Category: WW2 German Tank Destroyers

10.5 cm K gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette “Dicker Max”

Post author By Johannes Dorn
Post date August 21, 2023
10 Comments on 10.5 cm K gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette “Dicker Max”

10.5 cm K gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette. Illustration by Pavel Alexe.

German Reich (1941-1942)
Heavy Tank Destroyer/Bunker Buster – 2 Built

The “10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.)” (Eng. 10.5 cm cannon (armored self-propelled gun)) or “10 cm K. Pz.Sfl.IVa” (Eng. 10 cm cannon self-propelled gun IVa), more commonly known as the “Dicker Max” (Eng. Fat Max), was a German self-propelled artillery gun. Development started in 1939, with the Army requesting a mobile “bunker buster” to destroy the fortifications on the French border. However, it would never fulfill that role, since the only two vehicles ever built were completed in early 1941, well after the end of the Battle of France.

The tank was based on the reliable Panzer IV chassis and used the standard K.18 German heavy artillery gun. The ammunition used consisted of Tungsten core rounds, which, in combination with the high velocity of the gun, had great penetration capabilities. Both vehicles were sent to the Eastern Front as tank destroyers, where one of the two would prove itself very successful, destroying a large number of Soviet tanks.

Colorization of the second “10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.)”, part of “Panzerjäger Abteilung 521” (Eng. Anti-Tank Battalion 521). Photograph taken in the Summer of 1942 in the Soviet Union. Colorized by Johannes Dorn. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

Context: The Need for a “Bunker Buster”

One of the main problems that the German High Command faced during preparation and planning for what would become the Second World War was how to defeat France. The German-French border was heavily fortified on both sides, with the French Maginot Line in the Alsace-Lorraine province and the German Siegfried Line mirroring it. In the end, two plans were prepared. The first plan was to revisit the Schlieffenplan that was already used during WW1. The idea was to invade the neutral Benelux states and invade France through the Belgian border.

British Soldiers of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) enter a bunker complex of the Maginot Line in 1939. Source:
https://de.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datei:Troops_of_51st_Highland_Division_march_over_a_drawbridge_into_Fort_de_Sainghain_on_the_Maginot_Line,_3_November_1939._O227.jpg

The second plan was to power through the heavily fortified Maginot Line on the French-German border. However, this plan was only to be executed if the first plan failed. For this purpose alone, Germany started development of multiple heavy mortars, such as the 60 cm heavy mortar Gerät 40/41.

A map showing the strong and weak fortifications on the French border around 1940. Source: https://www.landofmemory.eu/de/sujets-thematiques/die-maginot-linie-und-die-deveze-bunker/

Beside this immense self propelled mortar, the Germans also intended to reuse the 8.8 cm Flak gun in this role. This gun was quite cumbersome to move, and in order to increase its mobility, two different proposals would be adopted.

The first would be created by placing the gun on a half-track chassis, creating the 8.8 cm Flak 18 Sfl. auf schwere Zugkraftwagen 12 t (Sd.Kfz.8) als Fahrgestell. The second variant was more orthodox in design, consisting of an armored half-track prime mover and a slightly modified 8.8 cm Flak 18 gun.

Both of these were built in limited numbers and saw use in their designated roles. Alongside the previously mentioned projects, the need arose for a much more compact self-propelled tracked chassis mounting a powerful gun that could deal with enemy concrete bunkers.

Some 10 8.8 cm Flak 18 Sfl. auf schwere Zugkraftwagen 12 t (Sd.Kfz.8) als Fahrgestell would be built. While having a number of issues with their overall design, these vehicles would prove to have excellent firepower against tanks and bunkers. Source: https://en.wheelsage.org/daimler-benz/db_s8/daimler-benz_db_s8/pictures/jy7d0g

Another proposal that was adopted in limited numbers was the Gepanzerter 8t Zugkraftwagen and Sfl.Flak. It was a more orthodox design, consisting of an armored half-track prime mover and a slightly modified 8.8 cm Flak 18 gun They would see action in France during 1940, after which they would be removed from service. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No. 22-5 Gepanzerter 8t Zugkraftwagen and Sfl.Flak

Development of the ‘Panzerselbstfahrlafette IVa’

Because Krupp had previously developed most German tanks, the Wa Prüf 6 (Eng. Army Design Office 6) once again contacted the firm in 1938. However, because Krupp had never designed a large caliber self-propelled gun, there were many different concepts and ideas on how this SPG would look. After having agreed on some specifications, Krupp started the development in 1939.

One of the first problems that occurred was where to place the engine. Krupp submitted two drawings in April 1939. In the first drawing, the engine was placed under the gun, in the front, which resulted in a shorter overhang, reduced by 800 mm compared to the second drawing, in which the engine was placed in the center. However, putting the engine below the gun resulted in numerous disadvantages that Krupp listed:

poor access to the engine
unfavorable installation of the radiator and cooling air fans
crew encumbered by heat and fumes
noise from the engine
complicated operation of the transmission
firing height increased to at least 2 m
nose-heavy vehicle

On the other hand, placing the engine in the center of the hull would result in a lower firing height of 1.7 m and easier access to the engine. Additionally, the center of gravity would be better placed. In the end, the Wa Prüf 6 went with the first plan, because they thought that 800 mm of additional overhang with the second engine location was too much to handle for such an SPG.

Next, it was settled that a 180 hp V-6 engine would be installed instead of a 320 hp V-12 engine. However, the drawbacks were an increased height of 100 mm. By May 1939, Krupp had to design a new variant of the SPG with the engine below the gun, a torsion bar suspension, and a 6-cylinder engine. On May 2nd, 1939, Krupp presented their new design. This design included the V-12 Maybach HL 120 engine instead of the agreed V-6, because they thought the V-6 would not be powerful enough.

Additionally, it offered easier access to the cylinders. The problem was that the V-12 was heavier and was planned to go out of production. In addition, Krupp proposed that they would use the steering unit and transmission of the VK9.01, but with dry-pin tracks and not lubricated ones. Lastly, a muzzle brake was installed. This reduced the recoil from 1,000 mm to 800 mm, which meant the gun could be moved 200 mm more to the rear. It was also specified at this point that the 10.5 cm K 18 gun was to be installed in the new SPG.

On May 15th, 1939, Krupp again met up with the representatives of the Wa Prüf 6, who decided in favor of a new design with a 200 hp Maybach HL 66 placed in the middle of the hull, with an estimated total weight of 22 tonnes. Krupp added a radiator behind the engine for better cooling. Additionally, the Wa Prüf 6 requested the recoil cylinder and recuperator be moved back to save space in the armored housing. It was also at this point that it was settled that a regular panoramic gunsight was to be used for indirect firing and a new periscope gunsight would be added for direct firing. After this, approval for constructing a full-scale wooden mock-up model was given to Krupp.

Later, Krupp would inform the Wa Prüf 6 that a weight increase could not be avoided if they intended to use a torsion bar suspension. Because of this, Krupp suggested using the Panzer IV’s leaf spring suspension to save weight. This caused a problem, as the Wa Prüf 6 had originally planned to use the torsion bar interleaved suspension with lubricated tracks with rubber pads to achieve the maximum possible speed. However, the Design Office knew that the excess weight that came with the torsion bar suspension could not be reduced from anywhere else and that, due to this excess weight, lubricated tracks without rubber pads would not work due to ground pressure limitations. The Wa Prüf 6 then thought about simply using a regular torsion bar suspension with dry pin tracks, like on the Panzer II Ausf.D1/2.

On August 10th, 1939, when the wooden mock-up model was completed, Wa Prüf 6 suggested reducing the hull width to match the one of the Panzer IV. Later, the final decision was made to limit the weight to 20 tonnes by using the 8-wheel leaf suspension and chassis of the Panzer IV. The Panzer IV was chosen over the Panzer III because, at that time, it was more readily available and lighter.

On August 21st, 1939, the decision was made to use the Maybach HL 66 P engine together with the transmission and steering unit of the VK9.02, after previously being proven to be compatible. This was very important, because higher turning power was needed, as the Panzer IV normally had a width to length ratio of 1:1.46 compared to 1:1 for the VK9.02. A maximum speed of 35 km/h was requested.

Krupp was then awarded a contract to produce two trial vehicles, with all necessary equipment and real armor. The gun was to be provided by the Wa Prüf 4 (Department for Artillery). On September 4th, 1939, Krupp presented the construction drawings. The SPG did not have a turret and the hull and superstructure were constructed as one unit. The two trial vehicles were to be completed by May and June 1940, with the armor hulls completed eight weeks prior so the gun could be mounted in time.

On the same day, the final changes before production were made. These included minor changes to the gun sights, mounts for the periscopes, changes to the gun shield, and the gunner’s hatch being made to be rectangular and counter sunk. Additionally, the range finder was omitted.

The second SPG in front of the barracks in 1942, after undergoing repairs. Source: Ebay, unknown seller

A “10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.)” stuck in the mud of the Soviet Union in autumn 1941. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

Name

The designation for the “10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.)” is quite complicated. First off, this article is referring to the vehicle as an SPG, because that was its original intended role, even though it was eventually used and classified as a tank destroyer.

During the entirety of the development and production, it was referred to as “10 cm K. Pz.Sfl.IVa”, which stands for “10 cm Kanone Panzer Selbstfahrlafette IVa” (Eng. 10 cm canon self-propelled gun IVa). On August 13th, 1941, the name was changed to “10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.)” which stands for 10.5 cm Kanone (gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette) (Eng. 10.5 cm canon (armored self-propelled gun)). After the war, the name “Dicker Max” appeared, which is nowadays the most popular name for the vehicle, presumably due to its simplicity and funny connotations.

Interestingly, in a diary entry of the commander of the second SPG, Kurt Hildebrandt, he gives the vehicle’s nickname as “Brummbär”.

The article iwill use the original designation when referring to the development/production/design sections and the second description when referring to everything after August 1941.

One of the two SPGs in the Soviet Union in August 1941. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

Production

During production, on October 11th, 1939, Wa Prüf 6 again met up with Krupp. They informed Krupp that the transmission of the VK9.02 would not be installed and the regular SSG 46 transmission should be used instead. However, this significantly reduced the speed to 25 km/h, as the gear ratio was only 1:8 at 188 hp.

During a production report in April 1940, Krupp stated that they were working on the next generation of AFVs, which included the “10 cm K. Pz.Sfl.IVa”. The completion date was extended to August 1940, since the need for such an SPG was reduced after the invasion of France, as the Germans attacked around the heavy fortifications of the Maginot Line. However, Krupp would only complete the two SPGs in January 1941. During a demonstration for Hitler on March 31st, 1941, it was decided that serial production could begin in spring 1942. However, this was never implemented and only the two AFVs were ever produced.

Presumably the second “10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.)” after it returned to the frontlines in summer 1942. Source: Ebay, unknown seller

Design

Hull

The 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.)’s hull was slightly redesigned in comparison to a standard Panzer IV hull. The forward-mounted transmission was unchanged. The difference was that it received a new angled top armor plate cover that completely enclosed it. The two hull frontal brake access hatches, including the large square-shaped bolted hatch, were retained. The engine and driver’s positions were moved to the center of the hull. The gun and its mount were placed directly above the enclosed engine. Lastly, to the rear, was the crew fighting compartment.

Presumably the first SPG in the Soviet Union in mid 1941. Source: Kurmark – Antik via Ebay

Suspension

Given that this vehicle was based on a Panzer IV chassis (unspecified version, but likely the Ausf.D or E), it used the same suspension. This consisted of eight small double wheels placed on each side, suspended in pairs, and placed on four bogie assemblies. The small road wheels were suspended by leaf-spring units. There were also four return rollers on each side. Finally, the drive sprocket was at the front and the idler at the rear.

The suspension was to be taken from the Panzer IV Ausf.E, while the drive sprocket appear to be taken from Ausf.D. The difference was in the covering caps. This basically changed nothing, as these were only minor mostly changes and performed the same. It also does not help that the Germans often mixed older and newer components on their vehicles.

The 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.) used a standard Panzer IV suspension. While not perfect, it was simple and easy to maintain. Source: https://www.tankarchives.ca/2016/12/dicker-max.html

Comparison between early type and Ausf.E type covering caps. Source: K. Hjermstad Panzer IV

In its early development phase, Wa Prüf. 6 and Krupp engineers often discussed what type of suspension to use. Several different proposals were made. This included the use of a torsion bar suspension and lubricated tracks without rubber pads. Ultimately, at the insistence of Krupp engineers and with the aim of saving weight and easing production, the use of the Panzer IV’s suspension was chosen. It weighed 430 kg less than a Panzer III’s torsion bar suspension. In addition, it provided more internal room and was generally easier to maintain. It was already in production, so there would be enough spare parts and it would also help save development time. Krupp still proposed that the Army should test a prototype that used a six-wheel bogie suspension. While Wa Prüf 6 considered and even issued a production order for a prototype equipped with this suspension for testing, it was eventually canceled, and no such vehicle was built.

The second SPG after arriving back at the front in 1942, giving a great view of the suspension. Source: Koelsch333 via Ebay

Engine

For the construction of this vehicle, the Panzer IV’s original Maybach HL 120 TRM engine, giving out 265 hp@2,600 rpm, was replaced with a much weaker Maybach HL 66 P, providing 180 hp@3,200 rpm. The engine was then connected to a forward mounted SSG 46-type transmission. Initially, a MAN Cletrac-type steering unit was to be used. However, this was replaced with a standard Panzer IV steering unit to simplify production.
With these changes, the maximum speed dropped considerably to 27 km/h. Krupp engineers were alarmed by the reduction of speed and requested that the transmission be changed. A possible replacement was the A.K.6 S 55, but this was not yet properly tested. To avoid delaying the project, it was decided to keep the SSG 46 transmission despite the reduction in speed. The change of engine also reduced the overall operational range, which was 170 km on road and 120 km cross-country. The fuel tanks were located in the front part of the hull, but their capacity is not specified in the sources.

The engine itself was moved to the center of the hull in order to allow for the necessary room for the crew. The engine was placed in a fully enclosed casing. Two ventilation ports were placed above the engine compartment. This arrangement would later be used on many German vehicles adapted for various roles, including the 15 cm armed Hummel self-propelled artillery, which was also based on the Panzer IV.

The decision to replace the engine with a weaker one was mainly motivated by the need to keep the vehicle’s overall height as low as possible. This decision would greatly and negatively affect the overall drive performance of the 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.). Given the reduction of speed, the whole point of providing a mobile support vehicle was lost. In order to engage a target, the whole vehicle had to change positions often, and, together with a weaker engine, often led to overheating problems.

Superstructure

For the construction of the superstructure of this vehicle, the Germans especially wanted to avoid using complex-shaped armor plates. Instead, they went for the simplest design possible. Starting from the front, the Germans added an enclosed housing to the left of the gun, where the driver was positioned. It was a simple box-shaped compartment with a front mounted pivoting driver vision port, vision slit to the left, and a hatch on top. The driver’s protective visor, the Fahrersehklappe 50, was 50 mm thick. When the visor was closed, the driver would use a binocular periscope to see through two small round ports located just above the visor. Opposite this compartment, the Germans placed another fake one. It was meant to confuse enemy gunners, so that they had a harder time hitting the driver.

The front superstructure plate armor was made of one large piece with a hole in the center for the gun itself. The side armor consisted of four welded armor plates. The lower two were placed straight up, while the upper two were slightly angled toward the center of the vehicle. The upper part of the side armor was cut down as it went toward the rear part of the vehicle. This was done intentionally to reduce the weight of the vehicle and would appear commonly on many later German vehicles of similar design. The rear part of the vehicle was protected by one larger armor plate. Two escape hatches were placed there.

The top part of the vehicle was mostly open. The exception was the front part of the vehicle, where the gunner’s periscope was positioned. In front of it was a small bullet splash protector. The rear part of the vehicle was also lightly protected in order to provide the loaders with some level of protection against aerial attacks. The crew fighting compartment was left open to facilitate ventilation of the smoke created during gun firing. It also provided a good view of the surroundings, reduced production cost, and overall weight. The downside though is obvious, as the crew was exposed to enemy fire and the elements.

In order to confuse the enemy, the Germans added a fake driver compartment on the right side. Opposite it is the real driver position, which was enclosed in a small box-shaped superstructure. While the driver would normally use the front pivoting vision port, if it had to be closed down, he would then use a binocular periscope to see through two small round ports located just above the visor. Source: https://www.tankarchives.ca/2016/12/dicker-max.html

The rear view of the vehicle. Notice the two hatches (the right one is open) which provide the crew with an entry point to their positions and to restock ammunition. Given that the vehicle was open-topped, the crew could easily just jump out of the fighting compartment. Source: https://www.tankarchives.ca/2016/12/dicker-max.html

A view of the fighting compartment. The internal space was rather cramped and only a limited amount of ammunition, important equipment, and the crew’s personal belongings could be carried inside. Source: https://www.tankarchives.ca/2016/12/dicker-max.html

Armor Protection

The thickness of the armor, like many other components, was determined by the weight limitations of the vehicle. To prevent the vehicle from becoming too heavy, the armor was kept relatively light. To enhance protection, the front armor plates were face-hardened.

The front hull had a thickness of 50 mm, while the upper front superstructure armor measured 30 mm. The box-shaped gun mantlet had a thickness of 50 mm. In contrast, the side hull and superstructure armor were thinner, measuring only 20 mm. The rear armor was even lighter at 10 mm. The upper armor varied between 10 and 20 mm in thickness.

The Germans made an intriguing addition to the vehicle by including a thin armor cover for the ammunition bins, even though the crew compartment was open-top. This feature aimed to offer some protection against potential attacks from enemy aircraft. However, doubts remain regarding the actual effectiveness and practicality of this measure.

In general, the armor thickness of the vehicle was considered relatively insufficient when compared to the standards of 1941. Nonetheless, the presence of a powerful and long-range gun helped alleviate this concern to some extent. The vehicle had the ability to engage targets from a distance, potentially preventing them from mounting effective counterattacks, at least in theory.

Main Armament – The 10.5 cm K18 Gun

The main armament chosen for this vehicle was the 10.5 cm K18 gun, which had been developed in the late 1920s. The designation “K18” was intentionally misleading, as the Germans were prohibited from developing new artillery after World War I. By using designations that falsely implied it was a pre-World War I design, they were able to bypass these restrictions. The K18 gun incorporated elements from both Krupp (carriage) and Rheinmetall (gun), which were merged together into a single design. Production began in 1933 after a successful testing phase, following a standard pattern similar to other modern German artillery pieces.

The gun featured a split-trail carriage and was connected to two large leaf-spring-suspended solid rubber-rimmed wheels. The barrel, housed in a protective jacket, was a single-piece design connected to a horizontally sliding breech. The gun was designed for towing by trucks or half-tracks, and if necessary, it could also be towed by horses, although in this case, the barrel had to be removed and placed on another trailer. It had a traverse range of 64° and an elevation range of 0° to +48°. With the strongest charge, it had a maximum firing range of just over 19 km. The gun weighed 5,640 kg when in action.

Despite its relatively long-range capabilities, the 10.5 cm K18 gun was considered to have a small caliber, despite its large size. However, it remained in use until the end of the war. An interesting aspect is that in the early stages of the war and during the invasion of the Soviet Union, it was often employed in anti-tank roles.

The 10.5 cm K18 gun was used as long-range artillery and, in an emergency, even as an anti-tank weapon. Source: https://ru.pinterest.com/pin/9781324180303270/

In order to fit inside this particular vehicle, the 10.5 cm gun had to undergo redesign. The gun was removed from its carriage and placed on specially designed mounting points located on top of the engine compartment. To accommodate the limited space, smaller recoil cylinders and recuperators were utilized. These modifications allowed for the omission of a large gun mantlet. Despite the reduced size, the gun maintained a sustained rate of fire of 120 rounds per hour (2 rounds per minute). A large muzzle brake was incorporated into the design, although it was later replaced by a smaller one when the gun was deployed on the frontlines. Additionally, a large travel lock was added to the front of the gun to support its heavy weight and long barrel.

In order to fit inside the vehicle, the original recoil cylinders and recuperators of the 10.5 cm gun were replaced with smaller ones. These modified components were positioned farther back, removing the need for a large gun mantlet. In the image, you can see the new recoil cylinder and recuperator located just above the breach block. Notably, ammunition bins for the rounds and propellant charges can be observed on the right side of the image. Additionally, the vehicle features a scissor periscope, which the commander used to assist in spotting targets. Source: https://www.tankarchives.ca/2016/12/dicker-max.html

The design of the vehicle’s gun system had some shortcomings, particularly in terms of its limited traverse and elevation capabilities. The gun had a traverse of only 16° and an elevation range of -15° to +10°. To operate the gun, the control wheels for both elevation and traverse were positioned on the left side of the vehicle, ensuring convenient access for the gunner. Each full rotation of the traverse wheel resulted in a traverse speed of 0.7°, while the elevation speed ranged between 0.7° to 0.8° per wheel turn.

The 10.5 cm gun exhibited remarkable anti-tank capabilities that served as a notable strength despite its design limitations. With a muzzle velocity of around 822 m/s (this varies slightly in different sources), it could penetrate up to 155 mm of armor at a range of 500 m. At a distance of 1 km, it was capable of defeating 128 mm of armor, and at 1.5 km, it could pierce 111 mm of armor. These exceptional performance characteristics established it as one of the most effective anti-tank weapons during the early years of the war.

The 10.5 cm gun employed a two-part ammunition system, comprising a propellant and a round. Although this type of ammunition slightly reduced the firing rate, it offered several advantages. It facilitated convenient storage within the vehicle and allowed for loading regardless of the gun’s position. Additionally, during firing, the gunner had the flexibility to utilize one or more charges as required. The ammunition load for the vehicle consisted of a total of 26 rounds, which were stored both on the right side of the crew compartment and in close proximity to the driver’s position.

Another ammunition bin was installed next to the driver due to the lack of internal space. Source: https://www.tankarchives.ca/2016/12/dicker-max.html

The gunner would employ the Selbstfahrlafetten-Zielfernrohr for direct firing, specifically targeting enemy armor. However, when fulfilling the role of mobile artillery for firing support at long distances, the Rundblickfernrohr 34 would be utilized instead. The effective range for direct firing was limited to 3 km, providing the 10.5 cm gun with substantial firepower to engage distant targets. Nevertheless, due to various factors such as poor visibility, adverse weather conditions, ammunition quality, or sheer luck, engaging enemy armor at longer ranges was infrequent.

While no secondary machine gun was incorporated, the crew members were equipped with 4 MP 40 submachine guns for close self-defense purposes alongside two magazine pouches for each weapon.

The newly built vehicles were initially supplied with a massive muzzle break which was, at some point, replaced with a smaller design. Source: https://www.tankarchives.ca/2016/12/dicker-max.html

Given the large size of the gun, it was necessary to install a forward-mounted travel lock. Source: https://www.worldwarphotos.info/gallery/germany/tanks-2-3/dicker-max/

Crew

The crew of the vehicle consisted of five: commander, driver, gunner, and two loaders. The driver enjoyed full protection as he was situated in the small driver compartment. The commander occupied the position on the right side of the gun and was equipped with a doppelscheren Turmspaehfernrohr scissor periscope for observing the surroundings. The periscope offered a 3x magnification and a 20° field of vision. Positioned opposite the commander was the gunner, while the two loaders stood behind them, prepared to load the gun.

The vehicle required a crew of five. Four of them were positioned in the rear, while the driver was alone in his small compartment. Source: https://www.tankarchives.ca/2016/12/dicker-max.html

A close-up view of the interior. The crew seats show the crew positions, with the gunner and the commander being placed forward and the loaders to the rear. Source: https://www.tankarchives.ca/2016/12/dicker-max.html

Organization and Doctrine

The two 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.) were assigned to one of the most famous German early to mid-war anti-tank units, Panzerjäger Abteilung 521 (Anti-Tank Battalion 521). This battalion fielded various anti-tank weapons, including the Panzerjäger I and the larger Panzerselbstfahrlafette für 12,8 cm Kanone 40. During Operation Barbarossa, the unit was initially part of the XXIV. Army Corps and later came under the command of the 3rd Panzer Division in September 1941. It was later incorporated into the XVII. Army Corps and participated in the Battle of Stalingrad, where it was ultimately destroyed as part of the 6th Army.

Within the Anti Tank Battalion, the two 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.) were organized into a new platoon, which consisted of a fighting column and an ammunition transport column. The fighting column included two 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.) vehicles, two Kfz.4 anti-air defense cars, and a Kfz.15 radio communication vehicle. This composition allowed for both direct and indirect fire capabilities, contributing to the battalion’s effectiveness in combat.

A great photo for showing what followed the SPGs around during an advance. In front are multiple cars with ammunition trailers. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

The primary purpose of this particular self-propelled gun was to engage and destroy heavily fortified concrete bunkers at long distances, all while maintaining its mobility on the battlefield. Additionally, it served as a formidable weapon against heavy tanks that were impervious to other anti-tank weapons. However, due to its delayed deployment, it did not have the opportunity to fulfill its original intended role during the events in France in 1940. Instead, when it was eventually sent into the Soviet Union in 1941, its focus shifted primarily to its secondary role of engaging and combating enemy tanks.

The second 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.) after it was sent back to the battlefield in mid 1942 with members of the Panzerjäger Abteilung 521. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

Combat Results

First stage – Operation Barbarossa and Early Losses

The following reports come from Panzerjäger Abteilung 521, which participated in the invasion of the Soviet Union on 22nd June 1941. The first operational report comes from 24th June 1941.

One of the two 10.5 cm K (gp.Sfl.) of Panzerjäger Abteilung 521 relatively early in the campaign against the Soviet Union, together with the ammunition column and a Panzerjäger I. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

The platoon was employed in a vanguard in the fight around the area east of Kobryn, where it fired HE rounds at infantry positions. In the evening, the platoon was supporting an attack by motorcycle gunners that crossed over a river. The SPGs engaged open artillery at a range of 1,100 to 1,700 m and successfully disabled them.

One of the two SPGs during the very early stages of Operation Barbarossa in a Polish village in 1941. Source: Auction-factory.de

During the advance on Slutsk on June 26th, 1941, an unfortunate incident occurred which resulted in the destruction of one of the self-propelled guns. Although the exact cause was not definitively determined, it is believed that the intense heat generated from the engine, combined with the exceptionally high temperatures outside on that day, led to a buildup of heat. Within the area, a small quantity of high-explosive (HE) grenades was stored, which likely ignited as a result.

Fortunately, the crew members were quick to react when they noticed a small burst of flame, allowing them to promptly evacuate the vehicle. All five crew members observed the SPG continuing to move for a short distance before coming to a halt. However, shortly thereafter, the flames spread and reached the main ammunition storage, causing a catastrophic fire. As a result, the vehicle was completely destroyed and had to be abandoned at the roadside. Remarkably, despite the loss of the vehicle, it was reported that the gun of the SPG remained intact and was still usable.

The first SPG after it burned out. Interestingly, this wreck would later turn out to be a popular photoshoot point, as many photos exist of different units passing by the wreck and examining the remnants. This also says a lot about how long a wreck would sit on that road side. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

Wehrmacht soldiers of presumably another unit examine the remnants of the SPG. The large opening and missing plates were not damaged by the fire but presumably the result of scrapping by other units. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

The report noted that the gun was still intact, which can be seen in this photo. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

At some point, a recovery vehicle pushed and tipped the wreck over. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

At another point in 1941, the wreck was recovered and driven into the woods for better examination. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

The first SPG at its new location in the woods, presumably to protect the scraping crew from Soviet aircraft. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

The same vehicle, presumably also photographed around the same time as above from a distance. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

What is likely to be the last photo of the first SPG destroyed. Looking at the last two photos, it appears that the SPG was either almost entirely blown up or scrapped for metal plates. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

On June 30th, 1941, the final remaining self-propelled gun confronted a Soviet armored train but was unable to halt its escape to safety. The SPG encountered an internal problem with one of its components, specifically a broken bolt in the slide mechanism of the steering brakes. This malfunction significantly impeded the gun’s ability to aim accurately at the target. Consequently, the team lost approximately 5 minutes of crucial time, during which the armored train managed to elude capture and find a secure location.

On August 20th, 1941, the self-propelled gun found itself engaging an enemy column from a considerable distance of over 4,000 m. This was primarily due to the absence of a closer firing position that would ensure the SPG’s safety. As the enemy tanks opened fire, their long-range shots and the continuous movement of the column hindered their ability to aim accurately, providing relative safety for the SPG.

To engage the column, the SPG employed high-explosive (HE) grenades with delayed fuzes set to the maximum range of 2,400 m. Although the crew initially estimated the distance to be 3,000 m instead of the actual 4,000 m, they skillfully targeted the column with well-placed hits and multiple spotting shots. Following the German tank crew’s training protocol for column destruction, the gunner aimed at the first tank in the column using a pre-loaded HE grenade. While a direct hit was not achieved, subsequent observation revealed damage to the tank’s tracks.

Continuing the engagement, the SPG fired three additional rounds of regular armor-piercing ammunition at the same tank. However, none of the shots hit their mark, as the gunner had to rely on trial and error to adjust the gun’s elevation beyond the effective range of 2,400 m. Later, it was observed that the crew of the enemy tank, identified as a KV-1, intentionally destroyed their own tank and managed to escape.

The second SPG with its kill markings (7 T-34 tanks destroyed) relatively late during its short expedition. In the background appears to be an ammunition carrier based on a Panzer IV. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

In addition to the destruction of the first tank in the column, two more tanks, likely T-34/76 mod.1941s, met a similar fate. The rounds fired by the SPG caused damage to the suspension of these tanks, rendering them immobile. Subsequently, the crew of each tank took the decision to set their vehicles on fire, effectively destroying them.

During a defensive battle on August 29th and 30th, 1941, the Battalion encountered Soviet tanks. On the 29th, the gunner and commander of the SPG scouted the area to identify suitable defensive positions and gain a better sense of the distances to specific points, making the aiming process easier. Upon returning to the tank, a Soviet T-34 approached their position, unaware of the presence of the SPG. Exploiting this advantage, the crew successfully destroyed the tank at a close range of 100 m. Subsequently, they engaged a second T-34 at approximately 1,000 m, managing to immobilize it. However, the Soviets recovered the disabled tank under the cover of darkness later that night.

On August 30th, 1941, the SPG encountered a T-34 tank and two T-26 light tanks positioned approximately 1,200 m away. However, the SPG was unable to advance closer due to the presence of Soviet anti-tank positions in the area. Despite the challenging circumstances, the SPG successfully immobilized the T-34 tank but failed to hit the T-26 tanks, which managed to escape into a nearby forest.

Regrettably, the available records for the 10.5 cm, K (gp.Slf.) conclude at this point. Towards the end of 1941, the sole surviving vehicle was withdrawn from the frontlines.

The only surviving 10.5 cm, K (gp.Slf.) on a rail wagon on the way back to the factories. Note the damaged road wheels. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

Second stage – Into Stalingrad

After being withdrawn from the frontlines, the SPG underwent extensive repairs and maintenance at the Krupp facilities. The vehicle required significant repairs and was repainted, resulting in the loss of its kill markings. During this time, Krupp proposed using a new Panzer IV chassis, but the Army Design Office rejected the offer, stating that the existing suspension would suffice.

In spring 1942, the SPG was deployed back to the frontlines, once again assigned to Panzerjäger Abteilung (Sfl.) 521, which had survived the unsuccessful attack on Moscow in the winter of 1941. Alongside two similar vehicles, known as the Panzerselbstfahrlafette für 12,8 cm Kanone 40, the SPG was expected to be combat-ready by June 1st, 1942. It subsequently participated in operations such as Case Blue and the assault on Stalingrad, with the objective of capturing the oil fields near Stalingrad.

The second 10.5 cm, K (gp.Slf.) repaired and ready to be sent back into action together with its larger partner tank destroyers, the Panzerselbstfahrlafette für 12,8 cm Kanone 40, that would also later meet their fate in Stalingrad. Source: Ebay, unknown seller

During this period, from spring to October 1942, the recorded history of the SPG is scarce, suggesting that the Army Design Office had less interest in its performance. It is likely that the vehicle was seen more as a reserve vehicle to plug equipment gaps in the Wehrmacht, rather than a subject for further testing or development. By this time, the Army Design Office had likely accumulated sufficient knowledge and experiences from previous operations, diminishing the need for detailed documentation of the SPG’s activities during this period.

The SPG met its demise in October 1942, as indicated by the absence of any mention of the vehicle in inventory reports from November and December of that year. The last known photograph of the tank was taken in December 1942 by Soviet soldiers. In the photo, the vehicle is seen in its original dark gray color with patches of sand yellow applied over it. Additionally, the tank underwent white washing, resulting in an interesting camouflage pattern. This type of camouflage was commonly employed by vehicles entering combat during the summer of 1942. The SPG featured a total of 18 kill rings and a small tank symbol painted on the barrel, reminiscent of the markings added by the crew in 1941.

What appears to be the last photo ever taken of the second SPG, around Stalingrad in December 1942, being examined by a Soviet soldier. Interestingly, in this photo, the exterior equipment differs greatly from the one above. Also, the small tank symbol and the 18 kill rings are not shown in the photo above. Colorized by Johannes Dorn. Source: World War Photos

Lessons Learnt

According to the Army Design Office’s request, the crews and unit were tasked with closely monitoring and describing the flaws and performance of the 10.5 cm, K (gp.Slf.) during combat. The following points are based on reports from July to September 1941, shortly before the second vehicle was sent back to Germany:

The vehicle’s effectiveness in the vanguard was limited due to its lack of maneuverability. With a combined traverse of only 18°, the entire tank needed to turn even for minor adjustments. This, combined with the vehicle’s weak engine and heavy weight, significantly slowed down the aiming process. Furthermore, since only the frontal armor provided adequate protection, the tank crew had to constantly be vigilant to avoid being flanked and always keep its front facing the enemy. The nature of vanguard operations demanded the ability to engage targets from any direction without encountering such challenges.
The tank had proven its effectiveness in providing support to infantry attacks from open positions through direct fire. However, a significant challenge arose from the large dust cloud generated in front of the gun, which hindered the observation of the tank’s own shots. To overcome this issue, it was deemed crucial to deploy an observation post or a dedicated team led by a fire control non-commissioned officer (NCO) who possessed knowledge of both the crew and the vehicle. This team’s role was to provide accurate observations and assist in adjusting fire, thereby maximizing the tank’s effectiveness in combat situations.
The tank had not yet been utilized in its intended role as a concrete bunker destroyer with direct fire. However, its large caliber and high penetration demonstrated in the destruction of medium tanks indicated its effectiveness.
The transmission and engine did not encounter any major issues. However, there were concerns regarding the overstressing of the steering brakes, leading to bolts in the steering slide tearing out.
Achieving direct hits on heavy tanks like the KV-1 at ranges of 4,000 m proved challenging. Destruction or damage to the suspension primarily resulted from shell fragments, which sometimes led the crew to abandon and destroy their tank. However, this occurrence was not consistent, with instances where the enemy crew managed to tow their tank away during nighttime.
Due to the gun’s capability in engaging soft skin targets up to 4,000 m, it was recommended to mark the range scale accordingly. However, most armored targets could only be effectively engaged at a range of 1,500 m.
Prior to each firefight, it was crucial to scout the terrain in order to identify an optimal firing position. This task could be carried out by either the commander or the gunner.
Engaging moving targets proved challenging, especially at longer distances. The limited traverse of 9º on either side was insufficient for pre-aiming at targets over large distances.
It was not recommended to engage heavy tanks directly at ranges exceeding 1,000 m, as achieving penetration became increasingly challenging. Additionally, there was limited visibility monitoring the impact location of projectiles. Therefore, it was advised to engage tanks only within a range of up to 1,000 m.
In order to facilitate indirect fire with high-explosive grenades, the inclusion of a rangefinder was seen as crucial, especially for ranges exceeding 1,000 m.
The commander’s observation periscope proved insufficient and had to be replaced with a standard Scherenfernrohr (scissor telescope) for improved observation capabilities.

The encountered challenges and experiences played a vital role in the development of subsequent German self-propelled guns (SPGs), such as the Wespe and Hummel. These vehicles incorporated several of the necessary upgrades derived from the lessons learnt.

A great panorama shot of the second SPG in autumn 1942 and multiple support vehicles, including an observation Sd.Kfz.253. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

The second 10.5 cm, K (gp.Slf.) in autumn 1941 with its commander standing in front of it. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

Conclusion

The 10.5 cm, K (gp.Slf.) served as a well-conceived initial endeavor to create a specialized self-propelled gun (SPG) dedicated to the destruction of heavy bunker positions. However, like many first attempts, it exhibited several design flaws and performance concerns on the battlefield. Nonetheless, the project held significant importance for both Krupp and the Army Design Office, as it provided valuable insights and lessons in terms of combat performance. These experiences proved instrumental in the development of subsequent SPGs during the war. Moreover, the knowledge gained alone rendered the vehicle useful for the German Army, despite its imperfections.

Furthermore, the vehicle’s actual combat performance demonstrated its effectiveness as a tank destroyer, as the second vehicle showcased its capability by successfully destroying numerous Soviet medium tanks with its powerful gun. However, it is important not to overlook the negative aspects, which significantly impacted the vehicle’s mobility and overall performance. The design flaws, in particular, played a pivotal role in the destruction of the first vehicle, highlighting a potential recurring problem if larger numbers had been produced, akin to the issues faced by many Ferdinand tank destroyers in 1943.

An interesting photo of one of the two SPGs at an early stage of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

10.5 cm K gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette. Illustration by Pavel Alexe.

10.5 cm K gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette in winter camo. Illustration by Pavel Alexe.

10.5 cm, K (gp.Slf.) Specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)	7.47 x 2.86 x 2.53 m
Total Weight	22 tonnes
Crew	5 (driver, 2 loaders, gunner, commander)
Speed	On roads 27 km/h, off-road 17 km/h
Range	On roads: 170 km, off-road: 120 km
Armament	10.5 cm Kanone L/52 3x 9 mm MP 40
Armor	10-50 mm
Engine	Maybach HL 66 P, 6 cylinder water cooled, 6.6-liter gasoline, 180 hp
Ammunition	26 10.5 cm (HE and AP) shells 576 9 mm rounds
Elevation	-15° to +10°
Steering ratio	1.48
Gunsight	Sfl.Z.F.1, 2x 20 degrees, 3400 m for AP, 2400 m for HE
Power Ratio	8.2 hp/tonne
Ground clearence	40 cm
Total Production	2

Sources

D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
T. Anderson (2018) History of the Panzejager, Volume 1 Origin and evolution 1939-42, Osprey Publishing.
P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (1997) Panzer Tracts No.4 Panzerkampfwagen IV
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2004) Panzer Tracts No.7-1 Panzerjager

Has Own Video WW2 German Tank Destroyers

Panzer IV/70(V)

German Reich (1944)
Tank Destroyer – 930 to 940 Built

The further development of the StuG series led to the introduction of the Jagdpanzer IV tank destroyer. The Jagdpanzer IV was initially meant to be armed with the long 7.5 cm L/70 gun. As this gun was not available in sufficient numbers, as a temporary solution, the vehicle was armed with the shorter L/48 gun instead. In early 1944, the production of the long gun was finally increased and it could be used for this purpose. This would lead to the introduction of a slightly modified Jagdpanzer IV which was renamed Panzer IV/70(V). Production started in August 1944 and, by March 1945, some 930 to 940 vehicles were built.

Panzer IV/70 (V). Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

The Development

The introduction of the Jagdpanzer IV into service provided the German Army with an effective anti-tank vehicle that had a small silhouette, was well-protected, and had a good gun. Work on such a vehicle was initiated by Waffenamt (Eng. Army Weapon’s Office) in September 1942. Initially designated Sturmgeschütze Neue Art (Eng. New Type Assault Gun), the new vehicle was to be armed with the 7.5 cm KwK L/70 gun and protected with 100 mm frontal and 40 to 50 mm of side armor. It was intended to have the lowest possible height, a top speed of 25 km/h, 500 mm ground clearance, and a weight of up to 26 tonnes. It is somewhat ironic that this vehicle, initially intended as a replacement for the StuG III, ended up being hijacked by the Panzer branch.

However, the initial plans to use the 7.5 cm L/70 gun could not be fulfilled, as its production was limited and reserved for the Panther tank program. While the short-barrelled Jagdpanzer IV was slowly entering production in January 1944, a meeting was held to discuss the use of the larger gun. For this reason, one prototype was to be built and tested to establish the feasibility of the concept once enough guns were available.

The prototype of this new vehicle was completed in early April 1944. It was, in essence, just a modified Jagdpanzer IV (chassis number 320162) armed with the long gun. Of course, some internal structural changes had to be made in order to fit the larger gun. The new vehicle was presented to Hitler on 20th April 1944. Hitler was impressed and insisted on a monthly production order of 800 such vehicles. The Waffenamt was slightly more realistic and issued a production quota of 2020 vehicles (both the L/48 and L/70 versions) to be completed by the end of April 1945, closer to 160 vehicles per month.

The first prototype of the vehicle that would later be known as Panzer IV/70(V). Source: https://warspot.ru/12584-slishkom-dlinnyy-stvol

Designation

Throughout its development and service life, the new tank hunter received several different designations. This was nothing unusual by German standards. The initial designation for it was Sturmgeschütz auf Pz.Kpfw.IV. This name derived from its original purpose as a replacement vehicle for the StuG III. On Hitler’s own personal insistence, this vehicle was to be renamed to Panzer IV lang (V). The V stood for the manufacturer, Vogtlandische Maschinenfabrik AG (Vomag), while the word lang (Eng. Long) referred to the L/70 gun. This order was issued on 18th July 1944.

In October 1944, this designation was slightly changed to Panzer IV lang (V) mit 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70. Starting from November 1944, it was referred to as Panzer IV/70(V) – Panzerwagen 604/10 (V) mit 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70. Lastly, in January 1945, the term Jagdpanzer was once again used. The full designation was Jagdpanzer IV lang (V) (Sd.Kfz.162). To avoid confusion with the previous model and to be consistent with most sources, this article will refer to the vehicle as the Panzer IV/70(V).

This vehicle is also known by the nickname ‘Guderian Ente’ (Eng. Guderian’s Duck) given to it by its crews. This is often described as being related to its slower speed and reduced mobility in the sources. According to W. J. Spielberger (Military Vehicle Prints), this nickname was translated as ‘Guderian’s Hoax’ and is related to his refusal to accept this project. The word Ente in German (and in some other languages) can refer to as false news, hence Spielberger’s interpretation of this term.

Production

Given that Vomag was already involved in the Jagdpanzer IV’s production, it was logical that this company would produce the new Panzer IV/70 (V). Production plans were quite ambitious, especially taking into account that this occurred in late 1944, when the Allied bombing campaign had slowly grinded down the German industry to literal dust. The lack of resources and a logistical collapse were also notorious during this late part of the war. Many newly built vehicles never reached the front. Nevertheless, despite all the hardship, Vomag managed to keep up with the planned production, as can be seen in the following production table from T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV).

The month of production	Planned production quota	Actual production numbers
1944
August	60	57
September	90	41
October	100	104
November	150	178
December	180	180
1945
January	200	185
February	160	135
March	180	50
Total	1,120	930

Up to March 1945, the production numbers were often reached and sometimes even exceeded the planned quotas. Production dropped in March 1945 before ultimately stopping. That month, Vomag’s facilities were completely devastated by an Allied bombing raid. Given the chaotic state of Germany at that time, there was no time nor resources to restart production. While the production could not be restarted, there were some 30 hulls and 10 superstructures left available. Some of these were completed likely in April and issued for frontline use. It is possible that at least 10 more vehicles were completed.
In July 1944, Adolf Hitler insisted that production of the Panzer IV was to be terminated in February 1945 at the latest. Instead, the companies that were initially involved in the Panzer IV production were to focus on the Panzer IV/70 tank hunter. Given the insufficient production numbers of tanks such as the Panther and the Tiger II, the Panzer IV could simply not be phased out. This order was never implemented in reality.

Design

The Panzer IV/70(V) inherited the Jagdpanzer IV’s overall design. In essence, it was the same vehicle with better armament. Still, some modifications were necessary in order to fit the larger gun, while other changes were implemented in order to reduce production costs or to reduce the usage for materials that were in short supply. The Panzer IV/70(V) was built using chassis taken from Panzer IV Ausf.H and Panzer IV Ausf.J tanks.

The Panzer IV Ausf.H and J chassis served as the base for this new vehicle. Source: www.panzernet.net

Hull

The overall hull design was mostly unchanged from its predecessor. Some minor modifications were introduced during the production run. For example, the air intake vents on the brake inspection hatches were replaced with simple handles. They had become unnecessary, as the Germans had added ducts that extracted the smoke to the ventilation ports of the engine compartment. Their locking mechanism was also altered slightly. Another small modification was adding a vertical towing bracket which was welded to the rear part of the hull. This was a late introduction, first appearing in December 1944.

This vehicle uses early brake inspection hatches with ventilation ports on them. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

It is difficult to find a proper photograph that shows in more detail the Panzer IV/70(V)’s front hull, especially the brake inspection hatches. In this photograph, the soldier on the left actually holds the handle from the left brake inspection hatch. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV

Drawing of brake inspection hatches. The larger one to the right (number 3) is the original Panzer IV hatch. The remaining two were used on the Jagdpanzer IV and Panzer IV/70. The air intake vents (number 2) would be replaced with a simple handle (number 1). Source: J. Ledwoch. Panzer IV/70 (V)

Suspension and Running Gear

Given the added extra weight of the gun and armor, the Panzer IV/70(V)’s suspension became overburdened and thus prone to breakdowns. The rubber rims on the two front wheels wore out quickly. In addition, steering the vehicle on the uneven ground became problematic.

The problem with the suspension was already an issue with the slightly lighter Jagdpanzer IV, but became a serious problem for the later vehicle. One of the earliest attempts to resolve this issue was a proposal to move the road wheels’ positions to the front by 10 cm. It was hoped that this would shift the center of gravity a bit. This idea was flawed from the start, as the front road wheels were already too close to the drive sprocket. It would also necessitate huge changes to the hull design. In turn, this would cause delays in production, and thus it was never implemented.

The only real attempt that gave some positive results regarding the overburden suspension was the introduction of steel-tired road wheels. The two front road wheels were replaced with this new model. In addition, lighter tracks were to replace the ones in use. Both of these measures were introduced starting in September 1944. Of course, the older vehicles were at some point likewise provided with these reinforced wheels to help cope with the added weight.

The number of return rollers would be reduced to three. In addition, these were made of steel due to the lack of rubber. Lastly, different types of idlers were used depending on the availability of spare parts.

The first-built vehicles were not provided with steel-tired road wheels and had the standard four-return roller configuration. Being nose heavy, the first suspension boogie was under huge pressure. This led to quicker wear of the rubber rims. Source: http://www.panzernet.net/panzernet/stranky/stihace/jgdpz4.php

Despite the introduction of the steel-tired road wheels, not all vehicles received these. This particular vehicle does not have them but has three return rollers. Source: http://www.panzernet.net/panzernet/stranky/stihace/jgdpz4.php

This vehicle has two steel-tired road wheels. One of them appears to be damaged. Source: http://www.panzernet.net/panzernet/stranky/stihace/jgdpz4.php

Engine

The engine compartment received no major modifications. It was still powered by the Maybach HL 120 TRM which produced 265 hp @ 2,600 rpm. Given the increase in weight from 24 to 25.8 tonnes, the overall drive performance dropped significantly. The maximum speed was reduced from 40 km/h to 35 km/h. The cross-country speed remained the same, at around 15-18 km/h. While this decrease in maximum speed does not appear as much at the first glance, the Panzer IV/7(V) became difficult to steer and the added weight caused huge stress on the engine itself. With a fuel load of some 470 liters, the operational range was 210 km.

The cylindrical exhaust muffler was replaced with two upright-positioned Flammentoeter (English: flame exhaust mufflers). These were implemented on vehicles produced starting from November 1944. Chain links were attached to the cooling air intake and flap so that they could be manually opened or closed depending on the need.

A good illustration of the changes implemented to the engine exhaust mufflers. Initially, a standard cylindrical exhaust muffler was used. This would be replaced with flame exhaust mufflers. Lastly, their cover was slightly modified during production. Also, note the added vertical towing bracket on the last illustration. Source: И. Мощанский, И. Переяславцев Tank Destroyer Pz.IV/70V)

The Superstructure

The upper superstructure design was mostly the same, except for one major difference which is not obvious and somewhat illogical. The superstructure’s top, despite the use of a larger gun which would require more working space inside the vehicle, was actually lowered by some 30 mm. While not a huge difference, the reason why this was implemented is unknown.

Besides that, other minor improvements were also introduced, mostly near the end of the war. Some vehicles received rain channels which were positioned under the commander and the loader’s hatches. The Panzer IV/70(V) was meant to receive a jib boom crane installation. This required adding five sockets that needed to be welded to its top superstructure. This crane would provide the crews with a means to easily remove heavier components, such as the engine. This was rarely added to the vehicles and appears to be mainly present on vehicles produced near the end of the war.

The design of the sliding gun sight cover was also slightly changed to make it easier to build. Initially, it consisted of two curved single-piece sliding rods. These would be replaced with sliding rods that consisted of many smaller parts.

Some vehicles had spare track link holders added to the sides of the superstructure. It is not clear if these were introduced during production or added by some of the crews as an improvisation.

A good view of the Panzer IV/70(V)’s upper superstructure. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

Given its late introduction, pictures of the Panzer IV/70(V) with the jib boom crane installation are hard to come by. Here is a picture of a StuG IV with a jib boom crane. In essence, the installation on the Panzer IV/70(V) would be quite similar if not the same as here. Source: Walter J. Spielberger Sturmgeschütz and its Variants

The leading gun sight cover was also modified. To the left was the one used initially. It would be replaced with a new design that incorporated many segmented parts (on the right). Source: И. Мощанский, И. Переяславцев Tank Destroyer Pz.IV/70V)

Some vehicles had spare track link holders added to the sides of the superstructure. Source: И. Мощанский, И. Переяславцев Tank Destroyer Pz.IV/70V)

Another such example with slightly shortened spare track link holders. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

Armor and Protection

The Panzer IV/70(V)’s armor was the same as on its predecessor. It was well protected, with thick and well-angled armor plates. For the lower hull, the upper front armor plate was 80 mm thick at a 45° angle and the lower plate was 50 mm at a 55° angle. The side armor was 30 mm thick, the rear 20 mm, and the bottom 10 mm. The hull crew compartment had 20 mm of bottom armor.

The upper superstructure frontal armor was 80 mm at a 50° angle, the sides were 40 mm at a 30° angle, the rear armor was 30 mm, and the top was 20 mm. The engine compartment design and armor were unchanged from the Panzer IV, with 20 mm all around and 10 mm of top armor.

The 80 mm of front armor was introduced on the Jagdpanzer IV series in May 1944. The later version incorporated a larger gun which led to an increase in weight. Thus, in August 1944, it was proposed to once again use weaker 60 mm thick frontal armor. Even Hitler agreed that the superstructure frontal armor needed to be reduced in thickness in order to save some weight. For unknown reasons, this decision was never implemented.

The Panzer IV/70(V) was initially provided with Zimmerit anti-magnetic coating, but after September 1944, its use was abandoned. Additional 5 mm thick armor plates were also provided for extra protection of the engine compartment’s sides. The Panzer IV/70 (V) could be equipped with additional 5 mm thick armor plates (Schürzen) covering the sides of the vehicle. They served mainly to protect against Soviet anti-tank rifles. In rarer cases, at the end of the war, these were replaced with Thoma Schürtzen wire mesh. While these were lighter and provided the same level of protection, their use was delayed due to problems with production.

The 5 mm thick armor plates (Schürzen) cover the side of the vehicle. They served mainly to protect against Soviet anti-tank rifles. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

The crews of some vehicles often added all kinds of improvised armor. These were often reused spare parts, such as tracks and road wheels. Some of the crews added concrete to the front armor plates. The effectiveness of this improvised armor was dubious at best, but these improvised up-armoring jobs were relatively common on other German vehicles, such as the StuG III series.

The crew of this vehicle added concrete on the front superstructure armor. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

Armament

The Panzer IV/70(V) was rearmed with the stronger 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70 (sometimes referred to as 7.5 cm StuK 42 L/70) gun. The position of the gun was unchanged, as it was placed slightly off-center to the right. Given that it was a much larger gun with stronger recoil forces, some structural changes were needed. For example, the gun mantlet was redesigned in order to save weight. In addition, a hydro-pneumatic equilibrator was installed on the right side of the gun. To provide better gun balance, an iron counterweight was added at the end of the recoil guard. Despite being a considerably longer gun and using stronger rounds, the recoil was only 42 cm. The total weight of the gun itself was 2.2 tonnes. Surprisingly, no ventilation fan was present in the crew compartment. Instead, an air blast mechanism was meant to blow fumes created after firing the gun out the barrel.

Given the longer length of the gun barrel, an external travel lock had to be provided. Its purpose was to help stabilize the gun during traveling. This in turn would help avoid damaging or even misaligning the gun sight. When connected to the travel lock, the gun was raised up at a 13° angle. This was necessary in order to avoid accidentally hitting the ground when driving on uneven ground. While this seems unlikely to happen, the Panzer IV/70(V)’s lower height and longer barrel meant that this was a real possibility. The prototype was initially not provided with a travel lock, but it quickly became apparent that such a device would be needed. In order to free the gun, the gun operator only had to elevate the gun a bit and the travel lock would fall down. This allowed for a quick combat response but also avoided the need for a crew member to exit the vehicle in order to do it manually. The shape of the travel lock was changed during production. Initially, these had a large opening in them. Later built travel locks did not have this opening.

The Panzer IV/70(V)s initially did not have a gun travel lock. Source: http://www.panzernet.net/panzernet/stranky/stihace/jgdpz4.php

Given the long barrel, the use of a travel lock was required. In order to free the gun, the gun operator only had to elevate the gun a bit and the travel lock would fall down. Source: http://www.panzernet.net/panzernet/stranky/stihace/jgdpz4.php

A Panzer IV/70 with the later introduced travel lock. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

The elevation of the main gun was –6° to +15° and the traverse was 24°. Here it is important to note that these numbers differ greatly in the sources. These particular numbers were taken from T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV). A muzzle brake would not be added to the gun, as it would create a lot of dust during firing and also increase the cost of construction slightly. Some guns had threaded ends on the barrel for the installation of a muzzle brake. As this was a labor-intensive task, most were likely not provided with such a feature.

The 7.5 cm StuK 42 L/70 could fire a few different types of rounds, including armor-piercing (PzGr 39/42 or 40/42), high-explosive (SpGr 42), and armor-piercing tungsten rounds. While the latter had superb anti-armor penetration power, due to the scarcity of tungsten, these rounds were rarely employed.

Distance:	500 m	1 km	2 km
Standard Armor-piercing round	124 mm	111 mm	89 mm
Armor-piercing tungsten round	174 mm	149 mm	n/a

Thanks to this firepower, this gun could effectively engage most Allied tanks up to the war’s end. The maximum firing range of the high-explosive rounds was 5.1 km, while the armor-piercing range was 3 km.

	T-38-85	IS-2	M4	Cromwell	Churchill
Front	2000 m	800 m	2800 m	3400 m	2000 m
Side	3500 m	2000 m	3500 m	3500 m	3000 m
Rear	3300 m	1000 m	3500 m	3500 m	2000 m

The 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70 Armor penetration (maximum range) table against enemy tanks. Source: T.L. Jentz (Germany’s Panther Tank)

The ammunition load consisted of 55 rounds, but this would be increased to 60. Usually, around 34 were armor-piercing, while the remaining 21 were high-explosive. This could differ depending on the combat need or availability of ammunition.
The 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70 gun used a Sfl.Z.F.1a gun sight which had a magnification of x5 and a field of view of 8°. On some vehicles, the gunner sight was encased into protective covers. Starting from November 1944, one-third of the produced Panzer IV/70(V) were meant to receive the SF 14 Z scissor periscope. In addition, these were also to incorporate the use of an Entfernungs-Messer 0.9 m (Eng. Range finder). Three small connecting points were welded around the commander’s hatch for the installation of this range finder. Due to delays with the delivery of such equipment, the first vehicles mounting this were supplied in March 1945.

A good view of the Panzer IV/70(V) commander and gunner’s periscopes. In addition, notice the three connecting points, with one in front and two to the rear of the commander’s hatch. These were to be used to mount the range finder but were introduced too late to see any real service. Source: https://warspot.ru/12584-slishkom-dlinnyy-stvol

As a secondary weapon, the MG 42 machine gun was retained. The ammunition load for it consisted of 1,950 rounds. In addition, at least one 9 mm submachine gun MP 40 or a later 7.92 mm MP 44 assault rifle was carried inside for crew protection.

Some vehicles were equipped with the Rundumfeuer machine gun mount that was operated from inside the vehicle. This mount provided an all-around firing arc. In addition, the operator did not have to expose himself to fire when he was using the machine gun. However, he still needed to go outside to manually load the machine gun. While this installation was tested on the prototype, it did not see wide use on the Panzer IV/70(V).

The first prototype did receive the Rundumfeuer machine gun mount, but its use appears to have been limited on the later production vehicles. Source: https://warspot.ru/12584-slishkom-dlinnyy-stvol

A destroyed vehicle that was provided with the Rundumfeuer machine gun mount. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

The Panzer IV/70(V) was also equipped with the Nahverteidigungswaffe (Eng. close defense grenade launcher), with some 40 rounds of ammunition (high explosive and smoke rounds), placed on the vehicle’s top. Due to the general lack of resources though, not all vehicles were provided with this weapon. In such cases, the Nahverteidigungswaffe’s opening hole was closed off with a round plate.

The Nahverteidigungswaffe’s firing port was located on the left of the commander’s hatch. When not provided (which was often the case), the opening was simply hidden by an armored cover. Source: Digital Collection of Armin Freitag

For defense against infantry that got too close, an unusual weapon attachment named Vorsatz P was provided. This was a curved muzzle attachment for the MP 43/44 assault rifles. With this curved barrel, the loader (who was to be equipped with this weapon attachment) could engage enemy infantry from inside the vehicle without exposing himself. The Vorsatz P barrel was angled at 90°. For installation on armored vehicles, such as the Panzer IV/70(V), a small ball mount was developed. It was to be attached to the top superstructure hatches. For combat use, the assault rifles were to be attached to this ball mount vertically, pointing up. With the extended curved barrel, the maximum firing range was around 15 m. Despite its odd appearance, the system actually worked. This weapon system was introduced too late and was only issued in limited numbers in 1945.

The Vorsatz P curved muzzle attachment for the MP 43/44. https://panzerworld.com/stg-44

Crew

The crew number and position remained unchanged. It consisted of the commander, the gunner, the loader/radio operator, and the driver. The loader’s position was to the left while the remaining three crew members were placed opposite him.

Organization and Distribution to Units

In July 1944, Hitler came up with the idea of using smaller mobile armored formations. Their purpose would be to act as a quick response to enemy attacks. These were the so-called Panzer Brigaden (Eng. Tank Brigades). They were to consist of three 11-vehicle-strong Panther companies and one 11-strong Panzer IV/70(V) company. In addition, they were to be protected by at least 4 anti-aircraft vehicles. Guderian was against the formation of such small units, as they diverted vital resources of men and materiel that were desperately needed by the Panzer Divisions. Regardless, Hitler persisted and some 10 such units were to be formed. A few additional brigades were equipped mainly with Panzer IVs.

The first units to be equipped with a Panzer IV/70(V) company were the 105th and 106th Panzer Brigades in August 1944. A month later, five more such units were formed. These were the 107th, 108th, 109th, 110th, and the Führer Grenadier Brigade. The whole Brigade concept was quickly abandoned and, by November 1944, nearly all such units were absorbed by the existing Panzer Divisions.

Besides these short-lived brigades, the Panzer IV/70(V)s were issued to 10-vehicle strong Panzerjäger Kompanie (Eng. Anti-tank company). Other units, such as the Panzer Grenadier Divisions and schwere Panzerjäger Abteilungen (Eng. Heavy anti-tank battalions) were to be slightly stronger, at 14 vehicles. It is worth pointing out that not all units received these in the prescribed number strength. There were often variations in the delivered number of vehicles Besides forming new units, the Panzer IV/70 (V) was also issued as a replacement vehicle to existing formations.

A destroyed vehicle from the Führer Grenadier Brigade lost in January 1945 on the Western Front. Despite most of these brigades being disbanded, the Führer Grenadier Brigade was one of few that did not share this fate. Source: И. Мощанский, И. Переяславцев Tank Destroyer Pz.IV/70V)

The 24th and 116th Panzer Divisions each received 10 vehicles during September and October 1944. As the Eastern Front came under pressure from the Soviets, more Panzer IV/70(V)s were rushed there. The 7th, 13th, and 17th Panzer Divisions each received 21 vehicles, while the 24th Panzer Division received 19 vehicles.

At the start of 1945, the quick collapse of all fronts meant that the Panzer IV/70(V) was issued to frontline units without much training. The numbers allocated to different units were also dependent on the available vehicles. For example, the 563rd Heavy Anti-Tank Battalion received 31 vehicles in January 1945. It was probably the strongest single unit supplied with this vehicle. On the other hand, others were less lucky, receiving only 10 vehicles, such as the 510th Anti-Tank Battalion in February 1945.

After March 1945, the situation became even more chaotic. Any form of organization was discarded, and instead, vehicles were sent to various units as they arrived at the front. For example, in late March and early April 1945, the Panzer Lehr Division received 12, 114th Panzer Division 5, and the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division 21 vehicles. Even some assault gun brigades received Panzer IV/70(V)s during this period. These units finally received the vehicle that was initially designed for them way back in 1942.

The same month, out of desperation, the Germans tried to mobilize some 711 armored vehicles that were used for training. While this seems like a huge number, most of these vehicles were either obsolete older equipment or had been stored and not operational. At least two Panzer IV/70(V)s were used in this manner. One of them was likely the first prototype built.

In Combat

The Panzer IV/70(V)’s late production start meant that it took some time to actually deliver these vehicles to the frontlines. Crew training was also an important part, as it also required much-needed time. The German logistical infrastructure had been ravaged by Allied bombing runs. As the Allies liberated France, it was possible to build new air bases closer to Germany itself. Roads and railroads were under constant threat of enemy air attacks. This meant that vital supply transportation lines were often targeted. Transportation of new vehicles to the frontline became dangerous and, in many cases, they failed to reach their destinations.

Ardennes Offensive and the End of the War in Western Europe

The Panzer IV/70(V) began to reach frontline units in significant numbers only at the end of 1944 and the start of 1945. The first vehicles were concentrated for the German Ardennes offensive in late 1944. At that time, the Germans mustered some 210 vehicles of this type. An additional 90 were to be used as reinforcements and replacements. The precise numbers of Panzer IV/70(V)s used during the Ardennes offensive differ between sources. The previously mentioned number is according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV), while K. Mucha and G. Parada (Jagdpanzer IV) give a much smaller number of 135 vehicles.

A well-recorded action where the Panzer IV/70(V) saw combat action was during the battles around the Belgian Krinkelt-Rocherath villages at the end of 1944. This was part of a German attack spearheaded by elements from the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. This Division’s 12th SS Panzerjäger Abteilung had Panzer IV/70(V)s in its inventory. The attack was also accompanied by infantry support from the SS Panzergreandier Regiment 25. It is worth mentioning that, by this point of the war, the German soldiers were mostly inexperienced and poorly trained.

As the Germans advanced, they threatened to surround two Allied infantry divisions. In order to prevent this, the 9th Infantry Regiment, together with various elements from the retreating Allied soldiers were gathered to form a defense line at the Krinkelt-Rocherath villages and the Lausdell crossroads. Interestingly, the commander of the 9th Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel William Dawes McKinley, favored the use of bazookas over towed 57 mm anti-tank guns. Both struggled to do damage to the front armor of some of the better German armored vehicles. Still, a team armed with bazookas could be effective, especially from concealed positions.

German infantry, supported by two Panzer IV/70(V) companies, attacked the Allied positions on 17th December 1944. The defenders did not have any armor support at this point, but they laid a huge number of mines. Several Panzer IV/70(V)s from the 2nd Company led the attack, supported by small Panzergrenadier infantry groups, some of them hiding on the Panzer IV/70(V)’s engine decks. The remaining infantry followed up from behind.

Illustrated map of the fighting that took place during the battle for Krinkelt-Rocherath (to the left) and Lausdell crossroads (to the right) Source: S. Zaloga Bazooka Vs. Panzers Battle for the Bulge

Once the German vehicles were spotted, they were immediately bombarded by American artillery. One vehicle was destroyed by an artillery hit, and two were immobilized by mines. Two more were destroyed by the Allied’s bazooka teams. Later that day, despite heavy losses and pressure from the Allies’ artillery, the Germans made another attack. They were supported by the fire of one immobilized Panzer IV/70(V). This vehicle would be destroyed with thermite grenades and a fuel canister. At least one more was destroyed in this attack.

At the same time as the attack on the Lausdell crossroads was carried out, the Germans also attacked the Allied’s positions at the Krinkelt-Rocherath villages. At least three Panzer IV/70(V)s led the attack and managed to penetrate into the villages. The M4 tanks sent against the Germans were quickly taken out. There was heavy fighting that lasted the whole day, but the Germans withdrew the next morning, expecting reinforcements and supplies. On the 18th, the Germans attacked again, this time advancing with Panther tanks in the direction of Rocherath. Two leading Panthers would be taken out, blocking the road to the village, forcing the remaining vehicles to try to go around them. Around one hour later, one Panzer IV/70(V) came to the place where the two Panthers were lost. This vehicle was quickly taken out by bazooka fire.

The precise losses suffered by both sides are not well documented. The defenders lost some 11 tanks, 2 M10 tank destroyers, and a large number of anti-tank guns. The Allies reported the destruction of over 40 German armored vehicles, including 5 Tigers. These reports were not correct, as no Tiger was used during this battle. In addition, the precise number of destroyed German vehicles was likely less than mentioned above, as many vehicles would be recovered.

Interestingly, the Allies used a captured Panzer IV/70(V) during the winter of 1944/45 to test the effectiveness of bazookas. While the front armor proved impervious, the sides and the rear were vulnerable to this weapon.

The two Panthers taken out near Rocherath, which blocked the entrance to the village. Just behind them is the destroyed Panzer IV/70. The two Allied soldiers are standing on it. Source: S. Zaloga Bazooka Vs. Panzers Battle for the Bulge

The captured Panzer IV/70(V) was used for testing the bazooka’s effectiveness against armor. The hits were marked with chalk numbers. Its thick and angled frontal armor proved to be immune to bazooka rockets. Source: S. Zaloga Bazooka Vs. Panzers Battle for the Bulge

At the end of December 1944, some Panzer IV/70(V)s participated in the last large German offensive in the West, Operation Northwind. The operation ended in another German failure by late January 1945, further depleting the strength of its armored units.

After the last offensive against the Western Allies, the German armored formations in this part of Europe were dangerously depleted. There were only six surviving anti-tank battalions equipped with Panzer IV/70 vehicles. By mid-March, the Germans had only 77 Panzer IV/70s vehicles on this front, with only 33 operational. This number likely included both the Vomag and Alkett versions.

An abandoned Panzer IV/70 vehicle was captured by the Allied Forces near Bremen in April 1945. Interestingly, this vehicle only has one steel roadwheel. Source W. J. Spielberger Military Vehicle Prints

Eastern Front

The Panzer IV/70(V) also saw heavy action on the Eastern Front. For example, on 16th March 1945, at the Oder River near Stettin, in north Poland, a platoon leader of the 6th Company from the 9th Panzer Regiment noted the following:

“ … About 900 hours, we learned that Ivan had positioned many tanks ready to attack in front of our infantry’s defensive positions. After signaling the Abteilung and Regiment by radio, we learned from an infantry messenger that the rest of our Kompanie and Abteilung must already be advancing. Their progress was delayed by the plowed up terrain caused by the heavy artillery barrage. At exactly 1100 hours, the artillery fire stopped. It was still deadly all around us. Then, from the deep holes and machinegun nests, signal flares were fired – Enemy attack! The first Russian T-34-85 and SU-85 rolled into the field of view of our Jagdpanzers which were in defiladed positions. Quickly, flashes appeared from hits on two of the forward T-34s, then they started were smoking. Thereafter, a further five to eight enemy tanks quickly appeared beside and behind these. They burnt just as fast. So it went for most of the other enemy tanks that continued to appear in advancing tank squadrons. Every shot from our gun was now a hit. Our knowledgeable and experienced gunners, who were the oldest corporals and sergeants in the Abteilung, could hardly miss their targets. After about a 30 minute fight, a strong formation of T-34s attempted to bypass the right flank of our position. We had fired almost all of our ammunition when behind and beside us additional guns opened fire. The rest of the Abteilung had arrived and supported our bitter defensive battle against the overwhelming Red tank formations.’’

Unfortunately, the report does not mention the precise Soviet armor losses, but these were possibly heavy. The report was meant to highlight the effectiveness and experience of the German gunners. This may somewhat be misleading, as the number of experienced German gunners and crews by the end of the war was greatly reduced due to attrition. The majority would be replaced with inexperienced and poorly trained crew members. Not surprisingly, their performance would be greatly diminished. In any case, the particular Panzer IV/70(V) mentioned in the report would be immobilized by a hit from a T-34-85 to the rear.
Another example would be the 563rd Heavy Anti-Tank Battalion, which saw extensive combat action against the advancing Soviet forces in early 1945. This unit was in the process of reorganization and was supplied with one Jagdpanther company and two Panzer IV/70(V) companies. The total combat strength was 18 Jagdpanther and 24 Panzer IV/70(V). The crew of these vehicles had been previously used as standard infantry and were quite exhausted from heavy fighting with the Soviets. As there was no time for recuperation, on 21st January 1945, they advanced toward the enemy. The unit reached Wormditt that day, where heavy fighting with the enemy occurred. Thanks to their superior firepower and experience, the German vehicles managed to inflict severe losses to the enemy. During a period of 10 days, some 58 enemy tanks were reported destroyed. The Germans only lost one Jagdpanther and four Panzer IV/70(V)s. The remaining vehicles had to be blown up to prevent being captured due to a lack of fuel or spare parts.

The IV SS-Panzer Corps, which engaged the Soviets in a desperate attempt to reach the besieged Budapest, had in its inventory some 55 Jagdpanzer IV and Panzer IV/70(V) tank destroyers. Some would also see service at the last major German armored offensive in the East at Lake Balaton during March 1945. By mid-March, the German Army on this front had some 357 vehicles in its inventory, of which 189 were operational.

Abandoned Panzer IV/70(V) somewhere in Hungary during early 1945. Source: https://www.yaplakal.com/forum2/st/25/topic1261749.html

Panzer IV/70(V) from the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend retreating after the Battle of Lake Balaton during March 1945. Source: H. Meyer The 12th SS The History of the Hitler Youth Panzer Division: Volume Two

Some Panzer IV/70(V)s participated in the fighting around and in Budapest in early 1945. Source: И. Мощанский, И. Переяславцев Tank Destroyer Pz.IV/70V)

Italy

The Panzer IV/70(V) saw limited use in this part of Europe. Newly produced vehicles were rushed to either the Eastern or Western Fronts. The hilly terrain in Northern Italy would likely have led to overheating and transmission problems. Thus, by April 1945, only three such vehicles were present on this front.

Jagdpanzer IV Versions

Panzer IV/70(V) Befehlswagen

An unknown number of Panzer IV/70(V)s were modified to be used as Befehlswagen (Eng. command vehicles). These vehicles had additional radio equipment installed, namely the FuG 8 30 radio station (30 W power) with an operational range of 80 km. The extra equipment was positioned behind the loader and was to be operated by an extra crew member. The Befehlswagen would also use a Sternantenne (English: star radio antenna) which was 1.4 m long and located on the left side of the engine compartment.

Other Users

After the war, some surviving Panzer IV/70s would see service with a few different armies.

Bulgaria

The Bulgarians, who were allied to the Germans, switched sides in late 1944. They joined the Soviet Union in the fight against Germany. In March 1945, the Bulgarian armored force was supplemented with one captured Panzer IV/70(V) (chassis number 320662) supplied by the Soviets. In Bulgarian service, this vehicle was known under the Maybach T-IV designation. This vehicle still exists to this day and can be seen at the National Museum of Military History in Sofia.

National Museum of Military History, Sofia, Bulgaria. Source: https://preservedtanks.com/Profile.aspx?UniqueID=202&Select=1

Romania

An unknown numbers of captured Panzer IV/70(V)s were supplied to the Romanian Army by the Soviet Union (possibly after the war). In Romanian service, they were known under the TAs T-4 designation. The TAs was an abbreviation for Tun de Asalt (Eng. Assault Gun) and T-4 was the Romanian designation for the Panzer IV.

A Romanian Panzer IV/70(V) seen during a military parade held in May 1948. Source: Trupele Blindate din Armata Română 1919-1947

Syria

Around five to six vehicles (both L/48 and L/70 armed versions) were given to Syria in 1950 by the French, although, depending on the sources, it is possible that the Soviets actually supplied them. During combat with Israeli forces in 1967 during the Six-Day War, one Jagdpanzer IV was lost when it was hit by a tank round. The remaining were withdrawn from the front and probably stored in reserve. These Jagdpanzer IVs were still listed in the Syrian Army inventory during 1990-1991. What became of them is, unfortunately, not currently known.

Surviving Vehicles

At least several Panzer IV/70(V) vehicles are known to have survived the war. They can be seen in museums around the world. The National Armor and Cavalry Museum Fort Benning in the US has one vehicle. Another US vehicle can be seen at the Army Ordnance Museum, Aberdeen Proving Ground. One can be seen at the Bulgarian National Museum of Military History in the capital, Sofia. Another vehicle is located at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa. The well-known military museum at Kubinka also has one vehicle in its collection.

Surviving Panzer IV/70(V) at the National Armor and Cavalry Museum, Fort Benning, in the US. Source: https://preservedtanks.com/Profile.aspx?UniqueID=201&Select=1

Another Panzer IV/70(V) located at the Aberdeen Proving Ground. Source: www.net-maquettes.com

Panzer IV/70(V) at the Canadian War Museum, Ottawa. Source: Wikipedia

Another example can be seen at the Kubinka Museum near Moscow. Source: Wikipedia

Conclusion

The Panzer IV/70(V) was the final result of the German attempts to create a new and better-armed assault gun to replace the StuG III. Ironically, some Sturmartillarie units only received these vehicles near the end of the war. The Panzer IV/70(V) would remain primarily a dedicated anti-tank vehicle. It possessed strong armament, was well protected, and was a small target. On paper, it met nearly all the requirements that were often associated with an effective anti-tank vehicle for Second World War standards at least. But it was far from perfect, as the added weight led to the chassis being overburdened, which resulted in reduced maximum speed, reliability, and mobility issues.

Despite being produced in relatively large numbers (for German standards), not all of these ever reach the frontline units. The German logistic supply lines were all but destroyed by the end of 1944. The Panzer IV/70(V)s were not concentrated in numbers but instead given in smaller groups to fill the gaps created on the fronts. Thus, their effectiveness was greatly reduced. By late 1944, there was a general lack of panzers, so the Germans were forced to use the Jagdpanzers as replacement vehicles instead. The Panzer IV/70(V) suffered losses, as it was often used in the role of panzer, a role for which it was not suited nor designed for. But, as there were no other solutions, something was better than nothing.

In the end, the Panzer IV/70 (V) was a sound design that exploited the old Panzer IV chassis that was reaching the end of its development limits. Its effectiveness was hampered due to its late introduction in the war, when it could do little to change the final outcome.

Late-type Panzer IV/70(V) based on the Panzer IV Ausf.H, 13th Panzer Division, Hungary, January 1945.

Early type Panzer IV/70(V) in winter camouflage, Hungary, possibly January 1945.

Panzer IV/70(V), late version, 1st SS Panzer Division, Hungary, 1945.

Panzer IV/70(V), late version, 13th Panzer Division, Hungary, January 1945.

Specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)	8.5. x 3.17 x 1.85 m
Total weight, battle-ready	25.8 tonnes
Crew	4 (driver, commander, gunner, loader)
Propulsion	Maybach HL 120 TRM, 265 hp @ 2,800 rpm
Speed	35 km/h 15-18 km/h (cross-country)
Operational range	210 km, 130 km (cross-country)
Traverse	12° right and 12° left
Elevation	-6° to +15°
Armament	7.5 cm (2.95 in) PaK 42 L/70 (55-60 rounds) 7.9 mm (0.31 in) MG 42, 1200 rounds
Armor	Front 80 mm, sides 40 mm, rear 30 mm and top 20 mm

Sources

T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2001) Panzer Tracts No.20-1 Paper Panzers
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2012) Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (1997) Panzer Tracts No.9 Jagdpanzer
D. Nešić (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
S. Zaloga (2016) Bazooka Vs. Panzers Battle for the Bulge, Osprey Publishing
T. J. Gander (2004), Tanks in Detail JgdPz IV, V, VI and Hetzer, Ian Allan Publishing
B. Perrett (1999) Sturmartillerie and Panzerjager 1939-1945, New Vanguard
S. J. Zaloga (2021) German tanks In Normandy, Osprey Publishing
K. Mucha and G. Parada (2001) Jagdpanzer IV, kagero
P. Chamberlain and T.J. Gander (2005) Enzyklopadie Deutscher waffen 1939-1945: Handwaffen
A. Lüdeke (2007) Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon books
H. Doyle (2005) German Military Vehicles, Krause Publications
S. J. Zaloga (2010) Operation Nordwind 1945, Osprey publishing
P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
P. C. Adams (2010) Snow and Steel The Battle of the Bulge 1944-45, Oxford University press
P. Thomas (2017), Hitler’s Tank Destroyers 1940-45. Pen and Sword Military.
Walter J. Spielberger (1993). Panzer IV and its Variants, Schiffer Publishing Ltd.
P. Paolo (2009) Panzer Divisions 1944-1945, Osprey Publishing
N. Szamveber (2013) Days of Battle Armoured Operations North Of The River Danube, Hungary 1944-45, Helion & Company
J. Ledwoch (2009) Bulgaria 1945-1955, Militaria.
J. Ledwoch. (2002) Panzer IV/70 (V), Militaria.
W. J. Spielberger (1972) Military Vehicle, Bellona Print Series 30
T. J. Jentz (1996) The Complete Guide to the Creation and Combat Employment of Germany’s Tank Force 1943-1945, Schiffer Publishing
H. Meyer (2005) The 12th SS The History of the Hitler Youth Panzer Division: Volume Two, Stockpile Book
И. Мощанский, И. Переяславцев (2002) Tank Destroyer Pz.IV/70(V)
S. Zaloga (2022) Tanks In The Battle OF Germany 1945, Osprey Publishing
B. Mihalyi (2022) Siege Of Budapest 1944-1945, Osprey Publishing

WW2 German Tank Destroyers WW2 RSI Armor

Semovente M43 da 75/46 / Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i)

Post author By Arturo Giusti
Post date March 25, 2023
2 Comments on Semovente M43 da 75/46 / Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i)

Semovente M43 da 75/46. Illustrations by the illustrious Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.

Italian Social Republic/German Reich (1943-1945)
Tank Destroyer – 11 to 18 Built

The Semovente M43 da 75/46 (English: 75 mm L/46 M43 Self-Propelled Gun) was the last self-propelled gun (SPG) produced by Italy during the Second World War. It was based on the previous Semovente M43 (plural semoventi) chassis, but featured new spaced armor that offered better protection to the crew. It was developed by Italian companies after a German request of late 1943.

A total of 11 to 18 vehicles were produced, but most of the vehicles were delivered to the Germans, who deployed them on the Italian peninsula against the Allied forces in the last stages of the Second World War.

Semovente M43 da 75/46 of the production series without the anti-aircraft support and the 20 liter can supports. Source: Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano

Previous Models

The effective Semovente M40 da 75/18 self-propelled howitzer based on the chassis of the Carro Armato M13/40 IIIa Serie immediately proved to be more potent than Italian-produced medium tanks in terms of firepower. When deployed in North Africa by the Italians, it demonstrated to be an effective support vehicle, and could deal with almost all the Allied tanks in that theater of operations. It was deployed mainly as an assault tank or to support infantry attacks, but it was also deployed to attack Commonwealth armored formations with success.

It was armed with a Obice da 75/18 Modello 1934 (English: 75 mm L/18 Howitzer Model 1934) with 44 rounds and a Fucile Mitragliatore Breda Modello 1930 (English: Breda Light Machine Gun Model 1930) with 600 rounds. Its engine was the FIAT-SPA 8T Modello 1940 diesel giving out 125 hp at 1,800 rpm.

Side view of the Semovente M40 da 75/18 at Ansaldo-Fossati plant. Source: Semovente da 75/18

After the production of a small series of 60 vehicles, the Semovente da 75/18 was changed to the chassis of the more advanced and modern Carro Armato M14/41, becoming the Semovente M41 da 75/18. This vehicle was powered by the new FIAT-SPA 15T Modello 1941 diesel engine with a maximum power of 145 hp at 1,800 rpm. This semovente was also captured by the Germans and renamed as the Beute Sturmgeschütz M41 mit 7,5 cm KwK L/18 850 (Italienisch) (English: Captured Assault Gun M41 with 75 mm L/18 Cannon [Coded] 850 [italian])

Semovente M41 da 75/18 outside the Ansaldo-Fossati plant of Sestri Ponente. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com

In 1942, the chassis was again changed to the Carro Armato M15/42’s, becoming the Semovente M42 da 75/18. It was longer than its predecessors by 14 cm due to the new engine compartment mounting a powerful 190 hp petrol engine, the FIAT-SPA 15TB Modello 1942. The M42 da 75/18 was known in German service as the Beute Sturmgeschütz M42 mit 7,5 cm KwK L/18 850 (Italienisch).

The Obice da 75/18 Modello 1934 had a great High-Explosive Anti-Tank round, but had a short firing range and was imprecise at long ranges. A new armored vehicle with a different gun had to be produced, and, in October 1942, Ansaldo-Fossati started the new development. In February 1943, the prototype of the new semovente was ready.

The new tank destroyer had a casemate that was made 11 cm longer in order to host the Cannone da 75/34 Modello SF [Sfera] (English: 75 mm L/34 Cannon Model [on Spherical Support]), which had more recoil than the previous howitzer.
In German service, the vehicle was known as Beute Sturmgeschütz M42 mit 7,5 cm KwK L/34 851(Italienisch).

A Semovente M42 da 75/18 (top) and a Semovente M42M da 75/34 (bottom) outside the Ansaldo-Fossati plant of Sestri Ponente. These are early vehicles from the 1943 production run (the M42M was produced from 26th March 1943). In these 2 images, the different casemate fronts are clearly visible. Sources: La Meccanizzazione dell’Esercito fino al 1943

Other developments were the Semoventi M41M da 90/53 tank destroyer, based on a heavily modified Carro Armato M14/41 chassis with the engine compartment in the center and the main gun on the rear. It was accompanied by the more conventional-shaped Semovente M43 da 105/25, a new self-propelled gun on a completely modified M42 chassis.

The Semovente M43 da 105/25 at the Ansaldo-Fossati plant of Sestri Ponente. Source: pinterest.com

The M43 Chassis

The Semovente M43 chassis, also called in Ansaldo documents Semovente M42L (L for ‘Lungo’ – English: ‘Long’), was 4 cm longer than the M42, reaching a length of 5.10 m. It was also 17 cm wider (2.40 m compared to 2.23 m of the M42) and 10 cm lower (1.75 m compared to 1.85 m of the M42).

A Semovente M42 da 75/18 (left) and the Semovente M43 da 105/25 prototype (right). Note the differences in the chassis’ dimensions. Source: associazioneansaldo.com

Finally, the flameproof bulkhead separating the engine compartment from the fighting compartment was moved back 20 cm, increasing the fighting compartment’s space. All these modifications brought the total weight of the vehicle to 15.7 tonnes battle-ready, compared to the 15 tonnes of the M42.

The Semovente M43 da 105/25 prototype (left) and a Semovente M42 da 75/18 (right). Source: associazioneansaldo.com

The Semovente M43 chassis was first adopted for the Semovente M43 da 105/25 equipped with the Obice da 105/25 Modello SF [Sfera] (English: 105 mm L/25 Cannon Model [on Spherical Support]), which needed more space for the cumbersome gun breech and longer ammunition.

A Semovente M42 da 75/18 (left) and the Semovente M43 da 105/25 prototype (right). Note the differences in the chassis’ dimensions. Source: Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano

It was also adopted by the Germans as the base for their new chassis, to which some original Italian production documents referred to as Semovente M42T (T for ‘Tedesco’ – English: German), meaning that it was derived from the previous Semovente M42L chassis.

The German ordered the installation of the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 (English: 75 mm L/46 Anti-Aircraft Cannon Model 1934) and Cannone da 75/34 Modello SF on this chassis to the Italian Ansaldo factory, which remained in the German controlled zone after the Armistice.

History of the Project

After the Armistice of 8th September 1943 and Operation Achse (English: Axis), the German forces captured thousands of Italian vehicles. Many of these were obsolete or needed to be repaired, but some were immediately redistributed to frontline German units in Italy and Balkans to replace some losses.

The Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen (English: Inspector General of the Armed Forces) of the Wehrmacht inspected the various Italian factories and their armored vehicle projects in order to reorganize the production of Italian vehicles. He canceled the production of non-suitable vehicles by German Army standards and ordered modification to some vehicles to meet some German tank requirements.

On 18th December 1943, the Abteilung Waffen und Gerät beim Wehrkreiskommando 6 (Italienisch) (English: Weapons and Equipment Department of the Military District Headquarters No. 6 [Italian]) reported the proposal of the modification of the Semovente M43 da 105/25, called by the Germans Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 10,5 cm KwK L/25 853 (italienisch) (English: Captured Assault Gun M43 with 105 mm L/25 Cannon [Coded] 853 [italian]).

After authorization from the LXXXVIII Armee Korps (English: 88th Armored Corps), German Hauptmann Dobiey, commander of the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 356 (English: 356th Anti-Tank Battalion) assigned to the 356. Infanterie-Division, proposed a series of modifications for the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 10,5 cm KwK L/25 853(i) that his unit had received after the Armistice. The 356. Infanterie-Division was formed in Toulon, France in May 1943, and was moved to northern Italy, between Genoa and Ventimiglia, in November 1943, where it received the Italian Semoventi M43 da 105/25.

Hauptmann Dobiey proposed the addition of 25 mm Schotten-Panzerung (English: Shadow Armor) and Seitenschürzen (English: Side Aprons) to increase the protection on the casemate to 60 mm on the superstructure sides and 34 mm on the chassis.
The German Hauptmann assumed an increase in weight of 600 kg, bringing the vehicle weight to about 16 tonnes, a weight that the original suspensions could withstand.

The Semovente M43 da 75/46 or Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) prototype at the Ansaldo-Fossati plant in Sestri Ponente. The gun barrel had a counterweight on the muzzle and was not painted as the chassis. Apart from the counterweight and the absence of the gun shield and the radio antenna, the prototype is identical to the production vehicles. Source: Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano Fino al 1943

It is not clear who proposed to mount the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 on this upgraded chassis. It is improbable that Hauptmann Dobiey, a German officer, had such extensive knowledge of the Italian cannon that he knew it was also an adequate anti-tank weapon and could be installed inside an armored vehicle.

Another note on the armament is that it was planned to modify the Cannone da 75/46 Antiaereo Modello 1934 to fire German PaK 40 ammunition. This would have increased the anti-tank performances of the Italian cannon and standardized ammunition production.

The Semovente M43 da 75/46 prototype from another angle. The absence of the gun shield here is more visible. Source: svppbellum.blogspot.com

Major General Ernst von Horstig, head of Dienststelle Italien des Heereswaffenamt (English: Italian Branch of the [German] Army Weapons Office), took the initiative and ordered the development of the vehicle. Ansaldo had to produce the prototype by 15th January 1944, less than a month later. The German general wanted the prototype tested before deciding its fate.

The Semovente M43 da 75/46 was rarely mentioned in Second World War Italian documents. It was barely mentioned by German sources either, but when it was mentioned, it was named with its German designation: Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) (English: Captured Assault Gun M43 with 75 mm L/46 Cannon [Coded] 852 [italian]).

In this article, the vehicle was referred to with both designations. The factory designation Semovente M42T will be used while referring to an up-armored version of the Semovente M42L chassis.

Production and Delivery

It is not known when the Semovente M43 da 75/46 prototype was ready and tested, but the German response was positive. Its production was organized at the Ansaldo-Fossati plant.

Ansaldo archive sources claim a total production of 11 Semoventi M43 da 75/46, 8 (including the prototype) in 1944 and 3 in 1945. The same document reports that only 7 spherical supports for the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 were produced, all in 1944. Photographic evidence confirms the existence of 6 production vehicles and a prototype.

A total of 6 Semoventi M43 da 75/46 equipped with guns ready to be delivered at Ansaldo-Fossati plant. This image confirms a production of 6 vehicles and a prototype, as declared by Ansaldo in 1944. Source: wardrawings.be

In the late war, the German Army wanted to save on raw materials, producing only the most powerful and reliable vehicles. This was done in Germany and also in Italy. It was planned to cancel the production of all Italian armored fighting vehicles apart for the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i), the Beute Panzerspähwagen AB43 203(i) (aka the Autoblinda AB43 medium reconnaissance armored car), and the Beute Panzerkampfwagen P40 737(i) (aka the Carro Armato P26/40 heavy tank).

On 20th February 1945, the Wehrmacht planned to equip 4 infantry divisions with Italian armored fighting vehicles. The Aufstellungsstab Sued was in favor of a production contract extension with the Italian factories. They essentially wanted to let all the Italian armored vehicle factories still capable of producing vehicles convert their production lines to Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) and Beute Panzerspähwagen AB43 203(i) (no mention was made of of the Beute Panzerkampfwagen P40 737(i) in this document), with a production estimated at 50 StuG and 50 Pz.Sp.Wg. per month.

The new production schedule for Ansaldo-Fossati plant of Sestri Ponente, where all the semoventi were produced, was of 116 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 (not specifying the armament) in total until August 1945.

Ansaldo-Fossati production planned by the Germans in early 1945
Vehicle’s Name	March	April	May	June	July	August	Total number
Panzerkampfwagen P40 737(i)	2	4	12	12	15	6	51
Beute Sturmgeschütz M43	14	22	25	25	25	5	116
Panzerbefehlswagen M42 772(i)	3	3	8	8	0	0	22

The document did not specify which of the 3 semoventi on the M43 chassis it refers to, but, the Germans wanted to standardize the production of the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i). It could be assumed that, in German plans, all or the majority of Sturmgeschütz M43 mentioned in the document would have been armed with the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934.

The German document also mentioned that the Ansaldo-Fossati plant produced 7 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) in 1944. Another 12 vehicles with and without main guns were produced in 1945.

Some of these were produced at the Ansaldo-Fossati plant but then sent to Milan, at the Fonderia Milanese di Acciaio Vanzetti Società Anonima (English: Milanese Steel Foundry Vanzetti Limited Company), which was reconverted into an assembly plant.

In fact, the German report specifically mentions the presence of 12 completed (but without guns) Sturmgeschütz M43 at the Fonderia Milanese di Acciaio Vanzetti S.A. assembly plant. At that plant, the vehicles were equipped with cannons and delivered to their German units, so it is probable that some of the 12 unarmed chassis at Fonderia Milanese di Acciaio Vanzetti S.A. plant of Milan were later equipped with Cannoni da 75/34 in order to send them to the frontline as soon as possible.

At the end of the war, Aufstellungsstab Sued (English: Positioning Staff South) reported the production of a prototype and 7 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) in 1944 plus 2 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) between 5th December 1944 and 5th January 1945.

Another 2 were produced between 5th January to 15th February 1945 and another 6 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) chassis were produced between 16th February and 20th March 1945, of which only 2 equipped with main guns.

Beute Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) Production as Reported in German Documents
Data	StuG M43 mit 75/46 852(i) Chassis Produced	StuG M43 mit 75/46 852(i) with Main Guns Installed	Status
1944	8¹	8	All delivered
5th January 1945	2	2	All delivered
15th February 1945	2	2	All delivered
20th March 1945	6	2	2 on the way to their unit²
Total	18	14
Note	¹Including the prototype ²Nothing is known about the other 4 chassis

The total German number of 18 Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) differs from the Ansaldo-Fossati one, of just 11. This difference in sources can be easily explained as, from early 1945 on, assembly (and probably production) of Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) was moved from the Ansaldo-Fossati plant of Sestri Ponente to Fonderia Milanese di Acciaio Vanzetti S.A. of Milan. When assembly was moved, Ansaldo simply stopped counting the Semoventi M43 da 75/46. Another explanation could be that some chassis meant for other types were armed with the Cannone da 75/34 in order to put them in service as soon as possible.

The same report from 20th February 1945 claimed that Beauftragte für Waffen (English: Weapons Commissioner) Goering had reported that 25 StuG M43 mit 75/46 852(i) should be delivered in March 1945.

A last note about Italian armored vehicle production was sent on 9th April 1945 to the Reichsministerium fuer Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion (English: Reich Ministry for Armaments and War Production), directed to Reichsminister Albert Speer. The note was sent by the Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen and reported that the Beauftragter fuer Panzerkampfwagen bei Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion (English: Representative for Armored Fighting Vehicles at Armament and War Production) in Milan wanted to order more Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) and Beute Panzerspähwagen AB43 203(i), reaching a full rate production of 50 StuG and 50 Pz.Sp.Wg. per month.

The Generalinspekteur der Panzertruppen wrote to Reichsminister Speer that he was in favor of continuing the Italian armored vehicle production if it did not interfere with German vehicle production because of the very few raw materials available.

The Generalinspekteur’s note reported that, if the Reichsministerium fuer Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion would approve, the Italian factories would increase, by every means, the production rate of armored vehicle currently on the lines, especially the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i).

This unrealistic production plan was never realized. On 25th April 1945, 2 weeks later, the Italian Partisans started a great insurrection, attacking the last Axis forces in the main cities of northern Italy. Turin, Milan, Novara and Genoa, where the Italian armored fighting vehicles were produced, were freed between 25th to 28th April 1945, capturing the production plants with the help of the workers.

German Modifications

Apart from the new armored plates, mounted only on some Semoventi M43 chassis, other upgrades were done on the Italian semoventi produced for the Germans. These included 4 bigger teeth bolted on the outside of the sprocket wheel, intended to prevent the track slipping off the wheels while driving in muddy or snowy terrain. Another modification was the addition of 3 helmet supports on the roof, 2 on the left side and one on the right, for the crew members when operating with open hatches. The third modification requested by the Germans was to substitute the right roof hatch with one openable in 2 parts for better ventilation of the fighting compartment.

A British light mortar squad near an abandoned Semovente M42M da 75/34 produced for the Germans. Note that the right roof hatch was shorter than the left one. Source: beutepanzer.ru

Other unconfirmed modifications claimed by many sources were:

Substituting the Italian radio apparatus with more reliable German-produced ones
Replacing the gearbox with one of German origin
German-produced Mauser MG34s or MG42s instead of the original Italian anti-aircraft machine guns

The Germans did not usually change the radio apparatus of the Italian tanks and self-propelled guns they used. It is possible the sources refer to occasional changes made by individual crews, such as German intercoms or new batteries and accumulators. The Germans did not modify the powerpacks on the Italian vehicles.

There is no photographic evidence showing the adoption of German machine guns on Italian self-propelled guns. This suggests that these were not widely adopted on Italian vehicles. Most likely, many sources are confusing the machine guns due to the German caliber. In fact, during the German occupation, the factories were ordered to change the caliber of the Italian machine guns and even some rifles to standardize to the German 7.92 x 57 mm Mauser caliber. Many Breda Modello 1938 Italian medium machine guns were modified to fire the Mauser cartridges. This could be considered another German modification of the Semovente M43 da 75/46.

Design

Armor

The armor was both bolted to an internal frame and partially welded (a great innovation for Italian vehicles) and had great thickness compared to Italian standards. The hull armor had 2 angled armored plates with a thickness of 50 mm at 40° on top and 35 mm at 50° on the bottom for the transmission.

The transmission deck plate was 25 mm-thick angled at 78°. It also had 2 brake inspection hatches of the same thickness. The hull side armored plates were 40 mm thick.
The superstructure had a 75 mm thick armor plate angled at 5° frontally, while the gun spherical support was 60 mm thick.

On the casemate’s sides, the 45 mm thick armored plates were angled at 7°, while the rear was protected by a 45 mm thick plate angled at 0°. A plate of 25 mm angled at 15° protected the back of the engine compartment. The roof and floor of the vehicle were 15 mm thick. Unlike its predecessors, the Semovente M43 da 75/46 had three-part side skirts.

The peculiarity of the Semovente M42T was the addition of 25 mm thick spaced armored plates angled at 25° on the front. They had a hatch where the driver port of the M43 was placed. The gun barrel received a 25 mm thick gun shield angled at 25°. This was a great improvement. For all the duration of the war, one of the problems encountered in Italian semoventi was the absence of protection to the spherical support that was sometimes blocked by light arm fire or artillery splinters. On the side, protecting the casemate and the lower part of the fighting compartment, there was a 25 mm spaced armored plate.

A Semovente M43 da 75/34 with its spaced armor plates. In this image, the hatches for the driving port and the gun shield are visible. Source: warthunder.com

Nothing is known about the real efficacy of this spaced armor. At the end of the war, the Italian ballistic armor, like the German one, was produced with poor raw materials and the final result was of bad quality and often broke or split.

Nevertheless, the spaced armor probably guaranteed more chances to survive thanks to the distance between the spaced armor and the casemate’s plate. The total weight of the vehicle was about 15.6 tonnes, 100 kg less than the less-armored Semovente M43 da 105/25.

Hull

On the left front mudguard, there was a support for the jack. On the sides of the superstructure, there were two headlights for night operations. On the rear part, the engine deck had two large-size inspection hatches which could be opened by 45°. Between the two inspection hatches were the sapper tools, including a shovel, a pickaxe, a crowbar, and a track removal system.

Rear of a Carro Armato M15/42. Even if many tools were removed, it was essentially identical to the one of the Semovente M43 da 75/46. Source: masterminiatures.it

The rear of the vehicle had the horizontal radiator cooling grills in the center, the cooling water cap and, on the sides, two fuel caps. The rear had a towing ring in the center and two hooks on the sides, one spare wheel on the left side, and a license plate on the lower left side with a brake light. A smoke grenade box was placed on the rear armored plate, on the right.

On either side of engine deck, on the rear fenders, there were two storage boxes and the mufflers covered by a steel shield to protect them from impacts.

Better view of the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 75/46 852(i) ready to be delivered at the Ansaldo-Fossati plant. This image allows seeing the turret roof details and bolted armor. Source: forum.warthunder.com

A total of 6 racks for 20-liter cans were placed on the sides of the vehicle, 3 on each spaced armored plate on the sides, just like on other Italian self-propelled guns and tanks. It should be noted, however, that on the Semoventi M43 da 75/46, the cans were not transported because they were never sent to North Africa, and it was not necessary to transport a great amount of fuel during operations in Italy, where it was deployed.

On the inside, starting from the front of the vehicle, was the transmission connected to the braking system, which had two armored inspection hatches. These could be opened from outside by means of two handles, or from the inside by means of a knob located on the right side of the vehicle, which could be used by the gunner. On the left was the driver’s seat, equipped with a fold-down back for easy access. In front, it had two steering tillers, a driving port that could be closed with a lever, and a hyposcope used when the port was closed. The hyposcope had 19 x 36 cm dimensions and a vertical field of view of 30°, from +52° to +82°. On the left was the dashboard and, on the right, the gun breech.

Interior of Semovente M43 da 105/25 prototype. Even if Semovente da 75/46 and Semovente da 105/25 had different main armament and main ammunition racks, they shared the same radio apparatus, dashboard (left) and machine gun maintenance kit and racks (right). Source: fondazioneansaldo.com

Behind the driver was the seat for the loader. The loader had, on the left, the radio apparatus and, above him, one of two armored hatches. In case of an attack from the air, the loader would also have to use the anti-aircraft machine gun. On the right side of the fighting compartment was the gunner’s seat without a backrest. In front of his seat, the gunner had the elevation and traverse handwheels.

On the gunner’s right was the support for the anti-aircraft machine gun when not in use, a maintenance kit, and a fire extinguisher. Behind the support was a wooden rack for ammunition for the secondary armament. In order to prevent the magazines from falling on rough terrain, the rack had a closable curtain. Behind the gunner/commander were the ammunition racks for the main gun. On the rear wall were the engine fan, an engine cooling water tank, and the Magneti Marelli batteries. On the rear side of the superstructure were two pistol ports which could be closed by revolving shutters from the inside. These were used for self-defense and to check the rear side of the vehicle in order to avoid the crew having to expose themselves outside of the vehicle. The transmission shaft ran through the entire fighting compartment, dividing it in half.

How the Semovente M43 da 75/46 would have looked without the spaced armor. It was based on a slightly modified Semovente M43 da 105/25 chassis. Source: Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano with author’s modifications

Radio Equipment

The Semovente M43 da 75/46’s radio apparatus was an Apparato Ricetrasmittente Radio Fonica 1 per Carro Armato or Apparato Ricevente RF1CA (English: Tank Audio Radio Receiver Apparatus 1) produced by Magneti Marelli. This was a radiotelephone and radiotelegraph station box of 415 x 208 x 196 mm and a weight of about 18.5 kg. It had 10 watts of power in both voice and telegraphy. It had a small cover that was raised up when the radio was in use.

The Apparato Ricevente RF1CA mounted on Italian semoventi and carri armati. Numbers refer to: 1) audio radio receiver apparatus, 2) power supply, 3) antenna support (early type), 4) accessories, 5) cable that connected the audio radio receiver apparatus with the antenna, 6) cable that connected the audio radio receiver apparatus with the power supply, 7) cable that connected power supply to the batteries, 8) headphones, 9) laryngophone, and 10) fuses. Source: Manuale Apparato Ricevente RF1CA TR7

Operating frequency range was between 27 and 33.4 MHz. It was powered by an AL-1 Dynamotor supplying 9-10 Watts, mounted on the hull’s right side, with a power supply of 12 Volts from NF-12-1-24 batteries produced by Magneti Marelli connected in series. It had a range of 8 km in voice mode and 12 km in telegraph mode. These capabilities were reduced when the self-propelled guns were on the move.

The radio had 2 ranges, Vicino (Eng: Near), with a maximum range of 5 km, and Lontano (Eng: Afar), with a maximum range of 12 km. Even with the Lontano range, in the voice mode it had a range of 8 km.

It was produced from 1940 by the Magneti Marelli company of Sesto San Giovanni, near Milan. and was mounted on all the Italian self-propelled guns and tanks of the M series (except for the Carro Armato M11/39) and the Carro Armato P26/40 heavy tank.

The radio was produced after the Armistice for the Germans, together with manual books in German language. The production of the Apparato Ricevente RF1CA until 1945 also contrasts the hypothesis of the use of German radios on semoventi. After the war, the turning unit of this transceiver was almost entirely copied on the US Army AN/GRR-5 receiver.

On the previous models of semoventi, the antenna radio was mounted on a support that was lowerable thanks to a crank inside the vehicle. The loader had to turn the crank until the 1.8 m antenna was fully raised or fully down. This was a slow operation and the crank occupied space inside the fighting compartment.

From 1942, a new antenna support was mounted on Italian vehicles. The first model equipped with this new antenna was the Semovente M41M da 90/53, while it was introduced in the Semovente M42 da 75/18 later. The new antenna had a 360° lowerable support, meaning that it could be folded in any direction. Usually, a hook on the left side of the front of the casemate permitted it to rest during long drives to avoid it hitting electrical cables or interfering with driving in narrow areas. It seems that, on the prototype and the production Semoventi M43 da 75/46, this support was never mounted and the crew did not have the possibility to lower the antenna.

The different types of antennas and supports mounted on the Italian medium tanks and semoventi. Early type (left) and new type (right), mounted from 1942 on. Source: Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano

On all the semoventi produced before the Semovente M43 chassis, the antenna support was mounted on the rear left side of the casemate’s roof, while on the Semovente M43 da 105/25, it was moved on the front left side for a different internal arrangement. On the Semovente M43 da 75/46, the antenna radio support was again moved to the rear left side of the roof. To speed up production, Ansaldo-Fossati deployed a single M43 chassis production line. When the chassis was ready, Ansaldo’s workers made a hole on the rear side on the semoventi that would have received spaced armored plates, filling the front left hole with a round armored plate welded on it.

Engine and Transmission

The petrol engine of the Semovente M43 was inherited from previous semoventi M42 and M43 and the Carro Armato M15/42. The new model, the FIAT-SPA 15TB (‘B’ for ‘Benzina’ – Petrol) Modello 1943 petrol, 12-cylinder, V-shaped, water-cooled 11,980 cm³ engine developed 190 hp at 2,400 rpm (some other sources claim a maximum output of 192 hp or even 195 hp).

FIAT-SPA 15TB Modello 1942 petrol engine, radiator, and cooling vents. On the right top is the cooling water tank that was located, on the vehicle, in the fighting compartment. It was divided from the engine by a bulkhead. Source: bnamodel.com

It is not clear if the Germans modified the vehicle in other ways. It seems improbable that they ordered the mounting of German transmissions or other German-produced parts on the semoventi. The engine was designed by Fabbrica Italiana Automobili di Torino or FIAT (English: Italian Automobile Factory of Turin) and produced by one of its subsidiary companies, the Società Piemontese Automobili, or SPA (English: Piedmontese Automobile Company).

Engine and radiator on a Carro Armato M15/42. Even if the Semovente M43 da 75/46 and the Carro Armato M15/42 were different, the engine compartment was only slightly modified. Source: facebook.com Associazione Raggruppamento SPA

The engine ignition system and lighting systems, engine cooling system, and fuel circulation systems were inherited from the previous Semovente M43 da 105/25. In order to start the engine, there was a Magneti Marelli electric starter but also an inertial starter produced by the Turin-based company Onagro. The lever for the inertial starter could be inserted outside the vehicle, on the rear, or from the inside of the fighting compartment. Two crew members needed to turn the crank, reaching about 60 rotations per minute. At that point, the driver could turn the engine button on the dashboard until the first strokes of the engine. The crew members rarely ignited the engine from the inside due to the cramped space, but this could become useful when under enemy artillery fire or in areas in which the enemy could easily ambush dismounted crews.

Ignition crank mounted on the rear of a Carro Armato M15/42. On the Semovente M43 da 75/46, the only difference was the presence of a smoke grenade box on the right. Source: associazioneansaldo.com

On road, the Semovente M43 da 75/46’s maximum speed was 38 km/h, while off-road, the maximum speed was about 15 km/h. It had an on-road range of 180 km and an off-road range similar to the one of Semovente M43 da 105/25, of about 100 km.

On the Carro Armato M15/42, thanks to the increased space in the engine compartment, the fuel tanks were increased to 367 liters in main tanks, plus 40 liters in the reserve tank. This gave a total of 407 liters. On the M43 chassis, the fighting compartment was 20 cm longer, reducing the space in the engine compartment. In other words, the fuel tanks were shortened, decreasing the volume from 407 liters to 316 liters.

This was also likely due to some changes to the engine. The Carro Armato M15/42 and Semovente M42 chassis mounted the FIAT-SPA 15 TB Modello 1942 petrol engine, while the M42T chassis mounted a FIAT-SPA 15TB Modello 1943. This could be simply a wrong official designation or a 1943 development by FIAT and SPA. The modifications are unknown, but it seems that they did not modify the overall performances of the engine. They probably concerned a decrease of the weight of engine or upgraded engine fire extinguisher system due to the extremely flammable petrol. Modifications to the engine weight are plausible due the extremely modest weight of Semovente M43 da 75/46, 15.6 tonnes battle ready, lighter than the Semovente M43 da 105/25 which did not have the spaced armor.

The engine was connected to a transmission produced by FIAT, with 5 forward and one reverse gears. The transmission was mounted frontally. In order to remove it, the transmission deck’s armored plate had to be removed first.

Image of the FIAT gearbox (produced by SPA) mounted on all Italian armored vehicles starting with the Carro Armato M15/42. It was connected to the transmission shaft. Source: Manuale Uso e Manutenzione Carro Armato M15/42 e Derivati

Due to the increased size of the casemate, the rear bulkhead that divided the engine compartment from the fighting compartment was moved 20 cm back. This increased the space occupied by the engine’s flywheel cover inside the fighting compartment, increasing the heat coming from the engine in the crew’s compartment.

The heat and proximity of fuel tanks near ammunition could be a serious danger in case of fire, but during winters, it warmed up the crew members that had to leave at least an upper hatch opened during fighting to ventilate the fighting compartment.

Suspension and Tracks

The Semovente M43 da 75/46’s suspension was a semi-elliptical leaf spring type, as on all vehicles developed from Italian medium tanks. On each side, there were 4 bogies connected to a leaf-spring with 8 doubled rubber road wheels paired on 2 suspension units in total. This suspension type was obsolete and did not allow the vehicle to reach a high top speed. In addition, it was very vulnerable to enemy fire or mines. Due to the lengthening of the hull on the Semoventi M43, one of the 2 suspension units was mounted a few centimeters back.

The tank had 26 cm wide tracks with 86 track links per side, 6 more than the other tanks of the ‘M’ series due to the hull lengthening.

One of the 2 suspension units of a Semovente M41M da 90/53. Each suspension unit was composed of 4 rubber road wheels divided in 2 suspension arms. Source: flikr.com @Chris Streckfus

The drive sprocket wheels were at the front and the idlers, with modified track tension adjusters, at the back, with 3 rubber return rollers on each side. The small surface area of the tracks (about 14,750 cm²) gave a ground pressure of about 1 kg/cm², increasing risk that the vehicle would bog down in soft soils, such as mud or snow.

In a photo taken in 1944 outside the Ansaldo-Fossati plant production line, there were a Semovente M43 da 75/46 and M43 da 105/25 for comparison. The Semovente da 75/46 was equipped with Ostketten (English: Eastern Chains) on the right track. These were probably delivered by the Germans for tests. They were meant to increase surface in contact with the ground and to decrease overall pressure on the ground. Apart from this photo, no other photographic evidence suggests the use of Ostketten on Italian captured armored vehicles.

The Semovente M43 da 75/46 prototype (left) next to a Semovente M43 da 105/25 without side skirts (right). Apart from the main armament and added armor plates, the vehicles were externally identical. The Semovente M43 da 75/46 had the right track equipped with German Ostketten. Source: militaryimages.net

Like the Semovente M43 da 105/35, the M43 da 75/46 was equipped with a side skirt. These were only 4 mm thick and partially protected the sides of the vehicle. Their role was not to protect the semovente from anti-tank rifle rounds or shaped charges ammunition, but to prevent shrapnel from damaging the suspension units and track links. The side skirts had a cut in the back to allow crew to be able to reach the track tension adjuster without dismounting the skirt. Another 3 small holes were made to add lubricant to the return rollers without losing time by removing the side skirt.

Main Armament

The Semovente M43 da 75/46’s main armament was the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934, an Italian anti-aircraft cannon developed by Ansaldo in 1932 that entered service in 1934. It appeared after an Italian Regio Esercito’s High Command request for a new anti-aircraft cannon in 1929.

Ansaldo and Odero-Terni-Orlando (OTO) not only developed some guns but also tested foreign ones, such as the 80 mm luftvärnskanon m/29 anti-aircraft gun produced by Swedish Bofors. The Bofors gun inspired the Ansaldo design office, which presented the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei in 1932.

Drawing of the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com

During trials, the Direzione Superiore del Servizio Tecnico Armi e Munizioni or DSSTAM (English: Higher Directorate of Technical Service Weapons and Ammunition), the branch of the Regio Esercito’s High Command which created artillery design requests and accepted them into service, helped Ansaldo to modify the cannon. This was done to such an extent that some sources even called the cannon the DSTAM-Ansaldo. In 1933, the gun was ready (even if it was only accepted into service in 1934), and the Regio Esercito ordered 100. Ninety-two were delivered by October 1939, while another 240 were to be built in 1940.

A Cannone da 75/46 Cotraerei Modello 1934 in North Africa in November 1940. Source: Istituto Luce via italie1935-45.com

At the start, only the Ansaldo Pozzuoli plant (specialized in artillery production) and the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano (English: Artillery Plant of Cornigliano), which was under Ansaldo’s control, produced the cannon. A total of 232 pieces were delivered between 1941 and 1942, while another 4 were delivered in the first 4 months of 1943, together with 108 spare barrels.

OTO and Arsenale Regio Esercito di Piacenza or AREP (English: Royal Army Arsenal of Piacenza) also produced spare parts. OTO delivered a total of 120 cannons by December 1942. The last order of the Regio Esercito’s High Command for 472 Cannoni da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 to be delivered by the end of 1943 was never started due to the Armistice of 8th September.

The Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei of the first batch at the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com

When the cannon appeared in the mid-1930s, it was a great artillery piece. It had high initial muzzle velocity due to the use of powerful propellant and barrel length, sustained rate of fire, and large firing arcs thanks to a cross-platform. The gun’s breech had a system to switch between being manually-opened or semiautomatic, with a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute with a trained crew. Its muzzle velocity was 800 m/s and maximum range was 8,500 m in the anti-aircraft role and 13,000 m against ground targets. The traverse was 360° while the elevation was from 0° to 90°.

Two Cannoni da 75/46 Cotraerei Modello 1934M towed by Pavesi P4 prime movers at the Nettuno shooting range. Source: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito via italie1935-45.com

A Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 with a rangefinder telemeter and Centrale di Tiro Modello 1937 ‘Gala’ deployed by artillerymen of the Nettuno Anti-Aircraft Artillery School. Source: Giuseppe Calò via italie1935-45.com

In July 1943, there were 31 batterie antiaeree da 75/46 (English: 75 mm L/46 anti-aircraft batteries) operational. The Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 was deployed on all fronts of the war, in the Modello 1934 version, Modello 1934M version (slightly modified), and Modello 1940 static defense version. The majority of the batteries were sent to North Africa. In the Soviet Union, the few groups sent gave great results in the anti-tank role against early variants of Soviet T-34 medium tanks.

A Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 of the Regio Esercito in the Soviet Union during the winter of 1942-43. Source: Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito via italie1935-45.com

Although it was a marked improvement over the 75 mm guns of the First World War and it had cutting edge characteristics for the 1930s, the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 showed some weaknesses during its use. Rapid wear and tear of cannon’s bore caused its muzzle velocity to drop from 800 m/s to 750 m/s. The Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 was quickly superseded as a positional piece for territorial anti-aircraft defense as the war continued. It was therefore time to switch to a more powerful weapon, the Cannone da 90/53 Modello 1939.

After the Armistice of 8th September 1943, the anti-aircraft gun was deployed by the Germans, who renamed it 7,5 cm Flugabwehrkanone 264/3 (italienisch) (English: 75 mm Aircraft-Defense Cannon coded 264/3 [italian]) and continued its production. Even the Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano (English: National Republican Army), the Italian Army allied to the Germans, equipped a pair of anti-aircraft units with this cannon. Some guns were also deployed by Italian soldiers in the Allied armies in order to defend Southern Italy from Axis air attacks.

A Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 of an Italian AA unit during deployment maneuvers after the Armistice. Source: Giuseppe Calò via italie1935-45.com

The Cannone da 75/46 mounted on the semovente was called Kampfwagenkanone 75/46 (English: 75 mm L/46 Tank Cannon) by the Germans. On the semovente mount, the Cannone da 75/46 had an elevation of -10° to +18° and traverse was 17° to either side. The traverse decreased compared to the Semoventi M42M da 75/34 and M43 da 105/25 of 18° due to the presence of new spaced plates.

Semovente M43 da 75/46 sight. Per Alzo da 75/46 Semovente can be read on it. Source: heroesandgeneral.com

The barrel weighed 686 kg, while the gun mounted on the spherical support of the semoventi weighed 810 kg according to German reports. An interesting feature was that the vehicle had the possibility of also being equipped with the Cannone da 105/25 Modello SF just by removing the 75 mm cannon and spherical support with a winch and changing the main gun’s ammunition racks. The difference between the Cannone da 75/46 and Cannone da 105/25 was that the latter weighed just 40 kg more.

The Semoventi M42L armed with the Cannone da 105/25 weighed more than the Semoventi M42T with spaced armor and Cannone da 75/46. This was largely due to weight of 105 mm ammunition. In other words, if the Semovente M43 da 75/46 was equipped with the Cannone da 105/25, its weight would have increased by several hundred kilograms.

Rare images of a rare Semovente M42T da 105/25. It was a Cannone da 105/25 mounted on the chassis of a Semovente M43 da 75/46. Source: pinterest.com @lucky01

The Cannone da 105/25 Modello S.F. was developed by Ansaldo and produced by the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano. It was developed on the basis of the Obice da 105/23 Modello 1942 a howitzer developed by Ansaldo as a prototype for divisional artillery, together with the Cannone da 105/40 Modello 1943. Due to delays and high costs, only the Cannone da 105/40 Modello 1943 was accepted in service, however it was only adopted from May 1943 and saw limited use. The the tank version of the Obice da 105/23 Modello 1942 was adopted on the Semovente M43 da 105/25 and, after the war, also used in Italian fortifications on the Italo-Yugoslavian border.

The Cannone da 105/25 Modello SF at the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com

Inside the semoventi, the Cannone da 105/25 Modello SF had a horizontal traverse of 18° to either side, as well as a depression of -10° and an elevation of +18°. Traverse probably decreased on the Semoventi M42T due to the spaced armor, like the horizontal traverse of other cannons mounted on the same chassis.

The Cannone da 105/25 Modello SF fired the same ammunition as the Cannone da 105/28 Modello 1916, with a maximum muzzle velocity of 500 m/s with armor-piercing rounds. It was capable of piercing a Rolled Homogeneous Armor (RHA) plate of 80 mm at 1,000 m according to German reports.

The Main Gun’s Problems

The Germans proposed to modify the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934, or as they called it, the 7,5 cm Fliegerabwehrkanone 264/3(i). It is unknown if they finally ordered a modification to the cannons, as planned in December 1943. The really slow production rate of the Cannoni da 75/46 for the Semoventi M43 da 75/46 could be explained by a long and difficult breech modification made in order to permit Panzerabwehrkanone 40 or PaK 40 ammunition to be fired.

The PaK 40 rounds had a length of 714 mm (75 x 714 mm R), while the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 round’s cartridge had a length of 580 mm (75 x 580 mm R). In order to fire PaK 40 rounds, Ansaldo had to modify the chamber, if necessary also modify the inner face of the bolt, the extractor, and probably also reinforce the breech and powder chamber if the pressures resulting from firing the PaK 40 ammunition exceed those tolerated by the Cannone da 75/46.

A partially assembled Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 at the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano in 1938. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com

However, the slow rate of delivery of Italian cannons could also be explained by other hypotheses. The first one could be the slow production of spherical supports used to mount the cannons on the semoventi chassis. This does seem an unsatisfactory explanation. In fact, the Italian industry, albeit always failing in the delivery of self-propelled gun spherical supports in large quantities, could probably have fulfilled a request for so few 75 mm cannon mounts.

An image showing off some Semoventi M43 da 105/25 lined up in an Ansaldo-Fossati depot, ready to be delivered. Even if this photo dates before the Armistice, it shows that, even if the Italian industry sometimes failed in the delivery of self-propelled gun spherical mounts, it had an average monthly production that matched the production of the hulls produced in one month by Ansaldo-Fossati with guns from the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano. Source: associazioneansaldo.com

The last hypothesis that could explain the low delivery rate of the Cannone da 75/46 is the really low production rate of Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934. It was produced in Piacenza, Pozzuoli, and Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano, under Ansaldo’s control. After the Armistice of 1943, Pozzuoli was freed by Allied forces in late September, while Arsenale Regio Esercito di Piacenza was converted mainly for vehicle reparation and production of armored improvised vehicles. The artillery production decreased. This meant that the majority of Cannoni da 75/46 production was the responsibility of the Stabilimento Artiglierie di Cornigliano, which remained one of the few Italian artillery producers until 1945.

Main Gun Considerations

The Germans and Ansaldo probably decided to mount the Cannone da 75/46 on the Semovente M42T due to its better anti-tank performance compared to other Italian guns at their disposal.

The choice of mounting a modified anti-aircraft gun proved to be a poor choice for the Germans and it cost them a very low production rate, especially compared to the production rate of Semoventi M42L da 105/25 and Semoventi M42T da 75/34, other last ones produced on the same chassis.

In order to increase the production of better armed Semoventi M42T, the mounting on the Semoventi M42T chassis of the German Panzerabwehrkanone 40 could have been an alternative option. The weight of the vehicle would not have increased by much, as the 7.5 cm KwK40 weighed 750 kg, compared to the 686 kg of the Cannone da 75/46.

Before the Armistice, Italy and Germany signed a contract for the license production of the field version of the PaK 40 in Italy (Italian nomenclature Cannone da 75/43 Modello 1940). The production was not started before September 1943, but some production lines were assembled. It is not known why the Germans did not restart the project earlier instead of adopting the Cannone da 75/46. It would probably have been easier to start delivering German-produced PaK 40 in Italy and then make Italian industry autonomous instead of modifying the Italian anti-aircraft cannon’s production line. After the armistice, OTO produced some spare parts for the PaK 40 for the Germans until the late war.

How the Semovente M43 armed with PaK 40 anti-tank cannon could have looked like. Source: drawingdatabase.com and the-blueprints.com with author modification

Secondary Armament

Secondary armament consisted of a Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938 (English: Breda Medium Machine Gun Model 1938) produced by Società Italiana Ernesto Breda per Costruzioni Meccaniche (English: Italian Ernesto Breda’s Company for Mechanical Constructions). It was derived from the Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1937, the most modern Italian medium machine gun during the war.

A Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938 on a Semovente M41 da 75/18 on an earlier anti-aircraft support. Source: pinterest.com

Breda Modello 1938 was its vehicle version, with a shorter and heavier barrel, pistol grip, and top-mounted curved magazine with a capacity of 24 rounds. These modifications were made to ease the use of the machine gun inside vehicles. Breda machine guns fired a particular cartridge developed by Breda especially for machine guns, the 8 x 59 mm RB with a muzzle velocity between 790 m/s and 800 m/s, depending on the round type.

Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938 with top-curved magazine without anti-aircraft sight. When not in use, it was stored in the left sponson of the self-propelled gun. Source: dandbmilitaria.com

The machine gun was fixed on an anti-aircraft mount attached to a crowbar that offered an increased horizontal traverse for the machine gun in case of an aerial attack. The anti-aircraft supports mounted on the previous model of Italian self-propelled guns barely covered the frontal arc of the vehicles. A similar feature was made on Beute Sturmgeschütz L6 mit 47/32 770(i) (Semovente L40 da 47/32), on which the Germans added a crowbar support for a machine gun to increase the horizontal traverse of the machine gun.

Semovente M43 da 75/46 with a new anti-aircraft support for the Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938. The vehicle is also equipped with 20 liter can supports on the sides and steel helmet supports for the crew member’s helmets. This particular vehicle was probably the prototype brought to production series status. In fact, this vehicle had the cannon barrel’s counterweight, which was mounted only on the prototype. Source: wikipedia.org

During the German occupation of Northern Italy, the Mitragliatrici Medie Breda Modello 1938 were rechambered for German 7.92 x 57 mm Mauser cartridges, due to the similar dimensions of the bullets: 82.00 mm for the German compared to the 80.44 mm of the Italian cartridge and casing diameter of 11.95 mm compared to the 11.92 of the Italian casings. The 24-round magazine and wooden ammunition racks were left unchanged.

Beginning in 1942, Italian factories started to produce a licensed copy of the German Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung or NKAV (English: Smoke Grenade Dropping Device). It was a smoke grenade system that, through a wire connected to a camshaft, dropped a smoke grenade to the ground. Total capacity was 5 Schnellnebelkerze 39 (English: Quick Smoke Grenade 39) smoke grenades. The grenades had a length of 140 mm, a diameter of 90 mm, and a weight of 1.8 kg. They had a burning time of 4 to 7 minutes, depending on wind and in which area the SPG released the smoke grenades.

The commander had to pull the wire and the camshaft rotated, dropping a smoke grenade.
This system was mounted on the rear of the vehicle, so the smoke screen was created behind the vehicle and not around it, on the front arc.

An unarmored Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung dismounted from a vehicle. Source: Bundesarchiv

The Germans began to stop using this system in 1942 in favor of smoke grenade launchers on the turret, because the grenades fell at the back and the tank had to reverse to hide behind. The Italians, on the other hand, apparently gave no thought to this problem and adopted it in 1942.

A Semovente M43 da 105/25 equipped with Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung mit Schutzmantel (where the Balkenkreuz was painted). Even if they were differently armed and protected, the M43 da 105/25 was similar to the M43 da 75/46. Source: beutepanzer.ru

It seems that the Italians copied the protected variant, called Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung mit Schutzmantel (English: Smoke Grenades Dropping Device with Protective Sheath). It had a rectangular protection, even if the Italian and German protections seem different. It is not known if the Italians also produced the Schnellnebelkerze 39 smoke grenades under license or if the Italian vehicles used the grenades imported from Germany. This smoke system was quickly adopted on all the Italian armored tracked vehicles starting from the Carro Armato M15/42 and on all the semoventi on its chassis. A smaller version appeared even on the Autoblinde AB41 and AB43 medium reconnaissance armored cars.

A cylindrical support for spare smoke grenades was also transported on the vehicle. It was fixed on the rear side of the armored superstructure, behind the engine’s cooling grilles and could transport 5 more smoke grenades.

A Semovente M43 da 75/46 during training. This is the only image of the semovente showing off its rear side. The Nebelkerzenabwurfvorrichtung mit Schutzmantel (red) and the cylindrical support for spare smoke grenades (green) are visible. Source: instagram.com @forza_italiana with highlights by author

Ammunition

Ammunition for the Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 transported on the vehicle was stored in 2 racks, totalling 42 rounds. One was on the left side of the floor of the fighting compartment and the second one on the floor of the right side of the fighting compartment. The left one was used by the loader as a seat, while the right one was behind the gunner and was openable from the top.

The left rack had the rounds stored in 2 5-round rows and 2 6-round rows for a total of 22 rounds, while the second rack had 2 4-round rows and 2 5-round rows, for a total of 18 rounds.

Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 Rounds
Name	Type	Muzzle Velocity	Fuze	Filler	Weight	Penetration (RHA angled 30° from vertical)
Perforante da 75/46	APCBC	~ 800 m/s	Percussion Model 1909	//	6.2/6.9 kg	70 mm at 500 m 55 mm at 1,500 m
Dirompente da 75/46	HE	?	Percussion I.O. 36/40	335 – 345 g of TNT	~ 6.3/6.5 kg	//
Notes	The gun could fire other three different types of rounds, but these were anti-aircraft rounds not adopted on the Semovente

Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 anti-aircraft round. Image taken at Cornigliano Artillery Plant. Source: fondazioneansaldo.com

Compared to other semoventi racks, these were under the level of the vehicle’s sponsons and were difficult to hit by enemy rounds that pierced the vehicle’s armor. This problem caused many Semoventi M42M da 75/34 or Semoventi M43 da 105/25 to blow up after penetration.

If the Cannoni da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 were really modified to fire the same ammunition as the PaK 40, it would probably fire all German ammunition for this type of gun.

Ammunition fired by the 7.5 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 40
Name	Type	Muzzle Velocity	Weight	Penetration (RHA angled 30° from vertical)
Panzergranate 1939 (PzGr. 39)	APCBC-HE-T	790 m/s	6.80 kg	108 mm at 100 m; 80 mm at 1,000 m
Panzergranate 1940 (PzGr. 40)	APCR	990 m/s	4.50 kg	143 mm at 100 m; 97 mm at 1,000 m
Sprenggranate 1934 (SprGr. 34)	HE	550 m/s	5.64 kg	N/A
Hohlladung pattern C grenades. (Gr.38 HL/C)	HEAT	450 m/s	4.57 kg	75 mm

Crew

The Semovente M43 da 75/46 had a crew of 3. The driver was positioned on the left of the fighting compartment. On his left was the dashboard and on his right was the gun breech. The commander/gunner was positioned on the right of the vehicle, on the left side of the breech, while the loader/radio operator was sat on the left, behind the driver.

Some German sources state that the Germans preferred to add a fourth crew member behind the gunner, who would load the gun. The loader’s seat would be occupied by the commander/radio operator and the gunner would perform only one function. Obviously, adding a fourth crew member meant reducing the space inside the cramped fighting compartment, which was already cramped with only 3 crew members.

A Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 10,5 cm KwK L/25 853(i) crew posing in front of their vehicle in an Italian depot. Source: beutepanzer.ru

Very little is known about the Semovente M43 da 75/46’s service. Due to their short service, there are no reports about the operational service or German crews opinions.

Major German complaints on other Italian semoventi were about their lack of proper observation sights, insufficient frontal armor, a cramped crew compartment, and (apart from the Semovente M43 da 105/25) main armament not capable of dealing with the most modern enemy tanks. The driving capabilities were never seriously complained about while, whereas for maintenance, complaints depended on a number of factors. If the German unit that deployed Italian semoventi had veteran Italian mechanics or was located in Italy, where Italian military workshops were present, the complaints were much lesser compared to German units that deployed them outside Italy, where the experienced Italian mechanics were few, and there was a general lack of Italian spare parts.

With the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i), in all likelihood, the insufficient armor and main armament’s anti-tank performance complaints were solved.

Operational Use

Not much is known about the Semoventi M43 da 75/46’s service in German hands. Neither Italian nor German sources mention to which German Panzerjäger-Abteilung (English: Tank Destroyer Battalion) the few vehicles produced were assigned to.

The prototype was assigned to a training school in northern Italy that trained German Panzerjäger and German-equipped Italian tank destroyer squads. Infantrymen were also trained to attack enemy tanks and self-propelled guns with anti-tank improvised devices, mines, anti-tank hand grenades, and rocket launchers. Unfortunately, the name of the German training unit is unknown.

A Semovente M43 da 75/46 deployed by the Germans to train a Panzerjäger unit in Italy. From the first image, it can be assumed that the vehicle was the prototype due the gun’s counterweight on the barrel’s muzzle. Source: instagram.com @forza_italiana

Some guesses can be made as to which German units used the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i). The 26. Panzer-Division (English: 26th Armored Division), which operated Italian self-propelled guns, created the Jägdpanzer-Abteilung 51 on 17th November 1944. The personnel of the new battalion consisted of veterans from Panzer-Regiment .26 (English: 26th Tank Regiment) and some Sd.Kfz.164 Nashorns from the Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 525 (English: 525th Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion) were used to equip the 1. Kompagnie (English: 1st Company).

The heavy anti-tank gun platoons of the Panzergrenadier-Regiment 9. and Panzergrenadier-Regiment 67. (English: 9th and 67th Mechanized Infantry Regiments) were used to form the 3. Kompagnie (English: 3rd Company). In November 1944, the unit was operational without the 2. Kompagnie (English: 2nd Company), which was deployed only in January 1945. Some vehicles of the 2. Kompagnie may have been Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i). The 26. Panzer-Division surrendered to the Allied forces in early May 1945 in the Vicenza area, about 200 km east of Parma.

The only unit that for certain deployed the Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) was the 148. Infanterie-Division (English: 148th Infantry Division) that was deployed in Italy after mid-September 1944. On 1st October 1944, it had in its ranks 6 mechanized infantry battalions supported by the 13. Kanonen-Kompanie (English: 13th Cannon Company) and 14. Schwere-Kanonen-Kompanie (English: 14th Heavy Cannon Company). These 6 battalions and 3 companies were divided in 3 regiments: Grenadier-Regiment 281., Grenadier-Regiment 285., and Grenadier-Regiment 286..

The Artillerie-Regiment 1048. (English: 1048th Artillery Regiment) deployed a total of 3 105 mm howitzers groups and 1 150 mm heavy howitzer group with 3 batteries each. It also had Füsilier-Battalion 148. (English: 148th Rifle Battalion), with 4 squadrons, together with many other logistic units, such as the Pioneer-Battalion 1048. (English: 1048th Engineer Battalion) and the Veterinär-Kompanie 148. (English: 148th Veterinary Company). In fact, only 30% of the division was mechanized, the rest of the logistics were towed by horses.

A Semovente M43 da 75/46 captured by the Brazilian troops of the 1st Infantry Regiment “Sampaio” of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. It was captured in Caorso, near Piacenza in the last days of war. In this image, the right opened split-hatch is visible. It seems to be damaged on the side skirt sections and appliqué side armored plate, but these seem to be more like transport damage than fighting damage. Source: Italian Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War II

On 3rd December 1944, the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1048 (English: 1048th Anti-Tank Battalion) was created, composed of Panzerabwehrkanone-Batterie 1. or PaK-Batterie 1. (English: 1st Anti-Tank Battery) with anti-tank cannons, Schwere-Panzerabwehrkanone-Batterie 2. or Schwere-PaK-Batterie 2. (English: 2nd Heavy Anti-Tank Battery) equipped with 8,8 cm PaK 43 anti-tank cannons. On 19th December 1944, it received a platoon of the Festungs-Pantherturm 2. (English: 2nd Fixed Panther Tank Turrets) and then, on 28th December, it also received 6 half-track-mounted 88 mm cannons, quite surely the surviving 8.8 cm Flak 37 (Selbstfahrlafette) auf Schwere Zugkraftwagen 18t (Sd.Kfz.9) (English: 8.8 cm FlaK 18 [Self-Propelled Gun Carriage] on [Sd.Kfz.9] Heavy Traction Vehicle 18 tonnes) formerly belonging to the 26. Panzer-Division that operated in the same areas.

The last company assigned to the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1048 was the FlaK Kompanie 3. (English: 3rd Anti-Aircraft Cannon Company). After March 1945, the Schwere PaK Batterie 2. was equipped with, as referred to by the original document, 11 7.5 cm Sturmgeschütze. These were in all likelihood of Italian origin, as also claimed by Italian historian Leonardo Sandri in La 148^ Infantrie Division sul Fronte Italiano 1944-1945: Una Documentazione. Eleven of these Beute StuGs is equal to the total production of the entire Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) until January 1945, so it is impossible that all the vehicles were Semoventi M43 da 75/46, some could have been Semoventi M43 da 75/34 or their pre-Armistice version, the Semoventi M42M da 75/34. It could also be a document error. In fact, in many cases, the official German documents referred to “in service” vehicles whilst, in reality, they had not yet been delivered to the unit. In March 1945, the 11 Sturmgeschütz had almost certainly already left the factory but they were still on their way to Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1048.

The Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) probably arrived at the German anti-tank unit between mid-March to early April 1945. They had a really short operative life with the German soldiers.

A Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i) was captured by the soldiers of the 1st Infantry Regiment “Sampaio” of the Força Expedicionária Brasileira or FEB (English: Brazilian Expeditionary Force) in Caorso, 60 km from Parma.

The history behind the capture of this particular vehicle is not clear. It was probably abandoned by Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1048 due to a lack of fuel or mechanical breakdown during the retreat from Bologna, trying to reach the southern shore of the River Po to cross it in the Piacenza area and try to reach northern Italian border to return home before the surrender of the entire 148. Infanterie Division. Another plausible hypothesis was that it was surrendered peacefully by the German soldiers of the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1048 after various failed attempts at opening a gap in the US and Brazilian encirclement in the Parma and Piacenza areas between 28th April and the morning of 29th April. The unit transferred over 600 wounded Axis soldiers between 13:00 and 14:30 on 21 ambulances to the Mantova Allied hospital and then surrendered to the Allied forces on the afternoon of 29th April 1945.

About 80 pieces of equipment, including 7,5 cm PaK 40, mortars, 105 mm and 150 mm artillery pieces, 8.8 cm half-track-mounted artillery pieces, and Sturmgeschütz, were captured. Together with these, the US and Brazilian forces captured 4,000 horses, 2,500 motor vehicles (trucks, staff cars, cargo half-tracks etc), 1,000 motorcycles, and between 13,579 and 14,779 Axis soldiers.

The only other operational service of the Semovente M43 da 75/46 was in Milan on 25th April 1945. One was captured by the Italian Partisans, probably at the Fonderia Milanese di Acciaio Vanzetti S.A. assembly plant, left abandoned by the German soldiers. This suggests that not all the semoventi in the Vanzetti plant were delivered to the German units.

The Semovente M43 da 75/46 captured in Milan by the Italian Partisans in late April 1945. Source: italiantanktree.files.wordpress.com

The Semovente M43 da 75/46 captured in Milan was ‘graffitied’ by the Partisans, with “W la Libertà” (English: Long Live Freedom) and the acronym “C.L.N.” or Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (English: National Liberation Committee) written on to avoid friendly fire. It probably had no ammunition and no secondary armament. The Partisans added a 7.7 mm Breda-SAFAT medium machine gun on the roof. It was probably delivered to the Allies after the war ended and scrapped.

Camouflage

The Semoventi M43 da 75/46 produced for the Germans were painted with a single camouflage scheme. It was similar to the Italian Continentale (English: Continental) adopted in mid-1943. The standard Kaki Sahariano (English: Saharan Khaki) monochrome sand camouflage was covered by reddish brown and dark green spots.

Continentale camouflage adopted by the Regio Esercito before the Armistice of 8th September 1943. Source: instagram.com @Forza_Italiana colourized by Johannes Dorn

The Regio Esercito’s Continentale camouflage scheme was upgraded, covering the Italian armored cars, medium tanks, and self-propelled guns with dark green and adding on them reddish brown spots and sand yellow stripes that bordered the reddish brown and dark green spots.

The Semovente M43 da 75/46’s prototype outside the Ansaldo-Fossati plant. In this image, colorized by Johannes Dorn, the 1944 Continentale camouflage is clearly visible. Source: wikipedia.org

As the Semoventi M43 da 75/34 received only this type of 3-tone camouflage, it never received Italian-style camouflage schemes. The prototype, probably assigned to a training school in northern Italy, received the Balkenkreuz, the German tanks’ coat of arms, for identification on the sides and rear, and the number “22” painted on the sides. The other vehicles seem to have been without coats of arms. This was also caused, in all likelihood, by the delivery of the semoventi in the last months of 1944 and early 1945, when German troops were in a shortage of trained crews, fuel, ammunition, and paint and did not waste time painting reconnaissance coat of arms or the unit’s own coats of arms.

Versions

Semovente M43 da 75/34

In 1944, a total of 29 Semoventi M43 da 75/34 were produced for the Germans on the same upgraded and uparmored Semovente M43 da 75/46 chassis. It was essentially a Semovente M43 da 75/46 armed with a shorter and less powerful Cannone da 75/34 Modello SF, already mounted on the Semovente M42M da 75/34. All the rest of the vehicle remained unchanged compared to the Semovente da 75/46.

A Semovente M43 da 75/34 in service with a German unit supporting Italian soldiers of the 1ª Divisione Bersaglieri ‘Italia’ in the Garfagnana area in winter 1944. Source: wikipedia.org

The Semoventi M43 da 75/34, known by the Germans as Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7,5 cm KwK L/34 851(i), were employed only by the Germans in Italy after late 1944. They supported an unknown German Panzerjäger-Abteilung in the Gothic Line, occasionally operating with Fascist soldiers loyal to Mussolini belonging to the 1ª Divisione Bersaglieri ‘Italia’ (English: 1st Bersaglieri Division).

Many sources place the total number of Semoventi M42M da 75/34 at 174 instead of 145. This is not correct, as the first number also counts the 29 Semoventi M43 da 75/34.

A Semovente M42T chassis was armed with a Cannone da 105/25 Modello SF and tested by the Germans but nothing is known about its fate after the German tests.

Conclusion

The Semovente M43 da 75/46 was the first Italian project that had offensive and defensive characteristics that made it capable of dealing with most of the Allied armored vehicles in the Second World War. This was mainly thanks to the German effort to upgrade some Italian vehicles.

The few vehicles produced and equipped with main guns had short operational lifes and not much is known about their service or their crew’s complaints.

The low delivery rate of the main armament provided by the Cornigliano artillery plant was the greatest problem causing the slow production rate. This forced the Germans to place the finished vehicles in depots awaiting for their main guns, which were delivered with a rate of 1 or 2 per month.

The low gun production rate was not the only criticism of the self-propelled gun. In the same period, the Germans also produced the Semovente M43 da 75/34 with a shorter and less powerful cannon as a stopgap while waiting for the ones armed with 75 mm L/46 guns.
Twenty-nine were built, and while more than those equipped with the 75/46 gun, this was insufficient to even put a dent in the thousands of armored vehicles of the Allied armies.

This low production rate, that was characteristic of the Italian industry during the Second World War, became more pronounced in the last stages of the war due to the scarcity of raw materials, Allied bombardments, and worker’s strikes.

Semovente M43 da 75/46. Illustrations by Godzilla funded by our Patreon Campaign.

Semovente M43 da 75/46 Specification
Size (L-W-H)	5.97 x 2.42 x 1.74 m
Weight, battle ready	15.6 tonnes
Crew	3 (commander/gunner, driver, loader/radio operator)
Engine	FIAT-SPA 15TB petrol, 190 hp at 2,400 rpm
Speed	38 km/h
Range	180 km
Armament	1 Cannone da 75/46 Contraerei Modello 1934 with 42 rounds, 1 Mitragliatrice Media Breda Modello 1938 with 504 rounds.
Armor	75 mm + 25 mm front, 45 mm + 25 mm sides and 45 mm rear
Production	1 prototype and 12 vehicles produced

Sources

Gli Autoveicoli da Combattimento dell’Esercito Italiano, Volume Secondo, Tomo II – Nicola Pignato and Filippo Cappellano – Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito – 2002

Italian Medium Tanks 1939-45; New Vanguard Book 195 – Filippo Cappellani and Pier Paolo Battistelli – Osprey Publishing, 20th December 2012

Carro M – Carri Medi M11/39, M13/40, M14/41, M15/42, Semoventi ed Altri Derivati Volume Primo and Secondo – Antonio Tallillo, Andrea Tallillo and Daniele Guglielmi – Gruppo Modellistico Trentino di Studio e Ricerca Storica, 2012

Panzer tracts No. 19-2 Beute Panzerkampfwagen, British, American, Russian and Italian Tanks Captured from 1940 to 1945 – Thomas L. Jentz and Warner Regenberg – Panzer Tracts – 2008

Andare contro i carri armati. L’evoluzione della difesa controcarro nell’esercito italiano dal 1918 al 1945 – Nicola Pignato e Filippo Cappellano – Udine 2008

Italian Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War II – Ralph A. Riccio – Mattioli 1885 – 2010

La 148^ Infantrie Division sul Fronte Italiano 1944-1945: Una Documentazione – Leonardo Sandri – published by himself – Milan 2021

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Jagdpanzer IV (Sd.Kfz.162)

Post author By MarkoPantelic
Post date October 15, 2022
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Jagdpanzer IV in France in 1944 Illustation made by David B.

German Reich (1943)
Tank Destroyer – 750-800 Built

As the Second World War progressed, the German Army faced an ever-increasing amount of enemy armor, while its own tank forces were steadily being reduced. Due to losses and meager production capabilities, the Germans were forced to introduce a series of improvised anti-tank vehicles. While these were nothing more than ad hoc solutions, they were effective thanks to their powerful guns and cheap cost. On the other hand, their survivability was quite limited due to their limited armored protection. Additionally, a series of vehicles, such as the StuG III, performed excellently in the anti-tank role when equipped with long guns. Further development of the StuG III concept armed with even stronger guns would lead to the creation of Germany’s first dedicated anti-tank vehicle, the Jagdpanzer IV.

The Jagdpanzer IV. Source: topwar.ru

The Need for a Mobile Anti-Tank Vehicle

The German Army’s main anti-tank weapon before and in the first period of the Second World War was the 3.7 cm Pak 36. This was an effective anti-tank gun when used against pre-war tank designs. It could be easily concealed or transported by a few men. Despite being lightweight, this gun still needed to be towed for longer distances and required some time to be set up for combat. Later, stronger anti-tank guns provided a huge boost in firepower when engaging enemy armor, but their weight greatly increased too, which limited their mobility. An anti-tank mounted on a tank chassis that had sufficient mobility to follow tanks and motorized units was seen as a desirable concept even before the war. Given the lack of German industrial production capacity, little could be done in this regard prior to the war.

The first attempt to produce an improvised self-propelled anti-tank vehicle was made just prior to the German invasion of the West in May 1940. This was the 4.7 cm PaK (t) (Sfl) auf Pz.Kpfw.I, generally known today as the ‘Panzerjäger I’ (Eng. tank destroyer or hunter). This vehicle consisted of a Panzer I Ausf.B chassis combined with a 4.7 cm PaK (t) gun (a captured Czechoslavkian 4.7 cm gun – hence the ‘t’ for ‘Tschechoslowakei’ after the name). This vehicle, technically speaking, was not new. Instead, it was constructed using obsolete Panzer I chassis and guns that were taken from Czechoslovakia. Despite being a hasty improvisation, it performed well, which showed the Germans that this concept had merits. But, given the nature of its design, it was also flawed in many aspects, such as using an underpowered chassis, the fact it was a relatively large target, and its weak protection.

In the following years, as the Germans made progress on other fronts, namely the Soviet Union and North Africa, the need for mobile and effective anti-tank vehicles became urgent. Once again, due to a lack of production capabilities, they were often forced to reuse already existing tank chassis and, in rare cases, half-tracks in order to mount the effective 7.5 cm Pak 40 anti-tank gun. This would lead to three different series of vehicles, known generally as ‘Marder’. In 1943, the 8.8 cm armed Nashorn anti-tank vehicle based on the Panzer IV and Panzer III chassis was also introduced. While these vehicles did their job well, they were also plagued with many shortcomings.

Side view of a Panzerjager I. Source: www.panzernet.net

Whilst lightly protected, the Nashorn anti-tank vehicle was armed with probably the best gun in the war, the 88 mm L/71. Source: www.panzernet.net

On the other hand, officials such as Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, one of the brains behind the German invasion of the West in 1940, argued for the introduction of a highly mobile, well-protected, and well-armed self-propelled artillery gun. Such vehicles were meant to provide infantry with mobile close fire support during combat operations. These vehicles were known as Sturmgeschütz (Eng. Assault gun), or simply ‘StuGs’, which would be introduced into service at the same time as the first anti-tank vehicles during the attack on the West in May 1940. These were dedicated designs that were fully protected and strongly armed. By late 1941, out of desperation, the Germans began refitting these vehicles with long guns to create new anti-tank vehicles. Combining their low silhouette, good frontal protection, and powerful gun, the Germans unintentionally created a highly effective tank destroyer. The StuG III would go on to be built in great numbers and used up to the end of the war. These misgivings and the addition of a more powerful gun led to a creation of a new series of anti-tank vehicles based on the Panzer IV chassis.

Compared to the improvised anti-tank vehicles, the StuG III was a dedicated design with a fully enclosed crew compartment. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (199) Panzer Tracts No.8 Sturmgeschütz

Development

The ‘story’ of the Jagpanzer IV began in September 1942, when the Waffenamt (Eng. Army Weapon’s Office) issued a request for the development of a new Sturmgeschütz design – the ‘Sturmgeschütze Neue Art’, Stu.Gesch.n.A. (Eng. Assault Gun New Type). The new vehicle was to be armed with the 7.5 cm KwK L/70 gun and protected with 100 mm frontal and 40 to 50 mm of side armor. It was intended to have the lowest possible height, a top speed of 25 km/h, 500 mm ground clearance, and a weight of up to 26 tonnes. Additional armament proposals included a 10.5 cm and 15 cm gun for the infantry support roles, but these two projects were never implemented.

At first glance, the obvious choice was to reuse the StuG III vehicles for this purpose in order to reduce the time of development and to reuse already produced components. The StuG III, despite not being designed for that specific role, performed excellently when used in the anti-tank role thanks to its improved weaponry. Their 7.5 cm L/24 short barrel gun was replaced with a 7.5 cm L/43, and later, the more mass-produced L/48 gun. These proved more than capable of destroying most enemy targets at ranges greater than 1 km.

The Germans predicted that, in the future, more capable guns with superior anti-tank performance would be needed. With the development of the Panther tank project, a new gun, the 7.5 cm L/70, would be made available. Attempts to install this gun were initially to be tested using the VK16.02 Leopard chassis. Given the rather small chassis, insufficient space to install the large gun, and the cancelation of this vehicle, the project did not go beyond the drawing boards.

The later version of the StuG III was rearmed with a long gun, creating excellent anti-tank vehicles. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info

A short-lived project included adding the long 7.5 cm gun on the Panzer II Leopard chassis. Given the sheer size of the gun and the small chassis, it is unsurprising that nothing came of it. Source: T. L. Jentz and H. L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.20-1 Paper Panzers

Alkett, the main producer of the StuG III series, went to work on figuring out a way to install the 7.5 cm L/70 in the StuG III vehicles. In late 1942, a wooden mock-up was completed. This mock-up had a much larger upper superstructure, somewhat resembling the later Jagdpanzer 38, in order to accommodate the new gun. It quickly became obvious that such an installation on the Panzer III chassis was impossible, so another solution would be needed.

Alkett wooden mock-up proof of concept of a modified StuG III armed with the long 7.5 cm gun. Source: T. L. Jentz and H. L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.20-1 Paper Panzers

The Panzer IV chassis was seen as a much better solution, given that it was larger and that the installation of the new superstructure and gun were feasible. Alkett once again presented a project of such a vehicle based on the Panzer IV chassis that could be armed either with a 7.5 cm L/70 (Gerät No.822) or 10.5 cm (Gerät No.823) gun. In late October 1942, a scale model was even presented to Adolf Hitler, but nothing came of it.

Vogtlandische Maschinenfabrik AG (Vomag) proposed its own version of the new tank hunter based on the Panzer IV to Adolf Hitler on 2nd October 1942. Hitler was impressed by what he saw and gave the project the go-ahead. The wooden mock-up was completed by May 1943, when it was presented to Hitler. This wooden mock-up was different from the later-built vehicles, as it was based on an unchanged Panzer IV Ausf.F tank chassis. After the presentation of the new vehicle, Hitler was satisfied and ordered the production of the first prototypes as soon as possible. In September 1943, Vomag began the assembly of two soft-steel 0-series vehicles. These prototypes were similar to the wooden mock-up, having rounded front corners, but the Panzer IV’s front hull was heavily modified with new angled armor plates. Additionally, on the Jagdpanzer IV’s superstructure sides, firing ports for a 9 mm MP-38/40 submachine gun were placed. Both of these features would be dropped on the production vehicles in favor of a simpler armor design and deletion of the side-firing ports. In January 1944, the second prototype was completed. After a brief examination, it was chosen as the basis for the production series.

The Vomag wooden mock-up, which was based on the Panzer IV Ausf.F chassis. Source: www.panzernet.net

A slightly improved mock-up, with two front machine gun ports cover, was presented to Hitler in May 1943. Source: warspot.ru

Front view of the Jagdpanzer IV’s first prototype. Note the quite different design of the front hull armor. Source: www.panzernet.net

Side view of the same vehicle. The side superstructure’s round-shaped machine gun ports are visible here. Source: warspot.ru

The second prototype of the 0-series was mainly used for training. Source: www.panzernet.net

Designation

The new tank hunter was, in reality, a further development of the assault tank concept, but more specialized and purely dedicated to the anti-tank role. It is not surprising that it was initially designated as Sturmgeschütze Neue Art. This project was initiated months before the position of the General der Panzertruppe was even created. The close involvement of the assault gun branch of the Army in this project can be seen in a letter written by General der Artillerie Fritz Lindemann to Heinz Guderian in early 1944.

“.. Because Sturmgeschütz fire 25 percent of their ammunition at tanks and 75 percent at other types of targets, the designation “Panzerjäger” relates to only part of the Sturmgeschütz assigned tasks. The designation “Sturmgeschütz” is a well-known concept to the infantry. Therefore, the General der Infanterie is for retaining the Sturmgeschütz designation.”

Parallel to the StuG III development, the Germans also employed anti-tank vehicles that were known as Panzerjäger. The term Panzerjäger originated in the First World War. The use of Jagdpanzer (Eng. tank hunter) in some sources is also interesting. Nowadays, the term Panzerjäger is often associated with improvised lightly protected, usually open-top vehicles, while Jagdpanzer is associated with fully enclosed anti-tank vehicles. This is a recent assignment, as both terms were, according to German military terminology and concepts, essentially one and the same.

Throughout its development and service life, the new tank hunter received several different designations, which was quite common for the Germans during the war. One of the earlier designations was Kleine Panzerjäger der Firma Vomag (Eng. Small Tank Hunter from the Vomag Company), dated May 1943. Other designations included: Panzerjäger auf Fahrgestell Panzer IV (Eng. Tank Destroyer on the Panzer IV Chassis) in August 1943, Stu.Gesch.n.A. auf Pz.IV (Eng. New Type Assault Gun on the Panzer IV Chassis) November 1943, and Leichter Panzerjäger auf Fgst.Pz.Kpf.Wg.IV mit 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 (Eng. Light Tank Destroyer on the Panzer IV Chassis) in December 1943. From 1944 onwards, much shorter designations were used: Panzerjäger IV 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 (March 1944), Jagdpanzer IV Ausf.F (September 1944), and Jagdpanzer IV – Panzerjäger IV (November 1944). Interestingly, despite being allocated to Panzer units, the designation Sturmgeschütze Neue Art mit 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 auf Fgst.Pz.Kpfw was used during the period of February to October 1944. Given that the vehicle is generally best known today simply as the Jagdpanzer IV, this article will use this name throughout.

Production

After Germany’s defeats in 1942, Heinz Guderian was brought back from retirement by Hitler, who hoped that he could somehow magically rebuild the shattered Panzer divisions. Guderian set immediately to the task of rebuilding this formation. At that time, the German industry was in the process of developing various new tanks and other armored vehicle projects, even more than it was realistically able of successfully mass-producing. With the support of Albert Speer, the Minister for Armaments and War Production, Guderian wanted to introduce rationalization programs and discard projects that could not be immediately put into production. The Jadgpanzer IV was deemed one such project. Both Guderian and Speer were not enthusiastic about this vehicle, as they deemed that it would only cause delays in Panzer IV production. In addition, the StuG III vehicle performed this role excellently and they believed its production should be increased instead.

On the other hand, Hitler, based on the field reports regarding the StuG III’s performance when used in the anti-tank role, had a very enthusiastic view of the new Jagdpanzer IV. He urged that its mass production should begin as soon as possible and that this vehicle was to totally replace the Panzer IV tanks. While without a doubt an effective vehicle, the Jagdpanzer IV’s lack of turret means that, if it was used in offensive operations as a tank substitute, its combat effectiveness would be greatly reduced. Both Guderian and Albert Speer could do little to convince Hitler of the opposite. Thanks to their insistence, though, only Vomag was selected for Jagdpanzer IV production in order to avoid causing delays in tank production.

The production of the Jagdpanzer IV was meant to commence with the first 10 vehicles being completed by September 1943. In the following months, the production rate was predicted to be increased by 10 vehicles every month. This meant that, in 1943, the production run should have been as follows: 20 in October, 30 in November, and 40 vehicles by the end of December. This did not occur and Vomag was only able to complete only 10 vehicles during that year. The problem with the delivery of sufficient numbers of gun mounts, in addition to the poor quality of the armor plates, led to delays in production. Up to May 1944, Vomag was involved in the Panzer IV’s production, after which it solely focused on the Jagdpanzer IV’s production.

By the time the production of the Jagdpanzer IV stopped in November 1944, some 750 vehicles had been built by Vomag. Monthly production was as follows. Note the sudden drop in numbers in September, which was due to the Allied bombings of the Vomag factory.

Date	Numbers
1943
All year	10
1944
January	30
February	45
March	75
April	106
May	90
June	120
July	125
August	92
September	19
October	46
November	2

Of course, like many other German vehicles, the exact production numbers differ depending on the author. The previously mentioned numbers are according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No. 9-2 Jagdpanzer IV). Author T. J Gander (Tanks in Detail: JgdPz IV, V, VI, and Hetzer) gives a number of 769 built vehicles. Authors K. Mucha and G. Parada (Jagdpanzer IV L/48) give an estimation of 769 to 784 produced vehicles and that some 26 more chassis reused for other projects. Author P. Thomas (Images of War: Hitler’s Tank Destroyers) mentions that some 800 were built.

A column of newly built Jagdpanzer IVs. Source: warspot.net

Design

The Hull

The Jagdpanzer IV was built by using the chassis of the Panzer IV Ausf.H tank, which was, for the most part, unchanged. It consisted of the front transmission, central crew, and rear engine compartments. The most obvious change was the new angled superstructure and the redesigned sharply angled lower front hull. This was done to provide an increased level of protection by using thick angled armor plates interlocked to each other. In addition, some internal redesigns were needed in order to accommodate the new superstructure and the gun mount. One example is the changing position of the bottom escape hatch. Originally, it was located under the radio operator on the Panzer IV, but on the Jagdpanzer IV, it was moved close to the gunner.

The Panzer IV Ausf.H, on the chassis of which the Jagdpanzer IV was based. Source: www.panzernet.net

The Suspension and Running Gear

The suspension and running gear were other elements reused from the Panzer IV. They consisted of eight small double road wheels suspended in four pairs by leaf-spring units per side. There were two front drive sprockets, two rear idlers, and eight return rollers in total. The standard Panzer IV return rollers were replaced with ones made of steel due to the lack of rubber later during production. In addition, by the end of production, some vehicles had only three return rollers on each side. Depending on the need or availability, wider tracks could be used instead of regular tracks in order to increase driving performance on mud or snow.

The Jagdpanzer IV’s suspension was taken directly from the Panzer IV. The simple leaf-spring suspension, whilst not perfect, did its job. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV

The Engine

The Jagdpanzer IV was powered by the Maybach HL 120 TRM which produced 265 hp @ 2,600 rpm. The maximum speed was 40 km/h (15-18 km/h cross-country). With a fuel load of some 470 liters, the operational range was 210 km. The engine and the crew compartment were separated by a fire-resistant and gas-tight armored firewall. In order to avoid any fire accidents, an automatic fire extinguisher system was installed in the engine compartment. The original position of the Panzer IV’s fuel tanks, under the turret, had to be changed in order to lower the vehicle’s height. Two fuel tanks were placed under the gun and a third smaller one in the engine compartment. In order to refuel the front fuel tanks, two (one on each side) fuel filler pipes were located behind the front drive sprockets.

The added front armor plates caused huge stress on the front suspension. To somewhat overcome the issue, most spare parts and auxiliary equipment were moved to the rear engine compartment later during the production. This included things such as spare tracks, wheels, repair tools, fire extinguishers, and the crew’s equipment.

To reduce the front weight as much as possible, auxiliary spare equipment was moved to the rear of the vehicle. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV

The Superstructure

The new superstructure was well protected, with its angled, thick, and simple armor design. The angled shape of the superstructure provided thicker nominal armor and also increased the chance of deflecting enemy shots. Also, by using larger one-piece plates, it was much stronger and easier to produce. This way, the need for more carefully machined armored plates, like on Panzer III or IV, was unnecessary. Using single-piece armor plates interlocked to each other greatly strengthened the overall structure, making it more durable.

A good view of the upper angled superstructure of the Jagdpanzer IV. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV

On the front plate, the gun with its mantlet was positioned slightly to the right of center. The gun mount was protected by a large ball-shaped shield, further protected by a larger cast gun mantlet known as Topfblende. On each side of the gun was a movable conical-shaped armored machine gun port cover. Lastly, to the lower left, the driver vision apparatus was placed. The side and rear plates did not receive any kind of vision port.

On the top part of the superstructure were two escape hatches. The right round-shaped one was for the loader. Left of it, the commander’s hatch had a small rotating periscope in the middle. The commander had a small additional hatch for the use of a retractable telescope. In front of the loader and commander hatches was a sliding armored cover for the gunsight.

Top view of a Jagdpanzer IV. There were two hatches for the crew. The front curved opening was used for the gunner’s gun sight. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV

The commander had a small additional hatch for the use of a retractable telescope, present here. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV

The Jagdpanzer IV, surprisingly for German standards, did not receive a command cupola. While such designs were tested, like this one, none were adopted for service. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV

Armor and Protection

The Jagdpanzer IV was well protected, with thick and well-angled armor plates. For the lower hull, the upper front armor plate was 60 mm thick at a 45° angle and the lower plate was 50 mm at a 55° angle. The side armor was 30 mm thick, the rear 20 mm, and the bottom 10 mm. The hull crew compartment had 20 mm of bottom armor.

The new upper superstructure frontal armor was 60 mm at a 50° angle, the sides were 40 mm at a 30° angle, the rear armor was 30 mm, and the top was 20 mm. The engine compartment design and armor were unchanged from the Panzer IV, with 20 mm all around and 10 mm of top armor.

Even a well-protected vehicle, like the Jagdpanzer IV, was not impervious to enemy fire. This vehicle was taken out by a direct frontal hit that pierced its armor. Source: warspot.ru

Even before this vehicle entered production, it was estimated that, in order to further improve protection, the armor plates had to be placed at even greater angles. This would be rejected, as it would lead to a huge delay in production and problems with space management.

Finally, in May 1944, it was finally possible to use 80 mm thick frontal armor plates. This was initially planned from the start, but the use of such thick plates would lead to delays in production which were deemed unacceptable, and their application was temporarily postponed.

The upper hull was built out of surface-hardened steel plates manufactured by Witkowitzer Bergbau und Eisenhütten. It is important to note that, by 1944, when the Jagdpanzer IV entered production, the quality of German production steel was not always guaranteed. The constant Allied air raids, lack of resources, and the use of slave labor greatly affected the quality of many constructions in Germany at that time, even armor plates.

The Jagdpanzer IVs were also provided with Zimmerit anti-magnetic coating, but after September 1944, its use was abandoned. Additional 5 mm thick armor plates were also provided for extra protection of the engine compartment’s sides. The Jagdpanzer IV could be equipped with additional 5 mm thick armor plates (Schürzen) covering the side of the vehicle. They served mainly to protect against Soviet anti-tank rifles.

A Jagdpanzer IV equipped with Zimmerit and Schürzen plates. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV

Some imaginative crews found other ways to increase their protection. In this case, they poured concrete on the front armor plate. Source: K. Mucha and G. Parada Jagdpanzer IV

The Armament

The first few prototypes were equipped with 7.5 cm L/43 guns. For the production version of the Jagdpanzer IV, the 7.5 cm PaK 39 L/48 was chosen. This gun was developed and produced by Rheinmetall-Borsig AG with the support of Seitz-Werke GmbH. In essence, this was the same weapon as the 7.5 cm StuK 40 gun used on the StuG III vehicles, but it was modified to be mounted on the new Jagdpanzer IV. This gun had a semi-automatic sliding block. This means that, after firing the gun, the spent round would be self-ejected, increasing the firing rate.

The elevation of this gun went from –8° to +15° (–5° to +15° or –6° to +20° depending on the source) and the traverse was 15° to right and 12° left (or 10° in both directions, once more, depending on the source). The main gun was not placed at the vehicle’s center, but was instead moved some 20 cm to the right side, mainly because of the gun sights. The gun was protected by the round-shaped gun mantlet. The ammunition supply for the main gun was 79 rounds. Usually, half were armor-piercing, and the other half were high explosive rounds. This was not always the case as, depending on the combat situation and needs, the ammunition load could be changed. In rarer cases, tungsten armor-piercing ammunition would be used. The standard armor-piercing round was capable of piercing 109 mm of flat armor at 1 km distance. The rare tungsten core round, at the same distance, could defeat 130 mm of armor.

An illustration of the Jagdpanzer IV’s interior. Source: D. R. Higgins Cromwell Vs Jagdpanzer IV Normandy 1944

Close-up view of the Jagdpanzer IV’s interior. Note the two gunner hand wheels needed to elevate or traverse the gun. This particular gun lacks its recoil cylinders. Source: Military Vehicle Prints 30 Panzerjager IV

Initially, the Jagdpanzer IV vehicles produced were equipped with a muzzle brake. The crews that operated these vehicles quickly noticed that, during firing, the muzzle brake would create extensive dust clouds in front of the vehicle due to Jagdpanzer IV’s small height. This reduced visibility, but more importantly, gave away the vehicle’s position to the enemy. As a result, crews began removing the muzzle brake from their vehicles. To compensate for removing it, Vomag engineers designed an improved recoil cylinder to help ease the recoil during firing. As this was being put into production, the troop field reports indicated that, despite removing the muzzle brake, the 7.5 cm gun worked without problems. Because of this, the introduction of the new improved recoil cylinder was actually not needed. Nevertheless, some newly built vehicles were equipped with it during production. From May 1944, the muzzle brake would be removed from the Jagdpanzer IV program. The later-produced vehicles did not have threaded ends on the barrel, as they were no longer needed.

There were also experiments with fixed non-recoiling mounts, known as ‘neur Art Starr’ (which could roughly be translated as ‘new fixed mount version’). Two Jagdpanzer IVs were modified for this purpose in September 1944, though this was unsuccessful and soon abandoned, but continued on the Jagdpanzer 38(t).

The Jagdpanzer IV was initially provided with a muzzle brake. It served to reduce the recoil during the firing of the gun. In the case of the Jagdpanzer, with the short height, it caused more problems than it was worth, so its use was quickly discarded. Source: www.panzernet.net

For self-defense, a 7.92 mm MG 42 machine gun with some 1,200 rounds of ammunition was provided. Unlike most other German armored vehicles, a ball mount was not used on the Jagdpanzer IV. Instead, the machine gun could be fired from two front gun ports located on the left and right of the main gun, which were 13 cm wide. These two machine gun ports were protected with conical-shaped armored covers. The left machine gun port proved difficult to use by the gunner and would be abandoned from March 1944. The vehicles that were at that time under production received a 60 mm thick round plate to cover the now useless machine gun port. The newly produced vehicle would receive the front superstructure armor plate that did not have this hole at all. From May 1944, the conical-shaped armored cover for the remaining machine gun port was slightly enlarged. When not in use, the machine gun could be pulled into a small travel lock that was connected to the vehicle’s roof. In this case, the machine gun port could be closed by pivoting the armor cover.

Both machine gun covers are open on this vehicle. The left-positioned machine gun port would prove to be difficult to be used and would be deleted from production. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV

This vehicle’s left machine gun port was covered with a simple round-shaped armored cover. Source: Military Vehicle Prints 30 Panzerjager IV

The prototype vehicles initially had two pistol ports placed on their superstructure sides. These were not adopted for service, as it was planned to add a remote-controlled machine gun mount (Rundumsfeuer) with a 360º firing arc on top of the superstructure. In theory, it would provide the crew with effective anti-personnel fire on all sides. However, the Rundumsfeuer machine gun mount was deleted early on. Some Jagdpanzer IVs were tested with this weapon system during March and April 1944, but it was noted that there was not enough room for it to be effectively mounted. This is peculiar, as the same machine gun mount was used without major problems on the much smaller Jagdpanzer 38(t) tank-hunter.

The prototype installation of the Rundumsfeuer mount. While it offered the crew with an all-around firing arc, it would not be adopted for service. Source: warspot.net

The crew of this vehicle use an MG 42 mounted on top of the superstructure. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV

The Jagdpanzer IV was also equipped with the Nahverteidigungswaffe (Eng. close defense grenade launcher), with some 16 rounds of ammunition (high explosive and smoke rounds), located on the vehicle’s top. Due to the general lack of resources though, not all vehicles were provided with this weapon. In such cases, the Nahverteidigungswaffe opening hole was closed off with a round plate.

The Crew

The four-man crew consisted of the commander, the gunner, the loader/radio operator, and the driver. The driver’s position was on the front left side. While he was provided with two front-mounted vision slits, his overall awareness of the surroundings was limited. For example, due to the position of the gun, the driver had a huge blind spot to the right. Just behind him was the gunner’s position. He was tasked with operating the main gun, using two hand wheels, one for elevation and the other for traverse, located in front of him. A Sfl.Z.F.1a gun sight for acquiring targets was used. When in use, the sight was projected through the sliding armored cover on the vehicle’s top armor.

The commander was positioned behind the gunner. For observation and finding targets, the commander had at his disposal three periscopes. These were a fixed sight (Rundblickfehrnrohr Rbl F 3b), binocular rangefinder (Scherenfernrohr SF 14 Z), and a rotatable periscope. The commander had a small additional hatch door for the use of a retractable Sf.14Z telescope. Lastly, the commander was also responsible for providing the loader with the ammunition located on the left sidewall.

The last crew member was the loader, who was positioned on the vehicle’s right side. He operated the radio, which was located to the right rear, and he also doubled as the 7.92 mm MG 42 machine gun operator. There was a small opening located above the machine gun which provided the gun operator with a limited view of the front. Nearly all periscopes were protected with an armored flap cover.

Organization

In the previously mentioned letter by the General der Artillery to Guderian, a desire and hope were expressed that the new vehicle would also be allocated to assault gun units. This actually never occurred, mostly on the insistence of Guderian himself. While the Jagdpanzer IV’s development history seems straightforward at first glance, it was actually followed by a fight between the German artillery and tank branches. The Jagdpanzer IV’s development was initiated by the artillery branch, in the hope of improving its StuG III vehicles with a new design, known as the Sturmgeschütze Neue Art. But, during its development, General Heinz Guderian insisted that it should be reclassified as a Panzerjäger and assigned to the Panzer units. In the end, Guderian won and the Jagdpanzer IV was allocated to existing Panzerjäger units, which were part of Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions, instead of the assault artillery units. This meant that the new Jagdpanzer IV was allocated to units that had little prior experience with this kind of vehicle. At the same time, the assault artillery units, which had experience operating such vehicles, were denied a weapon that could have potentially increased their effectiveness.

The Jagdpanzer IV was used to equip Panzerjäger Abteilungen (Eng. anti-tank battalions) of Panzer or Panzer Grenadier divisions. The anti-tank battalions assigned to a Panzer division were usually divided into two companies, each 10 vehicles strong. One more vehicle was to be assigned for the battalion commander, reaching the total strength of 21 vehicles.

Panzer Grenadier anti-tank battalions had two companies, with 14 vehicles each. Three more vehicles were used for the battalion commander’s platoon. In total, its strength was 31 vehicles. In both cases, a third company consisted of towed anti-tank guns. Depending on the availability and combat situation, the number of vehicles per Panzerjäger Abteilung varied depending on many factors, such as losses or availability of vehicles.

At the end of 1943, on the insistence of Guderian and with Hitler’s approval, the Panzer Lehr Division was to be formed, which would serve as a training point for armored formations. It would include experienced personnel from various other units. This unit was actually the first German division to be supplied with the Jagdpanzer IV. On 1st June 1944, its Panzerjäger Lehr Abteilung 130 was equipped with 31 Jagdpanzer IVs. Its structure was a bit unusual, with each of the three anti-tank companies being equipped with 9 Jagdpanzer IV. The remaining four vehicles were attached to the Battalion command. The reason for this unusual organizational structure lies in the fact that this unit was originally meant to be equipped with 14 Jagdpanzer IV and 14 Jagdtigers. As no Jagdtigers were available at this point, additional Jagdpanzer IVs were provided instead. Another unit with Jagdpanzer IVs was the Panzer Division Hermann Goering.

In Combat

France 1944

During the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944, various German units had been meant to receive the new Jagdpanzer IV. Some were already equipped, including the 2nd Panzer Division, 116th Panzer Division, and 12th SS Panzer Division, having 21 vehicles each, while the Panzer Lehr Division and 17th Panzergrenadier Divisions had 31. In the case of the 17th Panzergrenadier Division, its Jagdpanzer IVs arrived in France in August due to delays. The 9th Panzer Division was meant to receive the Jagdpanzer IV to replace its Marder II anti-tank vehicles, but these were not available by the time of the Allied invasion of the West in June 1944. Other divisions that would be included in this campaign that had the Jagdpanzer IV were the 9th, 11th, 116th, and 10th SS Panzer Divisions.

In the days following the Allied landings in Normandy, heavy fighting took place as the Allies tried to extend their beachhead and the Germans to turn them back. In the area between Caen and Bayeux, elements of the 12th SS Panzer Division were quite active. On 9th June, the Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment 901 and Panzerjäger Lehr Abteilung 130 proceeded toward Bayeux in an attempt to recapture this city and prevent future Allied advances. During this drive, some six Jagdpanzer IV were left behind the line, as they had faultily aligned gunsights. Given that the Germans were unsure as to what the next Allied main objective would be, even expecting a second landing in Belgium, organizing an effective offensive operation could not be easily achieved. The superior Allied air power and the long supply lines greatly affected the German overall combat performance.

A destroyed Jagdpanzer IV near Cintheaux from the 12th SS Panzer Division. Source: H. Meyer The 12th SS The History of the Hitler Youth Panzer Division: Volume Two

On the 10th, heavy fighting occurred, as both sides tried to engage each other. Fighting in this area, due to bocage-terrain in this part of France, was not easy nor suited for larger armored formations. On the evening of that day, some 5 Allied Cromwell tanks found themself behind the enemy line and even threatened the headquarters of the Panzergrenadier Lehr Regiment 902. Unfortunately for them, some Jagdpanzer IVs, with their unit commander, Oberleutnant Werner Wagner, were close by and prepared to engage the enemy. After positioning the vehicles to have the best possible firing range, they engaged the enemy tanks. Soon, one Cromwell was hit and set ablaze. A second Cromwell was immobilized by two hits before a third one destroyed it. A third Cromwell was also reported to be destroyed. The remaining Allied tanks tried to retreat but were unable to, forcing the crews to surrender.

The following day, the Allies mounted a great offensive in the area of Tilly-sur-Seulles. As the German defense line held the onslaught, the Allies dispatched another group of Cromwell tanks. Six Jagdpanzer IVs spearheaded the German’s own counter-attack. After destroying a few Cromwells, the remaining retreated back. The Jagdpanzer IVs proceeded with the attack, pushing the Allies back.

On 9th August 1944, the Allies launched large armored formations that moved toward the Caen-Falaise road, in order to liberate Cauvicourt. The Allied advance was met by Jagdpanzer IVs of the SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 12’s 1st Company, positioned around Hill 112, together with other German armor. During the engagements, of 22 destroyed Allied M4 tanks, between 16 to 22 were credited to the Jagdpanzer IVs. The German losses were four Panthers, six Panzer IVs, five Tiger Is, and five Jagdpanzer IVs. Two Jagdpanzer IVs would be sent forwards in reconnaissance missions and would go on to destroy 5 additional tanks.

A 116. Panzer-Division Jagdpanzer IV during the French camping in 1944. Source: D. R. Higgins Cromwell Vs Jagdpanzer IV Normandy 1944

Later that day, the Allies, frustrated by the lack of progress, dispatched some 9 Cromwell tanks from the 10th Mounted Rifle Regiment to try to outflank the German positions at Maizières Estrées-la-Campagne road. All would be taken out by the German Jagdpanzer IVs. Due to the heavy Allied artillery barrage though, the Germans began evacuating their positions. They quickly came under a night attack from the tanks of the Polish 1st Armoured Regiment. The SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 12’s Jagdpanzer IVs defeated the Polish-operated tanks, destroying some 22 M4 and Cromwell tanks.

The Jagdpanzer IV did not always perform well against the Allies. For example, during the fighting in the area of Laval and Le Mans, the 17th Panzergrenadier Division lost 9 Jagdpanzer IVs.

Nevertheless, overall, they performed excellently during the French campaign of 1944. For example, Oberscharfuehrer Rudolf Roy of the 12th SS Panzer Division claimed to have destroyed some 36 Allied tanks before being killed by an enemy sniper in December 1944.

Ardennes Offensive and the End of the War in Western Europe

During the Ardennes Offensive, on the Western Front, the Germans had 92 Jagdpanzer IVs. Some 20 Jagdpanzer IVs were part of the 2nd SS Division Das Reich. By the end of 1944, there were 56 Jagdpanzer IVs, of which only 28 were operational.

In December 1944, the Jagdpanzer IVs participated in the last large German offensive in the West, Operation Northwind. The 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division that participated in the offensive had 31 StuG IIIs, two Jagdpanzer IVs, and one Marder vehicle. The 22nd Panzer Division had four Jagdpanzer IVs and the 25th Panzergrenadier Division five Jagdpanzer IVs. The operation ended in another German failure by late January 1945, further depleting the strength of its armored units.

Italy

The Jagdpanzer IV also saw action in Italy, albeit in limited numbers. Three Panzer divisions received this vehicle: the Panzer Division Hermann Goering, the 3rd and the 15th Panzergrenadier divisions. Their combined combat strength was 83 Jagdpanzer IVs. By the end of 1944, this number was reduced to only 8 vehicles, of which 6 were operational.

Jagdpanzer IV in Italy in 1944. For unknown reasons, this vehicle had its track shortened. It was likely damaged and then towed to the rear for repairs. In this track configuration, it could not move on its own. Source: warspot.net

Eastern Front

The majority of the Jagdpanzer IVs produced were deployed on the Eastern Front, in an attempt to stop the Soviet advance. They saw heavy action there, but were also used in the role of tanks or assault guns, the former of which the vehicle could not fulfil. The heavy fighting in Poland during October 1944 cost the Germans many casualties, including at least 55 Jagdpanzer IVs.

Some 55 Jagdpanzer IV’s would be lost during the heavy fighting in Poland in October 1944. Source: S. J. Zaloga and J. Grandsen The Road to Berlin

Other examples included the heavy fighting in Hungary. While attacking Soviet lines at Homok (Hungary) on 19th December 1944, Panzerjäger Abteilung 43 lost three out of four Jagdpanzer IVs. On 23rd December 1944, the Kampfgruppe “Scheppelmann”, which had 8 Panzer IVs and 13 Jagdpanzer IVs, engaged a Soviet force north of Kisgyarmat. They managed to take out some 12 tanks, 3 American-supplied anti-aircraft half-tracks, 1 armored car, and 2 armored personnel carriers. By the end of 1944, there were some 311 Jagdpanzer IVs, of which 209 were operational. In an attempt to relieve the besieged city of Budapest, the Germans employed the IV SS Panzer Corps, which had some 285 armored vehicles in its inventory, of which 55 were Jagdpanzer IVs. All attempts to reach Budapest ultimately failed, with many losses among the German forces. During the last few months of the war, there is little information about the Jagdpanzer IV, as the sources mainly focus on the later improved version armed with the long gun. Like other German forces, they fought a fighting retreat all the way to the Battle of Berlin.

A Jagdpanzer IV was captured by the Soviets, possibly near the end of the war. Note that this Jagdpanzer IV still has its muzzle brake, which indicates that it is an early-built vehicle. Source: wio.ru

Despite its effectiveness, the Jagdpanzer IV was generally a rare vehicle and often could do little to come on top of the ever-increasing Allied armored formations. Source: warspot.net

Jagdpanzer IV Versions

Panzer IV/70 (V)

From the very start, the new Jagdpanzer IV project was intended to be armed with the longer 7.5 cm L/70 gun. As these weapons were not available in sufficient numbers, this was initially not possible. Once the 7.5 cm L/70 gun production was increased sufficiently that sufficient numbers could be spared for the Jagdpanzer IV project, work on an improved Jagdpanzer IV armed with this gun was immediately started. After a period of modification and testing in the first half of 1944, the production of a new Jagdpanzer IV version armed with the long 7.5 cm gun finally began in November 1944. The new vehicle was named Panzer IV/70 (V) and, by the time war ended, under 1,000 had been produced.

The development of the Jagdpanzer IV eventually led to the Panzer IV/70 (V). Source: www.panzernet.net

Jagdpanzer IV Befehlswagen

An unknown number of Jagdpanzer IVs were modified to be used as Befehlswagen (Eng. command vehicles). These vehicles had an additional FuG 8 radio station installed and one extra crew member. The Befehlswagen can be easily identified by the second radio antenna located on the rear left side.

The command version of the Jagdpanzer IV, the Befehlswagen, was visually identical to regular vehicles, aside from the rod antenna. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV

After the War

Syria

Strangely, the Jagdpanzer IV would see limited combat action after the Second World War. Around five vehicles were given to Syria in 1950 by the French, although, depending on the sources, it is possible that the Soviets actually supplied them. During combat with Israeli forces in 1967 during the Six-Day War, one Jagdpanzer IV was lost when it was hit by a tank round. The remaining were withdrawn from the front and probably placed in reserve or even stored. These Jagdpanzers IV were still listed in the Syrian Army inventory during 1990-1991. What became of them is, unfortunately, not currently known.

A few Jagdpanzer IVs were supplied to Syria and used against Israeli forces. Source: tankisworldoftanks

Bulgaria

As Bulgaria was part of the Axis alliance during World War II, it was supplied with German equipment, including some StuG IIIs, Panzer IIIs and IVs, and a small number of Jagdpanzer IVs. During the Cold War, in order to protect its border with Turkey, Bulgaria, a member of the Communist Eastern Bloc, used the older German-supplied armored vehicles, including the Jagdpanzer IV, as static bunkers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these vehicles were abandoned by the Bulgarian Army. They would remain there until 2007, when the Bulgarian Army made extensive recovery operations in order to salvage these vehicles. One of the salvaged vehicles was a Jagdpanzer IV.

This Jagdpanzer IV was salvaged by the Bulgarian Army in 2007. Source: www.reddit.com

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1AvM6-EE2Ww&ab_channel=MissingMilitary

The Jagdpanzer IV’s Grandson?

For the reorganized West German Army after the war, the concept of an anti-tank vehicle was not completely lost. They would develop and build the Kanonenjagdpanzer, which was, by design, very similar to the Jagdpanzer IV. While such a vehicle was effective during the Second World War, the technological developments and the introduction and widespread use of anti-tank rockets and missiles made such dedicated tank hunter vehicles obsolete.

The post-war Kanonenjagdpanzer, closely resembling the Jagdpanzer IV. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Surviving Vehicles

Today, several vehicles have survived the war around the world. One Jagdanzer IV can be found in the Bulgarian Museum of Glory in Yambol. There were three vehicles, including one of the 0-series, located in France, at the Saumur Armor Museum. The 0-series vehicle was given to Germany and can be today seen in the Panzermuseum Munster, together with another Jagdpanzer IV that was already there. One more can be seen in Switzerland at the Panzermuseum Thun. There is also one located in Syria.

The surviving 0-series Jagdpanzer at the Panzermuseum Munster. Source: Wikimedia Commons

The second Jagdpanzer IV at the Panzermuseum Munster. Source: Wikimedia Commons

The Jagdpanzer IV located in the French Saumur Armor Museum. Source:http://tank-photographs.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/jagdpanzer-IV-ausf-f-sdkfz162-tank-destroyer.html

The Jagdpanzer IV located in Switzerland at the Panzermuseum Thun. Source: http://preservedtanks.com/Types.aspx?TypeCategoryId=105&Select=1

Conclusion

The Jagdpanzer IV was the first German dedicated anti-tank vehicle. It had excellent protection and firepower and a low silhouette. The Jagdpanzer IV had all the characteristics needed to be an excellent tank hunter. It would see action on nearly all fronts the German Army fought on at the time, in the East, in the West, and on the Italian Front.

When used in combat, it quickly proved to be an effective anti-tank vehicle. While an adequate vehicle for sure, its overall performance was slightly better than the mass-produced StuG III. It shared many elements with it regarding the overall design, firepower, and small height. In retrospect, the Germans could well have been better suited had they followed Guederian’s advice and focused more on the production of an even greater number of StuG III vehicles. The Jagdpanzer IV drained significant and necessary resources from Panzer IV production. In the end, like many German late-war projects, it was built too late and in too few numbers to really have any impact on the whole war.

Early production Jagdpanzer IV. Illustation made by David B.

Jagdpanzer IV, Kampfgruppe Von Luck, Normandy, June 1944.

Jagdpanzer IV lost in France in 1944 and photographed by Sergeant Walther Shrek of the 3rd Armored Division.

Jagdpanzer IV L/48 in winter camouflage, 53rd Panzerjäger Abteilung, 5th Panzer Division, East Prussia, January 1945.

Jagdpanzer IV L/48, 3rd SS Panzerjäger Abteilung, 3rd SS Panzer Division, Hungary, March 1945.

Jagdpanzer IV L/48, Germany, April 1945.

Captured Russian Jagdpanzer IV, 3rd Ukrainian Front, Hungary, March 1945.

Specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)	6.85 x 3.17 x 1.86 m
Total weight, battle-ready	24 tonnes
Crew	4 (driver, commander, gunner, loader)
Propulsion	Maybach HL 120 TRM, 272 hp @ 2,800 rpm
Speed	40 km/h (25 mph), 15-18 km/h (cross-country)
Operational range	210 km, 130 km (cross-country)
Traverse	15° right and 12° left
Elevation	-8° to +15°
Armament	7.5 cm (2.95 in) Pak 39 L/48 (79 rounds) 7.9 mm (0.31 in) MG 42, 1200 rounds
Superstructure armor	Front 60 mm, sides 40 mm, rear 30 mm and top 20 mm

Sources

Has Own Video WW2 German Tank Destroyers

7.62 cm F.K. 36(r) auf gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3

Post author By MarkoPantelic
Post date October 25, 2021
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The 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz. 6/3 in action is North Africa. Both illustrations by David Bocquelet.

German Reich (1941)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 9 Built

During the war, the Germans encountered ever increasing numbers of strong enemy armor. Due to a general lack of numbers of their own tanks, they were often forced to field improvised anti-tank vehicles. These were mostly based on obsolete tank chassis, such as the Marder series, and armed with good anti-tank guns. In some rare cases, half-tracks were also employed in this manner. One such vehicle was the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette (Sd.Kfz.6/3) developed during late 1941. While the increase in firepower was welcome, these vehicles had a number of defects which ultimately lead to a small production run of only 9 vehicles.

The 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette (Sd.Kfz.6/3). Source: https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/506317-sdkfz-63-diana-soviet-guns-for-the-afrika-korps/

History

From 1941 onwards, on the Eastern Front, the Germans were starting to encounter tanks like the T-34 and KV series, which their tank and anti-tank guns struggled against. The situation in North Africa was not better either, as the British employed tanks such as the Matilda II, which were difficult to effectively deal with. The 7.5 cm PaK 40 towed anti-tank gun that was slowly entering service from the end of 1941 was able to successfully destroy these vehicles at long ranges. However, its main issue was its general lack of mobility, being a heavy towed gun. In the vast expanses of North Africa, a self-propelled anti-tank vehicle could offer a number of advantages, being able to quickly respond to enemy armor movements. It was for this reason that, in August 1941, the Germans began developing such a vehicle. It was meant to reinforce the German forces (Deutsches Afrikakorps DAK – German Africa Corps) fighting in North Africa.

For the initial tests, truck or half-track chassis were proposed. Regarding the armament, the Germans had two options to choose from, either the 5 cm PaK 38 or the captured Soviet 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r). The 7.5 cm PaK 40 was still under development at this time and far from entering service. Ultimately, the choice was cast in favor of the stronger and larger 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r) gun. According to the original plans, if the whole assembly proved viable, a limited production run of some 20 vehicles was to be carried out. This was ultimately changed to only 9 vehicles for unknown reasons. At the end of August, the German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres) announced that, due to the urgent need for such vehicles, the chassis of a modified Sd.Kfz.6 half-track was to be armed with a 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r).

The Sd.Kfz.6 5-ton half-track was one of several similar half-track vehicles employed by the Germans during the war. It was developed back in 1934 by Buessing-NAG with the intention of providing the Pioniere (German Army engineers) with a vehicle for towing pontoon bridges and other equipment and the standard German 10.5 cm field howitzers. During the war, these were modified and used as self-propelled anti-aircraft vehicles. Depending on the role it was to perform, it received a slightly modified designation. The regular engineer version was named Sd.Kfz.6, the artillery towing version was the Sd.Kfz.6/1 and the later anti-aircraft version was the Sd.Kfz.6/2. While the half-track had a somewhat complicated suspension which consisted of 5 (later increased to 7) overlapping and interleaved double road wheels, its performance was deemed satisfactory. Like many other German vehicles, there were simply never enough of them to fulfill the Army’s needs. When the production ended in 1943, some 3,122 had been built.

An Sd.Kfz.6 5-ton half-track towing the standard 10.5 cm leFH 18. Source: Wiki

The main gun for this modification was actually a Soviet 76.2 mm M1936 (F-22) divisional gun. Such guns were captured in huge numbers during the initial months of Operation Barbarossa in the East. After a brief assessment of the gun’s characteristics, the Germans were satisfied with its performance. The gun was given to the army for use, under the name 7.62 cm F.K. (Feldkanone) 36(r) (also sometimes designated as Feldkanone (FK) 296(r)). It was initially used in its original field gun role, but very soon it became clear that it possessed great anti-tank capabilities. As this was a captured weapon, the German Army High Command also issued orders to collect as much armor-piercing and high-explosive ammunition as possible. These were to be then allocated to the unit that was to be equipped with this gun.

The 7.62 cm M1936 (F-22) was a Soviet divisional gun. Source: Wiki

Testing the Prototype

Once the first prototype was completed by Alkett sometime during late August or early September, it was transported for testing at the secret research center in Kummersdorf during September 1941. The prototype had a very basic design, with a large thinly armored structure placed on the former cargo bay of the half-track chassis. The front driver’s compartment was unchanged. The gun was placed inside this new box-shaped firing compartment. In order to fit inside, its trailing legs were shortened.

A series of evaluation and firing tests were conducted on 10th September. A few days later, Wa Prüf 6 (the tanks and motorized equipment design office) personnel made a report of its overall performance. In short, the report described that some 44 high-explosive and armor-piercing rounds were fired from the prototype vehicle at different elevations and traverse angles. No major issues were detected with the gun assembly. The half-track chassis also proved to be up to the job, as it could withstand the recoil of the 7.62 cm gun.

The 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 had a laconic overall design, which is quite evident here. It consisted of a box-shaped fighting compartment and the unchanged driver compartment to the front. Given its short and fast development process, this should not come as a surprise. Source: https://www.chaosbunker.de/en/2020/02/07/sdkfz-6-3-diana-for-the-afrikakorps-but-how/

While the overall design was deemed satisfactory, some changes were requested. The prototype was provided with an armored cover for the half-track’s radiator to protect it from damage from firing the gun, but this did not happen. It was proposed that it be removed, likely to save as much weight as possible. Another change that was requested was to remove part of the rear armor. The reason for this was the noted difficulty that arose during the replacement of the gun barrel and recoil cylinder due to lack of space. The opening to the rear provided the crew with plenty of room to effectively change the gun barrel. To avoid any possible delays, simple soft-steel doors were placed in the opening. On 17th September, further firing tests were conducted using Soviet but also German rounds adapted for the gun. These tests were to be followed up by driving trials.

While not directly related to these projects, the Germans were also experimenting with the idea of using half-track chassis as highly mobile anti-tank vehicles. One of these, which saw combat, was the Panzer-Selbstfahrlafette II, built using the experimental HKP 902 half-track. Only two would be built and they were lost in North Africa.

Another half-track project, the Panzer-Selbstfahrlafette II. Source: red

Name

This vehicle received the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 designation. It is also known under the similar 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf 5t Zkgw designation. There are some misconceptions about the ‘Diana’ nickname for this vehicle. According to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No. Rommel’s Funnies), this name was associated with a subsequent Alkett project from 1942 based on the same half-track chassis, known as the 7.62cm PaK 36 auf 5t Zgkw Diana. While similar to the previous vehicle, it was to incorporate a number of improvements, namely a modified and improved anti-tank gun, better protection and fewer crew members. To complicate matters even more, according to the author T. Cockle (Armor of the Deutsches Afrikakorps), the ‘Diana’ nickname was actually given by the British.

Production Numbers

Only nine 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 vehicles were requested. For this reason, Buessing-NAG was tasked with the production of nine Sd.Kfz.6 chassis, which were delivered during October and November 1941. The company responsible for their final assembly was Alkett. Interestingly, while the majority of sources agree that only nine such vehicles were built, author G. Rottman (German self-propelled guns) notes that only six vehicles were built.

Specifications

The Chassis

This vehicle was based on the modified chassis of the Sd.Kfz.6 half-track. This half-track had a number of changes during its production run, aimed at improving its overall performance. In the case of the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3, the BN 9b subversion was used. Some of the changes compared to previous versions included redesigning the suspension by using the torsion bar units, adding two extra road wheels, and installing a stronger Maybach NL 54 TUKRM engine giving 115 hp @ 2,600 rpm. With this engine and a weight of around 10 to 10.5 tonnes (depending on the source), the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 could reach a maximum speed of some 50 km/h. The fuel load of some 190 liters offered an operational range of 222 km on road and 112 km off-road.

The 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 used a torsion bar suspension with overlapping and interleaved double road wheels. While somewhat complicated, it provided a relatively good off-road drive. Source: https://www.nevingtonwarmuseum.com/sdkfz-63-diana.html

The Fighting Compartment

The Sd.Kfz.6 cargo bay was replaced with a new fighting compartment that was protected by a simple but quite bulky box-shaped armored fighting compartment. The sides of this box-shaped fighting compartment were 3.6 m long and had a height of some 1.5 m. The rear plate was some 2 m wide with the same height. The front was open, with two smaller armored plates connected to the side walls. This is where the gun was to be located and its armored shield was to provide the crew protection from incoming fire. On top, this armored compartment was completely open, but could be covered with canvas to protect the crew from the harsh desert weather if needed. For this reason, three metal bar rails were added on the top to help stretch the canvas cover better.

The front was open in the center to provide room for the gun. Source: https://www.chaosbunker.de/en/2020/02/07/sdkfz-6-3-diana-for-the-afrikakorps-but-how/

On each side of this armored compartment, a large door was added for the crew to enter their positions. These doors could be opened toward the vehicle’s front. They were 90 cm wide and had a height of nearly 1 m. On the rear armor plate, a larger 60 cm wide door made of soft-steel was placed. This door was hinged at its bottom edge. Its primary function was to provide the crew with easy access in order to facilitate the replacement of the gun barrel and other parts. It could also be used to eject spent cartridges.

The doors are visible here. Source: https://www.armedconflicts.com/7-62-cm-FK-296-r-auf-gp-Selbstfahrlafette-Sd-Kfz-6-3-t8911

The Armor

The new fighting compartment was protected (except the rear positioned door, which was made of soft steel) by 4.5 mm armor plates. While it was hoped this would provide protection at least against small-caliber rounds, in reality, it did not. The front was mostly protected with a 3 mm thick gun shield. Some older sources mention that the overall armor thickness was either 8 or 10 mm thick. In a German war report about this vehicle’s performance, it was noted that this armor was insufficient to provide protection from even small caliber machine gun fire.

In theory, for any self-propelled vehicle that was lightly armored, the best defense was a well-selected combat position and good camouflage. While the first of these two could be achieved with good reconnaissance, the latter was quite tricky given the vehicle’s huge size. The half-track SPG was a notoriously large target, with a length of 6.33 m, a width of 2.26 m, and a height of 3.05 m.

While this vehicle was provided with 4.5 mm thick armored plates, in reality, these proved mostly useless against enemy return fire. The large size also did not help much in the survivability of this vehicle. Source: http://www.panzernet.net/panzernet/start.php

The Armament

The main armament was a captured Soviet 7.62 cm M1936 field gun. For installation in this vehicle, only the rear trail legs were shortened and then bolted down to provide stability during firing. The large wheels were also retained, but they were bolted down for the same reason. This gun had a traverse of 30° in both directions and an elevation of -7° to +20°. The armor penetration at 1 km was (depending on the ammunition used) 67 to 77 mm, more than enough to deal with enemy tanks encountered in North Africa.
In a German war report made by a Waffenamt liaison officer, it was noted that this gun (both in the towed and self-propelled versions) would generate fear among the enemy, who in turn would attempt to neutralize it by using artillery or airstrikes.

The 7.62 cm M1936 field gun, while possessing good anti-tank capabilities, was generally unsuited for this role. The main reason for this was the general arrangement of its traverse and elevation wheels. Namely, the traverse wheel was on the left, together with the gun sights, while the elevation handwheel was on the right side. As the gunner was positioned on the left, targeting was made quite difficult, if not almost impossible. The Germans took steps to address the issue, moving the elevation handwheel to the left side, but the linkages limited total elevation.

During the war, the Germans would modify and improve the 7.62 cm M1936 field gun for the anti-tank role. The changes involved adding a muzzle brake (but not all guns were equipped with it), cutting the gun shield in half (the upper part was welded to the lower part of the shield in a similar fashion to the PaK 40 two-part shield) and rechambering the gun to 7.5 cm caliber in order to use standard German ammunition ( as on the PaK 40). After these changes, the gun was renamed 7.62 cm PaK 36(r). This version was not the one mounted on the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3, but the original version of the gun.

The ammunition load was huge, with 100 rounds being stored in an ammunition bin which was located to the rear of the new fighting compartment. An additional 40 rounds could be stored on a towed trailer, if needed. Some sources claim that the ammunition load consisted of 64 rounds, while author D. Nešić (Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka) mentions that only 20 rounds were carried inside.

The original Soviet gun had its traverse and elevation handwheel positioned on opposite sides of the gun, which made aiming this gun for anti-tank duties quite difficult. The Germans would later change this by moving both handwheels on the left side. Source: Wiki

The armor plates offered no real protection against enemy return fire, and possibly most vehicles were lost this way. To save time and to provide stability for the gun, the wheels of the gun were retained and can be seen here. In addition, the shortened trail legs are also visible. Source: https://www.nevingtonwarmuseum.com/sdkfz-63-diana.html

The 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 gun had a traverse of 30° in both directions and an elevation of -7° to +20°. Source: https://www.nevingtonwarmuseum.com/sdkfz-63-diana.htm

The secondary armament consisted of one 9 mm MP 40 submachine gun allocated to the vehicle commander. The remaining crew were issued with pistols for self-defense.

The Crew

This vehicle had a rather large crew, which consisted of a commander, a gunner, a driver, a loader, and two additional ammunition bearers. Beside the driver, who was fully exposed at the front, the remaining crewmen were located in the box-shaped fighting compartment. The number of crew members is listed as 5 in a number of sources.

The 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 had a large crew of six. The driver was probably in the worst situation, as he was completely unprotected and exposed to enemy fire. Source: https://guerra-mundial-1914-1945.fandom.com/es/wiki/7.62cm_Flak_36(r)_auf_Selbstfahrlafette_Zugkraftwagen_5t_Sd.Kfz._6/3_%22Diana%22

Forming the First Units and Organisation

At the end of September 1941, an order was issued to begin the necessary steps for forming a unit equipped with 9 such vehicles. The delivery of completed vehicles was expected to be ready by 25th October. In mid-November, a new order gave instructions to form three Platoons (Zuge). each equipped with three vehicles. The commanders of these Platoons were to be supplied with cars including and support staff, like a motorcycle messenger.

In North Africa

The 9 vehicles were transported from Germany to Italy at the end of December 1941. From there, they were transported by ship to Tripoli. Six vehicles arrived there on 12th January 1942, while the remaining three arrived in late February 1942. The first six 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 were used to reinforce the 3rd Kompanie (Company) of the 605th Panzerjäger Abteilung (Anti-tank Battalion), which was part of the 90th Leichte Division (Light Division). Beside the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3, the 605th Anti-Tank Battalion was also equipped with at least 6 Panzerjäger Is (anti-tank vehicles based on the Panzer I chassis).

Beside the small number of 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 vehicles, the 605th Anti-Tank Battalion was also equipped with the Panzerjäger I which can be seen in the background. Source: https://www.nevingtonwarmuseum.com/sdkfz-63-diana.html

As only six arrived in January, these initially saw action against the British in early 1942. By the 10th of February, probably due to high mechanical failures, only one vehicle of the original six was still operational. By March, with the arrival of the remaining three vehicles, the whole unit was finally attached to the 90th Light Division. The first losses occurred during April, when two vehicles were written-off, but the precise cause of these losses is not recorded.

In May 1942, the 605th anti-tank Battalion still had three operational platoons equipped with this vehicle, which were slightly reduced in strength. The 1st Platoon had three vehicles, while the remaining two Platoons each were equipped with two vehicles. These remaining seven vehicles saw extensive action during Unternehmen Venezia (Operation Venice), an Axis attack on the British positions at Gazala in late May 1942. On 28th May, the few 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 managed to beat back the tanks of the British 4th Armored Brigade near El Adem.

Due to further fighting, the number of these vehicles was reduced to four, while one was under repair on 8th June 1942. Due to further losses, by the start of July, only one operational and two non-operational vehicles were left. The same month, at least two vehicles participated in the Axis conquest of Tobruk. During the failed attempt to break the El Alamein line, one more was lost. At the start of December 1942, the last remaining 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 were finally lost. Of the 9 vehicles built, at least one was captured by the British in North Africa.

This vehicle was captured and examined by the British. Source: http://www.panzernet.net/panzernet/start.php

While the 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 offered a great increase in firepower and mobility, due to its weak armor and large size, it did not prove to be a successful overall design. Source: https://www.chaosbunker.de/en/2020/02/07/sdkfz-6-3-diana-for-the-afrikakorps-but-how/

Related Vehicles

7.62 cm PaK 36 auf 5t Zgkw ‘Diana’

The ‘Diana’ was a subsequent project from Alkett, meant to provide a more mature design for this type of vehicle. While based on the same chassis, it used the modified Pak 36(r), which had better anti-tank performance, better armor and a smaller crew.

The 7.62 cm PaK 36 auf 8t ZgKw ‘Artemis’

Using the Sd.Kfz.6 was not the last attempt to develop an anti-tank vehicle based on a half-track chassis. The development of such a vehicle based on the larger Sd.Kfz.7 was initiated in August 1941. It was to be lightly protected and to have a crew of only four. While a single prototype was completed, the whole project was eventually abandoned and no photos have survived.

Conclusion

The decision to build only nine 7.62 cm F.K.(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 was quite justified, as this vehicle had a number of disadvantages. While its gun had good overall armor-piercing properties, its origin as a field gun made it somewhat unfit for the anti-tank role. The overall large shape of the vehicle offered an excellent target for enemy gunners. The weak, almost useless armor offered no real protection against any kind of enemy fire. The low numbers built also limited its overall performance on the front. In the end, while the Germans made some attempts to develop self-propelled anti-tank vehicles based on half-tracks, these projects ended in failure and were built in limited numbers.

The basic Sd.Kfz.6 half-track.

The 7.62 cm F.K. 36(r) auf gp. Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3 in action is North Africa. Both illustrations by David Bocquelet.

Specifications
Dimensions (l-w-h)	6.33 m, 2.26 m, 3.05 m
Total weight, battle-ready	10 to 10.5 tonnes
Crew	6 (Commander, Gunner, Driver, Loader and two Ammunition )
Propulsion	Maybach NL 54 TUKRM 6 cyl., 115 hp @ 2,600 rpm
Speed (road/off-road)	50 km/h
Range (road/off-road)	222 km, 112 km (cross country)
Primary Armament	7.62 cm F.K.(r)
T Armor	3 to 3.4 mm

Sources

P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
P. P. Battistelli (2006) Rommel’s Afrika Korps, Osprey Publishing
F. Kurowski (2010) Das Afrika Korps Stackpole books.
G. Rottman, German self-propelled guns, Concord
D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
A. Lüdeke (2007) Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon books.
V. Andorfer, M. Block and J, Nelson, Marder III, Nuts and Bolts Vol. 15
H. Scheibert, Die Deutschen Panzer Des Zweiten Weltkriegs, Dörfler.
T. Cockle (Armor of the Deutsches Afrikakorps)
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2005) Panzer Tracts No.7-2 Panzerjager
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2014) Panzer Tracts No.22-5 Gepanzerter 8t Zugkraftwagen and SFL. Flak (Sd.Kfz.7)
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (1997) Panzer Tracts No. Rommel’s Funnies
W.J.K. Davies (1979), Panzerjager German Anti-Tank Battalions of World War Two. Almark Publishing Co.Ltd.

WW2 German Tank Destroyers

4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen 35R 731(f)

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Post date June 2, 2021
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German Reich (1941)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 174 Anti-Tank and 26 Command Vehicles Built

After the defeat of France in June 1940, the Germans captured huge stockpiles of British and French war materiel. Some of the greatest prizes were the large quantities of tanks of several different types, including the Renault R35. While the R35 was available in great numbers and had good armor for its time, it lacked firepower, speed and had only two crew members. While some would be used in their original tank configuration on less important fronts, the majority would be adapted for various other roles, such as artillery tractors or ammunition supply vehicles. Some 174 would be modified and used as anti-tank vehicles with an additional 24 (based on the same model) being used as command vehicles.

The 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst. Pz.Kpfw. 35R 731(f). Source: https://www.armedconflicts.com/4-7-cm-PaK-t-Sfl-auf-Fgst-Pz-Kpfw-35-R-731-f-t6459

History

After the conclusion of the Western campaign, the Germans were in possession of nearly 800 R35 tanks. At the end of 1940, In 6 (the inspectorate for motorized and armored units) issued a request to Wa Prüf 6 for the development of an anti-tank vehicle based on the R35 tank. This vehicle was to be used to equip non-motorized Infantry Divisions. Prior to this request, the Germans had already tested the use of so-called Panzerjäger (anti-tank vehicles) during the Western campaign. These represented an attempt to increase the mobility of anti-tank guns by placing them on an obsolete tank chassis, like the Panzer I. The standard German anti-tank gun was the 3.7 cm PaK 36, which proved a good design in the Polish campaign, but was deemed insufficient for the task afterward. The Germans had in their inventory a good number of the more potent Czechoslovakian 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38 anti-tank guns, known as the 4.7 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 36(t), or simply as 4.7 cm PaK(t). Due to its better firepower, the Germans decided to use this cannon to arm the first self-propelled anti-tank vehicle, known simply as the Panzerjäger I. It consisted of a Panzer I chassis on which the turret was replaced with a 4.7 cm PaK(t) mount and a three-sided shield. While this concept proved to have merit, as shown in France, it was far from perfect. Simply put, the chassis was insufficient for the task and was poorly protected.

The Panzerjager I, the first German self-propelled anti-tank gun, based on the Panzer I chassis and armed with a 47 mm gun. Source: Wiki

As the larger Panzer III and IV were better armed than the Panzer I, there was no point in using them for such modifications at this early stage of the war, as they were too valuable as tanks for the Panzer Divisions. The French R35, on the other hand, was available in great numbers, was better protected than the Panzer I and had a stronger chassis. Adding the potent 4.7 cm PaK(t) instead of the weak 3.7 cm main gun would have kept these vehicles relevant on the contemporary battlefields. These were probably the main reasons why the Germans decided to utilize the R35 chassis for this role.

The R35 in German service. These vehicles were mainly used for occupation and anti-partisan activities. Source: http://www.tankarchives.ca/

The R35 was commonly used as a towing vehicle for German heavy artillery. Source: http://www.tankarchives.ca/

For the development of such a vehicle, Wa Prüf 6 chose Alkett to build the first prototype. The soft steel prototype was completed during early February 1941. The conversion included removing the turret and replacing it with an open topped combat compartment armed with the 4.7 cm anti-tank gun. At the end of March, it was presented to Adolf Hitler. He approved the design and an order for 200 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst. Pz.Kpfw. 35R 731(f), as it was known, was given, which was to be completed by August that year.

The R35

The Renault R35 was a French light tank developed during the early thirties to replace the aging FT tank. While the French Army tested other heavier designs (the Renault D1 and D2), a simpler and cheaper vehicle was deemed more desirable. Work on this tank began in 1933 at the French Army’s request for a new light tank design. Renault was quick to respond and presented its prototype to the France Army which, after a series of modifications (among which increasing the armor to 40 mm and improving the running gear), placed an order for over 1,600 tanks. While the R35 was well protected, with 40 mm-thick cast armor, it was plagued with problems such as weak firepower (it had the same 37 mm gun as the FT), just two crew members, a lack of radio and slow speed. During its service life, a number of further modifications and tests were carried out in order to improve its firepower and mobility, all with limited success. Regardless, it was the most numerous French tank during the German Invasion of 1940.

The R35 in French service. Source: http://www.warlordgames.com/new-french-renault-r35-tank/

Name

The designation of the German tank destroyer is slightly different depending on the source used. According to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No. 7-1), it is known as 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst. Pz.Kpfw. 35R 731(f). Author D. Nešić, (Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-Francuska) mentions it as the Selbstfahrlafette 4.7 cm PaK(t) auf PzKpfw 35 R(f). W.J. Spielberger (Beute-Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Deutschen Wehrmacht) names it the 4.7 cm PaK(t) auf Panzerkampfwagen 35 R(f) ohne turm. The precise name is also somewhat complicated by the Germans using both R35 and 35R in their documents.

This article, for the sake of simplicity, will use the simple and unofficial Panzerjäger 35R designation.

Design

Chassis and hull

The hull and superstructure were built using casting. The hull actually consisted of three cast parts that were bolted together. In the front part of the hull, the transmission was placed. Behind it was the crew compartment and, to the rear, separated by a firewall, was the engine compartment. On top of the chassis, a cast superstructure was added. It completely covered most of the vehicle, including the rear engine compartment. In front of the superstructure, a two-part hatch for the driver was located.

The R35 had a somewhat innovative cast hull and superstructure construction. Source: Pinterest

Armored crew compartment

For the construction of the Panzerjäger 35R, the Germans simply removed the R35’s turret and placed a box-shaped and open-topped armored compartment on top of the vehicle. To accommodate this new compartment, the Germans added a metal base that was extended over most of the upper part of the R35 superstructure.

The Panzerjager I was built using the R35 chassis without the turret. This particular R35 (on the left) is a perfect example of the chassis on which the German armored compartment would be added. Source: Unknown

The front rectangular plate of this compartment was placed at 30°. In the middle of it, an opening for the gun was placed. This opening was enclosed with an internal gun shield. On the gun’s left side, a hatch was placed. Its purpose was to cover the gun’s sight and had to be open when engaging enemy targets.

A view of the front plate, with the gun sight hatch closed on the left and open on the right vehicle. In addition, the right vehicle had metal bars welded to the top for better canvas support. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info

The compartment sides consisted of two armored plates. The smaller one, to the front, was slightly angled towards the front plate. The larger side armor had narrow rectangular hatches for the crew on both sides to the rear. On the left side, to the rear, an aerial antenna cubical mount base was installed.

Side view of the vehicle. The side doors are somewhat hard to spot, but they can be identified by the two hinges just behind the Balkenkreuz. In addition, note the antenna’s cubical mount. Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No7.1

A close-up view of the Panyerjäger 35R’s interior, but with many parts (including the rear part) missing. Sources: http://ritastatusreport.blogspot.com/2015/04/47mm-gun-on-renault-r35-chassis-in-thun.html

The rear part of the compartment consisted of a storage area which was elevated above the engine compartment. This was supported by three metal poles. While all were open-topped, some vehicles had two metal bars welded to the top to provide a better base for the canvas cover.

Rear view of the tank-hunter. Two metal bars holding the rear part of the upper armored crew compartment are visible. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info

Suspension

The Panzerjäger 35R’s suspension was unchanged from the original French design and consisted of five road wheels, three return rollers, one idler and one drive sprocket. Of the five road wheels, four were suspended in pairs and one was independently mounted. The paired road wheels were mounted on bell cranks and suspended using rubber springs. The rear idler was put close to the ground.

A good view of the Panzerjäger 35R’s suspension. Source: Pinterest

Engine

This vehicle was powered by a Renault 4 cylinder engine giving out 85 hp @ 220 rpm. While the overall weight, due to the added extra armor, crew members, armament and ammunition, was increased to 11 tonnes (or 10 tonnes, depending on the source), the driving performance seems to be unchanged in the specifications in most sources. The maximum speed was 20 km/h, while the cross-country speed was only 12 km/h. The low speed was not that a great deficiency for this vehicle, as it was intended to support the non-motorised infantry units. The operational range was some 130 km, dropping down to 80 km cross-country.

To reduce the wear and tear on the suspension and engine, the Germans often employed trailers to transport their tanks. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info

Armor protection

The armor protection could be divided into two sections, the French R35 hull and superstructure, and the German-added top fighting compartment. The French R35 was relatively well protected for its day. Its front hull armor was 32 mm rounded armor. The sides were 40 mm thick, the rear also 40 mm, but placed at 35°, and the bottom was 14 mm thick. The superstructure front armor was 32 mm thick, the sides and rear were 40 mm placed at 10° and 11°. The top armor of the superstructure was 13 mm.

Being lightly armored, good camouflage was one way to increase its survivability in combat. Source: www.armedconflicts.com

The new fighting compartment was less armored. The front was 25 mm thick, placed at 30°. The sides were 20 mm thick at 10° and the flat rear was 20 mm thick. Older sources mention that the frontal armor was 20 mm thick and the sides and rear only 10 mm thick.

The Panzerjäger 35R’s armored crew compartment was only lightly protected, as evidenced by the door’s armor thickness. Source: Pinterest

Armament

The gun used to arm this vehicle was the captured Škoda 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38, known as the 4.7 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 36(t), or simply as the 4.7 cm PaK(t) in German service. The standard armor-piercing Panzergranate 36(t) had a muzzle velocity of 775 m/s and a maximum effective range of 1.5 km. The armor penetration of this round was 48-59 mm at 500 m and 41 mm at 1 km.

In order to extend its operational effectiveness, a new Pzgr.Patr.40 tungsten round was developed (the muzzle velocity was 1,080 m/s). As the Germans lacked sufficient tungsten, this type of ammunition could not be produced in large quantities and its usage was rare. The 4.7 cm PaK(t) also fired high-explosive rounds (2.3 kg weight) with impact fuses to be used against light armor and infantry.

The Škoda 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38 Source: Wiki

The gun itself, without the wheels and the trail legs, was simply bolted on the front, where the R35’s turret ring was previously positioned. The 4.7 cm gun had an elevation of -8° to +10° and a traverse angle of 17.5° on each side. The elevation and traverse were controlled by two handwheels located on the gun’s left side. The main monocular gunsight was not changed. The total ammunition load is unknown. Seeing as the smaller Panzerjäger I was able to carry some 86 rounds, it would be logical to assume that the new Panzerjäger 35R’s ammunition load would be similar, if not slightly larger.

For crew protection, one MP38/40 submachine gun was carried inside. The ammunition load for it was 192 rounds. Being designed to cooperate with the infantry, the lack of a machine gun was not a major issue.

A close-up view of the 4.7 cm mount being bolted to the R35 tank. Source:https://imgur.com/a/vvL8xcN http://ritastatusreport.blogspot.com/2015/04/47mm-gun-on-renault-r35-chassis-in-thun.html

A dismantled 4.7 cm gun mount from a Panzerjäger I. The Panzerjäger 35R had the same design. Source: H. F. Duske, Panzerjager I, Nuts and Bolts

Crew

This vehicle had a crew of three, which included the commander, who was also the gunner, the loader and the driver. The driver’s position was on the left side of the vehicle. He entered his position through a two-part hatch with a visor. The remaining two crewmen were positioned in the new armored fighting compartment. The commander/gunner was positioned to the left of the gun, and the loader to the right of him. While not listed in the sources, it is likely that the loader would also act as the radio operator.

The Panzerjäger 35R had a crew of three. Source: Pinterest

Production

As already mentioned, the production order for this vehicle was awarded to Alkett. The preparation for production was to begin in February/March 1941, with some 30 vehicles per month. There would be some delays in production, so the quota of 30 vehicles was not always achieved. By May 1941, some 93 vehicles were completed, followed by 33 in June, only 5 in July, 22 in August, 28 in September and the final 19 vehicles in October 1941. Not all were built as anti-tank vehicles. Of the 200 vehicles, some 26 were constructed as command vehicles.

Organization

The first available vehicles were used to form three 30-vehicle strong Panzerjäger Abteilung – Pz.Jg.Abt (self-propelled anti-tank battalions), the 559th, 561st, and the 611th. Each of these battalions consisted of an HQ unit and three Kompanie (Companies). Each Company was divided into smaller three-vehicle strong Zuge (Platoons). There was an additional Company sent to the 43rd Battalion, supplied with a few vehicles, to act as a reserve and training unit. The remaining vehicles would be mainly distributed in smaller numbers to various Infantry Divisions.

Service

Failed actions in the East

The Panzerjäger 35Rs, like many other German armored vehicles, were mobilized for the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941. The 559th was allocated to Army Group North, while the 561st and 611th went to Army Group Center. For these vehicles, the war started pretty badly. Nearly all vehicles were out of action due to mechanical breakdowns just a few days after the start of the German attack. For example, in the case of the 611th Battalion, it lost all its vehicles on the first day of the attack. In desperation, the unit was instead equipped with the 3.7 cm PaK 36 towed gun and even some Soviet captured anti-tank guns. The 559th Battalion also had the same fate, replacing its vehicles with 3.7 cm PaK anti-tank guns. The 561st was pulled back from the front, temporarily waiting to replace the tank destroyers with towed anti-tank guns.

Another unit that was sent to the Soviet Union, probably in late 1941, was the 318th Company, which had ten 35R tank-hunters and 2 command vehicles. These performed poorly based on the unit report dated from February 1942. In this report, it was noted that these vehicles had poor engines, which were ill suited for the field conditions of the East. Bad weather and the poor road system prevented long road marches with this vehicle. Due to the low temperatures, the engines could not be started and even the road wheels would be blocked and unable to move because of this. After this poor performance, no more 35R anti-tank vehicles would be sent to the East. The fate of these vehicles is not clear in the sources.

A Panzerjäger passing a destroyed T-34 somewhere on the Eastern Front. Source: www.armedconflicts.com

The command version (easily identified by the lack of gun) based on the Panzerjäger 35R. Source: Pinterest

In the West

The remaining Panzerjäger 35Rs, some 148 vehicles in April 1942, would be stationed in the West, where the climate was more suitable for their use. In the West, these vehicles were not used in Battalion strength, but instead mostly allocated to a number of Infantry Divisions in small numbers. Some of these included 3 with the 100th Panzer Regiment, 2 in the 243rd Panzer Division, 11 in the 343rd Infantry Division, 10 in the 191st Reserve Division, etcetera. In December 1943, of 92 Panzerjäger 35Rs, some 88 were operational. Prior to the Allied invasion of France in 1944, some 110 vehicles of this type were available. Why this number is higher than the previous year is sadly not mentioned in the sources. Between 1942 and 1944, these vehicles were mainly used for occupation and patrol duties and crew training.

A Panzerjäger 35R during an exercise, possibly somewhere in France. Source: http://www.tankarchives.ca/

The available Panzerjäger 35Rs would meet the Allied invasion of occupied France. Unfortunately, the sources do not give much information about their actual combat service. Being based on a pre-war vehicle and armed with a weak 4.7 cm anti-tank gun (by 1944 standards), its effectiveness was limited at best. It is hard to know precisely, but probably all were lost in the first few months of combat in France.

An abandoned Panzerjäger 35R being inspected by American soldiers in late June 1944, at Littry. Source: www.armedconflicts.com

Modifications

Führungs-fahrzeuge auf Fgst. Kpfw. 35R 731(f)

The Führungs-fahrzeuge auf Fgst. Kpfw. 35R 731(f) (also known in sources as the Befehlspanzer fur 4.7 cm PaK(t) Einheiten auf Panzerkampfwagen 35 R) was a command vehicle based on the Panzerjäger 35R. It was built by removing the 4.7 cm anti-tank gun and replacing it with a ball mounted Kugelblende 30 MG 34 machine gun. Not all vehicles were actually equipped with the machine gun mount, as some were left without any armament. It was equipped with additional radio equipment and built in small numbers, some 26 vehicles in total.

Führungs-fahrzeuge auf Fgst. Kpfw. 35R 731(f). Source: T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No7.1

The 5 cm Pak 38 auf R35(f) project

At the end of July 1941, Alkett was instructed by Wa Prüf 6 to design and produce a modified version of this vehicle armed with the 5 cm PaK 38. This vehicle was designated 5 cm PaK 38 auf R 35(f). Once adopted, it was to be allocated to anti-tank units of standard Infantry Divisions. Due to the addition of the larger gun, the weight of the vehicle would rise to 11.5 tonnes. Ultimately, while one vehicle was to be ready by August 1941, it is unlikely that this was ever achieved.

The 5 cm gun was a powerful weapon with much stronger recoil, and it is not clear if the R35 chassis could have successfully handled it without major mechanical problems. The poor performance of this chassis in the East probably also influenced the decision to drop this project.

Drawing of how the 5 cm PaK 38 R35(t) may have looked. Source: http://www.tankarchives.ca/2016/10/renault-r-35-in-german-service.html

In Hungarian Service

At least two of these vehicles were temporarily given to Hungarians to fight Soviet partisans. Sadly, not much is known about their use by the Hungarians.

One of the two Panzerjäger 35Rs temporarily given to the Hungarians by the Germans. Source: B. Adam, E. Miklos, S. Gyula, A Magyar Királyi Honvédség külföldi gyártású páncélos harcjárművei 1920-1945

Surviving vehicle

Today, only one Panzerjäger 35R (with some parts missing) exists and can be seen at the Swiss military Museum at Thun.

The lone surviving Panzerjäger 35R Source: http://ritastatusreport.blogspot.com/2015/04/47mm-gun-on-renault-r35-chassis-in-thun.html

The Panzerjäger 35R shared a number of positive and negative characteristics with its cousin, the Panzerjäger I. It provided the German infantry with a more mobile anti-tank platform with a relatively good gun and somewhat better protection than the earlier Panzerjäger I. While it was slow, the infantry it was designed to provide cover for were themselves not a very mobile force, so it was not a major issue.

The problem with this vehicle was its mechanical unsuitability for the Eastern Front (a problem that most French vehicles had when they were used there by the Germans). The poor roads and cold climate prevented the Panzerjäger 35R from being of any use on this front. The armor protection, especially the all around (but open-top) crew compartment, was still weak by the standards of 1942. While the later Marder series was also poorly protected, they had the benefit of longer range guns, which this vehicle did not have. In any case, the Panzerjäger 35R was surely a good way of increasing the effectiveness of the obsolete R35 tank, but was let down by its basis.

The Renault R35s were given a new utility by mounting the Czech 4.7 cm gun on top. Illustration by David Bocquelet.

4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fgst. Pz.Kpfw. 35R 731(f) specifications
Total weight, battle-ready	11 tonnes
Crew	3 (Commander/Gunner, Loader and Driver)
Propulsion	Renault 447 85hp engine
Speed	20 km/h, 12 km/h (cross country)
Operational range(cross country)	130 km/ 80 km
Primary Armament	4.7 cm PaK(t)(r)
Elevation	-8° to +12°
Armor	20-45 mm

Source:

T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2004) Panzer Tracts No7.1, Panzerjager.
Major J. Bingham (1973) French Infantry Tanks: Part II, AFV weapons
H. F. Duske, Panzerjager I, Nuts and Bolts
W.J. Spielberger (1992) Beute-Kraftfahrzeuge und Panzer der Deutschen Wehrmacht, Militärfahrzeuge.
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-Francuska, Beograd.
P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
A. Lüdeke (2007) Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon Books.
S. Zaloga (2011) Armored attack 1944 U.S. Army tank combat in the European theater from D-day to the Battle of the Bulge, Stackpole Books.
S.J. Zaloga (2014) French tanks of World War II (1), Osprey Publishing
B. Adam, E. Miklos, S. Gyula (2006) A Magyar Királyi Honvédség külföldi gyártású páncélos harcjárművei 1920-1945, Petit Real

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Panzerjäger Tiger (P) 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71 ‘Ferdinand/Elefant’ (Sd.Kfz.184)

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Post date May 8, 2021
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German Reich (1943)
Assault Gun/Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 89 Built + 2 Prototypes

Following the cancelation of the Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Porsche’s VK45.01(P) heavy tank project, the Germans were left with 100 built chassis, including several completed tanks. As these represented a huge material, financial, and time investment, a solution for reusing these in some way had to be found. One solution was to modify them as self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, which the Germans ultimately did. The majority of Dr. Porsche’s VK45.01(P) heavy tank chassis would be rebuilt for this purpose. These would be armed with the powerful 88 mm L/71 gun and protected with 200 mm of frontal armor, making them formidable adversaries on the battlefield at that time. Despite the small numbers built, these would see extensive combat use during the war, where their effectiveness was plagued with many mechanical and logistical problems.

The Ferdinand tank destroyer. Source: Panzernet.net

Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Porsche’s heavy tanks projects

Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Porsche began his engineering career in the early twentieth century when he showed great interest in developing hybrid (combination of electric and petrol) engines. He even built a few new automobile designs which incorporated hybrid engines. During the First World War, while working for the Austrian Daimler factory, he proposed an artillery tractor that would use this hybrid engine. Eventually, nothing came from this idea. In 1930, he founded his own company located in Stuttgart. Porsche’s new company was mainly engaged in developing various designs based on the request of the clients.

Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Porsche. Source: WIki

Dr. Porsche would also get a chance to participate in military tank design, as he was appointed chairman of the German Panzer Commission in September 1939. This Commission was composed of leading owners of major industrial plants and engineers. Their primary function was to give suggestions and new ideas for further or already existing tank designs. While working on a number of military design projects, Dr. Porsche would establish a good relationship with Adolf Hitler. This support gave Dr. Porsche’s work a huge advantage over the competition, despite generally creating either too complicated or too expensive designs.

By the end of 1939, Dr. Porsche began working on designing components for a new heavy tank project for the German Army. His approach was somewhat unorthodox, as he was not limited by any requirements or technical specifications. Dr. Porsche’s initial work was mainly focused on the development of engines and transmissions. In cooperation with Oberingenieur Karl Rabe, Dr. Porsche made his first plans and calculations for a new vehicle called Porsche Typ 100 in early December 1939. While the name of this vehicle would change several times, today it is best known as the VK30.01(P), given by Krupp in March 1941. The following year, in 1940, in a meeting with Wa Prüf 6 (automotive design office under the Waffenamt) officials, Dr. Porsche received proper specifications for the new tank and received the necessary funds to actually build the first prototype. The Typ 100 was to be powered by two air-cooled engines placed at the rear. Each of these two engines was then connected to an electrical generator. These were used to provide power to the two additional engines placed in the hull. These in turn were used to power the front-drive sprockets. The Typ 100 used new longitudinally mounted torsion bars suspension. The six road wheels were to be placed in pairs on the three torsion bar units on each unit. Eventually, due to urgent needs of the development of the Tiger program, and due to a number of problems identified (huge fuel consumption, suspension problems, etc.) on the Typ 100, the project was canceled. Only one (or two, depending on the source) soft steel operational prototypes would be built and used for testing.

Porsche’s first heavy tank prototype, known as the Typ 100. Source: http://www.tankarchives.ca/2018/06/porsches-leopard.html

By the end of May 1941, Hitler issued the requirements for the new heavy tank project. These included an increase in armor thickness (up to 100 mm maximum) and the use of an 88 mm gun. Dr. Porsche began working on this new design during July 1941, and two months later, the first drawings and calculations were ready. Similar to the previous vehicle, this project was initially designated as Typ 101, but the name changed several times during the span of a year. Today, it is generally known as the VK45.01(P) or Tiger (P). This vehicle had several changes to its design in comparison to its predecessor. To have a better distribution of weight, the turret was moved more to the front and the final drive unit was repositioned to the rear. The engine was replaced with a more powerful one. Additionally, there were many overall design changes to its chassis and superstructure design.

The Typ 101, also known as VK45.01(P). Despite being produced in a small series, only one vehicle in its original configuration was used in combat. Source: Panzernet.net

Construction of such a vehicle was given to Nibelungenwerk. The first prototype was completed in April 1942 and presented to Hitler on his birthday, 20th April. Hitler was impressed with it, as Dr. Porsche received a production order for 90 vehicles (plus 10 with hydraulic drive) in May 1942. A second prototype, which was built shortly after, was transported to the Army weapon test site at Kummersdorf in June 1942. There, the VK45.01(P) proved to be prone to malfunctions, especially with the new engine.

Porsche gets rejected

Following a number of rigorous tests, the VK45.01(P) proved to be a complicated and mechanically unreliable vehicle. The competing Henschel prototype was also prone to malfunctions but was nevertheless deemed to have a better overall design. At the end of August 1942, the Reichsminister (Minister of Armaments and War Production), Albert Speer, had the opportunity to examine Dr. Porsche’s work at Nibelungenwerke. Reichsminister Speer even had the chance to actually drive the VK45.01(P) prototype. However, this visit was quite unsuccessful for Dr. Porsche. Witnessing the overall performance of the VK45.01(P), Reichsminister Speer insisted that this project be canceled, despite having received great favor from Hitler himself. Due to the many mechanical problems and overcomplicated design, even Hitler agreed that the VK45.01(P) was a failure and, on 22nd November (or October, depending on the source) 1942, he officially ended Dr. Porsche’s heavy tank project. While less than 10 (out of an order of 100) VK45.01(P) would be fully completed as tanks, only one heavily modified vehicle would be ever used in combat during 1944, on the Eastern Front, as a command vehicle.

As these chassis were already produced, they presented a huge financial and resource investment that could not be simply discarded, so something had to be done on that matter. Wa Prüf 6 made proposals to mount 150, 170, or even 210 mm heavy caliber guns on them, but nothing came from these proposals. Hitler proposed for them to be modified and used as schwere Sturmgeschütz (heavy assault guns). The frontal armor was to be increased to 200 mm (from the original 100 mm) and to be armed with the newly developed 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 anti-tank gun. In the following months, the precise role that this vehicle would fulfill was changed a few times. Initially, it was allocated to the Artillery Army branch. The project officially got the green light by the direct order of Reichsminister Speer on 22nd September 1942.

Name

This vehicle was initially designated as Typ 130 by Alkett (who was responsible for the development of prototypes). During its early development phase, in late 1942, a number of different designations were allocated to it. One of these was Sturmgeschütz mit der 8.8 cm lang or Tiger Sturmgeschütz. At that time, the simpler Ferdinand name (given in honor of Dr. Porsche) was becoming more frequently used by the designers and, later, even by the troops.

During February 1943, Wa Prüf 6 issued a list of potential names for this vehicle. These included Sturmgeschütz auf Fahrgestell Porsche Tiger mit der langer 8.8, Panzerjäger Tiger (P) 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71 Sd.Kfz 184 or the similar 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 Sfl L/71 Panzerjäger Tiger (P) Sd. Kfz. 184. The simplest one was Panzejäger Tiger (P).

At the end of November 1943, Adolf Hitler gave a suggestion for a new name, Elefant (Elephant). The name was officially adopted during February 1944 and came to be implemented from May 1944 on. Despite the common misconception that this designation was applied to modified vehicles that were used from 1944 on, this was not the case (source T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle Panzer Tracts No.9 Jagdpanzer). For the Germans, the Ferdinand and Elefant were one and the same vehicle.

Production

The Ferdinand was initially designated to fulfill the role of an assault gun. The major manufacturer of such vehicles (primarily the Sturmgeschütz III, StuG III) was Alkett for most of the war. While Alkett possessed the necessary tools and manpower to complete the construction of the Ferdinand vehicles, it was decided by Wa Prüf 6 (during February 1943) that these were to be completed at Nibelungenwerke. On the other hand, Alkett (with the support of Dr. Porsche) would be involved in the construction of the first two prototype vehicles (chassis numbers 150010 and 150011 – depending on the source, the numbers are written with a space after the third number or without it). In general, Alkett was unable to proceed with the Ferdinand project. It was heavily involved with StuG III production and could not free up its production capacity to be involved in another project. There was also a general lack of proper rail transport units that were able to successfully carry the heavy weight of the Ferdinand’s larger components.

The Nibelungenwerke factory was located in the city of Sankt Valentin (near Steyr, in Austria) and was founded shortly after the German annexation of Austria. Initially, it was involved in production of Panzer IVs, which were then transported to Krupp-Gruson. Nibelungenwerke would be substantially enlarged so that it was capable of producing Panzer IV Ausf.F tanks. Its officials would also make an agreement with Dr. Porsche to develop his heavy tank projects. While it possessed production capabilities to conduct the construction process, Alkett provided Nibelungenwerke with a group of 120 skilled metalworkers to speed up the whole production process.

Alkett’s first blueprints of the Typ 130. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer

As the construction of the Ferdinand required extensive modifications to the VK45.01(P) chassis, other subcontractors would be needed. For example, Eisenwerke Oberdonau from Linz was responsible for making the necessary modifications to the hull. Siemens-Schuckert of Berlin was to provide the electrical motors and the generator. Krupp from Essen was responsible for producing the large casemates.

Due to some delays, the first 15 hulls were completed in January 1943. The remaining hulls would be ready by mid-April 1943 when they were transported to Nibelungenwerke for final assembly. Krupp was also involved in providing additional necessary parts. On 16th February 1943, the construction of the first vehicle (chassis number 150010) began. According to the original production plans, the last vehicle was to be completed by mid-May 1943.

The precise production run was slightly different depending on the source. For example, according to T. Melleman (Ferdinand Elefant Vol.I), production began in early 1943, when 15 vehicles were completed. These were followed by 26 vehicles in February, 37 in March, and, by May, all 90 were completed. Initially, four vehicles were used for training purposes.

According to T. Anderson (Ferdinand and Elefant tank destroyer), production was planned as 15 vehicles in February, 35 in March, and the final 40 in April. T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (Panzer Tracts No.23, Panzer production 1933-1945) state that 30 were built in April and the remaining 60 in May.

A row of Ferdinands under construction. Source: Panzernet.net

The last completed Ferdinand, chassis number 150100, containing various inscriptions added by the workers. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info

The Ferdinand components were built by a number of different subcontractors. When completed, these were sent to Nibelungenwerke for final assembly. Source: J. Ledwoch Ferdinand/Elefant,

Initial testing

As the production of the first vehicles was going on, two Alkett prototype vehicles, chassis numbers 150010 and 150011, were transported to the weapon test site at Kummersdorf and Magdeburg by order of Wa Prüf 6 for testing and evaluation. These two can be easily identified by the rear positioned flexible fenders and protective covers for the forward-mounted headlights (both would be removed on the production vehicles). One of these vehicles would be presented to Hitler on 19th March 1943 during an exhibition of new vehicle prototypes at the Rugenwalde proving ground.

One of the two prototypes was presented to Hitler at the Rugenwalde proving ground on the 19th March 1943. Source; T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer

One of the first constructed Ferdinands (Chassis number 150011) at Kummersdorf during testing in mid-April 1943. Source: Vol.1 book

In a report dated 23rd February 1943, over a dozen or so deficiencies were listed for the second prototype (chassis number 150011). Some of these included that the fuel line from the left engine was positioned too close to the exhaust pipe, the electric-powered fuel pumps were unreliable, the fact that in order to drain the cooling liquid, nearly 50 screws had to be removed, checking the oil level in the air compressor was difficult, the short life of the cooling system drive belts, the hand brakes were too weak, the inadequate size of the towing hooks, and spring breakages on the running gears, among several others. In normal conditions, the Ferdinands would have probably spent months in the workshops, where designers and engineers would try to resolve these issues. But, in 1943, the German Army was preparing to commence a new offensive operation on the Eastern Front. The majority of the Ferdinands were already on their way to this front. The only real option was to provide the Ferdinand-equipped units with Formveräderungen (Modification kit equipment) to be implemented in the field.

The two prototype vehicles would be thoroughly tested during 1943, mainly focusing on their mechanical reliability. In the case of the prototype with chassis number 150011, by late August 1943, it was reported to have driven some 911 km. With a weight of 64.37 tonnes (without crew and ammunition), the fuel consumption was noted to be huge. On good roads, in order to cross 100 km, the Ferdinand needed 867.9 liters. Cross country, this reached up to 1,620 liters at the same range. Many defects with the engine design, huge fuel and oil consumption, problems with the suspension design, poor accessibility for maintenance etcetera were noted.

Specifications

The Ferdinand was, in essence, divided into two large sections. The hull contained the two front crew members, four engines, and generators. The enclosed casemate positioned at the rear held the 8.8 cm main gun, the ammunition, and the rest of the crew. Each of these components was built using welded armor plates with some elements being connected using bolts.

A cross-section showing Ferdinand’s interior. Source: butterfingeredmodelbuilder.wordpress.com

Lower Hull

The Ferdinand’s lower hull could be divided into four sections: the front driving compartment, the main engines positioned in the center, the lower rear electric engines, and the fighting compartment placed on top of it. The hull was constructed using welding, with the added frontal armor held in place by bolts.

Close-up view of a Ferdinand hull under construction. The original VK45.01(P) rear engine compartment’s curved armor is evident here. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II,

Superstructure

On top of the Ferdinand lower hull was a fully enclosed superstructure which provided protection for the two crew members and the engines. It had a rather simple square design, with flat sides that angled inwards toward the front plate, while the rear part had a reverse angle.

The front part of the superstructure was where the driver and the radio operator were positioned. These two crewmembers entered their position through two hatches placed on top of the superstructure. The original VK45.01(P) round side doors intended for these two crew members were simply welded shut. The front driver visor and the machine gun ball mount were removed and replaced with a simple 100 mm thick armored plate. To provide the driver with a means to see where he was driving, a protected three-sided periscope was placed on top of his hatch door. In addition, there were two round-shaped visor ports (additionally protected with armored glass) placed on both sides of the inward-angling side armor. Next to the radio operator’s hatch on the vehicle’s right side was placed the antenna mount.

Close-up view of the driver’s hatch and the three periscopes. Source: J. Ledwoch Ferdinand/Elefant,

These two crew members were separated from the remaining rear-positioned crew members. The only way of communication with the commander was by using an intercom. It consisted of earphones and a throat microphone. In real combat conditions, this system proved to be prone to malfunctions. In an attempt to solve this issue, the Germans tried using light signals for communication between the driver and commander.

Behind these two crew members was placed the engine compartment, which was separated (on both sides) by a fire-resistant wall. It consisted of the two gasoline engines, electric generators, coolant radiators, and cooling fans, oil and fuel tanks. In order to put all these components into the engine compartment, they had to be placed close to each other, which caused many overheating problems and even cases of fire were not uncommon later during Ferdinand’s service life.

The top of this compartment was protected by an armored plate that was held in place by simple bolts. This way, it could be easily removed to facilitate necessary repairs. In the middle of this plate, a square armored grid cover was placed for the air intakes. On both sides of it, two rectangular grid hatches for the protection of the radiator’s air fan exhausts were placed. Close to the large casemate, there were three narrow hatches that covered most of the width of the engine compartment. They mainly served as engine access doors but, in the field, the crews would often leave them open for better ventilation. The engine exhaust pipes ran internally on both sides of the hull. They exited through a small opening which was located close to the fifth road wheel on both sides. While this arrangement provided protection for the exhaust pipes, the extensive heat rapidly deteriorated the grease lubricants on the fifth wheels. These affected their life expectancy and they had to be replaced often.

Behind the rear positioned engine firewall, two Siemens generators were placed. Atop them, the remaining crew members were stationed, protected by the large and well-protected casemate. While the original VK45.01(P) hull was reused for the Ferdinand vehicle, the rear part was changed. The two angled side plates were replaced with a flat one extended to the rear, which was more suited to carry the huge casemate.

A brand new Ferdinand. Note the small round-shaped visor port on the angled left side. Source: www.armedconflicts.com

Front view of the Ferdinand vehicle. The front armored plates were held in place by over 30 bolts. Source: Panzernet.net

The toolbox was placed on the superstructure’s right front side. This was not an ideal location, as it could be easily damaged during combat operations. So, it would be moved to the rear of the vehicles. The crews would also add additional spare boxes for various additional equipment.

Ferdinands had a spare toolbox placed on the superstructure’s right front side. This particular box is opened and the tools stored inside can be seen. Source: Pinterest

Casemate

The huge casemate positioned to the rear of the vehicle housed the 8.8 cm gun and four crew members. Its overall construction was simple, as it consisted of four armored plates plus the top one which were welded together. Viewed from the front, the casemate had a trapezoidal shape. While these plates were thick, they were also slightly sloped to provide additional protection. It was not actually welded to the superstructure but was instead held in place by bolts. Outside, close to the engine compartment, there was a small rectangular plate (with five bolts) that served as a reinforced connector between the superstructure and the casemate.

The front plate had a round-shaped opening in the middle for the gun ball mount. To avoid getting rainwater into the engine, some crews welded two diagonal improvised drains in front of the superstructure.

This vehicle is under repair and in the process of removing its large casemate. The small reinforced connector plate is actually removed for this purpose. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer

This vehicle had the improvised rain drains located just below the third bolt on the gun mantlet. The Source: Unknown

To the rear part of each side armor plate, a cone-shaped pistol port was placed. These were actually plugs that were connected to chains. When in use, the armored cover would simply be pushed out by one of the crew members. Once open, these would just hang on to the chains and could be closed back by dragging the chain back in. To the rear, in the middle of the casemate, a large round-shaped one-piece hatch was located. In the center of this door, a much smaller round-shaped hatch was located. Its main role was to act as another pistol port and to be used during the ammunition resupply. Two additional pistol ports were placed on both sides of this door.

The rear positioned round door with the smaller center-positioned hatch being open and used for ammunition resupply. Source: Pinterest

The top was not flat and was actually slightly angled toward the engine compartment. In front of it, the arc-shaped armored cover was used for the gunner’s periscope. To the right of it, the commander’s square-shaped two-piece hatch was located. Somewhat surprisingly for German standards, the commander was not provided with a command cupola and his view of the surroundings was quite limited. Further back, on the left side, the loader’s round-shaped two-part hatch was located. In the back corners, two round-shaped ports were used by the two loaders to see the surrounding with periscopes. In the middle, a ventilation port with protective sides was installed.

Due to its extreme weight, every bridge crossing was not to be taken lightly. If the bridge construction was not strong, there was a good chance to disintegrate and take the Ferdinand with it, like in this case. However, this provides us with a good view of the commander’s (to the right) hatch, gunner’s (to the left) curved periscope shield, and the ventilation port in the middle. The loader’s hatch and the two periscope ports are not visible here. Source: Pinterest

This particular Ferdinand is missing its rear hatch. The two pistol port cone-shaped covers were out hanging on the chains. Source: Warspor.ru

A dismantled casemate awaiting repair and later assembly. Source: https://mikesresearch.com/2020/05/24/ferdinands-elefants-on-the-eastern-front/

Suspension and Running Gear

The Ferdinand’s suspension consisted of six large road wheels, a front idler, and a rear drive sprocket on each side. The six road wheels were divided into pairs and were placed on bell cranks, which in turn were mounted on longitudinal torsion bar units. Each of these pairs of road wheels was actually suspended individually. Initially, Dr. Porsche’s design utilized rubber-rimmed wheels. As these were quickly worn out due to the extreme friction between the track and the wheels, Dr. Porsche designed a much simpler solution, using steel wheels with inbuilt spring units to help with shock absorption. The Germans, by this time, were having shortages of rare materials, including rubber, so this was a welcome innovation that would see use in later years on the Panther and the Tiger tanks. The road wheels had a diameter of 794 mm.

The Ferdinand, on paper, had a relatively simple suspension that consisted of six large road wheels. To save rubber and to extend their service life, they were made of steel with no rubber rim. Source: Pinterest

The shapes of the front idler and rear drive sprocket were visually almost identical. The main difference between these two was in their internal construction. They were identical to simplify the production of parts. But the main reason was to prevent the track from falling off the suspension due to the vehicle’s length and lack of any return rollers. Both the idler and the drive sprocket had a diameter of 920 mm and consisted of two toothed rings that had 19 teeth. The tracks used were 600 mm wide and were connected using single-pins. The ground clearance of this vehicle was 50 cm.

Close-up view of the longitudinal torsion bar units. Source: tank-photographs.s3

Dr. Porsche’s suspension design had positive and negative sides. The positive side was that the whole suspension system was completely external. This allowed him to lower the vehicle’s hull and provide more working space inside it. On the other hand, while the overall design was (at least in theory) simple, it was prone to malfunctions and breakdowns. Due to the vehicle’s extreme weight, replacing broken parts was difficult to achieve without proper equipment.

Engine and Transmission

As Dr. Porsche’s original VK45.01(P) dual-electrical engine system proved to be too complicated and unreliable, it was decided to replace these with a more orthodox power unit. Two Maybach HL 120 TRM gasoline engines giving out 265 hp@ 2600 rpm were chosen instead. Each of these two engines was provided with a 74-octane gasoline fuel tank. The engine was water-cooled, with some 37 l placed in two coolant tanks. One cooling tank was placed on top of the generators, while the second was in front of the engine. Based on the experience the Germans gained during the previous two Russian winters, they paid great attention to providing Ferdinand’s oil radiator with a system that would enable it to start during cold weather. This was a simple system that redirected hot water from the cooling radiator to a small vessel placed next to the oil radiator, which in turn heated the oil. The engine’s gearbox had three forward and three reverse speeds. The engine compartment was designed rather hastily and the maintenance was not always easy to accomplish.

Each fuel tank could carry some 475 liters (950 l in total). The Ferdinand was, due to its weight, a heavy fuel consuming beast. It needed some 1,100 l for crossing 100 km of road. With the fuel load carried inside, the operational range was 150 km on good roads, while off-road, often the case on the Eastern Front, the operational range was reduced to only 95 km. The maximum speed for a vehicle weighing 65 tonnes was a solid 30 km/h, but it could be only achieved on good roads and for a short period of time. The maximum cross-country speed was only 10 km/h or even less.

The engines used to power the two Siemens Typ K58-8 generators. These two generators would in turn produce the necessary power for the two Siemens Typ 1495a direct current electric (230 kW each) motors. These two electric motors were positioned under the casemate. Each of them was responsible for providing power to one side of the vehicle, being connected to the rear positioned drive sprockets through electromechanical drives.

The rear positioned Siemens Typ 1495a direct current electric motors gave the necessary power to turn the two drive sprockets. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II

Top view of the engine compartment cover plate. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer

The position and the design of the engine compartment meant that any repair of this part of the vehicle was overcomplicated. Without proper tools and crane equipment, it was almost impossible. Source: Thoma

Armor Protection

The Ferdinand had formidable armor protection for its day. The upper front armor of the hull was 200 mm thick (at a 30-32° angle, depending on the source). This was not a single-piece armor plate, but instead two 100 mm thick plates (or 90 and 110 mm, depending on the source) joined together. These were held in place by 32 conical head bolts. Alkett initially proposed adding 80 mm of 55° angled armor to the front, but this was not implemented

The lower part of the hull was a single piece measuring 80 mm placed at an angle of 45° (42°). The top part of the lower hull was 60 mm at 78° (82°) angle. The flat hull side armor was 60 mm and the rear ranged from 40 (60 mm depending on the source) to 80 mm (at a 60° to 90° angle). The bottom armor was 20 mm thick. It is not clear in the sources if the previously positioned machine gun ball mount and the driver visor port openings were left empty or filled in with armor plates.

The superstructure frontal armor was 200 mm thick placed at a 9° (12°) angle. It too consisted of two separated armor plates held in place by a combination of welding and bolts. Some sources state both plates were 100 mm thick, while others claim they were 90 and 110 mm thick. The flat sides were 80 mm, rear 80 mm placed at a 40° angle, and 30 mm on the top.

This captured vehicle was used by the Russian as target practice. It has a hole where the machine gun ball mount was previously located. Source: Warspot.ru

The rear positioned casemate was protected with a single piece of 200 mm frontal armor plate placed at a 20° angle. The sides were 80 mm thick and placed at a 30° angle. The rear armor was the same armor thickness placed at a 20° angle. The top was much lighter, at 30 mm placed at an 86° angle.

The same vehicle as above. It had its casemate armor used as a firing target for a number of different weapons. While the Ferdinand’s front armor was formidable, the side and rear were still thick, but certainly not invincible. Source: Warspot.ru

Crew

The Ferdinand had a crew of six, which were separated into two groups. The first group consisted of the driver and the radio operator, who were placed in the front hull. For steering the Ferdinand, a standard lever arrangement was used. However, their operation was slightly different in comparison to other vehicles. Namely, by moving the steering levers, instead of controlling the two drive sprockets, on the Ferdinand, they actually controlled the two electric motors, each responsible for powering one side. In front of the driver, there were two pedals: one for acceleration and the second for activating the drum brake. There was also an auxiliary lever parking brake, which also served as a clutch.

The huge Ferdinand needed six crew members to be operated properly. Source: Panzernet.net

The radio operator’s job was to operate the Fu 5 radio set, which consisted of the transmitter and a receiver. The 2-meter aerial antenna was placed next to his hatch. An additional 1.8 m Sternantenne D antenna mount was placed on the rear right corner of the casemate. This antenna was used for the command vehicles which were equipped with Fu 8 radio, which had a stronger transmitter and receiver. The spare batteries for the radio were held under the radio operator’s seat.

The remainder of the crew, which included the commander, gunner, and two loaders were positioned in the rear casemate. The commander had only a limited view of the surroundings by using the Scherenfernrohr (scissor periscope), and only with the hatch open. The loaders had two Turmbeobachtungsfernrohr (observation periscopes).

Quite surprisingly, the Ferdinand did not have a commander’s cupola, which was quite a common sight on other German vehicles. The only way a commander could see potential targets was through a scissor periscope with a limited arc and with an open hatch. Source: K. Münch (2005) Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II,

Armament

The main armament of the Ferdinand was the 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71, probably the best anti-tank gun of the Second World War. It was, in essence, a modified version of the 8.8 cm Flak 41 anti-aircraft gun. During the war, the Germans developed and used two towed 8.8 cm anti-tank gun versions. The first one was the PaK 43, which was mounted on a four-wheel carriage, and the second was the PaK 43/41, placed on a mount with components from a few different artillery pieces (wheels from 15 cm s.FH.18 and the split trail legs from the 10.5 cm le.FH.18). The PaK 43/41 used a horizontal sliding block mechanism, while the Pak 43 had a vertical one. The PaK 43/41 was an effective anti-tank gun, being able to take out all of the Allied tanks, but was also too heavy.

The 88 mm PaK 43 and the 43/41 (in the picture) were some of the most effective anti-tank guns of the war. Their heavy weight, on the other hand, meant that they were difficult to transport or move by their crews. For this reason, they were jokingly known by their crews as the ‘barn doors’ (Scheunentor). Source: Wiki

For use on the Ferdinand (and, later, the Jagdpanther), the Germans introduced a slightly modified version, named 8.8 cm PaK 43/2, which was more suitable for installation into enclosed armored vehicles. It had a semi-automatic and vertical sliding block. It had an electrical trigger, with the firing trigger being placed on the elevation handwheel.

The gun itself was mounted on a cradle that stood on two runnions connected to two curved post arms. This installation was specially designed in order to reduce the stress acting on the elevation gears. The hydropneumatic buffer and the recuperator cylinders were placed on top of the gun.

The 8.8 cm gun had a traverse of 30° (15° on each side) and an elevation of -5° to +14° (or -8° to +18°, depending on the source). The traverse and elevation hand wheels were positioned on the left side of the gun and operated by the gunner.

After firing the gun, the spent case was caught by a canvas sleeve basket. Due to the 8.8 cm case’s large size, nearly a meter, not many could fit into this basket, so the loader had to frequently empty it. It also had a secondary role of measuring the recoil travel of the gun that had to be in the range of 550-580 mm. When on the move, the gun was held in place by a forward-positioned travel lock. Inside the casemate, there was another smaller ‘H’ shaped travel lock, located in the casemate ceiling.

A close-up look of an 8.8 cm mount, waiting to be assembled into a Ferdinand. The vertical sliding block and a part of the canvas sleeve basket are also visible. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer

The forward-positioned travel lock. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer

Despite being a huge vehicle, the total ammunition load was quite limited, with only 40 rounds. These were held in storage bins located inside the casemate sides. The Ferdinand crews would often use any available spare space to add additional rounds, reaching a total load of 50. Authors such as T. Melleman (Ferdinand Elefant Vol.I) mention that some crews managed to squeeze in up to 90 rounds!

When firing at longer ranges, the Ferdinand crews used the Sfl Zielfernrohr 1 a type telescopic sight. When engaging targets with direct fire, the Rundblickfernrohr 36 periscope sight was used. While the Ferdinand could be used as mobile artillery thanks to its armament’s range, sufficient elevation, and firepower, it was rarely used in this manner. The main problem would be the small ammunition load of high explosive rounds and the fact its main task was hunting tanks and other armored vehicles.

While the 8.8 cm gun could fire either armor-piercing or high-explosive rounds, the Ferdinands were initially to be armed with the armor-piercing only. Prior to their first engagement at Kursk, each Ferdinand was supplied with 20 two-part (propellant charge and explosive round) semi-fixed high-explosive (HE) rounds. These proved to be of poor quality and prone to jamming during extraction after firing. Another issue with the two-part rounds was their time fuse, which worked well for the original anti-aircraft use. On the Ferdinand, however, the significant forces exerted on the time fuse due to the high acceleration in the barrel could lead to premature explosions. These would later be replaced with better-designed rounds. The range of the HE rounds was around 5.4 km.

Regarding the armor-piercing (AP) rounds, there was a better choice, with a few different types available. These included the standard Pzgr.39-1 and the improved Pzgr.39/43 AP, which had a range of 4 km. The Pzgr. Patr 40 was a tungsten-cored armor-piercing shell with the same range of 4 km. Lastly, the Gr.Patr 39 H1 and Gr.Patr 39/43 H1 hollow charge rounds were available, which had a range of around 3 km.

When using the standard AP round, the gun could penetrate 182 mm of armor sloped at 30° at a range of 500 m. At 1,000 m this dropped to 167 mm, and at 2,000 m to 139 mm. The tungsten round, at the same ranges and angles, could penetrate 226 mm, 162 mm and 136 mm. As the Germans had problems with the supply of tungsten, this round was rarely used. The hollow charge round could penetrate 90 mm of armor inclined at 30° at any range. These hollow charge rounds were not well known for their precision and, when the target was hit, there was a good chance that the round would misfire.

The Ferdinands were equipped with a two-part, rectangular-shaped shield, which was bolted on the front part of the gun mantlet. Its purpose was to protect the main gun from any small-caliber rounds or shrapnel. Not all vehicles received these from the start, some were added later on (just prior to their combat use), while some never received them. During the later part of the Kursk Offensive, a number of crews improvised some by completely redesigning the gun shields, which could now be much easier replaced. After 1944, these became standard equipment and replaced the earlier design.

This vehicle is lacking the gun mantlet protective shield. Source: Worldwarphotos.com

This Ferdinand has the initial production gun mantlet protective shield, which proved too difficult to be taken off and would be replaced. Source: Warspot.ru

Later modified 1944 Ferdinand, with the shield initially used as an improvisation but that later saw widespread use. Source: Panzernet.ne

For protection against infantry attacks, the Ferdinand was equipped with an MG 34 machine gun with 600 rounds of ammunition that was stored inside the vehicle. In addition, there were two 9 mm MP 38/40 submachine guns.

Organization

The Oberkommando des Heeres OKH (German High Command) initially planned to form three Schwere Sturmgeschütz Abteilung – StuGAbt (Heavy Assault Gun Battalion). These included the 190th StuGAbt, which was to be reformed and renamed into the 654th Assault Gun Battalion, the 197th, renamed into the 653rd Assault Gun Battalion, and the newly formed 600th Assault Gun Battalion. Each was to be equipped with 30 vehicles divided into three 9 vehicle strong batteries. The remaining 3 vehicles were to be allocated to a HQ battery. Once ready on the front, each battery was to be separated from the main unit and used more as mobile close artillery support.

In March 1943, the organization and employment concepts were completely reworked. This was done by the General Inspector of the Armored Troops, General Heinz Guderian. He first reallocated the Ferdinands from the Sturmartillerie to the Panzerwaffe. This change also affected the unit organization and tactical use. The Ferdinands would be allocated to two battalions, the 653rd and 654th schwere (Heeres) Panzerjäger Abteilung – sPzJagAbt (Heavy Tank Destroyer Battalion). These were, in turn, part of the 656th schwere Panzerjäger Regiment (Heavy Tank Destroyer Regiment). This unit, besides the two Ferdinand-equipped units, also had a third, Sturmpanzer Abteilung 216 (216th Tank Assault Battalion), equipped with 45 Sturmpanzer IV heavy assault vehicles (based on the Panzer IV chassis). Each battalion was divided into three companies, each equipped with 14 vehicles (further divided into three platoons each, with 4 vehicles and two command vehicles), plus a Battalion HQ with three vehicles, for a total 45 per battalion. Additional vehicles based on the Panzer II and III, and Sd.Kfz 250/5 and 251/8 half-tracks were given to these units, either as command vehicles, close support, medical support, or for artillery observation. The change in tactical doctrine referred to the concentration of all available vehicles while attacking designated targets instead of dividing them into smaller units.

The Regiment HQ was officially formed on 8th June 1943, mainly from reserve cadres of the 35th Panzer Regiment. Oberstleutnant Ernst Baron von Jungenfeld was chosen as the commander of this Regiment. The command of the 653rd Battalion was given to Major Steinwachs, that of the 654th Battalion to Hauptmann Karl-Heinz Noak, and that of the 216th Battalion to Major Bruno Kahl. The 653rd Battalion, during its reorganization, was stationed at Neusiedl-am-See in Austria and the 654th in Rouen in France. By late May, the 653rd Battalion was visited by Heinz Guderian, who observed the unit during training exercises. He was quite impressed with how the vehicles managed to get over 40 km to their base without any mechanical breakdowns.

Camouflage

When they left the German factories, the Ferdinands were painted in the standard Dunkelgelb (dark yellow). They also had three Balken Kreuzen painted on the hull sides and to the rear. Once on the front, the Ferdinands crews would use their ‘artistic soul’ to paint their own vehicles to try to blend as well as possible with the surroundings (being a huge vehicle, this was not an easy task).

Each Battalion used different types of camouflages. The 653rd employed large blotches of green paint applied with either brushes or sprayed. These were either round in shape or with more straight lines. A few vehicles had three-color schemes: a combination of green with brown outlines. The 654th crews did a number of different designs mostly using dark yellow and green combinations.

Vehicles from 653rd were painted with large blotches of green paint applied with either brushes or sprayed. Also, note the Balken Kreuzen painted on the hull side and to the rear. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.I

A 654th sPzJagAbt Ferdinand with a different camouflage. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.I

Markings and emblems

Once these vehicles were given to the 656th Regiment, they also received their proper unit markings. The marking system employed on the Ferdinands consisted of the standard three-digit numbers, but it was quite complicated. The 653rd and 654th Battalions were designated as the I and II Battalion of the 656th Regiment. These were then divided into the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Companies of the I Battalion and the 5th, 6th, and 7th of the II Battalion. As mentioned earlier, each of these companies had 14 vehicles plus a Battalion HQ unit with 3 vehicles. Each company was divided into 3 Platoons, each with 4 vehicles, plus a Company HQ with 2 vehicles. It was common for the Germans to name the Company HQ as the 1st Platoon.

Of the three-digit markings, the first number represented the Company number. The number 4 was not used. The middle number indicated the Platoon. The Company HQ, which was listed as the 1st Platoon, would be marked as ‘0’. This also affected the markings of the remaining Platoons, as their number is actually smaller by one. For example, the 3rd Platoon would actually have the 2 number designation instead of 3. The last digit was used to designate individual vehicles in the Platoon. The odd numbers were used to mark the section commanders in each Platoon. As the Company HQ only had two vehicles, they were just marked as 1 or 2.

As an example, the vehicle with the number ‘721’ belonged to the 654th Battalion’s 7th Company, 3rd Platoon, 1st section command vehicle.

The smaller Battalion HQ, which had only 3 vehicles, was marked differently. It also consisted of a three-digit number, but the difference is that the first number represented the Battalion and was marked with a Roman numeral. The 653rd was marked as ‘I’ and the 654th as ‘II’. Being command vehicles, the second digit was 0, followed by the vehicle number from 1 to 3. For example, the IO3 was the 653rd Battalion HQ’s 3rd vehicle.

The two Battalions, while using the same three-digit system, painted these numbers differently. The ones on vehicles of the 653rd were white with black outlines, while the 654th used completely white numbers. These were painted on the vehicles’ sides and on the rear.

While it was somewhat common among the German armored units to have some unit emblems, this was not the case for the 656th Regiment. The 653rd Battalion simply adopted its original German Army eagle (from back when it was known as the 197th Assault Gun Battalion), but with the wings folded down and standing on two crossed guns.

The 653rd Battalion unit emblem. Source: K. Münch Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II

During the Kursk Offensive, the 653rd Battalion used an identification symbol that consisted of two smaller squares and a larger rectangle. The larger rectangle represented the Company, being marked with different colors. White was used for the 1st, yellow for the 2nd, and red for the 3rd Company. The exception was the 1st Company’s 3rd platoon, which had a red stripe, and the 4th Platoon, which had a red cross. The small square indicated the platoon in question, except for the 1st Platoon, which had none. The 2nd was indicated with the same rectangle color, the 3rd with no color but with white outline, and the 4th Platoon with Company color with white outline.

A completely blown up casemate due to an internal explosion. Note the rear positioned large 653rd Battalion identification symbol Source: Panzernet.net

Illustration of the 653rd Battalion’s identification symbols. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II

The 654th Battalion used less elaborate markings. These consisted of black rectangles with a white letter ‘N’, the initials of the unit commander, Karl Heinz Noak. The Company number would be added after the N, like N1, N2, and N3. In the case of the HQ, the letters ‘St’ (Stab – Command) would be added instead of the numbers. These were painted either on the glacis or left fender and on the rear left corner of the casemate. When this unit was later disbanded, all its surviving vehicles were given to the 653rd Battalion. These then received the 653rd’s markings and, in time, the camouflage scheme. When the first snow began to fall, all surviving Ferdinands received whitewash paint covering the whole vehicle, including the markings.

During the winter of 1943, all surviving Ferdinands received whitewash paint which covered all markings on them. Source: https://mikesresearch.com/2020/05/24/ferdinands-elefants-on-the-eastern-front/

The 656th Regiment officially received its own emblem, containing a shield with the silhouette of an exploding tank. Under the tank, the word ’Pampas’ was added. The precise meaning was sadly lost.

The 656th Regiment’s emblems, with the Pampas word written at the bottom. Different colors represented different Companies of the unit. https://mikesresearch.com/2020/05/24/ferdinands-elefants-on-the-eastern-front/

New marking and camouflage

The vehicles used in Italy in 1944 were painted in the same dark yellow and green combination. After 13th June, they received a new ‘U’ Gothic letter, usually at the rear end of the casemate. The precise meaning of this letter is not documented. Tactical markings were not used on the majority of the Elefants sent to Italy. A few vehicles would receive the three-digit numbers painted in white.

The vehicles that were not sent to Italy received a new emblem, the Sword of the Nibelungs which emerges from the Danube’s waves. It was usually painted in front and to the rear of the casemate, but some also had these painted on the hull sides.

The Sword of the Nibelungs emblem is visible in the right corner of the casemate. Source: Pinterest

An illustration of the Sword of the Nibelungs emblem with the company markings. Source: http://panzerserra.blogspot.com/2014/05/bergepanther-mit-aufgesetztem-pzkpfw-iv.html

Service

Baptism of fire at Kursk

The 656th Regiment was transported to the Eastern Front during June 1943 for the upcoming German offensive against the Soviet Kursk Salient, Operation Citadel. The main base of operation for this Regiment was the Smiyevka train station, some 25 km south of Orel. Once the vehicles were unloaded, they were driven to their designated area of assembly. In the case of the 653rd Battalion, the 1st Company was at Kuliki, the 2nd at Gostinovo and the 3rd Company at Davidovo. By the end of June, the entirety of the 656th Regiment was at its designated initial positions. The few days before the offensive were used for training and for the vehicle commanders to get familiar with the surrounding terrain. Of the three Battalions, only the 653rd was fully equipped with 45 vehicles. The 654th had 44 and the 216th had 42 vehicles (but many sources disagree on the exact numbers).

The first Ferdinands arrive in the East. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info

As the Ferdinands were intended to spearhead the German advance, they were to be reinforced with a remote-controlled tank company (equipped with Borgward B.IV Sd.Kfz.301) for cleaning minefields. These small vehicles were equipped with detachable explosive charges designed to detonate mines in a wide area. They could be either remotely controlled or driven by a human driver.

The small Borgward B.IV. Source: pinterest

The 656th Regiment was part of the XXXXI Panzer Korps under the command of General Harpe. Its order of battle during the initial stages of the Kursk Offensive was as follows: The 653rd Battalion was to support the attack of the 86th and 292nd Infantry Divisions, while the 654th Battalion supported the 78th Infantry Division. The 216th Brigade was to follow up in the second wave, together with the 177th and 244th StuG Brigades. Their objective was a heavily fortified Soviet position around the Malo-Archangelsk and Olchovatka area, with its key position around Hill 257.7 (later known as Panzer or Tank Hill).

Prior to the start of the offensive, the Ferdinands were camouflaged to avoid Soviet aerial reconnaissance. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info

The attack on the first day by the 653rd Battalion pierced the first Soviet defenses and reached its target, destroying some 26 T-34 tanks and dozens of anti-tank guns in the process. Many of its Ferdinands were temporarily put out of action due to extensive Soviet minefields, which spanned extensive areas. To increase the lethality of their mines, the Soviets coupled them to artillery shells or even aircraft bombs. While they usually just blew up parts of the suspension, some were so strong that they would damage the hull, which could not be repaired on the front. The anti-mine auxiliary unit did its best to clear the minefields, but lost many of its vehicles in the process. The Soviet artillery also made mine clearing operations difficult. Places that were clear of mines and marked as such were usually shelled by the Soviet artillery. The advancing Ferdinand crews would lose sight of the clear paths and accidentally run into minefields that were not cleared. In total, on the first day, the 653rd Battalion lost 33 vehicles to mines. While most required only minimal repair works, their recovery proved to be difficult. In order to move one Ferdinand, at least 5 heavy Sd.Kfz.9 half tracks were needed. Being unprotected, they often fell victim to Soviet artillery fire trying to prevent recovery of these vehicles. The 653rd Battalion would receive two new Bergepanthers (based on the Panther tank chassis), but even these proved to be inadequate. During the night, Soviet demolition teams would blow up any abandoned Ferdinands they could get to.

A destroyed Soviet anti-tank gun, claimed by the Ferdinands. Source: K. Münch Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II

The 654th Battalion, while advancing toward its objectives, Hill 238.1 and 253.5, also came across many minefields. Thanks to the remote controlled vehicles, clear roads were established with the loss of 10 of the Borgwards. Still, this was far from enough, leading to the loss of a large number of the 654th Battalion’s vehicles being damaged.

In a memorandum dated from 17th July 1943, Heinz Guderian described the 653rd Battalion’s combat operation. “….The very heavy artillery barrage (on the first day, 100 heavy and 172 light guns, 386 rocket launchers, and countless grenade launchers) smashed the attack by our infantry. The Ferdinands and Strumpanzers were not able to push their attack in the depths of the enemy positions, as the infantry had been halted. Thus, the tanks had to stop in the middle of the battlefield, attracting concentrated artillery fire. The enemy artillery always found time to regroup and to reinforce. The missing secondary armament on the tanks negatively affected the tanks in combat. Subsequently, losses were high”.

The experience of the Ferdinand crews is partly shown in the report to Generalmajor Hartmann written by Unteroffizier Böhm and dated from the 19th July 1943.

“…. On the first day of combat, we successfully defeated bunkers, infantry, artillery and anti-tank positions. Our guns were under artillery barrages for three hours and still maintained their ability to fire! Several [enemy] tanks were destroyed during the first night, and others fled. Artillery and anti-tank crews fled before our guns after we fired upon them repeatedly. In addition to many batteries, anti-tank guns and bunkers, our battalion destroyed 120 tanks during the first round of fighting. We suffered 60 casualties during the first few days, mostly from mines. ….. We also had bad luck. It was at the rail embankment when a Panzer III on the other side received a direct hit and flew through the air, landing on the front part of the Ferdinand. Wrecking the tube, aiming device and engine grating. …. We were more successful during the second operation defending east of Orel. Only two total losses. One gun under Leutnant Tariete destroyed 22 tanks in one engagement. The total number of tanks destroyed is high and the Ferdinand contributed substantially to the defence, just as with the penetration. One gun commander destroyed seven of nine American built-tanks that approached him. …… The Ferdinand has proved itself. They were decisive here, and we cannot go against the mass of enemy tanks today without a weapon of this type.”

On 8th July, a group of 4 Ferdinands and 20 Tigers were advancing toward the Soviet line. On the other side, some twelve SU-152’s under the command of Major Sankovsky were waiting in ambush. Once the German vehicles came to a distance of 500 m, the Soviet vehicles opened fire. In the following engagement, the range was even more reduced, just 300 m, where the Tigers suffered under the SU-152’s heavy large caliber rounds. The Ferdinands proved more resilient but after numerous hits they too would fall victims to the 152 mm guns at close range. At the end of this engagement, the Germans lost four (or three, depending on the source) Ferdinands and 8 Tigers, inflicting no losses on the Soviets.

By 11th July, some 19 Ferdinands were reported as complete losses. Of these, four vehicles were burned out due to engine accidents. The remaining were mostly destroyed by enemy artillery fire, which hit the less protected engine compartment top. In addition, some 40 vehicles were temporarily out of action and needed repairs. Half of those were brought back to action by 11th July.

On 14th July, any further salvage operations were abandoned and, instead, the surviving vehicles of the 653rd Battalion were redirected to support the German attempts to relieve the 36th Panzergrenadier Division, which was surrounded by nearly 400 tanks of the Soviet 3rd Tank Army. The Ferdinands, under the command of Lt. Heinrich Teriete, managed to drive them back, despite the small German armored numbers. Thanks to well-selected firing positions and the poor enemy reconnaissance, the Ferdinands took advantage of the 8.8 cm gun’s long-range firepower. During this engagement, Lt. Heinrich Teriete himself claimed to have destroyed 22 Soviet tanks, for which he would be awarded a Knight Cross later on. During the same day, some 60 Ferdinands (34 from the 653rd and 26 from the 654th Battalion) took defensive positions around the Shelyaburg-Tsarevka area.

During the period between 14th and 17th July, the German units at Kursk were faced with rapid Soviet counter-attacks. The 653rd and 654th Battalions, despite losses and mechanical breakdowns, participated in German defensive operations south of Orel. Their mission was to defend the heavily contested Orel-Kursk railway line. The already poor mechanical reliability of most Ferdinands was further worsened by constant skirmishes with the Soviets. The Regiment commander, Jungenfeld, reported his unit’s poor shape to the 2nd Army (elements of the 9th Army, including the two Ferdinand Battalions, were previously sent to assist this Army) in a report dated 24th July 1943.

“.. The Regiment has been permanently in combat since 5 July… The Ferdinand, as well as the Sturmpanzer, suffered numerous technical problems. Initially, it was planned to withdraw the tanks for 2-3 days after a 4-5 day commitment to undergo maintenance and repair work. This was not possible… All tanks now need an overhaul requiring 14 to 20 days.. I herewith report to the 2nd Army that, within a short time, the regiment will no longer be combat ready…”

At the end of July, due to constant Soviet pressure, it was decided by the 2nd Army that Orel had to be abandoned. At the start of August, the 653rd Battalion had 12 Ferdinands ready for action, some 17 in repair and 16 were reported as complete losses. The 654th Battalion, on the same day, had 13 operational, 6 in repair and 26 complete losses.

There was an interesting and somewhat unusual (to say at least) situation where a Ferdinand was lost, being hit by a ‘flying’ Panzer III. The strange situation occurred when a remote-controlled mine clearing vehicle was hit by Soviet artillery fire, detonating its 350 kg explosive charge. The following explosion threw into the sky many parts (including the chassis) of a nearby Panzer III command vehicle. A part of the chassis hit the engine compartment of a Ferdinand, setting it on fire.

The destroyed Panzer III that hit and heavily damaged the nearby Ferdinand vehicle. Source: K. Münch Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II

While the Soviets managed to either destroy or damage many Ferdinands, a few were captured in relatively good order. This particular vehicle (chassis number 150061) belonged to the 3rd Company of the 653rd Battalion. Source: Panzernet.net

Another captured example, belonging to the 1st Company of the 654th Battalion. While the burnt-down vehicle in the background was used as a firing practice target, the vehicle at the forefront has been preserved to this day. Source: Panzernet.net

A Ferdinand from the 653rd Battalion near Karachev. Source: Panzernet.net

A damaged Ferdinand from the 654th Battalion. While the frontal armor was almost immune to enemy fire, the sides were still vulnerable. Source: Panzernet.net

The ferocity of the fighting is evident on this vehicle, which received dozens of hits, but all failed to penetrate its armor. Source:T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer

The T-34, despite its angled armor, was vulnerable to Ferdinand’s 8.8 cm gun. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer

After Kursk

By mid-August 1943, the two Ferdinand Battalions were being pulled out of Orel to the rear for recuperation and much-needed repairs. While Ferdinand achieved great success in destroying enemy armor, many Ferdinands, which were irreplaceable, were lost. On 23rd August, all surviving vehicles from the 654th were given to the 653rd Battalion. The 654th Battalion was sent to Orleans in France for recuperation and refitting with the new Jagdpanther and Jagdpanzer IV.

Following this, the 653rd Battalion was pulled back from the front line and stationed at the Dnepropetrovsk industrial center. The damage on some vehicles was such that even this center lacked proper tooling and equipment for the job. Of 54 surviving vehicles, four could not be repaired. Of the remaining 50 vehicles, only 10 to 15 (depending on the source) were combat ready by mid-September. These, together with over 10 Sturmpanzer IVs, were used to form a Sinsatzgruppe (task force) and placed under command of Hauptman Baumunk. This group received orders to divide into two smaller units, with one was tasked with heading toward Sinelnikovo and the second to Pavlograd by rail. While the Soviets held part of the railway line, after a brief engagement, they retreated.

The Ferdinands would mostly be stationed in this area when, in late September, the unit was evacuated towards Zaporozhye. In early August, during a defensive operation at Krivoy Rog, the Ferdinands claimed to have destroyed 21 enemy tanks and 23 anti-tank guns.

On 10th November 1943, the Ferdinands were repositioned from Zaporozhye to positions south of Nikopol. The German positions at Nikopol were well defended and supported by the 24th Panzer Division, to which the Ferdinand Company was attached to. On 20th November, the Soviets managed to make an opening in the German defensive line, rushing in with large numbers of tanks in an attempt to exploit their breakthrough. This formation was successfully intercepted by the 24th Panzer Division and the Ferdinands.

A Ferdinand during the battle around Nikopol in November 1943. Source: Pinteres

At the end of November, during the battles around Kochasovka and Miropol, the Ferdinands inflicted great damage on the Soviets, claiming 54 tanks. Lt. Franz Kretschmer’s vehicle alone destroyed some 21 tanks. On the following day, the 653rd Battalion’s situation became untenable, having only 4 fully operational vehicles available. Besides these, of the 42 vehicles, some 8 needed some minor repairs, and the remaining needed major overhauls. The Battalion received orders to be transported to Sankt-Pölten on 10th December 1943. The withdrawal started six day later, but due to Soviet activity, this withdrawal lasted up to 10th January 1944.

In a German report dated from the 7th August 1943, the Ferdinands were credited with the destruction of 502 enemy tanks, of which 320 were achieved by the 653rd Battalion alone. An additional 100 artillery and 200 anti-tank guns destroyed were also reported by the German Army. Three months later, another report stated that they had destroyed 582 tanks, 3 self-propelled guns, 3 armored cars, 477 (or 377 depending on the source) anti-tank guns, 133 artillery guns, 103 anti-tank rifles, and 3 aircraft! It is not clear if these numbers correspond to reality or are just inflated propaganda numbers.

German post-combat analysis

Following Operation Citadel, the German after-action reports mended the overall performance of the Ferdinand vehicles. The most praised asset of the Ferdinand were its excellent anti-tank capabilities, demonstrated by the sheer number of destroyed tanks claimed. It had good accuracy, a long range and possessed great armor piercing capabilities. The more heavily protected Soviet KV-1 tanks could be effectively destroyed at ranges of 2 km. On average, 2 to 3 rounds were enough to completely destroy enemy tanks.

The ammunition, on the other hand, proved to be problematic, most noticeably in the case of the high-explosive rounds. The problem was mainly regarding the poor quality of the ammunition casing, which often led to the clogging of the gun chamber. The loaders were often forced to carry additional improvised equipment to try to eject the stuck spent rounds.

Another great issue was the lack of a machine gun mount that could be used for self-defence against enemy infantry attacks. While the crew had their own personal weapons and an MG 34 machine gun stored inside, these could not always be put to use against enemy infantry. There were four pistol ports, two on the sides and two to the rear, but none to the front. Some Ferdinand crews improvised by using their MG 34 machine gun to fire through the main gun barrel. The gun elevation and traverse were used to direct the firing arc of this machine gun.

Many crews used spent cases to make makeshift mounts to provide a more stable machine gun firing platform, in order to avoid damaging the rifling of the gun. Installing a machine gun mount on top of the armored casemate was also attempted but proved to be unpopular as the operator had to be exposed to enemy return fire and fragments. Installing an infantry platform to the rear of the casemate was tested. However, the supporting infantry riding on this were easy targets for enemy gunners, so this idea was shortly abandoned. To somewhat resolve this issue, the Ferdinand units were reinforced with 12 Panzer III tanks that were to act as a screen against enemy infantry and soft targets.

The armor protection was deemed sufficient. During the battle for Kursk, there were no reports of the front armor being penetrated. There were cases of the side armor being pierced by 76.2 cm rounds at closer ranges. While the front armor protection of the casemate was more or less invincible, at that time, it had one major issue. Enemy rounds or artillery fragments could ricochet into the insufficiently protected engine top cover. This would cause minor to significant damage to the engine, cooling system or fuel lines, to name a few. A number of vehicles were either immobilized or lost this way. For this reason, it was later requested to add 20 to 30 mm additional armor protection atop the engine compartment.

The cooling system was not up to the task, as there were cases of the engine compartment catching fire due to the engine overheating. At least one vehicle was completely lost during a recovery operation when it caught fire due to the engine overheating itself.

The Ferdinand was noted by its crews to lack sufficient visibility and had many blind spots and poor visibility in general. Radio equipment was often jammed due to Ferdinand’s electrical equipment. The temperature inside the casemate was high and there were cases of the signal flare ammunition blowing up. Despite its weight, the Ferdinand could relatively easily cross a 2.6 m wide trench. It also possessed a good climbing ability. However, their cross-country speed was noted to be only around 10 km/h.

Interestingly, the new gasoline-electric power train performed relatively well. Its power output was sometimes problematic, and some vehicles caught fire due to electric short-circuits. The suspension was deemed ineffective and prone to malfunctions. The narrow tracks, together with the weight, caused many vehicles to be bogged down. The lack of a proper recovery vehicle was also noted, with many vehicles having to be blown up because they could not be recovered.

Despite the long list of negative issues with Ferdinand, they showed that a well-protected and armed anti-tank vehicle had merits. They offered many advantages over the poorly armored and improvised anti-tank vehicles already in service (for example, the Marder series).

Back to Germany

Following the Eastern campaign, all surviving Ferdinands were brought back to Nibelungenwerke for a major overhaul. These included the 653rd Battalion’s 42 vehicles and a smaller number of vehicles that were recovered earlier during the Kursk operation and were sent back to Germany. In addition, the two Alkett prototypes were also sent to Nibelungenwerke.

An important note here, these vehicles were still named Ferdinands at this time. The Elefant designation was only implemented from February (or May) 1944 on. As mentioned earlier, the Elefant designation was never used by the Germans to separate the improved form from the initially produced vehicles. It was more a fulfillment of Hitler’s request to change the names of many vehicles to more aggressive animal names. As the Elefant designation was becoming official with the Germans during 1944, this article will use this name from this point onward.

Assembled vehicles awaiting repairs at Nibelungenwerke. Source; www.worldwarphotos.com

As these were being gathered at Nibelungenwerke, the workers and engineers set on repairing any major damage, but they were also working hard to address a number of noted shortcomings of the Elefant. This was mainly with regard to visibility, mobility, and anti-infantry weaponry. As this was not an easy task to achieve, the Vienna Arsenal was also included in the rebuild program. It is there that some 6 completely burned-out Elefants were brought back to life.

Modifications

In order to improve mobility, the Elefants were provided with wider tracks. For better visibility, in what was surprisingly not issued on the first production vehicles, the improved Elefant received a commander’s cupola very similar to that of the StuG III. This cupola had seven periscopes which provided the commander with a good all-around view. The commander’s hatch also had a small opening for the use of a periscope if needed, without exposing himself to enemy fire. The two small vision ports located on the superstructure’s front sides were welded shut. The driver’s periscope cover was also slightly improved by adding a plate to protect from the sun. A few vehicles were equipped with two-part round-shaped rear casemate doors instead of the single-piece one regularly used.

This vehicle was turned over by an aircraft bomb explosion. Thanks to this, we have a good view of the improved top. Source: T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II

Close-up view of the new commander’s cupola. Source; T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroye

Four vehicles received the new two-part hatches. The angled part on top of the doors was used for water drainage. Source: https://mikesresearch.com/2020/05/24/ferdinands-elefants-on-the-eastern-front/

Drawing of the two-part hatch. Source: https://mikesresearch.com/2020/05/24/ferdinands-elefants-on-the-eastern-front/

Visually, the most obvious change was the introduction of a machine gun ball mount (Kugelblende 100 or 80, depending on the source) placed on the right side of the superstructure. It was protected by an additional 100 mm of armored cover, with a small opening for the machine gun. This mount had an elevation of -10° to + 15° and a traverse of 5° in both directions. It was to be operated by the radio operator. The machine gun operator was provided with a 1.8x KFZ 2 optical sight.

The most obvious improvement was the introduction of the ball-mounted machine gun. Source: Panzernet

Why the machine gun mount was never installed in the original vehicles is not clear in the sources. There are a few different possibilities. While the original VK45.01(P) had a ball-mounted machine gun, this was not carried over to the later Ferdinand vehicles. One source gives information that this was done simply as the Krupp engineers lacked the men and skill to make an opening in the 200 mm thick plate. This explanation is somewhat problematic, because there were actually two 100 mm thick plates and that the German engineers already had some experience making the holes necessary for the installation of the ball mount. The second possible reason includes Alkett’s original proposal to mount additional angled armor plates in front of the vehicle. Adding a ball mount machine gun position would be much more difficult to achieve in this case. The main reason was probably that Nibelungenwerke’s engineers were forced to speed up the production and did not have the time nor tools to implement it. Also, the Ferdinand was initially intended to be used as an assault gun (like the StuG III), which themselves lacked a machine gun. The protection against enemy infantry was to be provided by the supporting infantry. Whatever the case may be, from early 1944 onward, the Elefant had better means of fighting off infantry attacks from the front.

The new machine gun ball mount was added starting from early 1944 on . Source: Ledwoch Ferdinand/Elefant

The lower hull armor of the driver’s compartment was increased by an additional 30 mm thick armor plate. The engine compartment top cover was slightly improved to provide better engine protection. The worn out engines were also replaced with brand new Maybach HL 120 models. Additional protection included Zimmerit anti-magnetic paste that was applied to roughly half the height of the vehicle.

The gun shield, previously more of a field modification, was now being used as standard. It was much easier to replace when damaged or during the change of the gun barrel. The ammunition load was increased to 55 rounds. The troublesome crew communication system was improved. With all these modifications, the overall weight of the vehicle rose to 70 tonnes.

The changes also included the appointment of a new 656th Regiment unit commander. The previous commander, Baron von Jungenfeld, was promoted to Colonel. In his place, Oberst Richard Schmitgen was appointed. Another change concluded the 656th Regiment’s fate. While on paper it still existed, in reality, its units were detached and sent to Italy in 1944, after which the 656th Regiment was never actually used at full regimental strength.

The overall repair process lasted from January to April (or March depending on the sources) 1944, with the first vehicles being combat ready by February 1944. During this time, some 47 vehicles and the 2 prototypes would be improved to the new standard.

Elefants in Italy

Following the Allied invasion of Italy in 1943 and, later, the American amphibious landing at Anzio in January 1944, the German High Command was forced to rapidly send more and more troops and equipment there. For this reason, elements of the 656th Regiment were also to be sent there. This included the 216th Assault Tank Battalion and at least one Elefant Company. Not many Elefants could be spared, as a large number of them were still in Nibelungenwerke’s workshop waiting to be repaired and modified. On 15th February 1944, the 653rd Battalion’s 1st Company, with 11 vehicles and one recovery vehicle under the command of Helmut Ulbrich, was ready to be transported to Italy. Initially, it was planned to send 14 vehicles, but the last three could not be repaired in time due to a lack of spare parts.

Elefant in Italy, 1944. Source: www.worldwarphotos.info

All vehicles reached Rome by 24th February 1944. Once there, the 1st Company was attached to the 508th Heavy Tank Battalion equipped with Tiger tanks under the command of Major Hudel. At the end of February, under bad weather, the Elefants and Tigers were ordered to attack American positions. The Elefants were once again used in a role for which they were not designed for. This attack was to be conducted through marshes which were unsuitable for heavy vehicles. During this attack, while crossing a bridge, one Elefant was immobilized. After a number of failed recovery attempts, it was abandoned. The next day, another vehicle struck a German mine, and once again, due to the inability to tow it to safety, it was blown up by its own commander, Gustav Koss. Due to the loss of two vehicles in a short amount of time, the remaining vehicles were pulled back. They would be stationed in a more defensive role near the cities of Cisterna and Velletri for the next few months. Due to problems with the arrival of spare parts, their use after the initial action around Anzio was limited.

The second Elefant to be lost hit a mine and, as it was unable to be recovered, it was abandoned. Source: Pinterest

American sources give us some information on their engagements with the Elefants around Cisterna. In the report of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, while on the road to Cisterna, two M10 tank destroyers commanded by Sergeant Harry J. Ritchie and Sergeant John D. Christian came under fire from a group of Tigers and two Elefants at ranges just over 230 meters. The gunner of one M10, Corporal James F. Goldsmith later wrote.

“ Sgt Ritchie ordered me to pull into open view around the corner of the building, and from this exposed position, directed three hits onto the most exposed tank, it being about 550 yards (some 500 meters) up the road at that time, and knocked it out. We received heavy armor-piercing and high-explosive fire from the other tanks, shells barely missing our destroyer by a few feet and fragments hitting us. We were exposed for about five minutes. Sgt Ritchie ducked his head and shoulders below the turret and pulled back behind the house. When enemy fire ceased, Sgt. Ritchie had me pull out again, and from the same exposed position, directed two rounds of AP shells that hit and bounced off the front armor of the Ferdinand 250 yards (230 meters) east of us. We again received intensive fire from the enemy tanks and shells were landing so close that fragments were coming through the open turret, one slightly wounding our gunner in the head when it hit our tank and damaging the counter-balance and .50 caliber machine gun mounted on the edge of the turret. We were again exposed to enemy fire for about five minutes. He ducked into the tank and we pulled behind the house again. We continued to fight throughout the day with our damaged gun. ”

While Sergeant Ritchie’s vehicle was under fire, the second M10, commanded by Sergeant Christian, shot several rounds at the German vehicles, scoring two hits on a Tiger and two more on the Elefants. He reported that only two crew members from the hit vehicles managed to escape. Whatever damage he did to them, or whether his 76 mm gun managed to pierce the Elefant’s armor is not mentioned.

By 20th May 1944, the Elefants were mostly kept in reserve for maintenance and repairs. A few days later, the Allies made a breakthrough, so the Elefants were once more put into action. In the initial engagements, they destroyed 4 to 6 (depending on the source) enemy Shermans, with the loss of two vehicles. One had an engine malfunction and was burned down, the second was blown up by its crew when it became immobilized. Following this, the unit had to retreat back to Rome by June 1944. The enemy armor was not the only threat that the Elefants had to face. The extensive Allied air superiority caused the further loss of two more burned-down vehicles. One was hit by a P-47 bomb on 5th June, while on the Via Aurelia road. The second vehicle was lost five days later, near Orvieto.

The stream of bad luck did not end there. While crossing an old bridge, the bridge construction simply collapsed under the Elefant’s extreme weight, taking the vehicle with it. The vehicle commander was killed during this accident As there was no way to recover it, the crew had no choice but to destroy it.

At the start of July, the 1st Company of the 653rd had only 3 (or 4, depending on the source) vehicles with only 2 operational and one undergoing repairs. In addition, the unit still possessed the recovery Bergetiger (P). Though orders for the unit to pull back to Germany were given on 26th June, frontline developments prevented this from happening. The few Ferdinands would see more combat action up to early August when they were finally pulled out to the Vienna Arsenal. By that time, only three (or two, depending on the source) combat vehicles and the recovery vehicle survived.

Most Elefants that were sent to Italy were blown up by their own crews to avoid capture. Source: Vol.2 Ferdinand near Rome

Back to the East

Despite some misconceptions that the Elefant’s story ended in Italy, this was not the case. Those vehicles that were not involved in Italy were actually being prepared to once again face the Soviets. The 653rd Battalion was now under command by Rudolf Grillenberger, while the 2nd Company was commanded by Werner Salamon and the 3rd Company by Bernhard Konnak.

An Elefant and some of its crew in Poland, at Rabka, in early 1944. Source; T. Melleman Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II

While the German Army planned to send the Elefants to the East in March 1944, this was not possible. By late February, only 8 vehicles were fully operational, while the remaining were still under repair. Among other reasons, shortages of spare materials, workforce, and a lack of electricity further delayed the completion of the remaining vehicles. Delays were also caused by a lack of sufficient supply of soft-skinned vehicles.

On 8th April 1944, the Battalion reached Brzezany and was attached to the 9th SS Panzer Division Hohenstaufen by mid-April. The 653rd Battalion had 30 operational Elefants, 2 Bergetiger (P), 1 Bergepanther and 2 Panzer III ammunition carriers. Additionally, one Elefant was still in Austria and was not available due to needing repairs. At this time, the problem with the acquisition of soft-skinned vehicles was not solved. In essence, the necessary ammunition, fuel, or supply operations could not be carried out.

The SS Panzer Division and the supporting units, including the Elefants, were intended to be used as a relief force for the trapped German units near Tarnopol. The bad weather caused huge logistical problems and greatly slowed down the 653rd Battalion’s attack, which led to the cancellation of an attack on the city of Siemakovce. On 24th April, another attack on Siemakovce was attempted. An advance unit consisting of German infantry and 9 Elefants managed to capture the city after two days of fighting. The next day, they crossed the Strype River and made a defensive line. After an engagement with the Soviets, the 2nd Company had two damaged vehicles, which were recovered, but the mechanics were not able to immediately repair them. Ultimately, the Germans failed their objective and were forced to retreat due to extensive Soviet attacks. The 2nd Company lost two more vehicles. Like many times before, they had to be blown up, being unable to be recovered. By late April, the 2nd Company was attacking Soviet positions at Siemienkowicz, but due to bad terrain, most vehicles were left temporarily disabled due to their engines being overheated.

By May 1944, the mechanical situation of all surviving Elefants was dire. Due to a lack of sufficient supply vehicles, the recovery vehicles had to be used in this role. Despite many tank destroyers being temporarily out of action due to a lack of much-needed repairs, the Elefants showed that they were still effective tank killers. The Elefant also gained a great reputation among the Russian but also the German ranks, but not all were impressed. In his memoirs, a Nashorn tank destroyer driver (from the 88th Heavy Anti-Tank Battalion), Gefreiter Hoffmann, wrote.

“I never saw this Porsche-thing. Everybody on the front was talking of it, calling it a wonder-weapon, being better than the Tiger … My boss was very proud of our Hornisse with its long gun, we were pretty successful. He scoffed at this giant vehicle: “Too heavy to move, too clumsy to steer, what a dreck”, he said”

On 11th May, the Battalion was repositioned to Kozova and Zborev, which were only 15 km from their positions. The sources are not clear about the precise number of vehicles at this point. While T. Melleman (Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II) states that few vehicles had to be blown up, author T. Anderson (Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer), on the other hand, stated that by June, no complete loss was reported.

After this operation, the Battalion was pulled back to a resting position near Brzhezhany. During this time, this unit received at least 4 Elefants which had the new rear casemate two-piece hatches. It was also supplemented with some bizarre field modifications based on the Bergepanther and the Soviet T-34 tanks.

In mid-July 1944, the Soviets launched a huge offensive against the German North Ukraine Army. The Germans responded by sending the 653rd Battalion to this area. The Elefants were attached to the Eingreiftruppe Nordukraine, in essence, a ready deployment force. This mixed unit managed to achieve success against the enemy armor. However, the Soviets managed to break through other points of the German defense line. The deployment force and the Elefants were forced to retreat to Landeshut. On 20th July, the Soviets were trying to stop this retreat but were constantly kept at bay, with the loss of a number of Elefants in the process. These were mostly blown up by their crews, as their engines would often break down due to overheating. The 653rd Battalion would see extensive action up to 27th July, when it managed to complete its retreat thanks to its tenacious defense and the shift of the Soviet direction of attack. Heavy fighting during July cost the 653rd Battalion some 19 to 22 vehicles plus 2 recovery Bergetiger (P), the command Tiger (P), and some 4 ammunition supply tanks. While only a few were actually lost in combat, the majority had to be blown up by their crews due to a lack of fuel and breakdowns. The loss of crewmen was surprisingly low, with 19 wounded and only 5 dead.

An ISU-152 taken out by precise Elefant fire. The round hole atop the driver visor is actually the place where the 8.8 cm round penetrated the ISU’s armor. Source: T. Anderson Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer

At the start of August 1944, there were still more combat operations which cost the battalion a few more vehicles. On 4th August, the 653rd Battalion received orders to reposition to Krakow. Due to a lack of vehicles, the 3rd Company was disbanded and sent back to Germany to be armed with the new Jagdtigers. In addition, at this time, two of the surviving vehicles from Italy were used to reinforce the depleted 653rd Battalion.

One of the several Elefants that survived the retreat of July-August 1944. Source: K. Münch Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II, Stackpole Books.

In mid-December 1944, the 653rd Battalion was renamed to Heeres schwere Panzerjäger Kompanie 614 (614th Independent Tank Destroyer Company). It was then attached to the 4th Panzer Army near the Bodzentyn area on 22nd December. The 614th Company saw heavy action in combat south of Kielce, where it lost some 10 vehicles from 14th to 15th January 1945. Interestingly, even by this time, the Elefant’s front armor was almost invincible, even capable of resisting several hits from the IS-2’s 122 mm gun. By the end of January 1945, there were only four Elefants and one Bergepanther left. The unit was moved to Stahnsdorf for much-needed repairs in late February 1945. The mechanical condition of these vehicles was poor and they badly needed repairs. Luckily for them, there were still some resources available to put them back in action.

Once repaired, the unit was repositioned to Wünsdorf in April 1945. On 21st April, it was attached to Kampfgruppe Möws, which, with the 4 Elefants, was to support Kampfgruppe Ritter. During preparation for transport on rails at the Mittendorf station, one vehicle had to be left behind, as it broke down and could not be repaired. It would remain there up to 1947, before finally being towed away. The remaining three vehicles would be separated, with one left defending a position at Löpten, and the remaining two sent to defend Berlin. These took action near Karl-August Platz, where they would be captured by the Soviet Forces.

This picture is often described as the last Elefant in Berlin. Source: http://panzerserra.blogspot.com/2014/05/bergepanther-mit-aufgesetztem-pzkpfw-iv.html

Bergepanzer Ferdinand and other improvised support vehicles

Prior to their engagement on the frontline, while used for crew training, the Ferdinands did not have many mechanical breakdowns that needed towing vehicles. Even if they did break down, there were Sd.Kfz.9 vehicles available for towing to the repair workshops. The reality of frontline service, however, showed the need for a dedicated recovery vehicle. In the field, a great number of Ferdinands were immobilized. As the Germans lacked the required numbers of Sd.Kfz.9 and tank-based recovery vehicles, the damaged Ferdinands were often blown up by their crews to avoid being captured.

To somewhat resolve this issue, three available Tiger (P) chassis were to be rebuilt as Bergepanzers (recovery tank). The modification included adding a new much smaller fully enclosed casemate to the rear. In front of it, a ball-mounted 7.92 mm MG-34 machine gun was placed, with two additional pistol ports on the sides. On top of this casemate, a round hatch door was installed, while to the rear, a two-piece hatch was placed, taken from a Panzer III turret. There were also three smaller slits on the front and sides of the crew compartment. The armor thickness of these vehicles was much lighter than the Ferdinand, with 100 mm to the front. The front casemate armor was 50 mm and 30 m on the side. A boom crane was placed on top of the vehicle’s superstructure. Another change was the use of longer tracks which, with the lower weight, provided them with better overall drive.

These three were completed by August 1943 and issued to the 653rd Battalion, with one vehicle per company. They solved the lack of towing vehicles and many Ferdinands were recovered thanks to their help.

Bergepanzer Ferdinand Source: Panzernet.net

Of special note, during 1944, the 653rd Battalion’s mechanics and engineers managed to build a number of improvised vehicles based on German and also captured vehicles. One such vehicle was created using a Panzer IV turret which was welded on a Bergepanther. Another example involved installing a 2 cm Flakvierling 38 on a second Bergepanther.

Soviet vehicles were also modified, with two receiving a new open-top turret armed with 2 cm Flakvierling 38 anti-aircraft guns, while two more were modified as ammunition carriers. One rare captured KV-85 had its gun removed and was used as a recovery vehicle. Finally, the 653rd Battalion was supplied with one Tiger (P) that was used by its commander as his personal command vehicle.

A Soviet T-34 armed with the 2 cm Flakvierling 38 placed in a new turret. Source: http://beutepanzer.ru/

A few Bergepanthers were allocated to the Elefant units. Source: http://panzerserra.blogspot.com/2014/05/bergepanther-mit-aufgesetztem-pzkpfw-iv.html

At the front is the only Porsche Tiger ever used in combat. Behind it is the strange Panzer IV/Panther hybrid vehicle. Source:https://forum.warthunder.com/index.php?/topic/321507-panzer-v-ausfuhrung-d1-mit-panzer-iv-h-turm-39panzer-viv39/

The 653rd Battalion managed to capture one rare KV-85 vehicle. This vehicle had its turret removed and was used as a recovery vehicle by this unit. Source: K. Münch Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II, Stackpole Books.

Surviving vehicles

Despite the small number built, today, there are two surviving vehicles left. One restored Elefant is located at the Fort Lee U.S. Army Ordnance Museum. This particular vehicle belonged to the 653rd Battalion and was captured in Italy by the Allies. The vehicle spent some time on loan at the Bovington Tank Museum in Dorset, UK. The vehicle was displayed as part of the museum’s “Tiger Collection” display from April 2017 until January 2019, when it was returned to the United States. This display brought all the members of the Tiger family together in one place for the first time. The second vehicle is located at the Russian Patriot Park and was captured during the Battle of Kursk.

The surviving Elefant located at Fort Lee. Source www.Tank-Hunter.com

The Ferdinand at Kubinka, before being moved to Patriot Park. Source: Wiki

Conclusion

Many sources that do not go into much analysis of the Ferdinand’s state that they were a waste of resources and had a poor overall design. It is important to remember that the Germans had already built 100 Porsche Tiger chassis. A lot of resources and time had already been invested in a vehicle that was not going to be put into production. They simply had no other choice than to see proper use of these already built chassis. For the later assembly of Ferdinands, additional resources were needed. The Ferdinand was rather hastily designed, which is best seen in the lack of s commander cupola and machine gun in the hull. The engine compartment was inadequate and too cramped, which later caused problems with the engine overheating. Some of these would later be corrected. Ferdinands also required frequent repairs and maintenance, but nearly all WWII vehicles required such things to be effective in combat. The armament and the armor were some of the best for their day. The Ferdinand is also often seen as too heavy. At its 65 and later 70 tonnes, it was. While it could reach a top speed of 30 km/h, its actual cross-country speed was only 10 km/h. Thanks to their long length, they had a good climbing ability.

In combat, the Ferdinands gained an enviable reputation among the German and Soviet units for their deadly gun and strong armor. The Soviets, when engaging German tank destroyers, would often describe them as Ferdinands, even though they were usually other vehicles in the German inventory. The German propaganda machine also helped by portraying the Ferdinands as wonder weapons. Despite this, the Ferdinand’s success as a deadly tank destroyer is hard to deny. During Kursk alone, over 500 Soviet armored vehicles were claimed to have been destroyed by them. Even taking into account a 50% overclaim ratio (which is excessive), the numbers remaining are still very impressive.

In the end, the Ferdinand was a deadly tank hunter that was plagued by its rushed development and lack of numbers. While not a waste of resources, they were no wonder weapons and possessed quite a number of flaws.

Porsche’s VK45.01 prototype in 1942. It was given as a favorite before problems with the complex powerplant emerged.

Early production Ferdinand, Panzerabteilung 653, summer 1943.

653rd Panzer-Abteilung, Eastern front, winter 1943-44.

Ferdinand of the 654th Panzer-Abteilung, Kursk, summer 1943.

Ferdinand of the 654th PanzerJäger Abteilung, Kursk, Eastern front, 1943.

Sd.Kfz.184 “Elefant” of the 1st company, 653rd Schwere Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung, Anzio-Nettuno, March 1944.

Tiger (P) Elefant (late type) from the Abt.653 HQ Company, Brzherzhany, Ukraine, July 1944

Panzerjäger Tiger (P) 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71 “Ferdinand/Elefant” Sd.Kfz 184
Dimensions (L-W-H)	8.14 m x 3.38 m x 2.97 m
Total weight, battle-ready	65-70 tonnes
Crew	6 (Commander, Gunner, Two Loaders, Driver and Radio operator)
Propulsion	Two Maybach HL 120 TRM 265 hp@ 2600 rpm
Speed (road/off-road)	30 km/h, 8-10 km/h
Range (road/off-road)-fuel	150 km, 90 km
Primary Armament	8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71
Secondary Armament	One 7.92 mm M.G.34 machine guns
Elevation	-5° to +14°
Armor	20 mm – 200 mm

Source:

K. Münch (2005) Combat History of German Heavy Anti-tank unit 653 In World War II, Stackpole Books.
Terry J. G. (2004), Tanks in Detail JgdPz IV, V, VI and Hetzer, Ian Allan Publishing
T. Anderson (2015) Ferdinand and Elefant tank Destroyer, Osprey Publishing
J. Ledwoch (2003) Ferdinand/Elefant, Militaria
R. Forczyk (2016) The Dnepr 1943, Osprey Publishing
V. Failmezger (2015) American Knights, Osprey Publishing
T. Melleman (2004) Ferdinand Elefant Vol.I, Aj.Press.
T. Melleman (2005) Ferdinand Elefant Vol.II, Aj.Press.
W.J. Spielberger (1967) Panzerjager Tiger (P) Elefant, Profile Publication.
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetskog Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2004) Panzer Tracts No.9 Jagdpanzer
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2004) Panzer Tracts No.16 Bergepanzer 38 to Bergeanther
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2004) Panzer Tracts, Panzerkampfwagen VI P.
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (20) Panzer Tracts No.23 Panzer production from 1933 to 1945.
P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
A. Lüdeke (2007) Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon Books.
Lt. Co. L. Vysokoostrovsky (1943) The Field Artillery Journal

Has Own Video WW2 German Tank Destroyers

Jagdpanzer 38 (Hetzer)

German Reich (1944-1945)
Tank Destroyer – Approximately 2,827 Built

Introduction

The first issue to clear up is the fact that the Jagdpanzer 38 was not officially called the Hetzer during the Second World War. Although most official wartime documents do not use the name Hetzer, a few did. Why this nickname has been associated with this tank hunter is investigated later in the article.

As the Second World War progressed, it turned into a numbers’ game. Germany needed more armored fighting vehicles that were cheaper to build and quicker to construct. They started using hulls of captured tanks and reliable but obsolete tanks, such as the Panzer 38(t), to mount anti-tank guns and artillery howitzers. This resulted in the production of the Marder series and Nashorn anti-tank self-propelled guns. They all carried powerful guns but had thin armor, an open-top fighting compartment, and a high profile which made them easy to spot on the battlefield. They could deal out punishment, but they could not take it.

German Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter self-propelled gun (UK School of Tank Technology)

The Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter was designed to have a very low profile which made it hard to target and easy to conceal. It was only 2.10 m (6 ft 10.6 inches) high which was ideal for ambush tactics. It was armed with a powerful high velocity 75 mm Pak 39 L/48 gun that could knock-out most enemy tanks. It was cheaper and quicker to build than a Panzer IV, Panther or Tiger tank.

It was not designed to be a close combat vehicle, used at the head of an attack like a tank. It was a self-propelled anti-tank gun that was intended to be deployed on the flanks to stop counter-attacks. A pack of Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters would hide in a wood or thick hedgerow and pick off enemy tanks at long range. The sloping front armor gave the crew reasonable protection from frontal attack. So long as the driver pointed the front of the vehicle at any threat, the crew could expect to survive a hit from an enemy armor-piercing shell. The thin armor on the sides of the vehicle and at the rear meant that there was a risk of being knocked out by flank and rear attacks with armor-piercing shells. If there was a danger of being outflanked, the driver had to change to a different location quickly.

In 1944, the Panzer 38(t) tank was considered outclassed and obsolete. It had been withdrawn from frontline units. The Jagdpanzer 38 utilized the tried and tested components of the Panzer 38(t) tank on a new wider hull. This meant that the Jagdpanzer 38 was relatively reliable, as all the early mechanical problems had been overcome. Because of this, production could start earlier than usual for a new armored fighting vehicle design, as most of the factory tooling for the manufacture of the Panzer 38(t) tank was still available. Due to the gun’s limited traverse, the driver had to continually change the vehicle’s orientation or move to engage new targets. This could reveal its location.

Inspiration: The Romanian Mareșal

Among the early inspiration sources for the casemate shape and light tank accommodation, the Romanian Mareșal is often cited. It was developed by Ateliere Leonida. This vehicle was born after the Romanian encounters with the Russian T-34 in Ukraine, which radically changed their opinion on armor and especially the possibilities of sloped armor. From there a project was born, which tried to create a tank hunter that would be extremely well-protected over an existing, readily available captured light tank chassis (the T-60), while keeping the weight down. It was achieved by giving the hull an extremely sloped, all-side armor. This resulted in the 50 mm (1.97 in) armor plates offering 100 mm (3.94 in) of effective protection against direct fire, which provided this small tank destroyer with the heavy tank protection level.

The Romanian Mareșal tank hunter self-propelled gun (Romanian military archives)

Six prototypes were built (M-00, M-01, M-02, M-03, M-04, M-05) between December 1942 and January 1944, but, after the 23 August coup d’etat, the plans and the remaining prototypes were seized by the Soviet army. Its main armament was a 7.5 cm (2.95 in) DT-UDR Resita Model 1943 and secondary ZB-53 7.92 mm (0.31 in) machine gun. Other guns were looked at. It was propelled by a Hotchkiss H-39 120 hp engine (10 hp/t) and transmission. It was based on a modified T-60 chassis, but with Rogifer suspension, comprising four stamped roadwheels per side. The top speed was 45 km/h (28 mph) on flat and 25 km/h (15 mph) cross-country.

The Romanian Mareșal tank hunter self-propelled gun with the glacis plate removed. (Romanian military archives)

German officers were sent to inspect the Romanian Mareșal tank hunter. They were impressed with many aspects of the overall vehicle design and at one point considered it being used in the German Army, but there were too many practical issues that would have to be rectified before entering service. The external shape and some ideas were incorporated in the later Jagdpanzer 38 design. A Romanian Army report of the inspection of the Mareșal tank hunter by the German officers was found from the Romanian military archives in Bucharest. The Romanian Army document dated April 1944 recorded the visit of two German officers: Lieutenant-Colonel Ventz from the Waffenamt (German Army Weapons Agency responsible for research and development) and Lieutenant-Colonel Haymann from German High Command OKH. Their initial reactions are also recorded in the report. This document is covered in more detail later in this article when we cover the origins of the nickname ‘Hetzer.’

A better view of the gunners position on the left of the Romanian Mareșal tank hunter self-propelled gun (Romanian military archives)

Development

On 26 November 1943, the production of Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III) assault guns at the Alkett company was severely interrupted when Allied bombers dropped a total of 1,424 tons of explosive and incendiary bombs on their Berlin factory. Due to the damage, the German Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres – OKH) investigated the possibility of starting Sturmgeschütz III production at the Böhmisch-Mährische Maschinenfabrik AG (BMM) company in Prague. Before the German invasion of Czechoslovakia, this factory used to be called Českomoravská Kolben-Daněk (ČKD) and built tanks for the Czechoslovakian Army.

On 6 December 1943, the OKH reported to Hitler that the BMM company was unable to carry out this type of production order, as it did not have the infrastructure to manufacture the 24-tonne StuG III. The factory cranes could not lift a completed vehicle. The BMM factory cranes could only lift 13 tonnes. It had spent most of the war constructing 9.8 tonnes Panzer 38(t) light tanks for the German Army.

Hitler gave orders that the BMM factory was to concentrate on producing the new lighter Sturmgeschütz. It was proposed this vehicle would have a top speed of 55 – 60 km/h (34 – 37 mph), weigh 13 tonnes, and, as a result, have thin but sloped frontal armor to keep the vehicle’s weight low. The side armor was only to be thick enough to provide protection from small arms fire and high explosive shell shrapnel.

On 17 December 1943, designs for the new vehicle based on the hull of the now obsolete Panzer 38(t) light tank and a new type of reconnaissance vehicle (Aufklärungsfahrzeug) were presented to Hitler. They were approved for production.

Development work was carried out quickly. On 8 January 1944, the drawings of the final version of the vehicle were finished. By 24 January 1944, a wooden 1:1 scale model had been built and, two days later, demonstrated to officers from the Heereswaffenamt (HWA), the Army weaponry research and development agency. The size of the fighting compartment on the wooden mock-up was shorter than on the production vehicle, and the engine compartment had a longer sloped cover. These features were changed to give the crew more room.

Wooden mock-up of the Jagdpanzer 38 with muzzle brake. (German Federal archives)

There were plans to design and mount a 7.5 cm rücklauflose main gun in the production version of Jagdpanzer 38. A rücklauflose weapon featured a gun barrel fixed to the turret or casemate, which took on the full recoil of a shot. Development of the rücklauflose gun would take too long, so in the meantime, it was decided that a 7.5 cm Pak 39 (L/48) anti-tank gun would be installed in the Jagdpanzer 38. This gun was already in production and available for use. Oberst Thomale (Colonel Thomale) ordered three prototype Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters to be built and available for trials. It took less than four months from the initial design approval to the production of the first prototype.

Production

Once the final design of the production Jagdpanzer 38 was agreed upon, BMM was awarded a contract to produce 2,000 vehicles. More were needed, so the Czechoslovakian company Škoda was also awarded a contract to build 2,000 Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters. Both factories suffered bombing raids.

The Jagdpanzer 38 production line (German Federal Archives)

Both factories were supplied with components from subcontractors. Three hundred and sixteen such companies were based in Bohemia and Moravia in the Czech Protectorate. A further one hundred and seventeen came from other occupied countries and Germany. Due to advancing Allied forces and the constant bombing, the source of parts for construction of the Jagdpanzer 38 changed repeatedly. This caused delays in supply which affected monthly production figures.

The armored hulls were produced in the steel factory in Vitkovice and by the Poldi steel mills in Kladno: both were in the Czech Protectorate. They were also supplied by two German steel-factories: Linke-Hoffman in Breslau and Ruhrstahl in Hattingen. The tracks were cast in the Czech Protectorate at the steel mills of Chomutov in north-west Bohemia and Královo Pole in Brno. The engines were manufactured by the Czech car manufacturer Praga, which also supplied the Wilson-type gearboxes.

A total of 2,827 Jagdpanzer 38 were produced by BMM and Škoda. About 2,612 were Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters, 14 were Jagdpanzer 38t Starr, 181 Bergepanzer 38 and 20 Flammpanzer.

Jagdpanzer 38 production
Month	Completed by Škoda	Completed by BMM
March 1944	0	3
April 1944	0	20
May 1944	0	50
June 1944	0	100
July 1944	10	100
August 1944	20	150
September 1944	30	190
October 1944	57	133
November 1944	89	298
December 1944	104	223
January 1945	145	289
February 1945	125	237
March 1945	153	148
April/May 1945	47	70
Total	780	2047
Note: The figures for BMM include Jagdpanzer 38 Starr and Bergepanzerwagen 38 (Source: Spielberger, Jentz and Doyle)

Jagdpanzer 38 at Škoda Works, Pilsen, Czechoslovakia. Notice the three false vision ports painted around the driver’s position to confuse Soviet anti-tank rifle snipers. (German Federal archives)

Design

Due to the limited space inside the Jagdpanzer 38 and the desire to keep the profile of the vehicle low, the gun mount was not bolted to the floor of the vehicle. Instead, a gun cradle mount was fixed to the glacis plate. The gun had to be installed off-center, to the right of the vehicle. This enabled the driver, gunner, and loader‘s positions to be on the left side of the vehicle, in line, one behind the other. The commander sat on the right side of the vehicle, at the rear of the fighting compartment, directly behind the gun, with his hatch above him. He did not have access to an armored cupola.

The gun was mounted to the right of the vehicle. This restricted its traverse to only 5° left and 11° right. To engage targets outside this narrow 16° traverse range, the whole vehicle would have to be moved. The off-center gun meant that there was too much weight on the right track and suspension. To the vehicle did not tilt towards the right, 850 kg of crew and equipment had to be placed on the left side of the gun as a counterbalance.

If all the hatches were closed, the crew had limited visibility, especially to the side and rear of the vehicle. The driver had two angled periscopes that protruded out of the upper glacis plate under a protective armored cover. The gunner was provided with a forward-looking Selbstfahrlafetten-Zielfernrohr 1a (Sfl.ZF 1a) periscope gun sight. The loader had a periscope to look out for threats on the left side of the vehicle. The roof machine gun was aimed by looking through a periscope. It could rotate 360°. The commander had access to a rearward-looking periscope. If the commander’s hatch was closed, he had no forward vision. It would only be kept closed in extreme emergencies, such as during an artillery or mortar barrage. Also available was a Scherenfernohrs 14Z (Sf.14Z) scissor telescope which poked out the top of the open roof hatch which had a magnification of 8 x 10.

Engine and Transmission

The Jagdpanzer 38 was powered by a Praga EPA AC 2800 6-cylinder 158 hp petrol engine. The Praga engine was very similar to the one used in the Panzer 38(t) tank but had been uprated. Instead of producing 129 hp, it now produced 158 hp. The engine was connected to a five-speed Praga-Wilson transmission which was in turn connected to a Planetary steering system. The vehicle had a top road speed of 40 km/h (24.9 mph). This was less than initially hoped for. The production vehicle weighed 16 tonnes rather than the proposed 13 tonnes, which affected the vehicle‘s speed.

The dome at the back of the tank is a simple cover for the hand crank. Although the Jagdpanzer 38 had an electrical starter, crews were instructed that the preferred method was to use the hand crank where possible, as the electrical starter was not robust and should only be used in emergencies. To the bottom right of the rear armor plate, there was a port to gain access to the cooling water heater. In severe weather conditions, the engine coolant would freeze. A blow lamp could be placed in this port to warm the coolant and defrost it before the engine was started.

When the left rear engine compartment hatch is opened, access can be gained to the fuel filler cap behind the 12V battery. The Jagdpanzer 38 had two interconnected fuel tanks. The fuel tank on the left held 220 liters while the fuel tank on the right held 100 liters. This would give an approximate operational range of 180 km (111 miles).

Cooling the engine was a problem, as it only had a small air intake vent on the rear deck. It required a powerful motor to drive the air intake fan, which reduced the overall performance of the vehicle because it took power from the engine.

Suspension

Although the hull, suspension, tracks, and road wheels look very similar to those used on the Panzer 38(t) tank, the vehicle was a new build. The hull was wider: the Panzer 38(t) tank was 2.13 m (7ft) wide, but the Jagdpanzer 38 was 2.63 m (8ft 7.5 in) wide. The road wheels were larger than those used on the Panzer 38(t) tanks: they were 82 cm diameter instead of the tank’s 77.7 cm (2 ft 7 in) diameter. The suspension has been made more durable than that used on the Panzer 38(t) tank, especially at the front of the vehicle, in order to cope with the extra weight. The tracks have been widened from 29 cm to 35 cm (11in to 1ft 2 in). The Jagdpanzer 38 was only provided with one track return roller, unlike the Panzer 38(t) that had two.

The Driver’s position

The Jagdpanzer 38 driver had a basic instrument panel in front of him. He steered the vehicle by using two hand tillers. Each one of these levers controlled one of the two tracks. The driver also had a handbrake. The foot pedals were not in the standard order that we have come to expect in a modern car. The accelerator was in the middle. The pedal on the right was the foot brake. The gear change pedal was on the far left.

The gearbox was to the right of the driver. It was a 5-speed Praga-Wilson preselector. The Wilson type was the same system used by the British and developed by the Wilson gearbox company. The driver did not change gear like you would in a modern car, where you put the clutch in first and then select the gear. Instead, while the engine was running, they had to choose the next gear first and then depress the gear change pedal, which acted like a clutch, and let it come back up, hence the name pre-selector. To stop the vehicle without stalling, the driver had to remember to select neutral first, then apply the brake and the gear change pedal at the same time.

Exhaust system

Early versions of the exhaust system at the rear of the Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter had the pipe coming down the back of the vehicle into a tubular silencer box that ran along the top of the rear armor plate, mounted horizontally. This was changed to a single pipe going into a flame hider on the back of the vehicle.

Front and rear view of captured Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters (US archives)

Main Armament

The 7.5 cm Panzerjägerkanone 39 L/48 (7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48) anti-tank gun was used to equip Jagdpanzer IV and Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters. The German word ‘Panzerjägerkanone’ literally translates to ‘tank hunter gun’ (anti-tank gun) and is usually abbreviated to Pak, thus sharing the contraction of the more common ‘Panzerabwehrkanone’. It was an electrically fired weapon fitted with a semi-automatic breech mechanism and a 48 caliber long barrel (3615 mm or 11 ft 10.3 in). It could penetrate the armor of most common Allied tanks at ranges up to 1,000 meters as shown in the table below.

When travelling across rough ground, the gunner used the internal gun travel lock to minimize any damage to the gun. The Sfl.ZF 1a periscope gun sight was fixed to the left side of the gun and protruded out of the roof in a semi-circular sliding section of the roof armor. It moved when the gun was moved. It did not rotate. The gunner had to change his body positions to follow the gun periscope as he searched to bring the gun onto the next target by turning the traverse wheel. He also had to avoid being hit in the head by the remote control machine gun handles above him.

The loader sat on the left side of the main gun, behind the gunner and driver. He had a very challenging job because the 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 anti-tank gun had been designed to be loaded from the right side. The loader’s controls were on the wrong side. To open the breech, he had to lean across the gun to access the breech opening lever. The main weapon had a semi-automatic loading system: once the first round was loaded, every time the gun fired, the recoil ejected the shell casing, and the breech block remained down in the open position waiting for another shell to be loaded. The large recoil guard was to his right, and this got in the way when loading shells. Not all of the ammunition was stored near the loader on the left side of the vehicle. Sometimes, he would have to reach over the gun breach and the recoil guard to access the shells stowed on the right side of this cramped tank hunter. The commander had a safety lever near him that prevented the gun from being fired while the loader was servicing the gun. When he was clear of the gun mechanism and a shell was in the breech ready for firing, the commander released the lever to enable the gun to be fired.

Design work on the 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 started in 1939, but it was manufactured from 1943 onwards by Rheinmetall-Borsig AG in Unterlüß and by Seitz-Werke GmbH in Bad Kreuznach, Germany. It used the same 75 x 495 mm R ammunition as the 7.5 cm KwK 40 of Panzer IV medium tank and 7.5 cm StuK 40 gun fitted on the later models of the Sturmgeschütz III (StuG III) assault guns. No towed version of the 7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48 was manufactured.

It could fire three common types of ammunition: Panzergranatepatrone 39 (Pzgr.Patr. 39) armor-piercing capped ballistic cap (APCBC) shell, Sprenggranatepatrone 37 (Sprgr. Patr. 37) high explosive (HE) shell, and different versions of the Granatpatrone 38 HL (Gr. Patr. 38 HL) high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) round. The latter was an effective high-explosive anti-tank shell and could be used against soft-skinned targets as well as armored vehicles. Its armor penetration qualities were not as high as the Pzgr.Patr. 39 (APCBC) shell. When fired, the Panzergranatepatrone 39 shell had a muzzle velocity of 750 meters/second (2460 feet/second).

Depending on availability, a few rounds of Panzergranatepatrone 40 (Pzgr.Patr. 40) high velocity, sub-caliber, tungsten core armor-piercing rounds were carried in case the crew encountered heavily armored Soviet tanks and self-propelled guns. The supplies of tungsten were limited.

7.5 cm Panzerjägerkanone 39 L/48 anti-tank gun armor penetration
(The data was obtained on a firing range. The armor plate was laid back at a 30-degree angle)
	Pzgr.Patr. 39	Pzgr.Patr. 40	Gr. Patr. 38 HL
Shell Weight	6.8 kg	4.1 kg	5 kg
Initial Velocity	750 m/s	930 m/s	450 m/s
Range
100 m	106 mm	143 mm	100 mm
500 m	96 mm	120 mm	100 mm
1000 m	85 mm	97 mm	100 mm
1500 m	74 mm	77 mm	100 mm
2000 m	64 mm		100 mm
(Source: Spielberger, Jentz and Doyle)

The initial design of the gun mantlet was 200 kg heavier than the later design. The early vehicle was nose heavy, and this put stress on the front suspension. By changing the mantlet to a lighter model, and making adjustments to the suspension, the maneuverability of the vehicle became tolerable.

Secondary Armament

The loader had the job of rearming and firing the remote-controlled roof-mounted 360 degrees swiveling 7.92 mm M.G.34 machine gun. It was fired from inside the armored protection of the fighting compartment. A hinged gun shield could be fixed in place to protect the crewman when reloading the gun. It was aimed by looking through a periscope. Behind him, on the rear wall, there was the radio, usually a Fu5 and the on-off master power handle.

Top view of the remote-controlled roof-mounted 360 degrees swiveling 7.92 mm M.G.34 machine gun (German Federal Archives)

Armor

The front upper glacis plate of the Jagdpanzer 38 was designed to be 60 mm (2.4 inches) thick, sloped at 30 degrees from the horizontal. This meant that an armor-piercing (AP) round fired straight at the front upper glacis plate would have to penetrate 120 mm (4.7 inches) of armor due to the angle. The steep slope would also help increase the chance that the round would ricochet. The feared Tiger 1 heavy tank only had 100 mm (3.93 inches) thick effective frontal hull armor. The front glacis armor plate had interlocking welded joints for added strength and security. Sloping the armor meant that the level of protection could be kept high, but the costs and complexity of manufacturing the armor could be kept low. The lower front glacis plate was 60 mm (2.4 inches) thick angled at 50 degrees. This would make the effective thickness of that armor plate 78 mm (3.07 inches).

From these statistics, it would appear that the front armor of the Jagdpanzer 38 was very strong. According to H.L.Doyle, these figures are deceptive because the armor plate used was of inferior quality to the face hardened armor used on the Panzer IV and Panther tanks. The 60 mm armor on the upper and lower glacis was roughly equivalent to the 30 mm (1.18 inches) face hardened armor used on the Panzer III. It was manufactured to E22 specifications and had a hardness of 265 to 309 Brinell. However, Panzer Tracts no.9, by T.Jentz, states that the Jagdpanzer 38’s front armor was meant to be immune to most anti-tank guns, contradicting Doyle’s statements.

The upper side armor of 20 mm (0.78 inches) thickness was comparable to the 14.5 mm plate used on the front of a Sd.Kfz.251 half-track. It was made from a low alloy Siemens-Marteneit (SM) steel. It had a hardness of 220 to 265 Brinell. The tolerances on armor production were quite wide. The thicknesses of four different Jagdpanzer 38 upper glacis plates’ 60 mm (2.4 inches) thick armor were measured. They all belonged to the Wheatcroft Collection. One was built in February 1945, but the other three were built after the war as part of the G13 Swiss Contract. The thickness ranged from 62.2 mm to 64.8 mm (2.44 – 2.55 inches).

The lower hull side armor was 20 mm (0.78 inches) thick and sloped inwards at an angle of 75o. The rear armor was 20 mm (0.78 inches) thick angled at 75 degrees. The roof armor was 10 mm thick (0.39 inches). The belly armor was 8 mm thick (0.3 inches). The Schürzen side skirt armor was made from 5 mm steel plate. It was designed to protect the side 20 mm thick lower hull armor from the Soviet 14.5 mm anti-tank rifles.

Modifications

As with all other German armored fighting vehicles, improvements were continuously introduced during production to improve the performance of the vehicle and increase the speed of manufacture through simplification of its design. Some changes had to be introduced due to the problems with the supply of parts or raw materials.

The idler wheel design went through several changes. In order to reduce the amount of time it took to manufacture the rear idler wheel with twelve holes, different designs were introduced in the following order.

1. Six holes in a flat disc
2. Welded spokes with eight holes on a smooth flat disc.
3. Stamped ribs with six holes on a dish-shaped disc.
4. Six holes on a smooth flat disc.
5. Four holes on a smooth flat disc.

When Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters were damaged, the maintenance workshop would fit whatever replacement idler wheels were available in their stores. Sometimes, late version vehicles would be equipped with early version idler wheels with twelve holes. If only one idler wheel needed replacing, then there would be situations where a vehicle would have idler wheels of different types.

In April 1944, further changes were introduced. The ram’s-horn towing hooks at the front and rear of the vehicle were omitted. They were replaced by extending the side hull armor plates and drilling a hole into the metal. The flange around the gun mantlet helped transfer the weight of the gun to the upper hull glacis plate. The size of the flange was reduced to decrease the weight of the gun mantlet. The length of the rooftop 7.92 mm MG 34 machine gun hinged shield was shortened to stop it from hitting the top of the Sfl.ZF 1a periscope gun sight.

The design of the front track drive sprocket wheel was changed. To save production time, the holes were no longer drilled on the outer ring of the sprocket wheel. A different type of rear idler wheel was fitted. It had four large holes in the disk rather than twelve holes in the earlier version.

Starting in May and continuing into July 1944, more changes were ordered. To stop having to open large hatches on the rear of the Jagdpanzer 38 to access the crew compartment, the commander was given a small hatch that opened to the rear. A hatch was added on the lower right to enable access to the radiator cooling fluid filling cap. Another hatch was added to the lower left to give access to the petrol fuel tank filling cap. The heat shield around the exhaust was no longer fitted. Three ‘mushroom’ short threaded cylinders were welded to the top of the Jagdpanzer 38 to enable a two-tonne temporary crane to be mounted to help with mechanical maintenance, replacement of heavy parts, and repairs.

Further changes were made in August 1944. As a result of a redesign of the metal used in the internal and external construction of the gun mantlet, the weight of the Jagdpanzer 38 was reduced by 200 kg. Road wheels with a larger diameter center disk with thinner rims were introduced. Initially, the rim was drilled for 32 bolts around the edge, but often only 16 bolts were fitted. To help the driver exit his seat quickly in case the vehicle was hit, two handles were welded above the driver’s seat.

Production line changes were introduced in September 1944. To protect the crew from Soviet 14.5 mm anti-tank rifles being fired at the lower hull armor, the Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter was fitted with Schürzen skirt armor plates. Crews found that these plates were ripped off as they brushed past bushes and trees. The front ends of the Schürtzen were bent in towards the hull to try and stop them from being torn off.

The front set of leaf springs experienced more stress than the rear set and often broke. The thickness of the front set of sixteen leaf springs was increased from 7 mm to 9 mm. The rear set of sixteen leaf springs remained 7 mm thick.

More design changes were implemented in October 1944. The design of the driver’s periscope mounting had to be altered after the early version acted as a ‘shell trap. When incoming armor-piercing shells hit the front upper glacis plate but failed to penetrate it, they would slide upwards and enter the crew compartment via the protruding cover over the driver’s periscopes, after getting caught on it. The armored cover was no longer fitted. Holes were cut flush with the glacis plate to hold the periscopes. A thin sheet metal dual-purpose sun and rain guard was installed over the holes. If a shell slid up the upper glacis plate and hit this guard, it would be ripped off but would not act as a ‘shell-trap.’

New road wheels were introduced that were riveted instead of being bolted. It had been found that some of the bolts on the earlier versions of the Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter’s road wheels came undone.

The red-hot glowing exhaust pipes and flames of a backfire can give away the position of the vehicle at dusk and during the night. This can result in it being spotted by an enemy artillery forward observer and calling in an artillery barrage. The cylindrical silencer was replaced with a Flamm-Vernichter (flame destroyer) exhaust.

Allied bombing disrupted the supply of ball bearings. The gun mount had to be changed. The ball bearings used in the gun mount were replaced with roller bearings. This necessitated the installation of a spring compensator to help with elevating the gun.

Filling the Jagdpanzer 38’s fuel tanks took a long time. To enable the tanks to be refilled faster, a larger nozzle with an overflow pan was fitted. Also, there had been reliability problems with the electric fuel pump, so a Solex-handpumpe manual hand pump was issued. The commander’s hatch was equipped with a head cushion.

As the cold weather arrived in November 1944, just in time for winter, a new heating plate was fitted to keep the battery from freezing. The heating inside the crew compartment was also upgraded. A better heat distribution vent was installed in the engine compartment firewall. It gave a more even heat distribution inside the vehicle. The water pump also upgraded to one that was more robust.

By changing the location of an internal stowage box to the right of the commander’s position, a further five 75 mm shells were able to be carried.

The last batch of changes started in January 1945. The Model 6 final drive had a gear ratio of 12:88. They suffered from mechanical failure due to the stresses put on them. The Jagdpanzer 38 was three tonnes over the initial design specifications. It was front heavy, and the driver regularly had to maneuver the whole vehicle to enable the gun to be aimed at a new target. In January 1945, a new more robust Model 6.75 final drive was fitted. It had a gear ratio of 10:80.

The Jagdpanzer 38 was an ambush vehicle and needed to hide. To make the crew’s task of fixing cut tree branches and bushes to the exterior of the vehicle easier, ‘U’ shaped brackets were welded to the upper front glacis plate and the side armor. Wire or string could be threaded through these ‘U’ shaped brackets and foliage tied onto it. The exact date in 1945 this feature started to be added onto vehicles under production is not known.

To strengthen the towing brackets on some vehicles, side supports were welded at the junction of the hull side armor and the front and rear armor plates. Others had the extended hull armor towing brackets removed and replaced with ‘U’ brackets welded onto the lower front glacis plate and the rear armor plate.

Did the Jagdpanzer 38 have a muzzle brake?

The answer is yes, no, then yes. A muzzle brake is designed to increase the life expectancy of a gun barrel by directing some of the explosive force of the shell gasses sideways rather than just forward. The wooden mock-up of the prototype was fitted with a muzzle brake. The early production Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters were fitted with a muzzle brake but these were removed by crews and later production vehicles did not have them fitted. It was found they produced too much dust and smoke, which gave away their ambush position. This was often fatal. The post-war Swiss G13 version had a muzzle brake fitted.

Early production Jagdpanzer 38 with muzzle brake. (German Federal Archives)

Camouflage

Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters left the factory painted dark sandy yellow (Dunkelgelb RAL 7028). Camouflage patterns were painted onto the vehicle when it arrived at the unit it was assigned to. In October 1944, new Jagdpanzer 38s were painted in a camouflage pattern before they left the BMM factory. It had a base color of dark sandy yellow (Dunkelgelb RAL 7028) with stripes and patches of dark red-brown (Rotbraun RAL 8017) paint and dark olive green (Olivgrün RAL 6003). Black rectangular false vision ports were painted on the upper front glacis plate to try and draw the enemy’s fire away from the driver’s periscopes.

The vehicle’s designation

The Jagdpanzer 38 was not officially called the Hetzer during WW2. What follows is an investigation into why the Hetzer nickname is associated with this tank hunter. Many German armored fighting vehicles had very long official designations, so shorter nicknames were used to assist in recognition, for example, the Panzerkampfwagen VI Ausf.E was called the Tiger. There are others, like the Ferdinand, Panther, Grille, Wespe, Hummel and many more. Some were official designations while others were unofficial and came from the soldiers using the vehicle. The German High Command even issued orders for vehicle names to be changed because they were deemed to be misleading or not suitable for a vehicle belonging to the German Army. Some of the names now used to describe Second World War German fighting vehicles arose after the war. A few were the invention of scale model kit companies.

Ein grosser Hetzer

A Romanian Army document dated April 1944 recorded the visit of two German officers: Lieutenant-Colonel Ventz from the Waffenamt (German Army Weapons Agency responsible for research and development) and Lieutenant-Colonel Haymann from German High Command OKH. They had come to inspect several vehicles including the Mareşal light tank hunter. Its design is believed to have influenced the final development of the Jagdpanzer 38. The comments of Lieutenant-Colonel Haymann were recorded in the last paragraph on the first page. He said the Mareşal would make ‘ein grosser Hetzer’ (an impressive hunter). The German word “Gross” does not only translate to big as in size. It can also mean good or impressive (Großartig). He went on to say it would be a superior adversary against the Russians.

This is a Romanian Army document dated 1944 that recorded the visit of two German officers to inspect the Mareşal light tank hunter. In the last paragraph, they describe it as, ‘ein grosser Hetzer.’ (Source: Romainain Military Archives, Bucharest)

The Jagdpanzer 38 had many different official names

The word ‘Hetzer’ has not been used during this article because it was not used officially by the German Army during WW2. It is a nickname used by some of the troops. The Jagdpanzer 38 was known by many different designations and abbreviations in official German Army and factory documents.

These are two monthly Heereswaffenamt (HWA – German Army Weapons Agency) reports: one is dated March 1944 and the other November 1944. It is one example of how the Jagdpanzer 38 underwent name changes. (Source: Steven Zaloga/NARA)

The following is an updated list of the different names and abbreviations given to the Jagdpanzer 38, followed by the source, and date of the document that was initially compiled by Thomas L. Jentz and Hilary Louis Doyle. The term ‘Hetzer’ was a nickname and not an official designation.

leichter Panzerjäger auf 38(t) Wa Prüf 6, (7 January 1944)
leichter Panzerjäger auf 38(t) Wa Prüf 6, (28 February 1944)
Pz.Jäger 38(t) KTB, GenStdH/Gen.d.Art. (18 January 1944)
Pz.Jäger 38(t) KTB, GenStdH/Gen.d.Art. (16 April 1944)
Sturmgeschütz neuer Art Gen Insp.d.Pz.Tr. an OKH/Wa Prüf (28 January 1944)
Le. Pz.Jäger (38t) Gen Insp.d.Pz.Tr. an OKH/Wa Prüf (28 January 1944)
leichtes Sturmgeschütz auf 38(t) Führer Konferenz (28 January 1944)
Panzerjäger 38 für 7,5cm Pak 39 (L-/48) (Sd Kfz 138/2) K.St.N. 1149 (1 January 1944)
le.Pz.Jg.38t Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr.Akten (4 March to October 1944)
le.Pz.Jg.38t Panzerjäger-Abteilung 743 (3 August 1944)
7,5 cm Panzerjäger 38(t) Chef.H.Rüst.u.BdE, Wa.Abn. (6 April to 31 July 1944)
Stu.Gesch.38(t) Chef.H.Rüst.u.BdE, Wa.Abn. (6 April to 6 June 1944)
Stu.Gesch.n.Aa mit 7.5cm Pak 39 L/48 auf Fgst.Pz.Kpf.Wg.38(t) Waffen bzw.Geräte (March 1944)
Stu.Gesch.n.Aa mit 7.5cm Pak 39 L/48 auf Fgst.Pz.Kpf.Wg.38(t) Überblick über den Rüstungsstand des Heeres Chef.H.Rüst.u. BdE/Stab Rüst lil. (15 May to 15 October 1944)
Ie.Pz.Jäg.38(t) GenSTdH/General der Artillerie Kriegstagebuch (7 June to 30 July 1944)
Stu.Gesch.38(t) GenSTdH/Org.Abt. Bericht (12 June and 28 June 1944)
I.Pz.Jg.38(t) Wa Prüf 6 (23 June 1944)
Ie.Pz.Jg.38(t) mit 7,5cm Pak L/48 auf Fgst Pz 38t GenSTdH/Org.Abt./Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr. (8 September 1944)
le. Panzerjäger 38t GenSTdH/Org.Abt./Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr. (8 September 1944)
Jagdpanzer 38 Name of Troop – GenSTdH/Org.Abt./Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr. (11 September 1944)
Jagdpanzer 38 Ausf Name of regulations – GenSTdH/Org.Abt./Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr. (11 September 1944)
Pz.-Jäger 38(t) (späterer Name wahrscheinlich Jagdpanzer) (probable later name Jagdpanzer) GenSTdH/General der Artillerie Kriegstagebuch (12 September 1944)
Jagdpanzer 38 Gen.lnsp.d.Pz.Tr.Akten (19 October 1944 to 6 April 1945)
Jagdpanzer 38 D652/63 (1 November 1944)
Jagdpanzer 38 und Panzerjäger 38 (7,5cm Pak 39 (L/48) (Sd.Kfz 138/2) K.St.N. 1149 (1 November 1944)
Jagdpz. 38 this style of abbreviation was used in a list as part of a combat readiness report by the Panzergrenadier Division “Feldherrnhalle”. None were shown on strength. (3 November 1944)
Jagdpanzer 38, Panzerjäger 38 (m 7,5cm Pak 39 (L/48) (Sd.Kfz 138/2) Überblick über den Rüstungsstand des Heeres, Chef H.Rüst u. BdE/Stab Rüst III. (15 November 1944 to 15 March 1945)
Jagdpanzer 38 WaA/Wa Prüf 6 (17 November and 19 December 1944)
Hetzer The origin of this name was explained in this document as coming from the troops to denote the Jagdpanzer 38 Gen. Insp.d.Pz.Tr. Guderian. (4 December 1944) (Source: Spielberger, Jentz and Doyle)
Hetzer and Pz.Jg.38(T) IX.SS.Geb.A.K (19 December 1944)
Panzerjager G13 Škoda parts list document 1944 edition.
Jagdpanzer 38 T (Hetzer) Chief General Quartermaster I.A.Gschwender, Luftwaffe High Command telex (16 February 1945)
Jg.Pz.38 t SS-Sturmbannführer combat readiness report. (March 1945)
Jg.Pz.38 t Hetzer SS-Sturmbannfüher combat readiness report. (March 1945)

The Project Hetzer E-10 prototype design confusion

‘Project Hetzer’ was the name used by the team tasked with designing a low-profile self-propelled tank hunter with a fast, powerful 400 hp engine that would give the vehicle a maximum road speed of 70 km/h (43.49 mph). It was an Entwicklungs-Serien (developmental series) 10-tonne vehicle that was allocated the designation ‘E-10’. It did not enter production. Weight designations in E-series were not very accurate. The E-10 was planned to weigh between 12-15 tonnes.

The plans for the Jagdpanzer 38 and E-10 were discussed at a concept design meeting between the German army ordnance officers from Wa Prüf 6, and the Czech Böhmisch-Märische Maschinenfabrik (B.M.M.) company. The language barrier may have led to a misunderstanding. It is assumed the Czech company officials believed the Germans were using the name ‘Hetzer‘ when talking about their Jagdpanzer 38 and not the rival company’s E-10 project. Thus, the nickname ‘Hetzer’ became connected to the Jagdpanzer 38 but not used as an official designation.
Military historian Herbert Ackermans found in the German Archives a report dated 21 January 1944, that detailed the items on the agenda and minutes of a number of meetings about the development and production of weapons and equipment, that took place with General Friedrich Fromm, German Army High Command (OKH), between April 1943 and 21 January 1944. (Archiv Signatur RH 10/37)

Klein-Panzerjäger (Source: Herbert Ackermans/Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv. Signatur RH 10/37)

Item 5 of the report dealt with Klein-Panzerjäger (small tank hunter). Major-General Beißwänger (General beim Chef der Heeresrüstung) remarked that the introduction of such designation (like ‘Klein-Panzerjäger’) was undesirable and that precise designations were required.

Oberst Crohn’s of Wa.Prüf. 6, informed those present at the meeting that the Romanian Maresal tank hunter was of no further interest to Germany as the production of the Jagdpanzer 38 has been decided upon. This also meant that Project Hetzer, Project Rutscher, and Project Sprengstoffträger mit Puppchen had been canceled.

This document provides evidence that the Jagdpanzer 38 and the Project Hetzer E-10 were treated as two separate vehicles.

The few wartime documents where the nickname ‘Hetzer’ was used

Hetzer document No.1

On 31 July 1944, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 743 (743rd Tank Hunter Battalion) reported having twenty-eight Hetzers available, with an additional fourteen Hetzers expected to arrive on 3 August 1944 when the battalion would be joined by the 3.Kompanie (3rd company) near Warsaw. On 3 August 1944, the Panzerjäger-Abteilung 743 submitted a ‘strength report‘ that listed how many vehicles were operational and how many were lost, damaged or needing mechanical repair. In this and later reports, the nickname Hetzer was not used. They were given the abbreviated designation of le.Pz.Jg.38t.

Hetzer document No.2

In a Führervortrag briefing sheet, dated 4 December 1944, from German General Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, Hitler is informed that the nickname Hetzer was used by the troops to refer to the Jagdpanzer 38. Hilary Louis Doyle and Thomas L. Jentz mentions this in his Panzer Tracts book. (Found again by military historian Herbert Ackermans in the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration – NARA)

8.) Erklärung Ausdruck “Hetzer.” Der kommt aus der Truppe und bezeichnet damit den Jagdpanzer 38.

8.) Declaration Expression “Hetzer.” The expression comes from the troops and refers to the Jagdpanzer 38.

This is the front page of the Führervortrag briefing sheet, showing the date 4 December 1944 (Source: Herbert Ackermans/NARA)

This is the second page of the same report.

This is the second page of the Führervortrag briefing sheet. The translation of the last point is “8.) Declaration Expression “Hetzer.” The expression comes from the troops and refers to the Jagdpanzer 38.” (Source: Herbert Ackermans/Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv.)

Hetzer document No.3

On 19 December 1944, a unit combat readiness report was submitted. It used both the abbreviation Pz.Jg.38(T) and just the nickname Hetzer when collating the figures of combat-ready Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters. The 22 SS-Kavallerie-Division reported they had two Pz.Jg.38(T) available. The 8 SS-Kavallerie-Division reported they had three Hetzers available. The subordinated unit to the Panzer-Division Feldherrnhalle stated they had three Hetzers available.

This unit combat readiness report dated 19 December 1944 uses both the abbreviation Pz.Jg.38(T) and just the nickname Hetzer (Source Russian Archives CAMO 500-12472-383 War Diary of AOK 6, late 1944)

Hetzer document No.4

The fourth document was discovered by historian Herbert Ackerman in October 2020 as he was looking at documents in the Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv (German Military Archives). It is a telex from Chief General Quartermaster I.A.Gschwender, Luftwaffe High Command addressed to the German High Command Panzertruppen Inspector. He asks when the Fallschirmjaeger Panzerjäger Abteilungen (airborne tank hunter battalion) are planned to be reequipped with Jagdpanzer 38 Hetzer, what are the composition numbers and delivery dates. It was sent on 16 February 1945 and used the name Jagdpanzer 38 T (Hetzer)

Wartime telex dated dated 16 February 1945 from Luftwaffe High Command to German Army High Command Panzertruppen D Inspector where the name Jagdpanzer 38 T (Hetzer) was used.(Source Herbert Ackermans/Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv Signatur RH 10/123)

Hetzer document No.5

The fifth document was a unit combat readiness report for March 1945. In the eighth line down, under the heading Pz.Abt.17 (17th Panzer battalion) there is an entry, Jg.Pz. 38 t Hetzer. It is strange why this SS-Sturmbannführer (Major) listed one Jg.Pz. 38 t in short term repair as a “Hetzer”, but later listed ten Jagdpanzer 38(t) tank hunters belonging to the Pz.Jg.Abt.Nibelungen (Anti-tank battalion “Nibelungen”) as just Jg.Pz. 38 t and did not include the nickname “Hetzer”. Seven of those ten are shown as operational, one in short-term repair, one in long-term repair, and one with transmission failure. (Source Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv)

A unit combat readiness report for March 1945 that uses the term Jg.Pz.38 t Hetzer. (Source: Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv)

Hetzer document No.6

The sixth document is also a unit combat readiness report dated 7 March 1945 for the attention of the German Army High Command Panzertruppen D Inspector from Kampfgruppe Panzer Korps “Feldherrnhalle”. In point 2, under the heading Pz.Jg.Abt.13 (13th Tank Hunter Battalion) there is an entry, (20 Hetzer) ready only after retraining of personnel on the Jg.Pz. 38. Earliest date 25 March 1945. Like some of the other documents it also uses both terms, Hetzer and Jg.Pz.38.

This document shows that the Pz.Jg.Abt.13 (13th Tank Hunter Battalion) will have 20 Hetzers ready only after retraining of personnel (Source: Bundesarchiv Militär Archiv)

How are the words ‘baiter and agitator’ connected with the Jagdpanzer 38?

During the Second World War and when hostilities had finished, German military prisoners, engineers, and factory workers were interviewed by Intelligence officers. The Allied translators chose to translate the German word ‘Hetzer’ when it was used by the person being interviewed to describe the Jagdpanzer 38, as ‘baiter’. These words appear in U.S. Soviet, British and Commonwealth reports. The interviews were recorded in German. They also noted that the nickname ‘Hetzer’ was used to refer to the Jagdpanzer 38 and some intelligence documents used the German word Hetzer rather than the English translation.

British M.I.10 intelligence source document noting that the Jagdpanzer 38 was also referred to as ‘Panzerjaeger 38’ and ‘Hetzer’ (Source Ed Webster/M.I.10)

Military Intelligence, Section 10 (M.I.10) was part of the British War Office, which would later become part of M.I.6. It was responsible for technical analysis of weapons. The original Secret documents were declassified on 22 November 1988. Multiple British army intelligence reports and English transcripts of German prisoner interrogations make use of the term ‘Baiter’ as an English translation for the German nickname ‘Hetzer’ when used to refer to the Jagdpanzer 38. These documents were collated and analyzed by M.I.10. The following extract is one such example.

British M.I.10 translation of an interview with Herr Mehlert about the Jagdpanzer 38. The Allied translator has used the English word ‘baiter’ as a translation for the German word ‘hetzer’. (Source Ed Webster/M.I.10)

In 1947, the M.I.10 used the name ‘Pz.Jäg. 38(t) – Hetzer’ under a photograph of a Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter in an official, secret, military reference book called ‘Illustrated Record of German Army Equipment 1939 – 1945, Volume III, armored Fighting Vehicles.’ The publication was a summary of all the intelligence reports that M.I.10 had collected on German vehicles. Unfortunately, there is no information in this document about the intelligence source on which naming the Jagdpanzer 38, ‘Hetzer’ was based.

This is a page from the British M.I.10 War Office 1947 publication Illustrated Record Of German Army Equipment 1939-1945 Volume III – Armoured Fighting Vehicles. It uses the nickname Hetzer (Source: Shrivenham Defence Academy/M.I.10)

Ralf Raths, the director of the German Tank Museum, whose first language is German, states that Hetzer is a German hunting term. ‘Hetzen” means to hunt your prey at high speed until it collapses or is caught. This is what wolves do in the wild. This would also cover hunting fox, deer, and hare with dogs and on horseback. The term Hetzer was applicable to the Project Hetzer E-10 fast tank hunter but not to the Jagdpanzer 38 which was a slow vehicle that only had a top maximum road speed of 40 km/h (25 mph). The popular modern phrase found on T-shirts, websites, and memes, ‘The Hetzer gonna Hetz’ is totally inaccurate. The Jagdpanzer 38 could not Hetz. It could not chase after its prey at speed. Its tactical deployment was as an ambush weapon.

Unfortunately, there is not a word in English that is a good translation of the German Word Hetzer. We have ‘hare coursing’, but ‘a coursing’ or ‘Project Coursing’ sounds wrong. There is not an overall general descriptive word in English that covers hunting fox/deer/hare/rabbit at high speed until it collapses. The verb ‘to harry’ is a hunting term but is associated with the bird of prey, the Harrier and the British fighter jet the Harrier: the ‘Harrier is gonna harry’. The ‘chaser’ would be the nearest accurate translation. ‘Project Chaser’ and ‘the Chaser’ sound correct in English: the ‘Chaser is gonna chase’. The problem with ‘chaser’ is that word does not always have a hunting association, unlike the German word Hetzer. The way a Jagdpanzer 38 operated in combat was the exact opposite of all these terms.

Many military history authors and magazine article writers translate the nickname ‘Hetzer’ as baiter or agitator. A dictionary definition of a ‘baiter’ is someone who ‘deliberately annoys or tauts another’. It is also defined as referring to a ‘malicious rabble-rousing agitator’ (This definition is where the word ‘agitator’ comes from). Both these explanations of the use of the word ‘baiter’ have caused confusion as it does not describe or hint at the tactical deployment of the Jagdpanzer 38.

There is another definition. A ‘baiter’ is a hunting term. It describes a hunter who baits a trap, lays in ambush hoping his prey takes the bait so that he can kill it. This describes the tactical deployment of the Jagdpanzer 38. They were given the job of protecting the flanks of an attack or defending a section of the front line. Crews were taught to camouflage their vehicles and hide on the edge of woodland. They would be deployed in a troop of three or more Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters and wait in ambush in a position where they had good visibility of advancing enemy units at a location they believed would be an Allied attack route.

Designation conclusion

To summarise, the Jagdpanzer 38 was not officially called the Hetzer by the Germans during WW2. Although most official wartime documents do not use the nickname Hetzer, a few did.

Operational service

Starting from 20 June 1944, Panzerjäger Schulen (tank hunter training schools) started to receive Jagdpanzer 38 vehicles for crew training. A surviving Panzerjäger Schule Milowitz (Tank hunter training school at Milowitz) document showed that Jagdpanzer 38 crews were encouraged to find preselected firing positions, preferably behind an earth wall in cover, like at the edge of a wood. Once targets had been engaged and there were no more targets available, the commander was to direct the driver to change to a different location by reversing out of their current position, to avoid being hit by enemy artillery.

Jagdpanzer 38 in Hungary. (German Federal Archives)

The Jagdpanzer 38s were assigned to independent Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilungen (Army Tank Hunter Battalions). They were to provide Infantry Divisions with a mobile anti-tank resource. When the infantry was under attack, they could be used as a resource to support the infantry’s counterattack. They were not intended to be used instead of a tank at the front of an attack in a major offensive. The guns’ limited traverse would make them liable to flank attacks.

Each of the Battalion’s three companies was given fourteen Jagdpanzer 38s, and three were allocated to the Abteilung Stab (Battalion headquarters). One vehicle per company and two of the headquarters’ vehicles were issued with long-range command and control Fu 8 radios. By February 1945, the authorized number of Jagdpanzer 38s per company was reduced from fourteen to ten. The Abteilung (battalion) approved total was reduced to thirty-eight from forty-five.

The Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 731 (731st Army Tank Hunter Battalion) was formed on 2 November 1943 by Heeresgruppe Nord (Northern Army group). Between 4 and 13 July 1944, they were issued with forty-five Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters for deployment on the Eastern Front.

Between 19 and 28 July 1944, Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 743 (743rd Army Tank Hunter Battalion) was issued with forty-five Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters for deployment on the Eastern Front with Heeresgruppe Mitte (Middle Army group).

In September 1944, the Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 741 (741st Army Tank Hunter Battalion) was issued with forty-five Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters. One company was sent to the Eastern Front, but the other two were directed to the Arnhem sector in Holland.
In February 1945, the Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 561 (561st Army Tank Hunter Battalion) was issued with forty-five Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters.

In March 1945, the Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 744 (744th Army Tank Hunter Battalion) was issued with forty-five Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters.

In December 1944 and January 1945, 295 Jagdpanzer 38s were used in the winter Ardennes offensive, the Battle of the Bulge. The two companies of Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 741 and eighteen other Heeres Panzerjäger companies were deployed in the region. A Heeres Gruppe B (Army group B) ‘combat strength’ report dated 30 December 1944 stated that 131 Jagdpanzer 38s were still operational out of their initial strength of 190. Heeres Gruppe G (Army group G) reported that it had 38 Jagdpanzer 38s still functional out of an initial total of 67.

On 16 April 1945, during the attack on Bolatice in Northern Moravia by Soviet Forces, the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the T-34-85 equipped 1st Czechoslovak Tank Brigade advanced from an area near Albertovec Farm. Two tanks were left behind just south of the farm to guard against a flanking attack. Corporal Ján Zámečník was the gunner in tank number 603. He fired on what he thought was a German machine gun nest on the edge of a wood. When it was neutralized, the crew went to examine the enemy position. They were shocked to find they had knocked out a very well camouflaged Jagdpanzer 38. The German crew had run out of fuel and main gun ammunition but had still decided to fight using the machine gun on the roof of their vehicle. The T-34-85 crew had not identified it as an enemy vehicle because it was so hard to see.

On 27 April 1945, eight T-34-85 tanks of the 3rd battalion, 1st Czechoslovak Tank Brigade advanced from the railway station at Dolni Lhota to Čavisov a village in Ostrava-City District, Moravian-Silesian Region. The attack halted as it encountered anti-tank obstacles. It was an ambush. Two tanks were knocked out, and a further three were damaged by a number of self-propelled anti-tank guns in concealed positions. The remaining tanks were forced to retreat. The Germans then made a tactical mistake. The crews of the Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters counter-attacked. They moved out of cover and into the village near the railroad station. One was knocked out before it reached the village and another was destroyed near the houses on the edge of the village. The others withdrew.

Jagdpanzer 38 driving over rubble in Prague 8 May 1945. (German Federal archives)

Swiss contract Jagdpanzer G13 tank hunters

The first Jagdpanzer 38 came off the production line in March 1944. By the end of World War II, the Czech company BMM had built 2,047 of them and refurbished 173 that came back to the factory for repairs. Another Czech company called Škoda started manufacturing Jagdpanzer 38s and built a further 780 by the time of the German surrender. A 91 paged 1944 Škoda parts list document was titled ‘Panzerjager G13 Ersatzteilliste’ showing that Škoda used their factory code G13 as part of the vehicle’s designation rather than the normal number 38.

Swiss contract Jagdpanzer G13 tank hunter

After the war ended, the Swiss were looking for new armored vehicles. They placed a contract with the Czechs. The first 10 that they received were German specification Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters. The rest were new-build vehicles for the Swiss contract. Some of them used World War Two parts that were readily available. Later vehicles had newly designed parts.

One hundred and fifty-eight Swiss contract Jagdpanzer G13 tank hunters entered service with the Swiss army. Ninety-four of them were re-engined with diesel power packs. The last G13 left the Swiss army in 1970. Many were sold to museums and private collectors who converted them to externally look like Second World War German Jagdanzer 38 tank hunters.

The G13 name

G13 – It is just the internal manufacturer’s code name for the Jagdpanzer 38 in the Škoda Factory. A WW2 wartime Škoda Jagdpanzer 38 Hetzer was called a G13 in the factory and on all internal documentation.
G = tank hunter, 1 = light, 3 = model i.e number 3.
G11 was Panzerjaeger I,
G12 was Marder III.
Postwar – the 75 mm PaK 40 with a muzzle brake was used instead of the 75mm PaK 39 on Jagdpanzer 38(t). The Škoda Factory did not have access to PaK 39 guns and used the PaK 40. In the Swiss Army this tank hunter was known by the factory code G13 rather than the Jagdpanzer 38 or Hetzer name.

This parts list document produced by Skoda in 1948 is good evidence of the use of the factory code G13 and that it was written G13 and not G-13.

Variants

Jagdpanzer 38 Starr

The Starr was characterized by a rigid mount for the main gun. It was tailored for simplified mass-production, and therefore the gun recoil system was entirely eliminated. The recoil had to be absorbed by the chassis and suspensions. Aiming was entirely performed by the same transmission, but coupled to a new Tatra 8 cylinder diesel engine in development. Also, in order to cope with poor vision, the commander received a rotating periscope. The diesel prototype remained the sole one to see combat and was used during the Prague uprising by both sides. Ultimately 10 were built, but later seven were converted back as standard Jagdpanzer 38 after the war because the Starr tubes had worn out. The Jagdpanzer 38 Starr was also meant to receive later a longer L/70 gun, but it came too late to see action.

Hitler inspecting the new Jagdpanzer 38 Starr. (German Federal Archives)

Jagdpanzer 38(d)

This final, transitional version had a wider hull, better side protection (50 mm/1.97 in), the same rigid gun mount as the Starr, but with the L/70 gun, and the new 8-cyl Tatra engine.

Flammpanzer 38

The German army needed more flame-throwing tanks for their December 1944 winter offensive in Ardennes, Operation Watch on the Rhine and the Operation North Wind in Rhineland-Palatinate, Alsace and Lorraine. Twenty Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunter chassis were fitted with a 14 mm Flammenwerfer flamethrower gun, instead of its normal 7.5 cm PaK 39 anti-tank gun. A tube was installed on the front of the flamethrower to make the vehicle look like the standard Jagdpanzer 38 in an effort to confuse the enemy.

Bergepanzer 38

Bergepanzer 38 light recovery vehicle. (German Federal Archives)

A light recovery vehicle created especially for the Jagdpanzer 38 and light vehicles of its class. Between 64 and 106 (even 120) were converted until the end of the war (chassis numbers 321001-323000-323001), equipped with jack handbars, winch, steel cables, wooden support planks, and a rear hydraulic leg for a better grip. Its only armament was a single 7.92 mm (0.31 in) Rheinmetall MG 34 or 42 mounted on the front arm.

Rearview of the Bergepanzer 38 light recovery vehicle with a dozer blade deployed at the back of the vehicle. (German Federal Archives)

Befehlspanzer 38

The standard command variant. Nothing really special except for a 30W FuG 8 radio set and extra whip antennas. It was still armed the same way as regular Hetzers, making it even more cramped inside.

Bergepanzer 38 mit 2 cm Flak 38 anti-aircraft cannon

A number of Bergepanzer 38 light armored recovery vehicles were converted into anti-aircraft Flakpanzers. They were fitted with a 2 cm Flak 38 anti-aircraft cannon.

In the background, you can see a Jagdpanzer 38 hull armed with a 2 cm Flak 38 anti-aircraft cannon with its gun barrel raised.

This weapon was originally designed to be mounted in German combat aircraft and intended to have a dual purpose as an anti-tank and air-to-air fighting weapon. This gun was also used on the five prototype Flakpanzer IV “Kugelblitz”. If necessary the gun could also be used in a ground support role against enemy troops and vehicles.

A Bergepanzer 38 with 2 cm Flak 38 anti-aircraft cannon

Soviet Army capture the factories

When the Red Army liberated Czechoslovakia, they conducted a stocktake of what was in production at the Škoda factories at the time they came under ‘new management’. A report was filed on the possibility of completing the vehicles found at Škoda factories. The auditor found 1,200 unfinished Jagdpanzer 38 tank-destroyers “G13” chassis. It was worked out that 150 of them could be finished from the parts available. The remaining 1,050 vehicles were 45%-60% completed and had only 78 main guns available between them. This report showed that production of the Hetzer chassis was outstripping the manufacturing capacity to build the main gun in sufficient quantities.

Czechoslovakian ST-1

The Czech Jagdpanzer 38 Hetzers (several dozens were captured in and around Budapest in 1945) were designated ST-1, for Stihac Tanku or “Tank Hunter”. 249 were pressed into service. There was also a school driver version designated ST-III/CVP (50 vehicles), the Praga VT-III armored recovery vehicle and the PM-1 flamethrower tank. 50 existing Jagdpanzer 38 tank destroyers were to be modified with a flame thrower turret, but the program was cancelled.

During the Prague uprising, 5th-9th May 1945, freedom fighters captured this German Jagdpanzer 38. It did not have a gun fitted but in its place, it was armed with a German anti-tank Panzerfaust. (photo capture taken from the film called ‘Květnová revoluce v Praze 1945’ held in the Národní filmový archive)

Foreign Users

Thanks to the great numbers of Jagdpanzer 38s built at the end of the war, it got to see service with a number of different armies during the war and after.

The only export user of the Jagdpanzer 38 was the Hungarian Army, which received about 85 vehicles between August 1944 and January 1945.

While the Soviets captured large numbers of Jagdpanzer 38s during their successful drive against the German armies, there is no evidence they put any into use. They did, however, supply some to their new allies, the Bulgarians (some 4 vehicles). Romania also captured a couple of Jagdpanzer 38s after switching sides and moving into Transylvania.

One of the most famous wartime Jagdpanzer 38s is Chwat, a single tank destroyer captured by the Poles during the Warsaw uprising that saw no combat use.

Another Jagdpanzer 38 was captured by Czechoslovakian rebels during the Prague uprising at the end of the war.

After the war, the Czechoslovakians had a number of Jagdpanzer 38s available to them left from production or abandoned on their soil. They produced 150 more and used them until at least the early 60s.

The Czechoslovaks also exported the Jagdpanzer 38 to Switzerland, which bought 158 vehicles that were in service until the 70s. Most of the current surviving Jagdpanzer 38s are actually Swiss G13s.

Yugoslavia also captured some 20 tank destroyers from the retreating Germans, some captured and used during the war. They remained in service until about 1952.

Conclusion

Overall, the vehicle was successful. It was quick to build, and cheap compared with the cost of constructing a Tiger, King Tiger or Panther tank. It was mechanically reliable, easily concealed, hard-hitting, and when used right, a hard-to-kill vehicle. A company of Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters working together, concealed in a good location, could damage or knock-out a considerable number of attacking enemy tanks.

Surviving Jagdpanzer 38

Currently, there are only 13 known surviving Jagdpanzer 38 tank hunters left. If the Jagdpanzer 38 you are looking at on display at a museum is not on this list of surviving vehicles then it is a post-war Swiss Contract G13 altered to resemble a wartime Jagdpanzer 38.
Australian Armour and Artillery Museum, Cairns, Queensland, Australia
Arsenalen Swedish Tank Museum
The Tank Museum, Bovington, UK
Bruce Crompton Collection, UK
Rex and Rod Cadman Collection, UK
Private Collection, Germany
Panzermuseum, Thun, Switzerland
Polish Army Museum, Warsaw, Poland
Army Technical Museum, Lešany, Czech Republic
Kubinka Tank Museum, Russia
Fort Lee U.S. Army Ordnance Museum, VA, USA
Canadian Forces Base, Borden, Canada
Wheatcroft Collection, UK

Sources

Liechte Jagdpanzer by Walter J. Spielberger, Thomas Jentz and Hilary L. Doyle
Jagdpanzer 38 ‘Hetzer; 1944-45 by Thomas Jentz and Hilary L. Doyle
Panzerkampfwagen 38 Panzer Tracts No.18 by Thomas Jentz and Hilary L. Doyle
Panzer Production from 1933 to 1945 Panzer Tracts No.23 by Thomas Jentz and Hilary L. Doyle
Jagdpanzer 38 ‘Box’ at the Tank Museum, Bovington Archives
Romanian Military Museum Archives, Bucharest
British War Office Military of Intelligence M.I.10 ‘Illustrated Record of German Army Equipment 1939 – 1945, Volume III, Armoured Fighting Vehicles. ’
Hilary L. Doyle. Start from the 17 min time period https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HG_mY-jSZzQ
Private correspondence with Mr. Hilary L. Doyle (1)
Herbert Ackermans document collection.

Jagdpanzer 38 specifications
Dimensions (L W H)	6.27 m x 2.63m x 2.10 m 20 ft 6.8 in x 8 ft 7.5 in x 6 ft 10.6 in
Total weight, battle-ready	16 tonnes
Armament	7.5 cm Pak 39 L/48, 41 rounds 7.92 mm (0.31 in) M.G.34, 1,200 rounds
Armor	8 to 60 mm (0.3 – 2.36 in)
Crew	4 (driver, commander, gunner, loader)
Propulsion	Praga EPA AC 2800 6-cylinder 160 hp @ 3000 rpm petrol/gasoline engine
Maximum Road Speed	40 km/h (25 mph)
Suspension	Leaf springs
Range	180 km (111 miles)
Total production	approx. 2,827

Romanian Mareșal, 1943.

Jagdpanzer 38, the first command model built with Fgst.nr.321001 radio.

Jagdpanzer 38 “Chwat” (Brave) captured by Polish insurgents. An early production tank, Warsaw, August 1944.

Hungarian early type Jagdpanzer 38, 1944.

Early type Jagdpanzer 38 “Black 233”, western front, one of the earliest captured by the Allies.

Hungarian Jagdpanzer 38, winter 1944-45.

Hungarian Jagdpanzer 38, 1944.

Hungarian Jagdpanzer 38, 1945.

Unknown unit, Bohemia, spring 1945.

Jagdpanzer 38 of the 11th SS Panzerdivision “Nordland”, winter 1944-45.

Jagdpanzer 38 with the spotted ambush camouflage, Germany, April-May 1945.

Czech Jagdpanzer 38, in service by May 1945 with the Russian Liberation Army (Русская освободительная армия)

Hungarian Jagdpanzer 38 “Mokus” tank destroyer, Lake Balaton battle, 1945.

Hetzer captured by the Russian army, Czechoslovakia, 1945.

Jagdpanzer 38 of an unknown Panzerjäger unit in Italy, 1945

Jagdpanzer 38 captured by Czech insurgents, Prague, May 1945.

Bulgarian Jagdpanzer 38, March 1945.

Unknown unit, ambush camouflage, Germany, April-May 1945

Unknown unit, Bohemia, 1945.

Variants

Befehlspanzerjäger 38, 741st Antitank Battalion, Eastern Front, 1944.

Flammpanzer 38, 352nd Panzer-Flamm-Kompanie, Army Group G, Belgium, December 1944.

Jagdpanzer 38 Starr (1945). Being rather disappointing, the six built of this much simplified versions were converted back as regular Hetzers.

Panzerjäger 38 mit 75 mm L/70.

Swiss G13 in 1960, notice the spare roadwheel should be on the other side. For identification only.

Derivatives

Bergepanzer 38.

Another, more common type of Aufklärungspanzer mit 7,5 cm KwK-37 L/23.

Jagdpanzer 38 mit 7,5 cm KwK-37 L/23, Battle of the Bulge, winter 1944-1945.

Vollkettenaufklärer 38 prototype.

Has Own Video WW2 German Tank Destroyers

Jagdtiger (Sd.Kfz.186)

German Reich (1943-1945)
Tank Destroyer – 74 Built

The Jagdtiger was the heaviest armored vehicle to see service in World War Two, yet paradoxically, the vehicle has remained somewhat enigmatic with confusion over its development, production and role. The design process started out with a demand for a heavy assault gun back in 1942 when the war was still in Germany’s favor and the army needed a heavily armored and armed vehicle to smash enemy fortifications. However, by the time the Jagdtiger, based on the Tiger II tank, came along two years later, the original need for the vehicle had vanished and it was put to work as a heavy tank destroyer instead. Despite its huge size, impressive armor and powerful main gun, the Jagdtiger failed to live up to expectations.

Chassis No. 305004, one of 11 Jagdtigers built with the Porsche suspension system. This vehicle is now part of the collection at The Tank Museum, Bovington. Photo: The Tank Museum

Tank Destroyer or Assault Gun

The majority of people looking at the Jagdtiger (English: ‘Hunting Tiger’) would conclude that the use of the vehicle, the ‘hunting’ part of its name and the shape of it would undoubtedly make it a tank destroyer. Nonetheless, it was actually originally conceived as an assault gun to support the infantry. The combination of heavy armor and a powerful cannon equally adept at penetrating enemy strong points, delivering high explosive, and defeating enemy armored vehicles was the priority, with the speed seen as less important. The range of fire of the Jagdtiger’s 12.8 cm gun could classify the vehicle as a self-propelled gun (indirect fire capability had been an original requirement but was subsequently dropped), and the confusion over name and role resulted in an argument within the German military over who controlled them. If the vehicle was designated as a Sturmgeschütz (Eng. Assault Gun), it would belong to the artillery but, if it was designated as a Panzerjäger (Eng. Tank Destroyer), it would belong to the tank destroyers. The StuG. argument was bolstered by Hitler and the Inspector-General of the Panzer Troops in late March 1944. On 13th July 1944, the squabble over the name was seemingly put to rest by Heinz Guderian, Chief of the Army General Staff (who was also the General of Artillery), when he listed the vehicle as “Panzerjäger with 12.8cm Pak. L/55 on Tiger II chassis” or ‘Jagdtiger’.

The Call For a 12.8 cm Gun

As far back as spring 1942, the German Army General Staff were requesting a 12.8 cm gun mounted on a self-propelled chassis as a ‘heavy assault gun’ capable of both supporting the infantry against armored targets (such as tanks and bunkers) as well as unarmored ones. By May 1942, Hitler was ordering a rifled anti-tank gun of that caliber and, in a letter from Wa Pruef 4 (German design office for artillery) to Friedrich Krupp of Essen on 2nd February 1943, the 12.8 cm Jagdpanzer concept was born. The letter set out the idea of mounting of a 12.8 cm Stu.K. (Sturm Kanone – Assault gun) on a modified Tiger H3. The ‘Tiger H3’ concerned was the Tiger II, which was not named as such until March 1943, following the abandonment of the the VK45.02(H) project, which was known at the time as Tiger II.

The requirements for the modifications meant moving the engine forwards on the chassis with the firm of Henschel und Sohn of Kassel responsible for that part of the project. The 12.8 cm gun in question was at the time intended to be taken, along with the gun gear such as brake and recuperator, completely unchanged from the Pz.Kpfw.VIII Maus – the 12.8 cm Kw.K. L/55 (Kw.K. – Kampfwagen Kanone – Fighting vehicle gun). Strong emphasis was also placed on the removal of the muzzle brake as this allowed the use of Treibspiegel (Sabot) shells for heavy anti-armor work. Developed by Krupp as the Treibspiegel-Geschoss mit H-Kern for the 12.8 cm gun on the Maus, these were high-velocity shells with a sub-calibre core made from an 8.8 cm Pz.Gr.40. Travelling at about 1,260 m/s, they were estimated to be able to penetrate 245 mm of armor at 30 degrees from 1,000 metres away. Although this shell was not developed to the point of service and issue for the Jagdtiger, the result was that the 12.8 cm gun could not have a muzzle brake for this would have adversely affected the sabot coming off the core as it left the barrel. Not using a brake, however, meant a lot more recoil energy needed to be dealt with on the mountings for the gun.

From Early Work to the Prototype

By the end of March 1943, the chassis destined for this 12.8 cm gun was going to be either from the Panther or Tiger II. A mockup was prepared on the hull of a Panther, but this was quickly discarded as being unsuitable. Drawings from Henschel for the alternative design on a Tiger II chassis were therefore to be ready by June 1943 and, initially, Dr. Erwin Aders (design lead at Henschel) was considering armor for the design to be up to 200 mm thick on the front and up to 100 mm on the sides, although this was to be subject to change in order to keep the weight to 70-tonnes or less.

Rival Tigerjäger Designs

On 12th April 1943, Henschel presented two designs for the vehicle which was being referred to as the Tigerjäger. The first design (Design A) disregarded the plan to move the engine to the front and kept the engine at the back, but even so, the hull still had to be lengthened by 300 mm. The frontal armor for this vehicle is described by Spielberger, Jentz, and Doyle (2007) as being 150 mm at 40 degrees and 200 mm thick on the 60 degree sloping part. The side armor had been reduced though, from the 100 mm desired in March to 80 mm in order to keep the weight down.

The width of the fighting compartment for the tank had been reduced too by 40 mm, as it would otherwise be too large to be shipped by rail. With an agreement on 14th April on the new design of the gun and the adoption of two-piece ammunition which simplified stowage, the whole gun and mounting could be moved 200 mm further back on the hull thus improving the center of gravity and taking off a lot of the load on the front wheels. Reducing the rail profile and keeping the heavy armor meant the movement of the gun was slightly restricted and reduced the depression available by 1 degree (from -8 to -7). A final modification was the lowering of the driver’s seat by 100 mm which lowered the plate over his head. This cover was designed to be a large plate encompassing both of the forward crew hatches (driver and radio operator) and was removable by a series of set-screws attaching it to the roof plate of the lower hull, allowing for the transmission to be removed. “This design choice was in response to lessons learned on the Tiger I and VK45.02(H) projects”. Neither of these had a removable cover and extracting the transmission for repairs involved first lifting the turret out of the hull! The Tiger II had a removable cover, though the turret had to be turned to allow full access. The cover did not solve the problems for this Tigerjäger design as even though there was no turret,the overhang of the gun prevented transmission removal; it therefore required the gun to be withdrawn from the casemate to do this task, no small job.

The second design (Design B) for a Tigerjäger followed the original requirement for the engine moved into the front but had significant drawbacks, not least that the vehicle was too large to ship by rail. The desired -8 gun depression could also not be achieved because with the engine and ancillaries in front of the casemate, it raised the hull roof. The gun would also have impeded maintenance of the engine whilst offering no substantial advantages over Design A. Design B, despite being the initial design demanded, was dropped. The Jagdtiger would follow the layout of Tigerjäger Design A.

The 12.8 cm Panzerjäger

By 5th May 1943, the vehicle, now being referred to as the ‘12.8 cm Panzerjäger’, was determined to weigh 75 tonnes. It was to have the field of motion for the 12.8 cm gun widened from 15 degrees each way to 18 degrees, but still wanting +15 to -8 for elevation. Based on the Tiger II, the armor was this new vehicle determined to be 200 mm thick on the front of the body, 80mm on the sides and back, and 30 mm on the roof. This roof thickness was an obvious compromise considering the Tiger I and Tiger II were to have 40 mm thick rooves to protect from plunging shell fire and aircraft attack. The 12.8 cm Panzerjäger dimensions were roughly fixed too: about 10 m long, 3.59 m wide and 3.47 m high. Fitted with the same 800 mm wide tracks as the Tiger II, this vehicle had a longer ground-contact length of 4.635 m resulting in a ground pressure of just 1.01 kg/cm2. Based upon these dimensions and the decided layout, a wooden mockup was ordered, although the design of the gun was not going to be finished by Krupp until 1st July 1943 and design changes were still taking place.

Henschel, to simplify production, had requested that the hulls be made separately to the casemate, but this was rejected as it made fire and waterproofing harder, and a rectangular hatch (700 mm x 600 mm) was added in the rear of the casemate for removal of the gun. The requirements set in May had slipped by June that year when Wa Pruef 6 agreed to allow just 10 degrees of traverse each side and -7.5 degrees of depression.

Around May 1943, Henschel had determined that as a result of design changes, the weight had been brought down to 70 tonnes complete (the hull alone weighing 43-tonnes) with 200 mm thick frontal armor, 80 mm on the sides and rear, and a casemate roof now 40 mm thick. Drawings for this vehicle were to be finished and submitted to Wa Pruef 6 by 15th June with the expectation that a prototype would be finished in December.

The wooden mockup of the vehicle referred to as the ‘12.8 cm Tiger-Jaeger’ was ready in September, as it was inspected on 28th September by Colonel Crohn (Wa Pruef 6) and Major Weiche (Inspector-General Armoured Troops), who recommended the elimination of aiming spot lamps, firing ports and the gunner’s hatch. Other changes included the enlargement of the commander’s hatch and rearrangement of the periscopes. The relatively small changes to the roof were added to a decision to increase the upper front plate from 200 mm to 250 mm and to make the hull roof 40 mm thick.

Wooden mockup of the 12.8 cm Panzerjäger. The presence of the aiming spot lamp still on the roof indicates this photo was taken probably no later than 28th September 1943. Source: Spielberger, Jentz, and Doyle

The amended and full-size wooden mockup was then shown off to Hitler on 20th October 1943 at the troop training centre at Ayrs, East Prussia, identified as ‘heavy Panzerjäger with 12.8 cm L/55 on Tiger II chassis.’

Full-size wooden mockup of the ‘12.8cm Panzerjäger’ shown off to Hitler on 20th October 1943. Of note are the small patches on the upper-left of the casemate perhaps indicating the location of the firing ports eliminated after 28th September 1943. In the background is a wooden mockup of a Jagdpanther and in the front of the picture is an Italian P.26/40 with the periscopes missing. Source: Spielberger, Jentz, and Doyle

Production was approved for this 12.8 cm Panzerjäger and the first production vehicle was ready on 6th April 1944.

Layout and Crew

Having considered both the Panther and Tiger hulls for the mount for the 12.8 cm gun, the vehicle selected for use was the Tiger II which was, at the time, still on the drawing board at Henschel. In order to fit the gun onto the chassis of the Tiger II, the chassis had to be lengthened by 260 mm and on top of this hull was placed a large flat-sided casmate for housing the main gun and four of the crew. The engine remained at the back and the transmission at the front, as on the Tiger II, and the hull crew positions were also retained. Inside this giant casemate would fit the no-less enormous 12.8 cm gun breech. In essence, this was the layout of the Jagdtiger, a box with a gun in the front of it sat on top of a Tiger II chassis.

The Jagdtiger had a crew of six men. The crew in the hull retained their role and positions from the Tiger II, with the driver located in the front left and the radio operator in the front right. This radio operator also had control over the secondary armament, a machine gun located in a mount in the glacis to his front. In the casemate were the remaining 4 crew. This crew consisted of a commander (front right), the gunner (front left), and two loaders located in the rear of the casemate. By 1945, with severe pressures on training caused by the war, some tank crews were even sent directly to the Nibelungen works to help with the production of the tanks they were to crew, both as a means to help familiarise them with the vehicles but also to help with production.

Production

Just as with Henschel, where the bodies of the Tiger and Tiger II were made by Krupp and then shipped to them for finishing and fitting into a fighting tank, the same is true of the Jagdtiger. The Nibelungen works did the construction, fitting, and assembly of components including the gun, but the basic armored hull was made at a different site, namely the Eisenwerke Oberdonau (Oberdonau Iron Works) in Linz, modern-day Austria.

The first prototype vehicle was assembled in Workshop VIII at the Nibelungen plant in Autumn 1943 but was fitted with a trial superstructure, Porsche suspension, and no armament. The hole in the glacis for the machine gun mount was blanked off and the vehicle was used for running trials. The second prototype was not finished until the new year and both prototypes (305001 with Porsche suspension and 305002 with Henschel suspension) were then delivered to the Army Ordnance Office for testing in February 1944.

Prototype Jagdtiger with Porsche suspension, Autumn 1943 at the Nibelungen plant. Source: Winninger

Despite the delivery of 15 hulls from Eisenwerke Oberdonau in April, 12 more in May, and 10 more in June 1944, production of further vehicles did not begin until June 1944, with just a single vehicle complete as production problems, including the preparation of machinery and rails inside the plant, were being resolved. Firstly, the Nibelungen works had to make changes to the production line in order to accomodate the fact that after the first batch of vehicles (10)* fitted with Porsche suspension had been finished, all future vehicles were going to have Henschel suspension. That was not the only production issue either. Eisenwerke Oberdonau had some production problems of their own which then caused knock-on problems for the Nibelungen works, not least of which affected quality. Vehicle 3005005, a Porsche suspension Jagdtiger, had such defects with the construction of the armor at the front that it was unfit for service and relegated to homeland use. The protracted development of the gun and mount had caused problems too which now became apparent. The Nibelungen works had to grind off up to 40 mm of steel from the inside walls of the casemate in places to allow the gun to traverse fully, and the cradle for the gun was a problem too. It was being made larger than it was designed to be and thus fouling on the front plate. This meant it had to be moved forward slightly with the outcome that it now fouled on the hull roof, restricting depression to just 6.5 degrees. With little option but to approve this 0.5 degree loss of depression, Wa Pruef 6 agreed to the changes but wanted them fixed as production went forward.

*Including the prototype this means 11 Jagdtigers were built with Porsche suspension: chassis numbers 305001, 305003-305012

Drilling out the holes for the suspension and the boring mills in Workshop V at the Nibelungen plant. Source: Wittinger

Other changes of a minor nature were made internally to the gun elevation mechanism, gun bridge, ammunition racks, and gunner’s seat. Externally, throughout production only five things were changed of consequence: the omission of sheet-metal shields over the exhausts (July 1944); the addition of a barrel brace (gun crutch) (August 1944); the addition of Zimmerit (from September 1944); the fitting of external hooks on the casemate sides for spare track links (December 1944); and the addition of ‘mushrooms’ (Pilzen) on the upper edges of the side and rear plates which were mountings for attaching a small crane.

Following a 12th October 1944 discussion with Hitler, it was planned to produce just 150 of these vehicles after which production would be switched over to the Panther. The planned 150 was broken down to an estimated rate of 30 Jagdtigers per month, a figure based on the availability of the 12.8 cm gun barrels, although 50 vehicles per month were demanded of the plant at Nibelungen which was building them.

Thirty guns a month would mean a complete production run of 5 months, and fifty vehicles a month would have reduced this to just 3 months worth of production. By 25th October 1944, with delays in the production of the Jagdtiger not meeting the numbers demanded, Hitler ordered that 53 12.8 cm anti tank guns from the Jagdtiger program should be mounted on captured Russian or French carriages to fulfill the needs of the army in the short-term.

The original order for 150 Jagdtigers was increased on 3rd January 1945 by Hitler, who demanded the continuation of production even though the production of the 12.8 cm gun barrels was a significant bottleneck in production. By the end of 1944, just 49 Jagdtigers plus the two prototypes had been finished, well behind the original schedule. Production was therefore scheduled to run through April 1945 with another 100 Jagdtigers planned, after which production would switch to the Tiger II instead. The Jagdtiger was not to be terminated however; production would simply switch to the firm of Jung in Jungenthal instead, with the first 5 planned to be ready in May 1945, 15 in June, and then 25 per month through to the end of the year.

On 25th February 1945, ‘extreme measures’ were ordered by Hitler to increase production of the Jagdtiger, which included the temporary expedient of fitting an 8.8 cm gun (the 8.8 cm KwK. Pak. 43/3) in lieu of the 12.8 cm piece if there were insufficient 12.8 cm guns available. During this period, by way of context, production of the Tiger II which had started in September 1943 was supposed to be reaching 50 vehicles a month from April through June 1944 (150 vehicles), but only 53 vehicles were completed during that period. By February 1945, when the ‘extreme measures’ were ordered to produce the Jagdtiger, production of the Tiger II was supposed to be 150 units a month but had only managed 42.

Vehicle number 54 during construction at the Nibelungen Works. Source: Schneider

Neither the rate of 30 per month (gun production) or 50 per month (vehicle production) were ever actually met, with monthly production in the region of 20 or fewer each month due to shortages of materials and labor combined with the effects of Allied bombing.

By the end of February 1945, just 74 vehicles (chassis number 305001 to 305075*) were completed. Along with the original prototype vehicle, this meant that production reached just 50% of the original requirement.

*See Below

A Jagdtiger hull damaged during a bombing raid on the Nibelungen works on 16th October 1944 affording a unique look inside. Source: Frohlich and Schneider respectively

Chassis Numbers

The official production number of Jagdtigers is usually quoted as running from serial number 305001 to 305075, meaning a total production of 74 vehicles. Chamberlain and Doyle (1997), state that chassis numbers went from 305001 to 305077 which would mean 76 vehicles. Winninger (2013) provides a production table from the factory showing serial 305075 was a March production serial number and that March production was to run from 305075 to 305081, with seven vehicles listed as delivered. April production lists serial number 305082 to 305088, another 7 vehicles, and then 305089 to 305098 (10 vehicles), with just 3 delivered. Some of these were supposed to be fitted with the 8.8 cm gun under Sonderkraftfahrzeug number Sd.Kfz.185 and some were built but not accepted, meaning the exact number of 12.8 cm armed Jagdtiger produced cannot be accurately determined.

Armor

The Jagdtiger, as can be expected of an assault gun, had the bulk of its armor at the front, with armor 250 mm thick on the front of the casemate, 150 mm thick on the glacis, and 100 mm thick on the lower front. The forward part of the hull had a 50 mm thick roof, although the rest of the roof over the casemate and engine deck was 40 mm thick. Of note here is that the roof of the casemate was not welded into place like the roof of the Tiger or Tiger II, but was actually bolted onto the superstructure.

Jagdtiger with the casemate roof unbolted and removed showing the enormous size of the breech for the 12.8 cm gun. Source: Spielberger

The lower hull sides were 80 mm thick and so were the upper hull sides, but these were also sloped inwards at 25 degrees affording the crew inside a good deal of protection from enemy fire as long as they remained facing the enemy or at an oblique angle.

Armour thicknesses for the Jagdtiger. Source: Jentz and Doyle

Even the rear of the Jagdtiger had 80 mm thick plates including the pair of large gas-tight doors at the back. The thinnest parts of the armor were under the sponsons over the tracks which were just 25 mm thick, and under the engine which was also 25 mm thick. The forward part of the lower hull was 40 mm thick providing good protection for the crew from mines. One final note on the armor is that was it not face-hardened, but rolled homogenous plate.

Manufacturing scheme for the Jagdtiger showing the massive casemate front armor to good effect. Source: Frohlich

Gun, Ammunition, and Performance

In February 1943, the letter from Wa Pruef 4 made it clear that the 12.8 cm gun for the vehicle was to be the same type as the one for the Pz.Kpfw. Maus: a 12.8 cm Kw.K. L/55 with the same gun gear and no muzzle brake. The elevation limits demanded were +15 to -8 degrees with a traversing field of 15 degrees each side. A design of this 12.8 cm gun was therefore requested to be ready by 10th March 1943, and after Krupp handed in the design for the 12.8 cm Stu.K on 28th April 1943, Henschel submitted its own FK-based design which moved the pivot point of the gun 120 mm further back. This moving of the gun’s pivot point allowed a depression of -7.5 degrees to where the gun met the roof, which despite a desire to lower it by 100 mm, could only be lowered by 50 mm instead.

Alone, this gun weighed 5,500 kg, with the cradle adding a further 1,000 kg. The reason for the delay in designing the mounting seems to stem from these issues over gun balance, as the designers at Henschel wanted the gun mounted further back in order to improve weight distribution,and as a result, a model of the gun was not ready from Krupp until 1st July that year. Development of the 12.8 cm gun though was slow, and the first 12.8 cm gun was not ready until the middle of August 1944. When first shown, the gun was mounted on a captured Soviet 152 mm M37 433(r) mount and later on a captured French 155 mm GBF-T cannon 419(f). It should be borne in mind too that the gun was not specifically designed for the Jagdtiger, the firm of Krupp had originally started developing this gun before the Jagdtiger was even planned.

On 15th May 1942 Hitler had expanded development of a 12.8 cm gun to include Rheinmetall-Borsig of Düsseldorf, and Skoda-Werke Pilsen and Aktiengesellschaft (A.G.) to assist Krupp in order to get the gun into production as soon as possible.

First firing trials of a 12.8 cm gun with Armor Piercing ammunition took place at Meppen in October 1943.

Even with their assistance, the work was slow. Rheinmetall’s design for the 12.8 cm gun reached the stage of several prototypes but was not approved, while the design from Skoda-Werke never left the drawing board. As such, only the Krupp 12.8 cm gun (made by Krupp at the Bertawerke in Breslau and at the Krupp plant in Essen) was ever mounted in the Jagdtiger and only about 160 of these guns were ever made.

12.8 cm Pak. 44 (Pak.80) L/55 Source: Frohlich

Despite some commentary on the internet to the contrary, this 12.8 cm had nothing to do with the entirely different 12.8 cm Flak 40 anti-aircraft gun which ended up being mounted on the two VK30.01(H) Tiger chassis, popularly know as Sturer Emil. What is more, the antiaircraft 12.8 cm was a two-piece barrel design, whereas the Pak. 12.8 cm was a single-piece barrel. Moreover, the ammunition for the anti-aircraft gun was unitary, whereas on this 12.8 cm it was to be a two-piece design to save internal space.

Once finished, this new Krupp gun was designated the 12.8 cm Pak. 44 L/55 (Pak – Panzerabwehrkanone) and later redesignated as the 12.8 cm Pak. 80. This gun was big and heavy; the barrel alone weighed 2.2 tonnes and was 7.02 metres long (rifling extended for 6.61 m of this) meaning that two barrel supports were needed for when the vehicle was travelling, one on the front glacis of the tank and a second internally within the casemate.

Despite the delay in development and delivery of this gun, Colonel Crohn wrote to Krupp on 24th September 1943 suggesting an improvement to the firepower before the first 12.8 cm L/55 was even finished. This new gun suggested was a 12.8 cm Kw.K. L/70 which could fit into the original and unmodified Krupp-mount for the L/55. Krupp replied to that idea on 21st October 1943, stating that it had completed a drawing of this plan and that with the 12.8 cm L/70 fitted, the centre-of-gravity of the vehicle was seriously affected, making it significantly nose-heavy and causing the gun to overhang the front by about 4.9 m. The solution offered by Krupp to this problem was to suggest an alternative scheme with the casemate moved once more to the rear with the engine-forwards, just like the Tigerjäger Design B. The idea for this longer 12.8 cm gun was then discontinued and the focus returned to the 12.8 cm L/55 instead.

The ‘extreme measures’ ordered by Hitler on 25th February 1945 to increase Jagdtiger production had included the possibility of substituting an 8.8 cm gun in lieu of the 12.8 cm piece to increase the speed of production. The fitting, or otherwise of this gun has been subject to a lot of confusion but it never entered service and in the end, these measures proved unproductive.

The original specifications called for a gun with a range of up to 21 km but a weight of less than 6.5 tonnes. This requirement would indicate that the gun for the Jagdtiger (an assault gun) was for use as artillery indirect-fire as much as it was for direct-fire. Traverse for the gun was limited to 10 degrees left and 10 degrees right with elevation ranging from -7 to +10 degrees. Direct-fire sighting from the telescopes ranged the gun for targets up to 4 km for the Panzergranate 43 Armor Piercing High Explosive (APCBC-HE) shell and 8 km for the Sp.Gr. L/50 high explosive shell.

Despite the original consideration of a special high-velocity anti-armor shell with a sub-caliber core, no such shell was deployed on the Jagdtiger. These shells known as Treibspiegel-Geschoss mit H-Kern used the 8.8 cm Pz.Gr.40 as the armor piercing core of the shell and were being developed for the Maus program at the time the gun was selected for modification into the Jagdtiger program. With the arrival of the Pz.Gr.43 and the significant increase it brought in terms of penetrating armor, the experimental and expensive idea for these sub-calibre rounds was effectively redundant. They have been included in the following table for the purposes of reference only.

Looking at the performance data from the various sources for the performance of the Pz.Gr.39 and Pz.Gr.43 provides a great deal of confusion, and not just in modern scholarship. A British intelligence report from 1944 quoting figures from a captured German document provided identical performance for the Pz.Gr.43 to that usually quoted in modern literature for the Pz.Gr.39. Contemporary documents from Germany also show a Pz.Gr.39 as Capped (APC) and not Ballistic Capped (APCBC) with those figures. What is unusual about the British intelligence document is that it quotes both the Pz.39 and the Pz.Gr.43 together, whereas other sources usually reference just the Pz.Gr.39 and omit Pz.Gr.43 performance. The question therefore is which is right and which is wrong. A table (below) is provided for comparison.

Secondary armament for the Jagdtiger consisted of a single MG.34 mounted in the front-right of the hull. For this machine gun, 1,500 rounds of ammunition were carried.

Stowage of ammunition inside the casemate of the Jagdtiger. Source: Schneider

The huge gun left little space for ammunition stowage. Ammunition was stored in the floor and side walls of the casemate and, even using two-piece ammunition, the Jagdtiger could carry just 40 rounds of ammunition. It is not known how many 8.8 cm rounds could have been carried for the vehicles (if any) which were fitted with that caliber gun, although it may not have been many more, as the 8.8 cm ammunition was single piece, which would have made stowage harder and less efficient. One final note on 12.8 cm armament is that at some point another gun between the 12.8 cm L/55 and the L/70 was contemplated. This was also a 12.8 cm gun but had a barrel length of L/66. It was not just the gun which changed either; the entire structure was lower by about 20 cm because of adjustments to the mounts for the gun. With the L/66, the gun projected 4.4 m from the front of the tank but still provided an elevation range of +15 to -7.5.

Modified Jagdtiger with 12.8 cm L/66. Source: Hoffschmidt and Tantum

Sadly there is no information about this proposed modification, but based on the discussion over improving the performance of the L/55, it would likely date to the end of 1943, although some unverified information suggests it was considered as late as November 1944. One additional feature other than the gun and lower casemate is the large box-structure at the back over the engine deck. Unfortunately only this side view is available, so the shape of this box is debatable. From the drawing, it does appear that the engine deck may be slightly shorter than on the production Jagdtiger, although this may simply be a mistake on the drawing as the dimensions are primarily concerned with the front end and not the back.

Optics

There is no point in having either a large gun or an effective shell if you cannot get the gun on target and get the shell to hit said target, and with a rate of fire of just 3 rounds per minute, the Jagdtiger was significantly slower to fire than other tanks, meaning it was all the more important that what was fired hit the target. One problem was the lack of a turret, which hindered all-round observation, and as a result, the Jagdtiger was fitted with a rotating hatch for the commander on the front right of the casemate with a periscope integrated into it. In front of this periscope was a rectangular flap within the hatch which could be opened separately. Through that hatch-within-a-hatch, the commander could insert a stereoscopic rangefinder. The commander was also provided with a single fixed periscope facing to the right.

Commander’s hatch on the front-right corner of the Jagdtiger with a fixed periscope and also a secondary hatch for the stereoscopic rangefinder. Source: Schneider

The gunner of the Jagdtiger, who was sat in the front left, did not have a roof hatch, but instead, had a large curved sliding cover through which a Winkelzielfernrohr (WZF) 2/1 10x magnification aiming telescope projected out. Behind this cover, on the roof, was a further periscope in a rotating mount and two more fixed periscopes pointed diagonally backwards from the rear corner at each side of the casemate.

Roof of the Jagdtiger facing backwards. The commander’s hatch appears bottom left of the image and the sliding cover for the gunner’s aiming telescope is bottom right. The circular hole directly behind the gunner’s telescope cover is a port for the Nahverteidigungswaffe (close defence weapon) Source: Schneider

In February 1943, it was decided that optics for the main gun were to consist of an Sfl.Z.F.5 and Rbl.F36 sight for both direct and indirect fire. Using the WZF 2/1 angled periscope, the vehicle could deliver accurate fire out to 4km with the Pz.Gr.43 and 8km with the Spr.Gr. L/5.0, although the original plan for indirect fire had been dropped along the way. The Jagdtiger was now just a direct-fire vehicle. Production vehicles were fitted with the Sfl.14Z and WZF 217 sights for the primary armament. Test firings of the 12.8cm gun showed the accuracy to be excellent with the Pz.Gr.43 achieving hits within 50% of the width and height of the target between 46cm and 86cm of the centre at 1000m, and between 90 cm and 118 cm at 2000 m. This was slightly worse for the standard AP shell with an accuracy of 128 cm to 134 cm of the centre of the target at 2000 m.

Arrangement of the gunner’s stereoscopic rangefinder. Note that the breech is incorrectly shown opening downwards rather than to the left. Source: Spielberger, Jentz, and Doyle

Running Gear

Other than extending the hull, the suspension and running gear of the Jagdtiger was essentially unchanged from the Tiger II. It consisted of full width torsion bars for each of the nine wheel stations fitted with 800 mm diameter steel wheels running over 80 mm wide tracks with 95 links per side and a ground clearance of 460 mm.

One curiosity for many is that two early Jagdtigers (hulls 1 and 4) were fitted with the Porsche running gear from the Elefant for the purposes of evaluation after Dr. Porsche had convinced Hitler of the benefits of his suspension in January 1944. Consisting of four wheel-units made from a pair of 700 mm diameter steel road wheels on each side, the Porsche system offered a production advantage over the Henschel running gear. Porsche promised than it took a third less time to produce than Henschel’s system, reduced the hull construction time as well as machining time, required less maintenance, and could actually be completely replaced in the field without removing other parts and without the use of a jack.

Two base Jagdtiger hulls showing the obvious differences between the amount of machining required on each hull. The Porsche-suspension hull (left) clearly requiring less cutting than the Henschel-suspension hull (right). Source: Frohlich

Despite the use of Porsche suspension, the system still used torsion bars – 1,077 mm long bars – but these were mounted longitudinally rather than transversely across the hull, and had pairs of wheels connected on a bogie attached to the bar. This reduced the number of bars to just 4 with two pairs of wheels on each bar, and in so doing, saved about 1,200 kg in weight, 450 man-hours of work time, gained 100 mm more ground clearance, and saved RM 404,000 (Reichsmarks) in cost. Much more importantly though, the use of this suspension freed up space inside the vehicle, an entire cubic metre extra in fact.

Jagdtiger chassis number 305001 fitted with the Porsche running gear seen in Spring 1944. Source: Spielberger, Jentz, and Doyle

However, this Porsche system was not adopted and only ten of the chassis were ever fitted with this system. The promise it held for improvements were simply not borne out by trials held in May 1944, and it failed to live up to the desired performance. In particular, it resulted in a lot of shaking on a hard road when driven at 14-15 km/h. Initially, this was blamed on the Type Gg 24/800/300 tracks, and as a result, these were switched for the Type Kgs 64/640/130 tracks from the Elefant, but to no avail. With testing behind it having proven unsuccessful, the Porsche system was abandoned and the Henschel system was retained instead. As a result, by September 1944, only production of the Henschel suspension Jagdtigers was underway.

Pictured in March 1945 near Morsbronn, this Jagdtiger is one of the 10 fitted with the Porsche running gear. Source: Schneider

The transmission for the Jagdtiger was the same standard gearbox as on the Tiger II, a Maybach eight-speed OLVAR OG40-1216B (made by Adlerwerke of Frankfurt and Zahnradfabrik of Friedrichshafen) connected to the same Maybach HL 230 P30 TRM as fitted to the Tiger II and Panther. This engine was simply underpowered for a vehicle of the bulk of the Tiger II, let alone this even heavier Jagdtiger. One option which was still at the planning stage by the end of the war was the replacement of that Maybach engine with a 16-cylinder X engine made by Simmering-Pauker.

800 hp 36.8 litre Simmering-Pauker X-16 engine with Mann und Hummel air filter. Source: Frohlich

Delivering up to 800 horsepower*, this 36.5 litre* engine would have provided a significant performance boost for the Jagdtiger, and for that matter, potentially for the Tiger II and Panther as well. The engine had the added advantage that it was more compact than the HL230 and well suited to the tight confines of a tank’s engine bay. The most noticeable change adding this engine to the Jagdtiger would have made would have been seen at the back with the exhaust near to the top of the back plate. The engine was never fitted and how far along plans were to incorporate it into production is unknown.

*some sources provide data for the X16 engine as 36.5 litre producing up to 760 hp and there is also an 18 cylinder version although data on both is often contradictory.

Simmering-Pauker X-16 engine as shown fitted in a Jagdtiger. Source: Frohlich

Paintwork

From the end of 1944 onwards, the exteriors of Jagdtigers produced at Nibelungen were painted in a red anti-corrosion primer which was then painted over in varying quality with dark yellow and green. The interiors which had previously been painted an ivory colour were left in the red primer colour instead to save time. Camouflage was left to units to apply in the field once they had received their vehicles.

Combat

The first user of the Jagdtiger was supposed to be 3rd Company Panzerjäger Training Abteilung 130, which was scheduled to receive 14 vehicles in March 1944, with two assigned to company staff and the three platoons receiving four each. Due to delays in production, that plan did not materialize and instead, the first user became Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 653 (s.Pz. Jg.Abt. 653), which had previously been operating the Elefant. By the end of November 1944, this unit had received 16 Jagdtigers.

1st Company s.Pz.Jg.Abt.653 took 14 Jagdtigers to the Western Front in December 1944 for the planned offensive in the Ardennes. Back on 3rd November 1944, these 14 Jagdtigers had been earmarked to form part of 3rd Company s.SS.Pz.Abt.501, but this was revoked by Hitler the next day. As it was, the 14 Jagdtigers were sent, but due to rail transportation issues resulting from Allied bombing, only 6 Jagdtigers managed to get to a staging area behind the lines at Blankenheim and took no part in the offensive. On 23rd December 1944, they were withdrawn as the entire s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 was being redeployed in order to take part in Operation Nordwind (Eng: Northwind).

On New Years Eve 1944, three Jagdtigers of s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 under the command of Commander Major Fromme and subordinated to the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division ‘Gotz von Berlichingen’, 1st Army of Army Group G, took part in the operation. This unit saw sporadic action against American forces in the Schwenningen-Chiemsee area of Southern Germany but the successes were minor and after just a few days the unit was disbanded. At around this time, s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 had a listed strength of just six Jagdtigers on 4th January 1945. By 9th January 1945, s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 was down to just two Jagdtigers in operational condition in the area of Boppard, where there was a repair depot, albeit without cranes. Of note on maintenance is that in the period from 30th December 1944 to 26th April 1945, s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 had a peak of 41 Jagdtigers with a peak operational readiness of 38 out of 41 on 15th March 1945 and its lowest operational readiness on 22nd March with just 2 out of 33 Jagdtigers operational.

Two Jagdtigers of s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 took part in combat near to an enemy bunker line adjacent to the German town of Auenheim on 17th January 1945. Attached to XIV SS Army Corps, they were used for fire support for an infantry attack. The next day, they were in action again against American forces and the German report on their action showed that their accuracy at 1,000 m against the enemy bunker was excellent, and after just two shots, the armored cupola of the bunker was burning. When the Americans counterattacked with tanks, one Sherman was hit and knocked out by means of a high explosive shell. In total, these two Jagdtigers fired 56 shells (46 HE and 10 Anti-tank) and suffered no losses to enemy fire. The unit did lose at least one Jagdtiger in this period though; it was later captured by US forces after having been abandoned in working order.

The fate of many Jagdtigers was to break down or run out of fuel and be destroyed by the crew; others fell victim to the total air-superiority enjoyed by the Allies towards the end of the war. This Porsche-suspension vehicle belonging to s.Pz.Abt.653 was destroyed by the crew setting off a charge internally which, in turn, detonated the ammunition completely destroying the vehicle. Source: Culler

On 5th February 1945, s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 had 22 Jagdtigers ready for action and a further 19 under repair when it supported the left flank of First Army of Army Group G in action in the region of the Drusenheimer Forest near to the French/German border. Whatever tactical successes the unit may have had however were at odds with the totally hopeless strategic position, and on 5th May 1945, the remaining Jagdtigers of s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653 surrendered to Allied forces near Amstetten, where Soviet and American forces had met. One Jagdtiger surrendered here was subsequently taken back to the Soviet Union and remains in the collection at Kubinka.

The other user of the Jagdtiger was s.Pz.Abt.512, formed 11th February 1945 at Paderborn from the remnants of s.Pz.Abt.424 (formerly s.Pz.Abt.501) and with troops from s.Pz.Abt.511. Forty-two Jagdtigers were destined for this unit consisting of 10 for each of three companies (30), one for each of the company commanders (3), and one for each platoon commander (9), and it was expected to be fully operational by the beginning of March 1945.

1st company s.Pzj. Abt. 512 under the command of Oberleutnant Ernst had only half its nominal complement of 12 Jagdtigers when it engaged US forces at the Remagen bridgehead. These six tanks first retreated to the area of Siegen and then on through the Ludenscheid-Hagen area to the Ergste region, and then once more to relieve German forces at Unna.

2nd Company, under the Command of Oberleutnant Carius, was shipped by rail to the area of Siegburg where it fought alongside LIII Panzer Corps. Two vehicles were lost and 2nd Company retreated along the Sieg when two more were lost to enemy air attacks. There were two further losses in combat around Siegen and Weidenau to mechanical failure.

On 11th April 1945, 2nd Company, which had only been cleared for combat on 30th March, was involved in the defence of Unna against the 1st and 9th US Armies advancing on Paderborn. The five Jagdtigers of the unit stood no chance of halting the American advance. 2nd Company was at a strength of just 7 Jagdtigers by the time of its surrender on 15th April. The 1st and 3rd Companies of s.Pzj. Abt. 512 fared no better and surrendered on 16th April at Iserlohn. In its short existence the unit had achieved relatively little, although 1st Company was credited with the destruction of 16 enemy tanks in the region south of Unna alone, meaning in one way that these vehicles were eclipsing their Allied rivals, albeit too little and far too late for Germany.

Jagdtiger knocked out by fighter-bombers near to St.Andreasberg, Harz mountain region 16th April 1945.

Nine Jagdtigers of s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512 remained in Austria though and were put to use by the 6th SS Panzer Army. On 9th May 1945, they engaged Soviet tank forces and destroyed several enemy tanks before they abandoned their last two serviceable vehicles and retreated towards the Americans to surrender to them rather than the Soviets. An unknown number of Jagdtigers were also used in the region of the Harz Mountains at the end of the war.

Conclusion

The fate of many Jagdtigers was simply to be abandoned or blown up by their own crews. Maintenance was a huge issue as the already overstressed components intended for the Tiger II were stretched yet further with the additional 10 tonnes from this vehicle. A lack of spare parts, a lack of maintenance equipment such a heavy recovery vehicles, cranes, and specialist tools combined with inexperienced crews (especially drivers) meant that the Jagdtiger never reached its potential on the battlefield. The value of the vehicle is also questionable. Big, heavy, and labor intensive, the Jagdtiger cost the equivalent of two Panzer IVs to construct and on the battlefield they failed to provide a return on this enormous investment worthy of their cost. The consideration of bigger guns like the L/70 when the L/55 was sufficient for the work at hand, the changing between suspension types at the start of production, and the rush to get the Jagdtiger into service stand in contrast to what it achieved. The largest and heaviest tank to see service in WW2 simply failed to perform. The expectations placed upon it as some kind of panacea to fundamental failings in German military strategy, where bigger and heavier tanks with bigger and more powerful guns could stem the tide of Allied armor attacking Germany from both sides, were misplaced. Worse still, the resources it consumed were actually counterproductive to Germany’s war aims. Nonetheless, the Jagdtiger remains a powerful symbol of both the technical advances and also the limits on German industry in a wartime economy.

One of the eleven Jagdtiger mounting the Porsche type suspension, photographed in 1944 at the Mielau training course. Colorized by Jaycee “Amazing Ace” Davis.

Surviving vehicles

Jagdtiger #305004 fitted with Porsche suspension – The Tank Museum, Bovington, UK
Jagdtiger #305020 fitted with Henschel suspension – Fort Benning, Georgia, USA
Jagdtiger #305083 fitted with Henschel suspension – Kubinka Tank Museum, Kubinka

Jagdtiger in a ‘Dunkelgelb’ scheme.

Jagdtiger in a 3-tone camoflauge scheme

Jagdtiger 331 of 3rd Kompanie, Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 653, Germany, March 1945

Jagdtiger 102, Schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 653, Germany, March 1945

These illustrations were produced by Tank Encyclopedia’s own David Bocquelet.

Specifications
Dimensions (L-w-h)	10.654 x (including gun) x 3.625 x 2.945 meters
Total weight, battle ready	72.5 tonnes (Porsche suspension) 73.5 tonnes (Henschel suspension)
Crew	6 (Driver, Radio operator/hull machine gunner, Commander, Gunner, 2 Loaders)
Propulsion	Maybach HL230 P30 TRM 700hp Petrol engine
Suspensions	Double torsion bars and interleaved wheels
Speed (late model)	38 km/h (road)
Armament	12.8 cm PaK 44 L/55 -7° to +15° elevation, traverse 10° R and 10° L
Armor	Glacis: 150mm at 50 deg. Hull Front (Lower): 100mm at 50 deg. Hull Front (Roof): 50mm Hull Sides (Lower) 80mm (vertical) Hull Sides (Upper & Casemate): 80mm at 25 deg. Hull Rear 80mm at 30 deg. Casemate (Roof): 40mm Casemate (Front): 250mm at 15 deg. Casemate (Rear) 80mm at 5 deg Engine Deck: 40mm Floor (Front): 40mm Floor (Rear): 25mm
Built	74
For information about abbreviations check the Lexical Index

Video

Surrender of s.Pz.Jg.Abt.512 to US troops at Iserlohn April 1945

Sources

British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee. (1945). BIOS report 1343: German Steel Armour Piercing Projectiles and Theory of Penetration. Technical Information and Documents Unit, London.
Chamberlain, P., Doyle, H. (1993). Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two. Arms and Armour Press.
Culer, B. (1989). Tiger in Action. Squadron/Signal Publications, TX, USA
Datenblätter für Heeres Waffen Fahrzeuge Gerät W127. (1976).
Duske, H., Greenland,T., Schulz, F. (1996). Nuts and Bolts Vol.1: Jagdtiger
Frohlich, M. (2015). Schwere Panzer der Wehrmacht. Motorbuch Verlag, Germany
General Inspector of the General of the Panzertruppen. (26th June 1944). Notes.
Hoffschmidt, E., Tantum, W. (1988). German Tank and Antitank World War II, WE Inc., CT, USA
Jentz, T., Doyle, H. (1997). Panzer Tracts No.9: Jagdpanzer. Darlington Productions, MD, USA
Jentz, T., Doyle, H. (2008). Panzer Tracts No.6-3: Schwere Panzerkampfwagen Maus and E100. Darlington Productions, MD, USA
Jentz, T., Doyle, H. (1997). Tiger Tanks: VK 45.02 to Tiger II. Schiffer Military history, PA, USA
Lilienthalgesellschaft für Luftfahrtforschung. (1943). Die Vorgänge beim Beschuß von Panzerplatten, 166, Berlin, Germany
Schneider, W. (1986). Rarities of the Tiger family: Elephant, Jagdtiger, Sturmtiger. Schiffer Publishing, PA, USA
Spielberger, W., Doyle, H., Jentz, T. (2007). Heavy Jagdpanzer: Development, Production, Operations. Schiffer Military History, PA, USA
US Army. (1950). Project 47: German Tank Losses. Historical Division European Command. US Army.
US Navy. (September 1945). Technical Report 485-45 – German Powder Composition and Internal Ballistics for Guns. US Naval Technical Mission in Europe Report.
War Office. (25th October 1944). 12.8cm A.Tk. Gun Pak.44 on Pz.Jag. Tiger (Pz.Kpfw. Tiger B Chassis) Sd.Kfz.186 JAGDTIGER. Appendix D War Office Technical Intelligence Summary, No.149 1944.
War Office. (25th April 1945). Technical Intelligence Summary Report 174 Appendix C.
War Office. (9th August 1945). Technical Intelligence Summary Report 183 Appendix B.
Winninger, M. (2013). OKH Toy Factory. History Facts Publishing

Tanks Encyclopedia Magazine, #3

The third issue covers WW1 armored vehicles — Hotchkiss Htk46 and Schneider CA and CD in Italian Service. WW2 section contains two splendid stories of the US and German ‘Heavy Armor’ — T29 Heavy Tank and Jagdtiger.

Our Archive section covers the history of early requirements for the Soviet heavy (large) tank. Worth mentioning, that the article is based on documents never published before.

It also contains a modeling article on how to create a terrain for diorama. And the last article from our colleagues and friends from Plane Encyclopedia covers the story of Northrop’s Early LRI Contenders — N-126 Delta Scorpion, N-144 and N-149!

All the articles are well researched by our excellent team of writers and are accompanied by beautiful illustrations and photos. If you love tanks, this is the magazine for you!
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WW2 German Tank Destroyers

Panzer IV/70(A)

German Reich (1944)
Tank Destroyer – 278 Built

The Panzer IV/70(A) was born from earlier German attempts to place the 7.5 cm L/70 into a Panzer IV turret. As this was not possible, another solution was proposed by the firm of Alkett. Their design simply reused a modified Vomag Panzer IV/70(V) superstructure (armed with the 7.5 cm L/70 gun) and placed it on a standard Panzer IV tank chassis. The result was a much taller and heavier vehicle than the Panzer IV/70(V) version. In theory, this would have sped up the whole production process, but in reality, only a small number were built by the end of the war.

Panzer IV/70(A) lost during the battle for Colmar Pocket in February 1945. Source: www.panzernet.net

First Jagdpanzer Designs

Even before the war, the famous German commander General Heinz Guderian had predicted the need for highly mobile self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, later known as ‘Panzerjäger’ or ‘Jagdpanzer’ (tank destroyer or hunter). The terms ‘Jagdpanzer’ and ‘Panzerjäger’ were, according to Germany military terminology and concepts, essentially one and the same. After the war, however, the ‘Jagdpanzer’ term would be used to describe the fully enclosed tank destroyers, while ‘Panzerjäger’ would be used for the open-topped vehicles.

In March of 1940, the first attempt to build such a vehicle was made. This was the 4.7 cm PaK (t) (Sfl) auf Pz.Kpfw. I, generally known today as the ‘Panzerjäger I’. It was more or less a simple improvisation, made by using a modified Panzer I Ausf.B tank hull and mounting a 4.7 cm PaK (t) gun (a captured Czechoslavkian 4.7 cm gun – hence the ‘t’ for ‘Tschechoslowakei’ after the name) with a small protective shield fitted to it. Later, during the attack on the Soviet Union and the battles in North Africa, the need for effective anti-tank vehicles became of greater importance for the Germans. The appearance of the towed 7.5 cm PaK 40 in increasing numbers somewhat solved this problem, but the main issue with this gun was its lack of mobility.

The need for mobile anti-tank vehicles would lead to the development of the ‘Marder’ series, which was based on several different tank chassis and armed with powerful and efficient anti-tank guns. Captured tanks and other vehicles were also reused for this purpose. In 1943, the Nashorn (then called the Hornisse), armed with the excellent 88 mm Pak 43, was put into production. However, most of these types of vehicles were hastily designed and built and, while they did the job, they were far from perfect.

These vehicles were built by using different tank chassis and installing a gun with limited traverse in an open-topped superstructure. The two main issues were the great height, which made them difficult to camouflage, and the general lack of effective armor.

The German infantry support self-propelled assault gun, the Sturmgeschütz, or simply ‘StuG’, (based on the Panzer III) proved to have great potential when used as a tank hunter. It had relatively good armor, a low profile, and could be armed with the longer barrelled L/48 7.5 cm gun. The mass-produced StuG III Ausf.G armed with the longer 7.5 cm gun (L/48) was able to efficiently fight almost all Allied tanks (except for the heaviest) up to the end of the war. The StuG vehicles were also much easier, quicker, and cheaper to build than their tank equivalent.

In 1942, the first plans to equip the StuG with a stronger gun and armor were made. These would eventually lead to the development of a series of three different Jagdpanzer designs based on the Panzer IV tank chassis. Despite the initials plans to equip the first Jagdpanzer IV with the longer 7.5 cm L/70 gun, due to insufficient stocks, the 7.5 cm gun L/48 had to be used instead. When the 7.5 cm L/70 gun became available in sufficient numbers, the production of the Panzer IV/70(V) version began in late 1944. The last version, known as Panzer IV/70(A), was an attempt to mount the 7.5 cm L/70 on an unmodified Panzer IV tank chassis.

History

In mid-1944, the German Herres Waffenamt (army ordnance department) personnel conducted a series of investigation to test the Panzer IV’s combat performance. The results were disappointing but, in a way, also somewhat to be expected. The newest enemy tank designs (like the Soviet IS-2 and T-34-85, and the later version or Shermans, M26, etc.) possessed far better combat characteristics, like having stronger armor or firepower than the Panzer IV. While still a threat to the enemy tanks, the Panzer IV was reaching the limit of its development life. Its 7.5 cm L/48 gun was still a potent weapon for its time, however, a stronger gun with much better firepower was more desirable. This was one of the reasons why Adolf Hitler demanded that the production of the Panzer IV tanks should be phased out in favor of the new Panzer IV/70(V) anti-tank vehicles. As the production of the Panzer IV/70(V) was too slow and there were urgent demands for increasing numbers of tanks, another solution to use the 7.5 cm L/70 on a Panzer IV vehicle was needed. For this reason, the Alkett factory received orders from the German Army in late June 1944 to test the installation of the 7.5 cm L/70 long gun on the Panzer IV chassis.

Armor penetration table: Source: I. Hogg. (German artillery of world war two). And T.L. Jentz (Germany’s Panther Tank)

The 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70 Armor penetration (maximum range) table against enemy tanks. Source: T.L. Jentz (Germany’s Panther Tank)

The installation of this gun in the Panzer IV turret had already been tested previous year and proved to be impractical, so the only way to mount this gun was in a self-propelled configuration. Due to a lack of time, resources, and production capacities, Alkett engineers proposed a very simple solution. A redesigned superstructure taken from the Panzer IV/70(V) would be placed on an unmodified Panzer IV chassis. This would increase the vehicle weight and height but, on the other hand, it would make production far simpler (at least in theory). This project was designated by Alkett as ‘Gerät 558’. It is often marked in post-war sources as Zwischenlösung (interim solution), but this term was never used by the Germans for this vehicles during the war.

This project received a green light from the German Army officials and the first prototype (made by Alkett) was quickly built. It was demonstrated to Adolf Hitler in early July 1944 at Berghof. Hitler was impressed with it and immediately ordered it to be put into production as soon as possible.

Hitler inspects the new Panzer IV/70(A) prototype vehicle in early July 1944. Source: warspot.ru

Side view of the Panzer IV/70(A) prototype. Source: firearmcentral.fandom.com

Designation Name

The initial designation for this vehicle was ‘Sturmgeschütz auf Pz.Kpfw.IV Fahrgestell’. This designation was changed by Adolf Hitler himself on 18th July 1944 to the much simpler Panzer IV lang (long) (A). The capital ‘A’ stood for the Alkett company that was responsible for its development. During its service life, other designations were also used, like Panzer IV/L (A) from August 1944, Panzer IV lang (A) 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70 from October 1944 and finally Panzer IV/70(A) from November 1944. The Panzer IV/70(A) designation is the most commonly used in the literature today. For this reason and for the sake of simplicity, this article will use this designation.

Technical Characteristics

The Panzer IV/70(A) was designed to have minimal modifications to the Panzer IV Ausf.J tank chassis. For this reason, the turret and the top of the hull were removed and, in their place, a new superstructure housing the gun was added on top. Visually, the Panzer IV/70(A) was different in comparison to the other Jagpanzers based on the Panzer IV. The most obvious difference is the overall shape of the new superstructure added atop the Panzer IV hull.

The suspension and running gear were the same as those of the original Panzer IV, with no changes to their construction. This consisted, on each side, of eight small double road wheels suspended in four pairs by leaf-spring units. There were two front drive sprockets, two rear idlers, and eight return rollers in total. The number of return rollers was reduced to three per side later in the production run. However, despite this, some late produced vehicles still had four return rollers. Similar to the Panzer IV/70(V) model, this vehicle was also nose-heavy due to the added weight. For this reason, the front road wheels were prone to being rapidly worn out. In an attempt to solve this problem, most vehicles were to be equipped with four (on both sides) steel-tired and internally sprung wheels from September 1944 onwards.

The engine was the Maybach HL 120 TRM which produced 265 hp at 2,600 rpm but, according to T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2012) in Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV, the engine produced 272 hp at 2,800 rpm. The design of the engine compartment was unchanged. The maximum speed was 37 km/h (15-18 km/h cross country) with an operational range (with 470 liters fuel) of 200 km. These vehicles were fitted with new flame dampening exhausts and mufflers (flammentoeter). The engine and the crew compartments were separated by a fire-resistant and gas-tight armored firewall.

In order to speed up the development process and make the production as simple as possible, the Alkett engineers decided to reuse many elements from the already existing Panzer IV/70(V) superstructure. While similar in many things (like armor thickness, roof design, gun shield etc.) there were a number of changes that had to be done before the adoption for production. The first thing was the increase in height of the superstructure, which was now 1 m tall in comparison to the original Panzer IV/70(V), which was 64 cm tall. The side armor angles had to be lower and the added frontal plate had the original Panzer IV driver visor placed on the vehicle left side. The prototype vehicle had a slightly different superstructure design with vertical lower superstructure sides. The production models had the sides angled at 20°.

The Panzer IV/70(V) superstructure had to be redesigned for two reasons. Firstly, the Panzer IV’s fuel tanks were located beneath the turret. This meant that the installation of the long gun required the raising of the superstructure. The second reason was a problem noted on the Panzer IV/70(V), namely that, when on the move on rough terrain, the longer gun (if not held in position by the travel lock) occasionally hit the ground (barrel strike) which could cause damage to the elevation mechanism of the gun.

Despite the extra height, the Panzer IV/70(A)’s superstructure was well protected with its angled and thick armor and had a relatively simple design. The angled shape of the superstructure provided thicker nominal armor and also increased the chance of deflecting enemy shots. This way, the need for more carefully machined armored plates was unnecessary. Also, by using larger one-piece metal plates, the structure avoided, a lot of welding making it much stronger and also easier for production.

A table showing the thickness of the armor of the Panzer IV/70(A), StuG IV and the Panzer IV Ausf.J vehicles. 1: The second number is for the driver plate armor. 2: The second number is for the engine compartment. 3: Same as previous. Source: Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV, No.4 Panzerkampfwagen IV and Panzer Tracts No.8 Sturmgeschütz

The prototype vehicle had a slightly different superstructure design with vertical lower superstructure sides. The production models had the sides angled at 20°. In addition, the MG 42’s conical-shaped cover was different on the production vehicle. Source: warspot.ru

The production version had angled side armor and a different machine gun armored cover. Source: Pinterest

The Panzer IV/70(A)’s upper front hull armor plate was 80 mm thick. The side armor was 30 mm, the rear 20 mm and the bottom was 10 mm. The engine compartment design and armor were unchanged, with 20 mm all around and 10 mm of top armor. The upper superstructure frontal armor was 80 mm at a 50° angle, the sides were 40 mm at a 19° angle, the rear armor was 30 mm, and the top was 20 mm. The front driver plate was 80 mm thick and placed at a 9° angle.

The Panzer IV/70(A) could be equipped with an additional 5 mm thick armor plates (Schürzen) covering the sides of the vehicle. In practice though, these would rarely last long and would simply fall off the vehicle during combat operations. Due to material shortages, by late 1944, stiff wire mesh panels (Thoma Schürzen) were used instead of the armor plates. These were much lighter and most sources claim that they provided the same level of protection as the solid type. It is often mentioned that Schürzen were designed as a protection against shape-charged weapons, but they were actually designed to counter Soviet anti-tank rifle projectiles. One more line of protection was the possible application of Zimmerit anti-magnetic paste to counter magnetic anti-tank mines, but the use of this paste would be abandoned in the late stages of the war.

In the hope of removing any extra weight at the front, most spare parts and ancillary equipment were moved to the rear engine compartment. These included things such as spare tracks, wheels, repair tools, the fire extinguisher, and the crew’s equipment. Some vehicles had an armored and welded base for a 2-tonne crane added on the superstructure roof.

Armament

The Panzer IV/70(A) tank destroyer’s main armament was the 7.5 cm StuK 42 L/70 cannon, also known as the 7.5 cm PaK 42 L/70. This gun was more or less the same one used on the German Panther tank. The elevation of the 7.5 cm StuK 42 L/70 was from –6° to +15° and the traverse was 12° on both sides. Due to the increased internal size, the Panzer IV/70(A) could carry more spare ammunition than its predecessors. Older sources noted that the total ammunition count was 60 rounds, while newer ones give a number of 90 rounds. The main gun was not placed at the vehicle’s center but was instead moved 20 cm to the right side because of the position of the gun sights

The 80 mm thick cast gun mantlet acted as extra protection for the gun. A hydro-pneumatic equilibrator was provided for better gun balance and an iron counter-weight was added at the end of the recoil guard. To avoid damaging the main gun when on the move, a heavy travel-lock was provided. In order to free the gun, the gun operator had only to elevate the gun a bit and the travel lock would fall down. This allowed for a quick combat response and also avoided the need for a crew member to exit the vehicle in order to do it manually.

The secondary support weapons consisted of a 7.92 mm MG 42 machine gun with some 1,200 rounds of ammunition, a 9 mm MP 40 submachine gun and a 7.92 mm MP 43/44 assault rifle. Unlike most other German vehicles, a ball mount was not used on this vehicle. The machine gun port was instead protected by a movable armored cover. The machine gun mount was located to the vehicle’s right side. The Panzer IV/70(A) vehicles were usually equipped with the ‘Vorsatz P’ curved muzzle attachment for the MP 43/44 (7.92 mm) assault rifles. The mounting for this weapon was placed on the loader’s hatch door and was operated by him.

Rearview of the Panzer IV/70(A). Several interesting details can be observed, such as the two rear flame dampening exhausts, the track links added to the side of the superstructure that were used as spare parts and extra armor, the ‘Vorsatz P’ curved muzzle on the top right side and the Thoma Schürzen. Source: warspot.ru

Here we can observe the Panzer IV/70(A)’s MG 42 machine gun. Its movable armored cover is missing on this vehicle. Source: unknown

Crew

The four-man crew consisted of the commander, the gunner, the loader/radio operator, and the driver. The driver’s position was on the vehicle’s left front side. Behind him was the gunner’s position, which was provided with an Sfl.Z.F. 1a gun sight for acquiring targets. This sight was linked to an azimuth indicator, the purpose of which was to tell the gunner the precise current position of the gun. When in use, the sight was projected through the sliding armored cover on the vehicle’s top armor. For operating the gun, there were two handwheels. The lower wheel was for the traverse and the upper one for the elevation. The gunner was also provided with a recoil shield, while the loader was not. Behind these two was the commander’s position, which had a rotating periscope located in the escape hatch and one pointing to the left. The commander had a small additional hatch door for the use of a retractable Sfl.4Z telescope. The commander was also responsible for providing the loader with the ammunition located on the left sidewall. The last crew member was the loader, who was positioned on the vehicle’s right side. He operated the radio (Fu 5 radio set) which was located to the right rear and he also doubled as the MG 42 machine gun operator. There was a small opening located above the machine gun which provided the gun operator with a limited view of the front. When not in use, the machine gun could be pulled into a small travel lock which was connected to the vehicle’s roof. In that case, the machine gun port could be closed by pivoting the armor cover. The crew could enter the vehicle through two hatches located at the top of the vehicle. There was an additional floor escape hatch door that could be used in case of an emergency.

Production

By the orders of Adolf Hitler himself, the production of the Panzer IV/70(A) was to begin immediately, with an initial order of 350 vehicles. The first 50 were to be built in August 1944, 100 in September, and then 50 vehicles each month until February 1945. However, for unknown reasons, these production orders were never fully implemented by the Waffenamt. The Waffenamt instead issued, on 21st June 1944, new production orders for 50 vehicles in August, 100 in September, 150 in October, 200 in November, 250 in December, and the last 300 in January. Yet very shortly thereafter, new production orders were issued for 50 in August, 100 in September, 150 in October and November, and only 100 December. In early August 1944, the production orders were once again changed to 50 in August, followed by a monthly production of 100 vehicles from October to January 1945. The last changes to the production occurred by the end of January 1945, when the monthly production was to be around 60 vehicles with the last 8 in June.

In the end, these production numbers were never reached due to the chaotic state in Germany in late 1944. Constant changes in the production orders also lead to confusion and delays in production. Besides the prototype, only 277 vehicles were ever built by Nibelungenwerk from Austria, with a monthly production of 3 in August 1944, 60 in September, 43 in October, 25 in November, 75 in December, 50 in January 1945, 20 in February, and the last one in March 1945.

In Combat

The Panzer IV/70(A) was to be allocated to units equipped with ordinary Panzer IV tanks, with the intent of increasing their firepower at longer ranges. According to initials plans, the first group of 68 vehicles was to be transported to the Eastern Front and then distributed to Panzer IV equipped units. As only five vehicles were actually ready by September 1944, these were instead given to the Führer Begleit Brigade together with a group of 17 Panzer IV tanks. The second group of 17 vehicles was to be dispatched to the Eastern Front, but it actually arrived in mid-October 1944. By the end of October, units that received the Panzer IV/70(A) were the 3rd Panzer Division, 17th Panzer Division and 25th Panzer Division, which had 17 vehicles each, while the 24th Panzer Division had 13, and the 13th Panzer Division had only 4 vehicles.

In response to the invasion in the West, in late 1944, two Abteilung with 45 vehicles each were formed and attached to the Panzer Regiment Grossdeutschland and the 2nd Panzer Regiment. The Panzer IV/70(A) Abteilung should have had 45 vehicles divided into three companies, each equipped with 14 vehicles, with three additional in the Command Abteilung. These two units were never fully formed due to the general lack of Panzer IV/70(A) vehicles. The 2nd Panzer Regiment was supplied with 11 and Grossdeutschland with 38 Panzer IV/70(A) vehicles.

By the end of 1944, Panzer Abteilung 208 was formed. It was supplied with 14 Panzer IV/70(A) and 31 Panzer IV tanks. It was organized in three companies, one of which was fully equipped with the Panzer IV/70(A). At this time, 10 Panzer IV/70(A) were also allocated to the 7th Panzer Division. In January 1945, the last Panzer units to receive 14 Panzer IV/70(A) vehicles were the 24th Panzer Division and the Panzer Brigade 103.

From January 1945 onwards, the Panzer IV/70(A) were allocated to Sturmgeschütz units only, mainly in the hope of increasing their firepower against enemy armored vehicles. Around thirteen Sturmgeschuetz Brigades (Stu.G.Brig.) were equipped with 3 vehicles each (for example 341, 394, 190, 276 etc.), while fewer (210, 244, 300 and 311) had four vehicles. Only two Stu.G.Brig. received larger numbers. The Sturm Artillerie Lehr Brigade 111 had 16 vehicles and the Stu.G.Brig. Grossdeutschland had 31.

Thanks to its thick front armor and strong gun, the Panzer IV/70(A) could be an effective weapon. An example of this comes from Stu.G.Brig. 311. During a Soviet attack on Breslau (mid-April 1945), Stu.G.Brig. 311, three StuG III and one Panzer IV/70(A) managed to destroy around 10 ISU-152 vehicles. The next day, Stu.G.Brig. 311 again engaged the Soviet armored advance. On this occasion, the Soviets lost 25 armored vehicles, of which 13 were reported to be destroyed by the lone Panzer IV/70(A). It is unclear if these values and those following are just claimed kills or verified kills.

Another example comes from Panzer Abteilung 208, which was heavily engaged in Hungary from early January 1945 on. On the 1st day of 1945, Panzer-Abteilung 208’s combat strength was 25 Panzer IV (with 21 combat-ready) and 10 Panzer IV/70(A) (with 7 fully operational). During the heavy Soviet assault (8th January) on the German position around village Izsa (located in Slovakia near the Hungarian border), Panzer Abteilung 208 managed to destroy 24 enemy tanks, of which 7 were credited to the Panzer IV/70(A), with the loss of three Panzer IV and one Panzer IV/70(A). The next day, four more Soviet tanks were destroyed, followed by seven more (five were reported to be destroyed by the Panzer IV/70(A) in the Panzer Abteilung 208’s counter-attack). On 17th January, 11 more Soviet tanks were destroyed by Panzer Abteilung 208, of which four by the Panzer IV/70(A) near Szentjánospuszta. On 22nd January, Panzer Abteilung 208, with a force of 25 Panzers and Panzer IV/70(A), made a counter-attack against the Soviet 6th Guards Tank Army, where the enemy lost nine tanks. Panzer Abteilung 208 lost most of its equipment during the failed attack on Kéménd on 19th February 1945. Of course, there is always a chance that in both cases these numbers were exaggerated for propaganda purposes.

The few produced Panzer IV/70(A) that did reach the front line were simply overrun by the vast numbers of enemy tanks. Most were simply abandoned or destroyed by their crew due to the general lack of fuel and spare parts. The German army was not overly satisfied with the Panzer IV/70(A)’s performance. In a report made on 15th January 1945 by the Generalinspekteur der Panzer truppen (Inspector General for Panzer units), the Panzer IV/70(A) was deemed as ‘not combat serviceable’ and that the Panzer IV tank production should be increased.

While the majority of produced Panzer IV/70(A) were used on the Eastern front, smaller numbers were also present in the West. This vehicle was captured by the Allies somewhere in the West in early 1945. Source: www.panzernet.net

While a potent tank-destroyer, most were lost due to mechanical failures and a general lack of fuel. Source: Pinterest

Front view of a destroyed Panzer IV/70(A). Source:forums.armchairgeneral.com

Surviving vehicle

Today, only one Panzer IV/70(A) (serial number 120539) is known to have survived the war and can be found at the French Musée des Blindes at Saumur. It was hit and damaged by Sherman tank fire at close range, but was still in running condition when it was captured by the French resistance army.

The only surviving Panzer IV/70(A) located at the Musée des Blindes at Saumur. Source: Wiki

Conclusion

While the Panzer IV/70(A) had the potential to be an effective anti-tank weapon thanks to its good firepower and strong frontal armor, it was built in too few numbers. Another problem was weight distribution and the increase of height which made it difficult to camouflage. This made them easier targets for enemy gunners. The introduction of yet another design put even more stress on the already desperate German industry.

In the end, the Panzer IV/70(A) did not influence on the course of the war, as it was built in small numbers and too late, but it was nevertheless a potent tank destroyer.

Illustration of the Panzer IV/70(A), produced by Tank Encyclopedia’s own David Bocquelet

Jagdpanzer IV/70(A) used in support of the 352nd Volksgrenadier division, Ardennes, 1944.

Jagdpanzer IV/70(A) from the 116th Panzer Division, Compogne, Belgium, fall 1944.

Specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)	8.87 x 2.9 x 2.2 meters
Total weight, battle ready	28 tonnes
Armament	7.5cm PaK 42 L/70 and one 7.92 mm MG 42
Armor	Hull front 80 mm, side 30 mm, rear 20 mm and bottom 10-20 mm Superstructure front 80 mm, side 40 mm top and rear 20 mm
Crew	4 (driver, commander, gunner, loader)
Propulsion	Maybach HL 120 TRM, 300 hp (221 kW), 11.63 hp/ton
Speed	37 km/h, 15-18 km/h (cross country)
Suspension	Leaf springs
Operational range	200 km, 130 km (cross country)
Total production	278

Sources

D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
P. Chamberlain and T.J. Gander (2005) Enzyklopadie Deutscher waffen 1939-1945 Handwaffen, Artilleries, Beutewaffen, Sonderwaffen, Motor buch Verlag.
A. Lüdeke (2007) Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon books.
D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
P. Thomas (2017), Hitler’s Tank Destroyers 1940-45. Pen and Sword Military.
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2012) Panzer Tracts No.9-2 Jagdpanzer IV,
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (1997) Panzer Tracts No.9 Jagdpanzer,
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (1997) Panzer Tracts No.4 Panzerkampfwagen IV
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2000) Panzer Tracts No.8 Sturmgeschuetz
J. Ledwoch (2002) Panzer IV/70, Militaria.
T. J. Gander (2004), Tanks in Detail JgdPz IV, V, VI and Hetzer, Ian Allan Publishing
Walter J. Spielberger (1993). Panzer IV and its Variants, Schiffer Publishing Ltd.
N. Szamveber (2013) Days of Battle Armoured Operations North Of The River Danube, Hungary 1944-45, Helion & Company
I. Hogg. (1975) German artillery of world war two, Putnell Book.
T.L. Jentz (1995) Germany’s Panther Tank, Schiffer Military History

WW2 German Tank Destroyers

4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Panzerkampfwagen I (Sd.Kfz.101) ohne Turm ‘Panzerjäger I’

Post author By MarkoPantelic
Post date November 9, 2019
8 Comments on 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Panzerkampfwagen I (Sd.Kfz.101) ohne Turm ‘Panzerjäger I’

German Reich (1940)
Tank Destroyer – 202 Built

Even before the Second World War, the famous German tank commander, Heinz Guderian, had predicted the need for highly mobile self-propelled anti-tank vehicles, later known as Panzerjäger or Jagdpanzer (tank destroyer or hunter). In March 1940, the first attempt to build such a vehicle was made. This was the 4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Pz.Kpfw. I ohne turm. It was more or less a simple improvisation, made by using a modified Panzer I Ausf.B tank hull and by mounting a 4.7 cm PaK(t) gun with a small shield on it. This vehicle proved to be an effective anti-tank weapon in the early period of the war, with a few examples remaining in service up to 1943.

Birth of the First Panzerjäger

During the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the 3.7 cm PaK 36 was the main anti-tank gun in use by the Wehrmacht. This gun proved to be effective against Polish tanks and other armored vehicles, which were generally lightly armored. The PaK 36’s mobility and small size proved to have a number of advantages during combat situations, but the biggest problem was the poor penetration power. While in Poland it did the job, for the upcoming invasion of the West, a more powerful gun was desirable. The much stronger 5 cm PaK 38 was still in the development phase and it would not reach the troops in time, so another solution was needed. The Germans were lucky as, during the annexation of Czechoslovakia, they came into possession of fairly large numbers of competent 47 mm anti-guns.

Both the 37 and 47 mm guns were light and relatively easy to move around using trucks, horses or manpower, and, for infantry formations, this was not a great problem. For the Panzer units, a towed anti-tank gun was a problem due to the frequent position changes required by the rapid advance of the armored units. Wheeled trucks had great problems driving off-road. Half-tracks were more efficient in this regard, but there were never enough of them available. In a combat situation, once targets were spotted, the PaK gun had to be disconnected from the towing vehicle and moved by the crew to a designated firing position, which could take valuable and vital time. The PaK gun was also an easy target for the enemy once spotted, as it had only limited protection from the front. Mounting a sufficiently powerful PaK gun on a mobile chassis was more desirable, as it would allow the gun to follow the fast-moving units and to quickly change position to engage enemy targets.

For these reasons, after the Polish campaign, the Heereswaffenamt (ordnance department) made a proposal to mount the Czech 47 mm gun on a modified Panzer I Ausf.B. tank chassis. The choice for the tank chassis was based on the obsolescence of the Panzer I as a front line tank and the fact that it was available in sufficient numbers. The Panzer II was still considered useful and effective and the Panzer III and IV were deemed too valuable (and scarce) for such a modification. The company that was chosen to undertake this modification, was Alkett (Altmärkische Kettenfabrik) from Berlin. During late 1939 and early 1940, Alkett made the first drawings of the future Panzerjäger. Very soon, a prototype was built and tested. The conversion proved to be feasible and easy to construct. This prototype was demonstrated to Adolf Hitler himself in February 1940. After this demonstration, an official order for around 132 vehicles was given to Alkett. These vehicles had to be ready by May 1940.

Front view of a Panzerjäger I designed and built by Alkett. Photo: www.drugisvetski.com

Name

The original designation for this vehicle was 4,7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Pz.Kpfw. I (Sd.Kfz.101) ohne Turm. Nowadays, this vehicle is mostly known as the Panzerjäger I. Whilst sources do not give precise information about the origin of this designation, for the sake of simplicity, this article will use this simpler designation.

The Modifications

For the Panzerjäger I conversion, the Panzer I Ausf.B chassis was used, as it had a more powerful engine and was longer than the Ausf.A. The Panzerjäger I’s suspension and running gear were the same as those of the original Panzer I Ausf.B, with no change to its construction. It consisted of five road wheels on both sides. The first wheel used a coil spring mount with an elastic shock absorber in order to prevent any outward bending. The remaining four wheels were mounted in pairs on a suspension cradle with leaf spring units. There were two front drive sprockets, two rear idlers and eight return rollers in total (four on each side).

The main engine was the water-cooled 3.8 l Maybach NL 38 TR, giving out 100 hp at 3,000 rpm. Due to the extra equipment and larger weapon, the vehicle weight was increased to 6.4 tonnes. The added extra weight affected the crossroad performance but the maximum speed was unchanged at 40 km/h. The gearbox (ZF Aphon FG 31) had five forward and one reserve speeds.

The most obvious change was the removal of the tank turret and, in addition, the superstructure upper and rear armor were also removed. In place of the turret was a new gun mount for the 4.7 cm gun. For better stability, the gun mount was held in place by three metal bars. Two vertical bars were connected to the vehicle bottom and another larger one to the rear engine compartment. For this conversion, the gun wheels and trails were removed. In addition, the standard 4.7 cm PaK(t) gun shield was replaced with a smaller curved one. For the protection of the crew, the first series of Panzerjäger I had a five-sided armored compartment, the plates of which were 14.5 mm thick. This armored compartment was bolted to the vehicle hull, which made repairs much easier. The second series of produced vehicles had two additional (one on each side) armored plates added, which increase the directions from which the vehicle was protected. This armored compartment provided only limited protection from the front and sides due to weak armor thickness. This is one of the reasons that the crews of these vehicles used steel helmets. In a vague hope of increasing the armor protection, some crews added spare tracks to the vehicle’s front armor.

The gun used was the Skoda 47 mm Kanon P.U.V.vz.38, known as the 4.7 cm Panzerabwehrkanone 36(t), or simply as 4.7 cm PaK(t) in German service. It was an effective weapon for its time. During the period of August 1939 to May 1941, some 566 4.7 cm PaK(t) were built by Škoda for the Germans. The standard Panzergranate Pz.Gr.36(t) had a muzzle velocity of 775 m/s and a maximum effective ranger range of 1.5 km. The armor penetration of this round was 48-59 mm at 500 m and 41 mm at 1 km range with the standard AP round. The 4.7 cm PaK(t) could effectively destroy most tanks of the time at long distances, with the exception of the British Matilda, French B1 and later T-34 and the KV-1. In order to extend its operational effectiveness, a new Pzgr.Patr.40 tungsten round was developed (muzzle velocity was 1080 m/s). As the Germans lacked sufficient tungsten, this type of ammunition could not be produced in larger quantities and their usage was rare. The 4.7 cm PaK(t) also fired high explosive rounds (2.3 kg weight) with impact fuses to be used against light armor and infantry targets. The 47 mm gun had an elevation of -8° to +10° (or +12° depending on the source) and a traverse angle of 17.5° on each side. Elevation and traverse were controlled by two handwheels located on the gun’s left side. The main weapon monocular gunsight was not changed.

The total ammunition load was 86 rounds carried inside the vehicle in five different ammunition boxes. Only 10 HE rounds were carried, located behind the loader on the vehicle’s right side. On the right side of the crew fighting compartment, where the loader was seated, there was another ammunition box with 34 AP rounds. Some 16 AP additional rounds were placed under the gun. The remaining rounds were located at the rear fighting compartment under the gunner’s and loader’s seats.

For crew protection against infantry attack, a MP 38/40 submachine gun was provided. The ammunition for this weapon was stored on the left and right sides of the armored crew compartment. The crews could also carry additional personal weapons depending on the combat situation.

As it had no machine gun mount for an MG 34, the crew was instead provided with an MP-38/40 submachine gun, which served for limited protection from infantry attacks. Photos: www.worldwarphotos.info

Adequate radio equipment was important and, thus, the vehicles were provided with the Fu 2 receiver. A flexible antenna (1.4 m high) from the original Panzer I was located to the right of the driver. Later vehicles were equipped with a receiver and a transmitter (Funksprechgerat A) for better communication. These models had the radio antenna relocated to the vehicle’s left rear side.

The Panzerjäger I was operated by three crew members, who, due to the lack of space, had to perform more than one role. The driver, who was located inside the vehicle, was also the radio operator. The commander, who also acted as the gunner, was located on the left side of the armored compartment. The last crew member was the loader, who was located to the right side, beside the commander. To avoid being affected by harsh weather, the crew was provided with a folding tarpaulin cover.

In order to carry additional crew equipment or for used ammunition casings, a welded metal or mesh wire basket was added to the rear, above the engine compartment. Sometimes additional storage boxes were placed on the fenders or to the vehicle rear.

Panzerjager I side view. The vehicle’s relatively small height and the five-sided armored shield for crew protection are observable. Photo: www.worldwarphotos.info

A vehicle from the second production series, easily identified by the extra armor plate added to the rear. Photo: www.worldwarphotos.info

Production

The Panzerjäger I was produced in two series during the war. The first series was assembled by Alkett and production lasted from March to May 1940. The guns were to be provided by Škoda, with Krupp-Essen providing 60 armored shields. Hannover-Linder also provided an additional 72 armored shields. The monthly production for this batch of vehicles was 30 in March, 60 in April and 30 in May. Due to a lack of guns, two vehicles could not be completed. These two would be completed in September 1940 and in July 1941.

Krupp-Essen was tasked with providing 70 new armored shields for the second production series starting on 19th September 1940. However, the production orders were changed and only 10 armored shields were to be shipped to Alkett. The remaining 60 vehicles were to be assembled by Kloeckner-Humboldt-Deutz A.G.. The first 10 were completed in November, followed by 30 in December and the last 30 in February 1941. In total, 142 vehicles were assembled by Alkett and 60 by Kloeckner-Humboldt-Deutz A.G. These numbers are according to T.L. Jentz’ and H.L. Doyle’s (2010) Panzer Tracts No.7-1 Panzerjäger.

Organization

The Panzerjäger I vehicles were used to equip the Panzerjäger Abteilung (Pz.Jg.Abt) motorisierte Selbstfahrlafette, in essence anti-tank (or tank hunter) battalions using guns on self-propelled carriages. Each Pz.Jg.Abt was composed of one Stab Pz.Jg.Abt, equipped with one Panzer I Ausf.B, and three Kompanie (companies). These Kompanie were equipped with 9 vehicles each. The Kompanie were again divided into Zuge (platoons), each with 3 vehicles and one Sd.Kfz.10 half-track for ammunition supply.

In combat

The Panzerjäger I would see its first combat action in 1940, during the attack on the West. While the majority were prepared for the invasion of the Soviet Union, small numbers were used in the Axis occupation of the Balkans and in the North African desert.

Attack on the West, May 1940

For the upcoming invasion of France, four Pz.Jg.Abt were to be engaged, but only Pz.Jg.Abt 521 was combat-ready from the start. Pz.Jg.Abt 521 was allocated to Gruppe von Kleist prior to the beginning of the campaign on 10th May. The remaining three units, the 616th, 643rd and 670th, were gradually sent to the front once they achieved full combat readiness. These were fully equipped with 27 vehicles each, with the exception of Pz.Jg.Abt 521, which had only 18 vehicles, with 6 in each Kompanie.

The Panzerjäger I proved to be an effective weapon during the French camping. The Panzerjäger I’s strongest point was its 4.7 cm gun, which could effectively penetrate the armor of most Allied tanks from over 500 to 600 m. While it was primarily designed to attack tanks, it was often used for attacking machine gun nests or similar targets. Machine gun positions could be effectively engaged from ranges of over 1 km. In a report from the 18th Infantry Division made after the defeat of France, the effectiveness of this vehicle is clear “… The 4.7 cm PaK auf.Sfl. has proven itself to be very effective against tanks and also against houses when fighting in towns. It had a very real effect as well as a demoralizing effect on the opponent…”

However, during the French campaign, numerous flaws were also noted. Despite having much better mobility than the towed anti-tank guns, the Panzer I chassis proved to be prone to malfunctions. The Panzerjäger I was often plagued with suspension problems. Another grave issue was that the engine overheated. In hotter days, in order to avoid overheating the engine, the Panzerjäger I could not be driven at a speed higher than 30 km/h with a half an hour pause every 20 to 30 km.

The lack of proper telescopic sights made the observation of the surroundings very dangerous for the crews. There were numerous instances crew members were killed by headshots while observing their surroundings from above the shielded compartment. This often forced the Panzerjäger I commander to rely on the gun sight only, which could be problematic when the vehicle was on the move. Another problem was the lack of proper communication equipment between the commander and the driver. Sometimes, due to the noise of the engine, it was almost impossible for the driver to hear the commander.

Armor protection was minimal. The Panzer I’s maximal armor was only 13 mm thick, while the combat compartment’s armored shield was a bit thicker, at 14.5 mm. This armor only provided protection from small caliber rounds and was useless even against French 25 mm anti-tank guns. Being open-topped caused other issues, as the crew could be easily killed. The limited space inside the vehicle caused additional problems, as the crew often lacked space to carry extra equipment or personal belongings. For this reason, some vehicles were equipped with a large storage box place on the right fender.

These problems would never be fully solved and would remain throughout the Panzerjäger I’s whole carrier. The poor roads in Russia and the hot climate in North Africa caused huge stress on the Panzer I tank chassis.

A row of tank destroyers in La Rochelle, France. Photo: www.worldwarphotos.info

Forming of New Units

With more vehicles being assembled in 1940 and early 1941, it was possible to form additional units. The first new unit was Pz.Jg.Abt. 169 (which was later renamed to 529). By the end of October 1940, Pz.Jg.Abt 605 was formed. Besides these, two Panzer-Jaeger-Kompanie (Panz.Jaeg.Kp) with 9 vehicles each were formed. The first, on 15th March 1941, was attached to Leibstandarte SS-Adolf Hitler. In April 1941, the second Kompanie was attached to the Lehr Brigade 900. Unknown numbers were allocated to the 4th Kompanie of the Panzerjäger Ersatz Abteilung 13, which was, in essence, a training unit at Magdeburg.

In the Balkans

For the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece, the Panzerjäger Is from Leibstandarte SS-Adolf Hitler saw some action. However, as the opposing forces lacked any larger armored formation engagements with tanks were probably rare if any took place at all.

Operation Barbarossa

For the upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, five independent tank hunter battalions equipped with the Panzerjäger I were allocated to this front. These were the 521st, 529th, 616th, 643rd and 670th Pz.Jg.Abt, with a total of 135 vehicles. Pz.Jg.Abt 521 was allocated to the XXIV Mot.Korps Panzergruppe 2 H.Gr.Mitte, Pz.Jg.Abt 529 to VII. Korps 4th Armee H.Gr.Mitte, Pz.Jg.Abt 616 to Panzergruppe 4 H.Gr.Nord, Pz.Jg.Abt 643 to XXXIV Mot.Korps Panzergruppe 3 H.Gr.Mitte and Pz.Jg.Abt 670 to PanzerGruppe 1 H.Gr.Süd. There were other independent battalions (559th, 561st and 611th, for example) equipped with vehicles using the same gun but placed on the Panzer 35R 731(f) tank chassis (captured in France).

Almost from the start, due to unexpected Soviet resistance, the losses among all German units began to mount. This was also the case with the independent tank hunter battalions equipped with the Panzerjäger I. For example, by late July 1941, Pz.Jg.Abt 529 lost four vehicles. By late November, the unit had only 16 vehicles (two were not operational) at its disposal.

Due to the weak armor, camouflage was essential for the vehicle’s survival. Source: Wikimedia Commons

During this campaign, the Panzerjäger I was also used to support the infantry. This was the case for Pz.Jg.Abt 521 while supporting the 3rd Panzer Division. Due to a lack of operational Soviet tanks, the Panzerjäger I were used for supporting infantry, operating similarly to the StuG III. The Panzerjäger I commanders, due to the light armor and smaller gun compared to the StuG III’s, opposed this deployment of their vehicles.

Despite their protest, the Panzerjäger Is of Pz.Jg.Abt 521 were extensively used in this role. While the 4.7 cm had an effective range of 1.5 km, the light armor of the vehicle made attacking any fortified position defended with anti-tank or artillery guns almost suicidal and lead to many losses. For example, during the attack on Soviet positions near Mogilev, Pz.Jg.Abt 521 lost 5 vehicles. Some did not even have a chance to fire at enemy positions before being destroyed. Despite its weak armor, the Panzerjäger I could be effective against enemy machine gun nest and for supporting infantry attacks if properly used and if the enemy had no artillery or other anti-tank weapons.

However, these actions were still dangerous for the crews due to the open-top nature of the vehicles. In addition, the lack of secondary support weapons, like MG-34 machine guns, meant the Panzerjäger Is were vulnerable to infantry attacks. The use of the Panzerjäger I in a support role against unarmored targets can be best described by the ammunition usage. From the start of Operation Barbarossa to the end of 1941, the Panzerjäger I units fired a total of 21,103 AP and 31,195 HE rounds of ammunition.

Engagements with enemy tanks also took place. A rather strange example comes from an action near Woronesh-Ost (Voronež) in August 1940, when one Panzerjäger I from Pz.Jg.Ab 521 engaged a Soviet BT tank. When the BT crew spotted the Panzerjäger I, the commander of the Soviet vehicle decided to ram the German tank destroyer. The Panzerjäger I managed to fire two shots at the incoming BT tank. After these hits, the BT tank caught fire but kept moving and rammed the Panzerjäger I.

The German losses by the end of 1941 were tremendous. In the case of the Panzerjägers armed with the 47 mm guns (both those based on the Panzer I and those based on the Renault R35), around 140 vehicles were lost. By 1942, most Panzerjager I units were being equipped with the better armed Marder III series. By May 1942, Pz.Jg.Abt 521 had only 8 operational Panzerjäger I vehicles. It was reinforced with Marder III vehicles with the 7.62 cm gun and with 12 ammunition carriers based on the Panzer I chassis. In 1942, Pz.Jg.Abt 670 operated one company of Panzerjäger I and two of Marders. Pz.Jg.Abt 529 had only two vehicles remaining when it was disbanded in late June 1942. Pz.Jg.Abt 616 managed to effectively maintain three Panzerjäger I Kompanies during this time.

While the Panzerjager I proved to be effective against the lighter armored Soviet tanks (T-26 or BT series), the newer T-34 and KV series proved to be problematic to the point that the 4.7 cm gun was deemed ineffective. This forced the Germans to look for larger caliber weapons. The surviving Panzerjäger I became obsolete by the standards of late 1942 and early 1943.

The low armor thickness of the Panzerjäger I could be easily pierced by any kind of gun larger than rifle caliber. Photo: www.worldwarphotos.info

In the hope of increasing the armor protection, the crews would sometimes add tracks to the vehicle’s front. While this did little do increase armor protection, it at least provided spare track links if needed. Photo: www.worldwarphotos.info

A Panzerjäger Ibeing captured by the advancing Allied force in late 1944 or early 1945. Source Panzerwrecks Germany 1944-1945

In Africa

Pz.Jg.Abt 605 was the only unit equipped with the Panzerjäger I to operate in North Africa. It was shipped to Africa from Italy and arrived in mid-March 1941. Pz.Jg.Abt 605, with its 27 operational Panzerjäger I, was allocated to the 5th Leichte Division. At the beginning of October 1940, in order to replace losses, a group of five Panzerjäger I were to be shipped to Africa but only three arrived. The remaining two were lost during the sea voyage.

By the time of Operation Crusader in November 1941, Pz.Jg.Abt 605 was in action and, on that occasion, lost 13 vehicles. In order to replenish the dwindling supply of spare parts for the Panzerjäger I, the Panzer I tanks of the German Afrika Korps were often cannibalized for the purpose, as they were obsolete or were put out of action. By the end of 1941, Pz.Jg.Abt. 605 had 14 operational Panzerjäger I remaining.

In January 1942, it was reinforced with four more vehicles, followed by three more in September and October 1942. In order to give Pz.Jg.Abt 605 much stronger firepower, in early 1942, the unit received improvised Sd.Kfz.6 half-tracks armed with the 7.62 cm gun. In mid-May 1942, Pz.Jg.Abt. 605 had around 17 operational vehicles. By the battle of El Alamein in October 1942, eleven vehicles were reported as operational. The last two replacement vehicles arrived in November 1942.

Panzerjäger I being unloaded from a ship in North Africa. Photo: www.worldwarphotos.info

During the African campaign, the Panzerjäger I was plagued with the same problems like on the other fronts. The armor was too weak, the suspension was prone to breakdowns, there were problems with the radio’s operational range, the engine frequently overheated and others. On the other hand, the gun’s performance was deemed sufficient. There are reports of three destroyed Matilda tanks at 400 m range in one action by using the rare tungsten rounds.

Panzerjäger I during the African campaign, 1941/1942. Due to problems with supplies, the crews often carried additional canisters full of water or fuel. Photo: www.worldwarphotos.info

Surviving vehicles

Four vehicles were captured by the Allies. One was sent to Britain and one to America for evaluation. This last one would remain at the American Aberdeen Proving Grounds up to 1981, when it was gifted to Germany. After restoration, it was moved to the Wehrtechnische Dienstselle at Trier. The fate of the remaining captured vehicles is unknown.

The only surviving Panzerjäger I, at the Wehrtechnische Dienstselle. Photo: Craig Moore

Conclusion

The Panzerjäger I proved to be an effective vehicle but not without faults. The gun had a higher armor penetration power than the current German anti-tank guns in the first years of the war. The problems with this vehicle were numerous, including the low armor protection, engine problems, transmission breakdowns, small crew, etcetera. Despite these, it proved to be capable of destroying enemy tanks that were otherwise immune to the smaller caliber 3.7 cm PaK 36.

The Panzerjäger I’s greatest merit is that it showed that the self-propelled anti-tank weapon concept was feasible and effective. It allowed the German Army to gain important experience in this kind of warfare.

Panzerjäger I of the Panzerjäger Abteilung 521, France, May 1940. It was part of the only eighteen vehicles ready on time to take part in the opening hours of the operations. The other companies were still training and would be engaged later in the campaign.

A Panzerjäger I operating during the Balkan campaign, in Yugoslavia and Greece, April-May 1941.

A Panzerjäger I of the Afrika Korps, Panzerjäger-Abteilung 605 (605th Anti-tank Battalion), Gazala, February 1942. Only 27 vehicles were sent, plus some replacements. They were the only tank-hunters available to Rommel during the whole campaign, until El Alamein.

These illustrations were produced by Tank Encyclopedia’s own David Bocquelet.

Panzerjäger I specifications
Dimensions	4.42 x 2.06 x 2.14 m (14.5×6.57×7.02 ft)
Total weight, battle-ready	6.4 tonnes
Crew	3 (commander/gunner, loader and the driver/radio operator)
Propulsion	Maybach NL 38 TR
Speed	40 km/h, 25 km/h (cross country)
Range	170 km, 115 km (cross country)
Armament	4.7 cm PaK(t)
Traverse	17.5 °
Elevation	-8° to +10°
Armor	Hull 6 to 13 mm, Upper armored superstructure 14.5 mm
Total production	202

Sources

N. Askey (2014), Operation Barbarossa: The complete organisational and statistical analysis and military simulation Volume IIB, Lulu publisher.
P. Thomas (2017), Hitler’s Tank Destroyers 1940-45. Pen and Sword Military.
L.M. Franco (2005), Panzer I The beginning of a dynasty, Alcaniz Fresno’s SA.
D. Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
P. Chamberlain and H. Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
P. Chamberlain and T.J. Gander (2005) Enzyklopadie Deutscher waffen 1939-1945 Handwaffen, Artilleries, Beutewaffen, Sonderwaffen, Motor buch Verlag.
A. Lüdeke (2007) Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon books.
D. Doyle (2005). German military Vehicles, Krause Publications.
P. P. Battistelli (2006), Rommel’s Afrika Korps, Osprey Publishing.
H.F. Duske (1997), Nuts and Bolts Vol.07 Panzerjäger I, Nuts & Bolts Books.
T.L. Jentz and H.L. Doyle (2010) Panzer Tracts No.7-1 Panzerjäger

WW2 German Tank Destroyers

8.8 cm PaK 43/1 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen III und IV (Sf.) ‘Nashorn’ (Sd.Kfz.164)

Post author By MarkoPantelic
Post date July 20, 2019
9 Comments on 8.8 cm PaK 43/1 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen III und IV (Sf.) ‘Nashorn’ (Sd.Kfz.164)

German Reich (1943)
Tank Destroyer – 494 Built

As the German armored forces advanced on all fronts in 1940 and 1941, they encountered many different enemy tank types that were almost immune to the guns of their Panzers. In France, these were the Char B1 bis and the British Matildas (both the A11 and A12 Matilda). When the Germans met the first Matildas at Arras, it was an unpleasant shock, although one that was overcome. In the Soviet Union were the famous T-34 and heavy KV-series, and in Africa, again, (in larger numbers) the A12 Matilda tank. While they were able to defeat these by various means, the Germans were pressed to find a better way to combat these threats.
The newly developed towed anti-tank guns (like the PaK 40, built in 1942 and the much stronger PaK 43 in 1943) could efficiently destroy these tanks, but they were not suitable for offensive operations due to their heavy weight. A logical solution was to try to mount these towed anti-tank guns on a tank chassis and thus solve problems of mobility, and so the new Panzerjäger’s were born.
These new vehicles followed a similar pattern: most were open-topped, with limited traverse, and thin armor. They were, though, armed with an effective anti-tank gun, and usually with one machine gun. They were also cheap and easier to build than ordinary Panzers. Panzerjäger’s were, in essence, improvised and temporary solutions, but effective ones nevertheless. Just as the name suggests, they were designed to hunt down enemy tanks at long range on open fields. Their primary mission was to engage enemy tanks and to act as fire support at long range from carefully selected combat positions, usually on the flanks.
In 1943, the development of an anti-tank gun version of the FlaK 41 was completed. As, at that time, there were no dedicated chassis’ designed to carry this gun and in order to increase the mobility of the towed version, a temporary self-propelled solution was needed. From this need, a new vehicle, well known as the Nashorn (Rhinoceros), would be designed and built based on a modified Panzer III/IV tank chassis.

History

The story of the Nashorn began in June 1942, when Hitler demanded that a new anti-tank gun should be developed based on the 88 mm Flak 41. Two famous German weapon manufacturers, the firms of Krupp and Rheinmetall, were tasked with its development. It was estimated that the development and production of some 300 to 500 guns would be ready by mid-1943. For this reason, it was proposed to also develop different towed carriages and self-propelled designs.
It was quickly noted that the new Selbstfahrlafette (self-propelled chassis) could not be completed by the time the new 88 mm gun was ready and so a new solution was needed to get the new weapon on the battlefield faster. In a Wa Pruef meeting held on 28th July 1943, it was decided to speed up the project by using already existing production capacities. An order was placed to the firm of Alkett-Borsigwalde to design and build a self-propelled chassis by using different components of the Panzer III and IV. Alkett was quick to make a soft steel metal prototype which was presented to Hitler in early October 1942. The new chassis was to be used for two different projects, one armed with the 88 mm gun and the second armed with 15 cm s.F.H 43 long-range artillery gun. Hitler was impressed with both designs and ordered a production run of 200 vehicles (100 of each).

An early production Nashorn. Its travel lock is missing. This vehicle was captured by the Soviets and tested at Kubinka. Source

Name

There were several different military designations for this vehicle, such as: Sfl. auf PzKpfw. III/IV Fahrgestell Hornisse mitt 8.8 cm PaK 43 from January 1943, Panzerjager III/IV “Hornisse” für 8.8 cm PaK 43/1 (Sd.Kfz.164) from August 1943, 8.8 cm PaK 43/1 Sfl. “Nashorn” from September 1944 and 8.8 cm PaK 43/1 auf Fgst. Pz.Kpfw. III und IV (Sf) Sd.Kfz.164.
Early on, it was also simply known as the Hornisse (Hornet). In late 1943, Hitler ordered to change the nickname to Nashorn (Rhinoceros). For the sake of simplicity, this article will use the Nashorn name.

Specification

Despite its close resemblance to the ordinary Panzer IV tank chassis, the Nashorn was actually designed and built by combining elements and components from both the Panzer III and Panzer IV. The Nashorn hull was mostly the same as that of the Panzer IV, but with the width of a Panzer III. Most of the components of the drivetrain were taken also taken from the Panzer III, including the two front drive sprockets, the transmission, and the steering unit with the drive shaft. The suspension was taken directly from the Panzer IV and it consisted of eight small road wheels on each side, suspended in pairs by leaf-spring units, a rear idler and four return rollers on each side. The tracks were also taken from the Panzer IV, with 108 links in total. The distance between the rear road wheels and the idler was somewhat increased during the production. The Nashorn could be equipped with different track types depending on the combat need and availability, like the Winterketten or Osketten for example. Despite being produced up the end of the war, the number of return rollers was never reduced to three (per side) on Nashorns, in contrast to other Panzer IV-based based vehicles.
The engine compartment was moved to the vehicle’s reinforced center. This was mostly done in order to create enough room for the gun and the crew to operate efficiently at the back. The engine was the Maybach HL 120 TRM, taken together with the radiators, cooling fans, and muffler from the Panzer IV. The engine performance was more or less the same as on the Panzer IV, giving a maximum speed of 40 km/h. Due to the central engine position, in order to avoid engine overheating, two (on both lower hull sides) rectangular shape cooling ports were added. In addition, the Nashorn had a crew interior heater system despite being open-topped. The engine was started by using an electrical starter but, depending on the situation, could be started manually by a crank located in the crew compartment. The fuel load was around 600 l (or 470 l depending on the source) held in two fuel tanks placed below the fighting compartment. With these, the Nashorn had an operational range of 260 km (around 130 km cross country). The Nashorn also had a problem with frequent breakdowns of the engine, mostly due to overheating, which was never fully solved.

Side view of the Nashorn, with the engine cooling ports visible. Source
The front of the Nashorn was covered by a well-angled and simple armored plate. The driver compartment on the front left side was fully protected. The driver had three observation hatches, one for the front, and one on each side. On top of the driver’s enclosed compartment was a round hatch. The rear crew compartment was protected by armored slats, but was open from the top. To the rear was a two-part door, through which the crew members could access their positions. The new superstructure (both the front and the rear) had a very simple design but the armor was very light. The maximum armor was 30 mm around the driver compartment and the frontal glacis, the hull sides and rear were 20 mm and the bottom 10 mm. The superstructure armor was only 10 mm on all sides, the top was open. Originally, it was planned that the armor would be 20 mm on the superstructure and 50 mm in the hull, but these plans were dropped in order to save weight. The new superstructure was built by Witkowitzer Bergütte und Geschutzwerke from Witkowice Silesia, all being completed by the end of 1943.
The rear part of the vehicle was the combat compartment, which offered the crew more working space. Crew-necessary equipment, instruments, personal belongings, weapons and ammunition were also stored here. Most of these were stored on the compartment sides. On the right side were the mountings for an MG-34 machine gun (with 600 rounds of ammunition) and spare parts, gas mask box, radio equipment, and 88 mm round storage cases. On the opposite side there was another 88 mm round storage case, MG-34 mounting, signal pistol, hot air inlets from the engine, a lever for releasing the gun lock, and the gun sights mount with its box. At the rear were usually held the crew personal weapons (MP-38 for example) and ammunition. Other equipment that was stored included the tarpaulin for protection from bad weather, first aid kits, fire extinguishers, and poles for determination of the direction of the firing axis (these were removed after March 1943) etc.
The crew consisted of five members, the commander, the gunner, the radio operator, the loader, and the driver. The driver and the radio operator were stationed in the front hull as on the Panzer IV (driver to the left and radio operator right) and were the only crew members that were fully protected. The driver controlled the vehicle by using levers and pedals that were positioned in front of the driver. Behind them, in the open combat compartment, were the remaining crew members. The gunner was stationed to the left of the gun, while the commander and the loader were behind him. For the crew, two internally mounted periscopes could be added for viewing the surrounding without being exposed to enemy fire.
In the case of Abteilung Stab Kompanie, additional radio equipment was provided (Fu 8) beside the standard radio. This caused some problems for the radio operator, as he was physically unable, due to different positions of the radio sets, to operate them both. The Nashorn equipped units often requested that an additional radio operator be provided to the Abteilung Stab. It is not clear if this was ever implemented, as the sources do not give more information on this matter.

The 88 mm PaK 43/41

During the war, Germans produced two anti-tank gun versions based on the 88 mm Flak 41. The first one was the PaK 43, which was mounted on a four-wheel carriage, and the second was the PaK 43/41 (also known as PaK 43/1 in some sources), placed on a mount with components from a few different artillery pieces (wheels from 15 cm s.FH.18 and the split trail legs from 10.5 cm l.FH.18). The PaK 43/41 used a horizontal sliding block mechanism, while the Pak 43 had a vertical one. The PaK 43/41 was an effective anti-tank gun, being able to take out all of the Allied tanks, but was also too heavy. It was jokingly known by its crews as the ‘barn door’ (Scheunentor).

Side view of the 88 mm PaK 43/41. Note the Lorraine 37L-based SPG in the back. Source
The PaK 43/41 was chosen as the main armament of the Nashorn. The installation was done by placing the gun mount above the central engine compartment. During production, there were plans to replace it with the Pak 43 version, but this was never implemented. The new gun was more or less the same as the towed version, with minor modifications in order to install it inside a vehicle. The 88 mm gun had a traverse of 30° and elevation of -5° to +20° (or -5° to +35° depending on the source). The recoil cylinder was located under and the recuperator above the gun. There were also two counterbalance cylinders (one on each side).
For direct fire, the Zieleinrichtung 43 SVo (with 3x magnification and 8-degree field of view) gunsight was used. For indirect fire, it was the Zieleinrichtung 34. These two sights were installed on the first series of 50 vehicles, after which the Zieleinrichtung 37 (with Sfl. Z.F.1a periscope) was used. With the installation of the new gun sight, the open slot in the gun shield where the old sight was positioned was closed.
The Nashorn 88 mm gun could fire four different types of ammunition:

88 mm Pzgr.39 (with a weight of 10 kg and muzzle velocity of 1000 m/s) AP round
88 mm Sprgr. (with a weight of 9.4 kg and muzzle velocity of 700 m/s) HE round with a maximum range of 17,500 m
88 mm Pzgr.40 (with a weight of 7.3 kg and muzzle velocity of 1,140 m/s), a tungsten-cored round, but it was rarely deployed due to general lack of this metal
88 mm Gr.HL (with a weight of 7.62 kg and muzzle velocity of 600 m/s) hollow charge round

A loader of a Nashorn is preparing to load a new round into the gun. Despite the relatively spacious rear fighting compartment, the total ammunition load was small. Source.
When using the standard AP round, the gun could penetrate 182 mm of armor sloped at 30° at a range of 500 m. At, 1,000 m, this dropped to 167 and at 2000 m to 139 mm. The rare tungsten round, at the same ranges and angle, could penetrate 226 mm, 162 mm and 136 mm. The hollow charge round could penetrate 90 mm of armor inclined at 30° at any range.
Despite the larger crew compartment, due to the large ammunition size, only a small number of rounds was carried inside the Nashorn. The ammunition was stored in two (one on each side) ammunition bins with 16 rounds in total, with an additional 24 round that could be stored on the floor. Due to the small ammo stowage, a constant supply of ammunition was to be provided by using Maultier half-tracks, which could not be always successfully achieved on the battlefield. It is plausible that the crews would have stored additional rounds in any available free space inside the vehicle. There were some problems with a general lack of ammunition, which could not be produced in sufficient numbers.
Originally, early vehicles were equipped with the same travel lock as on the Hummel, probably in order to simplify production. This travel lock did the job of holding the gun in position, but it had a drawback. In order to free the gun, one of the crew had to go out and manually remove the bolt that held it in place. While this is not a big issue for the Hummel, a vehicle that was usually providing fire support (depending on the combat situation) kilometers away from the main front line, for the Nashorn, which was far closer to the front, this was a big issue. One of the crew members had to expose himself to possible enemy fire and the time lost could prove to be fatal The gun lock was later replaced with an improved one that could be controlled from inside the vehicle. There was also a rear gun position travel lock, but its use was discarded in later models. The gun shield would see some changes in design to better fit with the superstructure sidewalls.

Production

Two firms were selected for the production of the Nashorn: Alkett from Berlin and Stahlindustrie from Duisburg. Alkett was charged with series production of 10 vehicles in January, 20 in February, 30 in March and then at a rate of 30 vehicles per month until March 1944, producing a total of 420 vehicles. Stahlindustrie was tasked with a smaller production series of 5 in May, 10 in June, 15 in July and then 15 per month (also until March 1944), with a total production of only 150 vehicles.
Like nearly all German production plans, the one for the Nashorn did not go as intended. In early February, in a meeting between Hitler and Speer, it was decided to reduce the monthly production of the Nashorn from 45 to only 20 vehicles. This was done for two reasons. Firstly, the Nashorn was seen as a temporary solution and never intended for large mass production. Secondly, it was intended to increase the production of the more important Hummel SPG. Due to a lack of main guns, Stahlindustrie was not able to commence Nashorn production and instead began producing Hummels. In July 1943, the production numbers were once again changed to 500 vehicles. Plans for changing the main armament to a modified 88 mm PaK 43 were abandoned in the hope of increasing the numbers of PaK 43/41 guns available, in order to build all the 500 planned vehicles. Due to the Allied bombing campaign in late 1943, the production of the 88 mm Pak was significantly slowed down, which also influenced the production of Nashorn. By 4th November 1943, some 284 vehicles were completed, while the remaining 216 were to be built in a series of 40 vehicles until March 1944, with the last 16 the following month.
In late November, there were even talks of stopping the Nashorn production, but it was decided to go on with it until the Jagdpanther was ready in 1944. Also in November, Alkett was bombed, so Nashorn production had to be moved to Deutsche Eisenwerke A.G. which had assembly factories located in Teplitz-Schönau and Duisburg. By May 1944, Alkett stopped the production of the Nashorn and Deutsche Eisenwerke were tasked with series production of 100 vehicles from April to June 1944. The order was changed to 130 from April to September, but due to many delays (lack of engines, transmissions, etc.), the production continued at a slower pace until the end of the war. In total, 494 vehicles (chassis number 310001-310494) were built, with 345 in 1943, 133 in 1944 and the last 16 in 1945.
In March 1945, there were discussions to reuse Hummel chassis’ and re-equip them with 88 mm guns, but due to material shortages, the need of the mobile artillery and the close end of the war, nothing came of this proposal.

Production Changes

As the Nashorn was considered only a temporary solution, the Germans did not introduce many modifications during its production run. It would only receive these modifications in order to simplify construction. Because of these changes, there were some minor differences between the early and late produced vehicles. Officially, there was never a special designation change in order to identify the early or late produced vehicles.
The early production vehicles had two front Bosch headlights, rear fitted mufflers and two front-mounted wheels. The later built vehicles had only one headlight, on the vehicle’s left side. The rear exhaust muffler was removed and replaced with exhaust pipes located on both of the vehicle’s sides. The front two wheels were moved to the rear and the rear mudguards were removed.
The early vehicles were equipped with the Hummel travel lock, but later models would have a new travel lock, equipped with a very simple wire release system which could be used from inside the vehicle.

Front view of the Nashorn, showing the improved travel lock that was released by a cable from inside the vehicle. These Nashorn “crewmen” are actually British soldiers, as this vehicle was captured somewhere in Italy. Source: Wikimedia
The rear mudguards were removed on later-built vehicles. There were also minor changes in the design of the driver’s observation hatch cover. Two brake vents were placed in the lower part of the angled front armor. During production, the size and design of the brake vents was slightly changed.
A hole with a movable armor cover was added to the lower-left of the hull. Its purpose was to help with warming the engine coolant with a blowtorch in cold weather. Two towing hooks were welded to the rear hull.

A late production model, with the two spare wheels mounted on the lower hull rear. There the two welded towing hooks, and the removal of the rear fender is also visible: Source.
Interior differences were not recorded, but there is always a possibility that there were some minor changes. While the Hummel received a specially designed front hull crew compartment (driver and radio operator), this was never implemented on the Nashorn.
Other changes were connected to the running gear of the Panzer III and IV. The early production vehicles had drive sprocket taken from the Panzer III Ausf.E (type Z.W.38). The return rollers and the idlers were taken from Panzer IV Ausf.D and F. Later produced vehicles used the drive sprocket taken from Panzer III Ausf.H (or Ausf.J depending on the source). There is evidence that a number of vehicles were built using a combination of these components.
There were also field modifications. While most were minor, like adding an extra tool or supply box, others include additional frontal armor plates in hope of increasing the armor thickness.

Organization

The Germans originally planned to use the Nashorn equip the 10 vehicle-strong Kompanie in the Panzerjäger Abteilung of the Panzer Divisions. This was never implemented. Instead, Nashorns were given to independent Schwere (Heeres) Panzerjäger Abteilung (heavy anti-tank battalions) which were then, depending on the operational needs, temporarily attached to different Armee Korps. This was a standard German war practice with other rare armored vehicles (like Tiger or Ferdinands for example), who were also grouped into independent units. Only Corps and Army Headquarters had the authority to give such orders.
These Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung would be composed of 45 vehicles, divided into three Kompanie (companies) with 14 Nashorn each and a Stabskompanie with 3 vehicles. The Kompanies were again divided into Zuge (platoons), each with 4 vehicles and with 2 in the Command Platoon.

In combat

During the war, several Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung (short s.Pz.Jg.Abt) would be formed, including 560, 655, 525, 93, 88, 664, 519 and 424. Other smaller units were formed, including the Schwere Panzerjäger Ersatz 43 und Asbuildung Abteilung, s.Pz.Jg. Kompanie 669 and Panzerkompanie Kummersdorf. The only units to receive Nashorns were the 1st Panzer Division and possibly the Das Reich Division.

Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 560

The forming of s.Pz.Jg.Abt 560 and equipping it with the Nashorn was a slow process. The first six vehicles were received in February, followed by 24 in March, and the last 15 in May 1943. In preparation for the coming Kursk offensive, s.H.Pz.Jg.Abt 560 was to be transported to Kharkiv in late April 1943. By the beginning of May 1943, the transportation of the unit was almost complete. In June, it was part of the Panzer Gruppe “Kempf”, but due to many mechanical problems, this unit was not ready for combat. While this unit did not see action during the battle for Kursk, it was busy defending the XXXXII Armee Korps’ (In September renamed into the 8th Armee) flanks from July onwards.

This vehicle had an early type travel lock that had to be released from outside. This vehicle belonged to s.Pz.Jg.Abt 560. It is on a train, possibly headed for the Eastern front. Source.
Throughout August, this unit also supported the 39th, 161st, and 282nd Infanterie Divisions. During this time, 14 vehicles were lost. s.Pz.Jg.Abt 560 would be used mostly in defending actions against Soviet attacks until the end of 1943.
Thanks to constant reinforcement (with 5 vehicles in September, October, November, and 4 in February 1944), s.Pz.Jg.Abt 560 managed to maintain almost full combat strength throughout 1943, although not all the vehicle were always operational. For example, on 31st October 1943, there were 39 vehicles in the unit, with only 8 operational and the remaining in various state of repair. By the end of 1943, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 560 reported having destroyed around 251 enemy tanks.
In January 1944, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 560 participated in the German defense of the city of Kirovograd (currently known as Kropyvnytskyi). In early February, this unit began a slow withdrawal toward Mielau in order to be requipped with the new Jagdpanther. By March, it was still engaged on the Eastern front under the LVII Pz.Korps, losing 16 Nashorn. By this time, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 560 had only 4 operational and 10 non-operational vehicles remaining. In late April 1944, the withdrawal was completed and s.Pz.Jg.Abt 560 was moved to Mielau.

Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 655

Another unit equipped with Nashorns was s.Pz.Jg.Abt “Stalingrad”. In April 1943, this unit was renamed s.Pz.Jg.Abt 655. For the creation of this unit, the remaining elements from Panzerjäger Abteilungen 521, 611, and 670 were used. It is for this reason that its Kompanie were named after these Abteilungen instead of the ordinary 1st, 2nd, and 3rd designations.
In April 1944, these would be renamed to 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Kompanie. In April 1943, this unit had 35 vehicles. The last 10 vehicles arrived in May. The unit assembly and training was carried out until June 1943. By the time of the Kursk offensive s.Pz.Jg.Abt 655 was part of the Heeresgruppe mitte, but was not directly involved in combat. It would, however, be engaged with the Second Armee in trying to stop the Soviet attacks. This defense proved to be unsuccessful and the unit was forced to pull out in the direction of the Desna and Dnieper rivers. In a report dated 1st July, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 655 was noted to have lost eight vehicles: one to a mine, and the remaining seven during an air raid. All these were recovered and sent to Germany for repair. From November to the end of 1943, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 655 was mostly used in support of different Panzer Division, both in the attack and in the defense, around the Pripet Marshes.
The Nashorns proved to be effective, as can be seen in the report of Kompanie 521 during a combat operation defending Orel in mid July 1943, when following vehicles were claimed to have been destroyed: 1 x KV-2, 19 x KV-1s, 430 x T-34s, 1 x M3 Lee, 1 x T-60, 5 x T-70s, and 1 rocket launcher mounted on a tank chassis, with the loss of only two Nashorns. These numbers are just claims and were probably larger than reality.
s.Pz.Jg.Abt 655 received around 33 Nashorns as replacements (8 in July, 5 in October, November and December, and the last 10 in March 1944). This unit was even above the official combat strength with 47 operational (and 1 in repair) vehicles during June-July 1944.
In February, it was stationed in Belorussia in support of the elements of the Second Armee. By the end of May 1944, this unit was transferred to the 4th Panzer Armee, and it would see action in Ukraine on the Vistula river and at Lublin. In August 1944, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 655’s 1st and 2nd Kompanie were moved from Heeresgruppe Nord Ukraine to the training center at Mielau to be equipped with Jagdpanters and Jagdpanzer IVs.

Sd.Kfz.164 of the 2nd Kompanie of the schwere Panzerjäger Abteilungen 560, summer 1943.

Nashorn of the schwere Panzerjäger Abteilungen 519, Group center, Vitebsk area, Russia, winter 1943-44.

Nashorn of the schwere Panzerjäger Abteilungen 88, Russia.

Another Nashorn of the schwere Panzerjäger Abteilungen 88, Russia, 1944.

Sd.Kfz.164 Nashorn of the schwere Panzerjäger Abteilungen 525 in Italy, summer 1944.

Sd.Kfz.164 Nashorn in Italy, schwere Panzerjäger Abteilungen 525.

Schwere Panzerjäger Kompanie 669

The 3rd Kompanie of s.Pz.Jg.Abt 655 was equipped with all remaining Nashorns (possibly around 24 vehicles). The unit was renamed to Einsatz Kompanie 655 and was stationed on the Eastern Front. It would remain on the Eastern Front supporting the 4th Panzer Armee near the Sandomierz bridgehead until late 1944. In November 1944, it was renamed to s.Pz.Jg.Kp 669. The combat strength of the s.Pz.Jg.Kp 669 was around 20 Nashorns (December 1944). During the Soviet offensive in January 1945, s.Pz.Jg.Kp 669 was part of 17th Panzer Division, suffering heavy losses during the battle for Kielce. In February 1945, it was reinforced with 13 new vehicles. The unit met its end during the battle for Prague in May 1945, when it surrendered to the Soviets.

Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 525

Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 525 was formed in August 1939 as Pz.Abw.Abt 525. During the attack on the West, this unit was equipped with 88 mm Flak 18 gun for use against tanks and bunkers. In France, it was used to attack parts of the Maginot line. Later, it would see action in the Balkans and in the Soviet Union. In late April 1943, it was ordered to reequip s.Pz.Jg.Kp 525 with Nashorns in a standard 45-vehicles organization. It was moved to Magdeburg where it was to be supplied with these vehicles, and by July 1943 the assembly of the 45 Nashorns was completed.
It was originally allocated to the 26th Panzer Division, but due to the need for crew training, the unit was only combat-ready by the beginning of August 1943. In preparation for the German occupation of Italy, s.Pz.Jg.Kp 525 was transported to northern Italy, but due to the Allied offensive, the unit was repositioned to the south. It was attached to different units (like the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division or 371 Infantry Division) and was mostly used for coastal defense. During December 1943, it was stationed near Rome as part of the 3rd Grenadier Division. From January 1944, it was engaged in defense of Cassino, where four Nashorns were destroyed and three damaged, but later repaired. Thanks to well selected and favorable combat positions, they managed to take advantage of their strong guns, even achieving a claimed kill from more than 2,800 m against an Allied Sherman tank. The 1st and 2nd Kompanie would see action during the Battle of Anzio in early 1944. In May, s.Pz.Jg.Kp 525 was again stationed around Cassino.
s.Pz.Jg.Kp 525 suffered losses during the Battle for Pontecorvo, where the Canadian Allied soldiers managed to capture one and destroy three vehicles. s.Pz.Jg.Kp 525 also saw action against Polish forces (part of the 2nd Corps) in August 1944, when one was captured and two destroyed.
On 31st August, s.Pz.Jg.Kp 525 was to be reinforced with Jagdpanthers and thus form a gemischte Jagdpanther-Abteilung. For this reason, the 1st Kompanie was sent to Mielau for rearming. The 1st Kompanie vehicles were given to the 2nd and 3rd Kompanies and these two would remain in Italy supporting the 10th Armee. In April 1945, what remained of the 2nd Kompanie was supporting the 26th Panzer Division and the 3rd Kompanie was supporting the 29th Grenadier Division. Many more vehicles were captured by the Allies during the German retreat across the River Po, as a number of Nashorns were abandoned by the Germans.
In late November 1944, the 1st Kompanie was in the process of reorganization, but due to the rapid development on the front, it was sent to reinforce Kapmfgruppe Fuehter-Begleit-Brigade. It was equipped with 10 Nashorns in late November 1944.

Schwere Heeres Panzerjäger Abteilung 93

The original name of this unit was Pz.Abw.Abt. 23 and it was formed in 1935. The name was changed to s.Pz.Jg.Abt 93 in October 1942. It was part of the 26th Panzer Division, stationed in France for training and rest. In June 1943, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 93 was chosen to be equipped with 45 Nashorns, and this process was completed in the period from July to September 1943. As the 26th Panzer Division was needed on the Italian front and s.Pz.Jg.Abt 93 was combat-ready, it was decided to detach it from this unit and attach it to the 7th Amree in Western France.
It was, from September 1943, engaged with Army Group “South” on the Eastern front for the support of the German retreat at the Dnieper River. and was used to support the German attack near Kryvyi Rog in late October. In early 1944, it supported the retreat of the 24th Division and the 6th Army. In early 1944, this part of the front was quiet, until 20th August when the Soviets launched a large offensive. Most elements of s.Pz.Jg.Abt 93 were lost together with the 6th Army near Chișinău (Kishinev). The 2nd Kompanie would survive and would be used to support s.Pz.Jg.Abt 525 in defense of the Rhine river. The final fate of what remained of s.Pz.Jg.Abt 93 is not clear.

Actions of the Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 93 and 525

s.Pz.Jg.Abt 93 and 525 were sent to the Western Front in order to reinforce the German forces which were desperately trying to stop the Allied advance to the Rhine. s.Pz.Jg.Abt 525 (1st Kompanie) was, in November 1944, equipped with 10 Nashorns while s.Pz.Abt 93 (2nd Kompanie) was, by December, equipped with just 12 Nashorns.
Both Abteilung 525 and 93 were attached to the 106th Panzer Brigade and operated in the Kolmar pocket until late December 1944 while suffering no losses. On 29th (or 27th depending on the sources) December, both were used to support Jagdpanthers from s.Pz.Jg.Abt 654. Later in January, they were used to reinforce the StuG.Brigade 280 until February. By that time, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 525 had suffered such heavy losses, that what was left was incorporated into s.Pz.Jg.Abt 93. In February, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 93 was renamed to s.Pz.Jg. Kompanie 93 due to its small size. By the end of February 1945, the Kompanie had only 10 vehicles left and was supporting 106th Armored Brigade near Cologne. In March, one Nashorn managed to destroy the new American T26E3 (at a distance of 500 m) tank near the town of Niehl. The Kompanie finally met its fate in April 1945, when it surrendered in the Ruhr area.

Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 519 and 664

Another unit to be equipped with Nashorns was s.Pz.Jg.Abt 519, which was formed in late August 1943. By November 1943, the last vehicle was received and the unit had 45 operational Nashorns. It was repositioned to the Eastern Front, where it supported the 3rd Panzer Armee. One of the first actions was the battle for Vitebsk, where the advancing Soviet forces were stopped. It would be stationed there from December 1943 to January 1944, during which time it helped repel many Soviet attacks. During the period from 10th December 1943 to 24th February 1944, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 519 claimed to have destroyed some 290 enemy tanks with the loss of only 6 vehicles, of which 4 were destroyed by their crews (due to a lack of towing vehicles).
From January to June, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 519 saw very few combat actions and was part of the 3rd Armee. From June 1944, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 519 was used to support the 4th Armee in Belorussia. By the end of June, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 519 claimed to have destroyed around 112 Soviet tanks with some losses. To replace the losses, this unit received 15 new vehicles (5 in March, April, and June). Due to the following fighting in July 1944, the unit lost many of its Nashorns. What was left of s.Pz.Jg.Abt 519 was used to support the Panzerkampfgruppe Hoppe by the middle of July. By August 1944, like the previous units, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 519 was also sent to Mielau to be equipped with Jagdpanthers, but was also equipped with StuG III.

Late production version somewhere on the eastern front. The crew observe their surroundings for possible enemy targets. The Nashorn is positioned between the two wooden houses which serve as makeshift camouflage. This vehicle belongs to s.Pz.Jg.Ab 519’s commanding Kompanie. Source.
Its remaining vehicles were given to s.Pz.Jg.Abt 664 which was equipped with towed 88 mm PaK 43 guns. This unit never achieved a full combat strength, with only around 12 vehicles being used (October 1944). It was engaged with HeeresGruppe Mitte, but was lost in late January 1945 on the Eastern Front.
Interesting to note is that Nashorn crews from s.Pz.Jg.Abt 519 had a habit of naming their (and paining it on the vehicle) vehicles after East German cities (like Pommern) or animals (Puma, Tiger, etc).

Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 88

s.Pz.Jg.Abt 88 was originally formed in late October 1940, and by late 1943 was mostly engaged on the Eastern Front. In late November, it was moved to Mielau to be equipped with Nashorns and for crew training. The unit reaches its full combat strength by January 1944 but was not ready for combat operation until February 1944.
By early 1944, s.Pz.Jg.Abt 88 was part of the 1st Panzer Armee on the Eastern Front. s.Pz.Jg.Abt 88 was heavily engaged during the battle of Kamienets-Podolsky. Later, in March/April 1944, this unit supported the 6th and 17th Panzer Divisions. An interesting fact is that, in May 1944, one s.Pz.Jg.Kp 88 Nashorn managed to destroy a new Soviet tank IS-2 in somewhat comic circumstances. This vehicle had actually been captured by the Germans and was in the process of being towed to the rear when it was spotted by the Nashorns. They immediately destroyed it without knowing it was actually captured by their comrades, although it is unlikely that the soldiers towing their prize back were amused by this incident.
This unit suffered heavy losses during the support of the Army Group A, around Brody and Lvov. In order to replace the losses, it received 30 new vehicles in August 1944. The rest of the year, this unit was stationed near Miechow. From January 1945, it was engaged against the Soviets near Lisow and Kielce.
In late January, an unknown number of Nashorns from this unit were supporting the German defense of Preiswitz near the village of Gieraltowice. During these actions, some Nashorns from s.Pz.Jg.Abt 88 were equipped with experimental night vision equipment, but in what numbers and how effective this system was is unknown. In March, the remnants of s.Pz.Jg.Abt 88 supported the 17th Armored Division near Lauban. s.Pz.Jg.Abt 88 would fight on until it surrendered in Prague in May 1945.

Schwere Panzerjäger Ersatz 43 and Asbuildung Abteilung

These two units were originally used for training and as reinforcements and were stationed at Spremberg. In desperation, both units were mobilized in the defense of the Oder River, where both would be lost. The number of vehicles that these units had is unknown.

The use of Nashorn in other units.

Panzerkompanie Kummersdorf was formed using the vehicle present at the Kummersdorf Weapons Testing Center, including at least one Nashorn. An unknown number of Nashorns were allocated to the 1st Panzer Division in December 1944. They were used to reinforce Pz.Jg.Abt 37, which had lost most of its Marder anti-tank vehicles. By April 1945, there was still an unknown number of Nashorns operational with this unit. It is possible that at least 12 Nashorns were given to the Das Reich Division in late December 1944, but precise information is not available.
By the end of 1944, there were still some 130-165 operational Nashorns in total (depending on the source). Most were located on the Eastern front, with smaller numbers to the West.

Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung/Kompanie 424

The origin of this unit is not clear, and depending on the sources it is either marked as an Abteilung or a Kompanie. What is known is that s.Pz.Jg.Ab 424 was mostly destroyed in early 1945 near the Kielce area. The remaining elements of this unit (with only two Nashorns) were used to defend the Order river.

Combat effectiveness

The Nashorn, due to its powerful gun, could engage any Allied or Soviet tank at great ranges. The best tactics when employing Nashorns was to select a good and well-camouflaged combat position some distance behind the main front line and with a good field of visibility. From such positions, its gun could destroy enemy armored vehicles with less danger from retaliation fire. Of course, this was the best-case scenario, which could not always be implemented due to many factors like terrain or inadequate leadership.
As the Nashorns would be thrown into areas with expected heavy clashes, the local commanders would sometimes used them in a role or in a way for which these vehicles were not designed and suitable for. This inevitably led to unnecessary losses. In order to provide many German units with strong anti-tank firepower, the Nashorn units were sometimes divided into smaller groups which reduced their combat potential. This also caused logistical and communication problems which could not be easily solved. Another problem was the positioning of these vehicles too close to the front or the inadequate scouting of enemy forces.
To address potential misuse of the Nashorn, instruction sheets were given to the troops (at the battalion level) of the 3rd Armee. These sheets included instructions on how to properly use the new Nashorns. It indicated that s.Pz.Jg.Ab was to be used as mobile defense units against mass enemy armor. They should be used as Abteilung or Kompanie strength, and to avoid distribution in smaller groups. This could cause many potential communication, ammunition and maintenance problems. Due to its weak armor, the enemy should be engaged at ranges greater than 1 km, and the Nashorn should never be used as an assault weapon (like StuG III for example). The Nashorn should attack enemy vehicles from well-camouflaged positions. The local commander should receive advice from the Nashorn commanders on the proper use of the vehicle.
Good cooperation between Nashorn units and the units they were attached to wasn’t always possible. There were situations when Nashorn commanders refused to execute the orders given to them by local commanders. This was the case of the Kompanie 521 (part of s.Pz.Jg.Ab 655), which refused to attack a well-defended position (with 20 to 30 tanks) while advancing over 2 km of open ground. The proper use of the Nashorns was demonstrated by the Zug from Kompanie 521, when on 3rd July, 12 KV-1s and 4 T-34s were destroyed with the loss of only one Nashorn. The Nashorns were well positioned and camouflaged, which played a great part in this action.

Due to its weak armor, the Nashorn provided only limited protection and could be easily destroyed by enemy fire. Source: Pinterest

The Nashorn’s best defense was a well-selected combat position and good camouflage. This vehicle belongs to s.Pz.Jg.Ab 525 (February 1944). Source.
Scouting was also essential for the Nashorn units, as they lacked any proper vehicles to do the job. Usually, the Nashorn commanders would go on foot to the designated area of attack. What is interesting is that (depending on the combat situation), the commanders of the Nashorn vehicles would give orders to their crew from outside the vehicle during a combat operation. This was done so that the Nashorn commander could have a better understanding on the current combat situation, in this instance, a key importance was that the commander had to be in close proximity of his vehicle. As the Nashorns were used mostly as fire support from the distance this was possible to be achieved without any major problems.
Thanks to its deadly gun, the Nashorn could effectively destroy enemy tanks from ranges above 2 km. In one case, it was reported that a T-34 was destroyed from a range of 4.2 km! It is important to note that the Nashorn would rarely engage at ranges greater of 2 km for several reasons. While the gun was powerful enough, there was a problem with potentially wasting precious ammunition, as the hit probability was significantly lower at such distances. Ammunition production could not reach the demands and the general low ammo count that could be carried inside the vehicle compounded this issue. Another problem was that the sights would be slightly knocked out of alignment during driving, which would affect the precision of the gun, especially at longer ranges. There are other facts that also had to be taken into account like the wind, the quality of ammunition, and a bit of luck etc. Hitting enemy vehicles at ranges of over 3 km was an exception rather than a rule, and in most cases, crews avoided shooting at these ranges.
One of the best known Nashorn aces was Lieutenant Albert Ernst who served with s.Pz.Jag.Abt.519. During the fighting on 19th December 1943, he and his crew managed to destroy 8 Soviet T-34s. Later that month, they destroyed another 14 T-34s tanks with just 21 rounds of ammunition. By 7th February 1944, he was awarded the Knight’s Cross for destroying 25 enemy tanks and many anti-tank guns. In the summer of 1944, he was transferred to s.Pz.Jg.Abt 654.

Conclusion

With the creation of the independent Schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung equipped with Nashorns, the Germans had units that could provide support and increase the offensive capabilities of any units attached to them. This also created some issues, the most common of which was the misuse of these vehicles by the local commanders.
During its operational use, the Nashorn proved to be an effective anti-tank vehicle with an excellent gun, but it was not perfect. The main drawback (like all similar German open-topped tank destroyers) was the lack of armor. It was also a relatively large vehicle and thus difficult to camouflage properly and suffered from a low ammunition count, and a small traverse arc. Another significant issue was constituted by the great number of engine breakdowns due to overheating.

Surviving vehicles

Today, there are only three surviving Nashorn vehicles. One is located in the Kubinka Museum in Russia and another one is at the U.S. Army Center of Military History Storage Facility. The third vehicle is a part of a private collection in the Netherlands. It was a fully operational vehicle, but was badly damaged in a fire in 2019, and is currently under restoration.

8.8 cm PaK 43/1 auf Fgst. Pz.Kpfw. III und IV (Sf) Sd.Kfz.164 specifications
Dimensions	Length 8.44 m, Width 2.95 m, Height 2.94 m
Weight	24 tonnes
Armor	Hull front 30 mm, side and rear 20 mm, top and bottom 10 mm, Superstructure 10 mm all around and the gun shield 10 mm.
Crew	5 (Gunner, loader, driver, radio operator and commander)
Propulsion	Maybach HL120TRM
Speed	40 km/h, 15-28 km/h (cross country)
Range	260 km, 130 km (cross country)
Armament	8.8 cm PaK 43/1 L/71
Gun Traverse	30°
Elevation	-5° to +20°
Total production	494

Sources

Thomas L.J and Hilary L.D. (2006), Panzer Tracts No.7-3, Panzerjager Panzer Tracts
David Doyle (2005), German Military Vehicles, KP Books
Alexander Ludeke, Waffentechnik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Parragon books
Duško Nešić, (2008), Naoružanje Drugog Svetsko Rata-Nemačka, Beograd
Peter Chamberlain and Hilary Doyle (1978) Encyclopedia of German Tanks of World War Two – Revised Edition, Arms and Armor press.
Tony G. and Detlev T. (2000) Nashorn 8.8 cm PaK 43/1 (L/71) auf Fgst. Pz.kpfw. III/IV (Sf), Nuts and bolt Vol. 14
Janusz L. (2010) Nashorn, Tank power Vol. XCIII, Wudawnictwo Militaria.
Ian V. Hogg (1975). German Artillery of World War Two, Purnell Book Services Ltd.
Peter C. and Terry G. (2008) Enzyklopadie Deutscher waffen 1939-1945 Handwaffen, Artilleries, Beutewaffen, Sonderwaffen.

Pictures:

Crew working inside the Nashorn. The crew member on the right, behind the gun, is the gunner. Behind him, on the left of the image, are the commander and, in the foreground, is the loader. The 88 mm horizontal sliding block mechanism is seen here. Source.

The large size of the 88 mm ammunition is evident here. Source.

When not expecting to go into action, the gun opening was covered in order to avoid getting dust into the chamber. Source.

Rearview of an earlier production vehicle. The large wheel inside the crew compartment was a part of the rear travel lock mechanism. Later built vehicles did not have this system. Source.

WW2 German Tank Destroyers

Jagdpanther (Sd.Kfz.173)

German Reich (1943)
Tank Destroyer – 415 Built

Historical context

After encountering heavy Soviet tanks such as the KV-1, it rapidly became apparent that the Pak 36, which formed the bulk of the German AT guns at the start of Operation Barbarossa, was inadequate. To counter the threat these tanks posed, heavier guns were introduced to the front, including the 7.5 cm (3 inch) Pak 40 and, more importantly, the 88 mm (3.5 inch) Pak 43. The 88 mm (3.5 inch) Flak, on which the Pak 43 was based, had been used in ground support since the Spanish civil war and had proven to be very proficient at taking out tanks. So it’s no surprise the decision was made to mount it onto a tank chassis.

The resulting tank was the Hornisse (later known as the Nashorn), which had a Pak 43 mounted onto a Panzer III/IV chassis. Despite having a high silhouette and very little armor, it proved more than adequate, being able to take out tanks at ranges of over 3000 m (3280 yards).
Another tank destroyer using the Pak 43 was the Ferdinand (later known as the Elefant). After losing a design contract to Henschel, Porsche had 100 Tiger P chassis which couldn’t be equipped with the Henschel turret, since they were reserved for the Henschel Tiger tank. In 1942, the order was given to convert the remaining chassis into tank destroyers, which were to use the Pak 43. The Ferdinand first saw use in the Battle of Kursk, where it could easily take out enemies from long range. But when it advanced, the flaws became apparent. The lack of close range defense made it an easy target for Soviet infantry, that could near the tank. to throw Molotov cocktails onto the engine deck. Its heavy weight also made it difficult to cross most bridges of it’s era, and the poor Soviet infrastructure made navigating near impossible in certain places.
It became clear that the German army was in need of a tank destroyer that offered decent mobility without sacrificing armor, and vice versa. And as such, the Jagdpanther came to be.

The hunting Panther

The Jagdpanther is one of the most iconic tank destroyers of World War 2. Based on the Panther chassis, the famous tank destroyer was produced from 1943 up until the end of the war in 1945. Mechanically more reliable than the Ferdinand/Elephant and the Köningstiger, armed with the 88 mm (3.5 inch) Pak 43 “Panzerknacker” and with 80 mm of 55 degree sloped armour (this presented 138 mm of thickness of armour to a shell fired horizontally at the front of the Jagdpanther) it was a formidable opponent for any tank at the time. During the war, over 400 tanks were produced, seeing action on both the Eastern and the Western European fronts. After the war, captured Jagdpanthers were used by the French army, along with Panthers and other German tanks, up until the 1950’s. Overall,the Jagdpanther was a great mix of mobility, firepower and armor. Today, only 10 of the tank destroyers are left, spread across various museums worldwide.

Development history

Design

When the Pak 43 was designed, it was originally meant to be towed into battle, but it soon became clear that the anti-tank gun was very unwieldy to transport in the field. As a result, the Wehrmacht started looking for a self-propelled platform to mount the 88 mm (3.5 in) gun onto. The solution was found on August 3rd, 1942, when the Heereswaffenamt (the agency in charge of R&D for the German army) decided to mount the Pak on a Panther chassis. Krupp was awarded the design contract, but was unable to deliver the design drawings by January 1943, and so the project was handed over to Daimler-Benz. Krupp, however, remained responsible for the production and delivery of the Pak 43, the main armament of the Jagdpanther. In the first designs, the tank was named the “88mm Sturmgeschutz.”
The final design was presented to Hitler on his birthday, and subsequently accepted by the Heereswaffenamt in May 1943. As production started on the first models of the Jagdpanther, it became apparent that there was a shortage of workspace in the Daimler-Benz factory. That, combined with Daimler-Benz not being able to produce the contracted amount of Panthers, lead to production being handed over to MIAG, a Braunschweig based company. A pre-production model was presented to Hitler on the 20th of October, alongside a model of the Tiger 2 and the Jagdtiger. November that year, mass-production of the Jagdpanther was authorized. When it entered German Army service it was given the designation Sd.Kfz.173.

Production

The first Jagdpanther meant for service was delivered in December 1943, with production increasing to 10 tanks per month in April 1944. Delays in production were mainly due to improvements being implemented. Strengthened gearboxes and intermediate gears were installed. Jagdpanther production was also slowed down due to bombing raids and lack of workmen. By the end of June 1944, only 46 of the tanks had left the factory floors, barely enough to equip one Schwerer Panzerjäger unit. This was far from the original 160 planned vehicles, which would have been enough to equip 3 units and have some left for testing and training.
The MIAG firm complained about the lack of workmen, and as such was sent 320 men from the Panzerjäger replacement unit. This managed to boost production to 20 tanks a month in September 1944. Neither the OKW, nor the Heeresamt were happy with the production numbers and, as a result, two other companies, MHN & MBA, were contracted to produce the Jagdpanther. This increased the total output to 67 tanks for December 1944.

Armament

The Jagdpanther was equipped with the fearsome 88 mm (3.5 inch) Pak 43. Based on an anti-air gun, the 88 mm (3.5 inch) soon turned out to be more than adept at taking on an anti-tank roll. Accurate at over 3000 m (3280 yards) and with a muzzle velocity of over 1000 m/s (3280 ft/s), the 88 mm (3.5 inch) gun has more than earned its reputation as one of the best anti-tank guns of the war.
The Pak originally featured a monobloc barrel, but due to the rapid wear of the high-velocity gun, the decision was made to replace it with a dual piece barrel. Although this didn’t reduce wear, it did make replacement easier. The main gun was able to fire different shells, ranging from the armor piercing PzGr. 39/43 and PzGr. 40/43 to the high explosive Gr. 39/3 HL.
The Jagdpanther carried 60 rounds of 88 mm (3.5 inch) ammunition, 1200 rounds for the coax hull-mounted gun and two MP40’s with 384 9×19 mm rounds. With the introduction of the Nahverteidigungswaffe (close range defense weapon), it was possible to launch projectiles near the tank without endangering the crew, and so 16 grenades were added to the inventory. However, this weapon couldn’t be built into most of the Jagdpanthers before June 1944, due to a shortage of the weapon. As a result, earlier models of the tank have the opening in the roof sealed with a circular plate which was held by screws.

Armor

As the Germans improved their armor, so did the Allies. As the war progressed, bigger and heavier guns were being developed by the Allies, capable of shooting shells of ever-increasing penetration. To counter this, tanks were designed with thicker and sturdier armor, with the Jagdpanther being no exception. Meant to be able take on other tank destroyers, the Jagdpanther’s frontal upper armor was a single, 80 mm (3.15 inch) thick wall of steel under an angle of 55°, with the lower frontal armor being 60 mm (2.35 inch) at an angle of 60°. This resulted in a formidable effective armor thickness of ~140 mm (5.5 inch) for the upper plate and ~90 mm (3.5 inch) for the lower plate, guaranteeing protection from all but the heaviest of guns.
The gun mantlet was just as tough as the frontal armor of the Jagdpanther. A 100 mm (3.9 inch) thick ‘saukopf’ (pighead) mantlet was installed on the gun. The sides of the superstructure of the tank had 50 mm (1.97 inch) of armor, while the lower sides had 40 mm (1.57 inch) of armor. The roof and the floor were between 16 (0.63 inch) to 25 mm (1 inch) thick.

Mobility

The production model of the Jagdpanther weighed in at 46 tonnes, making it one of the heavier tanks fielded by the German army. The drive train was the same as the Panther aside from the engine and the heavier transmission. It was powered by a 12 cylinder Maybach HL 230 P30 23.1 liter V12 gasoline engine, which would give it an effective range of 160 km (100 miles) and a top speed of 46km/h (28.6 mph), making it as fast as contemporary Allied medium tanks such as the M4 Sherman, despite the latter weighing 15.000 kg (33070 lbs) less.

Crew

Inside the Jagdpanther there was a 5 man crew consisting of the commander, driver, gunner, loader and radio operator, with the latter doubling as machine gunner. The two hatches at the top of the tank were for the commander and the loader, with the hatch at the back serving as an entrance for the crew and to replenish ammunition.
On early models, the driver used two periscopes to see ahead, and 5 pistol holes which could also be used to observe the surrounding battlefield, but the latter soon turned out to be more detrimental to the strength of the armor. In later models the holes were removed and the left periscope was welded over, being filled with a 15 mm (0.59 in) thick plate. The commander and loader had four periscopes available to survey the surrounding area, two rigid, and two capable of turning.
The Jagdpanther was provided with a 10 Watt Fu 5 transmitter and a 2 Watt Fu 2 receiver radio. Command vehicles received the long range 30 Watt Fu 8 radio set.

Modifications

As the war went on, several additions and adjustments were made to the Jagdpanther.
January 1944: The pistol ports , which weakened the overall hull strength and had become unnecessary with the installation of the Nahverteidigungswaffe, were removed from the tank.
February 1944: The left driver periscope was removed and welded shut with a 15 mm (0.59 in) piece of steel and a towing coupling was welded to the back servicing plate. To make space for this, the winch was moved up to between the exhaust pipes.
Earlier Jagdpanther still used the Panther Ausf.A engine cover, with the difference being the air intake was made smaller to fit on the tank destroyer. Where the Panther’s radio antenna was attached to the hull of the tank, the Jagdpanther’s antenna was mounted on the back of the superstructure, next to the rear hatch. This left a hole in the engine cover, which was covered with a screwed-on plate.
May 1944: The monobloc gun was replaced with the two-piece gun, facilitating replacement of the worn barrel.
June 1944: A mount for a small 2-ton crane was planned for the roof of the vehicles.
The gun mantlet was changed so that a screw was at the top of the cast piece.

Note the ‘mushroom’ crane mount towards the back of the casemate, and the Nahverteidigungswaffe to the front and left of it.
September 1944: The OKH ordered manufacturers to stop using the Zimmerit protective coating on the tanks.
October 1944: Sheet metal pipes were installed over the exhaust, on the account of them glowing at night, possibly giving the tank’s position away.
The leading wheels of the Jagdpanther didn’t clean themselves, and as mud and snow gathered, tracks got thrown. New leading wheels of a bigger diameter were developed, reducing the amount of tracks thrown.
December 1944: The Jagdpanther started using the new type of engine cover provided for the Panther and “flame-destroyer” exhaust mufflers are installed, preventing mixtures of fuel and air in the exhaust from igniting.

Derivatives

In late 1944, plans had been made to mount the 128 mm (5.04 in) Pak 80 onto the Jagdpanther chassis. The new vehicle, known as the Jagdpanther mit 12.8 cm PaK 80, would have had a rear-mounted casemate and weighed in excess of 50 tonnes. The project never got past the blueprint phase and got shelved before the war ended.

Jagdpanther in action

The Jagdpanther mainly saw action one the Western front from its deployment in March 1944, with deployment to the Eastern front only occurring from January 1945 onwards. The first unit to receive the new Jagdpanther was the schwere Panzerjäger-Abteilung 654. Each Jagdpanther Kompanie was scheduled to receive 14 of the tanks destroyers, and an additional 3 command tanks for the battalion headquarters. Due to production problems, it wasn’t possible to bring the 654th to full strength before being sent to the front in June, 1944.

First blood

The first action the Jagdpanthers saw was on the 30th of July, when they engaged a squadron of Churchill tanks near St. Martin de Bois. In a two-minute action, three Jagdpanthers managed to take out eleven Churchills, before an additional squadron of Churchills rushed in to help. The 6th Guards tank brigade reported the capture of two Jagdpanthers, which had been left behind due to track damage. Nonetheless, this encounter showed the strength of the new tank destroyer and helped cement its reputation as a threat to any tank that encountered it.

Ardennes Offensive

In preparation for the Ardennes Offensive, the OKH had planned to fully equip five tank hunter battalions with Jagdpanthers. Three of the five units were already at the front and as such weren’t at full combat strength. Due to supply problems, only 27 of the 56 planned Jagdpanthers made it to the battalions before the start of the offensive, with only 17 of them being operational.

Eastern front

Many of the tanks that were sent to the Eastern front weren’t destroyed by Soviet troops, but at the hands of their crew. The main problems that plagued the Panzer divisions were a lack of spare parts, fuel and delays in the production process that prevented more Jagdpanthers from reaching the front. In January 1945, the 563rd s.H. Pz.Jg.Abteilung managed to take out 53 tanks whilst only losing four Jagdpanzer IVs and one Jagdpanther to enemy fire. The bulk of their losses were credited to tanks being blown up lest they fell into enemy hands. For example, a stunning 12 Jagdpanthers and 17 Jagdpanzer IVs were destroyed by their crews in the 563rd alone. The rapidly deteriorating situation meant that many of the Jagdpanther crews sent to the front in 1945 had received little or no training, which reduced the already impaired effectiveness of the tank destroyer battalions.

An article by Thomas Verplancke

Links and sources

Walter J. Spielberger; Hilary L. Doyle; Thomas L. Jentz (2007), Heavy Jagdpanzer: Development – Production – Operations, Atglen, Pennsylvania: Schiffer Publishing
Peter Chamberlain; Hilary L. Doyle (1973), AFV Weapons Profile No. 55: German Self-Propelled Weapons,

Jagdpanther specifications
Dimensions L-W-H	6.86m (9.86m with gun) x 3.28m (3.42m with Schürzen) x 2.51m 22ft 6in (32ft 5in with gun) x 10ft 9in (11ft 3in with Schürzen) x 8ft 11in
Track Width	66 cm
Track length	15 cm
Total weight, battle ready	45,500 kg (100,300 lbs)
Crew	5 (driver, commander, hull gunner/radio operator, gunner, loader)
Propulsion	Maybach HL230 P30 V-12 petrol 700 PS (690 hp, 515 kW)
Suspension	Torsion bar
Speed (road)	46 km/h (29 mph)
Range	160 km (100 mi)
Armament	88 mm (3.46 in) Pak 43/3 L/71 (57 rounds) Hull MG 34 Nahverteidigungswaffe (on later models)
Armor	40-100 mm (1.57-3.94 in)
Total production	415 (generally accepted figure)

Germans Tanks of ww2

Early Jagdpanther, sPzJgAbt 654, France, Normandy, summer 1944.

Jagdpanther (early type) of sPzAbt 654, France, spring 1944.

Jagdpanther, 1st companie, schwere Panzer Abteilung 654, Ruhr pocket, March 1945.

Early type Jagdpanther attached to the 19th SS Panzerdivision, 1944.

Jagdpanther of the Führer Grenadier Brigade, Panzerdivision Grossdeutschland, fall 1944.

Jagdpanther of the sPzAbt 654, Normandy, summer 1944.

Late type, schwere Panzerjäger Abteilung 654, Normandy, France, summer 1944.

Jagdpanther, late type, unknown unit, France, winter 1944.

Jagdpanther, 1st Companie, 560th Heeres Schwere Jagdpanzer Abteilung DomBütt, Ardennes, 20 December 1944.

Jagdpanther (unknown sPzAbt), Ardennes, December 1944.

Jagdpanther of the sPzAbt 654, Ruhr area, March 1945.

Jagdpanther (unknown sPzAbt), Eastern Front, early 1945.

Jagdpanther (unknown sPzAbt), Eastern front, early 1945.

Unknown unit, Eastern Front, 1945.

All illustrations by Tank Encylopedia’s own David Bocquelet

WW2 German Tank Destroyers

7.5 cm PaK 40 auf Raupenschlepper Ost (RSO)

Post author By Eric Matzner
Post date January 14, 2016
5 Comments on 7.5 cm PaK 40 auf Raupenschlepper Ost (RSO)

German Reich (1943)
Tank Destroyer – Estimated 80-90 Built

From Hauler to Fighter

As the German army faced ever increasing numbers of Allied armour, more ways were found to place anti-tank weaponry on already existing chassis, in order to try and counter the Allied numerical superiority. The Raupenschlepper Ost (RSO) was no exception to the armed conversions that were built upon so many German vehicles at the time.

The decision was made in 1943 to take the well proven battle tractor and place a Pak 40/4 on its back, in order to provide more mobile anti-tank capabilities on the front line. After only a very limited amount were produced, it was made clear that this was one conversion that was not a successful fighting vehicle.

The original Raupenschlepper Ost tracked lorry with its trailer.

Origins in the mud

The development of this vehicle is directly linked to the development of the RSO tractor built by Steyr from 1942 to 1945. This tractor was developed to meet the needs of the Wehrmacht for bringing supplies and weapons to the front lines in the poor conditions that were met on the Eastern front. Many of the battles there were far from any road, and if roads did exist, they were often in very poor shape, especially in spring.
It was soon found that existing vehicles were not satisfactory for bringing supplies and the newer larger anti-tank weapons through this adverse terrain, thus the designs for the RSO were created. By 1945, about 27,000 RSO tractors had been produced.

German 7.5cm PaK 40 anti-tank gun being towed by a RSO Raupenschlepper Ost Tractor, Yugoslavia, Sep 1943
Development of an armed version of the RSO began only a few months after the tractor was in service. It was found that, due the rough nature of cross country driving, the sights of a gun being towed behind an RSO would be knocked out of calibration. Due to this, experimentation was undergone with mounting several guns on the bed of the RSO, including 75 mm (2.95 in), 105 mm (4.13 in) and 150 mm (5.9 in) weapons.
The intent would be to unload the gun at the front with a collapsible crane. This would allow for quick transport of weapons, but would still require time for the unloading and set up of the gun, and did not allow for any firing of the weapon while still mounted on the tractor. Though a few trial vehicles were made during these tests, none entered mass production
In the summer of 1943, the need for gun mounted on an RSO that could fire without having to remove the gun from the chassis was seen. A version made with a low silhouette cab (with only lower body protection for the driver and co-driver), along with collapsible sides on the cargo deck, was designed to carry a 75 mm (2.95 in) Pak 40/4 gun that could traverse 360⁰. When Hitler was shown this design, he ordered that it be put on high priority for production, as he saw in it an excellent balance of mobility, firepower and economics, which would provide an excellent tank hunter to the front.
On October 1st 1943, a prototype was presented to Hitler, after which production plans to produce 400 a month was put in place, despite there being no combat trials yet. However, very few were ever made. It is unknown how many of this RSO variant were produced, but it is generally believed to be less than 100.
Some information exists showing that Steyr was designing a new prototype immediately after the first design was approved for production, under the name “PzJag K43”. This would be a new generation of RSO tank killer that would have mounted the larger Pak 43, as well as have a wider chassis with a more powerful and less noisy engine. However, all work was halted in late 1943, when Steyr was ordered to stop working on tracked vehicle designs.

The sides of the Raupenschlepper Ost (caterpillar tractor east) SPG folded down to produce a larger platform for the crew of the 7.5cm Pak 40 gun.

Use in combat

The first deployment of this vehicle was with Army Group Center in January 1944. Some were sent to the 1st Ski-jäger Brigade, and some were sent to Army Group North, to Armee-Pz. Jägerabteilungen 751 and 752. In the 1st Ski Jäger Brigade, the RSO with Pak 40 was incorporated into the 13th Panzerjäger-Flak company, where it was deployed in 2 platoons with an infantry escort platoon.
Inside an RSO Pak platoon there were 3 RSO Paks, 1 supply vehicle, a Kübelwagen for the platoon commander and a Kettenkrad. In action, this vehicle was said to be less than desirable. It was slow, noisy and the engine had a tendency to overheat in warm weather. The lack of armor and high silhouette was also an issue, as many crews were lost when they attracted fire of any kind.
The small fighting platform made it difficult to work in an effective manner, and the floor lockers for ammunition storage were difficult to open when the weapon was in use. The vehicle earned the nickname “Rollender Sarg Ost”, a play on the RSO abbreviation. This nickname translates to “rolling coffin east”, reflecting the thoughts of the soldiers who operated it.

The RSO SPG fully tracked, lightweight vehicle was conceived in response to the poor performance of wheeled and half-tracked vehicles in the mud and snow.

An article by Eric Matzner

Sources

Nuts and Bolts Vol. 9. 7,5cm PaK40/4 AUF. GEP Selbstfahrlafette Raupenschlepper Ost (RSO). Peter Kwok, Heiner F. Doske.
RSO article. Germany’s Raupenschlepper Ost 7.5cm PaK 40/4 auf. RSO. Rick Lawler 2011.
Achtung panzer article
Article. 2015.
Article. 2010
RSO SPGs on www.tank-hunter.com
Surviving Raupenschlepper Ost list

Raupenschlepper Ost specifications
Dimensions (L W H)	4.17m x 1.7m x 2.49m (with canopy) (13’8″ x 5’7″ x 8’2″ ft.in)
Total weight, battle ready	5.2 tons (10,400 lbs)
Crew	4 (driver, commander, gunner, loader)
Propulsion	Steyr V8 3.5l 8-cylinder, 85 hp
Suspension	Leaf springs
Speed (road)	17 km/h (10.5 mph)
Range	250 km (155 mi)
Armament	75 mm (2.95 in) Pak 40/4 L/46, 28 rounds
Armor	5-10 mm (0.24-0.35 in)
Total production	80-90 in 1943-1944

The original Raupenschlepper Ost supply vehicle

Pak-40 auf Raupenschlepper-Ost, vermicelli livery

Pak 40 auf Raupenschlepper Ost, ambush camouflage, 1944.

Pak 40 auf Raupenschlepper Ost with its side panels panels down.

Video

Gallery

7.5cm Pak 40 auf Raupenschlepper Ost (RSO) with sides and canopy up

Raupenschlepper Ost RSO 75mm PaK 40 German WW2 tank destroyer with canopy removed and sides down to increase the size of the fighting platform.

Surviving vehicles

Raupenschlepper Ost RSO 75mm PaK 40 German WW2 tank destroyer at the German Tank museum in Munster.

Surviving RSO Pak 40 SPG at the German Panzermuseum in Munster without its canopy

Raupenschlepper Ost (RSO) 01 tracked lorry at the Auto + Technik Museum, Sinsheim, Germany. Photo by Walter Schwabe.

Germans Tanks of ww2

10.5 cm K gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette “Dicker Max”

Panzer IV/70(V)

Semovente M43 da 75/46 / Beute Sturmgeschütz M43 mit 7.5 cm KwK L/46 852(i)

Jagdpanzer IV (Sd.Kfz.162)

7.62 cm F.K. 36(r) auf gepanzerte Selbstfahrlafette Sd.Kfz.6/3

4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen 35R 731(f)

Panzerjäger Tiger (P) 8.8 cm PaK 43/2 L/71 ‘Ferdinand/Elefant’ (Sd.Kfz.184)

Jagdpanzer 38 (Hetzer)

Jagdtiger (Sd.Kfz.186)

Panzer IV/70(A)

4.7 cm PaK(t) (Sfl.) auf Panzerkampfwagen I (Sd.Kfz.101) ohne Turm ‘Panzerjäger I’

8.8 cm PaK 43/1 auf Fahrgestell Panzerkampfwagen III und IV (Sf.) ‘Nashorn’ (Sd.Kfz.164)

Jagdpanther (Sd.Kfz.173)

7.5 cm PaK 40 auf Raupenschlepper Ost (RSO)

German Reich (1941-1942) Heavy Tank Destroyer/Bunker Buster – 2 Built

Context: The Need for a “Bunker Buster”

Development of the ‘Panzerselbstfahrlafette IVa’

Name

Production

Design

Hull

Suspension

Engine

Superstructure

Armor Protection

Main Armament – The 10.5 cm K18 Gun

Crew

Organization and Doctrine

Combat Results

First stage – Operation Barbarossa and Early Losses

Second stage – Into Stalingrad

Lessons Learnt

Conclusion

10.5 cm, K (gp.Slf.) Specifications

Sources

German Reich (1944) Tank Destroyer – 930 to 940 Built

The Development

Designation

Production

Design

Hull

Suspension and Running Gear

Engine

The Superstructure

Armor and Protection

Armament

Crew

Organization and Distribution to Units

In Combat

Ardennes Offensive and the End of the War in Western Europe

Eastern Front

Italy

Jagdpanzer IV Versions

Panzer IV/70(V) Befehlswagen

Other Users

Bulgaria

Romania

Syria

Surviving Vehicles

Conclusion

Sources

Italian Social Republic/German Reich (1943-1945) Tank Destroyer – 11 to 18 Built

Previous Models

The M43 Chassis

History of the Project

Production and Delivery

German Modifications

Design

Armor

Hull

Radio Equipment

Engine and Transmission

Suspension and Tracks

Main Armament

The Main Gun’s Problems

Main Gun Considerations

Secondary Armament

Ammunition

Crew

Operational Use

German Reich (1941-1942)
Heavy Tank Destroyer/Bunker Buster – 2 Built

German Reich (1944)
Tank Destroyer – 930 to 940 Built

Italian Social Republic/German Reich (1943-1945)
Tank Destroyer – 11 to 18 Built

German Reich (1943)
Tank Destroyer – 750-800 Built

German Reich (1941)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 9 Built

German Reich (1941)
Self-Propelled Anti-Tank Gun – 174 Anti-Tank and 26 Command Vehicles Built