Categories
Has Own Video WW2 Soviet Prototypes

Object 217, PPG

Soviet Union (1940)
Mobile Machine Gun Nest – 1 Prototype Built

The Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940, more commonly known in the West as the ‘Winter War’, saw many one-off vehicles being designed to help the Soviet Red Army overcome the determined Finnish defenses. Many of these never made it to the front to be tested under fire.

One example of such a unique design was the Object 217, also known as the Podvizhnoye Pulemyotnoye Gnezdo or mobile machine-gun nest.

Background

As the Soviet Red Army set about reorganizing itself in January 1940 due to its ineffectiveness in the opening month of the conflict, many meetings were held to discuss how best to tackle the various obstacles encountered in Finland.

One complaint was the lack of tank/infantry coordination. More often than not, the Soviet tanks would charge ahead and smash through the Finnish lines. The Finns used this to their advantage by allowing the tanks to pass and then reoccupying their positions soon after and shooting at the following infantry. To help counter this, several designs for infantry shields and tank-drawn armored sleds were produced by the various factories of Leningrad (modern-day St. Petersburg). These allowed for sections of infantry to be towed in relative safety to the Finnish lines in order to secure them before the Finns returned.

Clad in snow-suits and well prepared for the harsh climate a Finnish light machine gun position firing upon advancing Soviet troops at Kollaa. Source:SA-Kuva

However, this was not always successful. Once the Finns understood the method of delivery, they used their valuable anti-tank guns to target the towing tanks, or they adapted their defensive positions in order to provide incoming fire as quickly as possible.

Another solution

Another idea was to design a machine-gun-armed tankette that could support advancing infantry. The already existing T-27 was too tall, too weakly armored, and performed too poorly in the snow. As the fighting was in full swing, a quick, cheap design was needed. The task of designing such a vehicle was given to Special Design Bureau No. 2 of the Leningrad Plant of Experimental Engineering No. 185, also known as the Kirov Plant, under the leadership of Josef Yakovlevich Kotin. Kotin created a team under Leading Engineer L. E. Sychev and given the project designation of ‘Object 217’. It was soon called Podvizhnoye pulemyotnoye gnezdo or mobile machine-gun nest by the team.

The finished Object 217 prototype. Source:- https://i.pinimg.com/

The design team quickly produced technical drawings based around a four-speed motorcycle engine with simple suspension. By the beginning of March, a prototype was ready and sent for factory testing. Another four prototypes were also being constructed for trials. The assessors were initially impressed with the vehicle as it fulfilled all the requirements laid out in the request. Even so, the design had numerous drawbacks that called into question its usefulness.

The two Degtyaryov DT machine guns had limited arcs of fire, the crew positions caused discomfort and fatigue within short periods of time, and the armor was seen as too weak when coupled with the limited mobility. However, none of these deficiencies was the reason for not adopting the machine. On 13th March 1940, the Winter War came to a close and there was no longer a need for such a niche vehicle. As a result, the Armored Directorate of the Red Army canceled the project. All the prototypes were scrapped.

Specifications

Hull

The Object 217 used a single-piece of rolled armored steel to form the main body of the vehicle. To this were welded and riveted the side and rear armor. The designers wanted to minimize the silhouette. To do this, they created an oddly laid out fighting compartment. The two crew members sat with the two access hatches on top of the vehicle open during transportation, but when in combat they would adopt a prone position, lying face down inside. At its maximum height, the Object 217 measured only 55 cm. To allow the crew to see, they were each provided with simple periscope devices that protruded from the roof and covered in an armored box. However, this meant that the two crew members had no visibility to their sides and rear.

The commander was seated on the right side, with the driver on the left side of the vehicle.

A headlight was present on the right-hand side, while a smaller rear light was also present on the left-hand side.

A model of Object 217, showing the layout of the hull. The added side vision slit is not seen in the photo of the real vehicle. Source: https://topwar.ru/

Engine and Transmission

To keep the costs down, a PMZ motorcycle 16 horsepower two-stroke, 2-cylinder, air-cooled petrol engine was used for this vehicle. This allowed for limited self-propulsion which was not an issue, as the deployment of the vehicle involved being towed behind a T-26 until it reached the Finnish defenses and then unhooking itself. The transmission was a three-speed gearbox seated next to the engine. A simple friction clutch system controlled by a set of levers was used to control the movement of the vehicle. The factory tests gave a top road speed of 18.5 km/h and a cross country speed of 7 km/h. Due to the large size of the engine in comparison to the internal space available, it was necessary to create an armored box at the rear of the vehicle with several access panels.

The trials also showed that the Object 217 was capable of climbing 30-35 degree inclines and could clear trenches 1 meter wide. It could also wade through streams and puddles so long as they did not exceed half a meter in depth. How this would have translated to the Karelian Isthmus though is not known. The relatively low ground pressure was ideal for getting across the snow but the varied terrain, especially at the specially selected areas of the Mannerheim Line, would probably be taxing on the vehicle.

The same model, clearly showing the engine box. Source: https://topwar.ru/

Running gear

The Object 217 was given a very simple running gear. This consisted of four large cast spoked road wheels which were fixed to rigid axles. To provide power, a drive wheel, about half the size of the road wheels, was installed at the rear. The front road wheels could also turn like the wheels on a car, bending the track in order to allow the vehicle to steer, in a similar style to the later Light Tank Mk VII Tetrarch. To lower the amount of dust and snow thrown up by the tracks, the front and rear had protruding fenders.

The lack of suspension was one of the biggest drawbacks to the design. It put a considerable strain upon the crew, especially under combat conditions that required them to lie down. After only a short while, the assessors reported fatigue which would only make the combat effectiveness of the vehicle worse.

Armor Protection

For the type of vehicle and time, the Object 217 boasted an acceptable armor layout. The front consisted of a rolled single piece of armored plate measuring 20 mm in thickness. The sides were 10 mm thick rolled single pieces that were mainly welded upon the body, with a few rivets in the rear of the vehicle to help strengthen it. The roof and underside were 8 mm thick rolled armored plates. The advanced use of single rolled pieces of armored plate coupled with a heavy reliance on welding gave it a great amount of protection against small arms and shell fragments.

The assessors did express concern about the armor’s ability to withstand anti-tank gunfire or near hits by artillery but this was less about the armor and more about how the limited mobility meant an overreliance upon the armor for protection.

An original document showing two views of the Object 217 vehicle. The upper photograph is already known, but the lower one shows the hatches open, giving information about the upper part of the vehicles. Source: Radikal.ru

Armament

The original directive stipulated that the vehicle had to be armed with a machine gun. This was due to its main task being to keep the Finnish defenders suppressed. The design team added two Degtyaryov DT machine guns in ball mounts which would be aimed using the attached sights. These allowed for 20 degrees of travel in all directions, but this was limited more due to ergonomics within the hull rather than the installations themselves. The sides of the hull contained racks for 25 pan-type magazines, giving a total ammunition amount of 1,575 rounds per gun. In order to allow the crew to maintain operation without the need to clear spent shell casings, each gun mount had a specially designed bag that connected to the side ejection port.

Analysis of possible use

It is not sure how Object 217 would be deployed but some speculations can be made based upon the tactics used by the Soviets during the second offensive phase of the Winter War.

Possibly, after a heavy artillery bombardment upon a section of the Finnish line, a squadron of 12 T-26s would set off, 2 towing Object 217s and 4 towing Sokolov sleds (each carrying 5 Soviet soldiers). As the tanks neared the line, they detached the tow cables and the soldiers advanced to the trenches. The Object 217s would take positions on the flanks, suppressing the Finnish defenders. With these types of tactics, which were deployed during the second offensive phase, but with T-26s taking the role that the Object 217s would have played, it would allow for more tanks to be pushed into the breakthrough and still have the Infantry secure the position. The vehicles could then use their own power to cross the trenches and be ready for any Finnish counterattack.

Conclusion

The Object 217 was a unique vehicle designed for a unique situation. As the Soviet advance stalled by the indefatigable Finnish defense in December 1939, the Soviet Red Army needed any solution to breakthrough. The solution of an armored machine gun position attached to the infantry was a quick fix as it negated a lengthy rework of the current Soviet tactics. The final vehicle produced, however, was inherently flawed as a design. With such extremely limited visibility and a very uncomfortable fighting position for the crew its combat potential was small. The crew would become rapidly tired and the mobile and adaptable Finns would no doubt have quickly learned of its serious limitation and come up with tactics to exploit its weaknesses using their mobility to get around it. With the end of the Winter War the serious deficiencies of the design were never shown by actual combat but the fact that this design was not repeated again is perhaps the strongest indication that this unique vehicle was not an effective solution to breaching well prepared enemy defences. To do that would rely on a far better use of coordinated operations and flexible vehicles supported by artillery – something the Soviets repeatedly failed to manage during the Winter War.

The very small Object 217 mobile machine gun nest was a very peculiar vehicle, very low, with the engine in a small box at the rear. Illustration by Yuvnashva Sharma, funded by our Patreon campaign.

Sources

Komolyets, Maxim. Tanks in the Winter War: 1939 – 1940 (Operations: Scandinavia 1939) (Leandoer and Ekholm (April 14, 2009))
https://warspot.ru/2973-proekt-217-mobilnaya-ambrazura
https://topwar.ru/105675-podvizhnoe-pulemetnoe-gnezdo-tanketka-obekt-217.html

Categories
WW2 Soviet Prototypes

Dyrenkovs Armored Tractors (D-10, D-11, D-14)

Soviet Union (1931)
Armored Tractors – 1 Prototype of Each Built

At the beginning of the 1930s in the USSR, several global interrelated processes were going on. These parallel processes had a severe impact on military effort and procurement.
Firstly, there was a need to re-equip and reform the army, in particular, the armored forces. The armored forces of the USSR mainly consisted of outdated tanks and armored cars, such as the British Mark V and Medium Mark A Whippet tanks or Garford-Putilov armored cars captured during the Civil War, and T-18 (MS-1, Maly Soprovozhdenya) tanks. These vehicles no longer met the needs of the tank units, The Red Army wanted a tank with a more powerful engine, better speed, maneuverability, ergonomics, and installed radios.
Secondly, the country’s leadership realized a serious setback in the industrial field. On July 15, 1929, the program of mechanization and motorization of the Red Army for the next 5 years was approved. By 1933, it was planned to have 3,500 active tanks in the army and another 2,000 in the mobilization reserve. At the same time, the RVS (Revolutsionniy Voenniy Sovet – Revolutionary Military Council, the supreme military authority of the Soviet Union) adopted a new system of auto-armor-tank-tractor armament, which was based on the modern requirements of combat and tactics.
When trying to implement the adopted plans for the development and production of new weapons and military equipment, the industry faced “enormous difficulties.”
Thirdly, both the production and the army suffered from a shortage of qualified personnel. New cadres (specially trained professionals) were not yet ready and did not have enough experience, and a significant part of the old and experienced specialists, for political reasons, were “cut off” from military service and leadership positions.
There were many different causes for rejecting specialists or young recruits “for reasons of political and moral inferiority”, such as affiliation to the “wrong ”class (bourgeoisie, clergy etc.) or professional backgrounds — service in the White Army or administration of the Russian Empire.
The military leadership, however, followed the global trends in the field of armaments and tactics and tried to keep up with them. At this time, new military theories were actively developed.
One of these theories was developed by the Soviet military theoretician and Marshal of the Soviet Union Mikhail Nikolayevich Tukhachevsky. According to that theory, simple and cheap armored tractors could be used as tanks of the 2nd and 3rd echelons (troops and armor of the 2nd and 3rd lines in a formation), even at the expense of reducing important combat characteristics.

“… we need to strive to have military tanks in numbers up to about one-third of the total, to perform special tasks, fight against anti-tank artillery, etc. The remaining tanks, usually advancing in the 2nd and 3rd echelons, can have somewhat lower speed, larger size, etc. And this means that such a tank can be an armored tractor, just as we have armored cars, trains and railcars, which will allow us to field armored tractors in huge masses.”

The Red Army required a large number of inexpensive, easy to manufacture and operate combat vehicles. The latter was especially important due to the acute personnel shortage – Soviet military theorists understood that the skills of the available manpower were not sufficient in the early 30s, and in the event of a major war, they would not have time to train qualified soldiers to man complex military equipment.
The Experimental Design Office of the Department of Mechanization and Motorization of the RKKA (UMM RKKA – Department of Mechanization and Motorization, Upravlenie Mekhanizacii I Motorizacii) was instructed to develop a “tractor tank”, like the American dual-purpose machine, the six-ton tractor Disston.
Most likely, the information about the Disston tanks was obtained from mass-media or during the so-called “Khalepsky Commission” visit to the USA. At that time, Nikolai Ivanovich Dyrenkov, a talented and extremely ambitious self-taught engineer, headed the Department of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army. Under his leadership, at the end of 1930, the development of so-called “surrogate tanks,” an infantry transporter and a number of other vehicles, began.

Development

The “Kommunar” tractor, a licensed version of the German tractor Hanomag WD50, was taken as the basis for the D-10 and D-14, and the American Caterpillar-60 tractor was taken as the basis for D-11.
The production of “Caterpillar-60” was planned to start in Chelyabinsk (a city east of the Ural Mountains, which became a very important transport hub and industrial center during 1930s). “Kommunars” were already in production in Kharkov.
The Department of Mechanization and Motorization of the Red Army was charged with building prototypes of so-called “surrogate tanks”: D-10, D-11, APC D-14 (“desantniy tank”). In Russian, the word “desant” is often used for troops which ride into the battle on top or inside the armored vehicles. Thus – “desantniy tank”. The same word is used for airborne troops – “vozdushno desantniye voyska”) and the D-15 “chemical tank”. All vehicles were created in the Moscow MOZEREZ plant (Moscow Railway Repair Plant, Moskovsky Zheleznodorozhny Remontny Zavod). By February 1931, they were ready.

Design

The design of all three vehicles was approximately the same: an engine was located in the front and, behind it, in the middle and aft part of the hull, there was a crew compartment, combined with a fighting compartment or compartment for troops. A fuel tank was also at the back.
On the roof of the fighting compartment there was a fixed commander’s cupola with viewing slots. Neither of the three vehicles had a rotating turret.

Armament

The D-10 and D-11 surrogate tanks were equipped with a 76.2 mm cannon on a pedestal mount as a primary weapon and two 7.62mm DT (Degtyaryov Tankovy) machine guns in the front and aft armor plates, as an auxiliary armament. Two more spare DT machine guns were stowed in the fighting compartment. There were two ball mounts for additional machine guns on each side armor plate. Worth noting is that the main gun mount was placed in the aft of the tank. In fact, this solution was the same as that of the Garford Putilov armored vehicles.
In the case of the Garford-Putilov, this decision was reasonable because the armored car had two driver positions and often went into battle ‘backwards’, but it was a significant flaw for the armored tractor, since it has to be turned around to fire the main gun.
According to some records, the ammunition did not fit into the tank and it was supposed to be carried on a towed trailer, but there is no information about the trailer itself. The D-14 APC was armed with two DT machine guns – one in the bow and one in the aft ball mounts.

Crew

The D-10 and D-11 tanks had a crew of 3 men – commander, driver, and gunner. D-14 APC had a crew of 2 men – driver and commander.
It is difficult to imagine how the engineers behind the design saw the distribution of crew duties between just two people. It can be assumed that firing was possible only after the vehicle stopped, so the driver or commander could take gunner positions.

Armored Hull

All three vehicles had riveted hulls made of rolled armor plates. The D-14 had three doors on each side of the hull used for the entrance and exit of the crew and dismounts. The D-10 had one door on each side; on the left side, the door was closer to the stern, on the right, to the aft. The D-11 had one door in the middle of each side.
A distinctive feature of all three armored vehicles was a massive armored engine in the front, which blocked visibility for the driver and made it difficult to fire a machine gun.

Engine

Propulsion was provided by a water-cooled four-cylinder, four-stroke engine with a carburetor and a vertical arrangement of cylinders. Kommunar 9GU and Kommunar 9EU had a 75 hp (55 kW) 4-cylinder petrol engine, and Caterpillar-60 had a 60 hp (45 kW) 4-cylinder gasoline engine.

Chassis and Suspension

All 3 vehicles used reinforced tractor chassis’ used as a basis with minimal changes. Transmissions were the same as on the original tractors. The D-10 and D-14 had a spring suspension with two springs for each bogie. The D-11 had a semi-rigid suspension.

Trials and Results

In 1931, all three vehicles were tested at the NIABT Test Site (Nauchno Ispytatelny Avtobronetankovy Poligon, Scientific armored vehicle proving ground in Kubinka, also NIABP). Most likely, the tests of all three vehicles (D-10, D-11 and D-14) were conducted in May-June 1931. This fact is confirmed by the document with the preliminary test results dated July 1931.
On July 18, 1931, the Scientific-Technical Committee of the UMM RKKA considered a report on the testing of three vehicles: a “Kommunar 9GU” armored tractor (D-10 tank), a “Kommunar 9EU” armored tractor-infantry carrier (D-14 APC) and an armored tractor “Caterpillar 60” (D-11 tank).

D-10 Tank

The total weight of the tank exceeded by 1.5 tonnes the original projection. As a result, the average speed and mobility decreased. Instead of the estimated speed of 7-8.5 km/h on roads and 5-6 km/h off-road, the tractor-tank showed 6-6.2 km/h on roads and only 3.2 km/h off-road. When the outside air temperature was above 15 °C and the radiator was closed, the water boiled after 1-1.5 hours of the engine being in use.
Obstacle overcoming tests were unsatisfactory. The tractor-tank coped with a 1.25 m wide and 1 m deep trench dug in sandy soil, which was no worse than MS-1 tank. But the vehicle did not cope with a 1.5 m wide trench. D-10 could cross, tear or crush barbed wire barriers only if the stakes did not fall between the tracks, because the bottom of the tank was not protected by armor.
The report also mentioned the fact that the engine could not be started from inside the tank and the absence of a vacuum apparatus for supplying fuel, both considered to be further negative aspects of the armored tractor. The D-10 had a ‘gravity fuel feed’, so if the tank got in an unfavorable position, for example, when crossing the trench, the fuel supply to the engine would be interrupted and the armored tractor would stop. It should be noted that the problem was old, and known since the days of the British Mark I Tank.
The following two problems were distinctive for most Soviet armored vehicles of the 1930s-40s. First, the tests showed difficulties with visibility due to the inconvenient location of the viewing slits. This applied, in particular, to the driver’s position. Secondly, it was noted that there was a lack of ventilation in the crew compartment.

Front view of a D-10 with the D-11 in the background. Source: RGVA

Right side view of the D-10. Source: Domestic armored vehicles. XX century

Left side of the D-10. Source: Domestic armored vehicles. XX century

D-14 Troop Carrier

The weight of the tank, as in the case of the D-10, was exceeded, this time by 2 tonnes. Due to the increased length of the hull, the load on the rear bogies was also increased; as a result, these bogies collapsed during the tests. Problems with the visibility and fuel supply were similar to those of the D-10.
There was also a problem with ventilation, although, in the case of an infantry carrier, it was more acute. According to the designer’s idea, the transporter was supposed to fit 18 riflemen (dismounts) with weapons, plus the crew, since the compartments for crew and dismounts were combined.
Poor ventilation made the conditions inside the APC such that after a few hours of being inside the vehicle, the soldiers and crew would be unable to perform their duties due to heat, cramped space and noise.
The engineer who designed the D-14 placed the doors for entering and exiting the armored tractor on the sides of the hull, with 3 on each side. The doors opened backward in relation to the nose of the vehicle. There were no hatches or doors in the stern. This decision made exiting the vehicle quite dangerous, as soldiers could not hide behind either the doors or the hull of the APC and would be exposed to enemy fire.
Subsequently, the number of troops carried decreased. Later Soviet experimental armored personnel carriers were designed for 14 (TR-1) and 15 riflemen (TR-4). For comparison, the crew of the French Lorraine 38L consisted of 12; driver, commander and 10 infantrymen – four in the troop compartment and another 6 in the armored trailer. It is noteworthy that the exit of the troops through the side hatches or doors returned to the Soviet APCs in the 60-70s, namely the BTR-60P and BTR-70.

Front view of the D-14. Source: Domestic armored vehicles. XX century

D-14 Prototype. Side doors and engine starting handle are clearly visible. Source: RGVA

Rear view of the D-14. Source: Domestic armored vehicles. XX century


Illustration of the D-10 Tank (armored tractor) based on the “Kommunar 9GU” tractor.


Illustration of the D-11 Tank (armored tractor) based on the “Caterpillar 60” tractor.


Illustration of the D-14 Troop Carrier (armored tractor) based on the “Kommunar 9EU” tractor.

These illustrations were produced by Andrei ‘Octo10’ Kirushkin, funded by our Patreon Campaign


D-11 Tank

As in the case with the D-10 and D-14, the weight of the vehicle was exceeded by 2.7 tonnes with similar consequences. The speed dropped to 4.7 km/h on roads and 3.9 km/h off-road. In addition to the familiar problems of D-10 and D-14 with fuel supply and engine overheating, the D-11 had its own unique ones.
According to test engineers, the armored hull was attached to the chassis extremely poorly. Firstly, the hull blocked access to the most important parts of the tractor, such as rear axle and gearbox. Secondly, during the tests, the armored hull of the tank tore off the bolts that attached it to the tractor and fell on the tracks.
Additional problems were reported: poor ventilation – during movement, “dust filled the crew compartment”. When trying to cross a trench, the tractor-tank “sticks the nose into the ground”.
It is not known whether this was a distinctive feature of this particular machine (which was the one based on the Caterpillar 60), or if it was also the case on the machines based on the “Kommunars”. In addition, D-11 has a reduced off-road capability in comparison with D-10 and D-14, because of the shorter base. The report noted a reduced cross-country capability and reduced mobility of this vehicle compared to the D-10 and D-14.

Left side view of the D-11. Source: Domestic armored vehicles. XX century

Test Results and Recommendations

On August 6, 1931, the test results were confirmed in another document, where conclusions and recommendations were presented.
General conclusions were as follows:

  1. “Surrogate tanks” were not suitable for clearing barbed wire fences due to unarmored bottom. Adding armor to the bottom meant increasing the weight, which means a decrease in the combat performance of already heavy and slow vehicles. In the second document, the general conclusion was much harsher: “nullifies the combat use of this type of armored vehicle”;
  2. The speed and maneuverability were considered insufficient, even for tanks of the 2nd to 3rd echelons. The chairman of the Scientific and Technological Committee UMM, Ivan Andrianovich Lebedev, noted that the average speed being “less than 4 km/h”;
  3. Suspension elements were destroyed or worn out due to the excessive weight of the vehicles;
  4. The artillery armament with which it was equipped was deemed unsatisfactory;

There was another important point that influenced the decision. It was considered that the “Kommunar” tractors surpassed the “Caterpillar-60” capabilities. But, firstly, “Kommunars” were produced by the KhPZ factory (Kharkov Locomotive Factory) in quantities that barely met the needs of the army in tractors for towage of artillery and other weapons. Secondly, the production at KhPZ was, in fact, custom-made. There was no exchangeability of parts even within the same series of machines.
The conclusion for Dyrenkov was disappointing: according to Lebedev, the main purpose of these tractors was towing artillery, therefore it was recommended to remove the armored hulls and convert the surrogate tanks D-10 and D-11 into self-propelled guns and test them.
In the case of the infantry transporter D-14, the UMM committee decided to retest it in order to “obtain more detailed data, both from the technical and from the tactical side.” Alterations included reduction of the troop compartment to 12 soldiers instead of 18. The rear part of the armored hull had to be partly cut off in order to reduce the load on the rear rollers.
In general, it was recommended to reduce the weight of the machine to 10 tons. To achieve this, it was proposed to remove or lighten individual armor plates. And, finally, to install an additional fuel tank, with the ability to pump fuel from the main fuel tank. Lebedev noted that “it is not possible to get a surrogate tank, even with reduced combat capabilities, without a major overhaul of the design.” In fact, it was easier to design a new tank.

Conclusion

Dyrenkov managed to create in 1931 armored vehicles that had the flaws of tanks of the Great War. The Red Army quit experiments with armored tractors but returned to them as an emergency measure in early 1941.
There was a plan to charge the faculty of mechanization and motorization of the Red Army to develop a personnel carrier on the chassis of the tank MM-1 (aka TMM-1, based on the Vickers Mk. E), as it was one of the most robust and common tanks of the Red Army. Further experiments with armored personnel carriers continued and the next attempt was the TR-1 (TR-26) transporter based on the T-26 tank. Nevertheless, the Red Army entered World War Two without any indigenous APC.
As for Dyrenkov and Tukhachevsky, they were both arrested and executed in 1937 during the “Great Purge”.

Specifications (D-10)

Total weight, battle ready ~ 12,000 Kg
Crew 3
Propulsion 4-cyl petrol, 75 hp (55 kW)
Maximum speed 6-6.2 km/h forward, 3.2 km/h reverse
Range 120 km on road
Armament 1 x 76-mm gun M1913 on Garford mount;
1 x 7.62-mm DT machine gun
Armor Front – 16 mm; Back – 16 mm; Sides – 11 mm, Top – 6 mm
Production 1

Specifications (D-14)

Total weight, battle ready ~ 12,500 Kg
Crew 2 + 18 passengers
Propulsion 75 hp (55 kW) engine
Maximum speed 6 km/h forward
Range 120 km on road
Armament 2 x 7.62-mm DT machine gun
Armor Front – 11 mm; Back – 11 mm; Sides – 11 mm, Top – 6 mm
Production 1

Specifications (D-11)

Total weight, battle ready ~ 13,250 Kg
Crew 3
Propulsion 60 hp engine
Maximum speed 4.7 km/h forward, 3.9 km/h background
Range 100 km on road
Armament 1 x 76-mm gun M1913 on Garford mount;
2 x 7.62-mm DT machine gun
Armor Front – 16 mm; Back – 11 mm; Sides – 11 mm, Top – 6 mm
Production 1

Sources

RGVA f. 31811 (Russian State Military Archive (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvenni Voennyi Arkhiv- RGVA)
Domestic armored vehicles. XX century: Scientific publication: In 4 volumes / Solyankin A.G., Pavlov M.V., Pavlov I.V., Zheltov I.G. / Vol 1. Domestic armored vehicles. 1905-1941 – M .: Exprint Publishing Center, LLC, 2002. – 344 pp. Ill., P. 61, pp. 88-89
Domestic Armored Vehicles 20th Century Vol 1 1905-1941 (Solyankin 2002)
Tukhachevsky / Boris Sokolov. – M: Molodaya Gvardiya, 2008. – 447 [1] s: il. – (Life of remarkable people: ser. Biogr .; issue. 1104)
Kirindas A.M. “Artillery tractor“ Comintern””, – Moscow: Yauza-Catalog, 2017
A.Bezugolny. “The Source of additional power of the Red Army …”, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2016

Red Army Auxiliary Armoured Vehicles, 1930–1945 (Images of War)

Red Army Auxiliary Armoured Vehicles, 1930–1945 (Images of War), by Alex Tarasov

If you ever wanted to learn about probably the most obscure parts of the Soviet tank forces during the Interwar and WW2 – this book is for you.

The book tells the story of the Soviet auxiliary armor, from the conceptual and doctrinal developments of the 1930s to the fierce battles of the Great Patriotic War.

The author not only pays attention to the technical side, but also examines organizational and doctrinal questions, as well as the role and place of the auxiliary armor, as it was seen by the Soviet pioneers of armored warfare Mikhail Tukhachevsky, Vladimir Triandafillov and Konstantin Kalinovsky.

A significant part of the book is dedicated to real battlefield experiences taken from Soviet combat reports. The author analyses the question of how the lack of auxiliary armor affected the combat efficacy of the Soviet tank troops during the most significant operations of the Great Patriotic War, including:

– the South-Western Front, January 1942
– the 3rd Guards Tank Army in the battles for Kharkov in December 1942–March 1943
– the 2nd Tank Army in January–February 1944, during the battles of the Zhitomir–Berdichev offensive
– the 6th Guards Tank Army in the Manchurian operation in August–September 1945

The book also explores the question of engineering support from 1930 to the Battle of Berlin. The research is based mainly on archival documents never published before and it will be very useful for scholars and researchers.
Buy this book on Amazon!


Categories
WW2 Soviet Prototypes

Matilda II Mk.IV with ZiS-5 76mm

Soviet Union (1941)
Infantry Tank – 1 Prototype Built

In the early stages of WWII, Great Britain started a lend-lease relationship with the Soviet Union. Along with the Churchill III, Tetrarch, Valentine and Universal Carrier, the famous Queen of the Desert Matilda II soon found itself in the USSR.

Between 1941 and 1943, some 1084 Matildas were shipped to the Soviet Union. Only 918 were ever received by the Red Army, however. It is suggested that the others never made it to the end of the famous Arctic Convoys. This is one-third of the entire 2987 vehicle production run of the Matilda.

The Matilda equipped with the 76mm ZiS-5 gun . Photo: pinterest

Fighting Under the Red Flag

The Matilda IIs that found their way to the USSR were mostly Mk.IIIs and Mk.IVs, with Leyland diesel engines. Diesel being the preferred fuel of the Soviets. The Soviets identified the Matilda as the “British Mk.2”. The 170th and 171st Tank Battalions of the South-Western and Kalininsk fronts were the first units to receive the tank. At the time of the Battle of Moscow, their first action under the Soviet flag, only 145 Matildas had been received. Along with the Valentine, the Matildas only made up 2 percent of all Soviet armor used. The 170th only had 13 of them at the time.

Matilda’s tanks of the Soviet 5th Mechanized Corps, 68th Army. Photo: Osprey Publishing

Soviet crews fell in love with the Matilda, however, and up until 1942 they deemed it “the toughest tank on the western front”. To the Soviets, of course, the German front was the “Western” front. The only thing they didn’t like were the tracks, that were ill-suited to icy conditions. The tank fought on several fronts under Soviet use, mostly on Western Front, but also at North Caucasian Front and Bryansk Front until at least early 1944. In December 1943, the 5th Mechanized Corps of the 68th Army, fighting on the Western front, still had 79 fully operational Matildas.

Soviet Modification

The Red Army soon realized that the standard 40mm 2 pounder cannon of the Matilda was becoming less and less effective against German armor. As such, in December 1941 at design office number 92, Vasiliy Grabin, the famous designer of the ZiS-3 gun, made plans to mount the Soviet’s own 76mm tank gun M1941 ZiS-5 (76-мм танковая пушка обр. 1941 г. ЗиС-5), on the Matilda.

The ZiS-5/F-96 gun used on the Matilda. Photo: warspot.ru

This was the same gun found on early war KV-1s. It was re-designated as F-96 for the project. The weapon was a substantial improvement over the 40mm/2-pounder. The 76mm shell could penetrate up to 61mm of armor at 1,000 meters and could fire numerous types of ammunition including HE-F (High Explosive – Fragmentation), APCR (Armor Piercing Composite Rigid) and APHE (Armor Piercing High Explosive). The gun could elevate to roughly 20 degrees, but could only depress 2 degrees. 120 guns were originally put-by for the project, however this was later cut down to only 40.

Cramped

Just one Matilda, still having its British War Department (W.D) numeral markings, was experimented on. Extensive modifications of the turret were implemented to allow the larger gun to fit, requiring a complete redesign of the mantlet. The new mantlet was based on the KV-1’s, and to grant a little extra room inside the turret, a gasket roughly an inch thick was placed in-between the mantlet and turret face.

The turret of the Matilda was cramped to begin with, so one can only imagine how much more uncomfortable it would’ve been with the 76mm inserted. It is unknown as to whether this Matilda would’ve kept the same amount of crew as the stanard tank. If so, the loading and general operating of the gun would likely have been an awkward task.

Another view from the front shows how disproportionate the mantlet looks to the rest of the Vehicle. Phot: ftr.wot-news.com

Fate

In January of 1942, the modified tank was sent to Moscow for testing. Come March 1943, the Commissar for Tank Industry, V. Malysheva and Commissar for weapons D. Ustinovu contacted the design team in a letter basically telling them the project was canceled as the guns were needed for the USSR’s own tanks, which were rolling off the assembly line by the battalion load. Because of this, the project was canceled with just the one prototype built. The prototype was likely scrapped soon after. It is possible that the component parts were put back into circulation. The guns may have been re-installed on their respective vehicles with the F-96 going back to a KV, and the 2-Pounder going back onto the Matilda hull.

There is, however, and unverified German intelligence report that the 36th and 37th Tank Brigade were equipped with 76mm armed Matildas. There is no concrete evidence to back this up though. It may be that the tanks were mistaken for Matilda CS versions, of which there was 130 sent to the Soviets.

This image shows the gun at maximum elevation. Photo: warspot.ru

The Soviets were not the first to attempt an up-gunning of the vehicle. As well as the experiments on using the Littlejohn adapter for the 2-pounder, the British army attempted mounting the QF 6 pounder gun in a new turret taken from the A27 Cromwell. Like the Russian concept, this too was scrapped with one prototype built.



The ZiS-5 armed Matilda. This illustration was produced by Tank Encyclopedia’s own by David Bocquelet.

Matilda II specifications

Dimensions 18 ft 9.4 in x 8 ft 3 in x 8 ft 7 in (5.72 x 2.51 x 2.61 m)
Total weight, loaded 25.5 tons (25.6 tonnes)
Crew 4 (driver, gunner, loader, commander)
Propulsion 2x Leyland E148 & E149 straight 6-cylinder water cooled diesel 95 hp engine
Max. Road Speed 15 mph (24.1 km/h)
Operational Road Range 50 miles (807 km)
Armament 76mm ZiS-5 Gun
Armor 15 mm to 78 mm (0.59-3.14 in)
Total production 1 prototype
Data source Infantry Tank Mark II Specifications, by J.S. DODD The Vulcan Foundry Ltd, Locomotive Works, August 1940

Sources

Infantry Tank Mark IIA* Specifications, The Vulcan Foundary Ltd by designer Sir John Dodd August 1940
Infantry Tank Mark II manual, War Department
Osprey Publishing, New Vanguard #8, Matilda Infantry Tank 1938-45

Soviet Matildas on FTR
Matilda Mk.IV on Panzernet.net (Czech)
A live journal entry on the Matilda IV (Russian).
An article by Yuri Pasholok on Warspot.ru.
Osprey Publishing, New Vanguard #247: Soviet Lend-Lease Tanks of World War II