to receive the rubber block suspension, though it was already experimentally mounted on some VMs and the newly built ZT prototype still used some VM suspension elements which would be replaced on the production vehicles. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierA front view of the newly-built ZT prototype. Note the return of a ventilation grill to the front, which would be retained on the production ZT, but also the widespread use of bolting in place of riveting, which would not be carried on in the production vehicles. Also note how the turret is unicolor while the hull is camouflaged. The turret was taken from one of the VM conversions while the hull itself was newly built. Source: Renault documentation via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François Vauvillier
Interesting elements of this ZT prototype include the use of bolting, rather than riveting, for the front hull, which was not kept on production ZTs, a revised gearbox and differential, and a new suspension. This suspension was the rubber-block type which had been at prototype stage on the VM since 1933. Like the AMR 33, it had four road wheels, two independent ones at the front and rear and two in a bogie in the middle, but these were mounted on rubber blocks (one for each independent wheel and one for the bogie) which could compress in order to allow movement and reduce shock. In comparison to previous coil springs, this suspension was thought of as more robust, and, once refined, offering a more comfortable ride. It should be noted that the suspension was not entirely finalized on the ZT prototype. It notably kept the same sprocket as the VM, while a revised though broadly similar one would be used on the production vehicle. The prototype received the Avis n°1 turret mounted on the first conversion, which explains why this converted vehicle would revert to the old and rejected Renault turret when it was put to other uses.
Overall, this final ZT prototype was much closer to the final production vehicle, which allowed for tests to make sure there were no major issues to offer more certainty. This does not mean it would be identical, however. Unsurprisingly enough for a mild steel developpemental prototype, it would be noted to be almost entirely different in terms of precise parts in November 1937. The ZT prototype was first showcased in Satory in October 1934 and then later tested by the Vincennes trial commission and the Cavalry’s study center in 1935. It proved to be satisfactory and confirmed the adoption which was made from the experiences of the converted VM prototypes was a good one.
Fate of the Prototypes
The three ZT prototypes would have three different fates.
The first converted VM prototype, n°79759, was refitted with the older Renault turret in order to give its standard Avis n°1 turret to the all-new ZT. Markings show that the vehicle was pressed into the service with the Saumur Cavalry School for driver’s training. Photos show that in 1940, the vehicle, disarmed, was used in the desperate defense of the city of Orléans, on the Loire River. Exactly how the vehicle ended there is quite a mystery, as Orléans is located 180 km from Saumur and the personnel and equipment from the Cavalry school was used to defend the city itself, also located further down the Loire River.
Prototype 79759, the first ZT, and likely one of the last AMRs to be knocked out. The vehicle’s configuration is an odd mish-mash. Its hull is closer to the AMR 35 in construction by this point, though by virtue of being a hastily-converted first prototype, it is still quite different to the final successor of the AMR 33. In the meantime, it has, for some reason, been refitted with the old Renault turret, which had been ditched for any kind of mass-production. Source: Marc Couillet collection via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: L’AMR 35 Renault, François VauvillierAnother photo of the same vehicle in the ruins of Orléans, a sad fate for what had been the fastest tracked French vehicle up to this point, going up to 72 km/h in its ZT prototype configuration. Source: Bundesarchiv via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François Vauvillier
The fate of the second VM conversion is, unfortunately, unknown.
The newly produced ZT prototype, was stored in Docks de Rueil (the facility which would become ARL) and engineers of the Puteau workshop (Atelier de Construction de Puteaux – APX) were allowed to use it as a basis for studies on mounting a 25 mm anti-tank gun on the ZT chassis, which would result in the ZT-2 and ZT-3 tank destroyers. The vehicle was returned to Renault in November 1937, but the vehicle was reportedly found to barely have been maintained by the crew of the French state workshops. ARL sent a plea to use the vehicle as a prototype for the ZT-3 (a tank destroyer mounting a 25 mm anti-tank gun in a casemate), but Renault refused under the argument that the vehicle differed significantly from production ZTs, making its use as a prototype for the ZT3 questionable. Renault proceeded to dismantle the vehicle for parts in February 1938.
The First Order
The first contract, signed on May 17th 1934, was for 100 vehicles, though only 92 would be of the ZT-1 standard type, the other 8 being ADF1 ZT-1-based command vehicles.
The French state once again pushed for an extremely ambitious delivery schedule that called for the first vehicles to be given to the Army in December 1934 and the last in March 1935. The vehicle was designated AMR Renault Modèle 1935 under the assumption that it would largely become operational in 1935. In reality, the delivery schedule encountered massive delays, as once again, the French state’s expectations far exceeded Renault’s capacities. The French state agreed to change the schedule for end of deliveries to August 1935, but that was once again overly ambitious. In early 1935, Renault was still finishing up the last five AMR 33s (two of which were rebuilt VM prototypes), and even though the AMR 35s would immediately follow them on the production line, they would still be far from being delivered to the French Army. Though the first would be complete in March 1935, due to the rushed adoption of the ZT design, a number of tests and trials would still have to be carried out, meaning it would be a long time before vehicles would become operational.
Turret development and production was largely managed separately from Renault’s production of the hulls, and by this point, it had already been decided that the ZT-1 would be divided into vehicles fitted with different fittings. Vehicles could be fitted either with the existing Avis n°1 turret or with a new Avis n°2, which followed a similar line of design but was larger in order to accommodate a Hotchkiss model 1930 13.2 mm machine gun.
Vehicles with either turret could be given an ER 29 radio. It was planned that out of 92 vehicles, only 12 would at this point mount the Avis n°1 turret, all fitted with radios, while the 80 others would all mount the better armed Avis n°2 turret. Of these, 31 would have radios, and 49 would not. In practice, the number of vehicles fitted with each turret matched the plans, but this was not the case for fittings for radio. This feature was dropped from all Avis n°2-equipped vehicles in February 1937. Vehicles with the smaller Avis n°1 turret would exist both with and without fittings for radio. It ought to be noted that the vehicles being given fittings for radios did not necessarily receive the radio post itself immediately. Though the vehicle would have elements such as an antenna cover and electrical fittings to eventually receive the system, it appears quite certain pretty much no AMR 35 was given a radio at first. The ER 29 radio, which was to be used, was to begin production in 1936, but in practice, serial production could only begin in earnest in 1939. Even by 1940, many vehicles, which one may imagine to have had radios due to their fittings, never did.
Delays, Hotchkiss, and Skeptical Officers: The Harduous Year of 1935
Before production AMR 35s were even delivered, the fate of the vehicle in the French Army appeared very uncertain during 1935. These were largely influenced by the leading figure of the French Cavalry at that time, General Flavigny, the director of the French Cavalry from 1931 to 1936.
In early 1935, the French Army formally decided to adopt the Hotchkiss H35 light infantry tank. However, the vehicle’s place in the French Army appeared uncertain despite this adoption. The Infantry appeared to have already settled for the R35. Army Chief of Staff, General Gamelin, then offered Flavigny to take the light tanks in. Flavigny was less than enthusiastic about the prospect. Writing on comparative trials between the Somua AC3 (which would become the S35) and the H35 he attended in 1935, he described the H35 as “slowly and barely following, shaken by every irregularity in the terrain”.
Hotchkiss H35 in service of the 2nd GAM, a cavalry unit which likely would have received AMR 35s had the deliveries of these not suffered from massive delays. Source: char-français
Flavigny, however, also wrote that he was in no way able to refuse such an offer. The H35 was in no way suited to be a proper cavalry tank. Designed for the Infantry, its maximum speed of 36 km/h was moderate. Much worse was its atrocious vision and terrible ergonomics and division of labor, making operations of the tank very sluggish, and overall, meaning the Hotchkiss would very much struggle to operate with any kind of autonomy. This was already less than good for an infantry tank, but could be said to be even worse for a cavalry force which could be expected to have to exploit breakthroughs. However, Flavigny was, in early 1935, very much confronted between a choice of no AFVs or Hotchkisses. There were, as mentioned previously, massive delays with the Renault ZT, in part due to complications with subcontractors. Schneider was the manufacturer of the armored hulls, while Batignolles-Châtillon would produce the new model of Avis turret, the Avis n°2.
These delays were a massive issue for the French Cavalry. It was at this point attempting a large reform to create a new type of division, the DLM (Division Légère Mécanique – Light Mechanized Division), and schedules of deliveries of equipment being met was an imperative to the proper formation of units. The issues caused by these delays came to their highest point in September 1935, for the Champagne manoeuvers, the same yearly exercises where the five VM prototypes had been used three years prior. There were no ZTs to be found, and cavalry detachments were found unable to operate properly due to a lack of vehicles, linked to the delays in deliveries. As a result, the issues came all the way up to the Minister of War, Jean Fabry. With renewed skepticism on cavalry mechanized units, any potential orders which could have been made were slashed, with orders to focus on ordering more equipment which could be delivered more quickly and reliably, such as firearms and artillery.
Jean Flavigny, director of the French Cavalry and a major architect of its mechanization. Source: actu.frJean Fabry in his uniform of 23rd Alpine Chasseurs Battalion colonel. He would be Minister of War from June 1935 to January 1936, a timespan which may seem short but was nothing unusual in the unstable and parliamentarian French Third Republic. Source: Wikimedia Commons
In late 1935, some progress was made. Renault received an informal request to deliver a further 30 vehicles after the current order for 100, though this would have to be confirmed at a later date. This contract would be formalized on April 20th 1936 as contract 60 179 D/P.. It included 30 vehicles, though only 15 were ZT-1 AMRs. These were all to be vehicles fitted with the Avis n°1 turret and radios. The other 15 were split between 5 ADF1 command vehicles and 5 of both the ZT-2 and ZT-3 tank destroyers. The delivery schedule would once again be overly ambitious, as the contract was to be completed by December 15th 1936.
Finally, a last contract was signed on October 9th 1936, adding 70 vehicles of the ZT family, of which 60 were ZT-1s. These were evenly split in 30 vehicles with and 30 without radio fittings, all to be fitted with the Avis n°1 turret. The 10 other vehicles were 5 of both the ZT-2 and ZT-3. Overall, an even 200 vehicles of the ZT family would be ordered by the French Ministry of War, though only 167 were ZT-1s armored cars. The others were split between 13 ADF1 command vehicles and 10 of both the ZT-2 and ZT-3 tank destroyers.
Of the 167 ZT-1s, 80 from the first order, had the Avis n°2 13.2 mm-armed turret, while 87 had the Avis n°1 7.5 mm-armed turret. In theory, 31 of the vehicles with the Avis n°2 were to be fitted with a radio, while 49 were not planned to have one. In practice, a decision was taken to abandon radios on Avis n°2 vehicles in February 1937, and it appears none ever received one. For the vehicles fitted with Avis n°1 turrets, 57 were to have radios, while 30 were not to have any. Though it is certain some vehicles would receive fittings for radios but never receive the post itself, it is more believable that the number of vehicles which were to be given fittings for radios was respected. If not, the number at least comprised a significant part of the fleet of Avis n°1-equipped vehicles.
The AMR 35 : Light Tank or Armored Car ?
The Renault ZT was adopted as an Automitrailleuse de Reconnaissance (AMR), or in English, Reconnaissance Armored Car. The term automitrailleuse deserves a little more attention to be understood in the context in which it was used in interwar France. In common French language, automitrailleuse is practically identical to the English word for armored car. However, in the interwar era, an automitrailleuse referred to any armed vehicle of the Cavalry, sometimes not even armored. Indeed, the French “automitrailleuse” comes from “automobile” and “mitrailleuse” (machine gun), with no part of the word implying the vehicle is armored.
In practice, the vast majority of automitrailleuse were armored vehicles, but a few unarmored cars armed with machine rifles used for patrol in the colonies were sometimes called automitrailleuse too. The term did not particularly come with an associated running gear when used in the context of the French military. Vehicles called automitrailleuse were wheeled, half-tracked, or even fully tracked, as long as they were operated by the Cavalry.
This may seem somewhat archaic from a modern point of view, especially as designations such as “cavalry tank” now exist, however, these were not necessarily widespread at that time. The idea that the tank (or “char” in French) was a weapon of the infantry, not of the cavalry, was not entirely French, and indeed there are other examples of fully tracked, turreted armored vehicles not been referred to as tanks when serving in the cavalry branch of other armies. Two notable examples are the American M1 “Combat Car” and the Japanese Type 92 “Heavy Armored Car”.
The Japanese Type 92 Heavy Armored Car (left) and American M1 Combat Car (right) are two other notable examples of fully tracked vehicles which were formally referred to as a form of “car” due to their cavalry use. Source: Reddit (Type 92), Warspot (M1)
When it comes to technical characteristics, there is nothing that would make the AMR 35, especially when armed with a 13.2 mm machine gun, a world away from vehicles systematically called light tanks, such as the Vickers Light Tank or Panzer I, both fairly similar in size and capacities. As such, colloquially calling it a light tank is not necessarily wrong. It remained classified as an automitrailleuse, and for this reason this article has and will keep referring to it as an AMR or an armored car.
The Panzer I (Ausf.A pictured here), Renault’s AMRs (here an AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°2 turret), and Vickers Light Tank (Here a Mark VIC in the magnificent Malta pattern) were families of vehicles developed within a similar timeframe and with reasonably equivalent capabilities. What makes only two of these three light tanks, and the other an armored car, is a question of semantics and doctrine much more than technical characteristics. Source: pinterest (Panzer I & Mark VIC), char-français (AMR 35).
Technical Characteristics of the AMR 35
The AMR 35 had followed in its AMR 33 predecessor’s tracks in terms of broad characteristics and role. While developpement had started on the basis of AMR 33 prototypes, the evolution they would undertake in comparison to the original AMR 33 was radical. This was brought even further when a new prototype was manufactured, and continued when the production vehicles differed even from that prototype in significant ways. In other words, the AMR 35 was by all means a new design and is not to be understood as a variant of the AMR 33. There is very little in common between the two vehicles in terms of actual identical parts and elements.
Though the new prototype had experimented with bolting, the AMR 35 ended up being constructed using riveting. Dimensions are generally reported to be a height of 1.88 m, a width of 1.64 m (the armored hull itself being 1.42 m wide), and a length of 3.84 m. Weight was 6 tonnes empty, and 6.5 tonnes with crew and ammunition. It is important to note that these characteristics very likely describe vehicles fitted with the Avis n°1 turret, without radio. Vehicles with the Avis n°2 turret would likely be higher by a few centimeters and a couple hundred kilos heavier, while vehicles fitted with a radio would be a couple dozen kilos heavier. These changes would have been too small to have a significant impact on the mobility of the vehicles.
Hull & Hull Construction
The general hull construction of the AMR 35 took cues from the AMR 33, but also differed significantly in several ways due to significant changes in configuration.
The AMR 35 went away from the AMR 33’s side-mounted engine block, where the radiator would be to the front right of the hull, while the driver would be to the front left. However, it did keep an asymmetrical design. The driver still sat to the left, with a driver’s post extending from the rest of the crew compartment. The front formed an openable hatch so more vision could be at the driver’s disposal when outside of combat. When closed, it still featured an episcope to improve vision. Just below, on the angled glacis of the vehicle, there was a two-part door/hatch, with handles so it could be opened from the outside. The driver would typically enter or exit the vehicle by opening both of these hatches. The glacis in front of the driver’s post had been made to be as low as possible in order not to impede on his vision, being in this way very similar to the AMR 33.
The headlight would be mounted on the glacis. At first, the AMR 35s used a Restor armored headlight mounted at the center. In 1937-1938, these were replaced by Guichet headlights mounted to the left, just right and below the left fender. A rounded rearview mirror was often mounted on this left fender. The front glacis was also used as stowage space, with mounting points for tools such as shovels to be mounted transversally.
A towing cable could be mounted on the front left. The middle front plate featured the vehicle’s registration number in the center and the Renault manufacturer’s plate on the left. Just behind the middle front plate and below the front part of the glacis would be the transmission, still mounted to the front, with the armor plates protecting it being made easier to remove for maintenance.
To the driver’s right, even though the radiator was no longer to the front right of the vehicle, there was still a large ventilation grill, as on the AMR 33, despite this element having originally been removed on the ZT prototypes. This grill was in two parts, one on the angled glacis and one on the upper hull.
Overall, the front of the AMR 35 hull was fairly similar to the 33. This was generally also true for the sides, with ‘sponsons’ extending over the tracks to increase internal space on both sides of the vehicle. The turret of the AMR 35 was still off-centered to the left, placed behind the driver’s post.
A good side view of an AMR 35. Note the open’s driver hatch, and the riveting of the side plate, with horizontal lines of rivets on the top and bottom of the side plate and a vertical line of rivets front of the plate’s center. Source: char-français
The configuration of the AMR 33’s rear, with a large two-part openable hatch on the left and a radiator grill on the right, could obviously no longer be used with a transversely-mounted rear engine. The configuration of the hull also changed in comparison to the prototypes, where there was a radiator grill following the hull’s shape to the left and an access hatch to the right. Instead, the AMR 35’s rear hull featured a significant protrusion to the left. The roof of this protrusion actually housed another ventilation grill for the engine, while the rear plate had mounting points for a spare road wheel, which was a standard accessory for AMRs.
A crate fixed to the vehicle but not part of the armored body used for storage was placed to the right of the rear. There was also a two-part openable access hatch entirely hidden behind the removable storage box. The exhaust pipe was on top and front of this crate and protrusion, on the rear of the vehicle’s main armored body. There was a central towing hook and two mounting points if the vehicle itself had to be towed, one on each side, below this protrusion and crate.
This photo of an AMR 35 with Avis n°2 turret of the 1st RDP at Bouy, Marne, in 1938, gives an excellent view of the AMR 35’s cluttered rear. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultAn abandoned AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°1 turret. Interesting features of this photo include the track removed on one side, but not the other, the turret machine gun having been removed, and perhaps most significantly, the access hatch, not just visible, but also open. Due to the storage box almost always being there, that is a very rare sight. Source: char-françaisThis photo of an abandoned AMR 35 ZT-1 (with an Avis n°2 turret that had the machine gun removed) gives an excellent view of both the engine compartment access hatch, the storage box having been removed, and of an ace of clubs tactical marking, indicating the vehicle’s platoon (4th) and squadron (unknown, as it was determined by color). Source: char-français
Armor Protection
The AMR 35 kept the same armor scheme as the AMR 33. All vertical or near-vertical plates up to 30° (most of the front plates, the sides, and the rear) were 13 mm thick. Plates at an angle higher than 30°, but still potentially vulnerable to most enemy fire, parts of the front glacis for example, were 9 mm thick. The roof was 6 mm and the floor 5 mm. Grills were meant to be bulletproof, by making it so there would be not one but two plates in the way of any bullet trying to go through. Both turrets which would be mounted on the AMR 35 would follow the same armor scheme as the hull. As with the AMR 33, this armor scheme was light, but not at all abnormal for a light, reconnaissance vehicle. It ought to be noted that, to an extent, it could still be said to be comparatively less useful, as dedicated armor-piercing weapons were becoming more and more common during the 1930s, and as tracked light tanks with armor trying to protect against .50 caliber projectiles, for example, were also becoming more widespread.
Anti-tank rifles, such as this 7.92×94 mm Patronen Panzerbüchse 39 widely used by Wehrmacht troops, were already largely able to pierce the AMR 35’s armor protection. Source: armedconflicts.com
Engine Block
In contrast to the AMR 33’s eight-cylinders, the AMR 35 used a 4-cylinders, 120×130 mm, 5,881 cm3 engine. This was the Renault 447, based on the Renault 441 city bus engine. It produced 82 hp at 2,200 rpm. The engine was fitted with an internal electric starting-up device, and alternatively could manually be started with a crank from the outside. It used a Zénith carburetor which was designed to allow a cold start. The front-mounted transmission had four forward and one reverse gear, with a “Cleveland” differential. This differential would prove to be an extremely difficult element to get in working order on the AMR 35. There was a two-part radiator, with a large ventilator placed to the rear of the engine block.
Overall, the AMR 35’s engine was actually slightly less powerful than the AMR 33, while the vehicle was heavier. This was a sacrifice that was agreed upon by Renault and the military in order to have a more reliable and easier to operate engine. Overall, a 4-cylinders, 82 hp engine would give the AMR 35 a power-to-weight ratio of about 12.6 hp/tonne. This was powerful enough to give the vehicle a maximum speed of 55 km/h on a good road and 40 km/h on a damaged road.
The AMR 35 had a 130 liter gasoline fuel tank, located to the rear right, in front of the access hatch located behind the removable crate.
Suspension and Tracks
The AMR 35 adopted, from the get go, the rubber suspension design which had been experimented on on VM prototypes.
Renault VM prototype 79758, with the first version of the rubber block suspension. Source: Renault documentation via Pierre Touzin via Les Automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 1: L’AMR 33 Renault, François VauvillierThe rubber block suspensions would be fitted on the last five AMR 33s, two of which were modified prototypes, before AMR 35 production began. This picture is also great to compare the AMR 33 and AMR 35 sprocket, idler and road wheels. Source: warspot.ru
The vehicle used four steel, rubber-rimmed road wheels: independent ones to the front and the rear and two in a central bogie. The wheels themselves had a heavier construction than those of the AMR 33, being full and not spoked hollow designs. This was likely a consequence of the AMR 33’s suspension elements being found to be too fragile. The central bogie, as well as each independent wheel, was linked to a rubber-block, an arrangement of five rubber cylinders for the center block and four for the front/rear ones, mounted on a central metallic bar. These rubber blocks would compress in order to absorb shocks. Overall, they made for a fairly smooth ride and were found to be much sturdier in comparison to the coil springs and oil shock absorbers of the AMR 33.
This photo shows one of the earliest AMR 35s in the final stage of production, still without armament and in the hands of Renault. Though the tracks are poorly tensioned, the view on the suspension is nonetheless very good. Though their construction is still light, the roadwheels, idler and sprocket are no longer hollow, as they were on the AMR 33, making them significantly sturdier. Source: Renault archives via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultThis completely destroyed AMR 35 gives a pretty good example of the suspension being sturdier than on the AMR 33. Despite the vehicle’s front being blown away, the front rubber block, roadwheel, suspension arm, and sprocket wheel still appear to be in a decent state. Source: char-françaisAn abandoned AMR 35 left in a ditch, with the track removed, giving a good view of elements of its suspension, and particularly the sprocket. Source: char-français
The AMR 35 featured four return rollers, a front mounted drive sprocket and a rear mounted idler wheel. The sprocket and idler had spoked designs, but unlike the AMR 33, were not completely hollow. There was metal between the spokes, though it was a lot thinner than the spokes. The tracks were still narrow, at 20 cm, and thin, with a large number of individual track links per side. The track had one central gripping point of the sprocket’s teeths.
This AMR 35 ZT-1, which has had its 7.5 mm machine gun removed, is not in the hands of the French, or even the Germans, but Czech resistance forces who captured it from the Germans during the Prague uprising of May 1945, this specific picture apparently being dated 10th May. While not of French origin, it is very interesting to give an idea of the construction of the AMR 35’s tracks, as the large amount of spare track links show both their small individual size and the central hole for the sprocket teeths to grip in. Source: www.praha12.cz
This suspension design allowed the AMR 35 to ford 60 cm, cross a 1.70 m trench with straight vertical sides, or climb a 50% slope.
Turrets and Armament
Avis n°1 Turret & 7.5 mm MAC 31 Machine Gun
Of the 167 AMR 35s, 87 featured the Avis n°1 turret, as mounted on the AMR 33.
An Avis n°1-equipped AMR 35 of the 1st RDP during the Bastille Day (July 14th) parade of 1939. There is a very interesting element in this picture. Looking at the side of the turret, one can see an hastily erased tricolor cockade, a marking that was previously present but was erased in late June or early July of the same year. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultTwo AMR 35s, one with each turret type, side by side in service of the 2nd GAM. Source: Chaillan/Soyer collection via Régis Potié via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
These turrets were manufactured by the state-owned workshop AVIS (Atelier de Construction de Vincennes – ENG: Vincennes Construction Workshop). Despite their name, they were not technically located within the municipality of Vincennes, just east of the city of Paris’s borders, but inside the Vincennes woods, technically within the territory of the municipality of Paris. In comparison, Renault facilities of Billancourt were located west of Paris, along the Seine and still within the urban area of the French capital. Though the design was carried out at Vincennes, production of the turrets took place in the Renault factory itself.
The small turret had the same riveted construction as the hull, and used a hexagonal design, with a front and rear plate, and three plates on the sides. The turret was higher at its rear. The turret in itself did not feature a seat. The vehicle, overall, was low enough that a seat located in the hull, even quite low in it, was high enough for the commander to be at eye level with vision devices. The vision devices included in the turret were, to the front, an episcope to the right, a vision slot to the left, and the machine gun sight. There was an additional vision port on each side, and to the rear.
The turret included a large semi-circle shaped hatch opening forward, allowing the commander to reach out from it. There was also an anti-aircraft mount for a MAC 31 7.5 mm machine gun present to the right-rear of the turret. Small handles were also present on the front sides to ease climbing into or out of the turret from the hatch.
In vehicles fitted with Avis n°1 turrets, armament was provided in the form of a MAC31 Type E machine gun, the shorter, tank version of the MAC 31 which had been designed for use in fortification. It used the new standard French cartridge, the 7.5×54 mm. The MAC31 Type E had a weight of 11.18 kg empty and 18.48 kg with a fully loaded 150-round drum magazine, fed to the right of the machine gun. The machine gun was gas-fed, and had a maximum cyclic rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute. It had a muzzle velocity of 775 m/s.
The MAC31E, the standard model of the MAC31 in armored fighting vehicles. Though there were some infantry/pintle mount versions and prototypes of the MAC31 which could accept some box magazines, the MAC31E could only use the drums. A distinctive element of the MAC31E was its short, 48 cm barrel. There was another tank machine gun version of the MAC31, the MAC31C, with the standard 60 cm-long barrel. Source: Mitrailleuses de 7,5mm modèle 1951, Guide Technique Sommaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale (Ministry of National Defense), France, 1953Views of the MAC 31’s 150 rounds drum magazine, disassembled on top and complete at the bottom. Drum magazines were complex, but had the advantage of being way more compact than a belt. Source: Mitrailleuses de 7,5mm modèle 1951, Guide Technique Sommaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale (Ministry of National Defense), France, 1953A fully loaded 150 rounds drum magazine with the cover removed. Source: Mitrailleuses de 7,5mm modèle 1951, Guide Technique Sommaire, Ministère de la Défense Nationale (Ministry of National Defense), France, 1953A MAC31E machine gun with the drum magazine attached. Source: tircollection.com
Within AMR 35s with Avis n°1 turret, a spare machine gun was carried. It was either to be used to replace the mounted one in case of malfunction or overheating, or to be mounted on an anti-aircraft mount present on the turret roof. As for ammunition, 15 150-round drums were stowed, for a total of 2,250 rounds of 7.5 mm ammunition.
This photo is perhaps the best one known to exist in demonstrating the use of the anti-air mount on the Avis n°1 turret, with the commander aiming the machine gun from his open hatch. This vehicle was a 4th RDP AMR 35 which had been detached to the 4th Cuirassiers regiment to serve as internal liaison vehicles for this unit. The vehicles were detached on May 5th 1940, with this picture being taken on May 12th. Source: Lucien Bertonneau Collection, via Régis Potié, via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Avis n°2 Turret & 13.2 mm Hotchkiss Machine Gun
A significant change of the AMR 35 in comparison to the AMR 33 was that a large part of the fleet would receive a new turret fitted with a more powerful machine gun. This would comprise 80 of the 167 AMR 35 ZT-1s.
An AMR 35 of the 1st RDP in 1938. With its larger gun and higher silhouette, the Avis n°2 is easy to distinguish from the Avis n°1. The vehicles in the background are Laffly S20 TL six-wheels trucks used by the RDP’s motorized infantry. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultA front view of an Avis n°2 equipped AMR 35 ZT-1, taken after the end of the campaign of France, likely by German troops having just captured the vehicle. Source: Bovington Tank Museum Collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
These vehicles received the Avis n°2 turret. It had been designated by the same Vincennes workshop as the Avis n°1. The turrets were manufactured by railcar manufacturer Batignolles-Châtillon in Nantes, western France.
The Avis n°2 followed similar design principles as its predecessor. It also had a riveted construction and an overall hexagonal shape, but was noticeably taller, in order to accommodate its machine gun being fed by a magazine attached to the top, and not the side. The machine gun was offset to the right of the turret, with a sight just by its side, and further left an episcope with an openable armored cover. As with the Avis n°1, there was an openable vision port on each side and one on the rear of the turret.
German soldiers stand on an abandoned AMR 35 equipped with an Avis n°2 turret, with the turret turned towards the rear, showing one of the vision ports. Source: char-français
The armament of the Avis n°2 was the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss model 1929 machine gun. As most, if not all .50 or near .50 heavy machine guns of the interwar, this model of Hotchkiss machine gun was developed as a response, and inspired by, the German 13.2×92 mm TuF cartridge. Initially, this German projectile was intended to be used mainly from a dual anti-air and anti-tank machine gun. Nevertheless, only the Tankgewehr anti-tank rifle would see action with this caliber. The ammunition and weapon were developed together in the second half of the 1920s, with the design finalized for adoption in 1929.
At first, the Hotchkiss machine gun used a 13.2×99 mm cartridge, and it was under this caliber that it was most widely exported. The Hotchkiss 13.2 mm machine gun will be most familiar to many as the standard Italian and Japanese 13.2 mm machine gun, produced under license in Italy as the Breda Model 31 and in Japan as the Type 93. In France, the barrels were found to wear out too quickly, with the blame pinned on the cartridge.
In 1935, a new cartridge was adopted, with French guns modified to fire it. This was a 13.2×96 mm, with the very small modifications centering on shortening the neck of the cartridge. Since the adoption of the shorter cartridge, the names of “13.2 Hotchkiss long” and “13.2 Hotchkiss short” have generally been used to differentiate them. When the AMR 35s armed with Hotchkiss 13.2 machine guns came out of their factories would all fire 13.2×96 mm Hotchkiss short.
From top to bottom: 13.2×99 mm Hotchkiss Long, 13.2×96 mm Hotchkiss Short, and the German Mauser 13×92 mmSR TuF cartridge which inspired them (as well as, notably, US 12.7×99 mm and Soviet 12.7×108 mm .50cal cartridges). Source: Costas-1963 on Wikimedia CommonsSchematics of the 1935 pattern 13.2×96 mm Hotchkiss “short” cartridge. Source: Wikimaginot
This 13.2 mm cartridge was fired by a machine gun operating under the Hotchkiss gas operated mechanism, designed in the late 1800s and most notably used by the French Model 1914 8×50 mm Lebel machine gun. The new heavy machine gun remained an air-cooled design, with large cooling rings surrounding the barrel in order to increase the surface in contact with the air. The machine gun, however, differed from previous Hotchkiss designs in that it was fed from the top, instead of from the side. The ability to be fed from feed strips remained, as a 15-rounds feed strip was available for the machine gun, but the design was also compatible with a more modern feeding solution, a 30-round box magazine, which in practice was by far the most common way of feeding ammunition to the gun. The cyclic rate of fire of the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss was of 450 rounds per minute, with a muzzle velocity of 800 m/s.
A Hotchkiss 13.2 mm machine gun on an infantry tripod, with anti-aircraft sights and a pistol grip, as was tested in the UK around 1930. Source: modernfirearms.netCutaway view of the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss machine gun. Source: Wikimaginot
The 30-round magazines were, however, fairly tall and curvy, and as a result, using them in enclosed armored vehicles would be impossible without designing an impracticable high turret. However, feed strips were a more fiddly solution, by no means desirable inside an AFV. In the end, the solution was to create a lower capacity, 20-round box magazine, which would stick out on top of the gun less, and therefore require less overhead space. As can be easily seen from the design of the Avis n°2, they obviously still required more than a side-fed machine gun like the 7.5 mm MAC 31. These 20 round box magazines are unfortunately extremely obscure, with no clearly identified view of them. In comparison to the curved 30-rounders, they likely were either straight or with a much less pronounced curve.
The 13.2×96 mm Hotchkiss had, as most .50 cal cartridges, non-negligible armor-piercing performances in the 1930s. With the standard model 1935 armor-piercing ammunition, it was found that the weapon could penetrate 20 mm of perpendicular armor at 500 m, and still 15 mm at 1,000 m. Against a plate angled at 20°, the machine gun would pierce 20 mm of armor at 200 m. At 30°, it was found the projectiles would penetrate 18 mm at 500 m and still 12 mm at 2,000 m. In addition to these piercing capabilities against steel, 13.2 mm caliber bullets would also obviously offer more penetration against various forms of cover, such as brick walls, armored shields, accumulated sandbags, etc., meaning they could also be used more effectively against infantry behind cover.
These capabilities made the weapon an interesting solution for armored vehicles which could not mount larger weapons, such as the 25 mm anti-tank gun. Even so, the 13.2 mm machine gun was more effective against infantry than the semi-automatic 25 mm gun, which did not have high-explosive shells. It should be noted, however, that the weapon was very rare in the French Army outside of armored fighting vehicles. The air force adopted the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss machine gun for airfield defense, and the navy used it as an anti-aircraft weapon too, but the Army opted to reject the heavy machine gun. The reason given was that it was feared projectiles fired against aircraft could end up falling into friendly lines and be dangerous in this fashion.
Therefore, 13.2 mm machine guns were very rare in the French Army. Outside of armored vehicles, around a hundred were found on the Maginot Line. A large number were deployed in casemates overlooking the Rhine, as it was thought their armor-piercing capacities would be useful in a hypothetical German attempt at an amphibious crossing with small boats or landing barges. Some would also be used for static air defense far behind the frontlines.
A 13.2 mm Hotchkiss machine gun in an ESCH double infantry casemate of the Maginot Line. Note the tall 30-round box magazine. Already a constraint in fortifications, it was totally impractical within armored fighting vehicles. Source: Photo by Julien Boulanger, from Wikimaginot
Within AMR 35s fitted with the Avis n°2 turret, 37 20-rounds box magazines would be carried, comprising 740 rounds. A further 480 13.2 mm rounds would be available, but these would be carried in cardboard boxes. The crew would have to refill magazines with them once they were out of full magazines, which is definitely not a task that could be reasonably performed in action. The assumption was most likely that the crew could refill their emptied magazines out of combat even if there was no immediately available supply of 13.2 mm ammunition, but the equal amount of space being used to store additional full box magazines would likely have been far more useful, even if it somewhat reduced the total number of 13.2 mm rounds stored inside the vehicle.
Unlike the vehicles fitted with the 7.5 mm machine gun, those using the 13.2 mm did not have a spare machine gun at their disposal, despite the contrary sometimes being stated. Accordingly, there was no mount for an anti-aircraft machine gun on the roof of the Avis n°2 turret.
Radios
Unlike the previous AMR 33, a portion of the AMR 35 fleet was intended to receive radios. Though, at first, it was planned that there would be radio-equipped vehicles with both turrets, in the end, only vehicles fitted with the Avis n°1 would receive the fittings for them.
Fifty-seven AMR 35 ZT-1s with Avis n°1 turrets were to receive radios, and were likely given the fittings for them. These evolved over the years, including a massive antenna at first, later replaced by a smaller housing, all on the right fender, just in front of the crew compartment. There were also some changes in the electrical wiring inside the vehicle in order to accommodate the radio posts.
Two radio-equipped AMR 35s of the 4th RDP, part of the first small batch of 12, at the Mailly camp in June 1937. This massive antenna would quickly be changed for smaller ones. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
These radio posts were to be the ER 29 (Emetteur Recepteur – ENG: transmitter receiver). Production was to begin in 1936, but only truly began in 1939. How many AMR 35 actually received their radios is not known, but many which were planned to have one never received it, making them no better than AMR 33s communication wise, and reducing their ways to communicate with hatches closed to flags.
When installed, the 50 kg ER 29 had a frequency of 14-23 m, and a range of 5 km. They were meant for communications between the vehicles of platoon leaders and the commander of their squadron. Unfortunately, French radios were not only rarely found, but also of poor quality. Their transmissions were easily stopped by obstacles such as trees. Nonetheless, even if poor, they were still a significant addition.
An AMR 35 with Avis n°1 turret leads two vehicles with Avis n°2s. The front vehicle had fittings for radios, but lacked the radio itself. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Towards the last months before the German invasion of France, there was also an ambitious plan to fit all AMR 35s, platoon/squadron commander vehicles or not, with a small (15 kg) short-range (2 km) ER 28 10-15 m radio. These would have been used for communications between vehicles of the same platoons, which would likely have been greatly appreciated, as French Army doctrine on the AMRs did include the possibility of vehicles of a same platoon separating beyond a range where voice communication or even flag communication is at all practical. Though this plan would have been a great upgrade to the AMR 35s, it was never carried out, and not a single AMR 35 received the ER 28 radio.
Camouflage
AMR 35s left their factories with one general pattern of camouflage, but with significant variations on how the colors were applied.
This was a three or four-tone camouflage. It was generally brush-painted in fairly large rounded shapes, which were separated by a blurry edge painted in black. The four colors used were olive green and Terre de Sienne (brown) for the darker colors, and ochre (in practice yellow) and vert d’eau”(watery green, imagined to be a lighter green color) for lighter colors. Black and white photos have generally left the lighter colors fairly distinct, but the olive green and Terre de Sienne’ can often be hard to differentiate.
This retouched photo of an AMR 35 with Avis n°1 turret gives a particularly great view of the camouflage scheme. Source: Renault documentation via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultThis side photo of an AMR 35 with Avis n°2 colors gives a good view of the camouflage, with a particularly visible edge between swathes of colors. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultA German color photo of two abandoned AMR 35s from the 1st RDP, showcasing the coloration of the vehicles’ camouflages. Source: Pierre Touzin collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Common Markings
A few different markings can sometimes be seen on AMR 35s.
One, of which the use varied significantly, was the tricolor cockade, or roundel. During most of the 1930s, it was not a standard to apply it on Cavalry vehicles, but in March 1938, its use was standardized. Vehicles completed after this date received one painted on the turret side and roof by Renault during production, while vehicles already in service had one painted by their crews. The standard size was a diameter of 40 cm.
AMR 35s of the 1st RDP parade in Versailles on June 25th 1939. The vehicles feature cockades painted on the sides of the turret. Radio fittings without antennas can also be seen on the two Avis n°1-equipped AMR 35s on the left. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
There were some non-standard cockades sometimes used. Some tiny ones can be seen on vehicles of the 1st RDP. A few months before the outbreak of the war, many vehicles had their turret side cockades removed, although the roof ones were often retained. Sometimes, some received cockades on places such as the turret rear prior to the Campaign of France.
Around 1938, the 1st RDP is known to have made use of very small diameter cockades. The vast majority were painted over and replaced with the standard, 40 cm -diameter cockades following the outbreak of the war, but some nonetheless remained, such as on this most likely abandoned vehicle (with Avis n°2 turret) of the 1st RDP. Also note the open stowage box on the rear-right of the hull. Source: char-français
There could also be unit insignias, both at the divisional and regimental level. The only unit known to have made widespread use of these is the 1st RDP of the 2nd DLM. The unit adopted a lozenge-shaped blue insignia adorned with two red and white flags.
This photo of German soldiers posing around an abandoned AMR 35 of the 1st RDP, gives a great view of its insignia, on the hull sides. The two little flags that adorned the blue lozenge’s top were coloured in white (bottom stripe) and red (top stripe). Source: char-français
An army-wide symbol, to be applied to all automotive vehicles, was chosen in 1940. It was in a white square with 20 cm sides. For the Cavalry, it was further refined by the addition of a blue lozenge, 15 cm high and 10 cm wide. Within the 2nd DLM, a small Cross of Lorraine was added within this lozenge as a divisional insignia.
An abandoned radio-equipped AMR 35 of the 1st RDP in the Dunkirk pocket. It gives a very good example of a marking that could be found on some AMR 35s. The standard army white square, adorned by the standard cavalry blue lozenge, itself completed by the 2nd DLM’s Cross of Lorraine. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
There was also a numbering system, though it only appears to have been in systematic use within the 1st RDP. Each squadron’s operational vehicles would be divided between tranches of 20. The 1st squadron would be vehicles 1 to 20, 2nd vehicles 20 to 40, and 3rd, if there was one, vehicles 40 to 60. Within the squadrons, a platoon’s five vehicles are assigned tranches of 1 to 5. For example, the 2nd squadron’s 3rd platoon would include vehicles 30 to 35.
A parade of 1st RDP AMR 35s. Here, the vehicles sport roof cockades and numbering. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
The use of playing-card game symbols to denote a vehicle’s squadron and platoon was also common. The practice was widely generalized within the whole of the French Army at the time. This could be manifested with each squadron having an assigned color, and each platoon having an assigned symbol. For example, the 1st squadron would use red, the 2nd blue, and the 3rd green. The 1st platoon would use an ace of spades, the 2nd an ace of hearts, the 3rd an ace of diamonds, and the 4th an ace of clubs. This way, by combining the color and symbol, one could determine what platoon of what squadron a vehicle belonged to.
AMR 35s of the 4th RDP parading in Verdun for Bastille Day July 14th 1939. The vehicles sport a rear-side turret cockade, an identifying number painted on the rear, and an ace of hearts on the hull side. This way, they can be identified as the 3rd and 5th vehicle of the 2nd Squadron’s 2nd Platoon. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultThis photo is very interesting for a number of reasons. It shows an AMR 35 ZT-1 abandoned next to an AMR 35 ZT-3 casemate tank destroyer, which happened rarely, as the ZT-2s and ZT-3s ended up deployed in units without any ZT-1s. An abundance of markings are displayed: what looks like a “38” tactical number; a non-standard “3”, perhaps indicating the vehicle being the third of its platoon; and a cockade that appears both irregular and placed in a non-standard place on the hull front. The ZT-3 also features cockades of various sizes, including in places, such as the engine deck and rear casemate, and in sizes that would not be expected. Source: char-français
Doctrinal Use of the AMRs
The AMRs were intended to be issued to Cavalry units. Their main role was close reconnaissance. For longer-range, more independent operations, another class of automitrailleuse existed, the AMD (Automitrailleuse de Découverte – ENG: ‘Discovery’ Armored Car), which would typically have more extensive range and more powerful armament than an AMR, in order to more effectively operate on their own for longer periods of time.
The Panhard 178/AMD 35, the vehicle which was to assume the role of AMD within cavalry units. Well armed for its size and better arranged than the large majority of French armored vehicles ergonomically, it is generally considered to be one of the better French AFVs of 1940. Source: Erik Barbanson Collection via Les Editions du Barbotin
On their own, the AMRs were meant to search within a selected, limited area for enemy contact. Their small size was viewed as a benefit in this, and it was specified that they had to use terrain to their advantage to the best of their abilities. Combat was to be engaged at close range only. The vehicles were to take contact with the enemy, but not stay in combat distance for long, as, with their thin armor, it was clear they would not last under armor-piercing or artillery fire. It was also specified that the vehicles would operate in close cooperation with other types of troops, either motorcycle-mounted reconnaissance troops, AMC (Automitrailleuse de Combat – ENG: Combat Armored Car) cavalry tanks, and/or traditional cavalry.
The AMRs were to operate in platoons of five. In operations, each platoon would be further divided into two small sections of two vehicles, with the fifth, independent vehicle, being the platoon leader. When operating on the AMR 35 type, the leader of each section was to use a 13.2 mm-armed vehicle. Platoons were to be followed by motorcyclists, which would typically be used to communicate with other parts of the unit.
The standard procedure was for a platoon of five vehicles to be tasked to investigate an area 1 to 1.5 km wide. Each section of the platoon was to operate at a distance sufficiently small that they would still be in visual contact with the other. Platoon leaders were not to stay behind, but to follow the first section, though under some circumstances, they could decide to stay to observe further back. The vehicle of the section leader was to lead, with the second vehicle slightly behind, so that if the first vehicle came under fire, the second could assist with its own armament.
Progression within an area to investigate was to be made in ‘hops’. Vehicles would go from one zone to observe the area from another, with the zones to stop at preferably offering decent cover. The next position would be observed with binoculars before being taken. In case of uncertainty in regards to a position, the second patrol could go to investigate closer while the first would remain in observation with binoculars.
When going from one cover to another, the AMRs were to progress, if possible, in non-linear ways, and if suspect positions were encountered on the way, they were cleared to fire at them in order either to reveal the position of enemy troops or find it clear of enemy presence. This would typically be done while stopping. It was noted that fire of the move was generally inaccurate and wasteful of ammunition, and it was to be used only in emergencies. The manual specified, for example, that shooting on the move would be used if an automatic weapon or anti-tank gun was suddenly revealed and the vehicle was under threat. The platoon leader was to organize and correct each ‘hop’, which as a rule, implied he had to follow vehicles rather swiftly, as they did not have radio to communicate with one another.
When encountering a village or wood, each patrol was to go around it on its outer border, observing if anything could be seen inside. Once that was done, one of the patrols would stay at the opposite side of the area to the one they came from and where the platoon leader would still be located. The other would go through the village or wood to the commander, and once they regrouped, progression would start again.
If the wood or urban area was particularly large, another procedure was in place. A patrol would stay with the platoon commander, while the other would quickly go to the opposite exit of the wood or urban area. It would then divide in two, with a vehicle staying to defend the opposite exit while the other would quickly drive through the area, reach the other patrol and platoon commander, and the group would then rejoin with the lone armored car on the other side of the area.
When one or a couple of vehicles fell under fire, they were to simultaneously fire back and find cover as quickly as possible, while other vehicles of the platoons were to flank in order to delimitate the area held by the enemy, and if the resistance was limited, try to push the enemy back from this flanking maneuver. If flanking was not a possibility, the vehicles were to cooperate progressively on a point at a time. If pushing the enemy back was not a possibility due to the resistance being too strong, the vehicles were to stop behind the nearest cover and retain binocular observation of the enemy, with one of the vehicles periodically going on a short patrol to confirm enemy positions were still occupied.
When operating alongside troops mounted on motorcycles, these were noted to be a very helpful asset in reconnaissance. They were said to, in practice, prove more reliable than the armored cars at providing vision when no enemy fire was encountered, notably when moving, as the AMR crews were said to have lacked vision when in movement. Once contact with the enemy was taken, they were to observe and note the firing points firing at the armored cars and retain observation even once the armored cars were no longer under fire.
It was generally hoped the armored cars would operate in conjunction with a motorcyclist platoon, forming a détachement mixte (ENG:mixed group). It would be led by the most senior officer between the AMR and the motorcyclist platoon. The motorcycles were generally to follow in the armored car’s stead, due to the latter’s greater protection against enemy fire. When under enemy fire, the motorcyclists were to engage in a more skirmish-like action, pushing the enemy flanks and making sure to keep contact with the enemy even if the armored cars no longer had line of sight. Against an enemy line, it was even, quite optimistically, said that the motorcyclists could attempt to infiltrate weaker points of the line, and be rescued by the AMRs if in trouble.
There were also different principles for when the AMRs were operating alongside AMCs, which, de facto, were cavalry tanks. The AMRs would take the lead of progress, with AMCs at a slight distance behind them to be able to observe the reactions triggered by the AMR’s presence and provide supporting fire. The AMRs would also be tasked with reaching the edge of cover to check for enemy presence, as well as to cover the flanks if they offered good firing positions for the enemy.
The Somua S35 would operate as the AMC within the DLMs in which AMR 35s were to serve. The S35, though still flawed in several ways, was arguably the most potent tanks in French service during the campaign of France. Source: char-français
Once resistance was uncovered, the AMRs would put it under fire and stop advancing, letting the AMCs catch up and take the lead for the time needed to reduce the enemy point. If the resistance was sporadic, once an enemy point was reduced, advance would continue as normal. If the group encountered the main enemy line of resistance, the AMRs would switch to a secondary role, operating in the intervals between AMC groups to provide supporting fire as well as screening the flanks for enemy presence.
The AMRs were also given the role of cleaning up minor resistance points which may have escaped the AMCs. In such a role, a platoon would cover areas 1 to 1.2 km-wide. These cleanup groups were to follow closely behind the AMCs in order to profit from the chaos caused by their heavier firepower, making sure each point was cleared of enemy presence as the Cavalry unit progressed.
The AMRs were also used in another offensive role, in what was called the “occupation echelon”. This would be the part of the unit which would follow after the offensive echelon, itself consisting of the AMCs and AMRs previously mentioned. This occupation echelon would lack AMCs and instead include traditional cavalry and motorcyclists, with the AMRs being, typically, their heaviest elements. The AMRs were to screen forward of this group in order to spot remaining enemy elements. The role of the AMRs of the occupation echelon was to relieve those of the cleanup group of the attack echelon. It was generally hoped that by this stage, all significant enemy resistance would be gone.
One could generally see these offensive doctrines as a three to four-layered attack. A first offensive layer, the largest, including AMRs and AMCs, itself constituted of the AMRs first closely followed by the AMCs. Then, following up, the cleanup platoons operating AMRs, the head of the occupation echelon operating AMRs, itself then followed by cavalry and infantry elements. At the very rear, there was to be a reserve squadron as part of the occupation echelon, meant to be used during emergencies.
These were, overall, the operating principles in offensive actions. They can be said to be very enthusiastic about the capacities of a group of five lightly armored and armed vehicles.
There were also principles given for defensive use of the AMRs. It was clearly mentioned that the vehicles had to be used for delaying actions, and not in a static defense. They would then be placed at the edge of cover, such as a forest or village’s edge, and fire upon enemy forces they spotted at greater ranges. It is then said they would keep this contact all the way to close range, if possible counter attack, and if not, swiftly retreat to the next cover in a sort of defensive reversal of the ‘hopping’ method of advance. If enemy forces were noted to be on the smaller and less equipped side, it was suggested to hold fire until closer ranges, in order to create ambushes. During these defensive operations, the platoon leader was given responsibility to ensure the flanks were well guarded.
Variants: A Whole Cavalry Vehicles Family ?
The previous AMR 33 had a quite limited number of derivatives due to its unorthodox engine placement, which was disliked and found unsuited for many hypothetical variants. As the AMR 35 used a more classic engine configuration, it would come to have more variants being built on its hull.
Renault YS and YS 2
The first variant is the Renault YS, which can be considered to be somehow a variant of both the AMR 33 and AMR 35. The concept of this vehicle was first mentioned in December 1932. The idea was to create a command vehicle with a larger superstructure that could house more men and the equipment needed for them to assume command functions.
Two YS prototypes would eventually be manufactured, the first in 1933, on the Renault VM’s suspension. They had a larger, boxier armored superstructure which could house six men, and had no armament, though they featured a firing port/hatch where an FM 24/29 machine rifle could be placed.
After the two VM-based prototypes, it was decided to order ten production Renault YS in January 1934, with the order formalized by contract 218 D/P on April 10th 1934. By the time they were being manufactured, it was decided to produce them on the chassis of the AMR 35, as its suspension was preferred and this was the type of vehicle being manufactured by Renault at the time.
These 10 production vehicles would be fitted with a number of different radio configurations and would be distributed within army units, within not just the Cavalry, but also the Infantry and Artillery branches, for experimental use. They were still in service by 1940.
In autumn 1936, one of the two prototypes was experimentally converted into an artillery observation vehicle, which was called the “YS 2”.
A production YS in service with the 507ème RCC, an Infantry tank unit, in Metz. This vehicle used an ER 51 receiver-transmitter and an additional R15 receiver radio. Three different radio configurations existed within the ten production YS vehicles. Source: L.Baccini collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultThe YS2 artillery observation conversion of one of the two YS prototypes. It should be noted that it sports the rubber block type suspension, but is nonetheless mentioned to have been built as a VM-based vehicle. It may simply have been refitted with the suspension at some point, perhaps as part of the conversion process into an artillery observation vehicle. Source: armedconflicts.com
ADF 1
The ADF 1 was, alongside the ZT-2 and ZT-3, part of the same contracts as the standard ZT-1 armored cars, with the total number of vehicles of the contracts being around 200 vehiclesThis variant was designed to serve as a command vehicle for AMR squadrons.
The requirements of the vehicle called for an enlarged crew compartment, with a casemate instead of a turret, to accommodate a three-man crew with a large ER 26 radio set. To increase the size of the crew compartment, Renault put the vehicle’s gearbox to the front instead of rear. The vehicle received an armored casemate, similar at first glance to a turret, but completely non-rotating. There was no permanent armament, but a firing port with a gun mask that could accommodate an FM 24/29 machine rifle. All vehicles except one ended up with two radios, an ER 26ter and an ER 29 (the only exception instead having two ER 29s). The ER 26 had a maximum range of 60 km, while the ER 29 was the same radio as already used by platoon commander vehicles.
Thirteen ADF 1s were ordered in total, and were manufactured in the second half of 1938. By 1940, six ADF 1s were in standard use within the RDP units that operated the AMR 35s. Six others were seemingly unemployed and within the reserves of Cavalry units, and a last one was at the Saumur Cavalry School.
A German photo of a captured Renault ADF1. Source: Bovington Tank Museum collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
ZT-2 and ZT-3
The AMR 35 ZT-2 and ZT-3 were the variants which followed and took different approaches to the same problem, adding additional firepower to AMR 35-equipped units.
The ZT-2 solved this issue in a very straightforward way, replacing the Avis turrets with an APX 5, a one-man turret armed with the 25 mm SA 35 vehicle-mounted anti-tank gun. It can be noted that the APX 5 also had a coaxial MAC31E, meaning the ZT-2 de facto had the combined firepower of an AMR 35 armed with an Avis n°1 and of a 25 mm anti-tank gun.
The AMR 35 ZT-2s were seemingly the last military-contract AMR 35s to be completed. Source: Renault documentation via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
The ZT-3, instead of mounting a turret, applied more intense modifications to the hull, being a casemate vehicle instead of a turreted one. The gun was mounted to the right, and was actually the non-shortened version of the 25 mm anti-tank gun, the SA 34.
The AMR 35 ZT-3 was a low profile casemate tank destroyer, though this profile was somewhat hindered by the large cupola. Source: Renault documentation via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Ten of each type were ordered, and were the last military contract Renault ZT-derived vehicles to be completed, with the ZT-3 being completed in early 1939, and the ZT-2s seemingly only receiving their turrets after the breakout of the war itself. The two types were present in some small AMR-equipped reconnaissance groups and were used during the campaign of France.
ZT-4
There was one last major variant of the AMR 35, but it was not actually ordered by a branch of the Ministry of War. Instead, it was ordered by the Ministry of the Colonies. This was the ZT-4, which differed from other AMRs in that it was actually called a char, or tank, by its users.
The ZT-4 was modified to be more usable in tropical terrain. It was specifically meant for use in South-East Asia, most significantly, in French Indochina, but also potentially in French holdings in China. The easiest way to differentiate the ZT-4 from other types is a large air intake grill on the left side of the hull.
The first ZT-4s were ordered as early as 1936, but production would be massively delayed, as the vehicles were lower priority than Army vehicles, and the colonial administration kept experiencing delays of its own. The first order was for 21 vehicles, of which 18 were actually to be made turretless, while the three others would have Avis n°1. It was planned that the 18 turretless vehicles would actually be given turrets from Renault FT light tanks already in service in Indochina, 12 of which would have 37 mm SA 18 guns, and 6 8 mm Hotchkiss machine guns. All of these vehicles were planned to have radios, but Renault was not to fit these into the vehicles. Fitting them to the vehicles was also to be carried out by the users in the colonies.
A further order for 3 Avis n°1-equipped vehicles was signed in 1937, and another order for 31 vehicles fitted with Avis n°1 turret, with no mention of radio fittings, in 1938. In practice, the ZT-4s were actually being manufactured in spring 1940, and a number were pressed into service in early June 1940. Contrary to their initial destination, they were used in mainland France to counter the German invasion. As none had turrets at this point, they were to be used with machine rifles fired from the empty turret ring. After the armistice, some vehicles would be completed with Avis n°1 turrets under German supervision and pressed into German security service.
A turretless ZT-4 being used in mainland France in 1940. Source:Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultAn abandoned German AMR 35 ZT-4 outside of Prague, May 1945. Source: Reddit
Trying to Get the AMR 35 Into Service: The Disaster Years
The adoption of the AMR 35 could be said to have been very premature, and the delivery schedules overly ambitious, to an almost absurd degree. Even once AMR 33 production was complete in early 1935, Renault would face constant issues with the AMR 35.
The first complete armored hull was completed by Schneider in March 1935. The vehicle was mostly completed by Renault in April-May, though a number of minor components were still missing, and the vehicle left the factory on May 20th 1935. The vehicle was sent to Satory for trials, and actually passed them satisfactorily.
On July 3rd, the 3rd production ZT hull, almost fully complete, was showcased to the French Cavalry’s technical services. From August 3rd to 7th, the vehicle, fitted with a turret, was evaluated at Satory. There were some minor issues, but at first, these remained mostly details. The vehicle was turning a little less well than prototypes, but otherwise appeared functional. This was until it was asked to climb a 40° slope with a number of moderately sized bumps. This would still have been very reasonable within the vehicle’s capacities, and another vehicle which was considered as a prototype AMR, the Gendron, successfully managed to climb it while being an all-wheeled vehicle. However, the AMR 35 attempted to climb twice and failed each time.
Likely a Renault factory photo of a freshly completed AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°2 turret. The start of production on these proved way slower than hoped by the French Army. Source: char-français
The French Army was dissatisfied by this performance, despite Renault’s objections that the vehicle managed to climb a 30°/50% slope at its facilities, and that this was what was specified. The French Army requested a change of gear ratios so the vehicle could climb the slope. Despite significant internal reservations, Renault was forced to undertake changes to the gear ratios.
These modifications to the gear ratios would prove disastrous for the AMR 35. The improvement at first seemed successful. The French Army refused 12 new vehicles which were fitted with the new gear ratios in September 1935. Renault would complete the first completed vehicle with the new gear ratios in October. By January 1936, 11 were complete, and by February 22nd, 30 ZT-1s with new gear ratios were complete and another 20 were on the assembly lines.
Finally, about a year and a half after the French Army’s expectations, the first AMR 35s were delivered to units in April 1936. These first units to receive them were mostly the 1st and 4st RDP, which were motorized infantry regiments which were part of the DLMs, though some would be delivered to various GAM armored cars groups, most of which would later be pressed into service within the same two RDPs.
Work on fixing the vehicles and continuing production was almost certainly slowed down by the massive strikes which took place in all of France’s industry in 1936. In this photo, striking workers in front of Renault’s Billancourt factory during the May-June 1936 general strike. Source: Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF).The AMR 35 was not the only cavalry vehicle produced by Renault to be going through arduous times in the 1936 to 1939 era. The heavier AMC 35/Renault AGC (the first prototype of which is pictured here) was also proving to be a disastrous program, plagued with massive delays and utter unreliability, further contributing to ruining Renault’s standing with the Cavalry. Source: tank archives
At the point at which AMR 35s were delivered to units, a disastrous series of incidents started. Final drives of the AMR 35s kept breaking at an alarming rate, with the vehicles becoming practically inoperable and extremely unpopular with the crews. The problem was so significant that the French Army inspection service took the radical decision to cease AMR 35 assembly and have the vehicles be stored and stop operation while Renault found a solution. After Renault considered a number of solutions, the modification of a batch of 20 was accepted on October 13th 1936. Seventeen of these vehicles would be delivered to the 1st RDP on December 23rd and 24th 1936, while another one was taken through very extensive trials in Satory.
The situation seems to, at this point, have improved somewhat, and the French state cleared Renault to modify all 92 ZT-1 armored cars of the first contract with the new reinforced gear ratios, with already delivered vehicles returning to Renault’s factory and vehicles in production receiving the modifications before completion. The production inspection services asked for two vehicles, one with each turret, to be presented to them as prototypes, which was done on April 8th 1937, with the two vehicles being accepted.
An AMR 35 ZT-1 of the 3rd GAM in early 1937, during the vehicle’s constant cycles of returning from the units to the factory, and from the factory to the units. Source: Imperial War Museum collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Slowly, production and deliveries resumed. By August 1937, 70 of the 92 vehicles of the first contract were completed. The vehicles were returned to active use within the units using them. Nonetheless, major issues and breakdowns of differentials would resume, particularly from October 1937 onward. The administration of the Ministry of War sent a very outraged letter to Renault on November 16th 1937, reporting that the AMRs had been through 5 major modifications since the first deliveries, and that despite that, out of 43 fixed AMR 35s that had been delivered to the 1st and 4th RDP, six already had their differentials break. The next day, it was reported that 84 out of the 92 vehicles of the first contract were completed, with the 8 others on the production lines. Renault was finally starting to work on the vehicles of the second and third orders.
The last vehicles of the first contract were delivered on February 16th 1938. The situation seemed to have improved from 1936, but still by no means acceptable. In a new letter on March 14th 1938, the administration complained that many out of at this point 85 vehicles delivered had suffered major breakdowns of the differentials. Renault was asked to produce new differentials to refit vehicles that had suffered a major breakdown, as well as send specialist teams to the 1st and 4th RDP to help with the very troubled operations of the vehicles. By autumn, 18 vehicles had to be returned to Renault’s factories for major repairs.
Production of the vehicles from the second contract had started in August 1937. Renault modified the vehicles a little by strengthening the front hull and used a modified gearbox. The first five vehicles from this contract were delivered from May 23rd to 25th 1938. Ten others were delivered on June 2nd-3rd, and by July 27th, 56 were complete, with 34 having been received by units. The last recorded deliveries were made on November 21st 1938, and overall it appears that the last of the 167 AMR 35 ZT-1s were delivered in the last weeks of 1938.
AMR 35 ZT-1s with Avis n°2 turrets of the 1st RDP in its barracks of Pontoise, 1938. Though the unit received the type two years earlier, the vehicle could not be said to have become acceptable for everyday use until 1938. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Overall, the production and delivery process of the AMR 35s proved an unmitigated disaster for Renault. By November 1938, the company was reduced to pleading to be freed from the delay penalties, which could prove massive. The constant return of vehicles to the factory to be fixed up had made the production less than lucrative, in fact, almost ruinous. Not only was the vehicle less of a financial success than hoped, but it also had a major role in ruining the trust of the French military, and particularly the Cavalry branch, in Renault. This was made even worse by another Renault vehicle, the AMC 35/Renault AGC, also facing production and operational issues, perhaps even worse than the AMR. Though the AMR 35 would seem to reach a workable and somewhat reliable state by 1939, this would never truly be the case for the AMC.
The AMR 35s are Delivered to Units
The AMR 35s had been procured with the main goal of equipping a new type of division of the French Cavalry, the DLM (Division Légère Mécanique – Light Mechanized Division). Meant as a division combining motorized infantry, armored cars, and cavalry tanks, the first DLM was created in July of 1935, but the concept had been years in the making. By the time the first AMR 35s were delivered in 1936, this division was still the only one in existence, but there were plans to convert more cavalry divisions in the future.
There were, at first, plans for a large number of AMR 35s to be assigned to each DLM. The fighting core of each DLM was to be a strengthened brigade composed of two reconnaissance-combat regiment, each comprising two squadrons of AMRs and two squadrons of AMCs. As such, a French cavalry squadron had a strength of 20 vehicles. Furthermore, there would be a three battalion-strong regiment of dragons portés, a type of motorized infantry, and each of these battalions would have a squadron of AMRs. In other words, it was planned a DLM would feature 7 squadrons, or a whopping 140 AMRs.
However, these plans were ditched long before the first AMR 35 was delivered, in large part due to the massive delays in deliveries. When the Cavalry adopted the Hotchkiss H35, it was to replace the AMRs within the four squadrons that would have used them in the combat brigade. It was also decided to reduce the number of AMR squadrons within the dragons portés regiment to two, in other words meaning there would be just two squadrons, or 40 vehicles, of AMRs in a DLM.
As the first AMR 35s were delivered, they were typically delivered to the 1st RDP, part of the 1st DLM. In early 1937, the 2nd DLM was created, and new AMR 35s started being delivered to its regiment, the 4th RDP. The 3rd DLM would only be created after AMR 35 production ceased, but there were already plans for an armored car group to be reformed into the AMR squadrons of its future RDP. The last AMR 35s were thus delivered to the 1st GAM (Groupements d’Automitrailleuses – Armored Car Group), at this point part of the 1st Cavalry Division, which was to become the 3rd DLM.
The AMR 35s at the Outbreak of the War
Plans for the AMR 35 were somewhat shifted in 1939. The 1st and 2nd DLM were raised back from two to three squadrons of AMR 35s, or 60 vehicles per unit. Plans to transform the 1st Cavalry Division into the 3rd DLM were canceled, with the 3rd DLM instead being created from the ground up. It would not receive any AMR, instead only using S35s, Hotchkiss light tanks, and AMD 35s. A single squadron of AMR 35s was kept within the 1st Cavalry Division, part of the unit’s 5th RDP.
In other words, there were seven squadrons of 20 AMRs in service by 1940: three within the 1st RDP of the 2nd DLM, three within the 4th RDP of the 1st DLM, and one within the 5th RDP of the 1st Cavalry Division. Each squadron would have two vehicles in reserve, for 22 vehicles each in total. An additional five AMR 35s were used by the Saumur Cavalry School and eight were in general reserve.
AMR 35s within the 1st RDP
The 1st RDP was the first unit to receive the AMR 35, starting in 1936. In pre-war times, it was based in Pontoise, a north-west suburb of Paris.
The unit used a lozenge-shape insignia, with small bicolor flags (a red stripe on top and a white stripe on the bottom) on the top sides. The insignia could be further detailed with numbering depending on the squadron operating the AMR. Before the outbreak of the campaign of France, the unit would also adopt a set of bicolor lozenge-shape tactical markings. The 1st Squadron used a full blue lozenge, the 2nd Squadron a red top and blue bottom half, and the 3rd Squadron a green top and blue bottom half.
As it received its AMR 35s earlier than any other unit, the 1st RDP was by far the one which suffered with the major teething issues of the vehicle the most. This was further made worse by the fact the unit had not previously received AMR 33s to fall back on, with the AMR 35 being the only fully tracked AMRs available to it. It operated its AMRs in two mixed squadrons, which both included four platoons of five AMRs, and two platoons of 13 motorcycles with side-cars.
The unit extensively took part in exercises during the late 1930s, and was also often employed for parades. In 1939, it notably paraded in Versailles in June before taking part in the Bastille Day parade in Paris.
1st RDP AMR 35s during exercises in the 1939-1940 winter. The support for an anti-air machine gun can be seen mounted on the Avis n°1 turrets. Source: EPCA-D via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
When the campaign of France broke out, the 2nd DLM operated alongside the 3rd DLM, being part of the French spearhead heading into Belgium to attempt to counter the expected German push there. The two DLMs formed the main French force during the Battle of Hannut from May 12th to May 14th and then in the battle of Gembloux on May 15th. These are generally considered the largest tank battles of the campaign of France and the Low Countries.
Unfortunately, the 66 AMR 35s of the 1st RDP were quite the minority within more than 500 French AFVs, with the heavier Somua S35s and Hotchkiss tanks both featuring better performances and leaving much more of an impression. Though the battles were not a disaster for the French, photographic evidence does show that a large amount of AMR 35s were lost on roads of eastern Belgium, and later, as French forces realized they were surrounded, in French roads closing towards the sea to the Dunkirk pocket. In one notable instance, on May 29th, four AMR 35s of the RDP’s 3rd Battalion were lost in the Belgian town of Furnes. All AMR 35s of the unit were left destroyed or abandoned in the pocket.
A German soldier in front of a particularly odd abandoned AMR 35 ZT-1 of the 1st RDP, which has had its rear wheel and suspension block removed. Source: char-françaisA flipped over AMR 35 of the 1st RDP, likely a victim of either artillery or air bombardment. Source: char-françaisA completely destroyed AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°2 turret in Belgium or northern France, May/June 1940. A vehicle being destroyed to such an absurd degree would be unusual, as 13.2 mm ammunition would not cause such an explosion. It is possible the vehicle could either have been sabotaged by its crew or have been used as a range target after it was first either abandoned or knocked out. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultAn abandoned AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°1 turret in the Belgian town of Furnes. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultGerman soldiers examine an abandoned 1st RDP AMR 35 ZT-1 with Avis n°2 turret in Furnes, Belgium. This vehicle sports a number of rifle-caliber non-penetrating impacts. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultGerman soldiers pose in front of an AMR 35 of the 1st RDP abandoned in a Belgian town, with hardly legible German graffiti on the side. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Vehicles of the 4th RDP
While still at battalion level, the 4th BDP started receiving AMR 35s in spring 1936. The unit already had AMR 33s at this point. It was reclassified into a regiment in October 1936, and completely replaced AMR 33s with AMR 35s in 1937. The unit was based in Verdun.
A motorcyclist poses in front of one of the 4th RDP’s AMR 35s. Source: char-françaisA soldier poses in front of an AMR 35 with Avis n°2 turret of the 4th RDP. This photo is particularly interesting as it shows the appearance of the 13.2 mm’s gun jacket when the machine gun is not inserted in it. Source: char-françaisAn AMR 35 of the 4th RDP in front of what is likely a truckload of grain sacks, and a garage. Note an excellent view of the anti-aircraft support on the Avis n°1 turret, as well as a seemingly quite poorly tensioned track. Source: char-français
The unit lacked a clear insignia, though a simple blue losenze in a white square was often painted on the vehicle’s fenders for recognition.
As part of the move into the Low Countries, the 1st DLM was the tip of the French spear. It was meant to cross Belgium and head towards the southern Netherlands in order to link up with the Dutch Army, which it did remarkably quickly, already engaging with German troops near Maastricht on May 11th 1940. On that day, the 4th RDP already suffered from seemingly uncontested air strikes, which did not cause major losses.
It is reported that on May 12th, elements of the RDP, including a squadron of AMR 35s, were used to hold the village of Diessen in the afternoon, but had to retreat to protect a canal in the evening. Several AMR 35s were probably lost in the engagement, with at least one confirmed to have been destroyed in Diessen.
AMR 35s of the 4th RDP in some of the first days of the campaign, in Belgium. The regiment was noticeably hit by German air strikes on the first two days of the campaign, and as such, it is not surprising to see this column of AMRs sport their spare machine guns mounted in the anti-air positions. Source: George Baudin collection, via Régis Potié, via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
The RDP held the canal the next day and retreated further on the night from the 13th to the 14th. At this point, the Regiment entered back into Belgium, and actually faced difficulties, as the unit’s officers had to negotiate with Belgians troops that wanted to blow up bridges before the 3rd Battalion could cross them. No battalion ended up stranded, but losses were still reported.
On May 15th, the unit continued its retreat, entering back into France. However, just like the others, the 1st DLM still ended up stranded north of the German breakthrough to the sea. In the early afternoon of the 18th, positions of parts of the Battalion were forced to retreat under the advance of German tanks. A counter-attack had to be hastily canceled, and overall heavy losses of AMRs appear to have been taken on that day and the next.
It is reported that the AMRs managed to fend off light elements, including small numbers of light tanks or armored cars alongside trucks and infantry, in the morning of the 19th, but in the afternoon, German troops managed to infiltrate French positions, forcing another retreat. By the 20th, already suffering from the cut of supply lines, it is reported AMRs were starting to lack fuel and ammunition, and that some vehicles were particularly used and in a bad state. Heavy losses continued in the next days, as the RDP fought a fighting retreat, orienting itself towards the sea and Dunkirk in the hope of getting out of the pocket.
In the last few days of May, some of the last still operational AMRs were often abandoned and sabotaged to avoid capture, as men of the RDP started evacuating from Dunkirk and Zuydcoote on March 30th. Though many would get away, all their fleet of 66 AMR 35s would be left behind, either destroyed or abandoned.
Two out of action AMR 35s of the 4th RDP in a ditch. These vehicles were likely abandoned in the very last days before the Regiment’s men embarked from the Dunkirk pocket. On the forefront vehicle, there is no machine gun to be seen, not just on the anti-air mount but also in the turret mount itself, suggesting the crew may have taken both with them. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 RenaultAMR 35s were generally meant to operate in mixed squadrons alongside motorcyclists. It is ironically a German one that is examining this abandoned AMR 35 with Avis n°2 turret of the 4th RDP, that seems to lack not just the machine gun, but also the gun jacket. Source: char-français
The Lone Squadrons of the 5th RDP
By the start of the campaign, the 5th RDP had a somewhat odd organization. There were two mixed squadrons equipped with AMR 35s, but they were both at half-strength with only two platoons, meaning overall, the RDP had the same 22 vehicles as one of the three squadrons of the 1st or 4th RDP .
The 1st Cavalry Division was reorganized as the first DLC (Division Légère de Cavalerie – ENG: Light Cavalry Division) in March 1940, and it was as part of this unit that the 5th RDP fought.
The various DLCs were generally placed on the flank of the French maneuver into Belgium, covering the Ardennes from expected German advances. In other words, they found themselves straight in the path of the German breakthrough. The 1st DLC experienced this quickly, encountering German troops on its flank as early as May 11th, with the unit forced to take to the left bank of the Meuse River in an attempt to create a defensive line on the river.
The unit suffered heavy losses, in large part on May 13th, when an order that was supposed to be sent to the 1st DcR (Division Cuirassée – ENG: Armored Division) was in fact sent to the 1st DLC due to the two names being mistaken, and the unit was ordered to attack German lines. It appears the attack did not take place, but heavy losses would nonetheless be taken.
It is known two AMR 35s were knocked out by air strike on May 14th. By the next day, the first of the RDP’s two squadrons had already lost an entire platoon, half its strength, while other AMRs were being abandoned due to mechanical issues or lack of fuel. Even the surviving platoon lost an AMR knocked out by a German anti-tank weapon on the evening of May 15th.
The 1st Squadron lost the last of its 11 AMRs on May 17th. Meanwhile, the 2nd Squadron suffered a major breakdown in the supply system that left nine AMR 35s abandoned by the side of the road in Villers-le Gambon, southern Belgium, on May 15th. In less than ten days of fighting, the 5th RDP had lost its entire fleet of AMR 35s.
A German soldier poses in front of an AMR 35 formerly in service of the 5th RDP, abandoned in woods near the town of Dinant, France, presumably on May 15th 1940. Source: Régis Potié collection via Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault
Late in the campaign, in June 1940, it appears the last few remaining reserve AMR 35 ZT-1s were pressed into service with the 4th Armored Cars Regiment, part of an ill-fated attempt at creating another DLM, the 7th, in desperate attempts to resist the German advance. No more than 10 AMRs total, including some AMR 33s, were part of this unit.
A destroyed AMR 35 ZT-1 from an unknown unit Source: char-français
Evaluating the AMR 35
The AMR 35 can be somewhat of a hard vehicle to judge in comparison to some other armored fighting vehicles of the French Army.
It can not be argued that the vehicle did not have some major flaws, and poor performances during the Battle of France demonstrated them. The vehicle’s teething phase had been particularly long and horrendous, with the vehicles becoming unpopular and crews frustrated as AMR 35s were constantly returning to Renault factories to have parts, in particular their differentials, changed.
The AMR 35 ended up as a disaster for Renault. The vehicle was, in many ways, an improvement over the previous AMR 33. It offered a better chassis for modifications, had a sturdier suspension, a more reliable engine, the ability to mount a more powerful armament, and the fittings of radios intended from the start. However, the massive delays and issues experienced from 1935 to 1938 meant that orders of the type remained moderate. At the same time, it proved not at all lucrative, and heavily damaged the relationship between Renault and the French Cavalry.
This photo, one of the AMR 35’s most well-known, does well to showcase the often forgotten bloodbath the campaign of France was. The French Army, while often mocked, suffered casualties with an intensity rarely found on the Western Front of the Second World War. Among many others, the casualties of armored vehicles crewmen were very high. In this aspect, the AMR 35s would do little to protect their crews. Source: char-français
By the point they were fighting in the campaign of France, the AMRs were distributed within motorized infantry regiments, and no matter how much the crews would be taught to perform reconnaissance action, it was to be expected that AMRs would end up used for infantry support as part of such an unit. They were woefully unsuited for that task, being lightly armed and armored, and the situation of the campaign was not kind to them, as AMR 35s were largely in parts of the front where German armor was the most common.
The AMR 35s also suffered from issues that plagued almost all French tanks, notably a one-man turret. However, it can still be argued that the vehicle was not comparable to some of the almost unsalvageable disasters the French industry put out in the 1930s, Renault’s R35 light infantry tank being a notable example.
Though significant flaws would always have remained, there were indeed some actual, planned improvements or features of the AMR 35 that could have made it better suited for mobile warfare. The use of radios is a notable one. Ultimately, due to the fittings of radios being canceled on many vehicles, and the production of radio posts being slow even for the others, only few AMR 35s were ever fitted with radios.The ER 29 and eventually ER 28 they were meant to be fitted with were rather small radios, by no means making a vehicle bearing them into a command machine unable of fighting. Had more attention been placed on these, a fleet of AMR 35s all equipped with both an ER 29 and an ER 28 would have started to have real qualities of reconnaissance.
The introduction of the 13.2 mm Hotchkiss was also significant. It would allow the AMR to fight off enemy armored reconnaissance elements armed with armored cars such as the Sd.Kfz.221, 222 or 231, or Panzer I light tanks.
The capabilities of the AMR 35 were in several ways quite similar to the Panzer I (pictured here, an Ausf.B during Operation Barbarossa). The Wehrmacht was able to make good use of a flawed but not entirely worthless design, while the French Army was not. Source: Les automitrailleuses de Reconnaissance, Tome 2: l’AMR 35 Renault (AMR 35), Ebay, courtesy of Armin Freitag’s digital collection (Panzer I)
The comparison with the Panzer I actually gives a good example of what the AMR 35 could have been, had more attention been put into it. The Panzer I is obviously not remembered by many as the greatest tank of its time. However, at the same time, it was able to function in a highly-mobile offensive warfare thanks to the use of radio and good mobility. The flaws the Panzer I had in common with the AMR 35, such a thin armor and one-man turret, did not prevent it from proving to be an asset. The AMR 35, however, never had that chance, due to the French Army’s neglect of radios, and in general, the Cavalry’s efforts to introduce mechanized warfare largely struggling against the traditionalism of headquarter higher-ups. As a result, the Cavalry’s light AMR 35s were little more than cannon fodder, and even the well armored and armed S35s could do little more than try to slow the German advance.
Under the Balkenkreuz
As with the vast majority of French armored fighting vehicles, German troops were able to capture a number of AMR 35s, and press them back into some form of service.
A German soldier poses in front of train wagons loaded with abandoned French vehicles, including two AMR 35s of the 4th RDP. Source: char-français
The German designation for the AMR 35 was Panzerspähwagen ZT 702 (f), indicating it as a reconnaissance vehicle of French origin. This designation did not only apply to the ZT-1, but all AMR 35s.
These vehicles were put back in service for security use, but it actually appears that, despite higher production numbers, the ZT-1 was not the most common type in German use and has rarely ever been photographed. During the Fall of France, the Germans had captured a number of ZT-4 vehicles during the production process, still on the assembly chain, and had many of them pressed into service, some completed with Avis n°1 turrets, while at least one would be turned into an 81 mm mortar carrier. Pictures of ZT-4 in German use appear much more common than ZT-1s.
Nonetheless, it is likely a few ZT-1s soldiered on alongside ZT-4s in German use. The vehicles were used for security in two different areas, the majority in mainland France, but a significant part in Czechia. It would be in Prague that the vehicles would get their largest share of action, as they were used by German security forces during the Prague Uprising from May 5th to 8th 1945, and were subsequently captured by the Czech Resistance and swiftly pressed into service for a few days. However, in this instance, the ZT-4 again appears to have been the more commonly used type.
Conclusion – The Failure of the Perfected AMR
The AMR 35’s story is somewhat tragic. The vehicle had been designed to perfect the issues of the AMR 33, and at a glance, it appears to have done so by adopting a robust suspension, a better armed turret, fittings for a radio, and a more rugged and reliable engine. When showcased, the schematics and theoretical capacities of such a vehicle in 1935, one could reasonably see it as in the higher-end of light cavalry tanks.
However, this was not to be, as massive production delays, in large part caused by overly ambitious expectations from the French state, were followed by teething issues the scale of which were seemingly not yet experienced in the French Army. By the time the AMR 35s were truly operational, the overall picture was way less rosy. It was 1938 and the vehicles mostly did not have radios, more than half were completed with the 7.5 mm machine gun instead of the 13.2 mm, and the crew had little trust in a machine that had spent the better part of two years breaking down and being sent back to its factory. Even by 1940, radios were still rare, and the vehicle had de facto been relegated to an ad-hoc infantry support role, while squadrons originally meant for reconnaissance went into battle with Hotchkiss H35 or H39 light tanks utterly unsuitable for this role. Production of more AMR 35s had been discontinued due to the massive difficulties and delays encountered.
Though a few French armored fighting vehicles, including the AMR 35’s unlikely replacement, the Hotchkiss light tank (in the form of the H39), were pressed in service of the reformed French Army in 1944-1945, the AMR 35 was not one of them. By the end of the liberation of France, there were very few, if any, AMR 35s left in running order.
Regrettably, it appears no AMR 35 has survived to this day. Not one vehicle exists in a museum collection, and not even a still visible wreck is known, neither in France nor in Czechia. The type disappeared without leaving a trace in such a fashion, which is an unfortunate turn of fate, as a good number of rarer French vehicles of the interwar have survived to this day, such as the FCM 36, AMR 33, AMC 35, and even the “M23” Citroën half-track armored car, one of 16 known to have been made having turned up in Kabul during the Coalition invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
AMR 35, equipped with the AVIS-1 turret (Batignolles-Châtillon) and the 7.5 mm (0.295 in) Reibel Châtellerault MAC31 machine gun. Illustration: Hadrien Barthélemy.AMR 35 ZT-1 fitted with the AVIS-2 turret. Illustration: Hadrien Barthélemy.Regular AMR 35, equipped with the AVIS-1 turret (Batignolles-Châtillon) and the 7.5 mm (0.295 in) Reibel Châtellerault MAC31 machine gun.AMR 35 ZT-1 equipped with a heavy 13 mm (0.51 in) Hotchkiss machine gun with 1250 rounds. Fitted with the AVIS-2 turret.
AMR 35 / Renault ZT-1 Specifications
Dimensions (L x w x h)
3.84 x 1.64 x 1.88 m
Ground clearance
0.39 m
Weight
6,000 kg empty, 6,500 kg fully loaded
Engine
Renault 447 22CV 4-cylinders 120×130 mm 5,881 cm3 engine producing 82 hp at 2,200 rpm
Transmission
4 forward + 1 reverse, front
Suspension
Rubber blocks
Power-to-weight ratio
12.6 hp/tonne
Maximum speed
55 km/h
Speed on damaged road
40 km/h
Track width
20 cm
Trench crossing
1.70 m
Fording
60 cm
Maximum slope crossing
50%
Crew
2 (Driver, Commander/gunner)
Driver vision’s devices
Front episcopes
Commander’s vision devices
Front-right episcope, front-left, sides and rear vision slots
Armament
7.5 mm MAC31E machine gun with 2,250 rounds & 1 spare/anti-aircraft machine gun (Avis n°1 turret)
OR
13.2 mm Model 1930 Hotchkiss machine gun with 1,220 rounds (37 20-rounds box magazines + 480 rounds in cardboard crates) (Avis n°2 turret)
Hull Armor
13 mm (vertical/slightly angled surfaces)
9 mm (significantly angled surfaces, notably frontal glacis)
6 mm (roof)
5 mm (floor)
Turret armor
13 mm (sides)
6 mm (roof)
Radio
None on most vehicles
Few fitted with ER 29s
Planned to fit the entire fleet with ER 28s, never carried out
The camouflage scheme and configuration of Malian Type 62s illustrated based on available photographs. Illustration by Godzilla, based on work by David Bocquelet
Republic of Mali (1981-Present, No Longer in Active Use)
Light Tank – 18 Purchased
The Republic of Mali has been a traditional customer of Soviet hardware ever since its independence in 1960. Over its history, in total, the country has purchased four different types of tanks. Of these, one stands out as somewhat of an anomaly compared to the three others. It is the only non-Soviet tank Mali has ever purchased, as well as the only one where evidence of active use has never been seen. This is the Type 62, from the People’s Republic of China.
China’s First Lightweight Tank, the Type 62
Though very similar to a downscaled Type 59 (a locally-produced Soviet T-54A tank), the Type 62 was actually the result of a complicated development process which includes a number of largely different and sometimes very obscure series of prototypes, such as the 59-16 light tank, the WZ-131, and the WZ-132. The tank which the PLA finally adopted and pressed into service in the 1960s, the Type 62, was a 21-tonne light tank armed with an 85 mm Type 62-85TC main gun, directly based on and firing the same ammunition as the T-34-85’s ZiS-S-53 gun. Smaller and lighter than a medium tank, the Type 62 was mostly meant for use in southern China, which includes numerous regions with mountains as well as poor roads, bridges and infrastructure in general, making heavier tanks hard to operate properly.
A People’s Liberation Army Type 62 during the ill-fated Chinese invasion of Vietnam, 1979. Source: Pinterest
China soon found itself exporting armored fighting vehicles as an additional means of both revenue and diplomacy, and the Type 62 was fairly well-suited for the role. China had somewhat of a “third-worldist” policy, attempting to develop ties with nations that were often decolonized by the West, but not clearly aligned to the Soviet Union. Many of these were located in either Africa or South and South East Asia, areas which at the time had not necessarily been left with high-end infrastructure after decolonization, and therefore lighter vehicles better suited for these country’s roads and bridges were attractive.
Mali Buys the Type 62
The Republic of Mali was a country that maintained good relations with the Soviet Union, its army largely operating on Soviet gear, but it was neither involved enough in the Socialist ideology nor the Eastern Bloc to truly be impacted by the Sino-Soviet Split of the 1960s. Therefore, Mali also had no qualms purchasing armament from China. In 1980, the country placed an order for 18 Type 62s.
These vehicles were, for a very long time, the only Chinese AFVs bought by Mali, with the next purchase, three Tiger armored patrol vehicles, only following in 2017, and another one, for six VN-2C armored personnel carriers, in 2020. This is not to say, however, that Mali did not purchase Chinese equipment during the Cold War. Likely in a similar timeframe to the Type 62, Mali purchased quantities of both Chinese rifles known as the Type 56, one being a copy of the AKM and another of the SKS. With the two original Soviet rifles already in Malian service, operating them was easy, and the price of Chinese-made guns was generally unbeatable outside of armament supplied from the Soviet Union as aid.
An AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) militant in Northern Mali armed with a Chinese Type 56 rifle in 2012. Chinese-made rifles are commonplace in Mali, likely both because of direct deliveries but also due to rifles delivered in neighboring countries ending up in Mali due to the country’s often unenforceable desert borders. Source: Wikimedia Commons
Mali’s Most Elusive Tanks
Ever since their delivery, Mali’s Type 62 have barely ever been seen. This is not particularly surprising pre-1991, but even in post-Cold War Mali, while footage of PT-76s and T-54Bs emerged, this was not the case for the Chinese-made tank.
In 2012, in an attempt at establishing the inventory of the Malian Army, French Military historian and terrorism expert Laurent Touchard qualified the Type 62s, alongside T-34-85s, BTR-40s, and BTR-152s, as “swallowed up by the sands or quietly rotting in Malian army barracks”.
The only known photos of Malian Type 62s are more recent. On March 19th 2019, Malian politician Karim Keïta, a parliamentary deputy of Bamako’s 2nd district, posted photos of a visit to Camp Tieba in Sikasso, one of Mali’s largest military bases that has also become the main storage location for Malian tanks. During the visit, the deputy was shown at least three Type 62 light tanks, which appear on two photographs.
Karim Keïta being shown at least three Type 62s at Camp Tieba. This is by far the best picture of Malian Type 62s in existence. Source: Karim Keïta on Facebook & Oryx Blog
These photos are, as of now, the only known view of Type 62s in Mali, and are quite interesting. The vehicles are not in a particularly bad state. Their camouflage has the same four colors, dark green, brown, beige, and black, as seen on other Malian AFVs in recent years. However, their application is slightly different. The vehicles do not feature the somewhat odd lines of one color inside of another. Instead, one color, black, appears to be consistently used to create lines, sometimes used as the edge between two different colors, and sometimes within a large swathe of one color to separate it in smaller sections. Green appears to be the color used the most, with beige also being quite common on the vehicles, and brown being limited to a few smaller swathes, often somewhat fading into the black edges. If anything, this camouflage pattern appears more professional than the one found on Mali’s PT-76 and T-54, where all four colors appear to be used in a fairly similar way.
This other photo does not focus on the Type 62 at all, however they can still be seen in the background. Source: Karim Keïta on Facebook
Other aspects to notice include the turret hatches seemingly being open on the vehicles. This may have been done for the presentation, but if not, it is a very questionable way of storing a vehicle in the open air, as sand may get inside. The photos show a heavy machine gun mount, though no machine gun is mounted, as well as a Malian armed forces registration number, something which even in recent years PT-76s and T-54B seem not to have had. There is comparatively quite little damage to elements such fenders in comparison to what has sometimes been seen on other Malian tanks, which does suggest the vehicles are, as expected, barely or not at all used. However, it does appear that at least a minimal amount of maintenance is carried out on them.
Conclusion – An Exercise in Vanity?
Out of all types of armored fighting vehicles used by Mali, the Type 62s are some of the least known, though they do have some competition in the form of vehicles of whom the service in Mali is also very obscure, such as the Fahd or the BMP-1.
In a way, the recent views of the vehicles raise almost as many questions as they answer. Many would have previously assumed the Type 62 to have been de facto abandoned, not so different from some completely obsolete types that are no longer in service in Mali, such as the T-34-85. Yet the recent photos seem to show the vehicles in a very recent camouflage scheme, and even featuring registration numbers, something not often seen on Malian tanks, but much more often found on Malian wheeled vehicles, and especially technicals, which have seen widespread use in the conflict in Northern Mali.
Despite this, the tanks seem to have never been seen outside of their storage space in Sikasso, and certainly not in use in the Northern Mali conflict, nor even in parades of exercises. It is not surprising not to see the vehicles in use in the war. Although perhaps more suited for Saharan warfare than T-54Bs, which Mali also operates, being about 15 tonnes lighter, they still are likely nowhere near as practical as a technical, and Mali may very well not have any spare parts to keep them running. However, not having seen them in any form of ceremonial or training use is curious. It is possible that the vehicles are not in running order. The fact that they are still being painted in a modern camouflage would be little more than play pretend. It is also possible that the Malian Army, already stretched thin with the conflict in Northern Mali, does not have the resources to crew them, yet still want a modicum of maintenance carried out on them, as if being saved for a rainy day when they may somehow be of use, as unlikely as that sounds.
The camouflage scheme and configuration of Malian Type 62s illustrated based on available photographs. Illustration by Godzilla, based on work by David Bocquelet
Republic of Mali (Likely 1970s-Present)
Main Battle Tank – 12 Operated
The Republic of Mali is one of a myriad of African states which broke free from France at the turn of the 1950s to 1960s. Soon after independence, it became one of the most Soviet-aligned states in West Africa. This logically led to the Malian Army being largely equipped with Soviet hardware, particularly when it came to heavy equipment, for example, tracked vehicles. The heaviest of these tracked vehicles in Malian service are a small number of T-54Bs, delivered at an unknown date, but in any case, having been in Malian service for decades now. Despite that, they seemingly never saw any action despite Mali being a deeply troubled state for about a decade.
Malian T-54B “Konna” on a tank-transporting trailer in Bamako. Source: maliweb.net
The T-54, Workhorse of the Eastern Bloc
The T-54 is a tank that requires little introduction. Pushed into mass production and service in 1947, it proved a massively successful vehicle. While an evolutionary design from previous Soviet vehicles, its hull directly based on the T-44 and its 100 mm D-10T gun almost identical to the SU-100’s D-10S (though the V-55 12-cylinder 580 hp diesel engine was new), it was an extremely potent vehicle at the time. From its introduction in the late 1940s to arguably the late 1950s, the T-54’s combination of armament, protection and mobility in a mass-producible package can be said to have been unmatched in the West.
Variants and upgrades obviously followed suit. After the three early 1946/47, 1949, and 1951 models, a first major upgrade/new model was introduced in 1955. This was the T-54A, which included a vertical stabilizer for the 100 mm gun, a new radio, infrared driver’s periscope and headlights, new telescopic gun sights, and a new radio, among others.
In 1956, the T-54B was adopted into service, adding a number of new improvements, including a TPN-1-22-11 active infrared imaging sight, the L-2 “Luna” infrared spotlight which could be quite common on late 1950s Soviet AFVs, an infrared commander’s searchlight, and 2-plane stabilization (from 1957 onward). This night fighting equipment was fairly exceptional for the time, more comprehensive than on tanks such as the M48A2/A3, Centurion Mark 3, or the myriad of older tanks, notably M47 Pattons, which formed the backbone of NATO’s tank force in Western Europe.
A Soviet T-54B. The type was a late 1950s/1960s workhorse of the Soviet Army. Source: krasnayazvezda.com
Not only were newly manufactured T-54Bs entering service, but the majority of previously in-service Soviet T-54s would be refitted to T-54B standard in the late 1950s, making the type a very common tank. By the late 1960s and especially the 1970s, however, though the T-54B definitely had not become a worthless combattant, the introduction of more modern tanks in the Soviet arsenal, the T-62, T-64, and soon enough, the T-72, as well as more advanced models of the T-55, meant the T-54 was no longer in its prime.
The vehicle was, however, an excellent hand-me-down to Soviet allies, being available in large numbers, and its armor and armament still being very significant in areas of the world where the most common armored fighting vehicles were armored cars. At the same time, its fairly light weight of 36 tonnes, about as light as a modern medium tank/main battle tank was, lighter than pretty much all NATO tanks of the class except the French AMX-30B, also made it a good option for countries with infrastructure not developed for exceedingly heavy vehicles.
The Unclear Export to Mali
Cold War Mali was almost exclusively a customer of Soviet armored fighting vehicles, being an openly Socialist dictatorship from 1960 to 1968 under Modibo Keïta, and a less clearly ideological, but still pro-Soviet military regime under General Moussa Traoré from 1968 to 1991.
There are three known major packages of armored fighting vehicles delivered to Mali. The date when T-54s were delivered, and as such, to which of these packages they belonged to, is not known for certain. The first package, including BTR-40s and T-34-85s, was delivered in 1960-1961, just after the country’s independence, and likely far too early for the USSR to deliver the still fairly new T-54B to an African state that had just become independent. This leaves two other known packages, the one delivered around 1975, which is known to have included BTR-152s, BRDM-2s, and PT-76s, and the one delivered around 1981, which included BTR-60PBs and perhaps some further T-34-85s, though these are sometimes quoted as delivered from another African state.
The 1975 package seems perhaps the most fitting, as it included the widest variety of vehicles and was overall larger in size, but the T-54 having been delivered in the early 1980s cannot be excluded for certain. It is also possible the vehicles were delivered at another date, outside of these major known deliveries. The vehicles are, after all, not the only Soviet AFVs where the exact date of delivery is not known, that also being the case of a number of ZSU-23-4 Shilkas and some extremely elusive BMP-1s the Sahelian country received.
As for the number of vehicles delivered, an attempt at establishing the inventory of the Malian Army by French military historian and terrorism expert Laurent Touchard from 2012 placed the number of T-54s in Malian service at twelve. It should be noted that this inventory was of vehicles still in existence, not of vehicles delivered. The same inventory established Mali had 18 PT-76 operational, while 20 are known to have been delivered, and therefore it cannot be confirmed Mali only ever received 12 T-54s.
However, as the vehicles appear to have seen less intense service than the PT-76s, it is more likely none were ever worn out to the point of being out of service in comparison to the amphibious light tanks, so 12 remains the most probable number of vehicles delivered. It should also be noted that the same report stated Malian T-54s were not in the best state. Their radios were reported to either be used and damaged, or sometimes entirely unoperational.
Operational Service
In December 1985, Mali waged a short 5-day war against its neighbor, Burkina Faso, over the Agacher Strip, but this was a small-scale conflict and it is not known if the T-54s were used as part of it. If so, they would likely have been a force to reckon with, as Burkina Faso did not (and still does not) field tanks. At the time, Burkina Faso’s most heavily armed armored vehicles were AML-90s and the recently delivered EE-9 Cascavels. The Agacher Strip War, however, likely did not see any armor engagements.
As of 2022, footage of Malian T-54Bs is known to have originated from three different places: Sikasso, capital of the eponymous Sikasso province; the capital, Bamako; and the city of Kati, 15 km from Bamako.
Sikasso is the main storage facility of Malian tracked armor. The vehicles are stored in the military Camp Tieba, which also hosts a military school/training facility. The vehicles appear to generally be stored in roofed, but open-air hangars, with no flooring on the sand or dirt ground, protecting the vehicles from some, but not all of the elements. Most Malian tanks appear to be in Sikasso almost all the time. This includes the T-54Bs, but also the PT-76s, and Mali’s most obscure tanks, a fleet of Chinese-made Type 62s that have seemingly never been seen outside of Sikasso’s Camp Tieba.
T-54Bs and PT-76s stored in Camp Tieba, Sikasso. Note that recent photos of T-54s seem to show them with no heavy machine gun mount at all, while photos of the vehicles in the 2010-2012 era show them with an unused heavy machine gun support. Source: Oryx Blog
The T-54s have otherwise been seen a number of times in Bamako, the Malian capital, during occasional military parades, often not moving under their own power but on a tank-transporting truck.
The location where T-54Bs have typically been seen moving under their own power is the city of Kati, 15 km from Bamako, where some Malian T-54s were seen on exercise in 2011.
Camouflage, Commemorative Name, and Their Evolution
The earliest known footage of Malian T-54s, starting in 2010, shows the vehicle in a uniform green camouflage, similar to the Soviet green color which the vehicles would have sported in Soviet service. This camouflage seems to have persisted until at least 2012-2013, and potentially several years later.
A number of commemorative names were seen on T-54Bs spotted in this period. They have been seen referring to a number of things, including settlements and cities, folktales, historical leaders or figures of Mali, and more recently, in reference to Malian Army servicemen killed in the conflict in the North.
On September 22nd 2010, a parade to celebrate the 50th Anniversary of Malian Independence was carried out in Bamako. It included three T-54Bs on tank transporters. One was named “Soni Ali Ber”, after a 15th-century leader of the Songhai Empire, a large medieval African state of which the capital was Gao, located in present-day Mali. A BTR-60PB has also been seen sporting the same name.
Another was named “Bakari Dian”, a half-man half-beast creature from a folktale from the Ségou region of Southern Mali, east of Bamako. The last is known from photographs which only allow part of the name to be identified, reading “Monzon Diarra”, a warrior king which ruled the Bambara Empire, an empire centered on the Bambara peoples (the most common group of ethnicities in Mali), at the turn of the 18th to the 19th century.
Two Malian T-54Bs on trailers during the 50th Anniversary of Malian Independence Parade in Bamako. Source: Esoteric ArmourA photo of T-54B “Bakari Dian”. Note the empty machine gun mount. Source: Esoteric ArmourA very similar shot of T-54B “Soni Ali Ber”. Source: Esoteric ArmourThe name of this third T-54B present in the 2010 parade is not entirely readable, but “Monzon Diarra” can be identified. Also note the white-painted rims on the vehicle’s road wheels, a classic parade scheme for Eastern Bloc-aligned militaries. Source: Oryx Blog
On January 20th 2011, Malian T-54Bs took part in a military exercise and demonstration, including live firing, in the town of Kati, 15 km from Bamako. Two vehicles were spotted, “Soni Ali Ber” and “Bakari Dian”, still sporting their names seen in the previous parade.
T-54B “Bakari Dian” during the January 20th 2011 exercise/demonstration. Source: Esoteric ArmourT-54B “Soni Ali Ber” during the January 20th 2011 exercise/demonstration. Source: Esoteric Armour
Two additional named T-54Bs were seen at later dates. One was named “Konna”, after a city in central Mali (which would be about the edge of terrorist group Ansar Dine’s advance into central Mali in January 2013, before the Franco-African intervention pushed it back), and another was named “Cne Sekou Traore”. This later name is particularly interesting, as it refers to a much more recent individual than usual. Captain Sekou Traore commanded a company, the 713ème Compagnie Nomade (ENG: 713rd Nomad Company) in the Battle of Aguel’hoc, one of the first major battles during which the Malian Army faced off against the Tuareg MNLA and islamist Ansar Dine and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) during the 2012 Tuareg Insurgency. After their victory in the battle, AQIM insurgents executed 97 Malian prisoners. The Malian state, in the following months, attempted to make the men that fought in Aguel’hoc into heroes and highlight the barbaric executions in an effort to try and bolster the country against the growing insurgency, which would see Mali lose control of the northern half of the country.
T-54B “Cne Sekou Traore” seen on a tank-carrying trailer, likely in 2012 or 2013. Note, this time, the red painted road wheel hub caps. Source: Oryx Blog
In recent years (one photograph being dated from 2018), Malian T-54s have been seen sporting a new camouflage, which has also been observed on PT-76s and Type 62s. This camouflage is a multicolor scheme including dark green, brown, beige, and black. Large swathes of each color are painted on the tanks, and smaller irregular lines are then present inside the larger swathes.
A Malian tank crew poses in front of a T-54B in the new camouflage scheme in Kati, May 4th 2018. Source: voaafrique.com
Vehicles painted in this new camouflage scheme have been seen both in Kati as well as in Sikasso. The most recent known view of a Malian T-54 actually seems to be from a location from where no views of the vehicles had emerged previously, a military camp in Sevare, one of the largest cities in Central Mali. Within a number of photos documenting training of Malian crewmen on a 122 mm D-30 howitzer by the European Training Mission in Mali, one sports a T-54 in the background.
In this photo published in March 2021 by the European Training Mission in Mali, part of an article on training Malian crews using a 122 mm D-30 howitzers, a T-54B can be seen in the background. The vehicle appears to not have been moved for a while, and its fenders are noticeably damaged. Source: European Training Mission in Mali digital journal, March 2021 issue
Absence of the T-54s in the Current Malian Conflict and their Role in the Malian Army
Mali’s T-54s have not seen use in the current Malian conflict, despite war in the country having been raging for over a decade at this point. Though the vehicles not being used may be surprising at first, there are actually very reasonable motives for it.
The Malian conflict, outside of the ill-fated attempt by terrorist groups to progress into Central and Southern Mali that triggered foreign intervention in January 2013, has mostly remained confined to Northern Mali, an environment marked by the Sahara Desert, with settlements separated by sometimes hundreds of kilometers of desert with very poor roads. For an army to make proper use of tanks there, it would need a very strong logistical organization and wide availability of spare parts, something the Malian Army does not have. Vehicles such as Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles (MRAPs), and perhaps even more widely technicals (often based not only on the Toyota Land Cruiser, but also the Korean Kia KM450 truck in Mali) make much more sense.
In the modern Malian environment, the technical has proved a much more useful asset than the tank. This example is a Kia KM450 fitted with a 14.5 mm ZPU-1 heavy machine gun. It is here seen on guard duty in Gao on January 13th 2017, during the visit of French President François Hollande to French troops stationed in the city. Source:d Stéphane de Sakutin, AFP.
The vehicles have been retained in some service capacity though, and this can also appear reasonable at first. If Mali came to heads with one of its neighbors in a peer-to-peer military conflict, rather than counter-insurgency warfare, its T-54s would actually not be any worse than their opponents in most cases. Three of Mali’s neighbors, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Senegal, do not field any tanks, though all three have 90 mm-armed armored cars. Three others are in the same state as Mali, with a variant of T-54/T-55 as their heaviest tank. There is of course one exception to this, Algeria, one of the African continent’s military powerhouses. However, the border between Algeria and Mali is located in the middle of the Sahara, an impractical environment for tanks, and the impoverished Mali could never realistically hope to afford equipment to rival the Algerian military.
However, in practice, it is unlikely Mali’s T-54s would account to much in a conventional war. The vehicles themselves may not be worse than their opposition, but it appears they have only seen minimal service and maintenance, meaning they would both be susceptible to breakdowns, and be crewed by inexperienced personnel, who would both struggle to repair the vehicles and to operate them properly. When adding these factors to the small number of vehicles in service, even against other unstable and divided countries, such as Burkina Faso, Malian T-54s likely would only have a minimal impact. The widespread availability of anti-tank armament across West Africa capable of knocking out T-54s further diminishes the tank’s usefulness. This is true more so in the last few decades due to the breakdown of order in Libya and previously massive deliveries of ex-Soviet surplus largely expanding the number of anti-armor weapons being traded around in the region.
T-54B “Konna” likely in Bamako. Ever since 1991, there appears to have been little use for Mali’s T-54s outside of occasional parades in Bamako and exercises in Kati. Source: Oryx Blog
Conclusion – Mali’s Agonizing Giants
To a foreign observer, seeing T-54s in Sub-Saharan Africa may seem like an unnoticeable, common occurrence, and to an extent it is. However, T-54Bs likely brought a significant asset to their army back when the country suffered from less internal instability. Fielding actual tanks is not a given in the Sahel, with three of Mali’s neighbors being content with armored cars, including Burkina Faso, with whom Mali fought a very short war in 1985. In case a conflict like the Agacher Strip War was to escalate, the T-54s, despite their small number, would likely have been a significant help for the Touré regime of Mali to emerge victorious over its adversaries.
However, unfortunately for Mali, since the end of the Touré regime, the conflicts the Malian Army faces are no longer border wars with its neighbors, but rather much bloodier and, as of 2022, seemingly endless internal conflict. Whereas T-54s may have been useful assets fighting in the somewhat better infrastructure of the Niger river basin and the border areas of Southern Mali in general, their superior armament and armor is worthless when the conflict Mali faces takes places in the Sahara, where using tracked main battle tanks without a logistical train Mali cannot afford would be a fool’s errand. As such, Malian T-54s have largely remained in the southern half of the country, far from action, and likely progressively seen less and less as useful assets for the government. In the last few years, it appears the vehicles are appearing less and less in parades, with few photos of them rather showing them in the background, sitting still and likely unused, or in storage. While still notionally in service of the Malian Army, the country’s T-54Bs are likely dying a slow death under poor maintenance as there is, simply put, no use for them anymore.
T-54B “Cne Sekou Traore”T-54B in the late 2010s camouflage scheme. Both illustrations by Godzilla based on work by David Bocquelet
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