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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (1960s-Present)
Main Battle Tank – Unknown Number Built
The T-55 was the most famous main battle tank (MBT) of the Soviet Union during the early Cold War. It was and still is in service with dozens of nations around the world, with a total production of 30,000 tanks without even counting the T-54, the T-55s produced by other Warsaw Pact members, and the specialized versions built on its chassis. The T-55 also arrived in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the 1950s, becoming prominent in its ranks from the 1960s until the late 1980s, when it was substituted with more modern indigenous MBTs in frontline units. Notably, North Korea also produced its own variant, known simply as the 68 or Type 68 (or T-68), as Western sources renamed it.
T-54, T-55, and Type 59
Already during the Second World War, Soviet engineers tried to fit 100 mm guns in the turrets of T-34 and T-44 medium tanks. The results were not satisfactory due to the cramped space even with enlarged turrets. These vehicles could not properly accommodate the longer ammunition of the 100 mm gun.
In 1944, the new Object 137 project, that later became the T-54, began. The features of the new project included a 100 mm D-10T rifled gun, 200 mm turret front armor, four crew members, and new powerpack.
The first version of the T-54, the T-54-1, also known as T-54 Obr. 1946, did not meet expectations and production was stopped soon after starting. In 1949, a new version called T-54-2 or T-54 Obr. 1949 entered service with a new rounded turret front without gun mantlet. The 7.62 mm SG-43 machine gun boxes on the fenders were also substituted with a fixed machine gun firing from a hole in the front glacis. Other modifications included new oil-bath filters and throughout the production run, new 580 mm tracks instead of the 500 mm ones adopted on the T-54-1.
The production of the T-54-2 lasted until 1951, when a new version was introduced. The T-54-3 or T-54 Obr. 1951 had a new rounded egg-shaped turret and new optics.
The T-54A was introduced in 1955 and its improvements included: new D-10TG gun with smoke extractor, STP-1 gyro-stabilizer, new gunner sight, radios and many other details that increased comfort and the fighting capabilities of the tank. In 1957, the new T-54B substituted the older variant on the production lines. Most notably, it featured a new D-10T2S gun with upgraded gyro-stabilizer and IR (infrared) optics that enhanced the fighting capabilities at night.
A new project, called Object 155, was started after Soviet tests on nuclear detonation effects on tanks. The new project was equipped with a NBC (Nuclear Biological Chemical) protective suite and overpressure system to shield the crew from nuclear blasts and contaminated air.
A new 580 hp V-55 engine, substituted the V-54, together with a new transmission. The fuel capacity was also increased with two 200 liters fuel drums on the rear, which could be jettisoned from the inside in case of need. The vehicle was equipped with a smoke system that sprayed fuel on the hot surfaces of the engine, creating a smoke cloud around the tank. The ammunition rack capacity was increased from 34 to 43 rounds, while new “starfish” type road wheels were introduced.
The Object 155 was accepted in service in May 1958 as the T-55 and started production in June 1958. Production of the new T-55A with air filtration system and enhanced protection began in 1963.
The Chinese license production of the T-54A began in late 1958 as the Type 59 (although it is also known with its factory code: WZ120). It was almost identical to the Soviet version except for the lack of night vision devices on the initial vehicles. Another feature that distinguished the Type 59 was the presence of different bottom glacis weldings. The T-54 had distinctive interlocking welds while the Type 59 had (like the T-55) straight welds.
North Korean T-55
After the Korean War, in 1953, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) was equipped with a tank fleet of roughly 1,000 T-34-85 medium tanks and an insignificant number of T-34-76s, 12 IS-2 heavy tanks, and small numbers of SU-76Ms, SU-85s, SU-100 and ISU-122 self-propelled guns. In the mid-1950s, these tanks were joined by small batches of T-54-2s and T-54-3s.
It would only be in the 1960s that North Korean tank numbers increased. Still unable to produce armored vehicles independently at the beginning of the decade, the small Asian nation was dependent on Soviet and Chinese supplies. Soviet supplies, as far as armored tracked vehicles are concerned, resulted in the entry into service of PT-76B light amphibious tanks and T-55 MBTs, not mentioning various types of wheeled armored vehicles.
In the mid-1960s, probably helped by the Soviet Union’s experience and funding, North Korea started building the Ryu Kyung-su (in Sinhung province) and Kusŏng (in the province of the same name) production plants. The first was meant for the production of light tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs), the latter for the production of heavier armored vehicles.
According to North Korean sources, the first copies of the PT-76B light amphibious tanks rolled out of the factory in 1967. However, Western sources have expressed doubts on these claims. Many agencies, including the US CIA, hypothesize that the first PT-76Bs were simply assembled in the factory from kits that arrived from the Soviet Union and that the effective North Korean production started only in the next decade.
Concerning the T-55 production, there are other doubts. According to North Korea claims, the T-55 copies rolled out the Kusong tank plant in 1968, but it is impossible to confirm this claim. Western agencies started to monitor the production plant only in the early 1980s.
Although this claim cannot be confirmed, many suggest that the first tanks were, as with the PT-76B, simple kits that arrived from the Soviet Union. What is known for certain is that production of T-55s in North Korea was low during the first years, not meeting the needs of the KPA, which had to replace its WW2-era tank fleet.
In fact, despite indigenous production, in the late 1960s, until about the middle of the next decade, Korea purchased batches of T-55s and Chinese Type 59s to fulfill KPA armored needs. According to South Korean sources, the first T-55 produced in North Korea rolled out of the factory in 1973.
While most sources agree on the existence of some form of production of T-54/T-55 derived vehicles in North Korea, a lot of the specifics are unclear. It is currently unknown how many and which parts were locally built and how many had to be imported, if the North Koreans made any modifications, either upgrades or downgrades, to the vehicle (except some external ones) and just how many were actually built in the country.
It is generally believed that the North-Korean made 68s all featured the 14.5 mm heavy machine gun, smoke extractor on the end of the barrel, and the mushroom-shaped fan cover on top of the turret, in front of the loader’s cupola. While none of these are definite proofs of local production, they at least allow discerning vehicles that are surely imported from the Soviet Union and China. This article will assign all vehicles that posses these three features as being locally-made 68 tanks.
Which Version Was Produced by the DPRK?
Despite the official North Korean claims, which are repeated by all the most reliable Western sources, it seems that North Korea did not produce (or produced only small batches of) the T-55, but only the T-54 and/or the Type 59. Here are a pair of hypothesis on the indigenous production:
Due to the high percentage of what looks like Type 59s in North Korean service, it is plausible that North Korea quickly switched to the local production of the Type 59, as the book The Armored Forces of North Korea written by analysts Stijin Mitzer and Joost Oliemans suggest.
Another plausible hypothesis is that North Korea simply locally produced the T-54 with a small production difference that made its T-54 copies look like Type 59s: front straight weld instead of interlocking welds. The presence of different welds would mean that North Korea simply changed some production details to ease full-scale production for its unskilled workers. To make interlocking welds, precision iron-cutting tools and expert welders were needed. This explains why North Korea probably preferred to produce its tanks without this detail.
The only way to clearly distinguish a 68 from its Soviet and Chinese counterparts is the presence of the 14.5 mm heavy machine gun in anti-aircraft position instead of the Soviet DShKM and Chinese Type 54 (copy of the Soviet gun).
In total, South Korean sources estimate that North Korea had received and produced a total of between 1,600 and 1,800 T-54, T-55, and Type 59 tanks between 1950s and 1970s.
Design
Structure
The North Korean 68 is identical to its Soviet and Chinese counterparts from the outside. Starting from the chassis, it is equipped with five large-diameter ‘starfish’ road wheels on both sides of the vehicle, with the sprocket wheel on the rear, and the idler wheel on the front. The vehicle uses a copy of the OMSh single-pin metallic track type except during parades, where rubber-padded track links are used to prevent damage to asphalt roads.
On the right fender of the tank there are three external fuel tanks, with a total capacity of 280 liters, together with storage bins for tools and spare parts.
The hull is completely identical to the T-55 and Type 59 ones, with the driver positioned on the left front, the turret ring in the center, and engine compartment at the back.
Despite the racks being spotted in many images, it seems that the North Koreans have rarely used the 200 liter fuel drums on the rear of the vehicles. This was probably due to the small dimensions of the nation and the drastic scarcity of fuel.
The armor has the same thickness as its Soviet and Chinese counterparts, with the front glacis plate 100 mm thick angled at 60°, 80 mm thick vertical hull sides and the rear, with different angles, with thicknesses between 20 and 45 mm.
Turret
The egg-shaped turret, with the narrow portion pointing forward, is, as the rest of the vehicle, a copy of the other Warsaw Pact first generation MBTs.
Inside, there is enough space to accommodate three crew members: the commander, placed on the left, behind the gunner, while the loader is placed on the right. There is a commander’s hatch, probably equipped with a copy of the Soviet TPKU-2B periscope.
When it comes to optics and other devices, it is hard to establish what was maintained and what was changed. It is plausible that, in the first years of production, North Korean tank copies were equipped with sophisticated optics produced in the Soviet Union and exported to Korea. As such, to establish what was used on board the North Korean 68s, it is worth analyzing what was used on the potential donor vehicles.
For night surveillance and target spotting, on the T-54A and T-54B, the commander had a TKN-1 monocular or TKN-1S night sight on the T-55 and subsequent variants. To illuminate the TKN-1S, an OU-3 infrared spotlight was used. With this system, the commander was capable of spotting targets at a maximum range of 250-300 m during the night.
Until the T-54A, the gunner had a MK-4 binocular periscope for surveillance or a TPN-1 night vision sight from the T-54B onward. The gunner’s optic varied depending on the tank version: the TSh2-22 on the T-54-2 and T-54-3, the TSh2B-22 on the T-54A, and the TSh2B-32 from the T-54B to later models.
Until the T-55 started production, the loader had a MK-4 binocular periscope, identical to the one used by the gunner. After, it was replaced by the L-2 Luna infrared spotlight, which was added in 1957 to the turret’s right side, after which the loader lost his capabilities to check the front part of the battlefield.
Due to the cramped space inside the tank, the turret was equipped, like all the Soviet variants (and Chinese later production Type 59s), with handles on the rear circumference of the turret to fix tarpaulins and personal equipment. Together with these handles, the tank was also equipped with handlebars on the turret sides to store even more equipment or permit soldiers riding the vehicle to cling during off-road travel.
The cast turret armor was left unmodified from its Warsaw Pact analogues: 200 mm thick rounded on the front, 160 mm thick on the sides, 115 mm on the rear, and 30 mm on top.
Engine
There are doubts about the engine of the North Korean copy. It could be a V-54, V-55, or a Model 12150L, originally mounted on the T-54, T-55, and Type 59, respectively. The Model 12150L itself was a Chinese copy of the V-54. It is also unknown if the North Koreans ever made any modifications (either upgrades or downgrades) or if they were received from abroad. The engine is placed transversely in the engine compartment to save up space.
The V-54 and Model 12150L were diesel, 12-cylinder watercooled, direct injection, four-stroke, V-shaped engines with a volume of 38,000 cm3 delivering 520 hp at 2,000 rpm. Both T-54 and Type 59, had an internal fuel reserve of 520 liters plus 280 liters carried on external fuel tanks on the right fender, giving a range of about 650-700 km.
The V-55 was very similar to the V-54 except for the improved injection system that increased output to 580 hp at 2,000 rpm. On the T-55, the fuel tanks were modified due interior redesign. In total, 300 liters were carried in internal fuel tanks, 280 liters were carried on right fender external fuel tanks, and, optionally, two 200 liters fuel drums could be mounted on the rear of the tank, for a total fuel capacity of 980 liters. Without the fuel drums, the T-55 range was of 480-500 km on-road and about 300 km off-road. With fuel drums, the range was increased to 720-770 km.
The Soviet and Chinese engines had some parts made from lightweight alloys to decrease total weight or to decrease wear. Blockheads were made with aluminum alloys, intake valves were made of chrome-nickel vanadium steel, and valve guides were made of anti-friction cast iron, just to name a few.
Considering that the North Korean industry, at the time when it began to produce licensed tanks, was not so advanced, it can be assumed that their engines, whatever model they produced, were not built with such special metal alloys unless they received the parts from outside.
Although Korea’s metallurgical industry seems to have been the only state-of-the-art industry in the nation, it is clear that, at least in the 1970s, it could not guarantee enough quantity of special alloys. Their tank engines, therefore, at least in the early years, were made entirely of steel or with parts imported from the Soviet Union or China.
Main Armament
The 68’s main armament is almost without doubt a copy of the 100 mm D-10T rifled gun, even if the exact model produced in North Korea is uncertain. As clearly visible, the North Korean tanks are equipped with a smoke extractor, as on the D-10TG rifled gun, but no more data on the exact model can be found. It is probably a D-10TG or D-10T2S copy with an ejector and gyro-stabilizer.
There seems to be no doubt about the indigenous gun production. The DPRK had been producing artillery for some years by the time the first tanks came out of their factories. The gun has a total length of 5.608 m and a barrel length of 5.35 m (L. 53.5), for a total weight of 1,440 kg.
Nothing is known about ammunition stowage in the North Korean copies of the T-54/T-55, as cannot be said about North Korean ammunition quality due to a lack of available evidence and sources.
On the T-54 and Type 59, there were a total of 34 100 mm rounds transported on board, 20 in the primary rack on the driver’s right plus another 14 scattered on the turret’s sides and floor. On the T-55, the ammunition load was increased to 43 thanks to internal layout changes. The primary rack was reduced to 18 rounds, but a new 11-round rack was placed on the fighting compartment’s rear. Of the remaining 14 rounds, 7 were placed in the turret, while the others were placed on racks on the hull’s sides.
It is plausible that, in the first years, the Hermit Kingdom was dependent on foreign ammunition supply. Nowadays though, it produces its own 100 mm ammunition, of which nothing is known in terms of quality, armor penetration, and muzzle velocity. It can be argued that these are simply copies of Soviet and Chinese ammunition.
Secondary Armament
Secondary armament consists of a 7.62 x 54 R mm medium machine gun mounted coaxially to the main gun, on the right side. It is probably the North Korean Type 82, a copy of the Soviet PKT medium tank machine gun (adopted on Soviet models from the T-55A) or, alternatively, a SGMT or a Type 59 (its Chinese copy) medium machine guns mounted on the T-54s and Type 59s.
The PKT is a belt-fed tank medium machine gun that entered production in 1961 and is known in its infantry version as the PK or Kalashnikov’s machine gun. The machine gun was developed to substitute the SG-43 and SGM, and had a rate of fire of 800 rpm and a maximum firing range of 3,800 m.
The SGMT was the tank version of the SGM belt-fed medium machine gun mounted on the T-54 and on the Type 59 in its Chinese version, the Type 59T.
It seems that North Korea never produced the SG-43, the SGM, or Type 59T machine guns indigenously. During the Korean War, the Soviets supplied the Koreans with a huge amount of these guns. For this reason, it seems improbable that North Koreans decided to mount these older machine guns on their tank copies. However, these machine guns fired at 600 rpm and had a maximum firing range of 1,500 m. Thanks to the identical caliber shared on all the machine guns, the 250-round belts were identical.
As anti-aircraft armament, the tank is equipped with a 14.5 mm 64 (also known as Type 64) heavy machine gun operated by the loader. The gun was derived from the Soviet 14.5 x 114 mm KPV. The weight of the gun is about 50 kg, which forces the loader to elevate it using handwheels.
The 64 heavy machine gun was extremely versatile when the vehicle entered service, capable of hitting flying targets, supporting infantry with heavy fire, and even capable of dealing with lightly armored vehicles, with an armor penetration of 40 mm at 100 m.
Nowadays, the 14.5 mm heavy machine gun can be deployed in a more limited capacity against South Korean or US attack helicopters, for infantry support, and in modern conflicts, against UAVs or loitering munitions.
Although nothing is known about the internal layout of the North Korean tank copies, the ammunition quantity available for the medium machine gun probably consisted of 3,500 rounds, as on the original models, while for the 14.5 mm machine gun it is harder to tell.
Modernizations and Upgrades
The Korean technicians tried to mitigate the bad precision of the main gun with the adoption of laser rangefinders with related cross-wind sensors and fire-control systems (FCS) in the late 1970s. These systems were probably planned to be equipped on nearly all the tanks in the Korean People’s Army inventory but, being expansive solutions, they were only adopted on newly produced and more modern Ch’ŏnma tanks.
The laser rangefinders upgrade developed for the Korean T-55 seems to be mounted only on a negligible percentage of vehicles in North Korean service, being almost relegated for export only.
One of the only nations known to have adopted the North Korean rangefinder and FCS in great numbers was Syria, which deployed its upgraded T-55s against Israel in the 1982 Lebanon War. Their effectiveness is unknown, but some T-55s equipped with North Korean upgrades were spotted as late as the mid-2010s in the hands of many sides of the belligerents of the Syrian Civil War, of Islamic State terrorists, and even Kurdish rebels, underlining how this system was valuable enough to remain in service for over four decades.
The rangefinder is covered with a box-shaped armor with an openable shield that protects the laser beam emitter from splinters, bullets, or dust when not in use. Like all other laser rangefinders, it is mounted over the tank’s main gun.
On the turret roof, behind the cupolas, a cross-wind sensor is installed together with an external battery on the turret’s rear. The rangefinder and the cross-wind sensor are connected to a fire-control system which calculates distance and dispersion of the round to increase accuracy.
During the 1970s, North Korea started to study how to equip its tank fleet with a cheap but effective solution to protect them from shaped charge rounds. As many other nations have done, the KPA modified T-34-85s, 68s, and early production Ch’ŏnmas with slat armor on the sides of the turret and hull.
Mounting points for slat armor could be spotted on the turret’s sides and metal bars with brackets were used to also equip the hull’s sides with slat armor. The slat protection consisted of welded weave-mesh panels positioned several inches from the hull and turret that were easy to fix using short brackets. Despite many vehicles being seen with mounting points and brackets for the slat armor over the years, this kind of additional protection has very rarely been seen actually mounted.
On a handful of occasions, North Korean produced T-55s have been spotted with a pintle mount for a MANPADS (MAN-Portable Air-Defense System) HT-16PGJ, a copy of the Soviet 9K310 Igla-1E missile on the rear of the turret, meant to increase the anti-aircraft defense of the MBT. It is manually operated and a crew member or an infantryman has to stand on the engine deck to operate the missile.
Despite the difficulty operating the system, this new upgrade, seen only on a small number of tanks, could be a serious threat to enemy planes or helicopters that attempt to attack a tank or column of vehicles on the move.
Service in the Korean People’s Army
The T-54, T-55, Type 59, and 68 became the most used tanks of the Korean People’s Army after the Korean War. The first Korean unit to receive the initial batches of these modern tanks delivered by the Soviet Union was the 105th Armored Division ‘Seoul’ in the 1950s. The 105th Guards Armored Division ‘Seoul’ was, and still is, the best equipped and trained North Korean armored unit. In 1958, the 105th Armored Division ‘Seoul’ also received the name of Ryu Kyong-su. Ryu Kyong-su (1915-1958) was one of Kim Il-sung’s comrades during the anti-Japanese resistance and Second World War, and the first commander of the division. The number of modern tanks increased in the late 1950s and early 1960s, with the arrival of the first batches of T-55s and Type 59s in the small Asian country.
With the increased numbers of modern MBTs in the North Korean armored forces ranks, the T-55 were also distributed to other units, where they finally substituted the T-34-85s. It would only be in the late 1960s that the T-55s would completely replace the old medium tanks of the Second World War. Eventually, production in 68 began in 1968, coming into full production only during the following decade.
In the late 1970s, however, production of 68 gradually decreased at the Kusong Armored Vehicle Plant, when the new North Korean MBT, the Ch’ŏnma, entered production. Due to the slow initial production rate of the new MBT, T-54s and their derivatives remained in frontline service for much of the 1980s, being completely replaced in frontline units only in the 1990s.
In the last decades, the 68s and their Chinese and Soviet counterparts have usually been spotted at parades and training, replacing the T-34-85s in the ranks of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards (WPRG). This is a North Korean paramilitary group composed of citizens who, in the event of war, would be quickly mobilized to defend the homeland. The WPRG is armed with obsolete weapons, often dating back to the Second World War, such as DP-27 machine guns, PPSh-41 and Type 49 submachine guns (their North Korean copy), and artillery pieces such as 76 mm ZiS-3 field guns. The T-55s in this case would be a useful weapon to boost their offensive capabilities. This is not so absurd when one considers that, in the current war in Ukraine, Donetsk and Luhansk militias have also employed old T-55s in active service for the same role.
Export
Zimbabwe
After the end of the Rhodesia Bush War (1964-1979), Rhodesia was renamed Zimbabwe and leadership was placed on the black population majority.
The Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) was only equipped with former-Rhodesian Security Force Mine Protected Armored Vehicles (MPAVs) and small numbers of South African Eland armored cars. The leftist leader, Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), needed to arm the new ZDF with modern equipment and armored vehicles.
North Korean-Zimbabwe relationships were already strong because Robert Mugabe’s ZANU was trained by North Korean trainers and helped by advisors during the Rhodesian Bush War. In the 1980s, the North Korean also trained the Zimbabwe 5th Brigade, famous for being under Mugabe’s own command and for its brutality against opponents of the regime. Taking advantage of this prior relationship, it was not difficult for Zimbabwe to purchase a small amount of 68 MBTs and some 323 armored personnel carriers from North Korea.
There is no data about the precise year when the tanks arrived in the nation, but many Western sources wrongly identify them as Type 59s and put their number between 30 and 40. These uncertain claims were probably made due to a scarcity of images and due to the fact that Zimbabwe would have had inherited 8 T-55LD tanks from Rhodesia, which had received them from South Africa.
The North Korean vehicles probably arrived in Zimbabwe in the late 1980s and went to equip the mechanized brigade stationed in the Inkomo Barracks in Harare. They seem to have never been deployed in combat outside the nation and even during strikes in which, many times in the decades, the army has been called to intervene to disperse protesters.
In November 2017, a coup d’etat was held by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. On the night of 14th November, the ZDF occupied the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation and other sensitive targets in Harare, the capital city of Zimbabwe. The now 93-years old Robert Mugabe immediately ordered the armored units in the capital to surround the barracks of the Presidential Guard, which he considered not loyal to him, with tanks. During the short coup d’etat that ended on 21st November 2017 with Mugabe’s resignation, not a single T-55 or 68 was captured in photos in the capital’s streets, so it is impossible to confirm the presence of tanks during the coup.
When the Mugabe regime was dissolved, Zimbabwe reopened relationships with other nations worldwide. In 2021, the Zimbabwe Defence Forces founded its magazine, The Zimbabwe National Army Magazine, which covered many aspects of the Zimbabwe National Army, including training. This had led to the publication of some images of the 68s in service with the armored units, confirming the presence of North Korean hardware in the nation.
Syria
During the Yom Kippur War (October 1973), the Syrian Arab Republic suffered heavy losses against Israel in the Golan Heights sector. During the 19-day war, Syria lost many armored vehicles and other military hardware which needed to be quickly substituted in the Syrian Arab Army ranks.
New batches of tanks and aircraft were bought from the Soviet Union, while other types of equipment were bought from other sources. From North Korea, the Syrian government bought laser rangefinders that were installed on Soviet-produced T-54 and T-55 tanks.
An interesting feature that appeared in some Syrian T-55 was also the adoption of a 14.5 mm heavy machine gun as an anti-aircraft gun. This peculiar modification, coupled with North Korean laser rangefinders, started to be spotted in the Syrian Army from 1976.
It is therefore easy to hypothesize that Syria bought a small batch of 68s from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to replace the losses suffered in the 1973 war against Israel, even if this can not be confirmed by official documents.
This does not mean that all Syrian T-55s equipped with laser rangefinders are actually 68s. The presence of the 14.5-mm machine gun was a very rare feature in Syria, raising doubts that this was an indigenous conversion and moving the hypothesis that Syria did, indeed, purchase a small batch of North Korean vehicles. The presence of rangefinders, on the other hand, is widely documented and reported in iconographic sources, which show their extensive use to this day, but is not necessarily related to the North Korean origin of the tanks on which they are mounted.
Trade relations between Syria and North Korea were not limited only to the purchase of laser rangefinders and perhaps tanks. In the 1980s, Syria also purchased ballistic missiles and motor torpedo boats from the Hermit Kingdom that are still in service today. In later years, North Korea helped the Arab nation develop its own missile program, culminating in the 2000s with the construction of a nuclear reactor in Syria, in which Korean technicians instructed their Syrian counterparts.
Conclusion
Although a lot remains unknown about the 68, often confused with the T-54, T-55, or Type 59, it gave the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea a great starting point to develop its own military industry. It was the first main battle tank produced in the country, giving workers and designers the adequate knowledge to produce and develop their own tanks, albeit heavily influenced by Chinese and Soviet design.
In general, the 68s can be considered simple copies of the Soviet and Chinese tanks, although many often judge North Korean vehicles as “second-rate”. It should be noted that additionally to the DPRK, these vehicles have also been in service for more than four decades in Zimbabwe, where spare parts and quality of maintenance are completely questionable. To date, 68s remain in reserve service in the Korean People’s Army.
68 Specifications
Size (L-W-H)
6,20 x 3,27 x 2,35 m
Weight, battle ready
36 tonnes
Crew
4 (commander, gunner, loader and driver)
Engine
probably a V-55, water-cooled, delivering 580 hp at 2,000 rpm
Speed
50 km/h
Range
500 km
Armament
100 mm D-10T rifled gun copy, 7.62 mm Type 82 coaxial medium machine gun and a 14.5 mm 64 anti-aircraft heavy machine gun
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2020)
Main Battle Tank – At Least 9 Built
The date 10th October 2020 marked the 75th Anniversary of the foundation of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK), the far-left party of the totalitarian one-party Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). This took place in P’yŏngyang, the North Korean capital, through Kim Il-sung Square. During this parade, the new Hwasŏng-17 nuclear InterContinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) were shown for the first time and grabbed the international headlines. Additionally, and also catching plenty of attention between the plethora of new armored vehicles, a new Main Battle Tank (MBT) that has intrigued many military analysts and enthusiasts was seen for the first time and has aroused great interest.
Unfortunately, not much is known about this new vehicle yet. The Chosŏn-inmin’gun, or Korean People’s Army (KPA), has revealed its official name, only on 28th May 2024: Ch’ŏnma-2. Some unofficial sources referred to is as the Juche Type 109 Tank. Thus, throughout this article, the vehicle will be referred to as M-2020, as all the Western sources have unofficially baptized it.
Apart from that, all North Korean weapons without an official name revealed by the Korean People’s Army receive a US Department of Defense (DoD) designation that, for the vehicles, is composed of “M-” followed by the year of their first appearance. Following this logic, in this case, it would be M-2020.
The M-2020 is an almost completely new design that seems to have very little in common with previous MBTs developed in North Korea. It is also the first vehicle developed after the Songun-915, which had also been first presented in a parade, in the same place, in 2010.
North Korean Tanks
In the very last phases of the Second World War, between August and September 1945, Iosif Stalin’s Soviet Union occupied, in agreement with the United States, the northern part of the Korean peninsula, going as far down as the 38th parallel. The Soviet occupation lasted for three years and three months. In that period, the charismatic Kim Il-sung was appointed as new Korean leader.
Kim had been a guerrilla fighter against the Japanese during the occupation of Korea in the 1930s. Then continued to fight the Japanese during their invasion of China, became captain of the Red Army in 1941, and, with this title, in September 1945, he entered P’yŏngyang.
Under his leadership, the newly formed country quickly broke-off all relations with South Korea, under US control. DPRK became increasingly close to the two Communist superpowers, the Soviet Union and the newly formed People’s Republic of China, which had recently ended its own bloody civil war.
Most of the North Korean military’s early equipment was of Soviet origin, with thousands of weapons, such as rifles, submachine guns, machine guns, artillery pieces, T-34-85s, SU-76s, and Soviet-made aircraft arriving in North Korea. The outbreak of the Korean War, which lasted from June 1950 to July 1953, completely broke any relationship with South Korea, pushing North Korea to become even closer to the two Communist regimes, even if, after Stalin’s death, the ties with the Soviet Union began to deteriorate.
The Kim Family’s MBTs
After the Korean War, the core of the North Korean armored formations, the T-34-85, started being largely supplanted by T-54s and T-55s. In the case of the T-55, as well as the PT-76, at least local assembly, if not full production, was initiated in North Korea from the late 1960s onward, giving a head start to the country’s armored vehicles industry. Bolstered by those Soviet deliveries, as well as the Type 59, Type 62, and Type 63 from China, North Korea built a large armored force from the 1960s and 1970s.
Towards the late 1970s, North Korea began the production of its first indigenous main battle tank. The first tank produced by the North Korean nation was the Ch’ŏnma (English: Pegasus) which started as a mere T-62 copy with minor and obscure modifications. Interestingly enough, despite some rumors of the contrary, North Korea is not known to have acquired any T-62 from abroad.
The Ch’ŏnma went through a large number of evolutions and versions from its introduction to this day; in the west, these are often rationalized under the designations of Chonma-Ho I, II, III, IV, V ,and VI given by the US DoD, but in truth, those do not paint the full picture, as there are a lot more than six configurations and variants.
The Ch’ŏnma tanks have been in service since the last years of the 1970s. The obscure nature of North Korea means an accurate estimation of their numbers is hard to come by, with some sources claiming 800 produced and others up to 2,600. Regardless, the tanks have obviously been produced in very large numbers, with some early models even being exported to Ethiopia and Iran, and have formed the backbone of North Korea’s armored force in the last decades.
With the arrival of a Soviet T-72 Ural and perhaps of a T-72M from an unknown country (Iran or Romania according to the main sources), the DPRK technicians studied it and presented some upgrades to the original Ch’ŏnma series.
The Ch’ŏnma tanks have been the subject of many modifications, which have often confused enthusiasts. The most notable example of this is the so-called P’okp’ung-Ho. These are, in fact, later models known in Korea as Ch’ŏnma-215 and Ch’ŏnma-216, (first observed around 2002, which has led to them sometimes being called M-2002 as well). These, having added another roadwheel and numerous new internal and external components, being essentially hybrids between older Ch’ŏnmas and the T-72.
This has led to considerable confusion when North Korea actually introduced a tank that was mostly new, the Songun-915, first seen in 2010, which featured a large cast turret with a 125 mm smoothbore gun (whereas late Ch’ŏnmas had adopted welded turrets which appear to have retained 115 mm guns) and a new hull with a central driving position. All upgrades were introduced after studying the Soviet T-72 Ural/T-72M.
It should to be noted that the later models of the Ch’ŏnma as well as the Songun are often seen with additional, turret-mounted armaments. These have included anti-tank guided missiles, such as the Bulsae-2, MANPADS, such as locally-produced variants of the Igla, 14.5 mm 64 heavy machine guns (North Korean copy of the Soviet KPV, also known as Type 64), and even dual 30 mm automatic grenade launchers. All of these vehicles have a clear visual, design and technological descendance from Soviet-style vehicles. It ought to be noted, however, that, particularly in the last twenty years, North Koreans vehicles have evolved quite considerably from their roots, and can hardly be called mere copies of vintage Soviet armor anymore.
Before its First Public Appearance
In late 2015, a North Korean defector to South Korea made a somewhat absurd statement during an interrogation. He claimed that there was at least one Western-style MBT in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea that he thought was South Korean. The tank was studied in a place that he called the North Korean Tank Research Center but it was unknown to him how it arrived there. According to the same defector, the tank was equipped with a 120 mm smoothbore gun, new composite armor, an automatic target tracking system, advanced optical equipment, and an engine with about 1,000 hp. He also said that the North Korean officers were scared by the capabilities of this vehicle compared to the DPRK’s tanks.
At first, South Korean military intelligence considered these claims phony, but in the next few months, two more North Korean defectors stated similar claims. In response, the South Korean Ministry of Defence initiated an internal analysis of the Republic Of Korea Army (ROKA) to check if there were any missing tanks. In late March 2016, the final verdict was that no tanks were missing in the ROKA’s inventories.
The overall conclusion in military circles was that it was not a South Korean tank. Many analysts tried to establish what type of tank it could have been, to no avail. A hypothesis was that the tank in question could have been a US M1A1M Abrams captured by Iranian-backed militias in early 2015.
A total of 9 M1A1M Abrams were captured from the Iraqi Army between late 2014 and early 2016 by Kata’ib Hezbollah (a radical Shiite paramilitary group) and Badr Organization (a Shiite paramilitary organization). An unknown number of these tanks were transferred to Iran where they were evaluated, while others remained in the hands of Shiite groups to fight the Iraqi Army and the Islamic State.
Having a strong relationship with Iran, North Korea could plausibly receive a single captured tank in exchange for military hardware. Similar situations, as seen, already occurred in the past, during the Iran-Iraq war North Korea received a T-72 Ural captured by the Iranians from the Iraqis in exchange of small arms and 122 mm rocket launchers.
This hypothesis is not supported by any kind of evidence. The absence of official information on the start of the M-2020’s development makes it impossible to confirm the possibility that at least one M1A1M arrived in the DPRK and was evaluated during the development of the M-2020.
The claims of North Korean defectors may simply be explained as the opinions of inexperienced military personnel who lacked the proper knowledge to distinguish between the M-2020 prototype and a Western tank.
Design of Kim’s New Tank
The layout of the new North Korean MBT is, at first glance, reminiscent of standard Western MBTs, deviating significantly from previous tanks produced in North Korea.
These older vehicles have obvious similarities to Soviet or Chinese tanks from which they are derived, such as the T-62 and T-72. In general, these tanks are of a smaller size compared to Western MBTs, designed for lower weights and costs and for rapid transport by rail or air, while NATO MBTs are, usually, more expensive and larger, providing greater comfort to the crew.
Why the Particular Desert Camouflage?
Many South Korean and international sources have questioned the desert camouflage used in the M-2020’s first appearances. Indeed, such camouflage is totally different from the typical Soviet-era green monochrome camouflage used in North Korea until now.
One suggestion is that the vehicle was in sand yellow to be offered for sale to Middle Eastern nations. Another suggestion is that it was based on Iranian or People’s Liberation Army (PLA) camouflage schemes similar to the M-2020’s.
The last suggestion is that the vehicle was made with this type of camouflage to make the tank similar to the US Army M1 Abrams. In the event of an all-out war between North and South Korea, the United States would intervene on behalf of its Asian ally. The North Koreans could exploit the similarity between the M-2020 and the M1 Abrams to sow panic in the South Korean rear lines. A similar strategy adopted by German forces during the Battle of the Bulge in which some German tanks and vehicles were camouflaged and modified to look like US vehicles and confuse the US Army.
Of course, South Korean and US soldiers would have no problem distinguishing the vehicles, but civilians could easily fall victim to an M-2020 disguised as an Abrams. This would allow the North Koreans to commit war crimes against the civilian population and then accuse the United States. This is not an absurd theory, as the KPA has no problem making its Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) look like civilian trucks.
It is worth pointing out that in some of the last military trainings occurred in North Korea for which there is footage available, some older Ch’ŏnma-216 were spotted with brown and dark green camouflages with khaki and brown stripes, commonly used by the ROKA armored formations. This seems a similar situation in which the KPA is trying to make its tanks resemble enemy vehicles.
Hull, Running Gear, and Engine
The hull of the new tank is completely different from previous North Korean MBTs and is more similar to the modern MBT’s, in particular, the Russian T-14 Armata MBT presented in Moscow for the first time during the parade for the 70th Anniversary of the Victory of the Great Patriotic War on 9th May 2015.
The driver is placed centrally at the front of the hull, and has a pivoting hatch with two episcopes. The driver’s position suggests that the vehicle had part of the ammunition stored behind the driving compartment, translating into a safer position compared to older tanks, such as the Ch’ŏnmas, T-62s, and Leopard 1s just to name a few, where the main ammunition racks were on the driver’s side, in the front of the vehicle, increasing exposure.
The running gear is composed of seven large diameter road wheels protected by side skirts. On the lower part, a polymer skirt (the black one that can be seen in the pictures) almost completely covers the wheels, obscuring most of the running gear. Many detractors of North Korean vehicles have pointed out that this is a way to hide the old Ch’ŏnma or Songun hull from view, although it seems more plausible that the polymer skirts are meant to prevent mud splashing and dust kick-up.
Another piece of evidence that negates the hypothesis that the hull of M-2020 is simply a modified hull of old MBTs is provided by the Korean Central Broadcasting Committee’s (KCBC) own parade videos. In a parade shot, an M-2020 passes over the camera, showing-off its undercarriage and highlighting its torsion bar suspension.
As on nearly all the modern MBTs, the sprocket wheel is at the rear, while the idler is at the front. The tracks are a new style for a North Korean tank. In fact, they seem to be a double pin rubber-padded type which, during the Cold War, had only been adopted by Western vehicles. In recent decades, these have also been adopted by nations, such as China, Iran, and Russia on MBTs such as the Type 99, Karrar, and T-14 Armata respectively.
The rear part of the sides of the hull are protected by slat-armor. This type of armor, which protects the sides of the engine compartment, is often used on modern military vehicles and is effective against certain types of infantry anti-tank weapons with High-Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) warheads, such as Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) or Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs). On the left side, the slat-armor has a hole to access the muffler.
The rear of the vehicle is higher than the front. This was probably done to increase the space available in the engine bay, probably in order to house an upgraded version of the 12-cylinder Ch’ŏnma-216 and Songun-915 engines delivering, according to estimates, from 1,000 to 1,200 hp. This power is adequate for a tank with an estimated weight of about 50 tonnes, which exceeds the usual weight of North Korean tanks, usually between 37 to 44 tonnes (early Ch’ŏnma models and Songun, respectively).
Obviously, specifications such as maximum speed, range, or fuel consumption of the M-2020 are unknown.
Turret
If the hull, in its shape, reminds of the T-14 Armata, the most modern MBT developed by the Russian Army, the turret resembles that of the M1 Abrams, the standard MBT of the US Army, or the Chinese MBT-3000 export tank, also known as the VT-4.
Structurally, the turret is very different from that of an Abrams. In fact, the lower part of the turret has four holes for some Active Protection System (APS) tubes. On the right side of the turret is a support for two ATGM tubes.
On the right side of the turret’s roof is the commander’s cupola, on which, on the forward section, the Commander’s Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV) is placed. A gunner’ sight is placed just below it. Both the sights are usually covered by protective shields during parades. These shields protect the fragile and expansive optics from grenade splinters, shrapnel, dust, mud, and bullets on the battlefield. The gunner sight seems to be a sort of Belarus Sosna-U copy as mounted on the T-72B (from B2 sub variants), T-80BVM, and T-90M. The Sosna-U is a gunner’s optic developed by the Belarusian JSC Peleng and produced in Russia. It is equipped with daylight sight, thermal sight (Catherine-FC produced by the French company Thales), and laser rangefinder. For obvious reasons, France did not help in any way to develop these optics.
A Remote Weapon System (RWS) armed with an automatic grenade launcher is placed in the center of the turret and, on the left side, is a cupola for the loader. This one has a fixed front episcope to check the surrounding area.
On the turret’s left is what looks like a night vision camera. If the vehicle is really equipped with a night vision camera, this would be a significant addition to the North Korean arsenal (M-2020 would be the first North Korean tank equipped with such a device), sensibly increasing the capabilities of the tank during night operations or when visibility is reduced. It should be noted that many modern armored vehicles that are not equipped with night vision are proving less effective, as seen in the current conflict in Ukraine (as of 2024).
There is also another fixed episcope on the right of the commander’s cupola, an anemometer, a radio antenna on the right and, on the left side, a crosswind sensor.
On the rear, slat armor covers the sides and rear of the turret and four smoke launchers on each side. On the rear and on the sides are three hooks used to lift up the turret.
On the rear part of the turret, there are some hatches that seem to be blow-out panels for the rear ammunition rack. If this statement is correct, it increases the survivability of the crew and would be a step forward for North Korean industry. Previous tank models relied on Soviet-style racks that have amply been demonstrated to be vulnerable to enemy fire.
Armament
The main armament seems to be, like in the case of the Songun-915, the North Korean copy of the 125 mm Russian 2A46 smoothbore tank gun and not the 115 mm North Korean copy of the Soviet 115 mm 2A20 gun. The dimensions are obviously larger and it is also unlikely that the North Koreans would have mounted an older generation gun on what appears to be such a technologically advanced vehicle.
From the photos, it can also be logically assumed that the cannon is not capable of firing ATGMs, which Russian 125 mm guns can do, because the vehicle is equipped with an external missile launcher. This is not such a strange thing. The North Koreans seem to have always rejected the idea of launching missiles from the gun barrel on all their vehicles armed with 100 mm, 115 mm, or 125 mm guns, preferring launchers mounted outside the turret.
On the barrel of the gun, in addition to the smoke extractor, is a Muzzle Reference System (MRS) similar to the one mounted on the Chinese Type 99A MBT. The MRS allows the gunner to constantly check the alignment of the cannon with the axis of the line-of-sight and correct the linearity between gun and sight. To check the linearity of the gun, the MRS is composed of a device that points a laser beam over the gun (the small box over the barrel) and a receiver that reflects the beam to the device.
Many sources hypothesized that the small box over the barrel is a laser rangefinder. This seems to be incorrect because there is a receiver mounted over the barrel’s tip. As with many other modern MBTs, the M-2020’s laser rangefinder is probably placed inside the gunner’s optic.
Another assumption that can be made is that the gun is not equipped with an autoloader because there are three crew members inside the turret. The tank’s commander is behind the gunner, on the right side of the turret, and the loader on the left side. This can be assumed due to the fact that the CITV and gunner’s sight are one in front of the other on the right side, as on many Western tanks, where the commander is seated behind the gunner and has similar positions for the optics.
The secondary armament consists of a coaxial machine gun, probably a 7.62 mm Type 82, the North Korean copy of the Soviet PKT, mounted not in the gun mantlet but on the side of the turret.
Interestingly enough, the M-2020 is the first North Korean tracked armored fighting vehicle developed without a 14.5 mm 64 heavy machine gun. In its place is a 30 mm automatic grenade launcher mounted on a RWS controlled from inside the vehicle. The gun is probably a copy of the Soviet AGS-17 or AGS-30 automatic grenade launchers and is plausibly substitutable with medium or heavy machine guns even if, until today, no other weapons were spotted installed on the M-2020 RWS.
To fire the missiles, the right-mounged launcher had to be erected by 90°, as on the US M2 Bradley.
The decision of maintaining an external ATGM launcher instead of modern and safer Gun-Launched Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (GL-ATGM) is probably due to the different caliber of the gun.
A standard GL-ATGM has to be of the same caliber as the main gun of the armored vehicle to be launched from it. This means that the missile would have to be smaller than field ATGMs and its dimensions reduce the warhead, decreasing the missile’s penetration. Adopting an ATGM on external launchers also permits the tank to use the same anti-tank team’s missiles, reducing the problems of mass-producing new missiles.
Nothing official has been reported on the exact model of missiles carried in the M-2020’s tubes. Some sources have suggested that the missiles carried are Bulsae-2 (Bulsae means ‘Firebird’ in Korean), copies of the 9K111 ‘Fagot’ (NATO designation AT-4 ‘Spigot’) Semi-Automatic Command to Line Of Sight (SACLOS) anti-tank guided missiles or its laser beam-guided version, the Bulsae-3. Other ATGM models transported by the tank could either be the Bulsae-4 and Bulsae-5. The first one seems to be a unlicensed copy of the RAFAEL SPIKE with Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) fiber optic guidance and the second is a 9M133 ‘Kornet’ (NATO designation AT-14 ‘Spriggan’) laser beam-guided ATGM that North Korea had reverse engineered after some examples were delivered from Syria.
Although the exact model of the missiles is not reported, it is clear that the missiles could engage both ground and rotary-wing targets, increasing the performance of the North Korean tank.
The vehicle is not equipped with MANPADS launchers, unlike all of North Korea’s MBTs and many AFVs.
Protection
The M-2020 is equipped with what seems to be composite armor on the hull front and front and sides of the turret. Its theoretical thickness against kinetic or shaped charges ammunition has not yet been revealed by the North Korean military and we can expect that it will not be revealed in the future. The last thing that can be noted about the composite armor on the turret is that it is fixed on the turret, as on the M1 Abrams. This means that the armor can not be removed after being hit by enemy warheads, like it can be on many modern tanks, such as the Merkava Siman IV or Leopard 2, in which the composite armor is placed in removable modules that can be substituted with new ones when damaged. This also means that the armor can not be simply substituted with more modern and effective composite modules. This situation is clearly visible after the parade of 27th July 2023, in which the M-2020s were shown with an additional protection kit above the composite armor.
The most notable feature of the M-2020 is the presence of an Active Protection System developed to autonomously prevent destruction or damage of the vehicle from missile threats.
There are a total of 12 launcher tubes connected to the active protection system on the lower sides of the turret, six per side, grouped in four 3-launcher positions on the front and sides.
These systems are what seems to be a copy of the anti-missile subsystem of the Russian Afganit APS mounted on the T-14 Armata and on the T-15 Heavy Infantry Fighting Vehicle (HIFV).
The Russian Afganit APS is composed of two subsystems, the first being a generic one consisting of small charges mounted on the roof of the turret, covering a 360° arc that shoots small fragmentation grenades against rockets and tank shells. The second is an anti-ATGM system consisting of 10 large fixed grenade launchers mounted (5 per side) on the lower part of the turret.
Some sources have rightly doubted that the Russian Federation provided the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with the technology to produce such a modern APS, which was officially tested by Russia only on 24th August 2023. It has therefore been speculated that the Koreans developed the APS of the M-2020 from the older Soviet Drozd that entered service in limited numbers in the late 1970s.
The most probable theory is that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had stolen blueprints and other sensitive documents on the APS from Russian military industries during one of their hacking attacks.
On the M-2020, connected to the twelve APS tubes, are at least four radars, probably of the Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) type. Two are mounted on the frontal composite armor and two on the sides. These are meant to detect incoming anti-tank missiles aimed at the vehicle. If an anti-tank missile (such as RPG or ATGM) is detected by the radars, the system automatically activates the APS that fires one grenade in the direction of the target, annihilating the threat. According to official North Korean sources, the system seems to be functional and has been tested.
There are also two Laser Warning Receivers (LWR) on the turret sides. Their purpose is to detect laser beams from enemy rangefinders mounted on tanks or anti-tank weapons that are aiming at the vehicle and automatically activate the rear smoke grenades to hide the vehicle from the opposing optical systems. Interestingly enough, the LWR device placed on the left of the turret is positioned higher than the one on the right due to the presence of the ATGM launcher, which in firing position, would have covered part of the LWR detection area.
The presence of an LWR, along with an MRS and a cross wind sensor are of interest from the point of view of technological development in North Korea. Assuming that such systems actually work and are not mere mock-ups, these are state-of-the-art devices that not all modern MBTs possess.
As for the Laser Warning Receiver, already present in the latest versions of Ch’ŏnma and Songun, Western vehicles such as the Leopard 2 have only received it with the latest upgrades in the last decade. Other Western vehicles adopted it earlier, such as the M1 Abrams and the Italian B1 Centauro. As for the Muzzle Reference System, by now all Western MBTs have it, but not the Russian ones (with some modern exceptions, such as the T-90M and T-14), again underscoring a departure on the North Korean side from the Russian/Soviet tank influence.
The crosswind sensor, on the other hand, is a device that had already appeared in the latest versions of Korean MBTs presented in 2002, increasing the accuracy of North Korean Fire-Control Systems (FCS). Such a system, also very common on Western MBTs, has instead appeared on Russian tanks only with the T-72B3 in 2010.
As all other military vehicles, the M-2020 is equipped with a Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense system that protects the crew against enemy (or friendly) contamination.
Since its first appearance, the M-2020 received thick add-on armor over the turret roof. This is probably a cheap solution adopted by the North Korean developers against top-attack missiles, such as the FGM-148 Javelin or loitering ammunition. The first ones, becoming popular in Western media during the Ukrainian conflict, are difficult to counter with simple add-on armor, while the latter ones are probably useless against such thick protection due their limited warheads.
Last but not least, the M-2020 appears to have bolted on the side skirts with what looks like Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) blocks, or some other kind of Non-Explosive Reactive Armor (NERA) or applique armor.
Other ERA blocks are placed on the turret front on what could be nicknamed as the M-2020 Model 2023 (or Obr. 2023). A total of 8 pre-series vehicles paraded for the 70th Anniversary of the Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War on 27th July 2023 showed off the new protection kit. Some sources speculated that the ERA kit on the early M-2020 could be a copy of the Chinese FY-IV which provided protection against tandem warhead ammunition. In the M-2020 Model 2023, the ERA blocks on the side skirts heavily resemble the Russian 2S24 extensively adopted by Russian Armed Forces before the Ukrainian War in soft skinned boxes, then replaced with metal boxes. It can be spotted on various Russian tanks in Ukraine, such as the T-72B3M Obr. 2022 and T-80BVM Obr. 2022.
The turret front’s ERA blocks are similar in dimension and disposition to the ones mounted in the mid-2010s on the Songun-915. Where the APS launcher tubes are present, in the lower side of the front arc, the ERA blocks are placed only to cover the composite armor, not interfering with the APS operation.
The addition of ERA blocks to the outside of the side skirts does not affect the presence of ERA (or NERA or appliqué armor) in the skirt itself. In fact, North Korea has previously used double-stack ERA blocks on the Songun-915. The presence of a double row of ERA blocks would increase protection on the sides of the vehicle even after the first row has detonated, inhibiting the first threat.
Crew and Autoloader
The crew of the M-2020 consists of four crew members, namely commander, gunner, loader, and driver. What baffled Western analysts anyway is the presence of only three crew members during parades.
The presence of three crew members could be explained because, during parades, only three of them, the commander, the loader, and the driver, can show themselves from the tank’s hatches. The gunner does not have his own hatch and is, during parades, not needed.
The gunner and commander’s optics are placed one in front of the other as, for example, on the C1 Ariete MBT. On the C1 Ariete, the gunner sits in front of the commander while the loader has his own seat and cupola on the other side of the gun breech, exactly as on the M-2020.
It is unclear if the tank has an autoloader. If the M-2020 has an autoloader as, for example, on Russian T-72 tanks, the commander would sit on one side of the breech, while the gunner would sit on the other side, and their optics would be on opposite sides of the turret roof.
The Starving Tiger
Communist North Korea is one of the most peculiar countries in the world, with an army to match. The country, often called the Hermit Kingdom, is currently subject to almost worldwide sanctions due to its ongoing nuclear program and nuclear bomb tests. This has largely deprived the country not only of the economic benefits of trade but also of many resources required for tank construction, most importantly foreign weapons, weapon systems, and minerals which the country cannot extract from its limited resources.
While North Korea has found ways of circumventing these sanctions and engaging in limited trade (including selling weapons to foreign countries), the country has an annual GDP of only US$35 billion (2022), more than 50 times smaller than that of South Korea (US$1665 billion in 2022). The GDP of North Korea is close to that of such war-torn countries as Malaysia (US$30.12 billion, 2022), El Salvador (US$32.5 billion, 2022), or Honduras (US$31 billion, 2022). In terms of GDP per capita, the situation is similar. At $1,700 per person (Purchasing Power Parity, 2015), the country is overtaken by such ‘powerhouses’ as Haiti ($1,800, 2017), Afghanistan ($2,000, 2017), and Ethiopia ($2,200, 2017).
Nonetheless, despite these worrying economic indicators, North Korea spends a massive 33.4% of its GDP (2022) on defense, which amounts to $11.7 billion. This is closer to more developed countries, such as Singapore ($11.7 billion, 2022), Turkey ($10.6 billion, 2022), Taiwan ($12.5 billion, 2022), Pakistan ($10.3 billion, 2022), and Quatar($15.4 billion, 2022). It must be noted that none of the countries listed in this comparison are capable of developing a brand new MBT able to compete with the most modern Russian and American tanks. North Korea is a massive weapons manufacturer, proving able to build thousands of MBTs, APCs, SPGs, and many other weapon types. They have also made many improvements and adaptations of foreign designs. While it is clear that the North Korean versions are definite improvements over the originals, the originals are usually half a century old. No serious institution, except, of course, the North Korean propaganda machine, can claim that the North Korean vehicles are superior or even comparable to the most modern vehicles from other countries.
However, it is clear from the current information that the M-2020 is a real design and a good part of its more advanced features are apparently functional, the agglomeration of such high-tech features on a single design coming from North Korea is suspicious. It is possible that the proof shown thus far by the North Koreans has been doctored, that not all systems are really functional or that, given their expensive nature, they are seriously low production and the M-2020 will serve more as a trophy project than a real component of the KPA, similar to the Russian T-14 Armata.
Furthermore, the North Korean electronics industry is not in a position to produce the expensive and technologically complicated electronics systems (and their associated software) needed by modern MBTs. Even the local production of LCD screens involves acquiring many components and parts directly from China and then assembling them in North Korea, if not buying them whole from China and just stamping them with North Korean logos. Given all these factors, it is rather curious that the otherwise feeble North Korean economy and military industry could develop, design, and construct an MBT with comparable characteristics and systems as the most modern and powerful vehicles from the United States and Russia.
The Soviet Afghanit system which the New North Korean MBT is trying to emulate was based on decades of Soviet experience in the field starting from the late 1970s Drozd and going through the 1990s Arena. Similarly, the first American MBT to field APS protection is the M1A2C from 2015, which uses the Israeli Trophy system which entered production in 2017. Given that the USA, the largest economy in the world and the largest military spender in the world, did not develop its own APS system, it is extremely unlikely that the North Koreans were able to do so and emulate a highly advanced system such as Afghanit. While there is a chance that North Korea might have acquired this system from Russia, there is nothing to indicate that the Russians would be willing to sell this highly advanced system, let alone to a pariah state such as North Korea. However, this calculation may have been changed significantly by the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine, with Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un meeting in person in September 2023 to discuss some sort of military and economic collaboration. Another plausible import source would be China, which also has locally developed hard-kill APS.
Similar arguments can be made for the New North Korean MBT’s Remote Weapons Station, Advanced Infrared Camera, advanced composite armor, and main sights. It is highly unlikely that North Korea was able to develop and build these systems on its own. This leaves only two possible options: either these systems were acquired from abroad, most likely from China, which does seem improbable nonetheless, or that they are partly fakes meant to deceive its enemies.
The Lying Tiger
As in most nationalist-communist countries, propaganda plays a very important role in the ongoing functioning and perpetuation of the North Korean regime. It is spearheaded by the cult of personality for the current leader, Kim Jong-un, and for his forefathers, Kim Jong-il and Kim Il-sung, and of Korean exceptionalism. North Korean propaganda makes full use of the full censorship of information from the outside to paint all the rest of the world as a barbaric and monstrous place, from which the North Koreans are sheltered by the ruling Kim family and the North Korean state.
While North Korean propaganda plays an important role in perpetuating the North Korean regime internally through the vilification of the rest of the world, constant lying about the achievements of North Korea, and some outright fantastic claims (such that North Korea is the second happiest country in the world), its annual military parades are becoming more and more targeted to the outside, projecting North Korea’s power and dangerousness to its enemies.
These military parades have become a nearly yearly occurrence under the new leader of North Korea, Kim Jong Un. Furthermore, they are broadcast live through the Korean Central Television, one of the state-owned broadcasters in North Korea. Furthermore, the television channel is broadcast for free outside North Korea’s borders. This is how the world found out so quickly about the new North Korean MBT presented in the 2020 parade.
However, this has allowed the military parades to become more than just an internal show of strength and military power. They are now also a way for North Korea to publicly broadcast its capabilities and intimidate any potential enemies.
What must be remembered at all times is that a military parade is not an accurate representation of the military power of a country nor of the capabilities of the vehicles presented. It is a show meant to present the army, its units, and its equipment in the best and most impressive light. The equipment presented does not have to be in use, fully developed, or even real to appear on a parade.
North Korea has a long history of being accused of presenting fake weapons on its parades. In 2012, a team of German military experts claimed that the North Korean KN-08 ICBMs presented at a parade in Pyongyang were just mock-ups. They also mentioned that the Musudan and Nodong missiles presented in a 2010 parade were just mock-ups and not the real thing.
Similar accusations emerged in 2017 from former military intelligence officer Michael Pregend, who claimed the North Korean equipment presented during a parade that year was unfit for combat, highlighting the AK-47 rifles with attached grenade launchers.
However, the fact of the matter is that it can not be proven either way. There is no way for actual military researchers to get access to North Korean technology and the North Koreans refuse to publicly release any information on their equipment. With parades and carefully crafted material distributed through official channels being the only way to get a look at the newest North Korean military technology, it must be kept in mind that there is no guarantee that the systems shown are truly operational or fully developed or that they have all the capabilities that are presented. The information that can be gleaned is superficial, with most details that are crucial to understanding the capabilities of a modern weapon system being either inaccessible or obscured.
Appearances
Although the M-2020 is a modern main battle tank with only ten (9 in parade, 1 exposed) have been observed until now (May 2024), it has appeared many times in the nearly three years since the day of its first public appearance.
After the 75th Anniversary of the foundation of the Workers’ Party of Korea on 10th October 2020, it was presented to world customers on October 2021 during P’yŏngyang’s military Expo known as Self-Defense 2021 together with many other weapons systems developed in the last years by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, such as the 300 mm KN-09 multiple rocket launcher system and KN-23 and KN-24 tactical ballistic missiles.
During this military exhibition, the M-2020 was given a place of honor on the stage where Marshal Kim Jong-un gave speeches.
The third occasion during which Western observers spotted the M-2020 was during a parade for the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea on 15th January 2021, when a total of eight tanks paraded through Kim Il-sung Square.
On 25th April 2022, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un organized a parade for the 90th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Korean People’s Army. Others have pointed out that it was also to celebrate the 100th birthday of Kim Il-sung, founder of the nation. At the parade, 8 pre-series M-2020 appeared for the fourth official time.
Externally, they were unmodified. It is possible that some of the expected development and modifications have been delayed by the Covid-19 pandemic and its financial impact, in spite of the regime’s best efforts to prevent the virus entering the country and stopping its spread. Similarly, development and modifications may have been affected by the main focus being on missile tests over the last two years. In the period of January to April 2022 alone, North Korea has launched 20 missiles.
However, they had a new three tone light green, dark green, and khaki spot camouflage, more suitable for the North Korean terrain than the original tan camouflage. Hwasŏng-17 missiles, already seen in the 2020 parade and which recently completed a successful launch test on 24th March 2022, were also at the parade.
For over a year, between May 2022 and July 2023, the M-2020s disappeared from the radars only to appear on three different occasions in late July 2023.
On 26th July 2023, Russian Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu arrived together with a Russian military delegation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. According to North Korean and Russian sources, the visit was made to improve diplomatic relations between the two nations, while Western sources suggested it was an excuse to distance Shoigu from Moscow after the Wagner Group rebellion on 23-24th June 2023 and to agree on ammunition supplies from North Korea to support the conflict in Ukraine.
During his short presence in Korea, Sergei Shoigu visited the new military expo in P’yŏngyang, Self-Defense 2023, accompanied by Kim Jong-un himself. In one of the images of the visit, between many multiple rocket launcher systems, tactical ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles, an example of M-2020 Model 2023 can be spotted in the background.
On the same day, an official video of the M-2020’s firing tests and active protection system tests were made public by the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). The M-2020 was successfully tested in the Machine Plant managed by Ho Chol-yong (more simply known as Kusong Production Plant) Proving Ground as satellite images had suggested.
On the evening of 27th July 2023, Kim Jong-un, together with the Russian and Chinese delegations (the latter arrived after the military expo visit) attended the parade in commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War. During the parade, eight M-2020 Model 2023 opened the column of armored vehicles. It was the first official appearance of the Model 2023 to the rest of the world.
On 14th March 2024, the KCNA published an article on its official website, the day before, Marshal Kim Jong-un, Pak Jong-chon, Secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK, Kang Sun-nam, Minister of National Defence of the DPRK, Ri Yong-gil, Chief of the General Staff of the KPA oversaw a training session of the best crew members of the 105th Armored Division ‘Seoul’, the best trained and equipped division of the Korean People’s Army Ground Forces.
A total of eight M-2020 Or. 2023s were deployed probably at the Geombullang Training Area for the first time and cooperated with another unit equipped with Ch’ŏnma-216. After the training, Kim Jong-un spent some time with the crews and also took a short drive on the new MBT. Returning the tank to its crew, Kim Jong-un then took a commemorative image with the North Korean tank crews which participated in the training.
This event removes any doubt about the credibility of the vehicle, proving that it is not a mock-up or a fake. Obviously this training, which showed only a total of 8 vehicles of this model, does not confirm the beginning of its mass production, but only the transition from a tank seen only in parades to a tank that actually entered service in the KPA.
M-2020 Appearances
Date
Occasion
Note
10th October 2020
75th Anniversary of the foundation of the Workers’ Party of Korea
9 vehicles in 3-tone desert camouflage
21st October 2021
Self-Defense 2021 military expo
1 vehicle
15th January 2021
8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea
8 vehicles in 3-tone desert camouflage
25th April 2022
90th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Korean People’s Army
8 vehicles in 3-tone continental camouflage
27th July 2023
Sergei Shoigu visit/70th Anniversary of the Day of Victory in the Great Fatherland Liberation War
8 M-2020 Obr. 2023
13th March 2024
105th Armored Division ‘Seoul’ Training
8 M-2020 Obr. 2023
On 28th May 2024, Kim Jong-un officially visited the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s National Defense Academy for the 60th anniversary of its foundation. The leader of the North Korean nation visited a series of exhibition halls in which various models of vehicles were shown, including the 155 mm-armed M-2018 self-propelled howitzer, a tracked self-propelled mortar carrier, a 8×8 fire support vehicle, and the M-2020 Obr. 2024. A framed picture of Kim visiting the M-2020s inside the production plant could be seen on one of the walls of the exhibition. In the caption of the image, the tanks were called 천마-2호 or Ch’ŏnma-2. As such, it can be established that this is the official name of the tank. This follows the historical name of older North Korean Ch’ŏnma tanks based on the T-62.
Production and Assembly
As claimed by the North Korean defectors, the M-2020 prototype was tested at an imprecise Tank Research Center in North Korea, probably the Kusong Tank Plant, known in North Korea as the “Machine Plant Managed by Ho Chol-yong” in the Kusong province.
The M-2020 pre-series was also assembled at the Kusong Tank Plant, the only MBT production plant in Korea and one of the largest factories of the country.
In the past years, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had increased its production capabilities of tracked armored fighting vehicles and Transporter Erector Launchers (TELs), the vehicles that transport and launch missiles.
In order not to slow down the production of other tracked armored vehicles assembled at the Kusong Tank Plant, construction of a new large production hall and at least four smaller buildings began in late 2020. The other buildings near the bigger production hall were probably used to store and hide raw materials, semi-finished parts (such as engines, main guns, etc.) awaiting for assembly, and finished vehicles from spy satellites.
Due to the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic, construction of the plant was halted, just like production of the M-2020. However, in June 2023, satellite images showed that the construction of the production hall and other buildings was finished and probably the M-2020 mass production was finally started.
Could North Korean Tanks Finally Confront their South Korean Counterparts?
The M-2020 is surely a great improvement to the KPA’s armor capabilities that were totally outdated before their arrival.
In theory, the M-2020 totally outmatches the M48A3K, M48A5K1, and its sub-variants still in service in the ROKA. It is probably roughly comparable to the K1 produced by South Korea from the Chrysler XM1 prototype, but it probably still falls short to the most modern variants of the K1: the K1A1, K1A2, and K1E1.
The M-2020 is inferior to the K2 ‘Black Panther’ Main Battle Tank which entered service in 2014 due to the fact that the K2 is now considered to be one of the most advanced tanks in service anywhere in the world.
In general, these comparisons are valuable on paper, but as the Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022-present) has suggested, on the battlefield, nothing works as planned.
Roughly speaking, South Korea has in service 600 M48s in its various sub variants, 33 T-80Us and 2 T-80UKs received from Russia as a part of payment for a debt created during the Soviet era, 1,500 K1s in its various upgrades, and 206 K2s (plus 204 that are planned to be delivered in two different batches between 2023 to 2028). North Korea has 10 M-2020s confirmed by photographic evidence in service and it is unlikely that they would match South Korean numbers of modern tanks in a short period. This would force the KPA to rely on a fleet of less modern tanks in case of war against South Korea.
Despite its limited production, the integrated laser rangefinder, enhanced night vision optics, fire-control system, and stabilized gun would sensibly increase the anti-tank performance of the M-2020 that is capable of engaging targets day and night, even moving at low speeds. These capabilities were previously only limited or not even encountered on older North Korean tanks.
The modern composite armor, Explosive Reactive Armor, Active Protection System, and Laser Warning Receivers would increase the durability of the crew members permitting to adequately respond to threats on the battlefield.
Conclusion
As with all new North Korean vehicles, it was immediately assumed that the vehicle was a fake meant to arouse astonishment and confuse Western analysts and armies. According to some, this is actually an older Korean tank modified to fit new tracks and a seventh wheel in the running gear, but with a dummy superstructure.
Others claim it really is a vehicle of a new conception, but with the more advanced systems being fakes, either to deceive or to act as stand-ins until the real things are developed, like the remote weapon turret with a grenade launcher, the APS and its radars. In fact, these systems would be an almost unbelievable upgrade for North Korea, which has never showcased anything like this before.
With the entry into service in 2014 of the South Korean K2 Black Panther, North Korea also had to present a new vehicle that would be able to cope with the new South Korean MBT.
The vehicle presented by Kim Jong-un, the supreme leader of North Korea, seems like a very modern and technologically advanced vehicle. If Western analysts are not mistaken, it will be able to effectively confront, in a hypothetical conflict against NATO nations, the most modern Western vehicles.
Its profile is completely different from previous North Korean vehicles, showing that even North Korea, perhaps with the help of the People’s Republic of China, is able to develop and build a modern MBT. However, it must be considered that, no matter how advanced the vehicle may be, North Korea will never be able to produce enough of them to be a threat to world security. The real threat from North Korea comes from its nuclear weapons and its vast conventional arsenal of artillery and missiles. The new tanks will be used as a deterrent against a possible South Korean attack.
A detail not to be underestimated is that the nine models presented on 10th October 2020 are probably pre-series models and that, in the coming years, production vehicles should be expected if this vehicle is really meant to see service. However, as of September 2023, no more than 9 vehicles have ever been spotted at any one time.
Sources
Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans – The Armed Forces of North Korea: On the Path of Songun
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (1978-Present)
Main Battle Tank – Unknown Number Built
The Ch’ŏnma, better known under the unofficial designation of Ch’ŏnma-Ho, is the second North Korean-produced Main Battle Tank (MBT) in service with the Korean People’s Army. Originally, the Ch’ŏnma was a licensed production version of the T-62 Soviet MBT built in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It was intended to equip its armored divisions with an indigenous tank capable of facing the US-made MBTs serving in the Republic of Korea Army in the late 1970s.
The program fulfilled the request, and for about a decade, the DPRK deployed MBTs capable of dealing with South Korean armored fighting vehicles north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Despite its initial superiority over South Korean tanks, with the appearance of the K1 Main Battle Tank in the late 1980s, the Ch’ŏnma became obsolete. Already in the early 1980s, North Korean technicians tried upgrading the tank with indigenous programs. These upgrades led to the development of the Ch’ŏnma-92, Ch’ŏnma-98, and other later variants.
The high production costs of the upgraded Ch’ŏnmas forced the Korean People’s Army (KPA) to still maintain early production Ch’ŏnmas with small upgrades in service to this day, swelling the ranks of the KPA in case of a massive attack through the DMZ.
Korean Tank Production
From the creation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea until the late 1960s, its army was equipped with Soviet and Chinese armored vehicles. About 1,000 T-34-85 medium tanks and an unknown number of T-54-2s and T-54-3s were received by the Hermit Kingdom.
As the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea officially claims, its tank industry was born in 1967, with the creation of production lines for PT-76B light amphibious tanks, of which serial production started in the 1970s. In 1968, a T-55 assembly line was initiated and production started shortly after. In both cases, production was only possible with a great deal of support from the Soviet Union, which retooled the Sinhung (for light tanks and APCs) and Kusong (for heavier vehicles) production plants in North Korea.
Ever since, the two production plants have become the backbone of North Korean tank production, with many hundreds of vehicles produced each year. In 2023, the plants were modified and retooled, and it seems that Sinhung now has the task of producing North Korean MBTs.
In the late 1960s, the first production lines for the Soviet BTR-60 were assembled in Korea with Soviet help. Production of the North Korean indigenous copy of the Soviet armored personnel carrier, called ‘69’, started in 1969.
This North Korean-improved version of the Chinese YW 531A amphibious APC featured an elongated hull, hydro jets, and a rotating turret armed with two 14.5 mm KPVT heavy machine guns.
Ch’ŏnma Theories
It has been stated many times that the DPRK ordered 500 T-62s from the Soviet Union in two batches in 1970 and 1974, which were delivered between 1971 and 1978. This information seems to have appeared in various early 2000s unofficial and unconfirmed reports, but seems to be completely wrong.
The most accurate current theory states that, between the early and mid-1970s, the DPRK asked the Soviet Union for new T-62s, probably also placing an order in the early 1970s. The Soviet Union, which never delivered T-62s to Korea, organized the production of the MBT in Korea as it had done for the PT-76B, T-55, and BTR-60. Also, in this case, the Soviet Union probably donated a T-62 production line to the DPRK.
The drastic deterioration of the international relationship between the Soviet Union and the small Korean peninsula nation in the mid-1970s due to the Sino-Soviet Split forced the Korean technicians to start their production without additional Soviet aid. The DPRK took the Chinese side and the diplomatic relationship with the Soviet Union collapsed. The planned production of the T-62 seems to have been canceled since China did not produce, nor possess, T-62s, except for a single T-62 captured by the People’s Liberation Army during the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clash along the Ussuri River. That single vehicle was jealously guarded by Chinese engineers for testing and evaluation.
It is possible that, as other unconfirmed sources state, the DPRK could have received at least one T-62 from Syria in the early 1970s, after the Yom Kippur War, and started the reverse engineering process to produce it.
In the late 1970s, the Korean T-55 copy production in the Kusong production plant gradually decreased in order to reorganize the production lines. From North Korean sources, confirmed by the CIA, in 1976, the first T-62 left the production line with the Korean designation of Ch’ŏnma (Korean: 천마), referring to the Korean mythological flying horse. It was designated by the US Department of Defense (DoD) as Chonma-Ho I or Chonma-Ho Ga. The Korean People’s Army and official North Korean sources never called the main battle tank Ch’ŏnma-Ho.
A plethora of North Korean-made design elements present on these initial Ch’ŏnmas make North Korean-licensed production the most likely theory and indicate that these were not merely bought from the Soviet Union or assembled in North Korea with Soviet-produced components.
CIA reports also claim that the Ch’ŏnma production started in 1978 (when the Soviet Union ended its T-62 production), reaching large-scale production in 1980.
Design
Hull
The serial production Ch’ŏnma copied the hull of the Soviet T-62 Obrazets 1962 and the turret of the Soviet T-62 Obrazets 1972.
The hull of the Ch’ŏnma, with the same dimensions and characteristics as the original Soviet one, was not equipped with supports to mount anti-mine roller devices, such as the KTM-7, on the front glacis. This is still a major and puzzling shortcoming for North Korean MBTs that need specialized vehicles to clear minefields. This would slow down any attack through the 4 km deep Demilitarized Zone, which is completely covered by minefields.
The hull’s rear could be fitted with supports for external drum fuel tanks to increase the range of the Ch’ŏnma. Despite this, the fuel drums were rarely seen mounted on the North Korean Main Battle Tanks. The absence of external fuel tanks could be explained by the scarcity of fuel in North Korea due to embargoes, the small dimensions of the nation, and their vulnerability even to light arms fire.
Suspension
The North Korean MBT had 5 big “starfish” style road wheels on each side, torsion bar suspension, and probably a copy of the Soviet V-55V diesel engine delivering 580 hp. This should have been sufficient for the Ch’ŏnma, which weighs about 37 tonnes.
The Ch’ŏnma had slightly longer and different rubber covers on the rear mudguards compared to the T-62.
The tracks adopted by Koreans are all-iron single-pin links designed and produced by the North Koreans, although similar to the Soviet and Chinese track links. It was common for Ch’ŏnmas in foreign service to be equipped with Soviet RMSh or OMSh single-pin links.
Starting in the early 2000s, the Ch’ŏnmas appeared on parades equipped with modern rubber-padded track links. These were probably adopted in order not to damage P’yŏngyang’s streets during parades.
Turret
Other differences with the Soviet T-62 MBT regard the turret. The loader’s rounded hatch is different, together with the anti-aircraft mount that is equipped with a Korean-produced 14.5 mm KPVT heavy machine gun instead of the Soviet 12.7 mm DShKM. The loader’s hatch can be rotated and used to protect the loader by opening it forward. Due to the larger dimensions of the anti-aircraft machine gun, the hatch was modified compared to that of the original T-62. The machine gun was installed on a mount that rotated with the loader’s hatch. In other words, the heavy machine gun had a traverse of 360°, increasing the anti-aircraft and support fire of the Ch’ŏnmas compared to regular T-62s.
Another modification that could be easily spotted is the presence of the handles welded on the turret’s sides. On the Soviet T-62, there were two handles on each turret side, while, on the Ch’ŏnma, there is one handle on each side.
Apart from these small details and different cast turret weldings, the Soviet and North Korean Main Battle Tanks are externally identical.
As on the T-62, the driver is positioned on the front left side of the fighting compartment, the commander and gunner are on the left of the cannon and the loader is positioned on the right. There are only 3 hatches for the crew members, one for the driver, one for the commander and the gunner, and one for the loader.
There are some theories regarding the Ch’ŏnma’s armor being different to the T-62. There is no supporting evidence to the claim that the armor of early production Ch’ŏnmas was made of thinner armored plates than on the Soviet T-62. As it was a copy, the armor should have had the same thicknesses, even though the quality of the steel it was made from was probably lower than the Soviet equivalent. It seems that no foreign nation that operated the Ch’ŏnmas ever complained about thinner armor, or in general, the quality of the armor.
The armor of the Ch’ŏnmas was adequate to deal with South Korean MBTs at least until the introduction of the K1 Main Battle Tank designed by US Chrysler Defense and South Korean Hyundai Precision Industry in 1987.
Main Armament
The main armament of all the heterogeneous variants of the Ch’ŏnma was a copy of the Soviet 115 mm U-5TS semi-automatic smoothbore cannon with roughly comparable characteristics.
When the Ch’ŏnma entered production, the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) could not oppose it with MBTs of similar quality. Compared to the 90 mm rifled cannon that armed the M47 and M48 tanks that the ROKA had in its ranks, the U-5TS had greater penetration, due to a muzzle velocity of 1,600 m/s, and better angle performance. Unfortunately, the bad quality of the aiming devices did not allow gunners to take full advantage of the cannon’s capabilities.
The North Korean technicians repeatedly tried to improve the poor precision of the cannon with a laser rangefinder, fire-control systems, and barrel sleeve, but these expensive solutions were rarely adopted on early production Ch’ŏnmas. Even nowadays a great part of the KPA’s Ch’ŏnma fleet are not equipped with these upgrades.
Nothing is known about KPA ammunition, except that it was considered by South Korean analysts to be similar in anti-tank performance to its Soviet counterparts. Many sources state that the Ch’ŏnma could carry a total of 40 115 mm rounds, as on the T-62.
In the 2010s, with the introduction of new versions of the Ch’ŏnma, new 115 mm rounds were developed and produced, or at least this is claimed by analysts. It is not known if the older versions of Ch’ŏnma could fire this supposed new ammunition.
Secondary Armament
As secondary armament, the Ch’ŏnma had a coaxial 7.62 mm medium machine gun derived from the Soviet PKT. As an anti-aircraft gun, a 14.5 mm KPVT heavy machine gun was operated by the loader. The weight of the gun is about 50 kg, which forces the loader to elevate it using handwheels. The total ammunition carried for the 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun is unknown. In contrast, for the 14.5 mm KPVT heavy machine gun, a maximum of 3 magazines, probably 50 rounds each, are transported outside the tank and fixed on the turret’s rear. But it is also unknown if any additional magazines are carried inside the hull.
The KPVT machine gun was extremely versatile when the vehicle entered service, capable of hitting flying targets, supporting infantry with heavy fire, and even capable of dealing with lightly armored vehicles, such as the US M113 armored personnel carriers.
Nowadays, the 14.5 mm machine gun can be deployed in a more limited capacity against South Korean or US helicopters, for infantry support, and with lucky shots, against UGVs or loitering ammunitions.
During a parade in 2010, some early Ch’ŏnmas were spotted with a pintle mount for a MANPADS (MAN-Portable Air-Defense System) missile on the rear of the turret, presumably to increase the anti-aircraft defense of the MBT. It seems to be manually operated and a crew member or an infantryman has to stand on the engine deck to operate the missile. Such devices disappear during exercises and seem to be meant only for parades.
Despite the difficulty in operating the system, this new upgrade (seen only on a small number of Ch’ŏnmas) could be a serious threat to enemy planes that want to attempt to attack a tank or column of vehicles on the move.
Upgrades
Several small modifications were made to the basic Ch’ŏnma main battle tank during the 1980s to increase the capabilities of the North Korean tank.
1st Upgrade
The first upgrade of the Ch’ŏnma was spotted during a parade in 1986. It had a new turret bustle to increase the turret’s interior space. It seems to be used to store the radio and other equipment to free up space inside the turret for a ready-to-use 115 mm rounds rack, perhaps increasing the original ammunition capacity of 115 mm rounds.
The turret bustle was an indigenous modification never seen on the Soviet T-62 and shows the first Korean attempt to add changes to the aging Soviet design. The Ch’ŏnma MBTs with turret bustle filmed in 1986 also had new night vision optics for the tank’s commander, mounted on his cupola.
This variant of Ch’ŏnma was also sporadically equipped with mounting points for slat armor on the turret side and metal bars with brackets to also equip the hull sides with slat armor. The slat protection consisted of welded weave-mesh panels positioned several inches from the hull and turret that were easy to fix using short brackets.
The new model of Ch’ŏnma never received an official designation, nor an unofficial one. Its rare appearances during Korean parades and military training suggests that very few were produced.
The slat armor supports were retrofitted on some early Ch’ŏnma already produced and even on earlier Soviet and Chinese origin tanks in service with the KPA, such as T-34-85s, Type 59s, and T-55s.
The slat armor, even if now quite obsolete against HEAT warheads from MBT rounds or Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs), could be useful in a modern conflict against loitering munitions, which have shown themselves to be more and more effective in the Nagorno-Karabakh War (2021) and Ukrainian Conflict (2022-23).
2nd Upgrade
A second upgrade for the North Korean Ch’ŏnma MBT was first spotted in 1985 and officially shown, during a parade, in 1992 for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the KPA. Laser rangefinders assembled by North Korea were positioned on the main guns and a new Fire-Control System was installed. This upgrade was intended mainly to overcome the firing limitations of the second generation Main Battle Tanks. Combined, they increased the speed of target acquisition and first hit compared to the previous older optical devices.
The laser rangefinder mounted on the Ch’ŏnma has a different appearance from the Soviet KTD-1 and KTD-2 laser rangefinders mounted on Soviet MBTs and it was probably developed by Korean technicians.
In addition, the turret was fitted with two small boxes on the rear. These boxes were used to store tools and other items. Night vision optics using infrared light were also installed.
This upgrade was named Chonma-Ho II or Chonma-Ho Na by the US DoD, but it did not have an official KPA designation. It was probably intended to upgrade all the existing Ch’ŏnmas with laser rangefinders and fire-control systems, but the high costs of conversion probably forced the Korean People’s Army’s High Command to abort the plan in favor of installing new hardware on the most modern Korean-built MBTs. The small boxes on the turret rear and night vision devices were also retrofitted on early produced Ch’ŏnmas.
Production and Deliveries
The Korean People’s Army has never made public the number of Ch’ŏnma main battle tanks in service in its ranks. It is currently estimated that between 800 and 2,600 Ch’ŏnmas of all variants have been produced. Other analysts have placed the number at between 1,000 and 1,500 Ch’ŏnmas of all variants produced, and this seems to be a more plausible count.
The factories that produced the tank at least until the 1990s were located in Sinhung, South Hamgyong Province, under the 2nd Machinery Industry Bureau of the 2nd Korean Economic Committee. The biggest one seems to have been the Ryu Kyong-su Tank Factory, which started the production of new main battle tanks in 1992. Components and subsystems were produced by factories across the country, with some components presumably imported from the People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, Eastern Europe, or the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The first examples went on to equip the 105th “Seoul” Tank Division, the KPA’s elite unit and only armored division. In the following years, the Ch’ŏnmas also equipped part of the 10 tank brigades and other mechanized units in the KPA ranks.
After the early 1990s, with the fall of the Soviet Union, North Korea lost its greatest source of food causing a famine. Until the late 1990s, the great famine killed over 500,000 people and forced the country’s leadership to cut funding for defense.
As a result, fuel and ammunition resupply to units was lowered and, from the testimonies of North Korean deserters, it appears that the majority of the North Korean main battle tanks were parked in depots for the majority of the year. They were only taken out a handful times each year for overall maintenance and division-size training exercises.
Because of DPRK’s limited economical and industrial capability, and the priority given to the nuclear program, until 2010, the Korean factories had produced only small quantities of modern tanks, forcing the KPA to maintain hundreds of unupgraded Ch’ŏnmas in service.
Starting in the 1990s, Korean tank crew members used dedicated training vehicles and equipment to improve their skills on Ch’ŏnmas.
The Ch’ŏnma armored units are positioned north of the DMZ and in P’yŏngyang, and are ready to intervene in case of a new conflict breaking out with South Korea.
In the early 2000s, South Korean and US intelligence reported that the Korean People’s Army had about 4,300 Main Battle Tanks and light amphibious tanks in its ranks, out of about 40,000 armored fighting vehicles, SPGs, APCs, SPAAGs, towed artillery, and MRLSs.
At present, the older Ch’ŏnmas variants are supposedly being withdrawn from service in favor of upgraded Ch’ŏnmas or the newer, more powerful Songun-215 main battle tanks that appeared during the 65th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea military parade in 2010.
If the mysterious new M-2020 main battle tank enters service with the Korean People’s Army, the older Ch’ŏnmas will likely be replaced in the armored brigades by the more modern Ch’ŏnma-216 and Songun main battle tanks.
These vehicles will likely be either scrapped or repurposed into specialized vehicles. However, the Ch’ŏnmas could potentially find a second life by being sold at a favorable price to nations unable to afford more expensive Chinese or Russian equipment. Countries like Eritrea, Yemen, and Zimbabwe require an expansion of their armored units with cheap tanks. For instance, Eritrea and Zimbabwe are currently equipped mostly with T-55 and T-62 tanks.
Export
Iran
The Iranian Revolution, which began in 1978, led to the deposition of the Shah (King) Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in early 1979 and the installation of religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini. In September 1980, the Iraqi Republic, led by Saddam Hussein, invaded Iran, sparking the bloody eight-year-long Iran-Iraq War.
During the early stages of the Iran-Iraq War, the Islamic Republic of Iran faced great military difficulties and subsequently started purchasing large quantities of weapons and equipment from various sources in order to bolster its forces.
The DPRK reportedly sold an unknown number of Ch’ŏnma tanks to Iran in the early 1980s, with some sources claiming the number to be 150, though this was never officially confirmed. The tanks were part of a larger supply of war materiel that also included 170 mm Chuch’e p’o self-propelled guns, multiple launch rocket systems, small arms, and ammunition.
The service record of the Ch’ŏnma tanks during the Iran-Iraq War is unknown, as is the opinion that the Iranian Army had of them. In general, the Iranian view of Korean equipment during the war was negative, particularly when it came to light arms. However, there is a lack of information regarding heavier equipment. Despite the bad reputation of Korean light arms, it appears that heavier equipment, such as self-propelled artillery and main battle tanks, remained in service even after the war.
The surviving Ch’ŏnma tanks were later deployed by the Islamic Republic of Iran Army for many years and occasionally appeared in military parades in Tehran. At least one example was displayed at the Museum of the Islamic Revolution and the Holy Defense of Tehran. Their current service in the Iranian Army is unknown.
During the Iran-Iraq War, at least one Ch’ŏnma tank was captured by Iraqi forces and likely left abandoned in an Iraqi depot. In 2003, the tank was discovered by US forces abandoned on the roadside and subsequently moved to an Iraqi Captured Vehicles depot, where it was eventually scrapped.
Ethiopia
The relationship between the DPRK and the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was established in 1974, when a military coup in Ethiopia overthrew Emperor Hailé Selassié I and installed a new Marxist regime under the control of the Derg, a military junta that ruled Ethiopia. During the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia from 1977 to 1978, North Korea delivered an unknown number of self-propelled guns, small arms, and ammunition to Ethiopia.
North Korea also delivered an unknown number of Ch’ŏnma tanks to Ethiopia in the early 1980s. However, due to the complete absence of reports and photographic evidence , it is unclear how many tanks were delivered, when they were delivered, and their service history. It appears that the Ch’ŏnma tanks did not participate in the Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia from 1977 to 1978, as mass production of these tanks did not begin until 1978, after the end of the conflict.
In the early 1980s, Ethiopia entered into a bloody civil war. Overall, the role of the Ethiopian Ch’ŏnmas is uncertain. A handful of pro-government Ch’ŏnmas took part in the desperate defense of Addis Ababa in May 1991 among a greater number of Soviet T-62s. At least three were positioned by the Government forces at Addis Ababa’s Royal Palace for a last stand. Alongside an unknown number of T-62s, they faced the rebel forces that attacked the Royal Palace on 28th May 1991. One was destroyed and burned out during the fight, while another was probably captured by the rebel forces.
The active service of the Ch’ŏnmas during the confusing and bloody civil war shows how the vehicle could be operated even by inexperienced crews and in the almost total absence of spare parts.
The standard of North Korean equipment, often considered of a low quality and unreliable, is elevated thanks to their service in Ethiopia, which used the Ch’ŏnmas for about a decade, helping to qualitatively reassess the North Korean tanks.
It is unknown if Ethiopia deployed Ch’ŏnmas in the Eritrean–Ethiopian War between 1998 and 2000 in which dozens of main battle tanks were lost in combat. The lack of information or even images showing tanks in service does not allow the identification of any Korean MBTs in service.
For the same reason, it seems that nowadays the Ethiopian Ground Force does not have Ch’ŏnmas in its ranks. During the Tigray War between November 2020 and November 2022, both factions used many Soviet and Soviet-inspired main battle tanks in combat. Even if photographic evidences do not show North Korean vehicles, it is possible, that it will eventually emerge that some of the tanks deployed in the conflict were old North Korean Ch’ŏnmas. Even the Tigray militias that fought against the government forces were equipped with Cold War-era MBTs , among which may be a handful of Ch’ŏnmas.
Eritrea
Eritrea currently has some Ch’ŏnma MBTs in service in an unknown but limited number. It is not clear if Eritrea inherited them after independence from Ethiopian Army depots, if they were captured in battle, or whether the Ch’ŏnmas were handed over to Eritrea by North Korea after 1991. Despite North Korea’s alliance with Ethiopia during the Eritrean Independence War that broke out in 1982 during the Ethiopian Civil War; Korea and Eritrea created a strong relationship, while relations between Ethiopia and North Korea were cut again. As many Western sources have confirmed, North Korea has sold small arms and communications technology to Eritrea. The shipment of new North Korean tanks would be surely spotted and tracked by Western observers.
During a parade in August 2019 celebrating the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the Sawa Military Training Centre and the launching of the National Service Programme in Siwa, at least one Ch’ŏnma was spotted between some Eritrean T-62 Obr. 1962s and T-62 Obr. 1972s. The vehicle, which had received a new camouflage, had a peculiar Eritrean modification. The 14.5 mm PVK heavy machine gun was mounted coaxially to the main gun on the right side. This characteristic modification is also visible on the standard Soviet-origin T-62s during the same parade.
Unfortunately, due to the absence of other photographic sources, it is impossible to state how many North Korean Ch’ŏnmas are currently in service with the Eritrean Army. The Eritrean example easily shows how the Ch’ŏnmas are roughly comparable to the Soviet T-62 main battle tanks for their robustness and reliability. The Eritrean Ch’ŏnmas have been in service for nearly four decades.
Modernized Versions
Ch’ŏnma-92
The Ch’ŏnma-92 was presented at a parade for the 60th anniversary of the founding of the KPA, on 25th April 1992, and showed off new North Korean upgrades, such as a new welded turret equipped with Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) blocks on the sides, a thermal sleeve for the gun, eight smoke dischargers per side, and a new laser rangefinder mounted on the barrel. The chassis seems unmodified even if it was equipped with rubber side skirts.
This new Ch’ŏnma variant was presumably produced in small numbers as a stopgap to counter the South Korean K1. The Ch’ŏnma-92 was unofficially known by Western commentators as the M-1992 and designated by the US’ DoD as Chonma-Ho III or Chonma-Ho Da.
Ch’ŏnma-98
The Ch’ŏnma-98 was first spotted during a parade in 2000 and featured a new welded turret shaped like more modern Chinese MBTs, such as the Type 85. Albeit with a new shape and dimensions, it seems that the optical devices and the crew member’s hatches remained in the same position as on the previous cast turret.
It shared many of the upgrades of the Ch’ŏnma-92, such as side skirts, smoke launchers, and a new model of laser rangefinder over the barrel.
Analysts have reported that North Korea could have imported fire-control systems and thermal imaging cameras, and even a new autoloader for this tank from the Islamic Republic of Iran, but these suggestions have never been confirmed by official sources.
The Ch’ŏnma-98 has rarely been spotted in parades and the like, with its last appearance being at the North Korean Tank Exhibition on 12th April 2012 for the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Kim Il-sung. It is officially known with the US’ DoD designation of Chonma-Ho IV or Chonma-Ho Ra.
Ch’ŏnma-214
The Ch’ŏnma-214 appeared for the first time in 2001. It seems to be the serial production version of the Ch’ŏnma-98. The vehicles shared many upgrades, such as the same turret and laser rangefinder, even if the Ch’ŏnma-214 received add-on armor on the frontal part of the turret to better protect the vehicle. The Ch’ŏnma-214 is also equipped with rubber flaps under the add-on armor and on the lower side of the hull.
The Ch’ŏnma-214 is rarely spotted in military parades in P’yŏngyang or other North Korean cities. This would suggest that the Ch’ŏnma-214 was a simple stopgap, perhaps serving as a pre-series for the next-generation North Korean main battle tanks.
The US’ DoD designation for the Ch’ŏnma-214 is Chonma-Ho V or Chonma-Ho Ra.
Ch’ŏnma-215
On 16th February 2002, US intelligence reported that a new North Korean main battle tank was tested in the P’yŏngyang area. The development of the new Ch’ŏnma-215 had probably already started in 1992, when the DPRK received a T-72 “Ural” from unknown sources. Work was most likely carried out by the 2nd Economic Committee and the 2nd Academy of Defense Sciences.
New features included an anemometer, used to better calculate gunfire, increasing the precision of the U-5TS gun coupled with a new laser rangefinder. Laser rangefinders of the same model are also mounted on the modern Songun main battle tanks.
It appeared with add-on armor on the hull front and rubber flaps on the lower hull’s front. The turret add-on armor seems to be different from the previous one on the Ch’ŏnma-214.
A 6th road wheel was added to the vehicle, increasing the total length of the vehicle, thus permitting the designers to increase the turret diameter.
The Ch’ŏnma-215, as many other North Korean vehicles, has received several unofficial designations, from M-2002 and Chonma-Ho VI (Chonma-Ho Ma) in the early 2000s, to P’okp’ung-Ho I adopted later in 2010 when it was first spotted.
Ch’ŏnma-216
The most recent version of the Ch’ŏnma series is the Ch’ŏnma-216, which appeared for the first time at the North Korean Tank Exhibition on 12th April 2012. It was then spotted in several parades held in subsequent years. The Ch’ŏnma-216 received the US’ DoD designation of P’okp’ung-Ho II.
On this version, the smoke launchers are mounted in two rows, instead of a single row, as on previous models.
An upgraded variant was spotted for the first time in 2014. It had an increased armament with two ATGMs and MANPADS for air defense. This increases the offensive capabilities of the vehicle against more modern South Korean main battle tanks.
In 2018, the Ch’ŏnma-216 was seen with a plethora of new upgrades, including two ATGMs mounted on the left side of the turret. On the rear of the turret, a lowerable support for two MANPADS was also mounted. It appears the ubiquitous 14.5 mm KPVT heavy machine gun has been abandoned for heavier support guns and two 30 mm automatic grenade launchers, which are a copy of the Soviet AGS-17.
To increase the protection of the vehicle, new Laser Warning Receivers (LWRs) have been added on the turret sides to detect enemy rangefinder’s laser beams and automatically activate the smoke launchers to cover the vehicle with a smoke screen.
Ch’ŏnma designations
Name
US’ DoD designation
Other names
Ch’ŏnma
Chonma-Ho I or Chonma-Ho Ga
Ch’ŏnma
Chonma-Ho II or Chonma-Ho Na
Ch’ŏnma-92
Chonma-Ho III or Chonma-Ho Da
M-1992
Ch’ŏnma-98
No DoD designation
Ch’ŏnma-214
Chonma-Ho IV or Chonma-Ho Ra
Ch’ŏnma-215
Chonma-Ho V or Chonma-Ho Ra
P’okp’ung-Ho I or M-2002
Ch’ŏnma-216
Chonma-Ho VI or Chonma-Ho Ma
P’okp’ung-Ho II
Variants
Ch’ŏnma ARV
The Ch’ŏnma Armored Recovery Vehicle is based on a turretless Ch’ŏnma chassis with three hatches to protect the crew. Unlike other armored recovery vehicles of its era, it is not equipped with a dozer blade or crane, and it is probably only deployed to tow damaged or broken-down vehicles. This has forced the Korean People’s Army to adopt other specialized vehicles for other engineering roles, such as bulldozers and cranes.
The Ch’ŏnma ARV was also spotted during a military training exercise with a KPVT heavy machine gun and over 10 soldiers riding it. This could probably mean that it can also be deployed to transport a sapper squad and support it with machine gun fire in specific situations.
Ch’ŏnma Bridgelayer
The Ch’ŏnma Bridgelayer has only been spotted a couple of times in official North Korean videos of military training exercises. It is a Ch’ŏnma with its turret replaced by a special bridge-launching equipment similar to the one mounted on the Slovakian MT-55A armored vehicle-launched bridge. The bridge can be deployed to overcome obstacles, such as anti-tank ditches and small rivers, and could be an effective support vehicle in the Korean peninsula.
Conclusion
On occasions, people tend to underestimate the DPRK’s tank production capabilities. Even if the early series Ch’ŏnmas are totally outdated nowadays, it could effectively be used by a fierce army of fanatics ready to defend every inch of North Korea from an attack. Even during the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the better-equipped Russian Army was forced to reactivate some T-62s for use, even if they are not more than infantry support vehicles. With upgrades such as laser rangefinders and Fire-Control Systems, some Ch’ŏnmas could prove to be troublesome enemies to deal with, even for the better-equipped US Army and ROKA forces.
It should also be noted that the DPRK was the only country under Soviet influence to produce a licensed copy of the T-62, giving luster to the country’s war industry, which was also able to export several hundred examples to other nations.
Despite the bad reputation that gravitates to everything produced and exported from the DPRK, the Ch’ŏnma appears to be one of the few vehicles with comparable capabilities to its Soviet counterpart, the T-62. Its service of more than four decades in the KPA and some African nations are a testament to North Korean capabilities.
Regardless, under present circumstances, a fleet of hundreds of Ch’ŏnmas cannot compete against the more modern South Korean and US MBTs deployed south of the Demilitarized Zone.
Ch’ŏnma Specification
Size (L-W-H)
9.350 x 9.335 x 2.395 m
Weight, battle ready
~ 38 tonnes
Crew
4 (commander, gunner, loader, and driver)
Engine
V-55V diesel engine copy delivering 580 hp
Speed
~ 50 km/h
Range
~ 400 km
Armament
Korean copy of the 115 mm U-5TS cannon, 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun, 14.5 mm anti-aircraft machine gun, and from 2010, 1 MANPADS
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (2009-Present)
Main Battle Tank – Unknown Number Built
North Korea, or officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), stands as one, if not the most isolated major tank manufacturer in the world. Sometimes thought of as a relic of the Cold War desperately clinging onto existence, the country, sometimes known as the Hermit Kingdom, has long wanted to assert its independence from the Soviet Union and China when it comes to its military equipment, long before the Soviet Union even collapsed.
The country’s military industry started becoming increasingly independent in the late 1960s. Since then, it has put out vehicles differing more and more significantly from their Soviet or Chinese ancestors. Despite the harsh interruption of the 1990s crisis and famine, the 2000s have seen a significant renewal for North Korea’s tank industry, with a large variety of new vehicles introduced since the start of the 21st century.
One of the most significant and iconic of these developments is the Songun-Ho main battle tank, unveiled during the 65th anniversary of the Worker’s Party of Korea military parade. When unveiled, it was one of, if not the North Korean MBT that appeared to differ the most from the T-62 on which the Hermit Kingdom based its Chonma-Ho series of main battle tanks.
Roots of a new tank: The quest for a T-72 and upgrades to the Chonma
North Korea started local production of Soviet tanks, first in the form of the PT-76 and T-55, in the second half of the 1960s. These first production runs were not entirely accomplished by North Korea in isolation. A high degree of Soviet involvement was noted, but exactly how deep this was is unclear. It could range anywhere from the North Koreans just assembling vehicles from Soviet-made parts all the way to the Soviet Union delivering just the plans and critical elements. This first North Korean experience in armored vehicles manufacturing proved crucial for the nation, allowing it to be in possession of facilities able to manufacture armored vehicles, in the form of the Sinhung and Kusong tank plants. The Sinhung plant was mainly involved in manufacturing light and amphibious vehicles, whilst the Kusong plant is the producer of North Korea’s MBTs.
In the late 1970s, North Korea started the production of its Chonma-Ho series of main battle tanks, at first a mere slightly modified model of the Soviet T-62. These vehicles would become the mainstay of North Korea’s armored force, despite no large quantities of T-62s ever having been acquired from the Soviet Union. As early as the 1980s, the North Koreans started to upgrade the vehicles, giving them at first laser rangefinders (first observed in 1985) and later explosive reactive armor, welded turrets, and smoke grenades dischargers (M1992 & Chonma-92, first observed in 1992)
However, at the same time as upgrading the existing T-62s, it quickly became evident the technology of the T-62 would not be sufficient forever. The tank was actually superior to the M48 fielded by the South Korean Army (Republic of Korea Army, ROKA) for several years after its introduction in 1978. However, developments in the USA and South Korea, which would result in the M1 and K1, would quickly make the Chonma obsolete. The result was that North Korea was in dire need of more advanced components. With relations having considerably worsened with the Soviet Union ever since the Sino-Soviet split, acquiring highly modern and critical technology from them was not a possibility. North Korea therefore needed to find a way to acquire a tank more modern than its T-62-based Chonma-Ho if it wanted to not be completely superseded technologically.
A solution would appear in the form of the geographically distant but diplomatically close Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran and the DPRK had quite close diplomatic bonds, with the North Koreans having supplied about 150 Chonma-Ho tanks to Iran during the early phases of the Iran-Iraq War beginning in 1980. As a result, when the Iranians managed to capture some T-72s Ural tanks from the Iraqi Army, it is no surprise that a battle-damaged vehicle ended up being shipped to North Korea in the early-to-mid 1980s. The existence of this tank is confirmed by some partial footage from the era.
Whilst the T-72 Ural was far from the most advanced model of T-72, it at least provided North Korea with a 125 mm gun and, to a moderate extent, a more advanced engine, suspension, and armor arrangement to study. Despite rumors of North Korea acquiring T-72Ms from the Soviet Union or even T-90MS from Russia in the 1990s, this T-72 Ural acquired from Iran appears to actually be the only T-72 North Korea ever got its hands on.
Droplets of T-72 dropped onto T-62s: The later Chonma-Hos
The acquisition of a T-72, even if it was a fairly primitive model, was a major step in the evolution of North Korea’s main battle tanks. It significantly helped North Korean engineers in developing components more advanced than those found on the original T-62 to use in the Chonma-Ho series.
While North Korea appeared on its way to considerably upgrade the Chonma-Ho in the early 1990s, in the form of the M1992 & Chonma-92 notably, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its consequences for North Korea (with a famine) put a tragic halt to these developments. In 1994, as Supreme Leader Kim Il-Sung passed away, a tragic famine that would last until 1998 touched North Korea, resulting in 500,000 to 600,000 excess deaths and stopping new military developments pretty much completely. Only a fairly modest new model of the Chonma made its appearance in the later half of the decade and was known as the Chonma-98. In comparison to the Chonma-92, the Chonma-98 featured little more than a lower ERA coverage and slight modifications to the turret and side-skirts.
The first signs of influence taken from the T-72 and other modern Soviet MBTs would appear in the Chonma-214, first seen in 2001. This tank replaced the ERA with applique armor on the turret and additional bolted-on armor on the upper front plate and steel plates on the hull sides. It also included front rubber flaps covering the lower front plate, in a fashion similar to the much more advanced T-80U. A new front drive wheel inspired by the T-72’s design was also featured. Finally, while the exact nature of these additions is pretty much impossible to assess, seeing as it would require much more direct access to the North Korean vehicles, the Chonma-214 likely features a more advanced fire control system and its predecessors – the influence of the T-72 likely being significant in its design.
The T-72-influenced features of the Chonma-214 would be conserved and expanded upon by two subsequent models of the Chonma; the Chonma-215, of which production started in 2003, and the Chonma-216, of which the production started in 2004. The Chonma-215’s most significant modification was switching the original chassis from five to six road wheels, as on the T-72. The length of the tank had, however, not been significantly lengthened in adding this new wheel. Whilst the wheels retained a ‘starfish’ style similar to the T-62 and earlier Soviet tanks, they had been reduced in size by about 10%, making them somewhat more reminiscent of T-72 wheels in comparison to the original configuration. The vehicle also featured considerable additional applique armor and elements suggest its fire control system was considerably improved – a wind sensor notably appearing to have been added.
The Chonma-215 would be fairly elusive and short-lived though, being very quickly followed up by the Chonma-216. For this vehicle, the North Korean engineers took the six-road wheel base of the 215 and used it to extensively modify the chassis, which was somewhat lengthened; the engine compartment, notably, was considerably redesigned and appeared much more similar to the T-72’s, suggesting a similar engine may have been adopted for the vehicle. The suspension was also redesigned to resemble the one featured on the more modern Soviet tank; the arrangement of the smoke grenade dischargers was altered to resemble the one of more modern Soviet tanks more closely. Lastly, it has occasionally been theorized the vehicle may feature a 125 mm-gun based on the T-72’s 2A46, but it appears more likely the Chonma-216 retained the original 115 mm U-5TS. It would, however, be the last North Korean main battle tank to retain this armament.
On the path of Songun…-Ho
The various evolutions of the Chonma-Ho in the 2000s show increasing influence from Soviet designs of the late Cold War on North Korean tank designs. This is likely out of an effort to try and at least somewhat compensate for the technological advantage South Korea had acquired in the late 1980s and 1990s thanks to its K1 main battle tank and its subsequent models. Although it appears beyond doubt that vehicles such as the Chonma-214 or Chonma-216 improved the combat values of the Chonma-Ho and were quite significantly superior to the original T-62, they still had no chance of realistically competing with South Korea’s K1. In order to at least try and compensate for the technological gap, a considerable jump would have to be performed from the base of the T-62. This jump would be unveiled to the eyes of the world in 2010, during the 65th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea military parade, in the form of the new Songun-Ho or Songun-915 main battle tank, a type of tank which appears to have entered production in 2009.
As always with North Korean vehicles, the development of the Songun-Ho is more than nebulous and its history is best derived from an analysis of the observable elements of the tank, and attempts to try and find or at least theorize on their origin. The tank was likely designed after the Chonma-216, and serves as a logical conclusion to North Korea’s experience taking inspiration from the T-72 and other late Soviet tank designs: designing a new, or at least mostly new tank on the basis of experience gained by studying those designs.
Design
The New Tank’s Hull
The new Songun-Ho features a vastly modified hull in comparison to the previous Chonma-216. Though it is still based on the Chonma, to an extent, it incorporates more changes than any individual model of the previous series ever has.
The change that is perhaps the most indicative of the considerable structural evolutions the Songun-Ho has undertaken is the driver’s position. On all models of the Chonma-Ho, the driver sat to the front left of the hull, as on the T-62. The Songun-Ho instead uses a central driver’s position, a layout similar to the one of the T-72.
The hull of the Songun-Ho appears to have been widened in comparison to its predecessors, sitting at about 3.50 m in width, in comparison to 3.30 m on the T-62 and likely all Chonma-Ho models. The vehicle, however, appears to retain the same 58 cm-wide OMSh metallic hinge track as found on Chonma-Ho and T-62s. Although those tracks are fairly outdated and somewhat primitive by modern standards, they allow for commonality with older models and allow North Korea’s industry not to have to do a fairly hard and expensive switch to a new set of components. Those tracks can also be fitted with rubber pads in order not to cause damage in urban areas during parades.
In terms of length, the distance between the first and last axles of the road wheels present on the Songun-Ho appears to be of about 4.06 m, a value similar to the T-62, and those road wheels are separated by 30 track links, as on the old Soviet tank. This makes it obvious that the size of the Songun-Ho’s wheels has been reduced, seeing as it maintains the 6 road wheels configuration of the Chonma-216. The vehicle still uses ‘starfish’-type road wheels, as on previous tanks and, just as with track links, this part commonality likely is a significant factor in the decision to maintain old components. The tank uses torsion bar suspension, and photos of the vehicle without side skirts during military exercises have revealed it has 3 return rollers. The vehicle features thick rubber side skirts covering the upper suspension, like previous North Korean tanks; its fenders slope downward, as on the T-62, but feature a rubber covering, as on the T-72.
The overall length of the Songun-Ho’s hull is about 6.75 m, with the engine compartment overhanging further than the rear idler wheel by several decimetres. This is only slightly longer than on the old T-62, which was about 6.63 m long. Nonetheless, the engine compartment of the Songun-Ho appears quite different from previous vehicles. Interestingly, it includes grills not only on top of the engine, but also on the rear of the right mudguard. North Korean sources claim the Songun-Ho uses a 1,200 hp engine that propels it at 70 km/h. This claim of the vehicle featuring such a powerful engine is likely an overestimation done for propaganda purposes, but the Songun-Ho does quite likely feature an engine developed from the T-72’s, likely quite more powerful than those used on previous Chonma-Hos. Considering the vehicle has a fairly moderate estimated weight of about 44 tonnes, it may still have a very decent mobility.
The Songun-Ho’s upper front plate has always been seen under a cover of explosive reactive armor plates. Two headlamps are present on the front-sides of this ERA covering. The lower front plate is hidden by a thick rubber sheet, as on the T-80U and later models of the Chonma-Ho. Behind the ERA covering, the Songun-Ho is thought to have some form of basic composite armor, though likely simplistic and dated in its composition. Again, the assumption would be that this composite would be derived from the T-72 Ural.
An Odd Return to Cast Turrets
Though it has some new features, the hull of the Songun-Ho differs much less significantly from previous North Korean tanks when it is compared with the tank’s very peculiar turret.
While new North Korean tanks had been using welded turrets ever since the early 1990s, the Songun-Ho saw a return to a cast turret. It is a design somewhat similar to the T-62 in general appearance, but much taller and more bulbous. A number of reasons can be found to justify this increase in size.
Firstly, the Songun-Ho is the first North Korean tank that is certified to feature a 125 mm gun. The most likely inspiration for this gun came from the 2A26M2 or 2A46 present in the T-72 Ural, however, the external appearance of the gun shows it is not an identical copy. The gun is very likely compatible with most, though not all Soviet and Chinese ammunition, and North Korea very likely produces local shells as well, although how advanced they are is a question to which an answer is unlikely to be forthcoming. It is, however, fairly certain that the North Korean 125 mm gun is not able to fire gun-launched anti-tank missiles. The larger size of this gun is a reason to accomodate a larger turret and the higher roof of the Songun-Ho’s turret may be to allow for more depression as well. Unlike the vast majority of Soviet and Chinese 125 mm-armed tanks, the Songun-Ho has not opted for an autoloader, which may have been too complex to manufacture and fit into a hull still based on the Chonma-Ho. Instead, the tank has a human loader, meaning the turret houses three men, an oddity in modern designs that take their roots in Soviet principles. With the gun included, the vehicle appears to be around 10.40 m long.
The Songun-Ho’s turret features a laser rangefinder (LRF) on top of the gun. It is smaller and likely more modern than previous North Korean LRFs, but remains external, an archaic feature in modern tank design. An infrared spotlight is mounted on the right of the gun, linked to it via braces in order to accomodate elevation. This is a very common feature in North Korean tanks. The loader sits to the right, the gunner to the front left, and the commander to the rear left.
The vehicle has another commonly-found feature in the form of the 14.5 mm KPV machine gun mounted on top of the turret. Its presence on the right side suggests it is operated by the loader. This machine gun very likely is not remotely operated, meaning the loader has to open the hatch and make himself vulnerable to small arms fire in order to operate it. Another secondary weapon that has been present since the first parade of the Songun-Ho is an Igla man-portable anti-aircraft missile, installed to the left of the turret and likely operated by the commander; this is once again a common feature in North Korean vehicles. However, footage of the Songun-Ho during exercises seems to suggest this missile is rarely if ever used in the field. A coaxial 7.62 m machine-gun of unknown model (perhaps a PKT) is very likely present as well.
Though cast, the Songun-Ho’s turret features a fairly large rectangular turret basket, with two storage rails encompassing its surface. The nature of this basket is not exactly known – it may serve to house ammunition or provide more internal space. The most likely theory is that it actually contains storage boxes that can be accessed from outside the vehicle. The tank’s smoke dischargers are installed on the turret sides, in front of the basket, with a bank of four dischargers on each side. A cross-wind sensor is also installed seemingly on top of the turret basket.
A drawback of cast turrets is that they typically are a lot harder to fit with composite armor. This does not deter North Korean sources from claiming the Songun-Ho’s turret offers “900 mm of protection”, though they do not specify whether this is against APFSDS of HEAT projectiles. In any case, it is very unlikely the turret actually provides this amount of protection. While it is reasonable to expect the Songun-Ho to have some form of composite armor array in the turret, the combination of cast turret and, in general, likely fairly primitive composite armor technology in use by North Korea does not bode well for the turret’s capacity to withstand modern anti-tank ammunition.
Modifications to the Songun-Ho
After it was first unveiled in 2010, the Songun-Ho has been shown in a couple of other configurations which differ from the one first seen in 2010 by the presence of turret ERA as well as secondary armaments.
The first modified version, which may have been seen as early as 2010, differed from the original by the presence of ERA blocks on the turret. These ERA blocks are placed on the turret front and front-top, providing additional protection on the frontal arc of the turret. Curiously, the blocks present on both sides of the mantlet appear to be double-stacked. The ability for ERA to work while double-stacked is one which is far from present in all ERA blocks, typically present only in some more modern blocks, and it is quite surprising North Korea has already developed such a type of ERA blocks (though some sometimes claim the only reason while North Korea uses double-stack ERA is for deception purposes). Vehicles using this double-stack ERA have been seen in both the single-color camouflage used in the 2010 parade as well as a more colorful yellow and green camouflage seen in later parades, particularly in 2017. North Korean sources claim their turret ERA provides an additional protection that would be valued at 500 mm, in addition to the 900 mm that would already be provided to the turret, giving it a protection value of around 1,400 mm. Once again, this is very likely an exaggeration, and the type of ammunition that would be used is not even mentioned.
Another early configuration of the Songun-Ho, seen in a military exhibition, featured the above mentioned ERA package, as well as two Konkurs Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) present on the right front of the turret. The use of external ATGMs on the Songun-Ho, which re-occurred at a later date, is thought of as a proof the North Korean 125 mm is not able to fire any gun-launched missile, and likely indicate the penetration capacities of the gun are limited to an extent, seeing the need for missiles that likely improve the penetration of enemy armor quite significantly. The same configuration also sports two other missiles, which appear to be an unidentified type of man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADS).
Another form of early configuration the Songun-Ho has been shown in is an amphibious crossing configuration, in which the vehicle is fitted with a snorkel for river crossing operations; the turret-mounted machine-gun is also covered by a protective cover in this form.
The most visually impressive configuration that the Songun-Ho has been shown in, and which brings far more additional armaments than the previous, is the new weapons package that has been seen on some tanks in 2018.
This was first seen during the parade for the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the DPRK. On the right of the turret, the 14.5 mm KPV machine-gun has been replaced by a dual 30 mm automatic grenade-launcher, a weapon of North Korean design. Instead of a single Igla missile, two were mounted on a tall, mast-like superstructure at the center rear of the turret. Lastly, a new anti-tank missile launcher can be seen on the right hand side. Cleaner than previous launchers in designs, it appears the missiles it launches are North Korea’s Bulsae 3. Claimed to be similar to the powerful Russian 9M133 Kornet in capacities, some other sources indicate than the Bulsae 3 likely is an improved model of the old Fagot ATGM, which North Korea has copied as the Bulsae-2.
The main modification of the Bulsae-3 would be the replacement of wire guidance by laser guidance, based on technology indeed taken from Kornet missiles that North Korea would have received not from Russia but from Syria, with which the Hermit Kingdom maintains some significant military ties. However, recent evidence has mostly ruled out the roots between the Bulsae-3 and the Fagot, and the missile indeed appears some form of local Kornet copy. Their addition to this armament package likely indicates they are thought of as superior to the Konkurs missiles in any case.
The operation of the weapons present in this package is somewhat questionable. The weapons do not appear to be remotely operated, which means their operation in active combat would likely be a considerable risk for the crew. It has been suggested the package may be present purely for show – and would not actually be used in exercises or active operations. It is indeed not that uncommon to see North Korean tanks in exercise footage field none of the missile armament they may have been seen with in parades, although this could be for the far simpler reason of avoiding damage to things not essential during training.
At the same time, it appears that this armament package was only fitted to newly produced vehicles, showing that Songun-Ho production has continued through the 2010s. It is known the Kusong tank factory has known some considerable slow-downs in Chonma-216 and Songun-Ho production at times though, due to the factory also being involved in production of hulls for ballistic missile launchers or self-propelled artillery. How many Songun-Ho have been manufactured is therefore very much unknown, but likely either in the high tens or low hundreds. The vehicles are very likely operated by some of the best equipped and trained North Korean armor regiments operating near the DMZ, the so-called “demilitarized zone”. This is, in practice, the very-much militarized border between the two Koreas, where the most well-trained and equipped troops of both armies tend to be located.
Meaning of the Name
The “Songun” name of the tank is a reference to the policy of Songun, which roughly translates to “military first”. Though North Korea has been a particularly militarized state ever since the 1960s, this policy has been an official component of the ruling Juche ideology only since the 1990s. It has become a major aspect of it, as North Korea continues to upscale and invest as much as it can into its military – seemingly its only way to obtain some find of leverage and assurance of its survival. The name of what was, in 2010, North Korea’s newest tank and first member of a line of new models ever since the Chonma-Ho introduced in 1978, is therefore “Songun”. As for the -Ho suffix, it is the standard North Korean designation for a tank model.
Conclusion – The future of the Songun-Ho
Overall, the Songun-Ho is a particularly interesting vehicle. A significant jump forward from the previous Chonma-216, it is still likely highly inferior to the newest South Korean tanks, the K1A1, K1A2, and K2 Black Panther. Still, the improvements it brings to North Korean armor are not to be ignored and it should be remembered that the ROKA still operates a considerable number of M48A3K and M48A5K/K1/K2. Against these tanks, the Songun-Ho likely has both a firepower and protection advantage. Against perhaps even the first K1 model, which notably retained a 105 mm gun, the Songun-Ho may very well have a chance, although its fire control system likely is not as advanced. While the tank is certainly not as advanced as contemporary MBTs, the step forward formed by the Songun-Ho should not be underestimated. After all, just 10 years prior to the type being introduced, North Korea fielded nothing better than the Chonma-92 or 98, which were little more than T-62s with laser rangefinders, smoke dischargers, and ERA. As such, the Songun-Ho marks a substantial increase in military capability for North Korea.
Recent developments have shown that North Korea likely is very much aware of the Songun-Ho’s inferiority. On October 10th 2020, a new model of main battle tank appeared during the 75th Workers’ Party of Korea anniversary parade. While how many of this tank’s features are real and how many are fake is very much still in debate, the vehicle appears to take the base of the Songun-Ho tank and to considerably expand on it – a manifestation of North Korea’s wishes to try and close the technological gap in particular with South Korean and American tanks. While this new type now enters service, it is very likely the Songun-Ho may still be in production for a while, remaining one of the most modern tanks in the Korean People’s Army’s arsenal.
Songun-Ho specifications (estimations)
Dimensions (L-W-H)
~6.75 m (hull only) or 10.40m (hull and gun)/3.50 m/unknown (estimations)
Total Weight, Battle Ready
~44 tonnes
Engine
1,200 hp engine (North Korean claim); likely a derivative of the T-72’s V-12 diesel engine
Suspension
Torsion bars
Maximum speed (road)
70 km/h (claimed)
Crew
4 (driver, commander, gunner, loader)
Main gun
Local 125 mm gun derived from the 2A46M, with laser rangefinder, IR searchlight, crosswind sensor
Secondary armament
Likely a 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun (all configurations), 14.5 mm KPV & Igla missile (original configuration), AT-5 Sprandel/Konkurs & unknown MANPADS (first known other configuration), Dual 30 mm AGS, Dual Igla missiles, dual Bulsae-3 launcher (2018 configuration), a single 14.5 mm KPV machine gun (exercise configuration)
Armor
Composite array & ERA claimed to be equivalent to 1,400 mm (turret); hull armor unknown
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