Kingdom of Italy (1940-At Least 1954)
Medium Tank – 710 Built
The Carro Armato M13/40 was an Italian medium tank used with mixed results by the Italian Regio Esercito (English: Royal Army) from 1940 to 1943 in North Africa, the Balkans, and the Italian peninsula. The tank was produced in large numbers and was widely deployed by Italian forces during the war up to the September 1943 Armistice.
After September 1943, the remaining tanks were used by the German forces, Italian Fascists, and Yugoslav and Italian partisans. After the war, the surviving vehicles were inherited by the new Esercito Italiano (English: Italian Army) and Corpo degli Agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza (English: Corps of Public Safety Officers). The police used them in active service until at least 1948, while the Italian Army did until 1954.
Italian Tank Precedents
At the end of the First World War, the Regio Esercito only had two FIAT 2000 prototypes, 12 Schneider CAs and Schneider CDs, and four Renault FTs, in addition to 152 FIAT 3000s produced in the following few years. In 1928, Vickers unveiled the Vickers 6-ton. The Regio Esercito ordered one equipped with two turrets that was secretly tested in Italy in 1929.
In 1929, Ansaldo, the company based in Sestri Ponente, near Genoa, began development of a new tank, the Carro di Rottura da 9t (English: 9 Tonnes Breakthrough Tank), inspired by the ones used during the First World War, which was finished in 1932. It was tested for the first time by the Regio Esercito in 1934, but its suspension was judged inadequate and was substituted in 1935 with a semi-elliptical leaf spring, the same used on the Vickers 6-ton.
The Carro di Rottura da 9t was soon relegated to the annals of history, but in 1936, the same model of suspension was mounted on the new Carro di Rottura da 10t (English: 10 Tonnes Breakthrough Tank), which had similar armament, but more effectively placed, with the main gun in a casemate and two machine guns in a rotating turret.
The development of the Carro di Rottura da 10t continued. Its initial diesel engine, taken from the FIAT 634N heavy truck, was too underpowered and created problems in mountain roads, where the tank was intended to operate. It was replaced with a powerful diesel one and the structure was heavily modified, and, in May 1938, it was ready for tests again.
The production vehicle was renamed Carro Armato Medio da 11 Tonnellate, Modello 1939 (English: 11 Tonnes Medium Tank Model 1939), simply known as the Carro Armato M11/39 (Carri Armati plural). The tank was characterized by a small turret with two machine guns and the primary armament on the right-hand side of the hull. The first order for 100 medium tanks to be delivered by November 1939 was placed in mid-1938. The Regio Esercito also considered ordering a batch of 50 other vehicles and then another batch of 400 medium tanks.
History of the Prototype
On 13th December 1937, Ansaldo received authorization from the Ispettorato della Motorizzazione (English: Motorization Inspectorate) to produce its medium tank project, which it had previously been developing with its own funds. This new tank project was developed to replace or accompany the Carro Armato M11/39. It was intended to correct the flaws of the M11, with the main armament placed in a rotating turret.
However, it was only an upgrade of the previous Ansaldo tank. The Carro Armato M13/40 was equipped with a new turret and a modified superstructure, but Ansaldo’s technicians tried to cut costs by reusing as much of the Carro Armato M11/39 as they could. For instance, the Carro Armato M11/39’s secondary armament was just moved from the turret to the casemate. A third machine gun was added in the coaxial position.
On 19th October 1938, the Regio Esercito’s High Command issued the Circolare Numero 3305 (English: Circular Number 3305), in which they defined the characteristics for the tanks under development. The circular also specified the characteristics of the new medium tank that would become the Carro Armato M13/40: a maximum speed of 30-35 km/h, 12 hours range, a 47 mm main gun with a coaxial machine gun, one or two machine guns in the hull, and a crew of 3 or 4.
On 26th December 1938, during an Italian High Command meeting, plans were made to order a total of 100 Carri Armati M11/39 plus maybe 50 more in future. For the “future medium tank”, an order for 400 tanks would be placed.
In September 1939, the Regio Esercito had received 96 Carri Armati M11/39, but the Italian High Command had decided not to order a second batch of M11s. Instead, they preferred an improved design with a main gun in the turret and fitted with radio as standard.
After the production of a detailed wooden mock-up was completed in mid-1938, the Regio Esercito showed interest in Ansaldo’s project. The production of the prototype of the new tank started shortly after and completed in mid-1939.
The mock-up already had the final silhouette of the vehicle. An interesting characteristic of the mock-up was the absence of a turret hatch mounted on the roof. For access to the turret, the crew members had a hatch on the rear of the turret, like in French light tanks.
On 15th October 1939, after tests at Ansaldo, the prototype was sent to Rome, to the Centro Studi ed Esperienze della Motorizzazione (English: Vehicle Study and Experience Center), where new proposal vehicles for the Regio Esercito were tested and approved.
This new approved medium tank had the same chassis as the previous Carro Armato M11/39, with the same suspension, tracks, and slightly modified engine compartment. However, it had some modifications concerning the superstructure. The driver was still on the left. On the right, instead of the main gun, a small casemate equipped with two machine guns was placed. This also created slightly more internal hull space. It had a rounded transmission cover (in the prototype not yet cast) instead of tilted armored plates and improved idler wheel.
A new two-man turret armed with a 47 mm gun, the most potent anti-tank gun with which the Regio Esercito was equipped at that time, was placed on top of the superstructure. It was capable of not only providing infantry support with high-explosive shells, but was also capable of penetrating the armor of most medium and light tanks in use in Europe at the time.
During tests on the vehicle on 16th November 1939, the Regio Esercito’s representatives were sufficiently impressed with the new tank to order 430 units. The first of these, according to the document signed by Ansaldo, was to be delivered in August 1940. On 11th December 1939, the total order was reduced to 400 tanks.
On 26th December 1939, the Regio Esercito, together with the Italian Government, decided to completely end the Carro Armato M11/39’s production in favor of Ansaldo’s new tank and officially named it Carro Armato M13/40 (Medium Tank, 13 tonnes, Model 1940). In the same document, the Regio Esercito asked for a single modification, the addition of a support for an anti-aircraft machine gun.
As a peculiarity of the Regio Esercito‘s organization, the Carro Armato M13/40 was first ordered and then accepted into service. In fact, the Carro Armato M13/40 was officially accepted into service on 15th January 1940, after the request of General Mario Caracciolo, Chief Inspector of Technical Services.
This allowed Ansaldo to modify the production line, prepare the raw materials, and train the workers, speeding up production for when it began. At the same time, this was a dangerous decision. If the tank would not pass the test phase, Ansaldo would have wasted lots of time and resources for nothing. Given the poor state of the Italian tank fleet at the time, however, this seems to have been a pragmatic decision to get as many new tanks on the field as quickly as possible.
Together with Regio Esercito‘s official document that accepted the vehicle into service, the Italian High Command also made a series of modifications for the series-produced vehicles.
The difference between the Carro Armato M13/40 prototype and the first production batches were:
- The transmission cover, on the prototype, was composed of two rounded plates bolted together (single cast rounded piece in production vehicles).
- Different slots on the sides and rear of the superstructure.
- The step to climb into the tank was modified.
- A rear turret’s hatch present in the mock-up was substituted in the prototype with a turret’s roof hatch with two doors that was maintained on the production vehicles.
- The prototype had a slit for self-defense on the turret’s rear. This one was also removed because it occupied space for the rear ammunition racks.
- The machine guns’ casemate on the right side of the hull in the prototype was composed of bolted plates, while on the production vehicles, it consisted of a single casted structure.
The Carro Armato M13/40 was officially presented to Italian journalists in February 1940 at the Bracciano’s Centro Addestramento Carristi (English: Tank Crew Training Center) near Rome. The prototype was deployed to instruct new medium tank crews and was later sent to the Centro Studi ed Esperienze della Motorizzazione. In fact, it appears in many photos taken in the Center in late 1940 and early 1941. It would later be transported again to Ansaldo-Fossati where it was modified into an observation tank.
Names
On 19th October 1938, the Regio Esercito’s High Command issued the Circolare Numero 3305 (English: Circular Number 3305). This Circular was important because it changed the name of tanks in Italian service. For example, the 3-tonne light tanks, previously called Carri Veloci or CV (English: Fast Tanks), such as the CV33, were renamed Carri Armati Leggeri or simply Carri Armati L (English: Light Tanks). Nomenclature was also changed, adding, together with the class name and year of production, the weight in tonnes, so the CV33 was renamed Carro Armato L3/33 (Carro Armato Leggero [da] 3 [Tonnellate] [Modello] 1933 – Light Tank 3 [Tonnes] [Model] 1933).
When the Italian High Command emitted the request for a more powerful carro armato medio (English: medium tank) on 1st December 1938, it already called it the ‘M13’, meaning [Carro Armato] Medio [da] 13 [tonnellate] (English: Medium [tank with a weight of] 13 [tonnes]). This was because the Italian Royal Army already planned that the maximum weight of this tank should not exceed 13 tonnes. The prototype was simply known as M13.
The medium tank was officially called Carro Armato Medio da 13 Tonnellate Modello 1940 (English: Medium Tank Model 1940 weighing 13 tonnes) or more simply Carro Armato M13/40 under the Circolare Numero 3305’s rules. With this nomenclature, the Regio Esercito mentioned the type of vehicle (medium), the weight in tonnes (13), and the year of acceptance (1940). The same was used with other tanks, such as the Carro Armato L6/40 (L for Leggero – Light) light reconnaissance tank. In the official manual printed by Ansaldo for the crews, the tank was called FIAT-Ansaldo Tipo M13-40 (English: FIAT-Ansaldo Type M13-40).
From 14th August 1942 onward, with Circolare Numero 14350, the name of the vehicle was changed to Carro Armato M40 (Model – year of acceptance), as with many other vehicles, such as the Carro Armato L6/40 light tank, which was renamed Carro Armato L40, and the Carro Armato L3/33, which was renamed Carro Armato L33.
In this article, the tank is referred to as the Carro Armato M13/40. This also because M40 was the name of the self-propelled howitzer on its chassis, the Semovente M40 da 75/18 (English: 75 mm L.18 Self-Propelled Gun M40). The German designation of the Carro Armato M13/40 was Beute Panzerkampfwagen M13/40 735(italienisch) (English: Captured Tank M13/40 [Coded] 735[Italian]).
In the article Carro Armato M (English: M Tank) will be used when the precise model of an Italian medium tank is not recognizable, as in many cases, the Carro Armato M13/40, Carro Armato M14/41, and Carro Armato M15/42 were not distinguishable in some cases.
Production and Delivery
In 1940, a total of 236 Carri Armati M13/40 were produced, of which the majority were delivered to the Regio Esercito. On 30th August 1941, the order was increased to 1,810 Carri Armati M13/40 to be produced by Ansaldo.
Before the start of the Carro Armato M14/41 medium tank’s production, the Carro Armato M13/40’s successor, a total of 710 Carri Armati M13/40 had been produced. Of the remaining 1,100 medium tanks ordered by the Regio Esercito, 695 (or 752) were Carri Armati M14/41 and 220 Carri Armati M15/42. Other hulls were completed but converted into semoventi or command tanks.
Many Italian companies participated in the production of the Carro Armato M13/40.
| Companies that participated in the M13/40’s production | ||
|---|---|---|
| Name | Location | Production |
| Fabbrica Italiana Automobili di Torino (FIAT) | Turin | Fuel injector pump |
| Società Piemontese Automobili (SPA) | Turin | Engines |
| Società Italiana Ernesto Breda per Costruzioni Meccaniche | Brescia | Machine guns |
| Magneti Marelli | Corbetta and Sestri Ponente | Engine starter, radio systems, and batteries |
| San Giorgio | Sestri Ponente | Optic devices |
| Società Italiana Acciaierie Cornigliano (SIAC) | Cornigliano | Armor plates |
| Calzoni Oleodinamica | Bologna | Turret power traverse |
| Alemanno | Turin | Pressure gauges and tools |
| Bosch | Air filters | |
| Società Anonima ALIT | Turin | Oil filters |
| FERGAT | Turin | Oil radiator |
| Roberto Incerti Villar (RIV) | Turin | Ball bearings |
| Pirelli & Company | Milan | Rubber parts of the return rollers and wheels |
| Ansaldo | Sestri Ponente | Guns, turrets, and final assembly |
| Duco | Milan | Paint |
All the produced parts arrived at Ansaldo-Fossati plant of Sestri Ponente, where they were finally assembled. Ansaldo produced the guns and turrets, while Duco of Milan produced the paints with which the Carri Armati M13/40 were camouflaged in the Sestri Ponente plant.
Design
The Carro Armato M13/40 tank was produced in three distinct production series: Iª, IIª, and IIIª Serie (English: 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Series). This article will mainly describe the last two, while referring to the differences between the Iª and IIIª for clarity.
Armor
There is a bit of uncertainty about the Carri Armati M13/40’s armor. General Luigi Sarracino mentioned that the armor of the Carro Armato M13/40 had been designed to withstand 20 mm rounds. Nevertheless, in many cases, smaller caliber armor-piercing rounds were able to penetrate it.
However, General Mario Roatta which was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, in his post-war book Otto Milioni di Baionette. L’Esercito Italiano in Guerra dal 1940 al 1944, mentions that the armor was designed to withstand rounds of weapons equal in caliber to the main armament of the Carri Armati M13/40, i.e. 47 mm. This seems to be totally incorrect. In fact, the British 40 mm Ordnance QF 2 Pounder cannon could easily penetrate the Carro Armato M13/40’s frontal armor at over 500 m.
The tank was not welded, but instead used riveted and bolted plates as well as some cast parts, such as the support for the hull machine guns.
The frontal armor of the transmission cover was rounded and 30 mm thick. The upper transmission cover and inspection hatches were 25 mm thick and angled at 81°. The frontal plate of the superstructure, including the driver’s slot, was angled at 11° and was 30 mm thick. The sides of the hull and superstructure, angled at 9°, were 25 mm thick, as was the left hatch. The back of the superstructure was 25 mm thick angled at 0° and 12°, while the back of the hull was 25 mm thick angled at 20°.
The engine compartment sides were 25 mm thick at 0°. The engine inspection doors were 9 mm thick, while the engine compartment deck was 10 mm thick.
The turret, on the other hand, had a maximum armor thickness of 42 mm on the rounded mantlet and 30 mm frontally angled at 16°. The sides and the back were 25 mm at 22°. The roof of the turret and the turret hatch had a thickness of 14 mm, while the floor of the hull had a thickness of 15 mm. The turret ring had a thickness of 50 mm x 25 mm and was riveted to the superstructure’s roof.
The upper armor was bolted to an internal frame, allowing for rapid construction of the vehicle as well as easier replacement of damaged armor plates than models with welded or cast armor. The price for this construction method was that it was not as light as a welded vehicle and that it generally made the armor less effective than it could have been.
The armor was produced with relatively low-quality steel. This was because, whilst the demand for ballistic steel to produce armored vehicles had increased since 1939, the Italian industry was not able to supply very large quantities of high-quality steel plate.
Turret
The two-seat horseshoe-shaped turret had a narrow mantlet armed with a 47 mm cannon and a coaxial machine gun on the left. There was a turret basket attached to the turret, with a support connected to a circular platform (of smaller diameter than the turret ring) above the transmission shaft.
Two padded folding seats for the loader and the commander were welded on the same support. In front of them were the gun breech and the machine gun with the elevation crank. On the right was the gun sight, produced by San Giorgio.
For the turret’s rotation, the gunner could use a manual hand wheel on his right. When the power traverse was operated, the gunner needed to pull down a lever to disengage the manual traverse handwheel.
The power traverse was the Pompa Rotativa Calzoni or Calzoni oleodynamic (hydraulic) system produced by the Calzoni Oleodinamica of Bologna. It was placed on the left of the traverse handwheel. This system was excessively complex and sometimes the crews dismounted it from their tanks, a solution not recommended by officers, but which also saved a few dozen kilograms of weight.
On the left, between the machine gun and the left turret wall, was a small ready-to-use rack for 13 magazines for the machine gun.
On the turret’s roof was a rectangular split hatch with a sight for the flags, two panoramic monocular periscopes produced by San Giorgio placed on the left and right side of the hatch for the commander and loader, and a support for the anti-aircraft machine gun.
From the Carro Armato M13/40 of the IIª Serie onward, a bulge was added to the turret’s roof, allowing for better depression for the main gun. This bulge changed the maximum depression from -12° without the bulge to -15° with the bulge.
On the sides were two pistol ports closed by revolving shutters from the inside. They were used for viewing the exterior and for close defense with personal weapons. At the back were ready-to-use 47 mm rounds in two different racks. There was also a box for two spare hyposcopes mounted on the turret ring, behind the gunner/commander. On the loader’s left was a wooden box, probably for a binocular or for spare gun optics.
The Carro Armato M13/40 prototype’s turret was equipped with a small rear slot, added by Ansaldo to permit the crew to inspect the rear of the turret. This slot was not added to the production Carro Armato M13/40 in order to speed up production and to enlarge the rear ammunition racks.
Hull
The frontal rounded transmission cover had two hooks on the sides and a towing ring in the center.
There were also two inspection hatches above the brakes to improve the flow of air around the transmission, especially to help cool the clutch on long drives. In combat, these hatches were to be closed. The two hatches could be opened or closed from the inside of the vehicle even while driving by means of a lever located on the right side of the chassis, operated by the machine gunner/radio operator.
On the right side, the front superstructure had a spherical support armed with two machine guns in a small casemate. In order to place the two machine guns, the casemate was lengthened by a couple of dozen centimeters. This was because the gunner/radio operator’s seat was positioned longitudinally to the driver’s seat and did not interfere with the turret basket.
On the frontal armored plate’s left side, there was a slot for the driver, who also had a hyposcope placed above, for use when the slot was closed. The hyposcope had a vertical field of view of 30°, from +52° to +82°.
For night driving, there were two adjustable headlights on the sides of the superstructure. On the left side, there was a large hatch for crew access. It was also equipped with a pistol port, identical to the ones in the turret, for close defense.
On the rear side of the superstructure there were two more pistol ports closed by revolving shutters from the inside and an air intake. The pistol ports were added after negative experiences of Italian crew members during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War (October 1935- February 1937), where they could not defend themselves from Ethiopian warrior attacks on the sides or rear. The air intake sucked air from the outside into the crew compartment and then conveyed in the engine compartment. This gave a sort of comfort to crews operating in North Africa but could create problems during winters in the Italian peninsula or Balkans.
On the mudguards, behind the superstructure, were tool boxes on each side and the mufflers behind. The engine deck had two large-size inspection hatches which could be opened at 45°.
The rear of the vehicle had the horizontal radiator cooling grills and, in the center, the fuel cap. The rear had a towing ring in the center and two hooks on the sides, one spare wheel on the right, a jack on the left, a track removal system on the center, a license plate on the left side with a brake light.
On the Carri Armati M13/40 Iª Serie, there were two spare wheels on the vehicle’s rear and the jack was placed in front of the superstructure, on the left fender (a feature that was reintroduced on the Carri Armati M15/42). On the Carri Armati M13/40 Iª Serie, the fuel cap was of a different shape and there were mudguards that covered all the vehicle while, on the IIª Serie and IIIª Serie, the mudguards covered only the frontal part of the vehicle.
As spare tools, the crew could transport a shovel, a pickaxe, a crowbar, and a sledgehammer on the engine deck, between the two inspection hatches. A jack, a spare wheel, a track connecting tool, a tow rope, and a towing shackle on the rear plus two tool boxes on the sides, in front of the mufflers, were also present.
Inside the tank, there were two machine gun tool sets to clean and lubricate the secondary guns, one on the right of the machine gunner and the second one was placed on a machine gun magazine rack behind the machine gunner.
Suspension
The Carro Armato M13/40’s suspension was of the laminated semi-elliptical leaf spring type. On each side, there were four bogies with eight doubled rubber road wheels paired on two suspension units. This suspension type was obsolete and did not allow the vehicle to reach a high top speed. In addition, it was very vulnerable to enemy fire or mines.
The drive sprockets were at the front and the idlers, with modified track tension adjusters, were at the back, with three rubber return rollers on each side. The tank had 26 cm wide tracks with 84 track links per side. The small surface area of the tracks (about 13,750 cm²) caused a ground pressure of about 0.94 kg/cm², increasing the risk that the vehicle would bog down in mud, snow, or sand.
Engine and Transmission
The Carro Armato M13/40 medium tank was powered by a V-shaped, 8-cylinder, liquid-cooled FIAT-SPA 8T Modello 1940 diesel engine with a volume of 11,980 cm³ and a maximum power output of 125 hp at 1,800 rpm.
The engine was mounted on the rear part of the vehicle, separated from the crew compartment by a bulkhead. The inspection hatches had two butterfly screws on the lower side and were attached to pins on the upper side opening upwards at 45° and blocked in an open position by a rod, as a car’s engine bonnet. Usually, during driving on asphalted roads in North Africa, where not much dust was raised, the crew kept the hatches open to ventilate the engine.
The associated 5-speed gearbox had four forward and a reverse gears. In addition, thanks to the built-in reductor, another four forward gears plus a reverse gear were available. However, if the tank switched from the standard gears to the reduced gears, it needed to come to a standstill. Unfortunately, the model of the transmission is not mentioned, but it was a FIAT model, probably produced by Società Piemontese Automobili, its subsidiary. It was coupled with a FERCAT oil radiator and Modello 80 oil filters. The fuel injection pump was a FIAT 6.70 2D18.
The engine chosen was one of the tank’s major handicaps. It was not very powerful and also not very reliable. This engine was developed for 8-ton vehicles and had already created problems on the Carro Armato M11/39 that was over 3 tonnes lighter than the Carro Armato M13/40.
During the first period of use in North Africa, the regrettable lack of sand filters was a serious limitation.The sand entering the engine scratched the walls of the combustion chamber and the cylinder, drastically diminishing the power of the engine. In the IIIª Serie, Bosch Fa 11 S1 anti-sand filters were added.
On occasions, during long drives, the bottom plug on the oil tank would fall, causing the oil to completely leak from the tank. The water cooling system often broke, causing boiling water to enter the fighting compartment, slightly scolding the crew. Due to diesel pump problems, in some cases, the diesel dripped in the oil pan, causing decreasing oil viscosity, resulting in worsening lubrication, engine compartment flooding, and increasing the risk of fire.
The engine used three different types of oil, depending on the temperatures in which the vehicle operated. In North Africa, where the outside temperature exceeded 30°, Ultra Denso (English: Ultra-Thick) oil was used; in Europe, where the temperature was between 10° and 30°, Denso (English: Thick) oil was used; while in winter, when the temperature fell below 10°, Semi Denso (English: Semi-Thick) oil was used. Due to unreliable Regio Esercito logistics, in some cases, battalions had to use winter oil in North Africa, diminishing oil lubrication.
| Carro Armato M13/40 speed | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Gear | Speed | With reducer | Speed |
| First gear | 6.46 km/h | First gear | 2.37 km/h |
| Second gear | 11.20 km/h | Second gear | 4.12 km/h |
| Third gear | 19.10 km/h | Third gear | 7.04 km/h |
| Forth gear | 31.80 km/h | Forth gear | 11.36 km/h |
| Reverse gear | 4.84 km/h | Reverse gear | 1.81 km/h |
In order to start the engine, there was a Magneti Marelli electric starter but also an inertial starter produced by FIAT (on the first vehicles), then substituted by an Onagro one. The FIAT starter was not produced with adequate materials and broke easily. In one instance, in the course of a few days, the VII Battaglione Carri M13/40 broke 35 inertia starters out of 46 tanks. The lever for the inertia starter could be inserted outside the vehicle, on the rear, or from the inside of the fighting compartment. Two crew members need to turn the crank, reaching about 60 rotations per minute. At that point, the driver could turn the engine button on the dashboard until the first strokes of the engine.
There was no water temperature thermometer on the dashboard of the first Carri Armati M13/40 produced, a serious problem, especially in the North African desert. It is unclear when the new dashboard was installed. The early production Carri Armati M13/40 and the Semoventi M40 da 75/18 did not have it, so it probably was mounted starting with the late production Carro Armato M13/40.
The two large fans powered by the engine sucked air through the fighting compartment. This allowed for the ventilation of air for the crew but also the cooling of the braking system and transmission due to the air drawn through the opened brake inspection hatches.
The FIAT 8-30-L-D fuel pump, which gave a lot of problems, in particular in the first batches of vehicles produced, were of Italian manufacture. After FIAT had purchased access to German Bosch fuel pumps, these were produced and mounted on the Carri Armati M13/40 engines. These new pumps gave fewer problems to the crews.
The fuel tank capacity was about 147 liters plus 35 liters of reserve, for a total of 182 liters in three tanks, two of 73.5 liters each and the third of 35 liters. The range was 210 km on road or about 10 hours off-road range. In North Africa it was common for the crews to transport 20-liter cans everywhere there was space inside and outside the tank to increase the range.
The tank could reach a maximum speed of 31.8 km/h on the road and about 15 km/h on rough terrain. The M13/40 had a turning radius of about 4.50 m, it could cross 2 m trenches, ford 1 m of water, and climb 0.80 m obstacles. The tank was also equipped with a hand brake that blocked the sprocket wheels.
The Carro Armato M13/40’s transmission was as epicyclic, as was the clutch. It was mounted frontally, connected to the frontal sprocket wheels. It was removable, together with the brakes, after removing the armored plate that protected it.
Main Armament
The Carro Armato M13/40’s main armament was the Cannone da 47/32 Modello 1935. This gun was originally designed by the Austrian Böhler company and found use with various nations. The Regio Esercito, for example, used over 3,200 guns which had been produced under license by various companies between 1937 and 1945.
Designed as an infantry support cannon, it proved to be reliable and precise during the Spanish Civil War and capable of taking out the few opposing armored vehicles. It had a total dismounted weight of 108 kg, while the barrel weighed 64.5 kg.
The Italian Army High Command, satisfied by its performance against enemy tanks in Spain, considered it a reliable anti-tank gun. Despite its performances in the Spanish Civil War, from 1940 onward, it became less adequate because the armor of the enemy tanks became thicker, from a maximum of 30 mm on the Soviet T-26 and BT-5 light tanks encountered in Spain, to 78 mm of the British Matilda Mark II infantry tank, which appeared on the North African battlefronts in late 1940.
According to Fabio d’Inzeo, an Italian writer, the gun could penetrate the British Cruiser Mark I’s armor at 1,200 m. However, this was not a great achievement, as the Cruiser’s frontal armor barely reached 30 mm.
The gun’s maximum range was 7,000 m, but it was effective up to 4,000 m for infantry support and about 800-1,000 m for anti-tank fire. Its compact mounting and short recoil of just 20 cm fit perfectly in the small Carro Armato M13/40 turret. For reference, the British 2-pdr recoiled 26.7 cm in a tank mounting like that of a Valentine.
The main gun was connected to a crank placed on the gunner’s left, with a 45° axis to the vertical. It was connected to a ‘worm’ and a ‘worm’ wheel connected to a pinion and a sector. This elevated and depressed the trunnion on which the optics, coaxial machine gun, and main gun were fixed.
The British, in their report on the Carro Armato M14/41, wrote that it was difficult to have a fine adjustment because of the coarse pitch of the teeth in the mechanism. The maximum depression was -15°, while maximum elevation was +25°, for a total arc of 40°. In order to permit the gun to reach a total 40° arc, it was needed to rotate the handwheel 16.75 times, each handwheel turn having a progress of 2.4°.
The gun sight, produced by San Giorgio, had a maximum 1.25x magnification and 30° of field of view. The sight was articulated, meaning the eyepiece remained stable regardless of the elevation or depression of the main gun. The reticle was graduated at intervals of 100 m up to a maximum of 1,200 m for the Mod. 39 armor-piercing round, but had a second range scale present for the high-explosive rounds. The crosswire was moved by a knob on top of the graticule box. The reticule could be illuminated by a small lamp that was connected by electricity by means of cables connected to the turret ring. This is not regarded by many historians as a very good optic, as it was difficult to remove from its support.
The rate of fire for the 47 mm gun was up to 28 rounds per minute in the field version with well trained crews. On tanks, the maximum rate of fire drastically decreased to just 6-10 rounds per minute due to cramped space inside the turret and the single loader present in the turret. Nonetheless, it was quick to load the gun thanks to its automatic breech that opened automatically, ejecting the spent case. The loader also had a lever that could be used to open the breech in case of a round that was defective or not firing.
To open fire with the main gun and coaxial gun, the commander/gunner had two pedals connected to a bar bolted to the turret ring. There were no electric generators in the turret, so the cables that connected the gunner’s pedals to the weapons in the turret were the ‘Bowden’ type wire cables (same used on bike’s brake). If the Bowden cables did not work, the gunner could still fire with a lanyard mounted on the right of the gun.
Main Armament Ammunition
The Carro Armato M13/40 Ia Serie carried a total of 104 47 mm rounds, while the IIª and IIIª Serie could carry just 87 47 mm rounds. In all the series, there was stowage in the turret for 34 rounds. A total of 25 were placed in two racks on the back of the turret, placed in two rows of 13 and 12 rounds. The third one, on the left side of the turret, had a total of 9 rounds in two rows of 5 and 4 rounds. The first 25 rounds were placed with the tip downward. These racks helped the crew to increase the rate of fire of the gun. However, due to the absence of armored doors, the crew members were exposed in case of an ammunition explosion. These rounds were only covered by thin metal sheets that were on rails.
The remaining 53 rounds (70 on the Carro Armato M13/40 Ia Serie) were stored in the hull, in a box-shaped metal sheet rack placed on the left side of the floor, pointing downward. The rounds were stored in two rows of 10 and three rows of 11 47 mm rounds. In the 70-round Ia Serie, the extra shells were probably stored in a similar way. As with the turret’s ammunition rack, this was not armored, increasing the risk of fire after a direct hit even if, because of the position, under the sponsons, it was rarely hit by enemy armor-piercing rounds.
The decision to diminish the ammunition on board the IIª and IIIª Serie has never been clarified. The decrease in transportable ammunition that can be carried on board forced the crews to store the ammunition everywhere in the crew compartment, creating serious risks of ammunition explosions in case of fire or enemy hits.
| Cannone da 47/32 Modello 1935 ammunition | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Name | Type | Fuze | TNT (in grams) | Projectile weight (kg) | Muzzle Velocity (m/s) |
| Cartoccio Granata da 47 Modello 1935 | High-Explosive (HE) | Percussion Modello 1935 or Modello 1939 | 150 g | 2,45 | 250 |
| Proietto Perforante Modello 1935 | Armor-Piercing – Tracer (AP-T) | Percussion Modello 1909 | 30 g | 1,42 | 630 |
| Proietto Perforante Modello 1939 | Armor-Piercing Ballistic Cap (APBC) | Percussion Modello 1909 | 30 g | 1,44 | 630 |
| Proietto Controcarri Effetto Pronto | High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) | Internal Modello 1941 | unknown | 1,2 | nk |
| Proietto Controcarri Effetto Pronto Speciale | High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) | IPEM front fuze | unknown | 1,5 | nk |
A serious problem was the lack of HEAT ammunition, which was produced late and not often distributed to the crews. In fact, according to Italian Army documents, in May 1942, there were only 12,537 47 mm Effetto Pronto rounds in North Africa out of a total 145,777 47 mm caliber rounds.
Precise values on the penetration of the Proietto Perforante Modello 1935 armor-piercing ammunition are not available. However, an Italian document of the Spanish Civil War era states that it penetrated 40 mm of armor angled at 30° at a distance of 650 m.
| Proietto Perforante Modello 1939 Armor Piercing round | |
|---|---|
| Distance (m) | Penetration of vertical armored plates |
| 500 | 35 mm |
| 1,000 | 30 mm |
| 1,500 | 25 mm |
| 2,000 | 22 mm |
There is no precise data on the penetration of the HEAT ammunition of the 47 mm gun, but an Italian report from some tests in October 1942 shows that the Effetto Pronto round was not able to penetrate the 52 mm thick side armor of the turret of a T-34/76 Mod. 1942 captured by the Italians on the Eastern Front.
The Effetto Pronto Speciale round, produced in very few numbers between early 1943 and the end of the war, had greater anti-tank capabilities and was theoretically able to penetrate the front armor of an M4 Sherman.
During the North African campaign, it was suggested to increase the number of rounds stored in the medium tanks to 110 rounds once more. This suggestion was taken on board by the Italian Regio Esercito, with 111 rounds of ammunition stored in medium tanks beginning with the Carro Armato M15/42.
Secondary Armament
The Carro Armato M13/40’s secondary armament was four 8 mm Mitragliatrici Medie Breda Modello 1938 (English: Breda Medium Machine Guns Model 1938). Two were placed in the spherical support in the hull, one was coaxial, and one was in the anti-aircraft position on the turret’s roof.
The machine gun was developed from the Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1937 medium machine gun after the specifications issued by the Ispettorato d’Artiglieria (English: Artillery Inspectorate) in May 1933. The requirements were a maximum weight of 20 kg, a theoretical rate of fire of 450 rounds per minute, and a barrel life of 1,000 rounds.
The Comitato Superiore Tecnico Armi e Munizioni (English: Superior Technical Committee for Weapons and Ammunition) in Turin in November 1935 chose the Breda project. A first order for 2,500 Breda medium machine guns was placed in 1936. During the same year, Breda developed a vehicle version of the machine gun. This was a lightweight machine gun, equipped with a shortened barrel, pistol grip, and a new 24-round top-curved magazine instead of 20-round strip clips.
The weapon was famous for its robustness and accuracy, despite its annoying tendency to jam if lubrication was insufficient. The theoretical rate of fire was 600 rounds per minute, while the practical rate of fire was about 350 rounds per minute. The three machine guns mounted inside were equipped with cloth bags for the spent casings.
The 8 x 59 mm RB cartridges were developed by Breda exclusively for these machine guns. The 8 mm Breda had a muzzle velocity between 790 m/s and 800 m/s, depending on the round type.
The twin Mitragliatrici Medie Breda Modello 1938 mounted in the hull had an elevation of +23° and a depression of -15°. The traverse was 15° to either side. They were coupled to a San Giorgio sight with 1x magnification and 30° field of view, the same used on the AB series armored cars.
The coaxial machine gun was mounted on the main gun’s left, while the anti-aircraft one was mounted on a support on the roof, near the commander’s hatch. When not used, it was stored in the hull, on the right side, near the radio apparatus.
Secondary Armament Ammunition
The original Carro Armato M13/40’s handbook printed by Ansaldo-Fossat mentioned that the Carro Armato M13/40 could carry a total of 3,048 8 mm rounds (127 24-round magazines) for the machine guns on board. This is unclear, probably referring to the 100 Carri Armati M13/40 Ia Serie, as the secondary ammunition load was then reduced for an unknown reason, as with the main armament’s ammunition.
On the IIª and IIIª Serie tanks, 2,592 8 mm rounds were transported for the machine guns in 108 24-round magazines. Their distribution was:
- 15 in three 5-magazines rows near the driver’s dashboard
- 13 on the turret’s left side
- 12 on the tank floor, near the transmission shaft, on the right side
- 4 were placed on the left side of the rear of the fighting compartment
- 16 ready-to-use magazines were placed under the spherical machine gun support
- 9 magazines were placed on the floor in a 3 row rack
- 27 on the right superstructure wall
- 12 on the left side wall
Interior
At the front of the fighting compartment, the transmission and the braking system were placed. On the left side of the superstructure was the driver’s seat, which had a folding backrest to facilitate access. In front of this position, the driver had a large slit with a lever on the left side used to open or close it. Above the slit was the hyposcope.
The driver also had two tillers to move the vehicle. The handbrake handle was on the right, together with the gearshift. On the left side were the dashboard and a box with spare hyposcopes. On the dashboard were the instrument for detecting the engine’s oil temperature and the start button. The speedometer was mounted as a separate instrument from the main dashboard.
In the IIª Serie, the dashboard had a water temperature gauge, an oil temperature gauge, two dynamo charging lights, a switch for the oil radiator fan, a light switch with three positions, a switch for the heater plug, a battery isolating switch, four fuses, and a starter switch.
On the driver’s right was the Indicatore di Marcia Interno SD-1 (English: Direction Indicator Repeater Model SD-1). Lacking an intercom device for drivers, commanders had their own SD-1 in the turret and, to indicate direction and speed to the driver, they moved some lever placed on their device. These indications were sent to the driver’s device by means of cables that connected the two devices, who could then read them and change direction and speed of the tank.
This system was very complicated and it worked even when the gun was pointing forward. In critical situations or simply while a commander was aiming and could not be distracted, to speed up the operation, commanders would hit drivers on their back with their feet to show them the direction to take.
On the right-hand side was the machine gunner, who also sat on a folding seat. In front of the machine gunner were the machine guns while, on the right, there was a lever to raise and fold the radio antenna and the radio system. On the lower side was the storage place for the anti-aircraft machine gun, which was fixed to the hull with straps, and the radio battery.
In the middle of the vehicle was the transmission shaft, which was largely covered by the circular platform which served as a floor for the two crew members in the turret. On the left side, at the bottom of the hull, was the largest 47 mm ammunition rack. The rear of the superstructure had two large cylindrical filters for the engine, two pistol ports (one for each angle), and the engine coolant tank.
Electric System
The 24 volt electric system of the tank, produced by Magneti Marelli, powered the dashboard, front headlights, rear brake red-light, two lights in the fighting compartment, and the electric starter.
The electric system was composed of two 12 volt accumulators connected in series with a capacity of about 120 ampere per hour. They were mounted on the right rear corner of the fighting compartment and connected to four Magneti Marelli 6UB7 140 amp 12V batteries placed on the floor.
The accumulators were charged by two 24 volt 300 watt generators with voltage regulation. The voltage regulator was a Magneti Marelli model for the 300 watt, 24 volt generators.
External illumination consisted of two headlights on the front of the superstructure and a red tail light. All these lights were connected to a three-position switch on the driver’s dashboard. The internal illumination was made up of two lamps on the rear bulkhead and one on the driver’s dashboard. The turret ring was equipped with a series of single pole sockets allowing the crew to connect extra circuits or inspection lamps. From one of these poles, the small lamps on the gun optic could also be connected.
Radio Equipment
Only a few of the Carri Armati M13/40 produced until 1941 were equipped with radio stations. This was not a financial problem, in fact, the radio station mounted only cost 17,000 Liras. The Regio Esercito’s High Command created a commission to examine which radio station was better to mount on the Carri Armati M13/40. The commission first tested a German Telefunken radio station. The Italian industry had a friendly relationship with Telefunken, which provided many radio stations on board Italian bomber planes. The radio was judged favorably but was too big for the Carro Armato M13/40’s interior space.
The commission then tested the Magneti Marelli company’s radios in January 1940, specifically the Apparato Ricetrasmittente Radio Fonica 1 per Carro Armato or Apparato Ricevente RF1CA (English: Tank Phonic Radio Receiver Apparatus 1) and Apparato Ricetrasmittente RF2CA. The first one was a radiotelephone and radiotelegraph station with power of 10 watts in both voice and telegraphy with a box of 35 x 20 x 24.6 cm and a weight of about 18 kg. The radio antenna was 1.8 m long and adopted on all the Italian tanks and semoventi. It was placed on the right side of the superstructure’s roof and could be raised and lowered by the radio operator by means of a lever.
Operating frequency range between 27 to 33.4 MHz. It was powered by an AL-1 Dynamotor supplying 9-10 watts, mounted on the hull’s right side. It had a range of 8 km in voice mode and 12 km in telegraphics mode. These figures were reduced when tanks were on the move.
For the first years of the war, there were never enough radios produced to equip all the tanks. These were mounted on nearly all tanks only from spring 1941. From December 1940, 80 Apparati Riceventi RF1CA had to be produced per month, but this goal was not reached. In March 1941, 76 Apparati Riceventi RF1CA radios were produced, but only 39 were mounted on ready Carri Armati M13/40.
The radio had two ranges, Vicino (Eng: Near), with a maximum range of 5 km, and Lontano (Eng: Afar), with a maximum range of 12 km. In early 1940, it was mainly dedicated to internal communications for the company’s commanders. With the continuation of the war, radio equipment was mounted on most vehicles, eventually becoming standard on every vehicle.
One of the most serious complaints from soldiers was the lack of radio equipment that forced platoon commanders to relay orders to its tanks with small flags. That system only permitted orders such as ‘faster’, ‘slower’, ‘turn left’, ‘turn right’, and ‘stop’. On some early Carro Armato M13/40 Ia Serie command tanks assembled by Ansaldo, a circular cap to cover the hole in the armored plate through which the orders were given were welded on. Due to the absence of radio apparatus for command tanks, the second radio station and its antenna were never mounted on the tanks.
This was a serious problem, and on 21st October 1940, General Mario Roatta criticized the lack of radios. The Royal Army deemed equipping all Carri Armati M13/40 with radios too expensive, so only the tanks for the commanders (platoons, companies, etc.) were equipped with them. During that year, Magneti Marelli tried to design receiver-only radios to be fitted to all the tanks but the project was abandoned. It was not until mid-1941 onwards that all the M-series tanks were equipped with radio stations.
Throughout its production, the Carri Armati M13/40 also had two types of radio antenna support, the first one mounted on the early tanks was bolted on the superstructure’s side, while the second one was fixed on the side of the engine compartment. The second type was also used on the Carri Armati M14/41 and Carri Armati M15/42 and also on the self-propelled guns mounted on their chassis. On some command tanks, the two types of antenna supports were mounted, one bolted to the superstructure for the frontal radio antenna and the support fixed on the engine compartment for the rear-placed radio antenna.
Crew
The crew of the Carro Armato M13/40 consisted of four. The driver sat on the left side of the hull, with the machine gunner/radio operator on the right. Behind them, sitting in the turret, were the tank’s commander/gunner on the right and the loader on the left. The crew of four was insufficient. The tank’s commander had to perform too many tasks, having to give orders to the rest of the crew, check the battlefield, find targets, aim, and open fire.
Machine gunners/radio operators had the same problem, as they needed to operate the radio and fire the machine guns in the hull and reload them. Aside from the driver, the other three crew members were connected to an intercom system.
For their personal equipment, crews had to rely on the already inadequate crew compartment free space or transporting it on the engine deck along with water canisters, wine flasks, and ammunition wooden crates that increased the weight of the vehicle causing greater engine stresses and decreased cooling of the engine compartment.
Carro Armato M13/40 Series
Carro Armato M13/40 Iª Serie
The Carri Armati M13/40 tanks were produced in three main series. The first one was the Iª Serie, of which 100 were produced from June to autumn 1940, with chassis numbers from ‘0652’ to ‘0751’. They were recognizable due to their three-piece fenders that covered the entirety of the track’s top section, as on the Carri Armati M11/39, but with a different step.
The Carro Armato M13/40 Iª Serie also had a jack on the front left fender and two spare wheels on the rear. Also at the rear, a box-shaped radiator coolant liquid tank with a cap and longitudinal outlet radiator grills was present. The mufflers had a single central support to fix them to the chassis and the Iª Serie had the first type turret roof.
During production, some modifications were implemented. Starting from the fiftieth completed vehicle, a track connecting tool was placed in the center of the engine deck on top of a small tool box, between the road wheels. Also starting from the fiftieth completed vehicle, the new Onagro inertial starter was added instead of the previous FIAT one.
Carro Armato M13/40 IIª Serie
The Carri Armati M13/40 IIª Serie consisted of 200 vehicles produced between late autumn 1940 to spring 1941, starting with chassis number ‘0752’. It had one-piece short fenders that covered only the frontal part of the tank.
From vehicles with chassis code ‘0752’ to ‘1202’, the two accumulators for the engine starter were removed and a different machine gunner’s seat was mounted.
The jack was moved to the rear of the tank, instead of the left-side spare road wheel. From the fifty-first vehicle produced, Ansaldo workers added a new turret roof with a rectangular hole covered by a bolted plate, increasing main gun depression by a few degrees. From the hundredth-and-first Carro Armato M13/40 IIª Serie, the commander’s dashboard was also modified. All vehicles from the IIª Serie received a new right side’s climbing handle and also covers for the headlight were mounted even if they were rare to see on the vehicles on the battlefront.
Carro Armato M13/40 IIIª Serie
The IIIª Serie consisted of 410 Carri Armati M13/40 produced between spring 1941 and autumn 1941, starting with chassis number ‘0951’ and engine number ‘000617’. The first photo of this verison in the Sestri Ponente plant was taken in December 1940. As on the IIª Serie tanks, these had short fenders, only a single spare wheel on the right rear side, and the jack on the left.
The IIIª Serie had a new ‘mushroom-shaped’ posterior radiator coolant liquid tank and a posteriorly relocated cap and new muffler supports. In the IIIª Serie, the engine’s temperature gauge was mounted on the driver’s dashboard. From chassis number ‘01002’ (engine number ‘000667’), the bulkhead on the rear of the crew compartment was modified with another one equipped with two air filters (for the engine) immersed in oil. A small ventilator connected to a small radiator was mounted in the crew compartment to cool the engine’s oil. From the hundredth-and-fifty-first Carro Armato M13/40 IIIª Serie, the electric system was powered, while starting with the vehicle with the engine number ‘000817’, the engine cooling system was powered.
Differentiating the Serie
When trying to identify an Italian tank, the first thing to do is to check its fenders. If they are the short ones, the tank is a Carro Armato M13/40 IIª or IIIª Serie. If it has long fenders, it could be a Carro Armato M13/40 Iª Serie or a Carro Armato M14/41, apart from the first 50 M14s built that had short fenders. From Carro Armato M14/41 hull number ‘1402’ onward, the three-piece fenders were mounted again on the medium tanks.
| Carri Armati M | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model | Carro Armato M11/39 | Carro Armato M13/40 IIIª Serie | Carro Armato M14/41 | Carro Armato M15/42 |
| Crew | 3 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| Weight | 10.9 tonnes | 14 tonnes | 14.51 tonnes | 15.50 tonnes |
| Size (L-W-H) | 4.85 x 2.18 x 2.25 m | 4.91 x 2.28 x 2.37 m | 4.91 x 2.28 x 2.37 m | 5.06 x 2.28 x 2.37 m |
| Engine | FIAT-SPA 8T diesel, 105 hp at 1,800 rpm | FIAT-SPA 8T diesel, 125 hp at 1,800 rpm | FIAT-SPA 15T diesel, 145 hp at 1,900 rpm | FIAT-SPA 15TB M42 petrol, 190 hp at 2,400 rpm |
| Maximum Speed | 33.9 km/h | 31.8 km/h | 33 km/h | 38 km/h |
| Range | 210 km | 200 km | 200 km | 220 km |
| Main Armament | Cannone da 37/40 | Cannone da 47/32 Modello 1935 | Cannone da 47/32 Modello 1935 | Cannone da 47/40 Modello 1938 |
| Ammunition | 87 rounds | 87 rounds | 87 rounds | 111 rounds |
| Secondary Armament | 2 Breda Modello 1938 | 4 Breda Modello 1938 | 4 Breda Modello 1938 | 4 Breda Modello 1938 |
| Ammunition | 2,808 rounds | 2,592 rounds | 2,592 rounds | 2,592 rounds |
Transportation Problems
Trailers
With the deployment of the medium tanks, the Italian Regio Esercito encountered a serious problem in the transportation of these tanks. With a weight of 11 tonnes for the Carro Armato M11/39 and 14 tonnes for the Carro Armato M13/40 (and subsequently 14 and 15 tonnes for the other models), the old trailers used for the Carro di Rottura FIAT 3000 and Carro Armato L3 light tanks were insufficient.
In 1940, Carrozzeria Strafurini (English: Strafurini’s Coachworker) and Officine Viberti (English: Viberti Workshops) started the development of two different flatbed-trailers for the transportation of medium tanks. The flatbed-trailers were difficult to build and only a few were produced, and were only ever used for the Carri Armati M11/39.
New two-axle trailers were developed by Carrozzeria Strafurini with its Carrello Speciale per Trasporto Carri M (English: Special Flatbed Trailer for M Tank Transport) and the Officine Viberti with its Rimorchio a Ralla Unificato Grande per il Trasporto Carro Armato M13 (English: Heavy Unified Trailer for M13 Tank Transport), also known as Rimorchio Unificato Viberti da 15T (English: 15-tonne Viberti’s Unified Trailer).
The Officine Viberti trailer was adopted by the Regio Esercito after testing. It was first presented on 12th December 1940 by the Turin company founded by Candido Viberti. It had two ramps to permit the tank to climb on. When not used, they were transported on the trailer’s floor, between the tank’s tracks. On the rear was a hand wheel that was used to adjust the friction of the brake shoes on the pads. This came in handy on downhill runs, where the weight of the fully loaded trailer would create problems for the truck.
The Officine Viberti trailer project was modified on 24th December 1940 after tests and was officially adopted and produced from early 1941. This trailer type was also produced by Breda and other companies in unknown numbers, but at any rate, they were fewer than needed.
In 1940, lots of medium tanks were abandoned during the disastrous retreat from Egypt or during the drive from Libyan harbors to the battlefield due breakdowns. Because of the lack of trailers, very few vehicles were recovered. Only a small percentage of the medium tanks damaged were recovered, and some civilian heavy unified trailers, with a maximum payload of 14 tonnes, were used to load some of these tanks.
In his book Africa Settentrionale 1940-1941, the commander of the Italian forces, General Rodolfo Graziani, mentions a note from 22nd December 1940 that the V° Battaglione Carri M13/40 under his command, slowly advanced from Tripoli due the absence of trailers. At first, crews towed the broken down tanks with other Carri Armati M13/40, but this was a bad idea, as they soon learned. The Carro Armato M13/40‘s engine was underpowered, and Carri Armati M13/40 would have mechanical failure while towing other Carri Armati M13/40.
Gen. Graziani also mentioned that Colonel Antonio Trivioli, commander of the III° Battaglione Carri M13/40, claimed that he moved to El Mechili (from an unknown position) with 21 Carri Armati M13/40 in a dispatch to the High Command on the maneuvers of his battalion. Of these, only three arrived at the Italian positions in El Mechili under their own power. The others arrived later towed by other tanks, prime movers, or loaded on trailers, some with 7 hours of delay due mechanical failure.
Landing Craft
For the landing of Carri Armati M, the Italian Regia Marina (English: Royal Navy) developed the Motozattere da Sbarco Classe MZ 700 (English: Landing Ship Tank MZ 700-Class). It could transport a total of 4 Carri Armati M13/40 medium tanks, three Italian medium tanks or three German Panzer IIIs, and 100 fully-equipped soldiers. For the landing of the ships on shores or not-prepared-harbors, Ansaldo developed a special engineering bridge that could be positioned by the ship itself.
On 13th January 1942, the order for 50 MotoZattere or MZ was approved, but the total number was later brought to 65 LSTs. Starting from May 1942, the deliveries of the first units began and they should have been completed by the following July, when Operazione C3 (English: Operation C3) should have started. Italy and Germany were planning Operazione C3, the maritime and paratrooper invasion of Malta. For the attack, the Kingdom of Italy needed landing ships. The issue was that there were not enough Motozattere da Sbarco Classe MZ 700.
The problem was solved, producing under license, with a different engine and armament, the German MarineFährPrahm-A or MFP-A (English: Naval Ferry Barge A) Landing Ship Tanks (LSTs). The Cantieri Navali Riuniti di Palermo (English: Palermo United Naval Shipyards) had already assembled for the Germans, in 1941, 15 MarineFäehrPrahm-As (codes ‘F146A’ to ‘F160A’) with parts arriving from Germany. The Germans donated the blueprints for these ships to the Italian Regia Marina in 1942.
However, the victorious advance of Rommel up to Egypt induced the Italian High Command to concentrate all the available vehicles, including all the LSTs and the personnel that were training for the invasion of Malta, in the North African sector in the hope of a strategic victory.
Aerial Transport
The Italian Regio Esercito’s High Command wanted to create its own air-portable tank corp. For it, there were plans for a cargo plane specifically for this purpose. The aircraft producer Caproni of Taliedo proposed the four-engined Caproni Ca. 180. Little is known about this airplane apart from its name, which does not appear anywhere except in Nicola Pignato’s book Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano Volume II Tomo I along with an artist’s impression. It was probably derived from the Caproni Ca. 204 four-engined bomber, the only 4-engine plane from which Caproni could take inspiration.
In spring 1943, the Italian High Command created a special platoon called Plotone Carristi Paracadutisti (English: Tank Crew Paratrooper Platoon) with six medium tanks (not known if Carri Armati M13/40, Carri Armati M14/41, or Carri Armati M15/42). This was not pursued further, probably because this four-engined cargo plane could not paradrop the only tank it could transport on board and had to land on a prepared airstrip. This would force the plane to land only on paved airstrips, meaning that the Regio Esercito, before sending the air-portable platoon, needed to occupy an enemy airfield.
Organization
On 19th August 1940, the Regio Esercito’s High Command created the battaglione carri M (English: ‘M’ tank battalion) structure. Each battaglione had three companies. After the third battalion was created, the number of companies was reduced to two for war needs, before being brought back to three again.
Each battalion had a tank for the battalion commander and four tanks for the plotone comando (English: command platoon). Each company had 16 tanks, one tank for the company’s commander and the other 15 tanks assigned to three plotoni carri (English: tank platoons), with four tanks and one tank for the platoon commander.
| Battaglione Carri M13/40 (on 3 Companies) Organization on 24th April 1942 | ||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Personnel | Vehicles | |||||||||||||||
| Officers | NCOs | Soldiers | Carri Armati M13/40 | Staff cars | Light trucks | SPA Dovunque 35 | Heavy trucks | Trailer or flatbed trailers | Special trailers | Fuel carrier | Mobile workshops* | towing trucks | Motorbikes | Motorcycle | Trailer’s ramps | |
| Battaglion command | 9 | 15 | 168 | 4 | 2 | – | 3 | 16 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 8 | 6 | 2 |
| 1ª Compagnia Carri | 5 | 15 | 118 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 19 | 16 | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| 2ª Compagnia Carri | 5 | 15 | 118 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 19 | 16 | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| 3ª Compagnia Carri | 5 | 15 | 118 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 19 | 16 | – | – | – | – | 4 | 2 | 3 |
| Total Compagnie | 15 | 45 | 354 | 48 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 57 | 48 | – | – | – | – | 12 | 6 | 9 |
| Total Battaglione | 24 | 60 | 527 | 52 | 5 | 3 | 6 | 73 | 52 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 28 | 12 | 11 |
A year later, in August 1941, the Regio Esercito’ High Command created the reggimenti carri M (English: ‘M’ tank regiments), equipped with three battaglioni carri M13/40 with three compagnie each. Each reggimento carri M had a theoretical force of 189 Carri Armati M medium tanks plus three reserve platoons (15 Carri Armati M13/40).
The Carri Armati M13/40 were allocated to 15 different battalions.
| Battaglioni Carri M13/40 | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Name | English translation | Commander’s Rank and Name | |
| 1 | III Battaglione Carri M13/40 | 3rd M13/40 Tank Battalion | Lieutenant Colonel Carlo Ghioldi |
| 2 | IV Battaglione Carri M13/40 | 4th M13/40 Tank Battalion | Major Achille Giani |
| 3 | V Battaglione Carri M13/40 | 5th M13/40 Tank Battalion | Lieutenant Colonel Emilio Iezzi |
| 4 | VI Battaglione Carri M13/40 ¹ | 6th M13/40 Tank Battalion | – |
| 5 | VII Battaglione Carri M13/40 | 7th M13/40 Tank Battalion | Major Alberto Andreani |
| 6 | VIII Battaglione Carri M13/40 | 8th M13/40 Tank Battalion | Captain Casale De Bustis Y Figaroa |
| 7 | IX Battaglione Carri M13/40 | 9th M13/40 Tank Battalion | Second Lieutenant Pasquale Prestisimone |
| 8 | X Battaglione Carri M13/40 ¹ | 10th M13/40 Tank Battalion | Major Luigi Pinna |
| 9 | XI Battaglione Carri M13/40 | 11th M13/40 Tank Battalion | Major Gabriele Verri |
| 10 | XII Battaglione Carri M13/40 | 12th M13/40 Tank Battalion | – |
| 11 | XIII Battaglione Carri M13/40 | 13th M13/40 Tank Battalion | Commander Da Toma |
| 12 | XIV Battaglione Carri M13/40 ¹ | 14th M13/40 Tank Battalion | Lieutenant Colonel Gigliarelli Fiumi |
| 13 | XXI Battaglione Carri M13/40 ² | 21st M13/40 Tank Battalion | Captain Sacchitano |
| 14 | LI Battaglione Carri M13/40 | 51st M13/40 Tank Battalion | Lieutenant Colonel Salvatore Zappalà |
| 15 | LII Battaglione Carri M13/40 | 52nd M13/40 Tank Battalion | – |
| Notes | ¹ Later re-equipped with Carri Armati M14/41 ² previously named XXI Battaglione Carri L3/35 (English: 21st L3/35 Tank Battalion) |
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Operational Use
The IV Battaglione Carri M13/40
The IV Battaglione Carri M13/40 in Albania and Greece
In 1939, the IV Battaglione, formed in 1936, was re-equipped with two companies of new materiel and renamed IV Battaglione Carri M13/40. Originally intended to fight in Libya, the military setbacks in the Greek campaign meant it was sent to Albania to support Italian forces. Each company had 13 Carri Armati M13/40 plus four tanks in the command platoon, for a total of 30 tanks.
On 10th December 1940, the Carri Armati M13/40 were moved near Tepeleni to block the Greek advance that threatened to reach Valona and cut off the Italian troop’s retreat. The 1ª Compagnia Carri gave the Carri Armati M13/40 their baptism of fire on 20th January 1941, entering into action maintaining two tanks in the rearguard. The 1ª Compagnia Carri advanced towards Kodra through a narrow mountainous road under Greek artillery fire while the 2ª Compagnia Carri followed it shortly after, losing a tank that overturned.
At 6:00 on 27th January 1941, 9 Carri Armati M13/40 used their main guns to destroy some Greek explosive traps. They soon began to receive Greek anti-tank fire just before reaching the bridge over the Desnizes River. They tried to cross the river but were under increasingly precise heavy Greek fire, probably from Greek 3.7 cm PaK 37s. Two tanks were damaged and the attack was restarted in the afternoon, with four tanks of the 2ª Compagnia Carri, of which only one returned, damaged, while the other three were knocked out by Greek fire. Over the course of two days, the IV Battaglione Carri M13/40 had lost seven tanks and failed to achieve its objectives.
On 17th February 1941, the 2ª Compagnia Carri counterattacked the Greek infantry that advanced to Mont Golico. It lost another tank two days later. In mid-February 1941, Italian forces were able to block the Greek forces, which began small skirmishes but without advancing further into Albanian territory. In late February, the Italian commander in the Balkans, General Ugo Cavallero, decided to launch an offensive to regain all the ground lost and to restart an offensive on Greek soil.
The IV Battaglione Carri M13/40 in Yugoslavia
After 24th March 1941, the 31° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista, which was reduced to 50 L tanks (Carri Armati L3/33, Carri Armati L3/35, and their flamethrower variant) and fewer than 20 Carri Armati M13/40 of the IV Battaglione, was moved to Tirana in anticipation for the planned Yugoslavian campaign.
On 15th April 1941, the Carri Armati M13/40 were ordered to advance to Jvanay in Montenegro. When the 22 Italian tanks (light and medium) on the right were advancing in line a meager 150 m away from the Yugoslavian lines, they were welcomed with precise anti-tank fire. Many tanks were hit while others retreated and just one arrived to storm the Yugolsavian positions. Meanwhile, another Italian medium and light tank force remained in reserve, attacked the Yugoslavian from behind, and forced them to retreat. Almost all the tanks on the left were stuck in the mud and only two arrived to attack the anti-tank guns. After the battle, the Italian losses were three medium tanks destroyed and one heavily damaged, 11 Carri Armati L3 burned out and five heavily damaged, with a total of 20 tank crew members killed and 12 wounded.
The remains of the IV Battaglione Carri M13/40 remained some time in Giannina and, on 5th May 1941, the unit returned to the Italian peninsula and was sent to Pordenone for training.
At the end of the training, the IV Battaglione Carri M13/40 was reformed with three Carro Armato M13/40 tank companies. The worned out Carro Armato M13/40 were later changed with the more powerful Carri Armati M14/41.
Even as early as the Yugoslav campaign, the Carri Armati M13/40 were misused and their performance were far from acceptable. The absence of radios was noted as a serious problem, leading to a failure to coordinate with other Italian units on the battlefield. Protection was limited to only portable anti-tank weapons and automatic weapons no larger than 20 mm, making the vehicle vulnerable during assaults. Despite these criticisms, the Carri Armati M13/40 was still the best performing Italian armored vehicle in the Balkan campaigns, given that the others were the Carri Armati L3/33, Carri Armati L3/35, and the obsolete FIAT 3000s.
The Battaglioni Carri M13/40 in North Africa and the Brigata Corazzata Speciale
Beginning of Operation Compass
The III Battaglione Carri M13/40 was sent to Benghazi, Libya, in September 1940 and started training. In October, it received the second batch of Carri Armati M13/40 produced by Ansaldo. In all, 37 tanks were sent to this unit. Of these 37 tanks, only three were equipped with radio systems. After training, in November 1940, the III Battaglione Carri M13/40 moved to El Mechili, where it was stationed until the first days of December 1940.
On 18th November 1940, the Comando Superiore Forze Armate Africa Settentrionale (English: High Command of Armed Forces in North Africa) ordered the creation of the new Brigata Corazzata Speciale (English: Armored Special Brigade) equipped with various Italian armored units, including two battalions of Carri Armati M13/40, one of which was yet to arrive in Africa. The new unit would be formed under the command of General Babini on 25th November 1940 at Marsa Luch, in Libya.
On 9th December 1940, the Allied forces launched Operation Compass, an offensive counter attacking Italian positions in Egypt and eastern Libya.
During the campaign, the Brigata Corazzata Speciale (also known as Brigata Corazzata ‘Babini’ after its commander) had a total of 57 Carri Armati M and 25 Carri Armati L3 light tanks. Other units soon arrived. The V Battaglione Carri L (English: 5th Light Tank Battalion) was quickly equipped with Carri Armati M13/40 after its deployment in reserve during the French campaign. With these new medium tanks, it was renamed V Battaglione Carri M13/40 and left Verona to reinforce the North African front. The unit arrived in Benghazi in mid-December 1940 and after a short period of training, it was sent to Derna to join the Brigata Corazzata Speciale.
The VI Battaglione Carri M13/40 was also sent to Africa to increase Italian armored forces in Africa. It landed in Tripoli on 17th December 1941 and was moved to Sollum with its 37 tanks. Alongside this Battalion, another spare 36 Carri Armati M13/40 arrived in Benghazi that were assigned to crews of the XXI Battaglione Carri L3/35 (English: 21st L3/35 Tank Battalion). The crews had previously abandoned their light tanks in Tobruk and reached Benghazi to be re-equipped.
When the V Battaglione Carri M13/40 reached the Brigata Corazzata Speciale in El Mechili on 10th January 1941, the Brigade now had a practical force of 61 Carri Armati M13/40 medium tanks, 24 of the III Battaglione Carri M13/40 and 37 of the V Battaglione Carri M13/40. On 23rd January 1941, the Brigata Corazzata Speciale was deployed in Shebib El Ghezze, south of El Mechili. The day after, the III Battaglione Carri M13/40 and V Battaglione Carri M13/40 fought against about 50 Allied tanks in that area. After a day of fighting, the Italians lost 7 tanks knocked out or destroyed compared to 10 tanks and 8 armored cars claimed lost by the Allies.
Battle of Beda Fomm
On 5th February 1941, the Battle of Beda Fomm, the last engagement of Operation Compass, began. To break through the Allied forces which were encircling the Italian forces, the VI Battaglione Carri M13/40 was moved in front of the Italian retreating forces. The Battalion was soon welcomed by British Cruiser tanks fire which destroyed an entire company.
The remaining VI Battaglione Carri M13/40’s tanks lined up in open formation on a 600-700 m front on the sides of the road but found themselves facing the British 7th Armoured Division, and in a short time, the Italians were defeated. The XXI Battaglione Carri M13/40 met a similar fate and was completely annihilated on the same day by other Allied units.
On the morning of 6th February, General Babini’s unit still had 16 officers and 2,300 men, 24 tanks of the V Battaglione Carri M13/40 and 12 of the III Battaglione Carri M13/40. At 13:00 on 6th February, about 40 Allied tanks were spotted and the V Battaglione Carri M13/40 engaged. When the Allied tanks were within firing range, the tanks of the two battalions opened fire, knocking out some Allied tanks. After intense fighting where the Allies repelled an Italian attack, the 2ª Compagnia Carri of the III Battaglione Carri M13/40 tried to encircle the Allied forces that, under heavy Italian fire, was forced to give up their attack, leaving two more tanks on the battlefield. The Italians had to abandon three Carri Armati M13/40 in the clash. In the afternoon, the surviving Italian tanks were engaged by the British but after heavy clashes, they repelled.
Despite the desperate situation they were in, the Italian tank crews did their best to face the overwhelming Allied forces. On 7th February 1941, the V Battaglione Carri M13/40 was engaged by Allied forces but remained in position to permit the rest of the Italians to retreat to Agedabia. In the short battle, the V Battaglione Carri M13/40 lost two officers, 13 NCOs and crew members, and 12 Carri Armati M13/40, but the Allied advance was stopped, permitting the Italian infantry and artillery to retreat. The last Carri Armati M13/40 which followed the retreating forces tried to open a breach in the enemy’s deployment, but were quickly defeated by 14 anti-tank 2-pounder guns.
During Operation Compass, the Italian Regio Esercito lost a total of 72 Carri Armati M11/39 and 145 Carri Armati M13/40. When also considering the 10 Carri Armati M13/40 previously lost in the Balkans, during these two campaigns, the Regio Esercito lost roughly 65% of the 1940 tank production.
The 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ and Operation Sonnenblume
In late 1940, as Italian losses increased during Operation Compass, the 32° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista (English: 32nd Tank Crew Regiment), assigned to the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ (English: 132th Armored Division), was equipped with Carri Armati M13/40. It reached North Africa between January and February 1941. The 32° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista had three battalions, each with a theoretical organic strength of 37 tanks. After all the ranks were completed, the Armored Division spent some days improving its training and, on 7th March 1941, it was ordered to deploy for the new German-led offensive against Allied forces, named Operation Sonnenblume (English: Operation Sunflower).
The 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’, with a total of about 80 tanks, was deployed between Bir Cahela and Bir Haddada, supporting the actions of the Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAF) (English: German African Army). The new Italian armored battalions assigned to the German units were employed more wisely by the experienced German generals, and by February 1941, they succeeded in driving the British out of Cyrenaica, causing many losses to the Allied troops, which had to retreat. The Afrika Korps reached Agedabia on 2nd April 1941.
To advance towards Egypt, German General Erwin Rommel put the Panzer-Regiment 5. (English: 5th Armored Regiment), the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’, and part of the 5. Leichte Division (English: 5th Light Division) together. These units advanced northeast toward Msus and El Mechili. The 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’, supporting the 5. Leichte Division, captured Marsa el Brega on 2nd April 1941, and the next day occupied Ghemines. The ‘Ariete’ then participated in the last actions at El Mechili on the night of 7th April 1941 against the 3rd Indian Motorized Brigade and the rest of the 2nd British Armoured Division.
The 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ was then sent to Tobruk. During the drive, the ‘Ariete’ was attacked by British forces, losing three M13/40s, but destroyed seven Allied tanks. The Carri Armati M13/40, which were not yet equipped with sand filters, quickly wore out and only seven tanks reached Tobruk on 11th April 1941. The remaining tanks reached the city after repairs.
Siege of Tobruk
In April 1941, the Siege of Tobruk began with the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ taking part in many of the siege’s most important engagements, almost always supporting the better trained and more efficient German forces.
On 17th April 1941, 4 Carri Armati M13/40 and 3 Carri Armati L3 light tanks commanded by Lieutenant D’Ambra attacked the fort of Ras El Madauer supported by German infantry. The Italian tanks, manned by volunteer crew members forced the Allied troops in the fort to escape and then pursued them for 4 km inside the Allied perimeter while the German infantry had disappeared. All the tanks returned to the Axis lines, but were hit by German ‘friendly’ fire.
Between 19th and 22nd April 1941, Allied forces tried to close the breach opened by the Axis forces near Acroma on Quota 201. It was defended by the reserve of the VII Battaglione Carri M13/40 and was captured by the Allies, reconquered by the Italians, and then recaptured by the Allies, all in a few hours. In spite of all the Axis’ efforts, under this siege, Tobruk would not fall.
In June 1941, in the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ had 99 Carri Armati M13/40 tanks in Africa. Later, in September, with the 132º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista, this was brought up to 141. In August 1941 the Italian armored division withdrew to the area of Ain el-Gazala to reorganize, replace losses, and rest their crews.
The 132° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista of the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ and Operation Crusader
The 132º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista was formed on 1st September 1941 at Elnet Lasga in North Africa. The battalions of the 132º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista were the VII Battaglione Carri M13/40, the VIII Battaglione Carri M13/40, and, some days after, the IX Battaglione Carri M13/40.
In the month of November 1941, the Allies launched Operation Crusader to raise the Siege of Tobruk and re-occupy Cyrenaica. Allied forces outflanked the Italian-German positions from the south, passing through Bir El Gobi. On 18th November 1941, after a short period of training, the 132° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista entered officially in service, ready to fight.
The British launched a surprise attack on 18th November 1941 from Marsa Matruh advancing north-west. The first day the advance was quick, but the next day, near Bir El Gobi (also known as Bir El Gubi or Biʾr al-Ġubbiyy), the 22nd Armoured Brigade of the 7th Armoured Division clashed with the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’.
Action at Bir El Gobi (November 1941) and Battle of Point 175
On the morning of 19th November 1941, as Allied forces moved towards Bir El Gobi, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’, with a total of 137 Carri Armati M13/40, was organizing in defense. The 3ª Compagnia Carri of the VII Battaglione Carri M13/40 counterattacked and forced British armored cars to retreat. Fire from British howitzers prevented them from advancing further east and they remained in the open field. British Crusader tanks outflanked the Italian company from the right by exploiting their speed and attacked them from behind. The Italians lost three Carri Armati M13/40 and three officers in the fight but managed to retreat. Also that morning, two companies of the VII Battaglione Carri M13/40 were sent on the left flank of the British column, but were annihilated by a British force ten times their number.
The situation was becoming unfavorable for the Italians. At 13:00, the 132° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista began a counterattack. The 1ª Compagnia Carri of the VII Battaglione Carri M13/40, closely followed by the 2ª Compagnia Carri, attacked the left flank of the British tanks at 13:30, while the entire VIII Battaglione Carri M13/40 (60 Italian tanks in all) was sent to attack the 22nd Armoured Brigade and the 2nd Royal Gloucestershire Hussars. The Italian tanks heavily engaged the two British units. Despite the British tank’s superiority in all facets, the slow Carri Armati M13/40 outflanked them and forced them to retreat.
A platoon of the IX Battaglione Carri M13/40 commanded by Second Lieutenant Colli was sent to support the Italian artillery and infantry defensive line, but was annihilated after fierce fighting. At sunset, 30 Carri Armati M13/40 which had been maintained in reserve, were moved to attack British supply convoys that tried to reach Tobruk, capturing many trucks and supplies.
At 16:30, British forces were forced to withdraw, under pressure from Italian tanks and the constant fire from anti-tank guns and long range’s autocannoni. Italian losses were mainly from the VII Battaglione Carri M13/40 and the VIII Battaglione Carri M13/40 and totaled 29 Carri Armati M13/40, equivalent to 20% of all available medium tanks before Operation Crusader.
The British attack was carried out with bravado and relied too much on the superiority of their vehicles and the inexperience of the Italian units, which, however, had learned from their mistakes made during previous battles. Crusader tanks were used without infantry support and only with long-range artillery support. The 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’, on the other hand, had learned the German tactic of tank-infantry coordination during training together with the Panzer units of the Afrika Korps in the previous months, and had put it into practice at Bir El Gobi.
Under German command, on 24th November 1941, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ advanced with Italian infantry divisions east to support the Axis troops that were fighting in Bardia. The 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ then approached Bir Ghirba and received the order to clear any opposition at Forte Capuzzo and link up with the 21. Panzer Division.
After taking Forte Capuzzo by 27th November, the Carri Armati M13/40 of the ‘Ariete’ advanced toward Tobruk. Their order was to take by surprise the New Zealand 21st Battalion at Point 175 which blocked the German Panzers. On 29th November 1941, the ‘Ariete’ overran the Allied defensive positions and heald off the armor counterattack.
Action at Bir El Gobi (December 1941)
A second action at Bir El Gobi was fought between 3rd December and 7th December 1941. The 136ª DIvisione Corazzata ‘Giovani Fascisti’ and some Bersaglieri units with 10 or 12 Carri Armati L3 light tanks and one or two Carri Armati M13/40 (sources disagree) resisted the attacks of several small Allied units. The 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’, which was to support the Italian forces, was slowed by Allied skirmishes on the road to reach Bir El Gobi. Nevertheless, the Division reached the Italian positions during the night of 6th December, and until dawn repulsed the Allied’s latest attempts to capture the positions around Bir El Gobi.
Due to heavy losses, on 8th December 1941, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ moved all the surviving operational Carri Armati M13/40 to the IX Battaglione Carri M13/40, probably fewer than 37 tanks. Losses continued throughout the month as the Axis retreated to the defensive line at El Agheila. On 20th December 1941, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ had in its ranks only 20 operational medium tanks, reduced to 18 by 26th December 1941.
Early 1942 in the Western Desert Campaign and the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ Reorganization
The 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’ began its participation in the African Campaign in January 1942. Due to the lack of armored vehicles, the Italian High Command assigned to the Division the XI Battaglione Carri M13/40 taken from the 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’.
After a period of training in the Pordenone and Cellina-Meduna areas of Italy, the 133º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista (English: 133rd Tank Crew Infantry Regiment) was sent to Puglia, in the Brindisi-Mesagne area. In January 1942, it was transferred to North Africa as part of the 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’.
Some of the convoys carrying the armored division to North Africa were sunk by the British Royal Navy, leaving the Division only partially effective. It was then decided to assign the battalions that had arrived in Africa to other Italian divisions.
Subsequently, as replacement for the lost tank battalions ceded to other units, the 133º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista incorporated the IV Battaglione Carri M14/41 (previously called IV Battaglione Carri M13/40, deployed in Greece in late 1940) and the LI Battaglione Carri M13/40.
On the night of 19th January 1942, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ and the 101a Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’ moved from their positions reaching the area 15 km east of Marsa el Brega. In January 1942, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ was deployed on secondary duties while Axis forces tried to weaken the British with small-scale attacks. The ‘Ariete’ performed well despite the drastic lack of vehicles thanks to veteran crews. Toward early February, the division also received new vehicles, such as the Semoventi M40 da 75/18. After reaching Benghazi on 12th February, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ spent a few days re-equipping and replaced the decimated VII Battaglione Carri M13/40 with the X Battaglione Carri M14/41. Both sides used the early period of 1942 to replenish their forces after the heavy toll of months of fighting.
On 14th February 1942, the VIII Battaglione Carri M13/40 received the task to protect a German sapper unit while mining the Garet Meriem area. After a 30 km march, both units were attacked twice by British armored and motorized patrol units. At night, the units reached Dei Crisma, 60 km from El Mechili. Fearing a British attack, the Italian Command sent a battaglione carri M13/40 and a semoventi group of the armored division to the area. On 15th February 1942, after a month of small-scale clashes, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ restarted the advance pushing east the British forces with accurate artillery fire.
Between late February and early March, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ moved to Ain el Gazala, where it reorganized until the next Axis operation. It received new tanks, enough to re-establish, with veteran crews, the VIII Battaglione Carri M13/40 and the IX Battaglione Carri M13/40. The new X Battaglione Carri M13/40 was assigned to the Division. It also received the Reggimento Esplorante Corazzato ‘Ariete’ (RECo) (English: Armored Exploring Regiment) with LII Battaglione Carri M13/40 and III Gruppo Corazzato ‘Nizza’ (English: 3rh Armored Group) equipped with AB41 medium reconnaissance armored cars.
Battle of Gazala
Before Rommel’s offensive in May 1942, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ had in its ranks 213 tanks and assault guns: 123 Carri Armati M13/40, 70 Carri Armati M14/41, and 20 Semoventi M40 da 75/18. The newly arrived 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’ had 157 tanks: 39 Carri Armati M13/40, 117 Carri Armati M14/41, and a Carro Armato M15/42 for prototype testing. In the Libyan depots, there were another 17 Carri Armati M13/40 and 19 Carri Armati M14/41 in reserve or maintenance. In total, this was 406 carri armati M and semoventi.
On 25th May 1942, the X Battaglione Carri M14/41 joined the Division. Two days later, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ was deployed against two Allied fortified positions, in preparation for Unternehmen Venezia (English: Operation Venice).
Between Gazala and Timimi, near Tobruk, the Allied troops concentrated their forces on a defensive line. The Axis Unternehmen Venezia started at 14:00 of 26th May 1942. The Italian and Afrika Korps units launched a frontal attack on the central Gazala positions. The following morning, Panzerarmee Afrika, commanded by Rommel, together with part of the Italian forces, attacked the southern part of the Allied defensive line covering its left flank with the Allied minefields.
At dawn of 27th May 1942, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ that was part of Rommel’s task force moved for the attack. The left side of the IX Battaglione Carri 13/40 was hit by violent anti-tank fire. In fact, because of the terrain, the distance between the VIII Battaglione Carri 13/40 and IX Battaglione Carri 13/40 had increased and the right flank could not support the left flank. The X Battaglione Carri M14/41 was then ordered to support the center and right side. As there were minefields on the left side, only the 7ª Compagnia Carri (English: 7th Tank Company) of the X Battaglione Carri M14/41 was deployed on the left side.
At 07:10 on 27th May, the tanks of the 132º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista broke through the Allied lines, capturing over 1,000 prisoners. During the skirmishes in Rugbet el Atasc, the Italians lost 23 Carri Armati M13/40 (many of which were repaired after the battle), 30 crew members killed and 50 wounded.
Italian sources disagree about the losses during the Battle of Gazala, as some sources claim 34 Carri Armati M destroyed or damaged. The total Carri Armati M losses of Italian divisions on 27th May 1942 amounted to 45 Carri Armati M (of which 27 were recovered and repaired), while the crew member losses were 42 dead, 102 missing, and 49 wounded.
On the afternoon of 27th May 1942, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ restarted its advance through the east, reaching Bir El Harmat (in Italian referred to as Bir Karmat) at night. The following morning, part of the ‘Ariete’ attacked the 4th British Armoured Brigade, while other tanks and semoventi repulsed, together with the 15. Panzer Division, an Allied attempt to circumvent the Italian Division with about 30 tanks. After the clash with the 4th British Armoured Brigade, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ restarted the advance but was shortly after stopped by the 22nd Armoured Brigade. Only the intervention of German armored units permitted the Italians to restart the advance at night, after outflanking the British Crusader tanks and forcing them to retreat under heavy Axis tank fire. On 29th May 1942, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ repelled the counter attacks of the 22nd Armoured Division with 44 tanks, and of the 2nd Armoured Division with a similar number of tanks in the area of Trigh Capuzzo.
In a few days, the Axis supplies decreased sensibly and Rommel decided to order Axis units to remain at the Ain El Gazala line to open a gap to permit supply units to reach the Axis’ armored divisions at Trigh Capuzzo. Another counter attack on 30th May 1942 was repelled with the total Allied loss of 57 tanks in a single day, whilst the ‘Ariete’ losses for this day are unfortunately unknown.
On 5th June 1942, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ and other Axis armored units were again attacked by the 22nd Armoured Brigade and 42nd Royal Tanks Regiment. The Italian tanks, unable to cope with the overwhelming British forces, slowly retreated. The British, believing that the Axis troops were abandoning the battlefield, advanced at top speed, maneuvering to encircle them, falling into a trap. Ahead of the Italians were minefields placed weeks earlier by Allied troops, and the British tanks drove into them, losing several vehicles. At the same time, the struggling British armored units came into range of the Autocannoni da 90/53 su Lancia 3Ro, becoming easy targets. At the end of the battle, the British had lost 50 tanks and only a few dozens escaped the trap.
Battle of Bir Hakeim
On 27th May 1942, after overwhelming the 3rd Indian Motorized Brigade, the VIII Battaglione Carri 13/40, IX Battaglione Carri 13/40, and X Battaglione Carri 13/40 of the 132º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista moved northeast of Bir Hakeim, a Free French-held stronghold.
The IX Battaglione Carri 13/40, with about 60 tanks, changed direction toward the fort. The IX Battaglione Carri 13/40 arrived in front of the minefield and barbed wire at Bir Hakeim at 8:15 in the morning, began the assault, and lost 31 tanks and a Semovente M40 da 75/18. Ten tanks overran the minefield and were put out of action by Canon de 75 mm Modèle 1897 guns, resulting in 124 Italian casualties.
The remnants of the IX Battaglione Carri 13/40 retreated into the main body of the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’, which moved north toward Bir El Harmat around noon, following Rommel’s original plan.
On 31th May 1942, the XI Battaglione Carri M13/40 followed the 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’ in attacking the position of Bir Hakeim. The attack on Bir Hakeim from the north was almost immediately stopped by the French anti-tank fire. On 10th June 1942, the British 1st Royal Tank Regiment and 6th Royal Tank Regiment launched an attack against a position held by the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ to relieve the pressure of the siege on the fort. On the British right, the 6th Royal Tank Regiment was targeted by a number of Carri Armati M13/40 and Autocannoni da 90/53 su Lancia 3Ro, while on the left, also the 1st Royal Tank Regiment launched an attack. Both regiments were repelled at 10:30, and by the end of the day, Allied losses amounted to 15 M3 Grants and 5 Stuarts, whilst Italian losses were just two Carri Armati M13/40.
The 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’ arrived at Ein El Gazala on 31th May 1942 and was deployed in Sidi Rezegh in the days after to protect the right side of the Axis forces that attacked Tobruk.
On 11th June 1942, the XI Battaglione Carri M13/40 and German tanks of the 90. Leichte Afrika-Division entered the Bir Hakeim stronghold after fierce fighting.
In the days immediately following the Battle of Bir Hakeim, the XI Battaglione Carri M13/40 was engaged in a series of engagements and operations that led to the encirclement of Allied forces in the area of Ain el Gazala, later taking part in the attack onTobruk.
The Fall of Tobruk
After Rommel’s offensive of May 1942, in early June 1942, the ‘Ariete’ had in its ranks 94 tanks plus 43 under repair. But on 18th June 1942, the Division had only 50 serviceable tanks and 20 under repair, plus 10 Semoventi M40 da 75/18.
By 18th June 1942, Tobruk was completely besieged and Rommel decided to attack the southeastern side of the British defensive perimeter. On 20th June 1942, the Axis attack on the city of Tobruk began at 5:20. The 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ and the 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’ received the task to break through the 2nd Battalion of the 79th Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders Regiment. The Italian divisions were stopped by the intense anti-tank fire, so the High Command quickly changed plans, redirected it to follow the German Panzers which had already broken through the Allied defenses. When its tanks were inside the Tobruk defensive perimeter, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ was sent on the west side of the perimeter.
The Commonwealth forces could not organize a counterattack and only the 4th Battalion of the Royal Tank Regiment attacked the Axis forces inside the defensive perimeter, but after an hour and half, the first German tank crossed the last defensive line in front of Tobruk. By noon, 113 Axis tanks were present within the defensive perimeter. The Axis tanks decimated the Allied tanks supported by the Axis’ ground attack planes.
At about 13:30, the Italian tanks and the 21. Panzer Division reached the Pilastrino ridge, only 9 km from Tobruk. In the advance, the German tanks supported by the Carri Armati M13/40 knocked out the remaining Allied tanks. At 16:00, the South African commander, General Hendrik Klopper, ordered the Commonwealth force to withdraw from Tobruk.
At 18:00, the first tanks of the 21. Panzer Division reached the outskirts of Tobruk’s harbor, and in about an hour, they reached the harbor and shot at some of the British vessels that tried to escape. On the morning of 22th June 1942, General Klopper officially surrendered to Feldmarschall Erwin Rommel.
After the battle the British armored divisions still had 185 tanks, while the German remained with 50 tanks. Although unknown, some have speculated that the Italian still had 50 tanks too, divided between the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ and the 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’.
After resupply with the Tobruk’s captured fuel, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ advanced west chasing the retreating British forces. The Italian tanks arrived in Sidi El Barrani and continued further east, pursuing the British forces first reaching Marsa Matruh and then Fuka.
In late August, the ranks of the ‘Ariete’ were filled with 120 tanks, while the ‘Littorio’ had 107 tanks of the M13 and M14 models.
Advance onto Egyptian Soil
The XI Battaglione Carri M13/40 of the 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’, after a short period of rest and rearrangement, took part in the victorious march towards the Egyptian border. Sollum, Sidi Barrani, Marsa Matruh, were the stages of the long, but rapid advance. The XI Battaglione Carri M13/40 reached Egyptian territory and was engaged in the First Battle of El Alamein, in the course of which, it faced the New Zealand 2nd Infantry Division 20 km southwest of El Alamein.
On the 23rd June 1942, the 133º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista crossed the border with Egypt, ready to continue the breakthrough in depth in order to exploit the success that, at the moment, looked almost guaranteed for the Italian-German forces.
On 3rd July 1942, the 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’ was counterattacked by Allied forces while trying to reach Deir El Ehen. It was forced to retreat to Deir El Qatan and then to the Munqar Wahla area, where it sustained a strong attack by New Zealand troops on 7th July. On the 9th July 1942, together with German troops, the 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’ captured the Deir El Qattara stronghold where it remained until 19th July 1942 and then moved to the Gebel Kalaki El Tayra area.
In the last days of August and early September, the XI Battaglione Carri M13/40 of the 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’ and the 133º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista took part in the actions led by General Rommel in an attempt to encircle from the south the Allied forces set up to defend the positions at El Alamein.
On 2nd September 1942, the XI Battaglione Carri M13/40 reached the other units of the 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’, having failed in their attempt to outflank the Alliedpositions, the Battalion and other advanced units of the 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’ were made to fall back to the positions of El Kharita.
In very early October 1942, the 133° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista began to receive the XIV Battaglione Carri M14/41. Before the Second Battle of El Alamein the 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’ had in its ranks 116 Carri Armati M of both M13/40 and M14/41 models.
Second Battle of El Alamein
From the 23rd October to 6th November 1942, the Second Battle of El Alamein was fought. The 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ had in its ranks a total of 117 Carri Armati M13/40 and M14/41, 17 Semoventi M40 da 75/18, and 14 Carri Armati Comando M40.
The 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’, together with the 21. Panzer Division occupied the southernmost position of the German-Italian deployment while 15. Panzer Division, the 90. Leichte Division, the 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’, and 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’ where in the northern sector.
The 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ was initially held in reserve, protecting the rear of the 27ª Divisione di Fanteria ‘Brescia’ and the 185ª Divisione Paracadutisti ‘Folgore’ (English: 185th Paratrooper Division). On the evening of 23rd October 1942, the Allied counter offensive was unleashed with artillery fire. On both sides there was fierce fighting until 30th October, when the 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’ was deployed in the coastal sector.
On 26th October 1942, the ‘Trieste’ was moved north to the area of Deyr el-Murra, where, having assumed combat formation, it aimed from the south to Tel el-Aqqir. The 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’ and the 15. Panzer Division converged from the north, but a violent Allied attack forced the Axis divisions to retreat.
On the night of the 1st November, the entire 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ received the order to move north to the Seir el Murra area. The battalions advanced all through the night, reaching the Seir el Murra area in the morning. The IX Battaglione Carri M13/40 was positioned in the southern sector held by the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’, the X Battaglione Carri M13/40 held the central sector, and the XIII Battaglione Carri M13/40 held the northern sector.
On the night of 1st November, the Allied Command launched a mighty attack with huge masses of infantry and tanks that crumbled the front. The situation for the Axis became critical and all the tanks available in the area were thrown into the fight. Among them were those of the XI Battaglione Carri M13/40 with the remaining units of the Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’. The tank battles lasted all afternoon on 1st November. The XI Battaglione Carri M13/40, animated by the example of its commander, Major Verri, fought desperately to the end in this struggle, losing one by one all of its tanks. Although it inflicted many losses on the numerically superior enemy, it was practically destroyed on 2nd November 1942, in the final stages of the Second Battle of El Alamein.
On 2nd November 1942, the last attempt of the Italo-German armored forces to stop the British attack failed. At Tell Alam el Aqqaqir, Rommel positioned all the tanks in the northern sector of the defensive line: 35 German tanks and about 40 carri armati M of the 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’ and 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’. At the end of the day, the 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’ had fewer than 20 tanks operational and two companies of the XII Reggimento Bersaglieri. The 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’ was less lucky, losing the majority of its tanks.
At dawn on 3rd November, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’, returned to the north and prepared to close the gap opened in the Italo-German line. By this stage, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ had about 150 armored vehicles, self-propelled guns, and armored cars in all the battalions, and only 2,000 Bersaglieri. On the same day the 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’ fought with the last 17 surviving tanks, losing all of them.
At 8:30 in the morning on 4th November, the Allied armor attack began, and the X Battaglione Carri M13/40 advanced against the British M4 Shermans. After suffering heavy losses, the Italian Battalion retreated, positioning itself south of the IX Battaglione Carri M13/40. For about two hours, the Italian medium tanks blocked the Allied forces with their fire and firing from a static position.
The battle went on throughout the day. In the evening, 31 tanks, 5 artillery pieces, 3 self-propelled guns and 200 Bersaglieri of the XII Reggimento Bersaglieri remained in action. The order to retreat had been issued at 15:30 but nobody had informed them. At about the same time that the retreat was ordered, the Commander of the ‘Ariete’, General Francesco Antonio Arena, that had not been informed about the retreat, messaged his superiors:
“Enemy tanks raided south. With this, 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ surrounded. Found about five kilometers northwest of Bir el Abd. Tanks of the ‘Ariete’ are fighting.”
In this fight, all tank battalions were annihilated except the XIII Battaglione Carri M13/40, the Bersaglieri regiment, and four Semoventi M40 da 75/18. The survivors moved at the assault supported by the paratroopers of the 185ª Divisione Paracadutisti ‘Folgore’ losing the majority of their tanks. Many tank crew members, when their Carri Armati M13/40 were disabled joined the paratroopers launching Molotov cocktails, hand grenades, or improvised explosive devices against the Allied tanks, aiming to stop them, even if just temporarily.
On 6th November 1942, near Fuka, the XIII Battaglione Carri M13/40, the only one to have survived the previous battles with few losses, even if it did not have more than twenty tanks, was also engaged by overwhelming enemy forces and eventually destroyed. Some sources claim that the unit sent a last radio message stating “Three tanks remain, 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ strike back”. However, it is unclear if this was really sent or if it is just post-war propaganda. On 6th November 1942, the last Carri Armati M13/40 and Carri Armati M14/41 tanks of the 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’ were destroyed in Tell el Aqqaqir.
On 21st November 1942, the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ was disbanded but with the remnants of the divisions of the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’, 133ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’, and 101ª Divisione Motorizzata ‘Trieste’, the Gruppo Tattico ‘Ariete’ (English: Tactical Group) was formed, but was equipped with only a few tanks. The last Carri Armati M13/40 were probably destroyed in the Battle El Agheila on 14th December 1942.
In the course of 14 months of war in the North African desert, the 132º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista paid a very high tribute of blood. This amounted to at least 340 dead and missing (40 officers – 75 NCOs – 225 tank crews). A total of 365 decorations for Military Valor were awarded to tank crews of all ranks in the regiment. With what was left, the 132º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista was reformed and continued the fight until Tunisia.
The 133º Reggimento Fanteria Carrista was disbanded on 18th December 1942. The XIV Battaglione Carri M14/41 then fought in Tunisia together with the 131ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Centauro’ until the surrender of the Italian Army in North Africa on 13th May 1943.
The 32° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista Survives
Back in April 1942, the 32° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista was removed from the 132ª Divisione Corazzata ‘Ariete’ (substituted by the 132° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista). It reached Sardinia with the regiment’s banner in September 1942, and was dislocated to the area of Sanluri assigned to the XIII Corpo d’Armata (English: 13th Army Corps). It was equipped with light tanks and French captured tanks.
During 1943, some new units were assigned to the 32° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista: DLXI Gruppo Semoventi da 75/18 (English: 561th Semoventi da 75/18 Group), XVI Battaglione Carri M42, and XVII Battaglione Carri M15/42. At least one of these three units was equipped with Carri Armati M13/40 per photographic evidence.
After the Armistice of 8th September 1943, the 32° Reggimento Fanteria Carrista remained loyal to the Italian king and switched sides in favor of the Allied forces. It took no part in any fighting and disbanded on 31st August 1944.
Defense of Rome
After the Second Battle of El Alamein in North Africa, only a few Carri Armati M13/40 remained in Italian hands. The remaining tanks had been stationed on the Italian Peninsula, mainly for training purposes, even as the war continued. In May 1943, the Axis armies in North Africa surrendered to the Allied forces that, a few months later, in July 1943, disembarked in Sicily.
The Armistice of Cassibile with the Allied powers was signed secretly in Sicily on 3rd September 1943, as the Allied attack on the Italian mainland started. The Armistice was made public to the Italian population at 19:42 of 8th September 1943. In some cases, the soldiers had not been informed previously and they learned of the news only because they listened to civilian or Allied radios.
The German reaction was quick and resolute. The Germans launched Fall Achse (English: Operation Axis), surrounding and disarming the majority of the Italian soldiers in the Italian peninsula or in the Balkans, killing over 20,000 Italian soldiers and capturing over a million.
In Rome, the situation was different. The Italian Regio Esercito had lots of units deployed in the city and its countryside to prevent Allied sea or air landings and also to prevent the generals and soldiers loyal to Benito Mussolini from regaining power by force. When the first German units entered Rome from the south, they were stopped by Italian soldiers. Some Carri Armati M13/40 taken from training schools were deployed to defend the city. A few photos taken in the days after the clashes in the city showed some of these tanks abandoned or destroyed, but it is difficult to reconstruct their stories.
Considerations
The Carro Armato M13/40’s engine power was often criticized, with crews and commanders judging it as insufficient. On 25th May 1941, General Gastone Gambara informed General Mario Roatta, the Chief of Staff of the Royal Italian Army, about the situation of the Italian tanks in North Africa. Of the Carro Armato M13/40 medium tank, he wrote that the chassis and structure were well produced, the armor and gun were adequate, but the engine was problematic. At a maximum speed of 8 km/h on soft desert terrains, the Carri Armati M13/40 were an easy and vulnerable target to any British gun in North Africa according to Gen. Gambara.
The engine was also prone to overstressing, as in North Africa, Italian crews sometimes positioned sandbags on the front plate and the transmission cover or even track links around the turret in order to increase the protection against British anti-tank guns. This solution marginally increased the protection, but also increased the weight of the vehicle.
Gen. Gambara had already shared a damning account on the M13/40 with Gen. Roatta on 23rd May 1941. Apparently, crews preferred to operate the Carri Armati L3, as the light tanks were faster and, at maximum speed, became difficult targets for the British anti-tank guns.
As some of the reliability problems present in the first batches were solved, the general perception of the Carro Armato M13/40 slightly improved. Aside from the underpowered engine, the tank was, at least in 1940 and early 1941, an adequate vehicle for the Regio Esercito. Its main gun, for example, was precise and had enough anti-tank capabilities to knock out almost all British tanks at 800 – 1,000 m, while the British 2-pdr cannon was limited to a practical anti-tank range of 600 m. The Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938 machine guns were considered suitable by the crews, even if they were easy to jam if not well lubricated.
The turret’s hyposcopes did not provide a great field of vision of the front and were a shortcoming. The hydraulic turret rotation mechanism was considered superfluous as it was cumbersome and often failed. A serious problem also arose because, in the desert, it was common to use this system to turn the turret even 180° to engage British forces. For this reason, many crews dismounted it when the tank was assigned to them in order to free up space and diminish the total weight.
Allied Opinion on the Italian M13/40 Tank
In the British School of Tank Technology of Chobham, Major J. D. Barnes and Lieutenant P. L. Gudgin wrote in October 1943 a detailed report of a captured Carro Armato M14/41 transported to the United Kingdom and tirelessly inspected. However, they had misidentified the tank and believed it was an M13/40. This was probably because an internal plaque in the tank bore “M13/40”.
Although the British had misidentified the tank, some of the conclusions are still valid, given the similarity between the M13/40 and M14/41. The British report noted the similarities with a Semovente M40 da 75/18 that had also been captured in North Africa. The British appreciated the turret’s interior volume and detailed the turret’s rotation system and the manual telegraph between the driver and the commander. The British technicians considered the side and rear superstructure and turret pistol ports superfluous, because they weakened the armor plates, which they already judged poorly.
In another British report titled Training of the Army in the Middle East Desert written by the British High Command in December 1941, the Carro Armato M13/40 was determined to be a poor quality tank with bad optics and only adequate mobility.
The opinions of the Allied forces on the Carro Armato M13/40 and Carro Armato M14/41 can also be found in the Recognition Pictorial Manual of Armored Vehicles of the US War Department FM-30-40 published on 3rd November 1943. Analyzing the Carro Armato M14/41, the US technicians judged it and the Carro Armato M13/40 as too vulnerable. If an armor-piercing round of a caliber greater than 40 mm penetrated the fighting compartment, it often killed all the crew. The tank was mechanically reliable, but had an obsolete suspension, poor interior design, and an excessively cumbersome turret rotation system. The machine guns had inadequate traverse and the anti-aircraft machine gun had a limited range of motion due to its support and was therefore judged as useless. During fighting, the loader had to rotate the turret, as the commander operated the anti-aircraft gun.
Other Users
Australian Service
In the last phases of the Italian offensive in Egypt, the remaining Carri Armati M11/39 of the II Battaglione Carri M were destroyed by the Matilda Mark II infantry tanks of the 7th Royal Tank Regiment in Nibewa. Of these tanks, six were captured by the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment, which was not equipped with tanks. Other Carri Armati M11/39 and some Carri Armati M13/40 were also captured in Bardia. In January 1941, after the Battle of Beda Fomm, the Allied forces put into service some of the 39 Carri Armati M13/40 captured in the battle.
Some of these took part in the Allied attack on Tobruk a few weeks later, where the surviving Carri Armati M11/39 of the I Battaglione Carri M were lost by the Italians. All the Australian vehicles were lost during fighting with the Axis troops.
German Service
The Deutsches Afrika Korps obtained various Carri Armati M13/40 in North Africa, mainly recaptured from Allied troops and then delivered again to Italian units that repaired them or used them for the spare parts.
At least one Carro Armato M13/40 Iª Serie was captured in the area near Beda Fomm in January 1941. It seems it had been abandoned and sabotaged by its crew in the area after the battle. The advancing Allied forces did not incorporate it into their forces and it was found during the Axis advance of early 1941. German forces captured another from the 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment, although it is not known if it was incorporated into any German unit.
After the Armistice of 8th September 1943, when the Italian joined the Allied side, the German forces managed to capture a total of about 22 Carri Armati M13/40, even if this number has never been fully confirmed. It is possible that some of the captured tanks were Carri Armati M14/41 mistaken for Carri Armati M13/40 by the Germans.
These Carri Armati M13/40 were deployed in Italy and in the Balkans by various German units until 1945. The vehicles were judged inadequate by the Germans for their obsolescence and lack of knowledge on Italian tanks that caused many failures that were hardly reparable due the lack of spare parts and trained mechanics.
On 21th June 2022, in Brandenburg, Germany, the remains of an Italian Carro Armato M was found, buried in mud for over 70 years. It had been lost in April 1945 during the defense of the city’s suburbs, probably abandoned after being stuck in the mud. Many social media accounts had stated that this vehicle was of the SS Panzer Kompanie 105. of the 5. SS-GebirgsKorps. The last report of the unif was of 13th April 1945 and mentions that the company had in its ranks 10 Beute Panzerkampfwagen M13/40 735(i) (German designation for the Carri Armati M13/40), 7 operational and 3 non-operational.
Repubblica Sociale Italiana Service
After the Italian Armistice of 8th September 1943, some Carri Armati M13/40 that had remained in the Italian mainland for training or other tasks were taken by Fascist soldiers still loyal to Mussolini that deployed them against The Partisans and Allied forces.
At least 11 Carri Armati M13/40 were used from Repubblica Sociale Italiana in addition to 14 more unspecified medium tanks, which were either more Carri Armati M13/40 or Carri Armati M14/41.
Of these tanks, 4 were operated by the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leoncello’ (English: Armored Group) that had recovered them from various training units. A total of 5 Carri Armati M13/40 and M14/41 were in service with the Gruppo Squadroni Corazzati ‘San Giusto’ (English: Armored Squadrons Group) that received them from the German Army. Another unit that used many Carri Armati M13/40 was the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ that throughout its existence operated a total of 35 Carri Armati M, of which at least 10 were Carri Armati M13/40 and M14/41.
Other vehicles were deployed by minor units, such as the Raggruppamento Anti Partigiani (English: Anti-Partisan Grouping) that had in service 2 Carri Armati M13/40s for a short period of time. Sometimes the tanks of the two major armored units were made available to smaller units for anti-partisan operations.
The tanks of the units that remained loyal to Benito Mussolini were mostly only used in anti-partisan operations and escorting convoy missions facing Italian or Yugoslavian partisan units equipped only with light guns. Only on a few occasions in the last days of war the tanks of the Gruppo Corazzato ‘Leonessa’ faced the Allied forces advancing from the south.
Repubblica Italiana
After the fall of the Repubblica Sociale Italiana and the end of the Second World War, the new Esercito Italiano (English: Italian Army) was created with the former Regio Esercito’s soldiers and with Partisans. The Italian Republic’s army and police corps were mostly equipped with British or US-built tanks and armored cars delivered after the end of the hostilities by the two armies to the new Italian Government.
In some cases, the Italian forces were not equipped with new vehicles. For that reason, some arsenals all around Italy recovered damaged armored vehicles and, after repairs, delivered them, with new camouflage and coats of arms, to the Italian Army and police units.
After 1954, the Italian tanks remained in service until they were totally worn out. They were then scrapped, but some tanks remained in service for tank crew, anti-tank teams, and tank hunter team training.
At least one Carro Armato M13/40 IIª Serie and 2 Carri Armati M15/42 were delivered by the Arsenale di Torino (English: Arsenal of Turin) to the Corpo degli Agenti di Pubblica Sicurezza (English: Corps of Public Safety Officers) in Milan. The tanks were probably survivors from the Repubblica Sociale Italiana recovered in Turin or Milan or the nearby countryside. The tanks went to equip the III° Reparto Celere ‘Lombardia’ (English: 3rd Fast Department) of Milan, a special police corps, which was well-equipped and trained. The unit’s task was to be quickly deployed to any part of the peninsula where it was needed.
Egyptian and Israeli Service
During the Second World War, many Allied tanks that were damaged during the fighting with the Axis forces were sent in Egypt and Palestine to be repaired. When the war ended, many vehicles that had been left on the battlefield were recovered to be scrapped. Many of these trucks, tanks, and planes were instead taken by the Egyptian Army and repaired. A Carro Armato M13/40 IIIª Serie that was deployed by the Egyptian forces was probably recovered in this manner.
The Egyptians mounted a new 37 mm cannon from a M3 Stuart or a 2-pdr cannon from a British tank in the Italian-built tank. It was deployed by the 4th Egyptian Brigade to attack Israel from the south in May 1948, starting the Israeli’s Independence War.
The tank’s stay in Egyptian ranks was short. In fact, on 12th July 1948, during the attack at the Negba Kibbutz (settlement), it hit a mine and was abandoned about 50 m from the kibbutz. It was recovered from the battlefield and transported to the settlement, where it remained for three days. On 16th July, a truck of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) recovered the tank and transported it to an unknown destination. On 1st March 1949, the 8th Armored Brigade of the Israeli Defense Force was armed with “an Italian 12.5 ton tank”. This could refer to the Egyptian Carro Armato M13/40 which could have been repaired and put back into service.
After the war, the Negba inhabitants asked the Israeli Defense Force for the return of the tank to erect a monument for the battle. At first, the IDF denied the request, but after a second request, some IDF officers started the research of the specific tank in their armored units. Having initially found nothing, workshops and scrap yards were checked, but the tank had disappeared. Instead, a M22 Locust light tank was provided to use as a monument. In all likelihood it seems that the M13/40 was used for target practice by the 8th Armored Brigade and destroyed.
An undated bad quality image shows the future Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein over the Carro Armato M13/40 with license plate ‘Regio Esercito 3700’. The tank was placed at the El Alamein War Cemetery in 1946. Saddam Hussein could have visited the cemetery during his period living in Egypt between 1960 to 1963.
Variants
| Carro Armato M13/40 variants | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Model | Carro Armato M13/40 Iª Serie | Carro Armato M13/40 IIª Serie | Carro Armato M13/40 IIIª Serie | Semovente M40 da 75/18 | Carro Armato Comando Semoventi M40 |
| Crew | 4 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 |
| Weight | 14 tonnes | 14 tonnes | 14 tonnes | 13.1 tonnes | 12.20 tonnes |
| Size (L-W-H) | 4.91 x 2.28 x 2.37 m | 4.91 x 2.28 x 2.37 m | 4.91 x 2.28 x 2.37 m | 4.91 x 2.28 x 1.85 m | 4.91 x 2.28 x 1.81 m |
| Engine | FIAT-SPA 8T diesel, 125 hp at 1,800 rpm | FIAT-SPA 8T diesel, 125 hp at 1,800 rpm | FIAT-SPA 8T diesel, 125 hp at 1,800 rpm | FIAT-SPA 8T diesel, 125 hp at 1,800 rpm | FIAT-SPA 8T diesel, 125 hp at 1,800 rpm |
| Maximum Speed | 31.8 km/h | 31.8 km/h | 31.8 km/h | 32 km/h | 32 km/h |
| Range | 200 km | 200 km | 200 km | 210 km | 220 km |
| Main Armament | Cannone da 47/32 Modello 1935 | Cannone da 47/32 Modello 1935 | Cannone da 47/32 Modello 1935 | Obice da 75/18 Modello 1935 | // |
| Ammunition | 104 rounds | 87 rounds | 87 rounds | 44 rounds | // |
| Secondary Armament | 4 Breda Modello 1938 | 4 Breda Modello 1938 | 4 Breda Modello 1938 | Breda Modello 1930 | 2 Breda Modello 1938 and a Breda Modello 1930 |
| Ammunition | 2,592 rounds | 2,592 rounds | 2,592 rounds | 600 rounds | 1,560 8 mm rounds 600 6.5 mm rounds |
Carro Armato M13/40 Centro Radio
The Carro Armato M13/40 Centro Radio (English: M13/40 Tank Radio Center) was a standard Carro Armato M13/40 medium tank equipped with a second radio station and used as a command tank.
This new radio was the powerful Apparato Ricetrasmittente RF2CA transceiver from Magneti Marelli, mounted on the right side of the fighting compartment. The Apparato Ricetrasmittente RF2CA operated in graphic and voice mode. Its production began in 1940 and had a maximum communication range of 28-30 km that diminished to 7-8 km when driving. It was used for communication among tank company commanders and with the regimental or divisional command, and in some cases, also with the army commanders. Thanks to this, the radio operator could send the radio messages of individual tank commanders to more senior command units. The number of machine gun rounds loaded on board decreased and another antenna was placed on the superstructure rear.
The production of this variant was really slow. In a list made in October 1941, only 10 Carri Armati M13/40 Centro Radio and another two on Carri Armati M14/41 chassis were listed as produced from 1940. Usually, these tanks did not take part in battles. Instead, they were as far behind the frontline as possible, hidden behind sand dunes or other obstacles.
Carro Armato Comando Semoventi M40
The Carri Armati Comando Semoventi M40 (English: Command Tank [for] Self-Propelled Gun M40) or Carro Comando M40 were Carri Armati M13/40 without their turret. A 4-door hatch with anti-aircraft support was mounted on the turret ring. The two Breda medium machine guns in the hull were left for self-defense, while a Breda Modello 1930 light machine gun was stored inside for anti-aircraft fire. The crew consisted of four: driver, commander, machine gunner, and radio operator.
The Carri Armati Comando Semoventi M40 were equipped with the Apparato Ricetrasmittente RF1CA and with the Apparato Ricetrasmittente RF2CA transceiver from Magneti Marelli, mounted on the right side of the fighting compartment. Its stereoscopic rangefinder was placed inside the fighting compartment and mounted on the tank’s roof when used. The vehicle was produced exclusively to command self-propelled guns units.
Carro Armato M13/40 Carro Osservatorio
The M13/40 Carro Osservatorio (English: M13/40 Observation Tank) was a standard Carro Armato M13/40 chassis with an enlarged turret equipped with a stereoscopic rangefinder, with the optical prisms on the sides.
The 1:1 scale wooden mock-up of the turret of the Carro Osservazione was not equipped with the dummy barrel of the Cannone da 47/32 Modello 1935, but to save time and a tank’s chassis, it was mounted on the Carro Armato M13/40’s prototype. This is easily recognizable due the fact that the prototype’s hull remained unchanged and with the same two-tone camouflage, while the turret remained in the original wood color.
The vehicle probably attracted the attention of the Regio Esercito’s High Command. In fact, some time later, a prototype of the M13/40 Carro Osservatorio was produced on the chassis of a Carro Armato M13/40 IIIª Serie. It had a 47 mm dummy gun and a machine gun casemate (identical to the one in the hull) for a single Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938. It was as similar to a standard Carro Armato M13/40 as possible to prevent it from drawing the enemy’s attention to itself. It was meant as the tank of the tank regiment’s commander, but the prototype was abandoned after testing.
Semovente M40 da 75/18
The Semovente M40 da 75/18 was the self-propelled gun version of the Carro Armato M13/40 inspired by the German StuG III. It mounted a short-barreled 75 mm gun in a fixed superstructure on top of the Carro Armato M13/40’s chassis.
The Semovente M40 da 75/18 weighed 13.1 tonnes, retained the original 125 hp FIAT-SPA 8T Modello 40 diesel engine from the Carro Armato M13/40, and a frontal superstructure with a maximum armor thickness of 50 mm and 25 mm on the sides. Its maximum speed on road was 32 km/h and the range was 210 km.
Sixty vehicles were produced before it was substituted on the production lines by the improved variant, the Semovente M41 da 75/18, based on the chassis of the more modern Carro Armato M14/41 medium tank.
Carro Armato M14/41
Due to the underwhelming performance of the diesel engine of the Carro Armato M13/40, Ansaldo improved the FIAT-SPA 8T Modello 40, increasing the bore diameter and stroke. This cheap upgrade increased the maximum output of the engine from 125 hp to 145 hp.
In total, 695 or 752 Carri Armati M14/41 were produced from 1941 until late 1942, all delivered to the Regio Esercito before the armistice with the Allied forces. Despite the slightly more powerful engine, the new vehicle did not solve any of the problems encountered by the Italians with the M13/40.
Carro Armato M13/40 ‘Matilda Mark II’
Probably in order to train the tank crews, at some point during the North African campaign, the Centro Studi della Motorizzazione created a Matilda Mark II wooden silhouette that was mounted on a Carri Armati M13/40. Not much is known about this strange conversion, even if it was probably used to train the crews to fight against British tanks. It was also used for propaganda purposes in the war film Bengasi, which aired in Italian cinemas in summer 1942.
Carro Armato M13/40 Workshop Vehicle
Another interesting vehicle was what is commonly called the Carro Armato M13/40 ‘Carro Ricambi’ (English: Spare parts tank), of which two were produced in late 1941. They were Carri Armati M13/40 IIª or IIIª Serie, probably damaged during a battle. They were converted into a support vehicle by the Libyan workshops of the 12° Autoraggruppamento AS situated in the village of Giovanni Berta, near the city of El Gubba in north-east Libya. Their task was to follow the armored unit with spare parts, such as radiators, pumps, towing cables and tools to repair and tow damaged tanks. They had a crew of three, a driver and two mechanics.
The turret was removed and it had a higher and angled superstructure mounted on top of the original superstructure. It was armed with the common twin Mitragliatrici Medie Breda Modello 1938 machine guns in the hull for close defense.
Carro Armato M13/40 Armored Ambulance
In 1942, the 12° Autoraggruppamento AS also produced an armored ambulance on a Carro Armato M13/40 but the exact series is unknown. It could carry a driver, a medic, and a stretcher bearer, plus two or three wounded soldiers on a pair of stretchers or seats in the free space in the crew compartment. Nothing is known about how it operated.
Camouflage and Markings
As on all Italian vehicles of the Second World War, the standard camouflage applied on Carri Armati M13/40 in factories was the Kaki Sahariano (Eng: Light Saharan Khaki) for operations in the North African theater of operations.
The prototypes used an uncommon, pre-war camouflage consisting of a green-gray color as a base with reddish-brown lines. It seems this was the only Carro Armato M13/40 that received this two-tone camouflage.
As for each Italian vehicle of the era, the Carro Armato M13/40 was equipped with a Regio Esercito bronze or aluminum rounded plate. It was applied on vehicles from 1936 until August 1943 and it meant that the vehicle was owned by the Italian Regio Esercito.
On the Carro Armato M13/40 and the other medium tanks of the same series, this plate was placed on the left side, between the left frontal inspection hatch and the frontal superstructure’s armored plate. The rounded plates were removed from the tanks after the Italian Armistice of 8th September 1943 by the Italian Fascist soldiers still loyal to Benito Mussolini and his ideology.
Another plate bolted on all the vehicles on the armor was the license plate positioned on the rear of the engine compartment. Subsequently, the license plate number was then painted on the front too.
The first batches of Carri Armati M13/40 and some Carri Armati M13/40 IIª Serie had a green-gray monochrome camouflage. In some cases, the crews operating in North Africa covered it with a Khaki camouflage if they had enough paint. Some batches of Carri Armati M13/40 with this type of camouflage scheme were also employed in the Balkans, where this camouflage scheme was adequate. Luckier crews who operated with a tank for a long period of time often had the Saharan khaki layer discolored from the abrasive desert sand. In some cases, the previous green-gray camouflage remained underneath the desert camouflage.
The rest of the Carri Armati M13/40 used in North Africa and Italy had the standard khaki camouflage pattern, sometimes with brown or green spots or with the addition of foliage to better camouflage them from potential aerial attacks.
The Carri Armati M13/40’s markings were officially created on 29th March 1938 through Circolare N° 4400 (English: Circular Number 4,400). They consisted of an Arabic numeral painted above a rectangle, indicating the number of the vehicle within the platoon. Under that was a 20 cm × 12 cm rectangle which varied in color depending on the company:
- Red for the 1ª Compagnia
- Blue for the 2ª Compagnia
- Yellow for the 3ª Compagnia
Black was used for the command platoon of the battalion. The command tanks of the two company-sized battalions had the rectangle divided in two and painted half in red, to indicate the 1ª Compagnia, and half in blue, to indicate the 2ª Compagnia. The three company-sized battalion commander’s tanks had their rectangles divided in three and painted ⅓ in red, to indicate the 1ª Compagnia, ⅓ in blue to indicate the 2ª Compagnia, and ⅓ in yellow to indicate the 3ª Compagnia. In some cases, in the command platoon tanks, the black rectangle had ‘CC’ written in white, meaning Carro Comando.
White vertical lines (dimensions: 2 cm length and 12 cm height) were then painted inside the rectangle to indicate the platoon to which the vehicle belonged. One white stripe for the 1° Plotone, two white stripes for the 2° Plotone, and so on.
Even more rarely, identification symbols were also painted on the back of the engine compartment.
For the Reggimento Comando (English: Command Regiment), a 4ª Compagnia Carri was introduced as only a command unit. Almost always, the tanks equipped with radios were deployed to this company. In order to be clearly distinguishable from the other tanks, it had the rectangle of the same dimension, but painted white with black bands instead of the battalion command’s platoon (that had the rectangle in black) or the other platoon’s bands that were painted white.
For aerial identification, in 1940, a giant white cross was painted on the turret’s roof. This was an uncommon feature for the Carri Armati M13/40 which, with their characteristic shape, were hard to misidentify.
In 1941, the Italian Regio Esercito decided to switch from the older white cross to a white circle with a diameter of 63 or 70 cm. This was probably also a political decision. The white Croce di Savoia (English: Savoia’s Cross) represented the Savoia Royal Family, and Fascist politicians did not like this monarchic symbol on their tanks.
The circles were painted at the Ansaldo factory, probably with Duco’s white paint. The circles were painted on the turret’s roof or on the engine deck. Some were also probably painted by the crews on their already delivered tanks. Some Carri Armati M13/40 of the VII Battaglione Carri M13/40 had this circle painted on the engine compartment, near the registration plate, making it useless for aerial recognition.
Many Italian vehicles received new markings painted in the field by the crews. They had Italian mottos or phrases, such as ‘Mia Cara Vado e Torno’ (My dear I go and return). It was a common phrase which Italian soldiers write on their vehicles or personal equipment, sometimes dedicated to relatives or loved ones. Other phrases were ‘A Colpo Sicuro’ (Sure Shot) or ‘Avanti ad ogni Costo’ (Ahead at Any Cost)
The Carri Armati M13/40 that survived the war and were used by the Italian Esercito Italiano were probably all repainted in Olive Drab, like US Army armored vehicles. This was intended to comply with the other Allied force armies and also because, after the war, thousands of US Army paint barrels remained in Italian territory.
The only known police post-war Carro Armato M13/40, registration plate ‘Polizia 8814’, received a peculiar camouflage scheme. The Milanese vehicles were painted like all the Italian police vehicles after the war, in Amaranth Red, a reddish-rose shade.
Surviving Vehicles
A total of three Carro Armato M13/40 IIIª Serie are currently preserved, two in North America and one in Egypt, none of which are in running condition.
A Carro Armato M13/40 with the license plate ‘Regio Esercito 3521’ was for many years exhibited exposed to the elements at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, in Maryland (USA).
On 1st March 2022, the US Army Armor & Cavalry Collection of Columbus, Georgia, announced in a Facebook post that 14 tanks from the Aberdeen Proving Ground would be received for restoration. The first of which, the Carro Armato M13/40, had arrived the day before. The restoration work started on 10th March 2022, when the tank was transferred to the museum’s workshop.
Between March and June 2022, the museum posted many photos of the tank under restoration. On 14th June 2022, the official US Army Armor & Cavalry Collection profile posted some photos of this vehicle totally restored with the coat of arms of the LI Battaglione Carri M13/40. The end of the restoration was announced on social media on 13th June 2022. The restoration is really accurate, although the interiors are not restored. It will probably remain a static vehicle.
A second Carro Armato M13/40 is exhibited at the Canadian War Museum in Ontario. It has been kept indoors and as a result is in a decent condition. It lacks the driver’s port on the front, and most importantly, also the license plate, which makes it impossible to identify. On this tank, the spare wheel and the jack support were mounted in front instead of on the rear of the tank. It is painted in a particular shade of dark green that was never used on the Carri Armati M13/40 of the Regio Esercito.
The third and last Carro Armato M13/40 that seems to have survived the war is the ‘Regio Esercito 3700’ of the XI Battaglione Carri M13/40.
After the war, Italian veteran Colonel Paolo Caccia Dominioni, Count of Sillavengo, former commander of the XXXI Battaglione Guastatori d’Africa (English: 31st African Sapper’s Battalion) and Partisan leader started a long but important mission. In 12 years, with other volunteers, he searched, recovered, and recognized the bodies of soldiers of each nation who fell and remained unburied in the Egyptian Western Sahara. On 1st July 1948, Caccia Dominioni and his squad found over the Tell el Sheikh Fadl Abu Sharsir hill the remains of the Carro Armato M with the license plate ‘Regio Esercito 3700’ of the XI Battaglione Carri M13/40. It was on kilometer 119 of the Alexandria Road.
After the recovery, the Carro Armato M13/40 was placed on a concrete pedestal base. It became the monument and the guardian for the over 5,000 graves of Italian soldiers that are buried in the cemetery near Quota 33.
An undated bad quality image shows the future Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein and some friends dressed in civilian clothes over the Carro Armato M13/40. The young Saddam Hussein could have visited the cemetery during his period studying in Egypt between 1960 to 1963. In the early 2000s, the monument received some modifications.
Conclusion
Considering the weakness of the Carro Armato M13/40 and its upgraded models, the M14/41 and M15/42, in the opinion of many enthusiasts, had the programmed Carro Armato P40 or another heavier tank entered in service in 1940-1941, it would have improved the capabilities of Italian armored divisions. Unfortunately, apart from the better performances of the main gun, this hypothesis is largely unfounded. Simply put, the Italian Regio Esercito could not adopt vehicles heavier than about 15 tonnes in 1941 due the logistic problems caused by weight and size.
The Carro Armato M13/40 was, for the Regio Esercito, the perfect tank in the late 1930s to 1940. It had a weight of 14 tonnes that permitted it to easily operate on the many Italian mountain roads in which many Allied and Axis tanks had problems during the Italian campaign. Its small dimensions and weight permitted it to be loaded on standard Italian civilian and military flatbed wagons with a payload capacity of 20 tonnes. The limited size and weight guaranteed an easy and quick transportation on railways when air attacks permitted it for the duration of the war. This feature also permitted the Germans, after the Armistice, to deploy the Italian medium tank everywhere, from Italy to Germany.
A heavier and bigger tank, such as the Carro Armato P40, needed a heavier flatbed wagon to withstand its 26 tonnes of weight. The development of the new wagon only began late in the war and was ready in 1943.
The smaller dimensions of the Carri Armati M permitted several to be loaded in their cargo bays of ships, increasing the number transported on each Mediterranean Sea crossing. The Carro Armato P40 was about a meter longer and 60 cm wider than the Carro Armato M13/40. The weight of only 14 tonnes was also an advantage because the tanks could be unloaded by the merchant ship’s cranes, speeding up the unloading operations at the Libyan harbors.
If the Italians had a heavier vehicle than the Carro Armato M13/40 in 1940, it would have suffered more problems due to logistics and would most likely have operated worse than the questionable Carro Armato M13/40’s service.
The Carro Armato M13/40 was the most produced medium tank in service with the Regio Esercito during the Second World War. It was a vehicle with questionable features. When it was presented by Ansaldo, it could be compared favorably with the British, French, Czechoslovak, and Polish tanks with regards to top speed, armor, and firepower.
During the first stages of the war, it was roughly comparable with the British tanks present in North Africa, but the lack of spare parts, lack of transportation, lack of recovery vehicles, and poorly trained crews all affected the quality of the vehicle, causing many losses in January 1941. These losses could not be substituted.
The Italian foundries never managed to produce adequate quantities of good quality ballistic armor and the M13/40s suffered for all of the early-to-mid North African Campaign from serious protection failings.
During the war, its 1930s-style design started to show its weaknesses, making the tank obsolete. The Allied also started to introduce more modern medium tanks (and US-built ones as well) with welded and thicker armor, more powerful main guns, and usually faster. These easily outmatched the Carri Armati M13/40 tanks.
The Carro Armato M13/40 was grossly outmatched by 1942 and, despite the heroism and sacrifice of many of its crews in the North African Campaign against superior British and US tanks, it has gained an unfair reputation.
The Carro Armato M13/40 was the result of an Italian Regio Esercito request made during the late 1930s, but by the early 1940s, it was completely overtaken by new developments and was now obsolete. The Italian High Command totally ignored the obsolescence of its medium tanks, considering them capable of countering the British tanks.
The Italian industry could develop medium tanks with better protection and armament, but the Italian High Command simply ignored the possibility of upgrading its medium tanks, forcing the Italian tank crews to fight unequal battles with courage instead of confronting opposing tanks with vehicles capable of defeating them.
In Italy, there is a phrase that historians, writers, and tank enthusiasts often use and that encompasses the situation of the Italian Army in North Africa: “Lacked luck, not valor”. This referred to the Italian crews that, even when outnumbered and outmatched by Allied tanks, bravely risked their lives with obsolete tanks.
Carro Armato M13/40 Specification |
|
|---|---|
| Size (L-W-H) | 4.915 x 2.280 x 2.370 m |
| Weight, battle ready | 14 tonnes |
| Crew | 4 (driver, machine gunner, gunner/commander and loader) |
| Engine | FIAT-SPA 8T Modello 1940 diesel, 8-cylinder, 11,140 cm³ 125 hp at 1’800 rpm |
| Speed | 30 km/h |
| Range | 210 km |
| Armament | one Cannone da 47/32 Modello 1935 with 87 rounds, four 8 mm Mitragliatrici Medie Breda Modello 1938 medium machine guns with 2,592 rounds |
| Armor | Hull: 30 mm front, 25 mm sides and rear. Turret: 30 mm front, 25 mm sides and rear. |
| Production | 710 tanks |
Thanks
Special thanks go to Daniele Notaro and Marko Pantelić and all the Tank Encyclopedia team for their help in finding information on other sources not owned by the author. Thanks to Johannes Dorn for his colorizations of some Carri Armati M13/40 images. Thanks also to the Associazione Museo della Melara through which the author was able to collect images and information regarding the Carro Armato M13/40 and its developments that will also help in future articles.
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