United Kingdom (1984-1986)
Main Battle Tank – 1 Built
Despite the progressive weakening of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, the prospect of a nuclear war in Western Europe was perhaps just as likely in that decade as anytime during the Cold War. The significant quantitative advantages that the Warsaw Pact had in tank terms had led to a serious rethinking in NATO as to how to increase the survivability and fightability of their own tanks. That redevelopment had been assisted in no small amount by the British development of a new type of armor called Chobham. This new generation of tanks had left some designs out in the cold and one of those was the Vickers Valiant or Vickers Mk.4. The Valiant failed to receive orders and was seriously damaged in a transportation accident. Its biggest problem, however, was considered to be the relatively low mobility, as the emphasis of the design had been on acceleration and torque rather than top speed.
With the design a failure and the need for a new successful product, the firm of Vickers was spurred at the end of the Valiant project to combine its own Universal Turret concept with a new high mobility hull and was considering its own options for a Valiant 2. When the hull for Valiant was ruined in an accident and with significant money already spent by Vickers and its partners, it needed a new option.
The solution to both a new hull and the mobility problem was found in the form of the West German Leopard 2 hull and mating the Vickers Universal Turret to that hull produced a very capable vehicle known as the Vickers Mk.7/2. The market being eyed was, once more, the lucrative Middle Eastern one.
The work on the Vickers Mk.7 built on the experience and knowledge of the engineers at the British firm of Vickers. That company, which had nearly a century of tank building experience was based in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne in the northeast of England. They had some export success with the Vickers Mk.3 and some failure in the form of the Mk.4 – better known as the Valiant. The success of the Valiant though was a Universal Turret concept. This turret could fit a variety of tanks through the use of a universal coupling, a design that also permitted the Vickers Shipbuilding 155 mm howitzer turret to fit a variety of vehicles. With the new Chobham-based armor package, this turret also offered a choice of guns that could be fitted, such as the RO L7 and L11 105 mm and 120 mm rifles and the Rheinmetall 120 mm smoothbore. The turret was a state of art design with modern optics, fire control, and armor, so adding this turret to the existing hull of the Leopard 2 provided a vehicle arguably better than the Leopard 2 or any other NATO tank then in service. From the Leopard 2 addition to the turret, the name was given as ‘Mk.7/2’.
Layout
The Vickers Mk.7/2 followed a conventional tank layout, with the driver in the front of the hull, the turret roughly centrally, and the engine in the back. The hull was identical to that of the Leopard 2. The turret was large and rectangular with vertical sides and an angled front made from flat panels. The gun, located centrally on the front of the turret, was flanked by a pair of smoke dischargers when it was on the Valiant. These would later be moved to the rear sides of the turret. On the roof were two circular hatches for the commander on the right, and the loader on the left. A rectangular sight was provided on the front right of the turret roof for the gunner who, in keeping with British general tank-layouts, was located on the right, in front of the commander. All 3 turret crew were positioned on a turntable that rotated with the turret and which was supported on steadying rollers as opposed to the conventional turret-basket concept. The floor of this rotating platform was covered with non-slip aluminum plating and also contained the ready-ammunition stowage.
The final crew member, the driver, was located in the hull on the front right, with an ammo rack to his left. The driver lay in a reclining position with automatic controls and steered by means of a wheel with a conventional accelerator and brake pedals.
Unveiling
Early ideas of using the upgraded Universal Turret from the Valiant project (repaired after the accident) had been looking for a new hull with improved mobility. Initially, Vickers had considered the existing Challenger 1 hull which would mean a joint Venture with Royal Ordnance Factory Leeds where it was made. At this time, however, ROF Leeds and Vickers were direct rivals competing for the same markets so this concept proved untenable. The German firm of Krauss-Maffei in Munich however, was much more receptive and, at the time, a hull with no weapons was not subjected to export controls meaning that, from the German point of view, that they could effectively be selling Leopard 2 hulls to countries where the government had export bans in place for a whole tank.
Work on the Mk.7 began in 1984 after trials of the Valiant elicited interest in the advanced turret with a goal to demonstrate the tank in the summer of 1985. The vehicle was unveiled on time in June 1985 and was set for Middle East demonstrations shortly thereafter.
Optics
A tank that is blind is worse than useless and modern optics are essential to the survivability and fightability of any vehicle. The optics for the Mk.7/2 were concentrated, as would be expected, in the turret.
The commander was provided with a slightly raised cupola consisting of 6 fixed x1 magnification non-reflecting Heliotype viewers. Sighting for the commander was provided by the French SFIM VA 580-10 2-axis gyro stabilized panoramic (360 degrees) sight. This sight had various magnification modes, x2, x3, and x10 and incorporated an nd-YAG-type laser rangefinder. In addition to this is a PPE Condor-type 2-axis gyro-stabilised image intensifier (Phillips UA 9090 thermal sight) displayed on a 625-line television monitor for both gunner and commander alike.
The gunner had a x10 magnification Vickers Instruments L31 telescopic laser sight with Barr and Stroud LF 11 nd-YAG-type laser rangefinder fitted with a projected reticle image (PRI) for ranging. In addition to this, he was provided with a Vickers Instruments GS10 periscopic sight for target acquisition. The loader was provided with a single AFV No.10 Mk.1 observation periscope.
Tracks and Suspension
The tracks and suspension for the Mk.7/2 were identical to those on the Leopard 2, as this was the hull on which the Vickers Universal Turret was placed. As such, suspension was provided by means of torsion bars for each of the 7 road wheels and 4 return rollers. Additional rotary shock absorbers were fitted to wheel stations 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7, and the 635 mm wide track was made by Diehl and fitted with removable rubber pads with rubber-bushed end connectors.
Automotive
The automotive elements of the Vickers Mk.7/2 were dependent on the engine and transmission of the Leopard 2 main battle tank. This meant that the power was provided by the German MTU MB873 Ka-501 12-cylinder 4-stroke turbocharged diesel engine delivering 1,500 bhp and a Renk HSWL 354/3 hydro-kinetic planetary gearbox containing all of the gear change and steering and providing 4 forward and two reverse gears. The top speed was 72 km/h. In the event of a failure of the automatic gear, the transmission could be used in manual mode with a single forward and reverse gear.
Armor
The Federal Republic of Germany (‘West Germany’) had received Chobham technology via the Americans after the British had shared it with them so it had come full circle to now have a German tank with the British Army and now a British turret to try and meet an export market in the Middle East. The hull armor was identical to that of the Leopard 2, with Chobham-type armor across the frontal arc on top of a rolled homogeneous steel armored base. The Valiant had saved a lot of weight using the unconventional approach of an all-welded-all-aluminum-alloy armor hull. Now, with the larger Leopard 2 hull in steel, the weight had gone up but, likewise had the engine power to move the vehicle
The turret was also a steel base structure and, although the exact makeup was never released, it should be borne in mind that the Valiant (or Mk.4, as it was originally) was based on the technology from the Mk.3. The Mk.3 had moved from an all-welded steel turret to a partially cast one to improve ballistic protection. Despite this switch, it appears that, in order to accommodate the blocky sections of Chobham, Vickers returned to an all-welded steel structure. This would be different to the Challenger 1 then coming into service – this had a complex steel half-casting covering part of the roof, sides, and all of the front to which rolled homogeneous armor was welded to complete the structure followed by the Chobham packs to complete the external appearance. Chobham armor covered the whole front of the turret and the sides to approximately ⅔ of the way back, at which point they became hollow boxes for storage around the rear corners. In the center of the turret at the back was the large and effective nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare air filtration system made by Westair Dynamics. Mounted externally, the unit was easy to access, making replacement and maintenance easier and consisted of a multi-stage high-efficiency filtration process and worked to create an overpressure inside the tank which served not only to keep gases out of the tank but also to evacuate fumes from the weapons.
An automatic fire fighting system, the Graviner Firewire CO2-based (could be switched for other gases, like Halon) was fitted to the Valiant, and an automatic fire fighting system from the Leopard was simply used on this Mk.7.
Firepower
The Universal Turret’s enormous selling point was not only the coupling allowing it to be mated to a wide variety of the most common tank hulls in the world’s armies at the time, but also the choice of different guns on offer. The Valiant had started with the reliable Royal Ordnance L7A3 105 mm rifled gun but this was quickly switched out for the L11A5 120 mm rifled gun. When it came to the Mk.7/2 tank, there was no option for the 105 mm gun as no potential buyer would have wanted one, as this was now the age of the 120 mm gun for NATO tanks. If the purchaser did not want the very capable L11A5 rifle, they could also choose the Rheinmetall 120 mm smoothbore which had been approved for the German Leopard 2 and the American M1A1 Abrams. With probably the most reliable hull in the world at the time (the Leopard 2), and this turret featuring some of the most advanced fire control of any vehicle, the addition of the best tank gun available in NATO and armor to match any contemporary, the Mk.7/2 was a true world-beater. Exports of this tank would technically and potentially mean that the UK was selling tanks as good as, or better than its own and those of its allies.
Ammunition storage for the 120 mm Rheinmetall smoothbore ammunition amounted to 44 rounds (20 in the hull front, 15 in the turret bustle, and 9 in the ready rack in the turret). With the British 120 mm L11A5 rifle storage was listed as being reduced to just 38 rounds. The reason for the low amount of stowage is unclear, as with this turret, the smaller Vickers Valiant was able to store 52 rounds and the turret was unchanged stowage-wise. Fifteen in the turret, plus an additional 20 in the hull rack next to the driver would make 35 meaning just 3 rounds in the ready rack instead of 9.
The elevation range for both of the guns was identical at -10 to +20 degrees. Loaded manually, the rate of fire was given as 10 rounds per minute (1 every 6 seconds). A Vickers muzzle reference system (MRS) on the end of the barrel added additional information into the computer system and the barrel was clad in a thermal sleeve to reduce distortion.
The fire control system and gun stabilization system was an all-electric system developed by Marconi. This system had a built-in laser rangefinder and a brand new ballistic computer to improve the chances of a first-round hit against static and moving targets as well as for supporting firing on the move. This system used the SFCS 600 computer derived from the GCE 620 system installed on the Vickers Mk.3 with some improvements known as the Marconi Radar Systems Centaur 1 system.
The RO L11A5 120 mm gun made by Royal Ordnance, Nottingham, was 7.34 m long and weighed 1,782 kg. It featured improvements over the earlier designs by using a forged upstand for the muzzle reference system and featured a smaller volume and lighter fume extractor than the L11A2. As a result of these changes, the gun was out of balance, so 7.7 kg of additional weights had to be added to counterbalance it normally.
Secondary armament included a single 7.62 mm Hughes chain machine gun mounted coaxially with the main gun and a second 7.62 mm machine gun (L37A2) in a remote-control mount next to the commander’s cupola on the roof. In total, 3,000 rounds for these could be carried. Both of these weapons were interchangeable with a variety of commercially available 12.7 mm machine guns.
Fitted with the British L11A5 rifled gun, firing trials were conducted in Egypt in 1985. In total, 43 rounds of Armor-Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) ammunition were fired at targets 2.6 m high between 1,100 m and 2,600 m, achieving a total of 32 hits – 74.4% accuracy. A second set of 40 shells (26 APDS and 14 Practice) were fired at the 2.6 m high stationary target between 1,100 m and 3,000 m, achieving 33 rounds on target – 82.5 % accuracy.
When the firing trials were repeated against a mix of stationary and moving targets using both gunner and commander’s stations to control the firing, a total of 65 APDS rounds were fired at ranges from 1,100 m to 2,370 m. In total, 37 rounds hit the target – 56.9 % accuracy.
A rate of fire of 6 rounds in just 43 seconds could be achieved using High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) ammunition (8.4 rounds per minute). In perhaps one of the most peculiar firing trials ever asked of a tank, the Egyptian team had the Mk.7/2 driven up an 18 deg ramp, brought to maximum elevation (20 deg.) and fired. The purpose was to test the strength of the coupling between the hull and the turret and firing an APDS shell to provide the stress. The British team expressed strong concerns about this test, not from the point of view of the coupling but because they really had no idea just how far an APDS round would go fired in this way even if the backdrop was the vast expanse of the Egyptian desert. Nonetheless, the round was fired, the coupling survived, and seemingly no random camel herd discovered the true range of a maximum elevation 120 mm APDS shell.
Markets
The market for the Mk.7/2 was a large one: Egypt. Egypt had been trying hard to modernize its military and, in particular, its outdated tank fleet. Mated to the Leopard 2 hull, the Mk.7/2 had been finished and formally unveiled in the summer of 1985 and evaluated for reliability and other parameters. Late on in that summer, the combined Vickers and British Army demonstration team led by Peregrine Solly and the Mk.7/2 were shipped out to Egypt for a very rigorous examination of everything including reliability, ease of maintenance, mobility, and firing.
The driving assessment showed it to have a range of 263 km cross country with an average speed of 55 km/h and a top speed of 80 km/h. On soft sand, just 151 km were driven, but it is noteworthy that the area selected was impassable by any Egyptian vehicles then in service. There, the Mk.7/2 managed to traverse the ground albeit at a reduced average speed of just 39.4 km/h. A further 274 km were then driven off-road, where it was still able to reach a top speed of 80 km/h and an average speed of 60.3 km/h.
Trials in the scorching 35° C Egyptian desert took place between 5th September and 1st October 1985 operated by both British and Egyptian crews. Firing trials showed the fire control system to be very good and that the MTU engine was easy to remove and maintain. Whether Egypt was ready to place an order is not known, but the Mk.7/2 had certainly made a good impression of itself. When the German government closed the chances of exporting the Leopard 2 hull, so ended the project and all chances of a contract with Egypt.
Termination
The tank had proven to be an effective combination of firepower and mobility. With the proven 120 mm British gun and the option to switch relatively easily to the German 120 mm gun if desired, and combined with the latest generation of optics, this tank was a fearsome opponent. With the Leopard hull, the tank gained a proven and reliable chassis and engine with the mobility found lacking on the Valiant but the project was just not going to happen. At the time, the export of an unarmed hull was not covered by German government export restrictions on arms, but by exploiting this loophole Krauss-Maffei could, in effect, circumvent the restriction to put a German-hulled tank into the hands of a nation which might other not be able to obtain the Leopard 2. It would also mean that countries that could buy the Leopard 2 could also buy this version which was better in many ways and also outside of the control of the German government. Virtually, at a stroke of a pen, the project was thus killed, the German government canceled the export of tank hulls, and lacking their own alternative, the Vickers Mk.7/2 was dead. A somewhat ignominious end to probably the best tank of the day.
Conclusion
The Valiant had not been a success and had died in ignominious circumstances only to be reborn as the Mk.7. The early plan to mate this excellent Universal Turret with the hull of the Challenger 1 to make the Mk.7 had failed due to competing business interests with ROF Leeds. Ironically, Vickers acquired ROF Leeds in 1986, when it won the contract for the Challenger Armored Repair and Recovery Vehicle. At the same time, Vickers had also taken over design authority from Royal Armament Research and Development (RARDE) at Chertsey. Yet this had come too late for the Mk.7 and, with the availability of the Leopard 2 hull, the chances for a second Mk.7 had appeared as the Mk.7/2. This was a world-leading design and yet, thanks to the German government pulling the plug on export licenses for the hull, this too failed. With no more options and no contracts for other vehicles, the attention for a market for the turret shifted from European and Middle Eastern eyes to South America. The technology of the Vickers Mark 7/2 turret seems to have been merged with that of the Vickers Mark 4 turret in order to create two brand new turrets for Brazil’s new MBT by Engesa, the Osório, which would also meet a similar ignoble end despite promising beginnings. The Mk.7/2 marks a true lost opportunity for a truly world-class vehicle.
Vickers Mk.7/2
Crew
4 (driver, gunner, loader, commander)
Dimensions
10.95 m long (with gun), 9.77 m (gun to the rear), 7.72 m (hull length only), 2.54 m high (turret roof), 2.99 m (top of commander’s sight), 3.42 m wide (without side armor packs, 4.945 m of track on the ground.
Ground Clearance
0.5 m
Weight
55,000 kg
Engine
German MTU 873 12-cylinder diesel engine delivering 1,500 hp at 2,600 rpm
Speed
80 km/h top speed on a good surface. Up to 60.3 km/h cross country(road). Very soft sand 39.4 km/h.
Suspension
Torsion bar
Armament
L11A5 120 mm rifled main gun, coaxial 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm machine gun, roof-mounted remote-control 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm machine gun. Rheinmetall 120 mm smoothbore.
Armor
steel base hull and turret with Chobham armor arrays across frontal 60-degree arc.
For information about abbreviations check the Lexical Index
Sources
Ground Defence International #69. November 1980
Ground Defence International #70. December 1980
Janes. (1985). Arms and Artillery. Janes Defence Group
Ogorkiewicz, R. (1983). Vickers Valiant. Armor Magazine March-April 1983 Lobitz, F. (2009). Kampfpanzer Leopard 2. Tankograd Publishing, Germany
First Series Lancia 1ZM with armored guards over the front and rear wheels. Source: Pinterest
The need for a new armored car
Italy was one of the pioneers of armored cars with several designs and vehicles made before the outbreak of the First World War, such as the L’A.MI.Co. armored car. With the war between the great European powers starting in 1914, it was obvious to Italian planners that a new armored car was going to be needed. The fact that Italy did not declare war immediately and remained non-belligerent gave the designers and the Army some precious time in which to develop a new vehicle. By the time they entered the war in May 1915, developments were well progressed.
Delivery and development
The firm of Ansaldo had already approached the Italian High Command with their idea for an armored car, and early work on development was started by Engineer Guido Corni in September 1914, right after the major powers started fighting. His design was finished, and a patent on the design files (number 147355) was obtained on 14th February 1915. In April 1915, they took this design to the Ministry of War, where it was met with approval, and an initial order for just 20 machines was granted. Only 20 could be ordered at this time due to a shortage of machine guns. With two machine guns in the lower turret and a third in the top turret, each machine required 3 guns, so 20 machines needed 60 machine guns.
Two views of the first prototype vehicle at the factory in 1915, both with and without the front and rear armored wheel covers fitted. Note the unusual arrangement of the cooling grilles on the bonnet. Source: Pignato
First series vehicles being assembled by Ansaldo in 1915. Source: Pinterest
The first 20 machines were to be finished and delivered to the 1st Artillery Regiment at the Genoa Fortress (1 Regimento Artiglieria da Fortezza di Genova) for evaluation between June and July 1915. Here, they were divided into 5 machine-gun squadrons (squadriglie mitragliatrici) comprising 36 officers and 399 other ranks. Delivery delays meant that by the end of 1915, only the first seven vehicles had been delivered, with the remaining 13 vehicles being delivered at the start of 1916.
Design and Production
The basic vehicle on which the 1ZM was built was very similar to the already successful and robust Lancia 35 hp truck chassis but reinforced and strengthened to take the additional strain imposed by an armored body. This involved replacing the original rear axle and springs with improved ones capable of withstanding the additional load.
The original chassis and armor alone weighed 3 tonnes. The engine was the 4.94 liter model 1Z Lancia 4 cylinder inline petrol producing 35 hp and capable of taking an additional load of 30% (for a total of 40 hp) for up to 30 minutes. Even so, the vehicles were always somewhat underpowered and struggled to reach 60 km/h on a good road.
The arrangement was simple. The driver in the front was in the same position as he would have been in the truck, and then, in the back, the rest of the crew of up to 5 more men to crew the machine guns, etcetera. Due to the different types of machine guns chosen, mostly due to shortages of machine guns, the amount of ammunition would vary, but up to 450kg of ammunition was expected during the design phase. In the rear of the vehicle was a large cylindrical section with was topped with a very wide circular turret fitted with two machine guns. A third, smaller, one-man turret was placed on top of this bigger turret. With each machine gun requiring one man to fire it, the commander could take the top turret for observations and other duties, leaving the remaining crew to supply ammunition to the gunners or provide observation from the firing ports around the vehicle. The amount of ammunition and crew must have led to a very cramped interior.
The 1ZM prototype did have some flaws which resulted in minor modifications to the standard vehicle. Notably, during the examination in April 1915, the vehicle lacked armored covers over the rear wheels which were seen as being vulnerable. Also, those wheels did not provide sufficient off-road mobility or support, so were changed from a 120 mm wide tire (120/880) to a wider 135 mm type (135 x 935). Spare tires were usually carried on the right-hand side of the cab.
The sixty 6.5 mm Model 1911 Vickers-Maxim machine-guns needed for the first batch of 20 vehicles were not provided and, instead, in order to finish the vehicles, Ansaldo fitted the first seven vehicles with captured 6.85 mm Maxim-Dreyse machine-guns instead. Those machine guns had been removed from the 8006-tonne German freighter Bayern (Hamburg-America Line) which was interned by Italy at the outbreak of war. These first 20 vehicles were classed as ‘Serie 1’ production machines. Protection was provided by 6 mm thick high-quality chrome-nickel armor steel for the prototype and for all series 1 and 2 vehicles. By the time the third series was being ordered in November 1917, supplies of this armor were in short supply, so the bodies were clad instead in lower quality molybdenum steel armor instead. Six millimeters was not a lot of armor, but initially, the protection requirement was just to guard against perforation by rifle ammunition from a range of 300 m, but this had been improved for the 1ZM to specifically be sufficient to protect from the 6.5 mm Model 95 Rifle at a range of 100m. With a lower plate quality for the ‘Serie 3’ vehicles, it can be assumed that this requirement slipped slightly. With the Spitzgeschoss mit Kern (S.m.K) bullet (steel cored) becoming widely available later in the war, even the original 100 m specifications had become obsolete.
The second series of machines was ordered in March 1917 for a further 17 vehicles. The design had been slightly modified once more with the armored covers over the front wheels being abandoned in favor of a simple mudguard and a new layout of ventilation slots in the bonnet. Additionally, the radiator of the vehicle gained a redesigned layout, with bulletproof grilles to protect it. The final 5 vehicles of this second-order received a further modification in the form of an increase in the strength of the chassis.
Disaster spawns another version
The military disaster for the Italian Army at Caporetto in October and November 1917 led to large losses in men and material. Within a week, with perhaps a sense of panic at not having provided enough equipment, the Italian High Command placed another order for 1ZM armored cars straight away. It seems that this disaster altered the production plans, as the Ministry for Arms and Production in October 1917 had suggested 12 more vehicles based on the SPA chassis instead of the 1ZM, but this was canceled before it was even started in favor of the third series of production of the 1ZM. One hundred new vehicles were ordered in this third series and it was to stay in production until the armistice of November 1918. These new ‘Serie 3’ vehicles equipped the 3rd and 4th Squadrons (being rebuilt after heavy losses), and newly formed Squadrons 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17.
This third series was simplified in order to speed-up production. The first models of the 1ZM had featured the unusual extra turret on top of the main turret, and to crew this little one-man turret the soldier had to stand on a column underneath. These ‘Serie 3’ vehicles would dispense with this ungainly additional turret, which in the process, also reduced the crew by one man, making more space inside. This removal simplified the design, reduced the overall weight, and also, because the vehicle was shorter, improved the stability of the vehicle off-road. Of note is that despite removing the secondary turret, it did retain a very small circular hatch in the top of the turret, probably just for ventilation, as it is too small to be used for access. It was less likely now to topple over with a lower center of gravity. The vehicle was still underpowered though, even with the weight of the extra crew member and top turret and front armored wheel covers removed. On top of this, the vehicle was hard to steer in reverse as there were no mirrors and no visibility for the driver to the rear. These problems combined to make the 1ZM a difficult vehicle to drive.
These ‘Serie 3’ vehicles also abandoned the Vickers-Maxim 6.5 mm machine guns, replacing them with the more powerful St. Etienne Model 1907 8 mm machine gun. Sixteen ‘Serie 3’ vehicles were finished in January 1918, with a further 16 the following month and just 3 in March, for a total of 35 vehicles of the 100 vehicle order made in just 3 months.
In Combat in WW1
The disaster at Caporetto in 1917 was not the first time the 1ZM had seen combat. Straight after delivery in mid-1915, the vehicle had been deployed immediately to the combat zone on the North-Eastern front along the Isonzo for reconnaissance of enemy positions. Each Squadron (Squadriglia) was to be issued with 6 Lancia 1ZM armored cars and, as new vehicles arrived, new squadrons were formed, and by mid 1916 there were 5. Two more were formed (6th and 7th respectively) when the 2nd Series vehicles were delivered, and by the end of the war the Italian Army had 16 squadrons.
The largest single loss of 1ZM’s was during the retreat at Caporetto, October- November 1917, when 10 vehicles were either destroyed or captured, with a few others being damaged. These losses were the reason for the replacement ‘Serie 3’ being ordered straight after. By the end of the retreat from Caporetto to the Piave, just 28 of these vehicles were left in running condition for the Army to use. When the ‘Serie 3’ vehicles arrived, their initial issuing was to the 3rd and 4th Squadrons to replace their losses at Caporetto.
By 1918, the 1ZM’s were deployed everywhere Italian troops were either fighting or peacekeeping, from Dalmatia and the Balkans, to Rome and Milan, and as far as the colony of Libya. More 1ZM’s were lost at the Piave (June 1918 – 2 lost) and Vittorio Veneto (October 1918 – 4 lost).
Post-WW1 Use
The inter-war period started with Italy having to reassert control over its troubled colony of Libya, which was undergoing periodic revolts to such an extent that outside of the main cities, the Italian Government exercised little control of the country. Eight Lancia 1ZM’s were sent to Libya in 1919 to try and regain control over the province, with three more following in 1923, forming two Squadrons of armored cars stationed in Benghazi. In 1923, two 1ZM’s were destroyed in combat with rebels at Bir Bilal, and the two units were simply merged into one with a total strength of 9 vehicles. The only notable modification post-war was that most vehicles had their armament replaced with the FIAT Model 1924 6.5 mm machine-gun.
Other vehicles were sold or transferred to Czechoslovakia in 1919 (2 vehicles), Afghanistan and Hungary in 1928 (1 vehicle each), Albania (4 vehicles), and Austria in 1934 (4 vehicles). Four ‘Serie 3’ vehicles were also sent to the Italian concession in Tianjin, China in 1932 to ensure the safety of Italian nationals.
The single ‘Serie 3’ 1ZM which ended up in Afghanistan was given to the Sovereign of Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan in 1928 on his visit to Italy and shipped back. Amazingly, this vehicle survived until at least 2007, when it was pictured by NATO forces at a military base. This incredibly rare vehicle is currently stored in Dresden.
Lancia 1ZM ‘Serie 3’ armored car found in Afghanistan. Picture taken in 2007, signs of the original paint of the turret can still be seen. Source: Twitter
East-African Campaign
Other than the deployment to Libya, the first major use post-World War One was to East Africa. Four Lancia 1ZM’s were sent to Italian Somaliland in about 1926 to conduct internal security duties, policing and convoy escort role. Ual Ual was in a disputed border area between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia, and two of these vehicle took part in combat there on 5th December 1934, where they were ambushed by Ethiopian forces and received numerous hits although neither was destroyed. Three additional sections of Lancia 1ZM’s were sent to Italian Somaliland in March 1935 for the Ethiopian campaign.
On 1st February 1936, three platoons, belonging to two companies of the I btg. Automotoblindato Casali with a total of 13 vehicles (3 platoon of 4 vehicles plus 1 command vehicle) entered Eritrea at the Port of Massawa.
In Ethiopia, they played an important patrol and escort role and some vehicles can be seen in photographs to be using heavy-duty tires to assist on soft or sandy terrain. Combat continued on and off in the region for some time, and on 17th September 1936, two more 1ZM’s on patrol at Langhei were ambushed and damaged.
On 20th October, at Sade, four more Lancias were attacked with 37 mm anti-tank guns (3.7 cm Pak 36). They were part of the column of ‘S’ Division and accompanied by 8 tanks (CV.3). All four cars and 6 of the 8 CV.3’s were hit and were damaged. Nonetheless, despite this fire, the Italians attacked and captured the 4 guns they had been attacked with. Those 37 mm guns were later given to the 4th Motorized Artillery Group at Gallo and Sidamo, Ethiopia.
Continual action and suppression meant that by the end of the 1930s, the area was mostly pacified, after which, they were used mainly for convoy escorts and securing the roads rather than for reconnaissance. A section of Lancia armored cars was located at Harar, another at Amhara, and two at Galla and Sidamo where they worked in company with the FIAT 611 armored cars. After the end of the campaign in Ethiopia, the vehicles remained in use in the region until WW2. At least 10 of the vehicles were rearmed with the FIAT Model 35 8 mm machine gun.
Spanish Civil War
To support the Nationalist forces under General Franco in the Spanish Civil War, Italy sent a single squadron comprising two sections of 1ZM armored cars (8 vehicles) of a mix of series variants. They arrived on 5th January 1937 at Cadiz in southern Spain. Once in Spain, all 8 vehicles were put under an independent armored car company in the Corpo Truppe Volontarie (C.T.V.) under the overall command of Major Lohengrin Giraud.
These vehicles took part in the occupation of Malaga in February 1937 and would also take part in the Italian defeat at Guadalajara in March 1937. Later, under Colonel Babini, they were in combat at Santander (August 1937) and in the Aragon and Catalan Offensives from the end of 1937 to well into 1938. By this point, they were part of the mixed mechanized battalion, along with a Bersaglieri company.
In Spain, the Lancia 1ZM proved to have some value in combat despite its age, being used to clear away infantry resistance, but what successes it had were not without loss. In September 1937, their use was curtailed with a warning due to their age and fragility. Crews were being regularly wounded by splash from small arms fire coming through the vision slits or from the inside of the armor. In contrast to the modern Soviet-supplied BA-6 and FAI and Republican Spain Blindado modelo B.C. and Blindado tipo ZIS, the Lancia was classed as obsolete. The Nationalist forces and C.T.V. had captured a number of BA-6 armored cars and the Italians sent one to Rome for analysis. The report, published in September 1937, revealed the deficiencies of the Lancias and the advantageous features of the BA-6. The report summarised the BA-6 as having a turret similar to that of the T-26 with a 45 mm gun, good armor, airless sponge rubber tyres, and 2 machine-guns – 1 hull and 1 in turret.
The Italian armored car squadron the Lancias were in decided to incorporate captured Soviet and Republican Spanish equipment and at some point, probably as early as late 1937 or 1938, the squadron had six 1ZM’s, one BA-6, and two UNL-35’s. Likewise, at least one captured 1ZM appears to have ended up being used by Republican forces for a while.
Five were still operational in 1938, though photographic evidence suggests the at least two of the ‘Serie 3’ vehicles had some sort of mechanical problems. By the end of the conflict in March-April 1939, of the 8 vehicles sent over, 5 had been lost to combat, mechanical failure, or accidents. Just three (one twin turret and two single turret examples) were still operational by February 1939 when they were seen at a public parade in Barcelona.
Hopelessly outdated by the late 1930s, these vehicles were well past their useful life, and the remaining three vehicles (two ‘Serie 3’ and a single ‘Serie 2’) are reported by Italian sources to have been handed over to the Spanish authorities rather than repatriate them. Spanish researchers find no trace that these were ever used after the Italians left meaning they may simply have been scrapped or that the records were incorrect.
The CV.3 tanks also sent over by the Italians were not suitable replacements to the use of armored cars which were still felt to be essential for the scouting role. With the Lancia outclassed and obsolete, there was a desire for a new armored car featuring many elements of the BA-6 they had captured. The new armored car was to have a dual drive, bulletproof tires, and a good degree of mobility; fast on road and good off-road. Just like in the BA-6, the Italians wanted a cannon in the armored car’s turret and also two machine guns, one in the front and one facing to the rear. The 1ZM was simply obsolete but had provided good service. The lessons generated from the use of the 1ZM and the Spanish Civil War in general would be put to good use in a replacement standard armored car for the army.
Another War
Despite being obsolete, there were still 34 Lancia 1ZM armored cars in service with the Italian Army at the outbreak of WW2 and the attack on France. Despite their obvious obsolescence, there was no replacement armored car. Of these 34 vehicles, 13 were sent to Libya in January 1941 and several more were sent to the Balkans. A platoon was also sent to the Italian-held island of Rhodes (312 Btg.). The last known use by Italian forces was in 1943 in China, where they served as the defense force in the Italian concession in Tianjin.
Organized out
The 1ZM had provided good service in WW1 despite its problems and would continue to serve in some capacity for some time, but it can be considered officially obsolete for military purposes after 1928. During those 1928 reorganizations, the Tank Regiment which had including a four squadron armored car group, each with a single twin turret IZM and four single turreted IZMs, was converted to use the CV.29 light tanks instead. This change over was complete by 1931.
Conclusion
The 1ZM was obsolete before WW2, but with a new war and limited armor available, the 1ZM actually survived in use with the Italian Army until the armistice in September 1943. Even then, they would not be phased out and the remaining examples stayed in use with German forces in the Balkans until the end of the War. The 1ZM was a well-armed armored car and based on a robust chassis, but was simply too slow and too thin to be of much military value by WW2. Nonetheless, the early vehicles with the second turret on top of the primary turret make the 1ZM one of the most recognizable armored vehicles ever made.
Variant summary
Prototype – 1915 – armored body made from chrome-nickel steel
‘Serie 1’ # 1-7 fitted with 6.85 mm Maxim-Dreyse machine-guns
‘Serie 1’ # 8-20 fitted with 6.5 mm Vickers-Maxim machine-guns
‘Serie 2’ # 21-32 – modified bonnet, front-wheel guards, and radiator grilles
‘Serie 2’ # 33-37 reinforced chassis, new shaped mudguards, reduction in the number of vision ports which were of a new pattern, 2-piece sliding rear door
‘Serie 3’ # 38-138 removed top turret, Vickers-Maxim 6.5 mm machine-guns replaced with 8 mm St. Etienne, armored body made from molybdenum steel.
In 1953, in British Columbia, Canada, an odd design for an amphibious vehicle was created. The intention was to create a tracked vehicle surpassing other designs in mobility across marginal or swampy ground and which could provide both firepower and protection in a simple and robust design. The shape, from the side, resembled a tracked football and, from the front, it had the outline of an apple. The design was not destined to be a success in any way, but it is perhaps one of the strangest designs to come out of Canada in the post-World War II era: Hurthig’s Amphibious Vehicle.
Behind the Design
Peter Ernfrid Hurthig of Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, filed the patent claim in the United States on 26th January 1953, assigning half of the value of the design to Ernest David Wesley of Maxwell, Vancouver. The language within the patent is “my” design and signed by Hurtig, meaning that this was Hurtig’s work and likely the value assigned to Maxwell was for assisting in funding the filing of the claim. Hurthig already had a patent to his name at this time in the form of a low profile in-ground animal trap which he filed in May 1946, but which was not granted until May 1950 and this was to be his last filing as well.
Primary Goal and Design
The goal of this patent was the creation of a vehicle that was able to better cross swamps and other marginal ground either for ‘war purposes’, as a tank, or for peacetime purposes, as some kind of transport. When used for military purposes, the vehicle was to minimize the number of gaps, seams, and angles that would provide weaknesses in the structure, making it vulnerable to enemy fire. Meeting both of those goals, therefore, called for a well rounded and well-sealed vehicle with the primary structure forming a cylindrical housing with hemispherical ends and sealed completely watertight below the water line – in other words, the vehicle would not just be able to navigate marginal terrain, but could also float.
Above this water line, each end would be provided with a blister in which a weapon could be mounted. Around the center, running circumferentially around the cylinder, was a track for propulsion. With just a single point of contact with the ground and based around a cylindrical shape, the vehicle would be inherently unstable, so the design called for a system of internal gyroscopic stabilization. Access to the machine was gained via two small rectangular sliding hatches, with one on each side behind the gun in the side blister, with a small ladder fixed to the outside to assist in access.
Armor and Armament
No specific thickness of the armor was mentioned in the design by Hurthig and Wesley, but they do state that the structure should be formed from some “suitable heavy armour material”. Assuming the vehicle was to be at least bulletproof, then not less than 8 mm or so of armor would be required, although this would be far from ‘heavy armor’. Certainly, the heavy curvature of the side blisters when viewed from the front would add substantial protection from enemy fire and the rest of the body would be covered from fire by the circumferential tracks. From the side, however, the tracks offered zero protection, as they would be all but invisible, and the very heavy curvature would be little more than a shallow curve at that angle.
For the non-military use of the vehicle, no armament would be needed or carried, but this was not the case for the military version. Here, the guns, mounted in the sponsons, would be able to fire forwards and backward, covering up to 180 degrees on each side, but with blind spots directly to the front and rear. Hurthig did not specify what type of guns were to be used, merely stating “cannons”.
Track
Propulsion of the vehicle was not by a single track but two. Both ran circumferentially around the central cylindrical section of the vehicle’s body. Each could be driven independently of the other, meaning the vehicle could rotate itself on the spot or steer by driving just a single track and/or counter-driving the adjacent one in the opposite direction.
Made from a series of rectangular plates, each with a series of three parallel ridges with a pair of valleys between them, each track plate was linked to the plate ahead and behind by a single ovaloid bar with a bolt at each end. The tracks were rather unremarkable and somewhat crude in this regard, certainly for 1953, when far more advanced track linkage systems were in use for armored vehicles. Indeed, in the text of the application, Hurthig even suggests tracks “somewhat similar to ordinary tank treads”, which suggests that he really did not know what tank tracks actually looked like in detail or indeed how they would work with his suspension idea.
However, what was innovative on the tracks was the decision to include suspension within the track system itself. Usually, on tracked vehicles, whether they be a digger, a crane or a tank, the track run goes around wheels fixed to sprung suspension units of some kind, so that the track pushes on the wheels which then move against the springing resistance of the bogie or torsion arm to produce the energy absorption needed to cushion the ride of the vehicle. There are some notable exceptions to that principle, such as the Yuba Ball Track from the early years of the 20th century, where the track included balls that rolled around a frame, but these are outliers as designs.
What Hurtig had in the patent was a continuous circular frame with teeth that ran around the outside of the cylinder and was supported by rollers around the circumference. The teeth would mesh with the drive sprocket on the inside. On the outside of this frame were mounted a series of springs.
At least four springs were mounted on the frame per track link and served to allow the outside of the track – the actual trackpad itself, to move inwards against the resistance of the springs during motion. The deflection was limited to the depth of the coil spring itself.
Propulsion
In longitudinal cross-section, the vehicle has the overall shape of an apple. A depression in the top of the machine allowed the tracks to run through it level with the top of the machine, whilst the inside was divided into sections. The lowest of these was below the floor of the machine and housed fuel tanks or other mechanical equipment or stowage. Above this was the primary fighting chamber, rectangular in cross-section and flanked by a pair of curved blisters or sponsons.
A pair of engines running on either petrol or diesel were located on the floor of the machine, either side of a small central auxiliary power unit or battery. Each engine was directly connected by a series of two gears connected by a driving chain with the main drive sprocket for each track, with that sprocket on the same axle as the second drive gear. In fact, per the drawing from Hurthig, despite both engines being connected to their own gears and chains and drive sprocket, the two sprockets shared a common axle near the roof of the machine to drive the frames and, thus, if one engine failed, then both tracks would still be able to be moved.
Crew
On the lowest level, right in the middle, against the floor plate, was the gyroscope used to stabilize the vehicle, with the pair of small petrol or diesel engines above it on the floor of the machine on which a crew would stand. Between those small engines was a supplementary power unit as well, creating an awkward internal space in which a crew would have to work. They would also have to work exposed to the noise and fumes from the motors, as well as the extreme hazard of becoming entangled in the drive chains or sprockets. Each side gun in the blister would require at least one man to operate it and at least another man to drive the vehicle, although Hurthig made no mention of exactly how the vehicle was to be controlled other than the obvious nature of turning the tracks at different rates to induce a steering force on it. The driver, wherever he may have had to be, presumably sat in the front, over the level of the engine, and would have little or no visibility through the front. At best, he was reduced to the narrow hole to see through in whatever gap the distance between the two tracks afforded him. An even worse position would befall a vehicle commander, who presumably would have to go in the back for lack of anywhere else he could go and thus would have no way to see forwards or effectively command the vehicle, meaning he would probably not even be needed anyway. An alternative might be to have a commander in the front and driver at the rear, but this would still leave the commander with little or no situational awareness on which to command the vehicle, with the added difficulty of then communicating the orders for direction and speed to the driver.
Conclusion
Hurthig’s design was, at best, naive. He had simply taken a general level of knowledge about tracked vehicles, such as the problem of crossing very soft ground or water, and solved it by creating even more and larger problems in its place. At worst, the design was little more than a floating metal ball forming a coffin for at least two men, as the design fundamentally failed to provide a clear advantage over something as simple as the dozens of floating or amphibious tanks already in existence by 1953.
Difficult to steer, difficult to control and command, with poor armament coverage and highly exposed tracks, the vehicle would be unlikely to be able to get to a fight and operate efficiently. In non-military use, the situation would not be much different, as the mobility sought for in the design solution just would not provide the benefits to offset the costs and the project was not a success as a result. No examples are known to have been built.
Sources
US Patent US2506834. Animal trap. Filed 28th May 1946, granted 9th May 1950.
US Patent US2756830. Amphibious vehicle and endless propelling belts therefore. Filed 26th January 1953, granted 31st July 1956.
Hurthig Amphibious Vehicle specifications
Crew
3? (2 gunners, driver/commander)
Propulsion
2 x petrol or diesel engines
Armament
2 cannons
Armor
bulletproof or more
For information about abbreviations check the Lexical Index
Republic of Finland (1943)
Armored Fighting Vehicle – None Built
In considering tanks and other armored fighting vehicles, there is usually a relatively straightforward choice of two means of propulsion: tracks or wheels, with a general understanding that there are disadvantages and advantages of each type. There are variations of each system and one such concept is the rotating cylinder for traction. This was the option selected by Olavi Mattila in Finland in 1943 for his design. The terrain of Finland and its difficult history of independence perhaps colored this design more than any direct military utility or experience. As it was designed, it was perhaps one of the more unusual ‘wheeled’ vehicles during WW2. It is also one of the few indigenously designed Finnish armored vehicles of the era, even though the design ultimately failed to leave the pages at the Finnish patent office.
Background
Finland, a country in Scandinavia bordering the Baltic Sea to the south and west, shares a lengthy land border with Russia to the east and Norway to the north. A country with under 6 million people today, it had just under 4 million inhabitants in WW2 and that conflict was a complicated situation for the nation.
Fought over for decades in a power play between Sweden and Russia which had ended in a Swedish defeat in 1809, the area remained part of Russia despite a strong and independent cultural identity and attempts to suppress it. With the collapse of Russia starting with the October 1917 Revolution, the whole situation in Finland became complex and the parliament declared independence in December that year, falling into a short civil war. After this, the country stabilized with a strong anti-communist sentiment. Russia next door had become the Soviet Union by this time and relations between the two got progressively worse, leading to the invasion by Soviet forces in what was known as the Winter War of 1939-1940.
A second war between Finland and The Soviet Union started in 1941, known as the Continuation War. Thanks to a mutual enemy in the form of the Soviet Union, the Finns gained considerable support from Nazi Germany, although it was otherwise not part of the Axis powers – a fact confirmed by the Tehran Conference of 1942 which considered the war in Finland as a separate war in its own right.
The Man
It is during that war and within that context that, on 12th March 1943, Olavi Mattila, from his apartment in Helsinginkatu, Helsinki, a professional builder by trade, submitted his application. The design was for a novel type of armored vehicle called the Hyökkäysvaunu (English: ‘Assault Wagon’ or archaic ‘Tank’).
Variants
The Hyökkäysvaunu was suggested in two forms: a four ‘wheeled’ form operating in the manner of an armored car and a second version. For the purpose of this article, they will be described as ‘Version 1’ – the one with 4 large wheels, and ‘Version 2′ – the one with two large wheels and stabilized by a small trailing wheel.
Version 1: ‘The Knobbly Car’
The first version of the assault wagon machine from Mattila was dominated by a pair of huge ‘wheels’ on each side, with the diameter of the two pairs accounting for ⅔ of the length of the entire vehicle. Between them was a concave-shaped hull, meaning that the large ‘wheels’ would be able to gain purchase on very rough surfaces and whilst climbing obstacles without the hull fouling on them. The second distinctive element of the wheels was the large number of raised nodules from the surface arranged circumferentially. At the center of the rearmost wheel was a dome-shaped projection with a gun, but no such projection was to be found on the center of the front wheel.
The hull dipped across the top in another concave shape and was surmounted by a large turret with a convex roof and sides angling towards the roofline. A large cannon was shown protruding from the front of the turret.
The ‘wheels’ were, in fact, not wheels, but lozenge-shaped when viewed in plan view, with the rounded ends of each lozenge forming the ‘wheels’ at the end. The center of the lozenge was fixed to the hull with a complex fixed locking design but one which allowed the front of the hull to blend seamlessly with the lozenge shape of both the front and rear lozenges. Drive for the design was contained within each lozenge and connected through the hull.
Each lozenge was actually two lozenges, with one inside the other. The outer lozenge rotated around the inner one and, in doing so, the mechanical and human elements inside the inner lozenge remained stationary whilst the outer elements ran over the terrain. In this way, Mattila sought to maximize protection and space. At each end of the lozenge, the inner and outer met and rotated around a circular coupling. Two ends were used, the first to host a ball-mounted weapon, and the other a large entrance hatch.
Cleverly, Mattila had arranged things so only a single type of lozenge drive system needed to be built and then connected together so that one hatch and one gun would be on each side. His design, however, created three split fighting areas. One in each lozenge and one for the turret, with no apparent route between them.
Digitally manipulated images from Mattila’s patent to illustrate the hull and ‘wheel’ elements as being distinct from one another. Source: Finnish Patent FII21290 as modified by the author.
Version 2: ‘The Armored Paint Roller’
With the appearance of a giant paint roller, Version 2 of Mattila’s Assault Wagon was effectively just a single lozenge with a trailing stabilizer. Here, the front lozenge was identical to the front lozenge on Version 1 and connected to the front of the hull in the same way. The primary thing missing from this second version was the turret. This was because the hull did not provide a solid platform between the pairs of lozenges, but instead angled down straight away from the lozenge to a single large stabilizing wheel at the back. This style of large wheel stabilized by a trailing small wheel concept has been used many times in designs, perhaps most famously on the Russian so-called ‘Tsar Tank’.
Using the same type of lozenge idea as the first variant, one end is visible, namely the left. It can clearly be seen that the left of the design was for a large hatch, but it is unknown if the right side was also to match or if it might have mounted a weapon in the same manner as each lozenge on the first variant, but it is likely.
Drive
The mechanical propulsion system for the Assault Wagon is shown and described in only the briefest detail, with each lozenge being a self-contained power unit with an engine and transmission. When connected together, such as the first version of the design, this would create a vehicle on which all the ends were driven. Traction on the ground from what were effectively dome-shaped wheels for the lozenge-ends was improved by the use of the knobs on each one. Arranged in 6 to 8 concentric rings radiating from the center of each wheel and circumferentially around the widest part, these knobs would be pressed into the ground as the vehicle moved and improved the traction it could gain. As these rings of knobs continued not only on the exterior of the dome-wheels when it would be operating on hard ground, but also inwards towards the center of the wheel, it meant more of them coming into contact with the ground the deeper it sank. A similar type of idea appeared in 1942 over 8,000 km away, in the USA, with Allison Williams’ design for a four ‘wheeled’ amphibious vehicle. There too would be an idea to maximize contact area on the ground to spread the vehicle’s load when operating on soft ground. Whereas Williams’ idea was amphibious, however, Mattila made no such claim.
The key benefits of Mattila’s idea were threefold. Firstly, the enormous wheels would put down a far larger ground contact area than any regular wheel or even tracks and thus improve cross country performance. In a country with more than its fair share of marshes, boggy ground, heavy snow-covered landscapes, and forests, this was no small benefit.
Secondly, the wheels were also so large as to be impossible to be easily damaged by enemy fire or terrain, such as being ripped off by tree stumps or battlefield debris. Thus, the wheels were more resilient than tracks.
Thirdly and finally, the layout of the fighting chamber within the wheels meant that the traction system also functioned as effective protection for the crew and engine by providing an outer layer of armor around the inner lozenge.
Mobility Flaw
Probably the most notable flaw of Mattila’s design is not the rather ungainly nature of the system with large knobbly wheels. It is the complete lack of any suspension system. From the knobs to the lozenges, there was absolutely no cushioning whatever to protect the occupants inside from the vibrations and shock of movement on any surface, but also from what would be an incredible din over a hard surface like a road.
It can only be surmised that, as shown, the vehicle would have to operate very slowly on any surface to avoid damaging itself or leaving a deafened and crippled crew unable to operate.
An artist’s 3D render of Mattila’s design. Source: via author
Armament
Mattila made no specific reference to what sort of gun or guns should go on the first variant of the assault wagon, but clues can be gained from the drawing he submitted. Each lozenge would feature an entrance hatch on one side and a weapons mount on the other. The mount itself was a ball mounting with a long-barrelled weapon inside, presumably a machine gun. On the inside of this weapon space was a small platform on which the gunner would be able to stand. He would, however, be isolated within this lozenge with seemingly only that single hatch as the entry and exit point and no means to access other parts of the vehicle.
Matching him in the second lozenge at the back of the vehicle, the gunner would be on the left of the machine as the lozenge was facing backward. Thus, this second gunner would be able to cover the other side of the vehicle including the hatch for the first lozenge and vice versa.
Finally, was the turret. With the lozenge being relatively small to accommodate and based on his drawing, the turret too would be big enough for just one or, at most, two crew members who would have to operate the main gun as well as provide command for the machine, which would have seriously hampered any fighting power.
Finally, the driver would be located in the center front of the lead lozenge, looking out through a small hatch in the center of the very narrow hull. Given the vehicle was intended to be just as mobile forwards and backward, a second driver would be logically located in the opposite position at the back. Thus, each lozenge would have a crew of at least two men and, with 2 more in the turret, this would make for a crew of 6 (machine gunner x 2, driver x 2, commander, and gunner).
For the second variant, there was no second lozenge and no turret, but at least one crew member was needed to drive the machine, and, assuming this lozenge was built the same way, another crew member would operate the side-mounted machine gun and perhaps command the vehicle.
Weaponry Flaw
It is unfortunate that the simplicity of the lozenge in terms of having them reversible to provide coverage equally to both sides of a double lozenge machine was lost on the single lozenge (variant 2) type machine. There is no way for the Variant 2 machine to provide coverage properly fore or aft or across any part of the left hand side of the machine, as it was shown. Even with the double lozenge machine (variant 1), coverage from machine guns around the vehicle would still leave large blind spots at the front and back. It does seem odd that Mattila would not have realized this and mentioned the allowance of providing a weapon in the hull at the front or back to obviate this problem.
Further, there is the issue of the turret. Obviously, having a turret enabled this design to offer all-around fire to the crew, which begs the question of why even bothering with the machine guns in the wheels given the weight and extra problems that would bring. Removing those guns would have concentrated firepower in the turret and allowed for an easier vehicle to control for the commander. It would also have allowed for hatches on both ends of the lozenges to enable crews to escape as well as more space inside for fuel or automotive elements. The turret, as shown, is rather small and, with a large cannon fitted inside, would make operation difficult as well as no clear way of storing an adequate stock of ammunition inside. Once more, ammunition stowage would be the best use for some of that wasted space in one of, or both of the lozenges. The lozenges also caused a problem for the turret as they were so big, so high, and so wide, and they blocked a substantial part of the firing arc of the main gun. Whilst a weapon mounted as drawn would have a good potential range of elevation and depression directly to the sides or front or rear, it would be severely hampered over the corners in each direction.
Conclusion
Was this specific vehicle design likely to see service? The simple answer is no. Like many other patents, the purpose of Mattila was not to design, down to the final nuts and bolts, an armored fighting vehicle. Instead, what he was doing was laying out some design principles on which tanks may be based in either a double-lozenge (variant 1) or single lozenge (variant 2) form. The years between 1943, when the design was filed, and 1946, when it was accepted, were three of the years during which tanks developed the most, with the end of the war, the emergence of the ‘modern’ type of tank and a generation change or two from those at the start of the war in Europe in 1939. In 1946, there was absolutely no chance of a complete revolution in tank design such as that perceived by Mattila. His design went nowhere and was forgotten.
Sources
Finnish Patent FI21290, Hyökkäysvaunu, filed 12th March 1943, granted 10th May 1946
Mattila’s Assault Wagon specifications
Crew
At least 6 for Variant 1 (machine gunner x 2, driver x 2, commander, and gunner)
At least 2 for variant 2 (commander/gunner, and driver)
Armament
Variant 1: cannon in turret plus 2 machine guns
Variant 2: likely a single machine gun
For information about abbreviations check the Lexical Index
Patents, the government license issued to an inventor or company to commercially protect or exploit an innovation or design, are wide ranging and can be as small as a new way of doing something up to a total rethink of how an existing thing might work. Julien Wieczorek, a Polish national living in France, falls into this latter category. Between 1986 and 2000, he submitted a set of design patents for a completely new tank. That is, a tank not just new in design, but new in philosophy as well. Wieczorek’s designs are from a skilled engineer looking at some of the fundamental problems associated with tank design and finding a way to work around them to produce a new bigger, and better tank. A tank with formidable armament, impenetrable armor, and a level of mobility to surpass any contemporary vehicle in NATO or beyond. His designs were not built but they not only provide an insight into some alternative solutions to the technical limits of current tanks, but perhaps also more widely into the design of modern tanks at the turn of the Cold War, where massed tank combat became less and less likely. At a time when nations were reducing tank numbers or seeking lighter and more ‘flexible’ vehicles, Wieczorek doubled down with a design nearly twice the weight and larger than any other – a true super tank for the 21st century.
The Man
Julien Wieczorek left a long catalog of engineering and design work in the patent office, yet is somewhat hard to trace from just those records. What can be discerned from them, however, is that Wieczorek was a Polish citizen who was living in France. His address, provided in British and American patent applications, showed him living in an apartment complex in Les Fougeres A2-36, Avon, which is southeast of Paris.
Wieczorek was clearly a professional engineer rather than the amateur armchair type of inventor. This is evidenced by the fact that he had taken part in one of the submission ideas for the road/rail link between the United Kingdom and France which became the Channel Tunnel. His idea was for a large suspension bridge and barrage-type crossing rather than a tunnel.
Over the years, Wieczorek had turned his mind to all sorts of large civil engineering projects, from commercial ship construction and a modular passenger aircraft (1969), a method of moving a large iron furnace by sea (1970), bringing water to the desert (1974 and 1984), and even plans for a new European capital between Berlin and the Polish border (1999).
On the military side of things, Wieczorek was no less inventive, with ideas for multiple drone fighters controlled from a single aircraft (1977), a huge flying boat which could launch and land fighters as a flying aircraft carrier (1977), a means of creating an artificial island as a military air base (1987), and a dual body helicopter with intersecting blades (1989-1990). Of particular note, however, are three designs from him relating to armored vehicles.
Twin-rotor dual-body helicopter designs, 1990. Source: French Patent FR2659934
The first was filed in October 1986, titled ‘Independent armoured modules for the driver, observer, and gunner for an automatic-loading armoured fighting vehicle’. The patent was granted in April 1988 as French Patent 260509. The second of these was filed as ‘Additional armour units with rocket-launching systems for an armoured fighting vehicle with automatic loading’ in March 1987. The application was granted in September 1988 as French Patent FR2613061. The third design was filed in August 1996 titled ‘Method for constructing, repair, maintenance and transport of heavy armoured fighting vehicles consisting of several modules’. This filing was also approved and a patent was granted in March 2000 as French Patent FR2782789 and European Patent EPO982560. There is significant overlap between all of the ideas in those patents as the idea has evolved in this time.
Spanning a period of not only nearly 14 years but also straddling the collapse of the Soviet Union and the new political situation in the world as a result, the designs are still complementary to each other, with a lot of similarities. As such, looking at these designs together provides a view of the thinking of Wieczorek and ideas which he wanted to build into a new generation of heavy main battle – one which was not only capable of dominating the late Cold War battlefield, but also the new post-Soviet world.
Birth of the EBC 1986
The first two designs are deliberately linked by Wieczorek in his applications, with FR2613061 (March 1987) directly referencing the slightly earlier application which was granted as FR2605095 (October 1986). The vehicle in FR2613061 was, for 1987, certainly ahead of its time in several areas, not least of which was an overall shape of a slab-sided tank which stands apart from its cast steel and rounded predecessors from the 1970’s or before, whether it was the British Chieftain, French AMX-30, or German Leopard 1. In fact, Wieczorek alludes to the inspiration for this new shape as coming from the public unveiling of the new French tank, the replacement for the AMX-30 known as the ‘Leclerc’ at Satory, France in 1987.
This new vehicle was what Wieczorek called an “Engin Blindé de Combat” (English: an armored combat vehicle). Wieczorek has preceded this unveiling with his own submission in October 1986, which was eventually issued as French Patent FR2605095, which was notionally about the separation and individual protection of crew positions within a new autoloaded main battle tank.
Design of the 1986 Patent
Dimensions
The 1986 vehicle is only mentioned as being of a similar size to modern Main Battle Tanks such as the M1 Abrams and Leopard 2. This probably means a length (without gun) of about 10 m, a width of 3.5 m and a height of about 2.5 m.
Crew
In the French patent from 1986, Wieczorek is clear that his goal was the creation of a modern tank that used an autoloading system to reduce the crew from 4 men to just 3, as it would no longer require a human loader.
The three crew members would sit in separate armored pods placed in the turret and the hull. The driver would stay in the hull in the 1986 patent, whilst the gunner and commander would stay in the turret in their pods. It is made clear, however, that, although the vehicle is shown with the driver in the front and engine in the back, it was also possible to put the engine and transmission in the front in a manner akin to the Israeli Merkava.
Wieczorek also avoided the common design choice of moving all the crew members into the hull for extra protection, preferring to maintain the observation advantage given by an elevated position. The tank commander would be located on the right, whilst the gunner would be on the left in the turret.
Despite being separated by their individual armored pods and being physically apart within the vehicle, the 1986 patent makes it clear that they would be in communication with each other continuously using both video and the internal radio communications.
The driver seems to have had access to three vision ports mounted on a rounded hatch. It is unclear how this hatch opened and if it would have interfered with the gun or turret. The commander had access to eight vision ports on his cupola, while the gunner on the left had access to four vision ports and a telescopic sight. Of course, these were just tentative placements, as the patent did not concern itself much with such details.
The great advantage of pods, except for the obvious addition of protection, was the supplementary protection of the crew from internal fires, explosions, fire extinguisher gases and NBC threats. It was far easier to insulate just the small pods than the entirety of a fighting compartment.
What Wieczorek seems to pay no mind to is the psychological comfort of the crew. While being in the small confines of a tank with other men in combat is certainly not a calming situation, finding yourself alone closed off in an even smaller space is possibly even less so.
Protection
Like other heavy tanks, Wieczorek’s design was planned to be well protected by means of a modern multi-layered arrangement, presumably composite armor. The sides of the vehicle would be covered by very thick side skirts that were connected to the hull over the tracks and to the extended magazine in between the tracks.
Wieczorek also mentions that, should a front-engine arrangement be chosen, the engine itself can help protect from a part of the shrapnel.
To protect against fire, including from fuel, ammunition, or hydraulic fluid, Wieczorek proposed an automatic fire fighting system based on releasing a gas concentration of 5% Freon 1301 (Bromotriflouromethane – CBrF3). This, he postulated was preferable to alternative systems like Halon as it was roughly as toxic as Carbon Dioxide and could only be tolerated by the crew for up to 5 minutes.
Should anything manage to penetrate the outer armor of the tank, or should a fire ensue inside, the crew were protected by their individual pods. Those ‘pods’ were to be made from a composite material involving steel or some other and lighter alloy and Kevlar. This provided protection from shrapnel and fire alike.
Automotive
Very little is mentioned in the 1986 patent about the automotive components of the engine. The engine and the transmission are at the rear of the vehicle, under a raised engine deck cupola with two large fans for cooling. The air intakes are on the side of the vehicle. It should be noted that the space allocated for the engine and transmission is very small.
However, Wieczorek mentions not only that these components can be moved to the front, but also that it should be possible to mount two engines and two transmissions, one at the front and one at the rear. How wise such a solution is mechanically and space-wise is not discussed by the inventor.
It is not exactly clear where the fuel tanks are supposed to be, although it is possible they were meant to be placed in the floor of the hull.
Suspension and Track
The tank was to be supported on 7 sets of double road wheels on each side. Each pair of wheels was fixed on a common trailing arm. Unusually too for the design, was that the roadwheel pairs were not all the same size. The leading two and rearmost two pairs of wheels were of a larger diameter (750 mm) than the 3 central pairs (600 mm), as this decrease in height allowed for the hull width extensions inside the track run. Making them slightly smaller allowed them to still deflect upwards by up to 200 mm without striking the hull side extensions.
The drive sprocket was to be at the rear, the idler at the front and just two return rollers were used, one on each side of the bulging ammunition compartment.
Although the drawings appear to show torsion bars across the width of the bottom of the hull, this is misleading. Wieczorek determined that torsion bars would not provide suitable suspension across the potential temperature ranges in which the tank was potentially going to operate at, namely -55 C to +60 C, and, therefore, the design would use hydro-pneumatic suspension instead. This system would allow for both manual and automatic adjustment of height, meaning Wieczorek’s design would be able to keep good ground clearance for off-road running and then lower itself in a fighting location to the extent of the hull floor being in contact with the ground. This allowed the vehicle to make itself a smaller target as well as harder to see.
Armament
The tank would engage an enemy with its primary armament – an autoloaded 120 mm gun. Ammunition for the main gun was to be either Kinetic Energy (KE) i.e. Armor-Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) or High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT), which Wieczorek called a ‘multi-purpose round’. With an assumed overall weight of 55 tonnes, 40 rounds of these shells at 20 kg each would be just 800 kg, or 1.45 % of the overall mass of the tank. As such, Wieczorek saw that as long as they could be made to fit in the space of a tank, then increasing ammunition storage could increase the firepower of the tank without much of an increase in mass. The plan therefore, was to adopt an 80-round loadout for a total of just 1.6 tonnes / 2.9% of the total mass.
The autoloader speed was estimated to be able to provide 10 to 12 rounds per minute, but far more unusual than the prospective high rate of fire was the layout of the loading system and how Wieczorek amended the hull shape to accommodate it. The problem was going to be where the autoloader would go. If he could make it fit and potentially cram in 80 or more rounds then this tank would be carrying twice or more than its equivalent Western MBTs. His solution was to place the ammunition in the bottom of the hull, in two large circular carousels.
No secondary armament is mentioned in the patent.
Ammunition Resupply
As previously mentioned, one of the advantages of carrying more ammunition was less frequent reloading and less exposure outside of the tank by the crew. Wieczorek proposed the use of a semi-trailer to be towed by the EBC and then used to reload the two magazines. The two magazines would be reloaded through the belly of the tank through two intermediary magazines.
Autoloader
Wieczorek was clear even in the first filing in October 1986 that the goal was an autoloaded tank to both increase firepower and also to reduce the number of crew from four to three. In his journey to deciding on an autoloader, he considered the alternative MBT autoloading projects of the time. The Soviets had their own 125 mm autoloader on the T-72 MBT and clearly, in some quarters, it was felt that this gave a firepower edge over Western vehicles. From the USA, Wieczorek looked at the Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) projects to replace the M1, known as the SRV and TTB, both of which used a drum under the turret storing 40 rounds with a rate of fire of 8 rounds per minute. The Leopard 2 120 mm smoothbore autoloader project from the firm Rheinmetall in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) could hold just half of that number of shells, just 20, and these were held in the back of the turret. The British had their own projects with several ideas considered by the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment (R.A.R.D.E.) and one from Alvis which loaded an externally mounted gun from an ammunition supply on the back of the tank.
The French too were in the process of finding a replacement for the elderly AMX-30 in the form of the new ‘Leclerc’ MBT and a variety of ideas for what that vehicle would eventually look like had been proposed. Ammunition storage for an autoloader had featured within that work too and had, at one point, even included the same kind of idea as considered by Alvis, with ammunition at the back in a pod for restocking the autoloader.
Mock-up model of the Leclerc with the rear-mounted external ammunition resupply pod concept. pholdeer.com
Storing additional rounds in pods on the back was not going to be a viable solution and was just one of several ideas floated around to bolster the available stock of ammunition. If the ammunition stowage for the autoloader was going to be in the back of the turret, then it was going to be limited by the volume available, although it had the advantage of accommodating the length of a unitary shell well. Nonetheless, not more than 20 or 30 rounds could be carried effectively in this manner and, if there was a move to an even larger calibre gun of say 140 mm, then even fewer could be carried due the width of the shells and the dimensions of the bustle rack. The solution to this was to put the rounds in the hull and this is exactly what the Soviets had done with the carousel-type loader on the T-72. However, herein lies an additional problem – hull width. Unitary 120 mm caliber shells would not be able to fit in a normal type of hull with a carousel autoloader, so even considering 140 mm rounds in such a way was completely out of the question.
The greatest single limiting factor in tank design is not weight, nor speed, or even cost – but width. Width, because most long tank movements are by rail and this means the railguage limits how wide of a load can be transported without fouling on a neighboring track, platforms, or bridges. This is generally around 3 to 3.5 meters in real terms for maximum width and excluding any side armor modules added later. This has been the fundamental maximum width, give or take, since the very first tanks in WW1. When Wieczorek was considering his carousel-type loading system with shells arranged in a circle and pointing inwards, this width restriction was the source of serious problems.
The length of a tank shell, such as a 120 mm NATO APFSDS, is 1 meter. Arranging such full-size shells on a carousel would mean placing them facing each other, doubling that in terms of required width. Even before considering the mechanism of the carousel to rotate it or move the shells to deliver them to the gun, a full 2 meters of the internal width of the tank is taken up. Allowing just 10 cm all around the outside of the carousel (total diameter 2.1 m) for clearance, problems can be plotted out as per Table 1 using a simple theoretical limit of 3 m of width to illustrate the problem.
On a conventional hull, where the sides of the hull do not project through or over the tracks (Table 1 Row a) and where the overall width is 3 m, it has to be factored in that the tracks on each side deduct from this maximum width. A track of even 60 cm width on each side, a little clearance between the hull side (~5 cm) and the track, and then the thickness of the hull sides (~4 cm) means a central internal space of just 162 cm – well short of being able to make a carousel autoloader using unitary shells.
This is one of the reasons why Soviet tanks using a carousel type loader tend to split the shell up into two parts (propellant and shell) and automatically load both parts to form a single shell. That ingenious solution is certainly very clever, but when it comes to an APFSDS round, one of the factors affecting anti-armor performance is the length of the APFSDS rod itself. Generally speaking, longer rods are preferable to shorter ones so, if your shell is split in two pieces, it is inherently harder to get a longer APFSDS rod. The goal, therefore, is to have a unitary shell to keep the APFSDS rod as long as possible. Assuming this was done with a conventionally laid out tank where the tracks and suspension project from the sides of the hull (Table 1 Row b), then the only possible solution is to have very narrow tracks. This is even more acute, as even larger calibre guns with longer unitary shells are considered and clearly, the central width could be made larger, the tracks get substantially narrower, which is limiting on the performance.
Wieczorek’s solution (Table 1 Row c) skipped deftly around this problem. As can be seen from the table, it can retain a track of the same width as the conventional or normally laid out tank and still provide substantial internal width without exceeding the maximum 3 m overall tank width limit. The dimensions for Wieczorkes tank were actually a maximum hull width of 3.42 m and, with the side skirts on, a total width of 4.3 m.
The way this was done was simply to revert to using sponsons – projections from the side of the tank. These projections did not go over the track but actually projected within it, so that the track ran both below and above the projection. In doing so, the tank could increase the maximum available width for a carousel autoloader and fit those unitary rounds. This available width was increased even more by angling the rounds so that they pointed down and thus decreased the effective width taken up. It also meant one more thing for Wieczorek’s design – the ability to create a double stack of such shells and increase the ammunition capacity of the tank.
Wieczorek decided to place the APFSDS and HEAT shells on separate stacks, with the APFSDS in the top one in his drawings. This would then allow for very simple choosing of the next shell to be loaded, making it very easy to keep track of which shell is which. Both the gunner and the commander could select what type of round would be loaded next. These would be loaded into the gun by two ‘robotic’ mechanisms.
1987 – Rocket Armor!
While the 1986 patent set the general tone for Wieczorek’s view of how a modern MBT should look, the 1987 patent came in and added rocket launchers to the vehicle. The grand idea of Wieczorek’s new patent was that his EBC could use the rockets carried inside the sides of the turret and hull to bombard enemy positions before being attacked by massed enemy tanks. The launchers would then remain to act as armor for the tank.
Design of the 1987 Patent
Crew
The 1987 patent followed up from the 1986 one, keeping the idea of crew pods for the men in the tank. However, citing critical voices within the army about the reduction of the tank’s crew to 3 men, Wieczorek added another crew member and reshuffled all of their positions.
The only crew member to retain his position was the gunner, remaining on the left side of the turret. He was accompanied by the new crew member, probably placed on the right side of the turret, the observer. What this man’s actual duties within the operation of the tank were supposed to be is not specified. They would be further protected by individual armored pods, creating in effect a semi-turret position for both of them, where most of their bodies would actually be below the turret ring.
The most drastic changes, however, were the placements of the driver and commander. They were moved from their initial positions into the middle of the tank, sandwiched between the turret and engine, in their own protected capsule. While this would arguably have been the safest place in the tank, it would also have provided significant problems with access and, most importantly, emergency exits. They would have to use cameras and displays to see their surroundings, drive and control the tank. It is worth noting that, in several countries, this would also mean his tank would not be legal to use on the road in some countries as the driver would have no ‘eyeball’ view of the road ahead of the vehicle.
Protection
This move of the driver into the rear of the tank divided the vehicle into a front unoccupied compartment, a sealed-off armored turret compartment, including the space under the turret (which was used for the loading system), and the two spaces at the rear for the crew compartment and engine/transmission, respectively.
It is said that the best defense is attack and Wieczorek took this to heart with perhaps the least well-considered part of his idea – fitting bombardment rockets to the sides of the turret, the sides of the hull and the hull front. The rocket pod in the front of the hull, whether full or empty, also created a large distance from the outer armor to the crew space, forming a heavily protected frontal aspect made from composite armor with a line of sight thickness of 2 to 3 metres in places. However, this also meant that a large weight would be added to the design and a lot of mostly useless space would be present, space that could far better be used for something else (or removed altogether).
This, Wieczorek felt, would provide protection against the current Soviet 125 mm caliber tank guns and also guns up to 140 mm caliber, which were being hypothesized as potential future tank guns.
Just as the rocket pod in the front added a substantial level of protection, Wieczorek provided for the rest of the tank to be well protected too. The cross-section of the tank from French patent FR2613061 shows not only a heavily reinforced floor to protect from mines, but also a heavily protected turret both on the sides and roof. Not only are the sides of the turret thick, allowing for an arrangement of armor that can make good use of that space, like a spaced or composite array, but the bottom sides of the turret extend out forming a shelf on each side. Onto this shelf was an angled and armored compartment containing the rockets. Regardless of whether the rockets were a good idea or not, the pocketting of this area meant a well-shaped and angled spaced armor layer with a good distance from the sides of the equally well-angled turret sides.
Assuming the rockets were dropped as a poor idea, the basic turret shape, as outlined with these pockets, would allow for space on the sides ideal for stowage of maintenance or crew equipment whilst keeping the outside of the tank clean and uncluttered – something important to provide the vehicle with a small radar signature to help keep it hidden. A similar concept was indeed adopted on the Leclerc, with stowage modules on the turret sides.
Moving vertically downwards from the shelf of the turret side was a trackguard to keep mud from being thrown up onto the deck of the hull. The top run of the track then ran in the gap below this mudguard and the top of the hull side extension. The extension itself was the same width as the outer edge of the turret shelf and is clearly drawn with a double thickness of armor over the projection, providing for additional security of the ammunition which lay directly behind. Moving down the hull side, below the extension, the hull then cut away sharply at an angle down to the belly plate, with the suspension units attached to this inwards angled lower hull side. Not only would angling this lower side add an increased level of protection to direct fire with a sloping surface and increased line of sight thickness, but it also improved the lower hull shape of the tank to provide increased protection from explosions underneath, such as landmines.
On the outside of the hull were the other rocket pods. Formed into long side skirts full of rockets, it actually created a double-thickness side skirt for the tank along its length. It particularly added value to the tank in providing additional coverage over the side extensions with the ammunition in them. However, Wieczorek makes it clear that these pods were optional and would only be fitted to the tank when required to fight from a defensive position. They would have made the tank too wide to be transportable.
Just like the turret sides, if the rockets were dropped, the extensions could be repurposed as large open boxes for stowage or an additional form of armor array. Just as with the turret side rocket pods being hollow boxes on the real Leclerc, here the hollow side skirts could be interpreted as being along the lines of the box-like extensions which ended up on the front of the Leclerc.
Mobility
In terms of power for this 55 tonne main battle tank, Wieczorek wanted something better than either the Ka-500 series 12 cylinder MTU diesel, as used on the Leopard, or the engine on the Leclerc, which he called the “Suralmo Hyperbar” – a high-pressure gas turbine. Instead, he preferred the idea of a pair of MTU-880 V8 diesel engines combined with an automatic gearbox. Each engine was capable of delivering 1,000 hp and the pair together a total of 2,000 hp. At 55 tonnes this would have meant an incredible 36.4 hp/tonne. Without all of the rockets of dubious practical value, possibly saving another 5 tonnes, it is reasonable to estimate he could have been looking more towards 40 hp/tonne assuming all of the other elements remained viable.
The track itself was made from steel, light metal, or composite materials, such as polyester reinforced with kevlar or glass fiber. It would be fitted with three rubber pads on the outside across the width, with the center pad of those three slightly thicker than the ones on either side. On the inner face of the track, the links were cushioned with kevlar pads. Across the top of the track run, the track would slide along the top of the hull side extensions but was supported at each end by a single return roller. The suspension type was retained though to the 1996 patent application.
Rockets
Wieczorek planned to use technology to disrupt an attacking enemy tank force starting at ranges beyond those for direct tank fire. This was to be fulfilled by using supplementary rockets. These were not to be just any old rockets either, but were to be a version of the Multi-Launch Rocket System (MLRS) which was at the time in service with the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), and Italy when the need was for long-range enemy suppression. Able to inflict damage well beyond tank-gun range, the MLRS rocket modules on the turret sides could deliver high explosive or presumably a load of anti-personnel or anti-tank mines 25 to 35 km away.
Wieczorek did at least hedge his bets with rockets by suggesting alternative and progressively more practical rockets instead of these. These included 120 mm to 150 mm rockets with a 15 km range, an unspecified ‘medium’ sized rocket for ranges up to 10 km, and ‘light’ LL11 40 mm to 60 mm calibre rockets for ranges between 3 and 6 km. Each rocket pod for these LL11 rockets would be able to hold between 15 and 20 rockets each, for a maximum of 30 to 40 rockets in total. These rockets were fitted all over the tank. The MLRS would go on the turret sides, more rockets of a large calibre in the armored side skirts on each side, a pod of light rockets in the front hull, and more within the sides of the turret.
The likelihood of such an idea ever having been adopted, notwithstanding the good parts of his designs, is extremely low as it was just too complex. Adding another complex and heavy weapons system to a tank added nothing which a smaller investment in artillery could not accomplish. Certainly, the idea of the large MLRS rocket and the potential firepower it could add was tempting and Wieczorek speculated that such a system could be added to the sides of the German Leopard 2 or British Challenger tank. It is hard to imagine either wanting to add six of these 4 m long, 300 mm caliber rockets, each weighing 300 kg. Six of them would mean a minimum of 1.8 tonnes, not including any launch pod or control equipment. There was one further rocket module as well, containing between 100 and 200 50 mm to 70 mm calibre rockets in the space in the front, where there would usually be a driver. This would allow Wieczorek vehicle to deliver maximum possible firepower forwards at short range with additional small rockets. This too could simply have been omitted to reduce complexity, cost and weight, or replaced with something more useful, like more fuel to increase range. Had Wieczorek dropped these ideas for at least 2 tonnes of unnecessary encumbrance from the MLRS rockets alone, the weight savings could have been reused elsewhere on the tank or just left off to help reduce the weight. Dropping all ideas for these rocket pods would have simplified the design, made it cheaper, and also substantially lighter.
Air Defence
The final firepower for the tank was a dedicated anti-aircraft gun of either 30 or 40 mm caliber and/or a pod for surface to air (SAM) missiles allowing for self-contained protection from enemy aircraft, including helicopters. This was yet one more thing adding unnecessary complexity and cost to the vehicle for a marginal benefit. These weapons were to be mounted in the back of the turret, as there was space available, having dropped the position of loader.
EBC Redux 1998 – the EBCL
Just a few years on from the original filing, the world had changed enormously, with the end of the Soviet Union and the utter destruction of Iraqi forces during the 1990/91 Gulf War demonstrating the enormous power of the modern MBTs over those even just a little older, like the T-72. Despite the T-72’s autoloader and the lack of such a device on the American M1 and British Challenger tanks deployed against them, it was an incredibly one-sided fight when it came to tank vs tank combat. Even Wieczorek’s consideration of substantially larger tank guns up to 140 mm was not in place and it could be argued that the British 120 mm rifled gun and the German 120 mm smoothbore on the American Abrams were more than adequate to deal with the Iraqi T-72s.
Nonetheless, work on a 140 mm gun had been taking place in Germany (now unified), the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. Wieczorek once more submitted for patent, in France and Poland, his idea for an ‘EBC’ – this time, however, the vehicle was larger and heavier with more suitable armament (no rockets). Yet, it was clearly an evolution of his earlier work – a culmination of a decades-long effort by him to create a tank better armed and armored than anything else at the time and suitable for up to 30 years of service.
With this in mind and an appreciation of the several or more years that it can take to get a tank design from drawing board concept to production and the cost of doing so, Wieczorek rightly saw that, for this concept to work, it would have to be adopted widely. This was not just going to be an idea for a giant French tank, but a giant tank that could be mass-produced and used by the members of NATO – grand ideas indeed.
Design of the 1998 Patent
Crew
In 1998, with the submission of the evolved EBC now an EBCL, Wieczorek stuck to his ideas of protective pods for the crew although this time all three crew were collated and all three were in the hull, a solution repeated decades later by the Russian T-14 Armata. This would greatly aid intercommunication between the men without the need for a video link although it was at the price of the commander being able to look out of the top of the vehicle.
The previous ideas of individual crew armored pods and of placing some crew members uncomfortably between the turret and the engine were gone. While the drawings show this crew compartment being in the front of the vehicle, Wieczorek mentions that this could have been put the other way around, with the crew in the back and the engine in the front.
In an effort to overcome the loss of awareness from detaching the crew from an elevated position, Wieczorek opted for an elevated observation periscope which could reach between 12 and 30 m high and fitted with a CCTV system and night vision equipment. The idea of a periscope would overcome some of that loss of situational awareness, as well as provide a significantly advantageous ability to see over obstacles or from behind cover. It would also mean that the gun could not be rotated past the periscope, hindering the ability of the tank to engage targets when the periscope was up.
Protection
By 1998, these ideas for protection were not seen as being sufficient by Wieczorek, who was conscious of a new generation of Russian guns to surpass the older 125 mm guns, specifically mentioning a new Russian 135 mm smoothbore gun. To increase protection for the EBC, Wieczorek proposed the use of composite armor involving multiple layers of different types of steels, light metals, ceramics, and kevlar to provide roughly four times the protection available from just using traditional steel armor for the same weight. The disadvantage of this new armor was bulk and cost. Heavy protection from use of this new armor would be arrayed across the front of the hull and a similar level of protection across the front of the turret, in modules that could easily be replaced if they became damaged.
In order to provide as thick of an upper front aspect as possible, Wieczorek once more did away with a driver’s hatch. Unlike the 1987 ideas of sticking the driver in the back, now all the crew were in the hull and in the front of it, so he had to come up with a method of access to and from the tank for these men which would not compromise the frontal armor. The solution was to adopt a pair of rectangular belly plates behind the front armor and under the crew space. Additional changes to the 1986/87 concept was the use of Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA) on the hull, with special attention to the area between the hull and the turret for this armor.
Even with the crew all together in a pod in the front of the hull, the use of bulky composite-type armor arrays provided a line of sight thickness of armor of between 1,200 and 1,800 mm.
Front aspect of the hull armor, with the Chobham armor array indicated by the ‘30’. Of note is that the floor armor is two layers with a small gap between them. Source: French Patent FR2782789
Two views of the front of the EBT both in 50 to 60 tonne form (solid outline) and 120 to 150 tonne form (dashed outline) showing the closed (left) and open (right) positions for the front hull access hatches. Source: French Patent FR2782789
By the time of the 1998 application, the weight had swollen faster than a cop on night shift near a doughnut shop. Gone was the 55 tonne ‘modest’ EBC, equivalent to other NATO tanks and a little lighter than some, and incoming was this new EBC at a mammoth 120 to 150 tonnes instead. At 120 tonnes, the EBCL would be ‘EBCL 1’ and at 150 tonnes ‘EBCL 2’. At this new weight, the EBC was now an Engin Blindé de Combat Lourds (EBCL) (English: a heavy armored combat vehicle).
Firepower
By 1998, the firepower, which was seen as adequate in 1987 in the form of a 120 mm smoothbore, was still adequate. However, as he discussed in his earlier patent application, he wanted a bigger gun. Somewhat thankfully, all attempts to clad the EBC as some form of mobile artillery were abandoned and the 1998 design featured no rockets at all.
Although the USA, UK, France, and Germany had all produced versions of a 140 mm smoothbore, the existing NATO tanks were not well suited to fitting them due to size and weight considerations, as well as recoil management. For example, the 120 mm smoothbore, as used on the Leopard 2 and M1 Abrams, had a recoil force of around 80 tonnes – heavier than the tanks themselves. The recoil force from a 140 mm gun would be even more severe and Wieczorek saw that the solution was to effectively take his 1986/87 EBC concept and make it bigger and heavier to accommodate this new generation of bigger tank guns. In his final part of discussion of tank guns, Wieczorek postulated that should his ideas for scaling up a tank to this size take place, then there would be no reason to suppose guns could not go up to 155 mm for the tank or a tank-based howitzer, or even bigger, although even he seems to have sounded skeptical when he suggested 210 mm as a caliber. It has to be considered though just what would warrant such a move to such a huge gun, as no Soviet era or Russian contemporary tank could warrant such an upgrade.
Making the next generation of EBC 120 to 150 tonnes would solve this problem in the sense that there would be more room for the bigger gun and ammunition as well as the new armor weight carried. Wieczorek made no mention of some of the problems with an MBT of that size, like fuel consumption, or whether or not it could cross smaller bridges. He did, however, consider transportation in terms of a road trailer and rail flatcar, and mentions that some contemporary cargo planes can carry 120 tons.
The EBCL was also going to be using shells of at least 140 mm caliber as well as surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) fitted in the turret rear. All of these shells and missiles would be bulky and heavy, meaning that some assistance was going to be required to replenish ammunition. Wieczorek details some assistive measures for ammunition resupply.
The first of these measures is a dedicated resupply vehicle with a manipulator arm. This arm would take the weight of the SAM and lift it to the height of the turret, whereupon the large side armor would hinge forward, revealing a supply port into which the missile could be loaded.
By having a closed-off system for the gun and ammunition to keep it apart from the crew, the vehicle gained valuable protection, but it also meant ammunition resupply by the crew would be difficult. The turret was, afterall, crewless, so there would be no manual loading of shells into the turret to then pass down into the carousel. Instead, Wieczorek solved the problem and substantially reduced the burden on the crew by simply accessing the ammunition supply from the side.
For the new tank, Wieczorek, somewhat confusingly, switches his ammunition types. He sticks to the APFSDS and HEAT shells, but no longer are these unitary rounds. No longer too are these angled downwards and inwards to further reduce the width they take up. Instead, the drawings show the ammunition, once loaded into the side, being two-part with a seperate propellant charge stacked on top of the ammunition part, all on a horizontal carousel. These were to be 140 mm or 155 mm rounds and it is possible he was simply trying to show a semi-artillery type of gun, where the amount of propellant could be varied to vary the range, or that he was trying to simplify the design. Whichever was the case, in doing so, he also removed one of the key advantages of his own design in moving back from unitary rounds. This would lead to a shorter APFSDS penetrator and this would drastically affect anti-armor performance.
The outline drawings of the EBC with the front crew pod from European Patent EP0982560 include dimensions of the vehicle, which reinforces the enlarged dimensions of this 100+ tonne tank. The front crew pod alone was to measure between 3.5 and 3.6 meters long measured from the front of the nose to the back of the module. The top of the hull was calculated to be 2.1 m high and, with the turret, a total height of up 3.65 to 3.8 meters, depending on which version of EBCL was going to be built. Ground clearance was good for a tank as well, with 0.5 m between the ground and the belly plate, which could obviously be reduced by use of the hydro-pneumatic suspension. At the lower end of the weight class ~120 tonnes, the tank (EBCL 1) would have a ground contact length of 7 meters and, at the upper weight ~150 tonnes (EBCL 2), a length of 7.2 meters.
Transport
As mentioned previously, it is width – specifically rail width, which is the dominant limiting factor for tank dimensions. When the EBC swelled from the 55-tonne range to that theoretical 120 to 150 tonnes, it did not just get heavier – it got larger too. Too large, in fact, to fit as a standard load on a rail car and awkwardly large for road transport.
Wieczorek did not ignore these issues and simply proposed moving the tank in separate pieces to reduce the individual load, somewhat ironically returning to one of the first problems to plague British tanks in WW1, where they were too wide to fit on rail cars and had to have the sponsons removed.
The solution was perhaps less grand than might be expected. It was simply to break the vehicle down into 3 modules: 1) the front crew module, 2) the central robotic and weapons module including the turret, and 3) the rear automotive module with the engine and transmission.
The American HET (Heavy Equipment Transport) was made by Oshkosh and consisted of the M1070 tractor and M1000 semi-trailer unit. It provided long-range haulage on and off road for US Army equipment, including the M1 Abrams MBT. Weighing in at 41,000 lbs (18.6 tonnes) for the tractor and 50,000 lbs (22.7 tonnes) for the trailer, the HET had a combined unladen mass of 91,000 lbs (41.3 tonnes). Able to haul a maximum load of 140,000 lbs. (63.5 tonnes), the trailer used 5 sets of quadruple wheels for a total of 20 wheels to take the load. With a haulage limit of 63.5 tonnes, this would not be sufficient for Wieczorek’s new heavier tank, but he proposed a vehicle similar to the existing in-service HET, albeit modernized and with an extra axle with 2 wheels each side, for a total of 24 tyres instead of 20.
This was not the only change that would be needed to the HET trailer to move the EBCL. The side skirts on the hull and turret would also have to be removed at times for transport, so Wieczorek proposed a simple crane arm be added to the front of the HET trailer.
For haulage by rail, a special rail car with a lowered central portion and two 4-axle bogies would be used, with the platform suspended between the two bogies, similar to the rail car designed for the German Maus. Much like the HET-type trailers for road transport, Wieczorek saw a relatively simple method for loading the tank onto both road trailers and also railcars. For transport, three HET-type trailers or rail cars would be placed alongside each other and the tank loaded on from the side to straddle all three trailers or cars. The track would be broken and the three modules separated. This method obviously would make loading and unloading tanks (reversing the process) easier where large flat hard surfaces, like car parks (for the HET trailers) or railheads with three parallel lines of track were available. Where they were not, life would have been significantly more difficult.
Conclusion
If the 1986/87 EBC was not a sufficient step-change in design for a tank, then the 1998 EBCL was a leap into a future where a military budget for a giant tank might once again exist. The designer himself, Julien Wieczorek, is a bit of an enigma, leaving a long legacy of well-thought-out and carefully considered patents on a wide variety of civil and military engineering topics.
The EBL from the late 1980s shows a level of out-of-the-box thinking which is extravagant enough to solve that critical problem of a unitary ammunition carousel loader. It was also an idea sufficiently grounded that it is not hard to see it legitimately considered at a time of the Leclerc being prototyped.
The respawning in the post-Cold War of the idea is perhaps less clear in its reasoning. Certainly, before, the prevailing threat to Western Europe was Soviet aggression, so considerations of tanks capable of delivering a level of firepower never seen before on a tank was somewhat understandable. Post Cold War such a tank would be hard to comprehend and although the idea of strapping MLRS rockets to the sides of the turret disappeared, Wieczorek doubled down on his design in other regards. At a time when many nations were scaling back their tank fleets, with the Soviet Union now gone, Wieczorek instead planned for a tank bigger than any other in service, armed with a gun far larger too. The logistical burden of such a huge tank, whether 120 to 150 tonnes in weight, was answered in part by his novel ideas for transporting it on trucks and rail cars in modules. Certainly, the idea of an autoloading 155 mm heavy main battle tank has some appeal, but in drawing it, he also sacrificed the whole point of making the carousel in the first place. With the width issue resolvable by means of module transport, such a complex system would not be needed and why he would then choose to go back to a two-part ammunition system is likewise unclear. If width was solved by just breaking the tank down into 3 parts, why not just make the tank wider and fit it normally without the extensions.
There were other problems too. The periscope for visual assistance would obstruct the turret traverse – something which could have been easily resolved by putting it on the turret. The front crew access hatches reduced the frontal protection of the tank and provided access in a very awkward location – one which in a hull down position with the hydropneumatic suspension employed would actually trap the crew.
Nonetheless, Wieczorek worked hard to come up with realistic, if perhaps impractical ideas and his goal was clear – a big, more powerful and safer tank, and a really thorough consideration of how to reload, move, and operate such a machine. None of his designs came to fruition. The French adopted the Leclerc MBT and no armies in the year 2000 were looking for a 120 tonne, let alone a 150 tonne MBT.
Sources
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Military Patents
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United States of America (1916)
Mock-up Training Tank – 1 Built
In the weeks and months following the tank being unleashed on the battlefields of France by the British in September 1916, the tanks generated enormous amounts of public interest and fascination. It was not until November 1916 that photographs were available from which the public could finally understand that some of the descriptions and artistic renderings which had been circulated were wrong.
Even then, the technology of what went into the tank was secret. However, the dominant feature was not the armor or the guns, but the tracks. The USA had no tanks at the time, but it had tracked vehicle makers and, with sales of Holt tractors during the war and persistent commentary of Holt being the machines of which British tanks were based, the publicity for Holt was enormous. Holt was a maker of tractors for agricultural, commercial, and military use. A competitor of Holt was the C. L. Best company in California. They also had a heavy tractor with tracks, just like Holt, and were eager to promote themselves. A new war with armies suddenly wanting tracked vehicles was a potentially very lucrative win and, not wishing to be left out either on the credit as inspiring the British tank or for any forthcoming sales, C. L. Best produced their own ‘tank’. Based on their tractor, this vehicle was one of the first ‘tank-shaped’ objects ever made in the United States. Whilst it was not armored, it is historically important for that reason. The vehicle was not a success but it also has possibly the oldest surviving footage of a US ‘tank’ to its accomplishments as well.
The Tractor
The C. L. Best Tracklayer 75 weighed in at a whopping 28,000 pounds (14 US tons / 12.7 tonnes), making it 1,500 lbs. (680 kg) heavier than the larger and more powerful 120 hp Holt tractor and 5,000 lbs. (2,268 kg) heavier than its primary competitor, the Holt 75 (23,000 lbs / 10,432 kg). Shaped in the manner of a tricycle with a single tyreless wheel at the front for steering, a pair of track units at the back for propulsion, and an engine located near the front towards that steering wheel, the layout was common across a number of tractors of the era. It should be noted that the company founder, Clarence Leo Best, owned a patent for elements of this arrangement since 1914, but Holt also owned a series of patents and accused each other of stealing their ideas. A string of litigation and acrimonious lawsuits between them followed.
The Best tractor had started life in 1912 as the C. L. Best 70 hp. Tracklayer, but became the ‘75’ in 1913. Powered by a giant 4 cylinder (independently cast cylinders) ‘valve-in-head’ engine with a bore of 7 ¾” (197 mm) and stroke of 9” (229 mm), it produced 40 drawbar hp at 450 rpm. The Best 75 was capable of 1.5 mph (2.4 km/h) in first gear and 2.375 mph (3.8 km/h) in second gear, along with 1.625 mph (2.6 km/h) in reverse. The fluid-load was 6 Imperial gallons (27.3 liters) of petrol mixed with 66 Imperial gallons ( 300 liters) of paraffin, 7 Imperial gallons (31.8 liters) of oil, and used 27 Imperial gallons (122.7 liters) of water for cooling.
Up until 1916, these tractors were built at the company’s plant at Elmhurst, California, until manufacturing shifted to San Leandro, also in California. Production ceased in 1919 and, by the time of the merger with Holt in the early 1920s, some 734 C. L. Best Tracklayer 70 and 75 tractors had been made.
In the months following the unleashing of the tank in September 1916 and even after the first photographs of it appeared in November that year, numerous imitations were created. Some were simple wooden boxes or frames covered with canvas for use as training aids or for promotional purposes. After all, what better way could there be to promote sales for tracked vehicles than a ‘tank’? The company C. L. Best managed to put together a quick ‘tank’ using one of their tractors. It was made with a large boxy-shaped body surmounted by a large fixed conning tower at about the level of the driving station, which would indicate the men basically sat on the canopy over the tractor, within its wooden walls.
Design
The design was what might be expected from a tractor turned into a ‘tank’ at very short notice. There was no way to turn a vehicle like the Best 75 into a tank to match the images of British tanks which had been released in November 1916. With literally no other tanks from which to take design cues, the result was not much more than a giant box.
Almost childlike in its simplicity, the sides of the body tapered slightly to the roofline and curved out from about halfway up the body to go down over the tops of the tracks. The front had a pronounced step, transitioning from the tapered upper sides towards the front. In this step was a small circular loophole. The front of the vehicle was big and flat, with a large rectangular flat front angled slightly backward, with a large ‘gun’ sticking out. Around the bottom half of the vehicle, across the front, was a simple rounded front extending beyond the front steering wheel.
The roof over the engine section of the tractor was completely flat, with just the two exhausts from the engine sticking out. Behind these was a raised fixed cabin. This had a pair of large rectangular openings in the front and another on each side. In the back of the cab was a circular opening in which another ‘gun’ was located. The rear of the hull sloped down from the roof to a large bulge, the purpose of which is unknown, and thence to the back of the machine.
The location of the cabin was unfortunate, as it was directly behind the exhausts. Any smoke coming from them would not only obscure the view ahead, but also allow fumes inside, to the detriment of the occupants.
One thing which is clear from the vehicle, however, is the ‘guns’. They were clearly not just simple wooden or metal tubes or mock-ups, but could also pretend to ‘fire’. A simple black powder charge or something similar would function as a blank to simulate it firing. This can be seen in remarkable footage from British Pathe of the vehicle during exercise in early 1917. However, despite this mock gunfire ability, the vehicle was unarmed.
Crew
No written record of how many men it took to crew the vehicle is known, but the vehicle which followed it did have a discussion of crewing. The Day Book of 25th April 1917 revealed that as well as the single driver, presumably sitting in the normal position above the tracks towards the rear on the right-hand side, a pair of ‘lookouts’ were also used. The pair of loopholes on the front of the vehicle could serve as a lookout for the driver, for whom there would be no view of the road ahead. In order to operate the ‘guns’, even during a mock battle, probably another 3 men would have been needed as well.
Use and End
The vehicle did not see much use for exercises. It was clearly a very crude rendition of a ‘tank’ for the purposes of training and disappeared around March 1917. When it reappeared, it had a different form, rounded and rather sleek, with a single fully rotating turret. The vehicle had dubious value as a training tool, being so big, so slow, and so different from real tanks. It went no further than its mock-up and survives today as only a short length of film and a few photographs.
United States of America (1942-1945)
Walking Pillbox – None Built
If someone tried to define the term ‘tank’ as a military vehicle, they generally would agree on the need for a turret, armor, and tracks. Whilst there are exceptions to each of these to one degree or another, the only real unifying point across definitions is the use of armor and this raises interesting possibilities, especially for Henry Wallace of Freeport, New York, USA. In 1942, Henry Wallace expanded the idea of what a tank can be to a vehicle with no tracks at all. In fact, Wallace did not even go for wheels for some wheeled tank/armored car, nor did he go the full way towards a legged machine. Instead, Wallace went for perhaps the most unusual method of transportation possible, a vehicle that walked on one leg, pushing what could be named as a tank to a new extreme.
The Man
The patent for this odd design came from Henry W. Wallace of Freeport, New York State, USA. He should not be confused with the US Secretary of State for Agriculture of the time with the same name. Freeport, New York, is not a large city but, as of 1940, there were just over twenty thousand people living there according to US Census Data. The only other patent from this man was filed in October 1940 and was for a flexible pen in the shape of a snake wrapped around the wrist. With a relatively common name and few other details to go off, there is insufficient information to be able to reliably identify the designer at this time.
Concept
There are inherent problems in a tank design that involve compromises. Whether operating on wheels or tracks, movement is limited to the direction the vehicle faces and a change in direction involves turning or reversing. Protection for the vehicle is concentrated forwards to protect from fire from the front, as it would be too heavy and impractical to add equivalent protection to the sides and especially to the rear. Thus, a conventionally laid out combat vehicle is more vulnerable from the sides and rear than the front. Any turning or change in direction by the vehicle might expose that weakness to an enemy. A vehicle on which all sides are equally armored does not have to worry about the direction of an enemy attack or even turn to face it.
The same is true for armament. With a vehicle carrying a turret armament, it has to be turned to target a specific threat, and, once more, the maximum of protection faces the enemy threat. Armor protection, as both weight and bulk have to be shared between the turret and hull, provides a challenge for a designer as to where to use the armor for optimal value.
With those two primary considerations in mind, the conventional vehicle cannot deliver equal protection and firepower all round – for Wallace, the solution was effectively a simple one. Create a vehicle that was symmetrical in defensive capabilities and offensive alike, and this meant a circular body. This body would make the tank especially valuable in a defensive situation, where it could simply ‘sit’ as a bunker to guard or control an area and then, when the job was done, move on.
The propulsion of such a vehicle could not rely upon tracks or wheels, as it would not be able to change direction quickly enough in the mind of Wallace. Instead, he opted for a single leg which was located in the center of the doughnut-shaped machine. With this, he felt, the tank would be able to “oscillate” to move, with all-round gun positions guaranteeing that firepower constantly faced the enemy. Thus, the vehicle could advance, retreat or move sideways without regard to enemy position or flanking attacks.
Layout
With a doughnut-shaped body resembling a pressure cooker or saucepan with a lid, the machine was certainly odd. The ‘handle’ of the lid was a small cabin that could be rotated in any direction and in which sat the driver of the machine, with a view slit for observation.
The rest of the machine was circular, with 6 gun positions located at 60 degrees from each other. Each position had a field of fire of up to 45 degrees to each side, which managed to create small blindspots immediately alongside the vehicle between the guns.
The smooth exterior of the vehicle was broken up by the 6 gun positions, but there would be no sign of the propulsion leg from the outside when the vehicle was ‘sat’ down as a pillbox. The leg itself resided in an octagonal area within the floor of the tank, with its gearing and hydraulic actuators around it to control its position and direction. The extension of the leg, however, was not done hydraulically but using compressed air or, as suggested by Wallace, by means of an explosive expansion of gas. This might have seemed like a good idea for a patent application, but was utterly preposterous for even this rather silly design. The automotive power was to come from a two-stroke fuel-injected diesel engine of an unspecified type. In a lengthy explanation of how the whole system was meant to work, Wallace explained that this explosive method was to work by releasing fuel into the top of the hollow extensible cylinders which formed the leg and that, with a single detonation of a cartridge into this cylinder, the explosive gases from this detonation would rapidly propel the vehicle upwards to get out of trouble or leap into action. Quite what effect this bounding kangaroo leap would have on the occupants is not explained and perhaps was never even considered as a possible issue or concern.
The rest of the internal arrangement within the machine was relatively straightforward. Between the outer walls, with those 6 gun positions, was a raised fighting platform under which ran a lot of the mechanical equipment (such as pumps) to run the machine. The outer skin of the machine was supported at the top and bottom by supporting beams. Despite the size of the machine and the number of men within it, just one hatch is shown in the patent drawing, in the rotating cabin for the driver at the top.
In terms of crew, even assuming just one man per gun (x 6), a driver, and a commander would mean not less than 8 men to reasonably crew this vehicle.
Propulsion
Whilst there have been designs for walking machines before, they usually relied upon continual support by their legs even when not in motion. More than that, they also had to depend on at least 2 legs for bipedal stability or more in motion. Wallace eschewed such ideas or any concept of motion short of brachiation from nature and went instead for a system using one leg. It is obviously not possible to walk on one leg without a hopping motion, but the design did not produce some giant pogo stick type of movement. It instead had an unusual undulating step where the second ‘foot’ would be the vehicle itself.
Consisting of a giant doughnut shape, with the single leg occupying the central recess in the bottom, at rest, the vehicle sat on the ground as a giant round fort or pillbox. During this phase, the leg could move forwards to a position in the direction of movement and then lift the whole vehicle off the ground, bringing it upwards and in the direction of travel. Now having moved a short distance ahead or in any direction, the leg would collapse slowly bringing the vehicle back to rest on the ground. The process would then repeat for as long as may be needed to move from location A to B. At all times whilst sitting on the ground, the leg was completely enclosed by the body and the vehicle provided both maximum firepower and maximum protection in all dimensions simultaneously. Using four large wheels, one on each side of the leg, and an element of rotation within the housing for it, the leg could be prepositioned in any direction in anticipation of a move that would be unknown to anyone outside the machine by observing it.
There are, however, serious problems with this method of motion, not least of which are ground pressure, balance, and speed.
Firstly, with the entire weight of the vehicle concentrated onto just a single point of contact with the ground. As the leg extended hydraulically into the ground to raise the body, it would sink into anything other than a good hard surface. The result would potentially be the leg impaling the ground to an extent that it might not be easily removed. This would be the military equivalent of trying to walk on a beach in high heels. If this sinking happened when the body was off the ground, the result could be disastrous, as moving a point of balance beyond the lip of the foot would result in the machine flailing over.
This brings up the second point of balance. Not only could the machine potentially tip if the ground shifted or leg sank when moving, but this would be magnified as a problem moving on anything other than a flat surface. Whilst the foot itself had a semi-flexible coupling in the manner of an ‘ankle’ connecting it to the base of the leg, the foot allowed for a limited degree of flexibility. Measurements of the vehicle would indicate that it would become unstable past 10 degrees of any slope. This would render the vehicle unable to operate on anything other than ideal flat terrain. Wallace sought to correct this rather obvious deficiency with his idea by stating that it was to use a gyroscopic stabilization device located around the center of gravity and consisting of two oppositional gyroscopes.
The final major problem with the practicalities of the mean of motion for the vehicle is speed. Movement in the chosen direction is limited by the amount of movement available to the foot at the point when the body of the vehicle is on the ground. Moving the foot in the desired direction whilst on the ground (1), as the hydraulics push on the foot, the body gradually lifts off the ground and is righted to a new forward position (2) until reaching full height (3). The tank can remain at any elevation between ground level and (3) for combat, although this would expose the leg to enemy fire. Return to the ground starts from the elevated position (4) down vertically (5) to the new resting position (6), a short distance from point (1). To continue the motion, the leg is moved to the new forward position (7) and the vehicle rises (8) to a new elevation (9) and so on.
One step beyond this slow move-lift-lower means of motion, Wallace drew an even more fanciful one. Here, the leg would do far more than even those rather absurd methods of movement, showing the tank literally jumping.
This slow move-lift-lower process could be sped up to a ‘dragging’ speed whereby only enough pressure need be applied to the foot to raise the body from the ground far enough that the hydraulics for the leg movement could drag it forwards and then return to the body to rest as the foot moves again. It is surely this method that would have been the only practical way of moving the vehicle, although practical is not really applicable to such an implausible design.
Wallace made no mention or estimate of the speed of this system of propulsion, but it was clearly not possible to combine a rapid bounding from the machine with a chance of the crew being in a fighting condition, even assuming the system had worked. The easiest, simplest, safest form of motion, the dragging method, would perhaps at best manage walking pace on a good surface.
Armor
As with many other features of this vehicle, little information can be discerned on which to judge the level of protection provided. No information is provided other than to say that protection was implied as being equal in all directions. From the approximate scale of the vehicle, the size of the seat, and space for the crew, the drawing would appear to indicate armor would have to have been metal (presumably steel) and not much more than bulletproof in thickness.
Armament
With 6 evenly distributed guns around the outside, it is unclear what sort of firepower Wallace had in mind. An enemy could be engaged at best by just two of the guns at any one time, leaving ⅔ of the firepower idle. Wallace could simply have had a rotating turret with a single large gun or multiple gun mountings, which would have obviated the need for so many crew and guns. Instead, unless the vehicle was totally surrounded, then all of the firepower could never be used at the same time and none of it when moving.
Conclusion
Weakly protected for a static pillbox, poorly protected for such a visible tank, and oddly armored for a fighting vehicle, the design was particularly bad when it came to motion. The single-leg concept, as drawn, was preposterous and unlikely to work even on a flat and hard surface, let alone a modest slope or wet ground. There, this tank would display the mobility of a lawn dart when moving and a house brick at other times, with less potential than either.
What Wallace was trying to secure as intellectual property with this design is clearly the single springing leg concept and a tank of equal protection and firepower. What he actually designed was perhaps one of the least practical, workable, or sensible systems of vehicular motion imaginable.
Trying to imagine what possible use this vehicle might have had to the US military or Allies in 1942, when it was submitted, is even less clear. Today, it can be seen as just one of those ideas from a well-meaning public eager to engage in and/or profit from the war by producing war-winning weapons and ideas. Sadly for Wallace, this was not one of them.
Kingdom of Italy/United Kingdom (1929-1937)
Breakthrough Tank – 1 Built
Great Britain was the first nation to deploy tanks in war. The classic ‘quasi-rhomboid’-shaped tanks were first used on the fields of France in 1916. No history of those vehicles is complete without considering the important role of the Lincolnshire-based firm of William Foster and Co. in their design and construction. Other vehicles from William Foster and Co. in WW1 (1914-1919) included the Medium Mark ‘A’ Whippet tank and the Medium Mark ‘C’ Hornet, but by the end of the war, orders for tanks had dried up. There were too many tanks available and not enough need for them, meaning that much of the skills of this firm were languishing unused or were being diverted towards civilian work. Through the interwar period (1919-1939) and especially into the early 1930s, Great Britain was still considered a world leader in tank design and production, with some highly successful designs and exports from the firm of Vickers in particular. William Foster and Co. had no such orders and were, in fact, out of the tank game almost entirely in this period. That is, until the Kingdom of Italy, a nation rearming after the crushing costs of WW1, was researching various designs with which to build a new tank arm to suit its unique needs. The vehicle designed by William Foster and Co. to meet this Italian requirement owed much to its WW1 forebears, a design for an earlier generation of armored warfare.
The need
Despite designing their own tanks in WW1, most famously the FIAT 2000, Italy had, at the end of the war, simply chosen to adopt a French tank, specifically, the Renault FT. The FT was cheap, simple, and available and compared to the large FIAT 2000, far better suited to the narrow roads and small bridges which characterized the north of Italy. More to the point, it was also going to be easier to transport to Africa to settle Italy’s colonial possessions in North Africa, where a faster tank was needed. as it could simply be carried in the back of a truck whereas the FIAT 2000 could not. The FT, therefore, was the logical choice. It was smaller, lighter, and whilst it did not carry the same firepower as the FIAT’s 65 mm gun and several machine guns, it could actually get its small 37 mm cannon or machine guns where they were needed quickly.
Compared to the 40-tonne, 8-man FIAT 2000, the 7-tonne, 2-man Renault FT was a diminutive vehicle. Lightly armed, carrying either a machine gun or a small cannon, and protected by armor up to 22 mm thick, the FT was a good balance of the need to protect the crew inside from enemy small arms fire and weight. With a top speed of 7 km/h, it was meant to be deployed ahead of the infantry to support their advance, suppress the enemy machine gun positions, etc. It was an ideal compromise for an affordable tank with which Italy could arm itself to overcome many of the problems which had plagued it during WW1.
Built under license in Italy as the FIAT 3000, the Renault FT was, despite minor improvements to the original Renault design, adequate but hardly ideal for the future. It was too slow for anything other than static warfare, too poorly armed to contend with heavily protected positions or enemy tanks, and unable to cope with the needs of a post-war military which, by 1923, now included a revolt in its Libyan possession, where a faster tank was needed.
Given the close political relationship between Italy and Great Britain, as demonstrated by its alliance with them and France in WW1, and given Britain’s pre-eminence in tank technology, it is no surprise that serious consideration was given to examining, buying, and adopting British tanks. There was, of course, a serious catch – very little money.
Post-WW1 Italy was still suffering from a serious financial crisis, as it struggled to manage the costs of the war and reassert control over its former colonies. Any tank they chose, therefore, would have to be either built under license or bought outright.
During this evaluation phase for rearming, which started in 1929, vehicles examined and purchased for testing included the Vickers 6-ton tank (Type B), the Carden-Loyd Mk.V*, and the Carden-Loyd Mk.VI. The Vickers 6-ton tank was valuable in terms of size and potential, but was limited by the twin turrets and machine gun armament. The Mk.V* was inadequate for the needs of the Army, generally lacking firepower and protection, but the Mk.VI was more successful. Small and fast, it could meet the needs for a fast light tank which was easily transportable by truck as well as being maneuverable enough to operate in the Alpine region if needed. That vehicle ended up being license-built in Italy and entered service as the CV29 (Carro Veloce – Fast Tank Model 1929), but even this successful vehicle was no panacea to the needs of the Army. It simply lacked the firepower the Army needed to support infantry in an assault role capable of knocking out enemy positions. Vickers was not offering anything suitable and, at some point, the firm of William Foster’s became involved. It is not known whether they reached out to the Italians offering to design something or if the Italians reached out to them requesting a design, but, however, it came to pass, this firm was back in the tank-design game once more.
Timeline
The precise timeline of these events is difficult to tie down for a variety of reasons, not least of which being the fact that the two countries ended up at war with each other in 1940 and the British firm was not advertising that it had been aiding what had become a member of the Axis. The other reason for this lack of clarity is on the Italian end. This was a secret program and one which, in 1940, would have come from a foreign enemy power. To this must be added the enormous loss of archival material and records which took place during the war in Italy, especially after the armistice of 1943, the deleterious effects of time on human memory and the conflicting dates for the project.
“In 1929, the company [Ansaldo] decided to send two engineers to Foster & C. Lincoln, Great Britain, in order to design a new tank without a turret. A metal model 1/10 [scale] was presented in Italy … this tank was designated ‘Carro da Armato Ansaldo 9t’, it was armed with a 65 mm gun in the casemate”
The chief draughtsman (designer) for William Foster and Co., William Rigby (one of the key men behind the British T.O.G. designs of WW2), recounted in 1977 (over 40 years later) that:
“In 1937, Foster designed and built a tank for Italy and I went out to the Grand Cornice to test it. It was not a development of the old tanks, it was something quite new, two Italians came over to the works and the whole thing was put under my control. It was used in the Abyssinian war. Me and my daughter went out to Venice just before this and I took an order for a 2’ 6” [0.76 m] threshing machine for Italy, they are usually 4’ 6” [1.38 m]. Then the Abyssinian war started and we were told that if we didn’t get out soon we’d not be able to, so we left quick.”
The Italian invasion of Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia) started in spring 1935, which suggests that, as the project for this vehicle started in 1929, it was still undergoing tests in Italy up to around January to February 1935, at least with Mr. Rigby having some involvement or oversight of the project.
Actual construction or assembly, in whole or part, likely took place at the Ansaldo factory in Italy, with construction finished in 1932. It was called ‘Carro armato da 12 tonnellate mod. 32’ (12-tonne tank model 1932) in a 1933 preliminary manual. Unveiled and accepted for trials under the designation ‘Carro armato, 9t’ (9-tonne tank), trials would begin under the direction of Centro di Studi della Motorizazione (English: Centre for the Study of Motorisation)(C.S.M.) in December 1934.
Tests
The vehicle had been built and unveiled in 1932. The first tests of this vehicle, designated Carro da 9t M.33 (9-tonne tank Model 1933), were carried out under the supervision of the C.S.M. through December 1934. During trials, however, the vehicle was found to be unsatisfactory. The top speed was just 22.5 km/h, 3 times faster than the FIAT 3000, but still substantially slower than the CV29 and CV33 light tanks, which could manage 40 km/h.
Modifications were therefore demanded in order to increase the speed and improvements were made in the form of a new engine. In order to improve the ride, a new sprung suspension system was fitted as well in 1935. With the new suspension in place, the older side armor plates were modified to make them smaller. This would offset some of the weight gain from the new heavier engine, although it is noteworthy that a partial side armor plate remained running from the section around the front wheel and extended to about halfway back on the tank. It was bolted to the top of the original frame which held the track support rollers.
According to the account of Mr. Rigby, some of this modification work may have been taking place under his supervision or assistance until the Spring of 1935, but this cannot be substantiated from Italian records at this time. Either way, the modification process was slow and it was not until 1935 to 1937 that the work was completed and the vehicle sent back to C.S.M. for a new evaluation. By 1937 then, some 8 years or so had passed from concept to design and testing, and the needs of the Army had rapidly changed during this period. The most obvious difference to the new design from the Carro da 9t was the suspension, but this was not the first or only modification. The first major change to the design was not the tracks nor the suspension, for the old system had still worked. Instead, this change was to the casemate. The original casemate had been narrow and much squarer, forming a tight box in which the men would fight.
When the tank was reworked, the upper front plate was replaced by a new plate, wider at the top, moving from a rectangle to a trapezoid. Two additional sections of armor in a triangular shape were added to the outside of the front of the casemate, so that the sides could remain vertical. These triangles formed an angular connection from the front to the sides. This change substantially widened the fighting space inside the vehicle and produced a more pronounced overhang over the tracks, as well as a wider appearance from the front. The 3 original vertical bolt lines up this upper plate had 7 bolts each. Whilst the number of bolts in each line was the same on the new wider front casemate plate, a fourth vertical column of bolts was added on the front plate, on the far right. This was because the cradle on the inside of the plate which held the gimbal mount for the main gun was bolted in vertical lines. On the original (rectangular) front casemate plate, the right-hand side of this support frame shared bolts through the frame to create the connection with the side casemate plate. When the casemate was widened, the gimbal support frame remained in the same place, but a new row of holes had to be made for where the frame and casemate side plate would attach. The wider fighting compartment, however, ensured that there was now more space in which to operate the main gun. It would also improve the coverage around the front of the vehicle from the machine guns.
With the upper front plate of the casemate widened, it also meant replacing the roof plates to fit the new dimensions and also adding in a pair of triangular plates on each side at the front.
When the suspension was modified doing away with the large side-armor, gone were the old wheels to a new system consisting of two large bogies. Each bogie had three pairs of larger rubber-tired road wheels (connected into parallel pairs with a gap between the pair), with two main pairs connected into a single suspension shoe and the third pair on a separate arm pivoting from the mount for the other two pairs. Connected to the top of this third wheel pair’s arm was a simple flat half-leaf spring system anchored above the two fixed pairs and both bogies had this third wheel pair facing inwards. The design appeared perhaps more complicated than it was but allowed for the ‘fixed’ wheel pairs to rotate about a common pivot on their mounting shoe, whilst being partially sprung. They were followed by the third wheel pair on the sprung arm for even more capacity. With the two sprung arms facing inwards, it concentrated the springing effect of the suspension over the center line of the tank, providing more stability for the fighting compartment. It appears that the lead roadwheel from the old design of suspension, which had been keeping the track from coming back into the suspension in the gap between the lead roadwheel on the ground and idler wheel, had been discarded, but the wheel at the back doing much the same purpose had been retained.
A good view of the new suspension bogies and tensioner wheel can be seen in the prototype 10-tonne tank being evaluated alongside the Carro da 9t at C.S.M. at the same time. What is not clear is whether the suspension was designed for the 10-tonne tank and then duplicated onto the Carro da 9t or vice versa. Either way, Italy had shifted from fixed rollers to a modern spring bogie system. With the Italian Army slowly modernizing at this time, vehicle names were being changed to reflect a new military concept of operations after 9th May 1936, which categorized vehicles slightly differently.
The old CV series ‘Carro Veloce’ (English: Fast tank) series of light tanks were being reclassified as ‘L’ or ‘Leggero’ (English: Light) tanks by dint of their mass, so the CV3/33 would become the L3/33, etcetera. As the Carro da 9t was still an experimental tank at this time, it is unclear what official nomenclature would have to say on the matter, as its role was clearly one for assault and breakthrough as a ‘Carro di Rottura’. It had been named (perhaps semi-formally) as the M.33. Even if ‘M.33’ was correct and official, this would have been changed when the vehicle underwent a substantial revision for the second trials, which might suggest a second ‘M’ number. For clarity, however, the vehicle which had started as Carro da 9t is more simply considered in terms of ‘early’ (original with narrow casemate and enclosed suspension), ‘intermediate’ (with widened casemate and original suspension), and ‘late’ (modified) forms. This even allows for the fact that the weight and role had changed.
The weight of the vehicle is also important to note. Giuseppi Rosini, the lead tank designer at Ansaldo, published a paper in 1938 making clear how weight categorization of tanks should be considered. Light tanks would be those 5 tonnes and below, whilst ‘assault tanks’ – those tanks whose role was to break through enemy lines, should be 6 to 8 tonnes in weight, and heavy tanks would have to have at least 40 mm of armor whilst not exceeding 14 – 15 tonnes in weight, all whilst still being as small as possible. The 65 mm gun as fitted to the Carro da 9t was identified as one of the two ideal weapons for a heavily armored vehicle of that weight, along with a 47 mm gun. This would mean that the Carro da 9t occupied an unusual position, being a bit too heavy for the role of a breakthrough tank or ‘Carro di Rottura’ and carrying the armament of a heavy tank, but without the armor needed to be a heavy tank.
The original all-steel track with no rubber pads appears to have been of a pressed and/or welded-type construction. It was characterized by a single hole in the center of each link into which the teeth from the drive sprocket could engage to drive it. When the suspension was reworked, available photographs also show that the track was replaced. Gone was the single hole track link and instead there was a new style of all-steel track link with no rubber pad and which appears to have been cast and which had a pair of sprocket-tooth holes. This would have been necessary to allow a center guide on the link to prevent it from slipping sideways on the new road wheels and also indicates that the drive sprocket was changed from a single ring of teeth to a more modern type with a pair of rings of teeth.
The change in track had a mobility advantage too, as the single horizontal spud on the original track was replaced on the new cast track with an integrated spud, meaning that the track was able to still obtain purchase off-road on soft ground, but also would be less likely to cause damage to a hard or surfaced road, as there was no projecting spud to dig in. Other than these changes, the essential features of the track system remained as before, with it driven by the sprocket at the rear and with the track tensioner at the front on the idler.
The Design
The design of the Carro da 9t was relatively simple, although this belies some important features. The basic shape was a giant steep-fronted wedge with a small vertical nose leading to a large angular glacis. A casemate then surmounted this, forming a large 4-sided and roofed fighting compartment that projected over the track. It was narrow at the front and slowly widened as it went backwards. Whilst the front was the width of the hull, the rear was slightly wider. The back of the tank going from this casemate sloped away all the way to the back, after a small step down from the roof. The sloping section was slightly narrowed right at the top before widening out to the width of the hull. In this space at the back of the casemate would be two weapon mounts. Thanks to the sloping rear, these could combine to provide complete machine gun coverage behind the tank.
The entire structure was bolted internally, not riveted, to a steel frame, in much the same manner as a WW1 British tank, except that these bolts could be undone as required to remove plates. Two full-length tracks and the suspension lay behind full height side armor plates along both sides. A single Tritton-patent (Sir William Tritton, – Director of William Foster and Co.) mud-chute was present so that the inside of the track run (covered with armor) would not become clogged with mud. The track itself was exposed all of the way around the track run, with no provision at all for a track guard to prevent mud being thrown up onto the top of the tank, although the sides of the casemate did partially overhang the tracks. In this way, parallels can be drawn between this design and the 1916 design for what became the Medium Mark A ‘Whippet’, where an exposed track run clad in armor and with mud clearance chutes ran along the sides of the tank. On the Medium Mark A ‘Whippet’, there was provision for a canvas mudguard to be fitted, suspended from inverted ‘L’ shaped brackets projecting from the front and rear of the tank on each side. No such provision seems to have been made for this design, but mud would later not be able to cover the side of the casemate, as it projected over the track. The wide part of the casemate actually worked as a mudguard in this way. Behind the casemate, however, mud would still be liable to be thrown up over the grilles, into the side of the raised hull rear and exhausts.
Exhaust from the engine would be vented out of the right and left-hand sides of the rear hull and carried all of the way to the back of the tank, ensuring no fumes could come back into the troop space and interfere with the crew. Atop the casemate was a single large rectangular hatch that slid backward. On the left and right sides of the casemate were large rectangular access hatches. both of which opened forwards and were fitted with ball mounts for machine guns. Finally, on the front face of the casemate was the primary firepower for the design, with a single machine gun ball mount and a large ball mount for a cannon, along with a small rectangular hatch for the driver low down on the front left of the casemate. During the post trials rework, the casemate was expanded and changed shape.
Engine
The arrangement of the automotive parts is perhaps the most intriguing part of the design. Instead of this being a manufactured (welded, bolted, or riveted) hull with the engine and gearbox then fitted into the vehicle separately, on this design, the whole package came as one. Two steel girders would run longitudinally along the inside length of the hull from the front, where the driver would sit and operate the vehicle by means of a pair of brake levers. The driver had a simple pair of pedals for his feet and a pair of gear levers for controlling engine speed and the transmission. The engine lay directly in line, a short distance behind the driver, once more attached to this frame, and was connected directly to a mechanical transmission and final drives at the back. Again, all of this was attached to this same framework and this meant that, with the necessary parts of the rear upper armor removed, the entire automotive assembly could, in theory, be removed in one piece. In modern terms, this idea is similar to the ‘powerpack’ on an MBT, where the engine and the transmission are removed as a single piece for ease and speed of maintenance. This is nothing new in the 21st century, but was certainly novel thinking in the 1920s and 1930s. This idea would actually crop up once more from the design team at William Foster years later, with their work on the T.O.G. tanks in 1940, but was otherwise outside of the mainstream of tank designs until after WW2.
The engine originally fitted was a V6 provided by Carraro developing 85hp but was found inadequate during testing. Compared to a fast light tank like the CV33 which could manage 40 km/h, this machine would be left behind and improvements to the automotive plant were ordered. By 1935 when the tank was shown at the Fiera Campionaria di Milano the engine had been swapped to an inline 6 cylinder FIAT 355 or 355C, the same engines used in the FIAT 634N truck, developing 75hp and 80hp respectively.
Suspension
Even though the side plates on the tank preclude seeing much of what lay behind, it is clear from the arrangement of the automotive framework that the drive was delivered to the rear of the tank. The track was supported at the top by 3 return rollers hidden by the side armor plates. The weight of the tank was originally to be carried onto the tracks by 8 small road wheels directly under the body of the tank, with two more behind to support the track when the vehicle sank slightly into soft ground and a further wheel in front of the main set of wheels which also served to keep the track in place. In total, 11 wheels ran along the bottom of the track run and, in keeping with William Foster designs, as the vehicle sank into soft ground, more of the track would come into contact with the ground to improve floatation. The effect of this slight upturn meant that only 8 wheels were bearing the weight on a hard surface and the effect is subtle to see in period photographs, but it also provided the advantage of the vehicle being able to ‘slew’ (turn) more easily.
Sadly, the details of any springing system are unclear due to the side plates. With the large void of the mud chute above them, there was no space for vertical springs. Indeed, the arrangement on the original design would appear to indicate that there was no suspension at all other than any cushioning effect from the wheels and track. It is not even clear if the wheels were simple rollers or if they were fitted with some kind of rubber tyre. Either way a fixed system would make sense, given that the Medium Mark A ‘Whippet’ was made in a very similar way with the wheels fixed into Timken bearings. Finally, at the front of the suspension was a British style track tensioner screw – again – in the same manner as that used on the Whippet.
A close examination of the available photographs for the vehicle during development show that the original suspension appears to have been changed from that initial 8 + 2 fixed wheel system to a spring-based system with 9 or possibly 10 wheels all positioned slightly behind a fixing point on the side armor suggesting the side armor point is the end of a pivot for an arm on which the wheels were mounted. That, in turn, suggests the springing system employed was a vertical coiled spring and with tensioning wheels between these suspension road wheels and the idler and sprocket.
Crew
At least two crew were needed for the tank, with one man necessary to do all of the driving from his seated position low down in the front left of the tank. His vision was limited to just straight ahead, either through the rectangular hatch or, in combat, with the hatch closed, through a single vision slit in the hatch. No vision slits were provided in the sides of the casemate for the driver, so, for additional information, he would have been dependent upon the commander or other crew members. A single wide vision slit transected the driver’s rectangular hatch in the front so he could see out whilst under fire and a second, smaller slit was provided in the front above the machine gun mount. Additional vision slits were provided in the rest of the casemate above the other ball mounts with the exception of the main gun. A second crew member was the operator for the main gun on the right hand side of the cab. In order to keep the breech clear, for his own safety, or to load, he may have simply had to stand to the left of the gun, approximately in the centre-line of the casemate.
The main gun mount featured a large sighting optic to the left which could be fixed to move with the main gun within the ball mounting. It is likely that there would have been a third crew member who would have been tasked with operating the front machine gun which was likely removable, so it could be used in one of the other mountings as needed. Whether this crewmember or the one with the main gun would be the vehicle commander is unclear, but given the very low visibility for the man on the left, with just three small vision slits, it seems more likely that the main gun operator, with the large moveable optic, was a better choice, even if operating the gun and commanding was not an optimal combination of roles.
The ammunition rack, located on the front right, alongside the driver, was below and forward of the gun breech, which would have made reloading by the commander awkward. It is likely that the second man would act as a loader when not busy with the machine guns or, when static, these would simply be passed to the gunner by the driver.
The commander had no specific optical devices on the roof to assist in observing his surroundings but would have been able to see sideways through the vision slits in the machine gun ball mounts, as well as forward using the telescope on the main gun or by eye through the vision slits. If needed, although hazardous in combat, he would also have been able to observe the enemy out of the roof hatch, although this would also mean he would be unable to operate any of the tank’s weapons at the time. The only available photograph of the tank with a crew also only shows two men, so this appears to confirm the tank had only a crew of two.
Armament
Firepower was an important consideration for this tank design, as it would need to not only tackle defensive positions for its breakthrough role, but also enemy infantry. The infantry-killing part of the armament was managed by means of five machine gun ball mounts, with one placed on the upper left side of the casemate, another two in each of the side doors, and two in the rear of the superstructure. No machine gun was mounted on the roof, as was common at the time on Italian tanks. Lacking a turret, the tank also had to rely on the pair of ball mounts in the rear of the casemate, or pull a machine gun from the front or side mount and deploy it out of the roof hatch by hand to cover the rear.
As the sides of the casemate were actually sloping forward slightly, the ball mounts there could deliver limited fire at perhaps as much as 45 degrees to the front as well as across both sides, at the price of a little coverage to the rear.
An ammunition rack for the main gun was provided in the front right of the hull, alongside the driver. It was angled upwards toward the inside to facilitate the shells being retrieved and used by the operator. With a capacity of 35 rounds, the rack was also notable in that it was a metal shielded rack to protect the shells from spall from the armor, but is not fitted with protective doors over the back of the shell casings. Looking inside the original casemate, it is clear as to why it was widened. There was simply insufficient side space available for either the main gun to be rotated to the left, where operation of the breech would be impinged by the sidewall, and for the machine gun on the front left being turned to the right. Space under the crew seating in the back of the casemate would allow for crates of additional ammunition to be carried. Historian Fulvio Miglia places the total ammunition capacity at 80 rounds for the main gun, along with 3,000 rounds of machine gun ammunition although is likely a guestimation based on the dedicated rack and storage space.
The 65 mm gun to be fitted was not, as might have been expected, the 65 mm L/17 Turin Arsenal M.1910/M.1913 mountain gun which had been fitted to the FIAT 2000 a generation earlier, and which was still in service with the Italian Army. In 1926, that gun had been removed from its role as an infantry support gun and passed to the mountain troops due to its compact size and weight. Despite its age, it was still an effective weapon for throwing a high explosive shell out to 6.5 km. That gun remained in service even through WW2 but, at 17 calibers (1.15 m) long, this was not the gun fitted in the Carro da 9t. The surviving drawings for the gun show the weapon to be substantially shorter than 17 calibers. Measuring pixels off the drawing, it is approximately 7 (measured as 6.8) calibers from muzzle to breech. The drawing also shows only a single type of ammunition as a solid shot, which would have been of little use against a fortified position, where an explosive shell was needed.
On the 65 mm L/17 gun, the high explosive shell was supplemented by two types of shaped charge shells, all of which were useful against armored or protected targets, but also an armor-piercing shot as well. That 4.23 kg shell was limited to an effective range of just 500 m and these shells were fired at between 320 and 355 m/s. With a shorter barrel, it could be expected that this 65 mm gun would have an even lower velocity. This would make no difference to the effect of a high explosive shell other than flight time to the target, but would impact the effectiveness of any use of the solid AP shell for anti-armor work. Assuming 65 mm shells from the 65 mm mountain gun, which were plentiful in Italian Army supplies through the period, were compatible with this one, then ammunition options would include high explosive (HE), shrapnel, canister, armor-piercing (AP), and ‘Effetto Pronto’ (rapid effect) shaped charge shells.
The gun is, however, a confusing issue. Whilst the model and indeed the plans both show this very short-barrelled 65 mm gun (~7 calibers), the gun as fitted on the constructed vehicle is clearly longer than this.
The 65 mm Model 13 mountain gun was 17 calibers long and was available, but this is also clearly too long to be the gun that was mounted in the casemate. This leaves open the question of exactly what the gun was. It might be suggested that the gun was a cut-down version of the M.13, but the breech of that cannon does not match either the available drawing or photographs. The gun as fitted is assumed to be between 7 and 13 calibers long and estimated as an L10 caliber gun.
Interior photographs of the Carro da 9t prior to it being rebuilt with a wider casemate appear to show a FIAT-Revelli Model 1926 machine gun. A 6.5 mm caliber weapon, the gun was fed from a 20 round box-type magazine from the left-hand side. On a ground mount, the machine gun came with an unusual crutch-shaped stock, but this was unnecessary in the fixed ball mount, so was not fitted.
Armor
Exact specifications for the Carro da 9t armor are not known but, between photographic evidence, logic, and the protection requirements, estimates can be made. The Medium Mark A Whippet had armor up to 14 mm thick – sufficient to keep out bullets from rifles and machine guns, but not cannon fire. Rosini, in his 1938 paper, notes that at least 40 mm was needed to provide protection from 20 mm cannon fire and the 10-tonne to 11-tonne M11/39 settled on 30 mm for the front and 14.5 mm for the hull sides. Clearly, 40 mm could not be achieved on even the front of the Carro da 9t and given its weight of 9 tonnes. The 3-tonne CV3 series of light tank had 14 mm on the front, going down to 8 mm on the sides. The Carro da 9t would clearly need to have at least that level to be viable. It is logical that the sides of the Carro da 9t at least roughly matched the M11, at around 14 mm, as less than this would render the vehicle vulnerable to fire from the flanks.
The Lessons from Spain
The original project had been for little more than a new powerful tank to refight much of the experiences of WW1, but times and weapons had changed dramatically in the years since 1919. Italy had gone into the Spanish Civil War with outdated equipment. One of the key lessons from the Italian involvement in that war was the need for a tank to have a turret. The Italian CV3 series light tanks (derived from the CV29) had been used and found to be outclassed by the Soviet-supplied T-26, a tank ironically derived from the Vickers 6-ton, which had been rejected by Italy in the early 1930s.
During this time, other developments for tank design had taken root in Italy with the 1935 requirement for a tank capable of operating in the mountainous north of the country, weighing just 8 to 9 tonnes. In this sense, the Carro da 9t can be seen as less desirable as a design to be pursued for mass production.
By the end of the 1930s, the Carro da 9t formed part of the lessons being adopted by Ansaldo for how to arm tanks. Putting all of the firepower in a casemate was problematic in terms of where firepower could be delivered, but it did produce a low-profile tank.
A final chance?
The Carro da 9t did not go anywhere in Italy. By the time it was finished, tested, trialed, and modified, a better option was available in the form of the 10-tonne/M11/39 project. Still carrying a cannon in the hull (albeit a 37 mm and not a 65 mm or 47 mm piece) and with a turret for all-around machine gun coverage on a smaller profile vehicle with better suspension, it was better in almost every way than the Carro da 9t. What had started as a design in 1929 for a tank of the 1920s was, by the mid-1930s, a dead end. By the time the Italians had finished testing it, it was little more than a testbed from which to draw lessons in vehicle design and weapons, so it is perhaps surprising that this was not the end of the road for the design.
In 1940, Sir Albert Stern, best known as chairman of the Special Vehicle Development Committee (S.V.D.C.), who worked closely with Sir William Tritton and William Rigby, offered this design to the British Tank Board. Quite why this design was even mentioned is unclear in the context of conversations outside the recorded minutes of the meeting. The design in no way met any of the criteria for a tank the Board wanted, so it can only be speculated that it was simply as a concept for how a bigger gun could be put onto a smaller vehicle as some kind of casemated mounting. Either way, the idea was not entertained, and using this design was not mentioned again.
Conclusion
If the goal at the end of the 1920s had been for a small light tank capable of penetrating enemy lines, then the design from William Foster and Co. was hopeless for that. Heavier than the Renault FT it was to replace, it had barely more armor and was, in effect, still a WW1 era design. The vehicle was never going to square the circle of conflicting needs for a light breakthrough tank. The development and testing took so long that events outside Italy simply rendered it obsolete before it was finished. Italy was going to need a turreted tank with a good gun, but what it was left with after the failure of this project was little more than the starting point for another obsolescent tank, the M11/39. The failure to invest in the interwar period and the lack of industrial capacity to make up that shortfall in the years running up to WW2 meant that Italy entered the war with a stock of outdated vehicles and struggled continuously to get a modern vehicle to the men who needed it. In an era of military cutbacks in vehicle design and development, lessons from this era and what happened to Italy should serve as a reminder for what happens when you fail to invest or prepare.
Specifications Carro da 9t Crew: at least 2, but probably 3 (driver, primary gunner/commander, machine gunner) Dimensions: 4.9 m long, 1.8 m wide, 2 m high. Ground clearance: 0.37 m Weight: 9 tonnes Armament: 65 mm, 2 machine guns (6.5 mm FIAT-Revelli Model 1926) Ammunition: 80 rounds (65 mm), 3,000 rounds (machine gun) Engine: Carraro V6 85hp – FIAT 355 75hp or FIAT 355C 80hp.
United States of America (1984-1987)
MBT – Models Only
In 1984, the US military was considering the problems connected with a new range of vehicles, such as the new M1 Abrams main battle tank and M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). As part of the evaluation of trends in future vehicles, a commission looked into the potential for electric drive systems for a 40-ton (36.3 tonne) (tank) and 19.5-ton (17.7 tonne) (APC/IFV) platform.
The US Army’s Tank Automotive Command (TACOM) issued a contract to General Dynamics Land Systems for this project – to evaluate existing electric drive technologies to use in future vehicles. This was contract number DAAE07-84-C-RO16 divided into 2 phases – a third phase was added later under contract modification P00006.
The goal was roughly that of evaluating the ‘new’ (electric drive for vehicles predates armored vehicle) technology available across a variety of platforms for what it may offer for further development. What it actually generated was the realization that electric-drive fighting vehicles were not only possible but had some valuable features worth exploring, especially with regards to a series of heavy IFV platforms. However, like so many other studies, this work faded away and the design work was abandoned. To this day, in 2020, the M1 Abrams remains in service with a conventional power plant along with numerous other armored vehicles in the US inventory. Despite the billions of dollars spent, to date, the US military has yet to capitalize on the potential of electric-drive vehicles.
Phase I: A survey of existing technology (document JU-84-04057-002) Phase II: Generation of concept vehicles with electric drive Phase III: A parametric study and evaluation with selection of 3 recommended concepts for further consideration
General Dynamics had actually been looking into the potential of electric drive systems as early as 1981, producing electric-drive concept vehicles for various other vehicle projects. It also had possession of a 8 x 8 wheeled, 15-ton (13.6 tonne) Electric Vehicle Test Bed (EVTB) it had paid for itself in order to test and validate electric drive.
General Dynamics EVTB (also known as the Advanced Hybrid Electric Drive vehicle). Source: DiSante and Paschen, and Khalil
The timetable for the project was for Phase I to be concluded by the end of 1984. In the end, the report on this phase was finished in July 1984 and then published in January 1985. By this time the second phase was already underway with an expected conclusion date in the latter half of 1985 to be followed by another report and, starting in the middle of 1986, Phase III running through into the start of 1987.
Why Electric Drive?
The potential of electrical drive systems was experimented with on tanks as far back as WW1. An electrical transmission offered the designer a significant freeing up of the internal layout of an armored vehicle, as the drive motors did not have to be next to the engine, and the ability to deliver continuous, reliable power in preference to mechanical systems. This is primarily because an electrical drive system has far fewer moving parts and bearing surfaces than a mechanical system. There are also major advantages, not the least of which being volume. An electrical system could be smaller than the equivalent mechanical system and smaller volume meant more internal volume in a vehicle for other things and/or a reduction in the amount which needed to be protected by armor – that means less weight too. Electrical transmissions are also quieter due to the absence of gearing and driveshafts and offer the not insignificant potential to provide electrical power for the vehicle’s systems.
Study Concepts
Some 38 possible concepts across the 19.5 (17.7 tonne) and 40-ton (36.3 tonne) vehicles were considered over four basic vehicle considerations. Plans from various companies and one university submitted concept plans for the program namely: Westinghouse, ACEC (Ateliers de Constructions Electriques de Charleroi), Unique Mobility, Garrett, Jarret, and the University of Michigan. All of the options were to consider a scheme for a baseline vehicle.
Baseline 40-ton electric drive vehicle. Source: GDLS
Baseline Vehicle Description
The baseline vehicle for the EDMBT was very similar in external hull layout to the M1 Abrams, with the automotive elements placed under a raised engine deck at the back of the tank. It had a relatively conventional external shape except that all of the crew were in the hull. Seven wheels on each side were drawn mounted on what appear to be arms, suggesting that it probably kept the same style of torsion bar suspension as on the Abrams. The most noticeable difference though is the lack of a turret, as the vehicle adopted a crewless weapon mount on the roof. This is the only weapon carried on the vehicle and is shown as an automatically loaded 155 mm STAFF (Small Target Fire and Forget) cannon with an elevation range of -7 to +20. Fitted with a single 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun, the gun carries just 15 rounds in an unusual T-shaped bustle at the back. A further 18 rounds were to be carried in the front right of the hull, alongside the driver. No armor was described but, unlike the Abrams, it had a pronounced slope to the glacis. One important note from the drawing is the location of the primary fuel tank containing 420 liters at the front, which would have added to the frontal protection. Protection levels could therefore reasonably be assumed to be at least no less across the frontal arc of the hull as on the Abrams. It is important to remember though that the vehicle shown in the drawing (LK10833), whilst more than a mere doodle of a viable tank design, should only be taken as an illustration of a possible future tank. The power plant work could just as legitimately be refitted to the Abrams – the key part of the study was not this tank per se, but a study to evaluate these power systems for tank propulsion.
40-ton (36.3 tonnes) vehicle Concepts
With four (five including one minor amendment) configurations being considered, the design task was simplified by the specification of the engines to be used. Although the AD-1000 advanced diesel engine generating 1,000 hp was selected, other options were considered across the 19.5 ton (17.7 tonnes) and 40-ton (36.3 tonnes) projects for alternative forms of power. However, in the end, other than the possibility of switching to a petrol-turbine the existing diesel engines were the only technology mature enough to be considered.
Each design was identified by concept number followed by a design number, for example ‘I-3’’ was Configuration 1 Design 3, whereas II-4 was Configuration 2 Design 4, and so on. Vehicle concepts selected to go forward from theoretical design to a drawing stage were all allocated a drawing number starting AD-8432-xxxx.
For the 40-ton (36.3 tonnes) concept, just two candidates were identified for further study – these were I-3 and IV-2. I-3 was designed by Garret and used a larger version of the same system as I-10 for the 19.5-ton (17.7 tonne) vehicle. The second was IV-2 from Unique Mobility which used scaled-up versions of the dual-path AC permanent magnet system it had proposed for the 19.5-ton (17.7 tonne) IV-2 concept.
The drive system for the 40-ton (36.3 tonnes) vehicle application was the same as that of the Garret I-10 19.5 ton (17.7 tonne) vehicle, namely that it used two different paths for the delivery of automotive power, one mechanical and one electrical. The electrical system alone delivered power for speeds from 0 to 15 mph (24 km/h) and, when more power was needed to go above that, the mechanical system was unlocked and coupled to the electrical system. The control unit then controlled the power between these two units.
The electrical power was provided by a permanent magnet AC generator driven by the engine rectified to DC and then inverted in order to provide power to the traction motors. The generator was an oil-cooled Garret-type rated at 400 hp and rotated at 18,000 rpm with 93.5% efficiency. The oil-cooled rectifier for this system operated at 685 Volts DC at 98% efficiency and connected to a 284 Volt AC inverter operating at 96% efficiency.
The traction motors used rare-earth metal magnets made from neodymium which removed the problem of the cobalt-type magnets as the US had adequate stocks of neodymium. The cost of 400 of these power units for the 19.5 ton concepts was estimated to be 1985 US$145,000 per unit (just under US$350,000 in 2020 values), but for the 40-ton (36.3 tonnes) concept, the cost would be around 1985 US$240,000 (over US$575,000 in 2020 values) as it used two traction motors for each final drive.
The Garret traction motors delivered 192 hp each and were able to operate at 200% for up to 30 seconds and deliver power to the final drive units which operated at a 4:1 reduction ratio.
Cooling was an important factor in all of the systems and calculations for the Garret systems (both I-10 for the 19.5 ton and I-3 for the 40-ton) were made. For the 40-ton (36.3 tonnes) vehicle, a maximum heat rejection of 8,737 BTU/Min (9,218 KJ/ Min) was needed.
Analysis by GDLS across the 40-ton (36.3 tonnes) drive systems showed that there would be 855 hp available. The Garrett system was the better of the two for the 40-ton (36.3 tonnes) vehicle and was capable of forward acceleration from 0 to 20 mph (32.2 km/h) in under 7 seconds and reverse acceleration from 0 to 10 mph (16.1 km/h) in under 5 seconds.
Conclusion
When this study was being done, the M1 Abrams was still a relatively new tank in service with the US military. The Soviet Union was still the major enemy to worry about with potential hordes of tanks able to swamp the armies of NATO in Europe still a constant threat in the minds of the NATO Generals. Lacking the option for a quantitative advantage over the Soviets, a qualitative advantage was sought and part of that grand quest was the goal for a tank with greater protection and more firepower than any Soviet contemporary. Just as the M1 Abrams had entered service to provide that advantage, the plan was simply to make an even better vehicle. Here, a turretless design with an autoloader that offered a small target and was capable of destroying any Soviet threat, and which also had the design flexibility offered by an electric drive, was seen as a promising approach. This vehicle was certainly not the only concept at the time to try and shed the weight of a turret on the Abrams or to increase its mobility and firepower. However, no electric drive main battle tank was ever produced along these lines, as the need for such an expensive system expired along with the Soviet Union.
Of the 38 possibilities for a drive system and layout for a 19.5 ton vehicle just three systems had been identified as being suitable for investigation or development; the Belgian ACEC DC system, the Garret AC permanent magnet drive, and the Unique Mobility dual-path AC permanent magnet drive system. Yet, for this heavier, 40-ton (36.3 tonnes) concept MBT design just two ideas made the cut, the Garret (I-3) using a larger version of the system proposed and selected as a potential system for the 19.5 ton (17.7 tonne) vehicle (I-10), and the Unique Mobility concept (IV-2), once more using a scaled-up version of its system proposed for the 19.5-ton (17.7 tonne) (IV-2) concept. Clearly from a logistics point of view and likely from a cost point of view as well any system selected for this 40-ton (36.3 tonnes) project should really have as much in common with the system on the 19.5-ton (17.7 tonne) project as well. Both projects, however, came to nothing and were dropped.
The potential advantages of an electric drive have still not yet been fully exploited by the US military or other tier 1 militaries around the world. With the prospect of freeing up additional internal volume, allowing a new configuration layout, and offering improved performance, a new generation of electric-drive AFVs is possible but unlikely as militaries opt to stick to traditional tried and tested propulsion systems.
Sources
GDLS. (1987). Electric Drive Study Final Report – Contract DAAE07-84-C-RO16. US Army Tank Automotive Command Research, Development and Engineering Center, Michigan, USA
DiSante, P. Paschen, J. (2003). Hybrid Drive Partnerships Keep the Army on the Right Road. RDECOM Magazine June 2003
Khalil, G. (2011). TARDEC Hybrid Electric Technology Program. TARDEC
EDMBT specifications
Total weight, battle ready
40 tons (36.3 tonnes)
Height
70.5 “ (1.79 m) hull (raised engine deck) 104” (2.64 m) overall height
Length
296” (7.52 m) overall length, 109.84” (2.79 m) from front wheel to rear (centers)
Width
133” (3.38 m) wide (139” (3.53 m) with side skirts)
Track Width
22.83” (0.58 m) wide
Track Length on Ground
183.07” (4.65 m)
Crew
3 – driver, commander, gunner (estimated)
Propulsion
1,000 hp AD1000 Advanced Diesel engine
Speed (road)
45 mph (72.4 km/h)
Armament
autoloaded 155 mm STAFF cannon with 15 rounds in autoloader plus 18 more in hull stowage, coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun
For information about abbreviations check the Lexical Index
United States of America (1916-1917)
Tank Mock-up – 1 Built
Tanks first came to the public consciousness with the British unleashing them at Flers-Courcelette on 15th September 1916. It was some time before pictures of them started to appear in the media and, in the meantime, various artistic renderings of this new weapon of war came out as well. Being tracked and with a complicated development, many claimants put themselves forwards as being the inventors or, at least, the inspiration for the design. The most obvious of these was the American firm of Holt with their ‘Caterpillar’ vehicle. Indeed, the name Caterpillar is now synonymous with tanks and other tracked vehicles in general, but they were not the vehicle on which the British based their tanks in WW1, despite numerous books and television programs repeating this again and again over the decades. There were, in fact, numerous tracked armored and unarmored Caterpillar vehicles used in WW1, and one which received widespread attention was the G-9. If the attention it garnered from the media of the time was impressive, then its ignominious fate did not. Since WW1, it has largely vanished into obscurity. Even the movie ‘Patria’ in which it featured has disappeared from the public consciousness. The Caterpillar G-9 was one of the first American ‘tanks’, a rather poor vehicle built at a time of little or no knowledge of armored vehicle development, but undoubtedly an important one in the history of US vehicle development.
The ‘Tank’
The body of the vehicle was rather crude. Consisting of a slab-sided superstructure that taped slightly towards the roofline, with multiple loopholes or vision slots in the side. At the front, the shape of the body followed the shape of the tractor underneath, curving around the circular mount for the leading wheel and then angling upwards to a large rectangular hatch on the front. At the rear, the slab sides, as well as taping towards the roof, also taped in slightly at the back and there was another large rectangular hatch. Poking out from the rear hatch was a tube for a fake gun and presumably the same from the front hatch. However, with the tractor radiator directly behind it, the option for even a movie extra to stand there and play make-belief is doubtful.
In the film and in some of the photos of it being observed by the US troops, it can clearly be seen to have a pair of turrets, one right at the front of the cab, directly over where the engine was, and a second directly over the rear. Some photos, however, only show a single turret in that second position, with the front one missing.
Given that the structure, other than the tractor underneath, was made of just wood, it is easy to assume that the front turret either fell off, became damaged, or was otherwise removed from the vehicle shortly after filming. Popular Science June 1917 reported that examination by the US military took place straight after filming had finished and this front turret was in a terrible position. Not only would the turret be directly over the engine and all its heat and noise, but it would also obscure any field of observation or fire from the rear turret. On top of that was the small matter of the exhaust. Images of the G-9 with just a single turret show clearly the exhaust from the vehicle exiting the roof right where turret 1 had been, implying that turret 1 simply sat over the exhaust for the film, something likely to have caused exhaust fumes to come back into the vehicle.
The height of the vehicle seems to be a function of the tractor underneath having a large canopy over the top. Building a framework for the ‘armor’ on top of this canopy would also allow someone sitting on top of it to operate the rear turret, making it move for the camera. If this was a real attempt at a design, then this extra height was utterly unnecessary and would only serve to make it a bigger target and more top-heavy. Underneath the turret/turrets and the ‘armor’ was a standard Holt 75 tracked tractor.
Armor
The Holt 75 tractor normally weighed 10,432 kg (23,000 lbs.), but was reported as being a ‘13 ton’ (US short tons) at the time of its crash in 1917. Thirteen US short tons is 11,793 kg, meaning an added weight from the ‘tank’ body and turret of just 1,360 kg. This confirms that the body was not truly armored. Were the vehicle to actually carry real and effective armor, such as something not less than 8 mm thick, it would have added substantial mass to the tractor, in the region of 10 – 20 tonnes. This meant that the 75 hp engine would not have been very effective. The maximum loading capacity of the tractor was just 21,350 lbs. (9,684 kg), so it is doubtful that, without a substantial change in the design of the G-9, any worthwhile armor could be carried on the vehicle.
The Holt ‘Caterpillar’
The Holt tractors, sold under the name ‘Caterpillar’, were effective and reliable tracked tractors. Indeed, the Holt design had been, to a degree, one of the reasons behind the impetus behind some of the British push for tracked vehicles in 1915 by men like Robert Macfie. It had some shortcomings too, such as poor speed and an underpowered engine. Even without any armor added, the machine was slow. Cladding several tonnes of extra weight would raise the center of gravity, making it unstable and even slower or utterly immobile, as well as making it hard for the driver to see where he was going.
As a farm vehicle or tractor for hauling guns, these were less problematic but not ignorable. The driver, sitting at the back on the right-hand side, had to try and see forwards over all these obstructions. Even when the vehicle was open and unarmored, his view was obscured by the engine to his front left. With armor, he stood no chance of seeing out of a small slot in the front. Instead, he would have to be guided by at least one other man, probably sat or stood right next to the noisy and hot engine. At least two men were therefore needed to control a vehicle with terrible visibility and, with the problems of communication between them caused by the engine, this was not a recipe for success.
Holt had been successful even before the ‘tank’ appeared, having sold the US Army 63 of its Model 60 tractors with a 60 hp engine. The Model 75, however, was an order of magnitude more successful than the Model 60, staying in production until 1924 at the plant at Peoria, Illinois. Some 442 Holt Model 75s were even manufactured by Messrs. Ruston and Hornsby Ltd. in Lincoln, England. Combined, 4,620 Model 75s were made, of which more than 2,000 entered military service.
Automotive
In 1916, at the time of the Patria movie, the Holt 75s available would have been US-built examples using the Holt M-7 7 ½” (190 mm) bore, 8 inch (203 mm) stroke ‘valve-in-head’ engine delivering 75 hp, originally known as the Holt 60-75 (A-NVS), if they were made since production began in the Stockton plant in 1913. Some 16 Peoria-built tractors made between 1914 and 1915 used the Holt M-5 ‘Ellhead valve layout’ (T-6 series) engine. Due to problems, this was quickly changed to the Holt 75 (T-8 series) engine being fitted at the Stockton plant in California. Given that the film was also shot in California, it is most probable that the Holt used was a Stockton-made one rather than a Peoria-made example.
The engine was considered perfectly adequate for its normal duties and remained the standard engine until 1921 when it was improved with a new radiator. The T-8 series Holt-75 engine was a 4 cylinder water-cooled unit that ran on paraffin with a capacity of 22.9 liters (1,400 cubic inches), delivering 75 hp at 550 rpm. This power was carried to the drive sprockets moving the tracks via a multiple disc clutch made from 5 plates made from bronze and cast iron, along with a simple reversing gearbox. The gearbox provided for 2 forward and a single reverse gear. Forward speed was limited to 2.13 mph (3.4 km/h) in 1st gear, 3.5 mph (5.6 km/h) in second (top) gear, and 2.13 mph (3.4 km/h) in reverse. The fuel tank held 53.5 Imperial gallons (243.2 liters) which, along with 5 Imperial Gallons (22.7 liters) of oil, and 67 Imperial gallons (304.6 liters) of water, provided the fluids required for the engine to operate.
The Holt tractor itself used cast iron wheels running on heat-treated axles on Hyatt roller bearings. The track itself was connected by case hardened steel pins linking pressed steel plates 24” wide (607 mm), although 30” (762 mm) wide tracks could be fitted. All of the links had pressed corrugations 1.5” (38 mm) deep acting as spuds for traction in soft ground. The load was carried on four double-coil helical springs springing the track along its 80” (2.03 m) ground contact length.
The steering was managed via a single wheel at the front, controlled via a long steering control shaft from the steering wheel and driver’s position. This was located roughly in line with the center of the track units. The steering wheel controlled a non-reversible worm and wheel gear.
Armament
An article in Popular Science June 1917 makes it clear that both the body and guns were made of wood, but also that there was a wire cutter built for the front of the vehicle. The G-9, therefore, was completely unarmed, although it is possible that pyrotechnics, like blanks, could be used to simulate gunfire.
The Movie
With the tanks of Britain and, later, France seeing combat and appearing in the press, it is no shock that, when William Randolph Hearst made a war movie in 1916, he would need a ‘tank’ of his own. Hearst was a very wealthy man and a media tycoon owning numerous newspapers and an animation studio called ‘International Film Service’ (I.F.S.). In 1916, filming of the first episodes began at Wharton Studios in Ithaca, New York, on a movie for I.F.S., all funded by Hearst and very much pushing a political agenda of military preparedness.
To an audience of 1917, the script had lashing of patriotism of dedicated Americans organizing for collective defense against a foreign foe, which culminated in a pitched battle in which, obviously, the ‘good’ side would prevail. In the modern world, it is impossible to see the film without cringing at the blatant jingoism as well as the overt racism of the movie, with stereotyped Japanese villains. However, what is unacceptable now was simply grist for the mill of the overall desire of many for the US to enter the war. It is perhaps odd then that the Japanese were the ‘enemy’, given that, in 1916, Japan was aligned with British interests and actively opposed German ones having already fought the Germans over Tsingtao in 1914. Nonetheless, the rather cartoonish plot involved a secret Japanese cabal of spies in league with nefarious Mexican interests gathering arms and gold in preparation for war in the US. This is perhaps the only time such an alliance has ever been contemplated on film. The Mexican angle was the more reasonable topic of the time, given the invasion of the US in March 1916 by Pancho Villa. Villa’s raid had sacked the city of Columbus, New Mexico, sparking a punitive retaliatory expedition by the Americans.
The shooting of the first episodes of the film took place on the site of Greystone Manor, which is now part of Cornell University. It starred Irene Castle (as Patria Channing) in her screen debut, along with established actors Milton Sills (as Captain Donald Parr), and Warner Oland (as Baron Huroki), an actor most famous later for his portrayal of Fu Man Chu and Charlie Chan.
Patria was a massive work made in no less than 15 separate episodes, costing a phenomenal US$85,000 (over US$2 million in 2021 values). The first 10 episodes were directed by Theodore and Leopold (Ted and Leo) Wharton, but the film was a little too jingoistic even for the day, particularly in its anti-Japanese portrayal.
After the first 10 episodes had been shot, allegedly, President Woodrow Wilson intervened with an appeal to the wealthy Mr. Hearst, requesting that the anti-Japanese sentiment be toned down. The result was that the leading villain, Baron Huroki, was changed from a Japanese character to that of ‘Manuel Morales’. However, the motion picture press coverage of the film at the time makes no mention of such an intervention and Huroki is both clearly villainous, Japanese, and referred to as Baron Huroki. Interplayed with this fiendish Japanese fifth columnist (although the term was not even coined at the time) plot was a criminal Mexican connection on the southern US border playing on the problems there at the time.
The wafer-thin plot of Hurki was contrasting with the glowing, alluring, and wealthy Elaine ‘Patria’ Channing (‘Patria’ means homeland in Latin, i.e. Elaine as the personification of the noble country defiled) working with handsome and dashing Secret Service agent Captain Parr. Together, these two would try to thwart the insidious threat to national security from the invaders and insurrectionists in the form of Huroki, the Japanese, and the Mexican soldiers.
The final 5 episodes were to culminate in stopping the invading Mexicans at the border. The filming for these episodes was moved from New York to the West Coast and were shot in Los Angeles by director Jacques Jaccard. No doubt, California offered a better landscape to match ‘Mexico’ or the Southern USA than New York did.
The film was published for release on 1st January 1917 and premiered on 6th January. It did not receive general release until 14th January 1917 in the USA. By the time of the final episodes being released, the political situation was changing. This culminated in the US declaring war on 6th April 1917, making it an ally with one of the main villains of the film, rendering many of the sentiments of Patria immediately and woefully redundant.
Sadly, the original serial episodes have suffered from the ravages of time and only the first 10 episodes are known to survive. They were pieced back together in 2012 by Serial Squadron. Only limited stills of episodes 11-15 are known to survive and, unfortunately, it is in these final episodes in which the ‘tank’ appears.
Although these final scenes are missing from the film, there are both clues and a few photographs of what the ‘tank’ was that appeared. In fact, the correspondent for Moving Picture World reported that there was not a single ‘tank’ but ‘tanks’ in the final battle.
No footage or stills of the climactic battle are currently known to survive, although one syndicated photograph was thankfully printed in several newspapers at the time. In the photo, a twin-turreted ‘tank’ can be seen ahead of a line of US troops, heading towards what appears to be men either standing or running and with a cloud of smoke or ‘gas’ rolling across the battlefield.
Further to the single image was a long explanation of the action in the scene, which, in the days of silent movies like this one, was fairly common. An audience could read up on the action before watching it and thus be fully informed as to nuances not easy to convey in the occasional slide of words during the film.
Here, in this account, it very clearly states once more that ‘tanks’, plural rather than ‘tank’ singular, were used. It even goes so far as to describe them vividly as “monstrous armadailloes [sic: armadillos]”. More than just two vehicles are actually mentioned, as the final charge is supported by “a fleet of ‘tanks’ – armored caterpillar tractors carrying machine gun crews”, yet this pluralization may simply be colorful reporting rather than strictly and literally correct.
This account of at least two vehicles is somewhat contradicted by that of Lescarboura (1919), who provides actual numbers of the extras and vehicles involved in the scene. He described the use of more than 2,700 men, including 1,200 of the California National Guard, 325 horses, multiple field guns, 25 aircraft, and just “one armored tractor or ‘tank’”. His account of just a single vehicle is backed up by the fact that there is no photo of more than one vehicle at the same time and, more importantly, by a review in Current Opinion which has the same still as before but printed more clearly. From this, it is also clear that there is just a single vehicle involved. A serious explanation of the episode’s key plot points was provided by the magazine Dramatic Mirror of the Stage and Motion Pictures, which also made clear it was just a single-vehicle.
“PATRIA
Episode 15 ‘For the Flag’
Baron Huroki plans a night attack on Patria’s line of intrenchments, in which he hopes to surprise her troops. The Japanese advance is driven back, but an attack of liquid fire enabled them to creep up upon the trenches. In desperation, the American troops play their trump cards and send out their huge Caterpillar tank, which ploughs through the enemy’s ranks and scatters them over the border.
Amid the enthusiastic plaudits of the soldiers, Patria seeks out Donald Parr, who had been wounded in the battle, and this thrilling story of romance of war ends blissfully in love’s young dream”
Dramatic Mirror of the Stage and Motion Pictures, Volume 77, Part 1 dated 28th April 1917
The Famous Photos
There is a trio of slightly more famous or well-known images of this vehicle that appeared in the media at the time, outside of the stills from the battle scene. The shooting of Patria had finished before January, as the episodes were rolled out into cinemas and the film-prop ‘tank’ which had been made was still around afterward. In April 1917, images of the tractor appeared in various newspapers and magazines as a ‘tank’ being evaluated by US officers for potential use.
More curious than those April photos was not that the images would be repeated even into September that year or that they even appeared as rather fanciful art, but that the vehicle appears to have predated all of those and the movie.
The first outline of the vehicle appears in the November 1916 issue of Popular Mechanics magazine, although it is important to note that the image is not a photograph but an artist’s impression of a tank. This is an important distinction as, although tanks were used on 15th September and news of their success captured the public’s imagination – images did not appear until 23rd October 1916. In this intervening gap, various fanciful depictions appeared and the November edition of Popular Mechanics is no different. Obviously, November is after October, but the November edition would go out in October and prior to the 23rd. Thus it missed the reveal of the real tank and was out of date almost immediately. Nonetheless, this was likely one of the first proper conceptions of what a tank actually looked like, which many Americans may have seen.
It is obviously not possible for the artist to have copied the vehicle from the film, as filming had not yet begun, yet the two vehicles are virtually identical, meaning they are assuredly connected. If one can imagine a wealthy man like Hearst trying to fund a great ‘patriotic’ movie at exactly the same time and not having access to an actual image of a tank but needing one in his film, it is not hard to imagine a situation where the film copied the design from this depiction. In the Popular Mechanics’ depiction, there is a clear explanatory note stating that their artist has rendered the drawing based on reliable data and on photographs of the Holt tractors which were already known to be in British use and purchased for the war. If a soldier at the time described a metal machine clad in armor and with two turrets, this drawing would indeed be a fair conclusion based on the common assumption of the turrets being mounted on the top of the tank rather than on the side as, in fact, they were on those first British machines. In the still image from the film, the vehicle can be seen still using a pair of turrets, as it is in the promotional images published in April 1917 and afterward.
In those April images, one thing is very clear – namely that the vehicle had a pair of turrets. Other images of the vehicle, purported to be taken during evaluation by the US Army, are also known and these feature just a single turret at the back. This change has led to speculation that there were, in fact, two different vehicles and that this is backed up by some of those film reports of multiple tanks in the final scene of Patria. However, not all of the film reviewers agreed that more than one tank was seen. It was, after all, just a prop for a single scene and those tractors were expensive.
Whatever interest the US military may have had in this beast is unclear. By the time they were allegedly looking at it, in the spring of 1917, the British tanks were already seen in the press and, unlike this ungainly machine, were fully tracked. Despite the structure being made out of wood and sheet metal (with wooden pegs inserted to imitate rivets) to simulate armor, the vehicle was still top-heavy and this helped to bring it to grief sometime in March 1917, at least a month or so before photos of it being ‘evaluated’ were shown. When the vehicle rolled over down a bank, it was utterly wrecked and thus it would have been unable to be evaluated, leaving just two possibilities. The first, that there was a second vehicle all along, or second, that the photographs were released after the crash.
Motor Age magazine, reporting on the crash in March 1917, also used the single-turret image and was clear that the photos were both taken in Los Angeles. With the different publishing dates distinct from the dates on which events happened, the reporting of multiple ‘tanks’ during filming, and the removal of one of the mocked-up turrets, it is not hard to see why it can be confusing as to whether there were two vehicles. Clearly, having crashed no later than March 1917, it could not be trialed in April or June, but the publishing dates are misleading, as they are not necessarily reporting events happening at that time, but events that had happened. I.F.S. owning the images is the first clue that option 2 is more likely the answer, as they could release the images to help promote the vehicle and, by default, their own film.
Conclusion
The design was somewhat awful. Impractically large, the tractor itself was solid and reliable and had been seen as helping to inspire some of the British tank development, but it was still not a tank by any interpretation of the word. The vehicle was simply a movie prop for Patria and not much more. The film has largely vanished from the collective consciousness and no full reel of it even exists anymore.
It might, however, be worth remembering the movie a little more. Not for its racism and xenophobia, but because it is likely to be the first ever representation of a tank recorded on film in the United States. In the post-unveiling of the tank by the British in the previous September, the world had come to see this new weapon of war as making a sea-change in the dynamics of land combat. America had clearly been languishing without. America would produce other imitations of foreign designs, eventually putting into production its own version of the French Renault FT. The G-9 design was clearly never a seriously considered tracked vehicle concept and, with the accident destroying the vehicle, it was quickly forgotten. In the century since, however, the appearance of soldiers next to it has led many to believe and claim that this was a real project considered for the US Army. Holt and Caterpillar did not suffer from this. Holt took over the firm of C.L. Best, a rival tractor firm, some years after the war, and together, the brand of Caterpillar went ahead to become a world-renowned brand in all manner of heavy plant equipment, surviving to this day.
Author’s Note: The author would like to thank the Wharton Studio Museum, New York, and Serial HQ for their help in preparing this article.
Specifications Holt Caterpillar G-9
Crew: 2+ (driver x 2) Armor: None Armament: None Engine: Holt M-8 series paraffin engine delivering 75 hp Speed: <3.5 mph (5.6 km/h)
Sources
Alexander, J. (2015). Briefly Famous, The 1917 Caterpillar G-9 Tank and other American Tanks 1916-1918. Privately Published. AllMovie Database. Patria (1917). https://www.allmovie.com/movie/v236096 Automobile Topics (1917). Volume 45 Bache, R. (1917). Our Forts on Wheels. Modern Mechanix Magazine, June 1917. Bache, R. (1917). Our Forts on Wheels. Illustrated World, June 1917. Crismon, F. (1992). US Military Tracked Vehicles. Crestline Publishing, USA Duncan-Clark, S. (1919). History’s Greatest War: A Pictorial Narrative. E.T. Townsend Publishing, USA Haddock, K. (2001). Classic Caterpillar Crawlers. MBI Publishing, USA Icks, R. (1975). Steam Power for Tanks. AFV-G2 Magazine Vol.5 No.4 Icks, R., Jones, R., & Rarey, G. (1969). The Fighting Tanks since 1916. WE Publishing, USA IMDB. Patria (1917). https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0008411/?ref_=fn_al_tt_1 LeGros. (1918). Traction on Bad Roads. Reprinted 2021 FWD Publishing, USA Lescarboura, A. (1919). Behind the Motion Picture Screen. Scientific American Publishing Company, New York, USA Motor Age Magazine 29th March 1917 Moving Picture World (10th March 1917). (Scenes in Patria Episodes explained) Moving Picture World (24th March 1917). Battle Scenes in Closing Patria Episodes. Omaha Daily Bee, 27th March 1917. ‘First tank to be built in the United States. The Day Book. (25th April 1917). Yankee Tank in Action Amazes. The People’s War Book and Pictorial Atlas of the World. (1920). R.C. Barnum Co. Cleveland, F.B. Dickerson Co. Detroit, Better Farming Association of Cleveland, USA and Imperial Publishing Co., Canada Wharton Studio Museum, Filmography 1913 – 1919 https://whartonstudiomuseum.org/filmography_2/ Young, J., Buddy, J. (1989). Endless Tracks in the Woods. Crestline Publishing, USA
United States of America (1916)
Tank Mock-up – 1 Built?
Tanks first appeared on the battlefields of Europe on 15th September 1916 at Flers Courcelette, during a British attack on German trenches. Whilst their use was by no means decisive, they showed that not only did the concept of a tracked armored vehicle work but that they had significant tactical potential. The success at that battle, no matter how small or temporary, was received with glee by a war-weary population in the UK and garnered substantial media attention domestically and abroad. Keen to capitalize on the lack of official photos of the tank at a time when what these weapons even looked like was not known, the firm of Holt, which was known to be supplying tracked vehicles to the British, took action. Even though the US was not yet in the war, Holt was keen to take credit for ‘tanks’ even if his vehicles had little to do with their actual development. The result was that, within just a couple of weeks of their first use, Holt had prepared one of their 75 hp tractors with a ‘tank’ body. The vehicle was used through October 1916 in parades in Peoria, Illinois and, at some point, was painted with the slogan ‘America First’.
‘America First’ the name
It is perhaps odd that the name of this vehicle, at a time of a worldwide war in which the United States was not even involved, would be ‘America First’, a campaign slogan for non-interventionism and isolationism. Whether the motives of promoting this slogan on the vehicle were to try and promote isolationism or to promote the vehicle as the first in the world is unclear. It was certainly a slogan known and used politically at the time and would later gain more prominence. However, in 1916, in this context, the phrase might be considered as one or both of those variants. An image of the vehicle from 16th October 1916 shows no such slogan on the side but, by the end of the month, the slogan had appeared.
Design
The design of the vehicle was relatively simple, consisting of 4 parts making up a large slug-shaped body. The first part was the nose of the vehicle, which curved sharply down from the top of the roof to a rounded point at the front. It was made from 12 large curved pieces, in the center of which was a large opening through which a ‘cannon’ poked through. The gun was presumably a fake one, as the weight of a real gun had no obvious means of support, as well as the fact that it would sit directly over the radiator and engine, making serving the gun as difficult, awkward, and impractical as could be imagined. Alongside this ‘cannon’, in the front, were a pair of narrower tubes sticking out of the nose to simulate some kind of guns or flame projectors. No vision slots or holes were provided in the front for the driver.
The center section of the vehicle was effectively a large rounded boiler made from 5 curved pieces running circumferentially around the vehicle to encapsulate the tractor underneath. Each of those curved pieces was made from a single piece running up to the level just above the ‘guns’ on the front, at which point it was joined to another section. Assuming that the top section went all the way around the top of the vehicle to the same height on the opposite side, it would mean that the ‘boiler’ body was made from a total of 15 pieces. On both sides, pierced through each of the pieces making up the side apart from the very first one, were simple circular holes. No covering for the holes appears to have been provided and they had the appearance of a loophole from which soldiers would be able to fire or provide observations. The holes were right at the top corner of the pieces, slightly above the level of the guns.
The third section was the rear. Once more, this had two narrow ‘tubes’ sticking out of the back, roughly in line with the two smaller ones on the front and once more presumably to simulate weapons. The shape of the rear was roughly the same as the nose as well, as it curved sharply down from the roofline down to the rear and covered the back of the tractor. Unusually, a side view of the vehicle showed that the rearmost section entirely projected past the rear of the tractor underneath, making the vehicle about a third longer than it needed to have been. Two other features identifiable on the rear are the US flag flown near to the top. Below this, a small tube was sticking out of the rear. This is presumed to be an extension for the engine exhaust to carry it backward. Although this normally went vertically, there does not appear to be anything sticking out of the front of the roof of the body, above where the engine went.
The final section of the vehicle was the turret. Made from a simple low cylinder with either a flat roof or just open, at least two more ‘guns’ are seen poking out. It is unclear if the turret was purely decorative or if someone could work in that space, as this would need some form of platform made underneath.
Crew
The minimum number of people needed to operate the vehicle was two. At least one person had to sit in the tractor under that body to control the steering and propulsion. With no windows to look out of and being sat just behind the midline, inside the hull, he would have no way of seeing outside. Thus, a second person would be needed, located either in the front or in the turret, to act as a guide to direct it in motion. This second person may also have acted as the commander. This was an awful arrangement for controlling a vehicle and alone should have precluded ideas of it being useful in combat as a successful weapon.
Assuming the other ‘weapons’ were operational, then more than 2 men would be inside. Three weapons pointed forwards each would require at least one man and the same at the back for those other two. The small turret could house perhaps two men at most and there is no indication of whether a few more could be housed inside to fire out of the circular loopholes in the side. Even ignoring those loopholes, that would be at least 9 men (2 drivers, 7 gunners). Despite the large crew complement, there is no indication as to how they could get in or out of the vehicle, as no hatches are shown. This leaves the only obvious means of access being to dip under the outer edge of the body and to climb in from ground level. This was perhaps acceptable for a display machine operating in parades, but was both utterly impractical and potentially deadly if there was ever an idea that this vehicle might serve as a template for a combat-viable vehicle. After all, if, operating on slightly soft ground, the vehicle caught fire, none of the men would be able to get out.
Armor
The Holt tractors, sold under the name ‘Caterpillar’, were effective and reliable tracked tractors, but they were relatively slow and heavy. They were, after all, designed for hard work, ploughing fields, etcetera. There, power and pulling were more important than speed or comfort. Unarmored, the Holt 75 tractor normally weighed 10,432 kg (23,000 lbs.). With a 75 hp engine, this meant a power to weight ratio of just 7.2 hp/tonne. Any armor or armament on top of the vehicle’s base weight would only decrease performance further, as well as altering the center of gravity, making it less stable. To have armor of any value, such as for stopping bullets, such a vehicle would need at least 6 to 8 mm of steel. Covering such a large body in that shape would add several tonnes to the weight. Assuming the weight of any armor, crew, armament, ammunition, etcetera added to the Holt 75 to make it into a ‘tank’ could be kept to perhaps not more than 10 tonnes, then it would mean a vehicle of over 20 tonnes propelled by just the same 75 hp engine, with a power to weight ratio of 3.75 hp/tonne. Effectively, in order to carry enough armor to be useful, this vehicle would become stuck on anything other than an ideal hard surface, at which point it may as well have just been an armored car, the type of which were already in existence. The design, as presented, could never be a viable tank in that sense – it was a display vehicle only, and the ‘armor’ likely just sheet metal fastened over a wooden frame to keep weight down. The bigger problem for the design was the armor at the rear. Any vertical slope or step to climb would raise the front of the vehicle, pivoting over the track area, where the longitudinal center of gravity was, making it tip back. The projection would then dig into the ground and immobilize the vehicle, therefore seriously limiting the amount of climb possible.
Automotive
In 1916, at the time the America First vehicle was being prepared, there were two plants owned by Holt producing the 75 Model. One was at Stockton in California, and the other at Peoria, in Illinois. Given that the parades taking place with the vehicle were in Peoria, it is virtually certain that the Holt 75 used was a Peoria-built example.
The tractor was powered by the Holt M-7 7 ½” (190 mm) bore, 8 inch (203 mm) stroke ‘valve-in-head’ engine delivering 75 hp. It had been in production since 1913, originally under the name Holt 60-75 (A-NVS), followed by the slightly improved Holt M-8 series engine. This was the standard engine and virtually unchanged until the end of production of the tractor in 1924.
This engine was a 4 cylinder water-cooled unit that ran on paraffin, with a capacity of 22.9 liters (1,400 cubic inches), delivering 75 hp at 550 rpm. This power was carried to the drive sprockets moving the tracks via a multiple disc clutch made from 5 plates made from bronze and cast iron, along with a simple reversing gearbox. The gearbox provided for 2 forward and a single reverse gear. Forward speed was limited to 2.13 mph (3.4 km/h) in first gear, 3.5 mph (5.6 km/h) in second (top) gear, and 2.13 mph (3.4 km/h) in reverse. The fuel tank held 53.5 Imperial gallons (243.2 liters) which, along with 5 Imperial Gallons (22.7 liters) of oil, and 67 Imperial gallons (304.6 liters) of water, provided the fluids required for the engine to operate.
The Holt tractor itself used cast iron wheels running on heat-treated axles on Hyatt roller bearings. The track was connected by case hardened steel pins linking pressed steel plates 24” wide (607 mm), although 30” (762 mm) wide tracks could be fitted. All of the links had pressed corrugations, 1.5” (38 mm) deep, acting as spuds for traction in soft ground. The load was carried on four double-coil helical springs springing the track along its 80” (2.03 m) ground contact length.
The steering was managed via a single wheel at the front, controlled via a long steering control shaft from the steering wheel and driver’s position. This was located roughly in line with the center of the track units. The steering wheel controlled a non-reversible worm and wheel gear.
In Action
A somewhat fanciful depiction of the America First tank in action appeared at the end of October 1916, a few days before any pictures of an actual tank were available. The artist made it seem like this giant slug of a vehicle was a viable weapon.
A close look at the image, however, provides some additional information on the structure. If it is correct in its representation of the vehicle, then the top of the hull was formed without a seam or joint along the top, meaning 5 large curved pieces made up the whole upper structure. Less believable are the three (or possibly four) large guns poking out of that small cylindrical turret leaving zero room inside for any crew, loading, or even a breach for the guns.
More interestingly, perhaps, than the fanciful depictions of these weapons in use, is that the front wheel of the tractor can clearly be seen to be suspended in thin air over the trench. This was not an error of art and was either good luck from the artist or an actual representation of something the tractor was often pictured doing – driving with the front wheel off the ground. This is because, despite the engine being towards the front of the vehicle, most of the weight was at the back, over the tracks. The result was that, when ascending or descending a slope or when crossing an obstacle, the front wheel was often seen off the ground. This looked very dramatic for images showing the capability of the vehicle, but was a serious problem if the vehicle needed to turn. That small wheel was the method of steering the vehicle and, when it was not in contact with the ground, this was a problem.
Time
The first use of tanks was on 15th September 1916 and the first photos in print did not appear in the USA or anywhere else until the middle of October. This left a gap of around a month in which various drawings and pictures of tanks were published in the press based on descriptions, which were often rather laughably inaccurate. In this gap came the vehicle from Holt, which was not a serious design for use off-road and was clearly put together as quickly as possible to show off the contribution of Holt to the war. By the time photos became available in the US press, at the end of October (although not in the British press until November), showing what real tanks looked like, such a vehicle from Holt probably looked a little ridiculous, sharing no design features at all with the real thing. By November 1916, the vehicle appears to have disappeared from the parade scene, likely stripped of its body and simply reused as a tractor.
Sources
Alexander, J. (2015). Briefly Famous, The 1917 Caterpillar G-9 Tank and other American Tanks 1916-1918. Privately Published.
Corsicana Daily Sun, Texas 4th November 1916
Le Miroir, 29th April 1917
LeGros. (1918). Traction on Bad Roads. Reprinted 2021 FWD Publishing, USA
Harper’s Weekly 16th October 1916
The Ogden Standard, 21st October 1916, To the rescue in a land cruiser.
United Kingdom (1951)
Light Utility Vehicle – 12,000 Built
An army functions on logistics. Logistics to bring food, men, guns to a fight. Logistics to move around the battlefield, and logistics to get from A to B in peacetime. The vehicle to fulfill these functions must be simple, reliable, rugged, and adaptable. Probably the most famous example of a vehicle to try and meet these needs was the WW2 US ‘Jeep’ but, in post-WW2 Britain, reliance on Jeeps was not going to be adequate. A whole new fleet of vehicles was being developed to prepare the British Army for modern war and replace most of the complex myriad of WW2 vintage equipment which was worn out or simply redundant. As part of this rationalization of the Army, it was desired to have a greater degree of compatibility and capability in the armored and unarmored vehicles than had ever been enjoyed before. These goals led to perhaps the finest light utility vehicle ever to come out of the UK, the appropriately named ‘Champ’.
Development – Gutty and Mudlark to Champ
The post-war desire from the British was to meet the needs for commonality and to generally have a vehicle better than the old Jeep. Work began in 1947 on the ‘Car, 4 x 4, 5 cwt. FV1800 Series’. The name said it all, a car (rather than a truck or armored vehicle), with four-wheel drive in the ¼ ton. (Imperial) class.
The prototype vehicle to meet this need was from Nuffield motors and known as the ‘Gutty’, of which just 2 examples were produced. Powered by a horizontally-opposed 4 cylinder ‘boxer’ engine, this neat vehicle came with deep-bodied sides, simple body panels including a radiator grille stamped from sheet steel with 10 slots (one of the two had vertical slots and the other had horizontal slots), and a curved bonnet with a swell in the top. A flat two-panel folding windscreen, with each panel having its own wiper, provided protection for the occupants from wind or rain whilst driving. A folding canvas tilt was used to cover the occupants from foul weather. Simple folding canvas seats provided some comfort for the occupants.
The Gutty was a sound design, albeit one with room for improvement, and served to spur the Fighting Vehicle and Research Development Establishment (F.V.R.D.E.) to continue development.
Charles Sewell led the design team, which included Alec (later Sir) Issigonis (most famous for his design of the Austin Mini, amongst others) working on the suspension. It set to work on improving the new vehicle, creating the Mudlark. Thirty prototypes of this new vehicle were constructed by the Wolseley motor car company under contract 6/Veh/2387 signed 27th August 1948. 12 of them were built with a hardtop as a saloon version and another with a 1-ton Turner winch. The power plant for the Mudlark was one of the key successes of the design which would become the Champ. It used a Rolls Royce B40 No. 1 Mk.2A petrol engine. The Mudlark, however, was perhaps a bit too car-like and not Army-like enough, although one Mudlark was shipped to the USA for government evaluation. The body had become more complex than the Gutty, with a more pronounced and rounded bonnet and a small radiator grille with 5 ovaloid holes. The Gutty had relatively simple curved mudguards projecting slightly from the sides, but the Mudlark adopted a large curved mudguard over the front. Whilst this would no doubt have been more effective at stopping mud being thrown up by the front tires when driving off-road, they would also add to the weight, complexity, and cost of the vehicle.
Once more, the design used a flat-bodied design and a folding two-piece windscreen, although the Mudlark was only fitted with a single windscreen wiper for the driver’s side.
The Mudlark was simply not adequate to the needs of F.V.R.D.E., which now had fully adopted the idea of commonality of engine parts. Tests of the Mudlark found problems with oil leaking from the differentials into the wheel hubs and it was clear that the Mudlark needed some additional improvement.
Twelve pre-production Champs were made for evaluation, with half as the Cargo version and half as the Fitted For Wireless (FFW) model. These vehicles tested very well in trials and little was needed for this vehicle to be put into production, although the most distinctive change would be the addition of pioneer tools to the outside and a more refined dashboard.
The ‘Car, 4 x 4, 5 cwt. FV1800 Series’ became the ‘Truck ¼ ton, 4 x 4 CT’, indicating it was now going to be more than just a car, but was still going to be capable of four-wheel drive and in the same weight class. However, now, by virtue of the ‘CT’ designation, it was suitable for use in a combat theatre, although CT stands simply for the first and last letters of the word combat rather than as an abbreviation for something specific. It retained the FV1800 series designation. This truck would fill the bottom end of the logistics spectrum compared to its larger siblings, the ‘Truck, 1 ton, 4 x 4,CT’ made by Humber motors, and the ‘Truck, 10 ton, 6 x 6, CT’ made by Leyland as the Layland Martian. Humber and Leyland had both hoped for the production contracts for the Champ, but it was Austin that got it.
Thus, the first of a new breed of light trucks had been born, and contract 6/Veh/5531 was signed for 15,000 vehicles for the Army. Production began on 1st September 1951 by Austin out of their plant at Cofton Hackett near Birmingham as the ‘FV1801A, Truck, ¼ ton, 4 x 4, CT, Austin Mk.1’ in both Cargo and FFW versions. The vehicle for the Army retained that rather complex name, whilst the version available on the civilian market was ‘Champ’. This was quickly adopted by the Army as well and, therefore, from its origins onwards, the vehicle would simply be known as Champ.
Construction
The Champ used a solidly built bodywork made from pressed steel panels from the ‘Pressed Steel Company’. These were welded together on top of an ‘X’ shaped chassis. The bodywork added stiffness to the design with reinforcing ribs pressed into the bodywork to increase integrity. The rear wheel arches were simple curves pressed out of the body, but the front ones were simple pressed extensions from the front, with a horizontal portion at the top turning to a down-angle – no more curves or flared wheel arches like on the Mudlark. The bonnet and grille, however, showed its Mudlark heritage much better, with a 5 ovaloid opening radiator and large rounded bonnet.
The two-panel windscreen, like the Gutty and Mudlark before it, could be folded down over the bonnet and was fitted with a pair of windscreen wipers.
A folding tilt, made from PVC-coated cloth rather than waterproof canvas, kept out the weather without the weight of a canvas title and featured a small vertical plastic window ahead of the door, a larger window in the door, and a pair of triangular windows in the rear. The doors and side panels were separately removable, allowing for the vehicle to operate simply with a title covering the top and rear but totally open sides (apart from the ‘V’-shaped struts holding the roof up) on each side.
On the rear of the Champ, a fitting for a spare Dunlop 6.5 or 7.5 x 16 tire came as standard on the rear right, and a jerry can on the rear left.
Automotives
The 80 bhp 2.838 liter Rolls Royce B40 petrol engine was a solidly built and rugged design. With 4 cylinders (‘40’ means 4 cylinders in the series designation) and a bore of 3.5”, this was a tough and solidly built motor using a carburetor (No. 1 was a carburetor engine in the series designation), cast-iron block, and a cast aluminum cylinder head. The engine had started life in 1936 to make an engine as reliable as could be.
Originally manufactured by Rolls Royce in Crewe, early production vehicles used the same No.1 Mk.2A version of the B40 which still had British Standard Fine (BSF) threads, even though, in 1949, a production switch had been made to use Unified Fine Thread (UNF) as the Mk.5 engine. Later production engines, therefore, moved from that Mk.2A version for the first 30 prototypes to the 2A/4 model for the next 1,477 vehicles, followed by the Mk.5A for the remainder. Some Mk.5 engine production was carried out by Austin Motors under license as the ‘Austin-Rolls’, with some simplifications added in. One of these was a switch from an aluminum cylinder head to a cast-iron one.
Civilian sales of the Champ were not a success, primarily because it was expensive, but the engine was also different. The civilian market Champ was sold with either the Rolls Royce B40 or the more economical 2.66-liter Austin A90 petrol engine. It would also not be sold waterproofed.
On the military version, the engine, along with all of the electrical systems, like the ignition and also the transmission, were completely sealed. This meant that the Champ was waterproof, with the engine perfectly able to run even when completely submerged. Video footage of the vehicle taken in the deep wading tank at Chertsey shows this very well, with the only thing required to wade being the erection of the deep wading air intake on the front right of the bonnet. The driver could then simply stand up to keep his head out of the water and then drive the Champ through water up to 6’ (1.8 m) deep. As long as the air intake was out of the water, the Champ was perfectly able to wade through any depth, although the real limitations of its wading were down to the height of the driver more than anything technical on the vehicle.
In the freshwater deep wading tank at Farnborough, 19th November 1952. The driver has sensibly prepared for immersion. The snorkel is up and the Champ will show its waterproofing to the full. Source: David Busfield on Flickr
The transmission system for the Champ was a robust 5-speed box with synchromesh connected to a Borg and Beck clutch. This made for a simple and robust system, to which a drive shaft was connected running under the truck to the transfer box at the back and thence to the rear wheels. The reversing gearing for the Champ was located in the transfer box at the back, which, in effect, meant that the Champ could go backward at the same speed it could go forwards, although it is unclear who, if anyone, ever tried reversing one at 50 mph (80.5 km/h). The feature of high-speed reverse, whilst hazardous for ‘normal’ use, would have an advantage for the vehicle if it was being used as a weapons carrier or for reconnaissance, where going backward very quickly out of sight of an enemy might be an advantage. One extra thing included on the civilian model was a Power Take-Off (PTO) on the transfer box, as it would be more useful for civilian farm-related tasks.
The suspension for the Champ, designed by Issigonis, used fully independent double wishbones on the front and rear, with torsion bars running underneath down the middle of the vehicle connected to the central meeting point of the ‘X’-shaped frame on which the vehicle was built. This unusual system provided for a superb level of comfort even off-road.
The Champ operated on a 24-volt electrical system allowing for easy fitting of radio equipment to form an FFW (Fitted For Wireless) vehicle, with just the addition of a sliding table and battery mounts. Civilian versions of the Champ operated on a more conventional and simpler 12-volt electrical system.
Operating on a 20 gallon (90.9 litres) petrol tank, this provided the Champ with an operational range of around 300 miles (483 km) at 15 mpg (6.4 km/l), although off-road or harsh driving, or being fully laden, would reduce that number substantially.
Versions
As part of FV1800 series vehicles, there were sub-designations of the Champ in service. Specifically:
FV1801A – Basic cargo version for use by all arms
FV1801A/1 – Basic FFW (Fitted For Wireless) vehicle
FV1801A/2 – Ambulance with modified body
FV1801A/3 – Cable layer for signals use with rear-mounted drum
FV1801A/4 – 0.5” heavy machine gun mount (unarmored) – no windscreen fitted
FV1801A/5 – 0.303 Vickers machine gun mount (armored)
Weapons
The standard general service Champ was not armed but, like the Jeep before it, could be adapted to carry a variety of weapons for whatever task it might be called upon to fulfill. Weapons carried on various mounts included the .303 caliber Bren light machine gun, .303 Vickers machine gun, 7.62 mm Browning machine gun, a 106 mm recoilless rifle, and even a 3” mortar.
Introduced to the British airborne force in 1956, the 106 mm recoilless rifle, in particular, offered a valuable capability for them, specifically the ability to bring a weapon capable of defeating any known tank at the time on an airborne operation on a mobile platform. This weapon, the M40, was actually 105 mm in caliber, but classed and named as 106 mm to avoid confusion with 105 mm tank ammunition. Loaded with a single shell at the time via a folding breech, it could fire a high explosive anti-tank round capable of defeating up to 400 mm of armor to a maximum range of just under 7 km. With a .50 caliber spotting rifle attached to improve accuracy, the weapon proved its value in Suez 1956, when one was used to knock out a Soviet SU-100 belonging to Egyptian forces.
A Weapon’s Mount that is not
A Champ used in a short TV film from British comedy duo Morecambe and Wise featured a Vickers water-cooled machine gun mounted inside the passenger space. This was not the correct mounting point for the weapon and only seems to have appeared because of the show itself. The Vickers machine gun mount was carried, in the normal position, on the front left of the vehicle and, therefore, would not have to fire over or through the driver to get to the target. The correct positioning of the Vickers machine gun can be seen in the section titled ‘Armor’.
Armor
Fifty sets of armor plates were produced for the Champ as part of trials for the FV1801A/5 version. Each kit cost GBP£100 (GBP£3,200 in 2020 values) and they were trialed prior to 1959, as they were disposed of from stores starting in 1958. The armor protection was modest. A large single angled plate was mounted on the front, covering the vulnerable radiator extending just above the bonnet, and would deflect bullets upwards over the vehicle or down in the ground. For the men crewing the vehicle, two rectangular shields were provided, with one for the driver and another for the front seat passenger featuring a cut out for a .303 caliber Vickers water-cooled machine gun. Less clear at first glance is what appears to be a semi-circular armor plate riveted over the dashboard bulkhead. Presumably, a cut-out was provided for the dials so the crew could see the speed of the vehicle, but this additional protection would prevent shots that avoided the front deflector plate from injuring the crew by simply passing through the top of the vehicle above the bonnet. No side, rear, or roof armor protection was provided and the arrangement was clearly set out with a reconnaissance version in mind. The total weight of the armor is unclear, but it was not extensive, so it is unlikely to have affected the performance outside of making it harder for the driver to see where he was going. The thickness of the armor is also unknown, but to be of use ballistically, it would likely be 8 to 10 mm thick.
The high mounting position of the machine gun is also of note. Positioned as it was, the front seat passenger would clearly be able to operate the gun from a seated position, firing forwards with complete coverage for their head from the plating. This would not be the most accurate way of firing, as aiming would be very difficult. If accurate firing was needed, the operator could simply stand up and still have their torso behind the plate.
Service
The regular British Army got the Champ just too late for the war in Korea, but in time for the intervention in Suez in 1956. It was also issued to units in Germany with the British Army of the Rhine (B.A.O.R.), Far East Land Forces (F.E.L.F.) in Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore as well as units with Middle East Land Forces (M.E.L.F.) in places such as Cyprus, Egypt, Aden, Malta, and Libya. Other vehicles went to British Guiana and Caribbean Command (C.C.) in Jamaica as well as East Africa Command (E.A.C.) in Kenya and Uganda. Basically, everywhere the Army of the era would be stationed, one could expect a Champ to make an appearance.
The British Army was not the only user either. In 1953, 400 brand new Champs were also purchased by the Australian Army from the British Ministry of Supply. They wanted these as a supplement rather than as a replacement to the Jeep. This was followed by the purchase of another 400 used vehicles from British Army stocks. Two other Champs fitted with the Austin A90 engine instead of the Rolls Royce B40 were trialed in Australia but returned after testing. Like the British, who had fitted a recoilless rifle to theirs, one Australian vehicle was also fitted with an M401A1 106 mm rifle, but only on an experimental basis. All of the Australian vehicles were withdrawn from service in the mid-1960s.
The French Army also trialed a cargo version of the Champ in 1953, fitted with a one-ton winch. That Champ was tested by loading it with 400 kg of ballast and driving across various terrain. The Champ passed the French trials very well and performed better off-road than the French Delahaye VLR, but was eventually rejected in preference for the French vehicle.
The End
Automotively, the vehicle was excellent. It had good performance, great riding characteristics, was solidly built, and had a rugged and reliable engine with lots of commonality with other vehicles for a low logistic burden to support it. With that, it might be surmised that the vehicle was a success, but it was not. It was prone to misuse and abuse, being fun to drive off-road, which caused some issues with broken rear axles. The primary problem, just as it had been with the Mudlark, was a lack of attention to oil levels in the axles. The overly complex electrical system and other features also proved hard to service and the benefit of spares interchangeability across other vehicles proved to be less useful than it might have been.
Despite this, the vehicle was popular, comfortable, and fitted with a heater. This was guaranteed to win the hearts of many soldiers but all of these were side issues to the real problem. The Champ was a bit too good. It just cost too much and did more than the Army really needed. The designers had gone too far and really built the Rolls Royce of Jeeps when what was needed was more a Toyota of Jeeps, reliable, but at a better price. The Champ cost a whopping GBP£1,200 (GBP£35,500 in 2020 values) per vehicle. With some 15,000 on order, this meant a huge cost that post-war Britain could little afford to spend on gold-plated vehicles. With the arrival of a cost-effective alternative in the form of the Land Rover from Rover Motor Cars, at nearly half the price and nearly all the capability, the Champ was doomed. In 1955, with 11,732 built, production ended and the 86” wheelbase Land Rovers began to replace the Champ in regular army service as ‘Truck, ¼ ton, 4 x 4, GS, Rover Mk.3’. Around 500 of the civilian version of the Champ were also made.
As they were being phased out through the 1960s, the Champs were pushed through Territorial Army units before the final vehicles were sold off in 1968.
The Champ had proved a mixed blessing. It was more capable than the WW2-era Jeep, but it was complex and expensive. Soldiers did not enjoy the additional maintenance burden of looking after the Champ. Many road accidents which had occurred during its service gave rise to an impression of it being top-heavy or having a tendency to roll, although this was more to do with improper training or soldiers who were too used to the poor suspension on the Jeep, misjudging corners.
Survivors
Today, the Austin Champ remains a popular vehicle with military vehicle enthusiasts. Two of the pre-production vehicles were known to have survived into the 1970s, although they are currently of unknown status. One of the two Guttys produced survived at the Heritage Motor Centre in Gayden, Warwickshire. Two surviving Mudlarks are known, with one believed to be in the USA. Two of the 50 Champs built as armored versions still survive, with one in the USA, although neither is fitted with the original armor.
Austin Champ specifications
Dimensions
12’ (3.66 m) long, 5’ (1.65 m) wide, 6’ 8.5” (1.87 m) high with tilt erected
Crew
1 (Driver), seating for 5
Propulsion
Rolls Royce B40 2.838 liter petrol engine producing 80 bhp at 3,750 rpm, or Austin A90 2.66 liter petrol
Speed (road)
50 mph (80.5 km/h)
Armament
None but optionally fitted with machine guns or a recoilless rifle
Armor
None as standard but armor kits available est. 8 – 10 mm thick
For information about abbreviations check the Lexical Index
The construction of a short cut from the Pacific to the Atlantic Oceans was a pipe dream for much of the 19th century for both the British and Americans. If a canal existed, then trade would be substantially easier and the United States would be the prime beneficiary. Thus, the US took a keen political, economic, and military interest in the isthmus of Panama, with construction of the canal finally taking place before the First World War.
To protect its vital national interests, the United States maintained a large military presence there throughout the 20th century and should anything threaten that, they would be primed to respond. When, in the 1980s, with political arguments about the future control over the canal at their zenith and a new political leader in Panama in the form of Manuel Noriega, the scene was set for a confrontation between Panama and the USA. This culminated in an invasion of Panama by the US at the end of 1989 – an invasion which deposed Noriega and ensured US control over the canal until 1999, when it was handed over to the people of Panama. The invasion would see a series of combined aerial assaults on key facilities and special forces operations. Other than a few BTRs encountered during the invasion of Grenada 1983, the US potentially faced the prospect of using armored vehicles against enemy armored vehicles in combat for the first time since Vietnam.
The Canal
The construction of the Panama Canal was a political minefield too dangerous to cross for decades, but it was the dream of both the nascent United States and also British financial trading interests in the 19th century.
In 1850, Great Britain and the US agreed in principle to a canal, albeit through the isthmus in Nicaragua, in what was known as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The project never got further than the treaty but it did at least allay a rivalry between the two countries over who would build a canal and control trade between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. Such a canal would potentially shorten the route between the east and west coasts of the USA by 15,000 km.
In 1880, the French, led by Ferdinand de Lesseps, the man behind the construction of the Suez Canal, began excavation through what is now Panama. At the time, it was a province of Colombia. After 9 years of failure, Jessops’ program went bankrupt and, a decade later, in 1901, a new treaty was made. This Hay-Pauncefote Treaty replaced the earlier Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and, in 1902, the US Senate agreed to the plan for a canal. The site of the proposed canal was, however, the problem, with it being on Colombian territory and the financial offer made by the US to Colombia was rejected.
The result was a shameless act of imperialism from the allegedly anti-imperialist United States. Having not got their own way with negotiation with Colombia, President Theodore Roosevelt simply sent US warships, including the USS Dixie and USS Nashville, with a combined Naval and USMC landing party to Panama City to ‘support Panamanian independence’. Even if this move was really some modest effort at really supporting an independence movement, the timing was pure opportunism and, with Colombian troops unable to cross the Darien Strait (a heavily forested and mountainous area which, to this day, has no major highway through it) to come and contest the American move, Panamanian independence was established on 3rd November 1903.
It was not without risk, for Colombia was not happy with the theft of a province that was theirs. They landed 400 men at Colon and one ship shelled the city briefly, killing one person. It was only the quick action of the Commander of the USS Nashville, Cmdr. Hubbard, who warned the Colombians that a direct attack on US citizens now in Panama would be a very bad decision and be the start of a war with the USA. The Colombian troops re-embarked and left.
With a new and some may say ‘puppet’ government in the brand new country, it very kindly agreed to the Nay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty signed just 15 days after independence. The terms of this treaty were incredibly one-sided, with the US getting everything it could possibly want to allow it to build a canal and have a complete monopoly not only over the canal, lakes, and islands on its route but also to a strip of land 10 miles (16.1 km) wide in which the canal would be constructed. All the Panamanians got for this ransom payment was ‘independence’, albeit completely on US terms, a single payment of US$10 million (just under US$300 million in 2020 values) and an annual payment (starting in year 10) of US$250,000 (US$7.4 million is 2020 values).
If Roosevelt was ebullient about what he could see as a foreign policy coup of bullying a far weaker South American nation and obtaining what he wanted for the canal, then he had underestimated how hard it would be to build. Just 80.4 km long, the canal cost a phenomenal US$375 million (US$11.1 billion in 2020 values), along with an additional US$40 million (US$1.1 billion in 2020 values) to buy out remaining French interests (purchases began in 1902 with the Spooner Act), as Roosevelt could not simply bully or steal those as easily as he had done with the Colombians. With around 5,600 deaths from disease and the conditions, along with the construction costs, the US had made an incredible investment in the canal on the basis of the Nay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, granting it control in perpetuity over the canal zone.
Construction was finished in 1913 and the canal officially opened on 15th August 1914, but the Nay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty forced on the new Panamanian nation proved a continual irritant poisoning relations between the two countries. The 16.1 km strip of what was effectively US sovereign territory, governed much as a colony would be, with a Presidentially-appointed Governor, effectively bisected Panama. The Governor was also a director and President of the Panama Canal Company, a company registered in the United States, and also could, if required, direct the US armed forces stationed in this colony as required to protect the canal.
The continual political problems caused by the Nay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty led to a loosening of it in 1936 and again in 1955 when the US gave up its ‘right’ to take any additional land it needed and handed control of the ports at Colon and Panama City over to the Panamanians.
Civil strife in 1964 led to a March 1973 UN resolution (UNSC Resolution 330) on creating a new canal treaty between the USA and Panama, but the USA was unwilling to cede any control. Three nations abstained from voting on the resolution, the UK, France, and the United States.
With international pressure to do so, the USA finally conceded to Panama and, with the signing of a new treaty in September 1977 between the nations led by US President Jimmy Carter and Panamanian President Omar Torrijos. Under the terms of the treaty, the US received (for the duration of the treaty) the rights to transit the canal and also to defend it, but “The Republic of Panama shall participate increasingly in the management and protection and defense of the Canal…” (Article I.3). More importantly, this treaty laid out a timeline for the handover of the canal to full Panamanian control, with a Panamanian national to be appointed as the Deputy Administrator (the Administrator was to remain a US citizen) until 31st December 1999, when both Administrator and Deputy Administrator roles were to be fully ceded, with Panamanian citizens taking both positions.
The Rise of Noriega and the Collapse in Relations
In 1983, Colonel Manuel Antonio Noriega was made commander-in-chief of the military by Colonel Ruben Paredes. Paredes had to resign as commander in chief himself so he could run for the Presidency. Thus, Noriega replaced Parades and then contrived to persuade Parades to withdraw from the race for the Presidency, leading to the election of Eric Devalle as President. With a new President as a figurehead, it was actually Noriega who, as head of the Panamanian military, was the de facto leader of the country. Noriega was no newcomer to political intrigue or even the military. Even at the time of the last free election in Panama, in 1968, when a military coup had toppled President Arnulfo Arias, Noriega was on the scene. In 1968, he was still a young and rather capable intelligence officer who spent his time fostering contacts within the upper echelons of the Panamanian government. He sealed this by creating a close working partnership with the American Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) in supporting covert and often illegal operations against Nicaraguan and Salvadoran leftist groups. Add to this mix his penchant for corruption, intimidation, blackmail, and bribery, and he was destined for the government.
He had also cooperated with the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) on providing information on the shipment of cocaine from states like Colombia to the USA, but it was perhaps his helping of President Reagan’s and the CIA’s support for the Contras, a Nicaraguan rebel group based in Costa Rica, which is the most notorious. In this period, Noriega assisted in the flow of illegal arms supplies to the Contras via the Islamic Republic of Iran, in violation of the dispositions of the US Congress, as well as Reagan’s own promise to never deal with terrorists.
Noriega was playing both sides and was actually involved in the smuggling of cocaine into the USA. In February 1988, he was charged in US courts, indicted on drug-related charges in Florida. Following his indictment on drug offenses, the actual President of Panama, Eric Arturo Delvalle, attempted to fire Noriega and failed, as Noriega simply ignored him. In violation of Article V of the 1977 Treaty, which prohibited any intervention in the internal affairs of the Panamanian Republic, the US then encouraged the Panamanian military to overthrow Noriega, culminating in a failed coup attempt to remove him on 16th March 1988.
Faced with a deterioration in the security in the canal zone, it was clear that the existing US forces present, primarily the 193rd Infantry Brigade, were inadequate. President Reagan, therefore, sent an additional 1,300 troops from both the Army and Marines to bolster the 193rd. It was not until 5th April 1988 that this additional force arrived. This defense plan was known as ‘Elaborate Maze’.
The US Forces deployed to Panama in April 1988 for Operation Elaborate Maze were
16th Military Police Brigade
59th Military Police Battalion
118th Military Police Battalion
A Marine rifle company from 6th Marine Expeditionary Force
Aviation Task Force Hawk consisting of the 23rd Aviation and an attack helicopter company.
7th Infantry Division (light), including 3rd Battalion
Presidential elections in Panama followed in May 1989. During these, despite the best efforts of Noriega to intimidate voters in favor of his own Presidential candidate, Carlos Duque, the winner was Guillermo Endara, as a candidate for the Democratic Alliance of Civic Opposition (ADOC). Noriega simply ignored this result and tried to nullify the outcome, appointing Duque as President. The USA, again, despite it being a violation of Article V of the 1977 treaty, criticized Noriega. For his part, Noriega was clearly frustrated with the US criticism and was unsubtle in his refusal to accept his own electoral defeat, even going so far as to have one of his Dignity Battalions assault a protest led by Endara and his running mate Guillermo Ford, leaving them both injured. Despite these events against Endara and Ford, it is important to note that they never requested US intervention. Even so, Noriega’s actions were destabilizing the region. The Organisation of American States (OAS), not often a friendly voice in favor of US regional hegemony, joined in with the criticism of Noriega and requested he step down. Despite this OAS request, only the USA recognized Endara as the legitimate head of government.
President Reagan had left office in January 1989 and his Vice-President, George H. Bush, took over as President having won the 1988 elections in the US. Bush was equally as hawkish as Reagan and, in April 1989, he too deployed additional forces to Panama during Operation Nimrod Dancer.
US Forces deployed to Panama in April 1989 for Operation Nimrod Dancer
Brigade Headquarters
a Light Infantry Battalion from 7th Infantry Division
a Marine light armored company equipped with LAV-25 Light Armoured Vehicles
Along with this troop deployment came Operation Blade Jewel – the evacuation of all unnecessary personnel along with military families to the United States. This not only included soldiers’ families, but also those troops whose deployment was the longest too, which obviously served to actually reduce the potential security force in situ in Panama. This particular decision to evacuate some military personnel was later identified as a critical mistake which served only to reduce the operational readiness of aviation resources.
In an escalating war of words and diplomatic slapping, in August 1989, the USA announced that it will not accept a candidate from Panama as Administrator of the Canal appointed by the Panamanian Government. This was even though the 1977 treaty provided that a Panamanian was to replace the US national as Administrator on 1st January 1990.
Noriega retaliated by doubling down and, on 1st September 1989, he appointed a government of loyalists. The US response was simply to refuse to recognise it. As tensions increased through September, more incidents of harassment of US troops and civilians around the Canal Zone were reported in what amounted to a policy of taunting by Noriega.
Despite this obvious destabilization in Panama, a second round of US troop withdrawals known as Operation Blade Jewel II took place, removing more service personnel and their dependents. Once more, the CIA was to try and interfere in internal Panamanian politics (in violation of the 1977 Treaty) by encouraging and helping to organise a Panamanian military coup out of neighbouring Costa Rica. About 200 junior officers led by Major Moises Giroldi were involved in a series of skirmishes around Panama City on 3rd October 1989, but they were quickly quashed by troops from Battalion 2000.
Seemingly having failed to get a candidate they liked elected fairly (the US-supported Endara with around US$10 million of financial assistance in his campaign), and having failed twice to oust Noriega by means of the CIA instigating a coup, there was now little the US could do short of a full-scale invasion.
Planning for Invasion
As of November, the choice of invasion as the means to remove Noriega was the only one left on the menu. Thus, contingency plans for the invasion were already underway under the code name ‘Blue-Spoon’ by General Maxwell Thurman (US Southern Command). This was to take the form of helicopter assaults on various key local locations. On 15th November, a group of M551 Sheridans (slightly more than a platoon’s worth) from 3-73 Armor was loaded onto a C5A Galaxy transport aircraft for deployment to Panama. This contingent was made up of 4 tanks and a command and control unit. These tanks arrived on the 16th at Howard Air Force Base and were kept undercover to conceal their presence from any prying eyes. When they were seen out, they were seen displaying a repainted bumper, removing the logo of the 82nd Airborne and replacing it with the unit identification for the 5th Infantry Division instead. As this was routine in Panama for jungle training, it was felt, would be less suspicious.
The plan for their use was for the four tanks to work with a platoon of Marines equipped with the LAV-25 to conduct reconnaissance operations under the unsubtle name ‘Team Armor’.
On top of those tanks in situ in Panama, an ‘armor ready company’ size element was prepared at Fort Bragg, North Carolina to accompany and support the deployment of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. As such, four of the M551 were fitted for low-velocity air delivery (LVAD), whilst other vehicles were prepared for air delivery for a rollout from an aircraft that had landed. This would be the first time the M551 was ever dropped outside of a training environment.
In late November, intelligence reports came in that Noriega and Colombian Drug Cartels were plotting car-bomb attacks on US facilities, which ramped up US security concerns for their forces in Panama. On 30th November, the US upped the ante with the imposition of economic sanctions on Panamanian ships, which prevented them from landing at US ports. This might not seem significant given how small Panama is, but Panama is actually used widely as a flag on convenience. For example, as of 1989, there were 11,440 vessels flying the Panamanian flag and none of these or the 65.6 million gross tonnes of cargo they would carry globally could land at a US port.
It’s War – Sort Of
On 15th December 1989, Noriega finally jumped the shark in his intimidation game of brinksmanship with the US and declared that a state of war existed with the USA in retaliation for the banning of Panamanian ships from US harbors. This was clearly not a serious or credible declaration of war in the sense of an actual direct conflict due to the gross mismatch in nations’ military capacities but an effort to make sure that Noriega was granted the official titular position as “chief of government”. It was also clearly a response to the shipping blockage which was taken for what it was, a blatant act of aggression against Panama. Such an action could cripple it financially. The Panamanian Assembly, full of Noriega’s loyalists, declared him to be the “maximum leader of the struggle for national liberation”, which perhaps shows the motivation all along – getting the US out of Panama.
Whilst some commentators have post-script, taken this declaration as the justification for the invasion, this is countered by the statements of President Bush’s White House Spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, who declared this ‘war’ as “another hollow step in [Noriega’s] attempt to force his rule on the Panamanian people”. Despite the raised tensions, no additional special precautions were put in place in Panama.
A day is a long time in politics and just a day after this hollow and rather pointless declaration of frustration by the Panamanians, the situation changed dramatically. This was when four off-duty US Officers drove past a Panamanian Defense Forces (P.D.F.) checkpoint and were fired upon. A passenger in that car, US Marine Lt. Paz was killed. Another passenger was wounded by the P.D.F. This shooting death marked the culmination of months of harassment by P.D.F. forces against US troops. For example, in August 1989, the US cited some 900 incidents of harassment (since February 1986) against US military personnel in Panama although it is notable that this was also the month that the US decided to detain 9 men of the P.D.F. and 20 Panamanian civilians who were ‘interfering’ with US military maneuvers in Panama, showing there was at least some tit for tat behavior taking place. Nonetheless, it was the killing of Lt. Paz which persuaded the US it needed to intervene and not the declaration the day before.
“Last Friday, Noriega declared a state of war with the United States. The next day, the P.D.F. shot to death an unarmed American serviceman, wounded another, seized and beat another serviceman, and sexually threatened his wife. Under these circumstances, the President decided he must act to prevent further violence.”
George H. W. Bush, 16th December 1989
Following the death of Lt. Paz, the US initiated its development phase of the invasion plan, making sure its forces were in place and, by 18th December 1989, this was complete.
For the M551s delivered in November, this entailed the fitting of 0.5” caliber heavy machine guns onto the mounts on the turrets and loading Shillelagh missiles. It is noteworthy that rules of engagement given to crews of the M551s were that approval for firing the main gun had to be sought from, and given by, the task force commander due to the high risk of hitting friendly troops or civilians or of causing collateral damage.
It is notable that, under the terms of the Charter of the Organization of American States, Article 18, “[n]o state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state.” Article 20 states that no state may militarily occupy another under any situation and, on top of this, the UN Charter says that nations must settle disputes by peaceful means. Both Panama and the USA were signatories to the two treaties. The only real substantive justification for the US invasion was for self-defense in response to an armed attack (Article 51 UN Charter), for which the incident with Lt. Paz was perhaps inflated to be an indicator of a larger and more widespread assault than perhaps an unfortunate accident or action of a few individuals. Had Noriega chosen to condemn the shooting of Lt. Paz publicly, he might have stymied the US justification, but it seems he was as overconfident as always and perhaps never imagined that the US might actually take direct action. Certainly, the poor state of readiness of the P.D.F. on the day of the actual invasion shows that little preparation had actually been made. US intelligence had found out that Noriega’s plan in the event of an invasion was the somewhat casual idea of sending his forces into the wilderness to wage some sort of insurgency. Given that zero effort seems to have been made, even after the ‘declaration’ of war, this seems less of a plan and more of an ill-conceived idea. This is even more surprising given that the Panamanians knew of a plan for the invasion. Extensive activity out of the normal could be easily seen in the Canal Zone, and the news media ensconced in the Marriott Hotel in Panama City had been alerted to mobilize. On top of that, the departure of the 82nd Airborne from Fort Bragg was even broadcast on US news the night before. For a former intelligence officer like Noriega, his actions can only be described as so blissfully self-confident. He seems to have thought it was never going to happen or was simply asleep at the wheel. A US Army account of these first hours details that Noriega was busy visiting a sex worker when the attack happened, so he may not have been asleep but was certainly otherwise engaged.
Later analysis of intercepted Panamanian radio traffic and phone calls actually showed that whilst Noriega might have been absent in the decision-making process, the men were not. Roadblocks had been set up leading to La Comandancia (the P.D.F. headquarters building) and individual units and installation commanders of the P.D.F. were notified of an impending attack.
Nonetheless, the fact that American planners for Blue Spoon (known later and more boringly as ‘OPLAN 90’) were concerned over possible dispersal of Panamanian forces into the interior (a concern which may stem in part from the debacle of Vietnam) added impetus for a rapid and multipronged strike to remove all Panamanian forces in one fell swoop.
The wranglings over the legal justification of the invasion amounted to a little bit of this being America’s Suez Canal crisis. The somewhat flimsy legal justifications offered by the US for its actions were perhaps a prelude to a little over a decade later when the next President Bush would have his own invasion of a sovereign nation on spurious grounds to contend with.
20th December 1989
With the background of steadily escalating tensions between Panama and the US, Bush’s hawkishness, and Noriega’s naivety and overconfidence, the stage was set for the invasion. Blue Spoon (OPLAN 90) was officially Operation Just Cause, as military planners felt it more fitting than ‘Operation Blue Spoon’ although perhaps this ignores the whole point of a code name. Regardless of the rights and wrongs of the change in the operation’s name, it was put into action on 20th December 1989.
That day, President Bush ordered 12,000 extra troops to Panama to supplement the 13,600 already there with four publicly stated objectives:
1 – Safeguard American lives
2 – Protect the democratic election process
3 – To arrest Noriega for drug trafficking and bring him to the USA for trials
4 – Protect the Panama Canal Treaty
The invasion began at 0100 hours on 20th December 1989, a time selected by General Stiner as being the most likely to achieve total surprise and also ensure no commercial traffic at Torrijos airport (Torrijos was a civilian airport next to Tocumen airfield, which was a military airbase) which might get in the way. Led by aircraft from Task Force HAWK, 160th Special Operations Aviation Group, 1st Battalion 228th Aviation Regiment (based out of Fort Kobbe) along with 1st Battalion of the 82 Airborne Division deployed across Panama.
US troops deployed included Rangers / Paratroopers, light infantry, and Navy Marines and Seals, totaling some 26,000 soldiers involved in a complex scenario involving a simultaneous attack on 27 targets.
Arranged against this US force was the Panamanian Defense Force, with just two infantry battalions and ten independent infantry companies. Armor-wise, the Panamanians had 38 Cadillac Gage armored cars purchased from the USA. The first of those vehicles arrived in Panama from the USA in 1973, consisting of 12 of the V-150 APC variant, and four V-150(90) variants. In 1983, a further delivery arrived in the form of three V-300 Mk.2 IFV variants, and 9 of the V-300 APCs, including a Command Post vehicle and an ARV vehicle.
The three V-300 Mk.2 IFV vehicles were to be fitted with the Cockerill CM-90 turret and gun imported from Belgium in 1983 and meant that, at least on paper, Panama had a significant anti-tank threat that had to be contended with.
The Cadillac Gage ‘Commando’ was first produced in the early 1960s and was available in a wide range of options. The V-150 was an upgrade to the original V-100 and was actually based on the V-200 and fitted with either a diesel or petrol engine. The vehicles use a drive system similar to the popular M34-series of trucks and capable of up to 100 km/h on the road. Protected by a monocoque welded steel shell made from Cadaloy*, the vehicle (4 wheeled version) weighed just 7 tonnes and yet was tough enough to resist 7.62 mm ammunition at 90 degrees and 0.50” caliber ammunition at 45 degrees. The standard 10-tonne V-150 APC was a four-wheel drive vehicle with no turret, a single-roof-mounted machine gun, a crew of two, and space in the back for up to 6 men. The ‘90’ version of the V-150 was the same basic vehicle but fitted with a small turret containing a single 20 mm cannon.
[* A type of high hardness steel plate (~500 Brinell)]
The later V-300s were longer (6.4 m instead of 5.7 m), as the chassis had been extended so that a third axle for two more wheels could be added. This allowed for greater internal space for troops in the APC version and also for a greater load capacity. The IFV version came with firing ports cut into the upper hull sides in the troop compartment and could carry 8 men in reasonable comfort in the back. It was onto this V-300 IFV variant that the Cockerill CM-90 was mounted. Panama bought the 15-tonne Mk.II version of the V-300, which featured a larger fuel tank and an improved power train over the earlier Mk.I.
The Cadillac-Gage armored cars were robust, cheap, and mechanically simple enough that these vehicles were ideal for a military with a modest budget but who needed some armored firepower. Modified with the addition of the 90 mm Cockerill turret, Panama effectively had wheeled tanks and, if they could be deployed properly, could constitute a genuine threat to US ground forces and their own armored elements.
Panama also had its own special forces units, including 11 Battalions de la Dignidad paramilitary battalions and some nondescript ‘leftist’ units. Membership of such units was somewhat informal with a total of between 2,500 and 5,000 active members in total. Their value as a combat force was extremely marginal.
Highly mobile thanks to the off-road motorbikes and well-armed with automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades, this member of the 7th Infantry Company P.D.F. known as ‘Macho de Monte’ is barely in uniform, with just a black tee-shirt and blue jeans. The ability of such forces to move rapidly and possibly harass US forces meant that it was vital for US forces to control as far as possible the movement of Panamanian forces. Source: Armed Forces of Panama
The Panamanian police, known as the Fuerza de Policia (F.P.), was also armed and consisted of around 5,000 personnel with small arms, although two public order or ‘civil disturbances’ units were within this Police force, known officially as the 1st and 2nd Companias de Antimotines (English: 1st and 2nd Anti Riot Companies) and more casually as the ‘Doberman’ and ‘Centurion’ companies.
There was also the less visible Departamento de Nacional de Investigaciones (D.E.N.I.) (English: National Department of Investigation). This innocuous-sounding organization was made up of around 1,500 personnel and was little more than a barely disguised secret police force. Other smaller units available and armed within Panama included the Guardia Presidencial (English: Presidential Guard), Guardia Penitenciaria (English: Penitentiary Guard), Fuerza de Police Portuario (English: Port Guard Police), and the Guardia Forestal (English: Forest Guard).
The Panamanian Navy, or ‘Fuerza da Marina Nacional’ (FMN) (English: National Naval Force), was headquartered at Fort Amador, with vessels berthed at Balboa and Colon. It was a small force of just 500 or so troops and operated 8 landing craft and 2 logistics support ships made from converted landing craft, as well as a single troop transport.
There was also a single Naval Infantry company, the ‘1st Compania de Infanteria de Marina) (English: 1st Naval Infantry Company), based at Coco Solo, and a small force of Naval Commandos (Peloton Comandos de Marina) based out of Fort Amador.
The Fuerza Aérea Panameña (FAP) (English: Panamanian Air Force) was a tiny force of just 500 personnel. It operated 21 Bell UH-1 helicopters (2nd Airborne Infantry Company) as well as some training, VIP, and transport aircraft. This force amounted, across all aircraft including trainers, to just 38 fixed-wing aircraft on top of those helicopters. It did, however, also control a series of ZPU-4 anti-aircraft systems.
The US, on the other hand, had a substantial military with an enormous budget and huge technical and vehicle resources at its disposal. American forces had a stock of the venerable M113 armored personnel carrier which had been in service since the 1960s. Looking like a tracked shoebox, with 50 mm of aluminum armor, the M113 was an ideal transport for moving goods or men from A to B, on or off-road whilst being protected from small arms fire.
The wheeled LAV (1983) series was a relatively new vehicle in the US inventory. Delivered to units from 1983 to 1984, the LAV had a crew of 3 with seats for an additional 4 to 6 troops in the back. At just over 11 tonnes, the 8 x 8 platform, built under license in Canada by GM Canada, was a license-built vehicle originally designed by the Swiss firm of MOWAG. Featuring a basic hull made from 12.7 mm thick aluminum, the vehicle was fitted as standard with a steel-applique armor kit providing protection from small arms fire and shell splinters. Ballistic protection was rated up to that of the Soviet 14.5 mm AP bullet at 300 m. Powered by a General Motors 6v53T V6 diesel engine delivering 275 hp powered the LAV. It could reach speeds of up to 100 km/h on the road and 10 km/h in the water when used amphibiously. Various armament options existed for the LAV as a platform, including mortar, TOW anti-tank missiles, command and control, recovery, air defense, or a general-purpose APC with a 25 mm M242 cannon and 7.62 mm machine gun in a small turret. Of note is that, although the gun-version was fully stabilized, no vehicle was issued to units fitted with a thermal sight until 1996 – after the Panamanian invasion.
Four US battalions were issued with the LAVs, including one reserve battalion. These four were designated as LAV battalions until 1988. In 1988, the LAV designation for the battalion was changed to ‘Light Armored Infantry’ (LAI), a term which stayed in use until they were rebranded once more in 1993 as ‘Light Armored Reconnaissance’ (LAR). The first operational use of the LAV by US forces would be in the 1989 invasion of Panama.
Later to form part of Task Force Semper Fidelis, Marine Force Panama (MFP) included 2nd Light Armored Infantry Battalion made up of four companies, A, B, C, and D. A and B Companies were used as part of Operation Nimrod Dancer, C Company in Operation Promote Liberty for the post-invasion nation-building, and D Company in Operation Just Cause – the actual invasion itself.
Prior to the invasion, A Company 2nd LAI arrived in Panama and used its complement of LAVs to provide escort duty for convoys, reconnaissance, and patrolling, but also served as a rapid reaction force if required. B Company 2nd LAI arrived next and, like A Company, conducted reconnaissance and security operations. D Company 2nd LAI was the third company to be deployed from 2nd LAI in Panama. This company was deployed as a show of force against the Panamanian ‘Dignity’ Battalions (a form of irregular militia which liked to set up ad-hoc roadblocks and carry out general intimidation of US forces and citizens). Prior to the invasion, D Company managed to achieve success in this work by accident. A crowd, whipped up to create disorder and possibly attack American interests, was held at a roadblock by a LAV on D Co. 2nd LAI. When the gunner negligently discharged a high explosive round from the 25 mm cannon and decapitated a telegraph pole, this crowd suddenly decided that courage in the face of armored fighting vehicles was not something it had and quickly dispersed.
On other occasions, they were not so lucky, and, multiple times, Marines had to retreat to the safety of their LAVs as hostile crowds beat on the vehicles with sticks and stones. In one encounter, a LAV was actually deliberately rammed by a pickup truck, damaging the front right wheel. These incidents continued to get worse right up to the death of Lt. Paz.
The Go
The go order for operations was given by President Bush on 17th December, with the invasion set for 0100 hours, 20th December. Efforts at secrecy seem to have been somewhat half-hearted as, the night before the invasion, there were certainly rumors abound. Some P.D.F. forces were already responding, although it has to be said that this appears to have been totally uncoordinated from the top. With invasion set for 0100 hours, some P.D.F. forces actually infiltrated the US airbase at Albrook and attacked US special forces as they were boarding helicopters destined for the attack on the Pacora River Bridge. Wounding two US troops, the Panamanians withdrew.
A second preemptive action took place at Fort Cimarron, where a column of vehicles was seen heading towards the city. Other troops were seen moving towards Pacora Bridge and the actual 0100 hours ‘H’ hour was advanced by 15 minutes to try and prevent these small P.D.F. forces creating a lot of problems for the great invasion plan.
US Invasion Forces
The US strikes on Panama would be multiple and coordinated using various task forces. Joint Task Force South, responsible for command and control of tactical operations, created four ground task forces; Atlantic, Pacific, Bayonet, and Semper Fidelis. These names very much indicated the source and type of the task force. Other smaller task forces were created for specific targets, such as Black Devil for Fort Amador (operating under Task Force Bayonet).
Special forces assigned to TFSF were color-coded, with Black being 3rd Battalion 7th Special Forces, Green being Army Delta Force, Red (Rangers), and Blue and White (SEALs). For some of these, the incursion was performed with little more than crossing the road, such was the proximity of the US forces to the invasion targets assigned.
Task Force Atlantic (TFA) in Action – Madden Dam, Gamboa, Renacer Prison and Cerro Tigre
TFA, under the command of Colonel Keith Kellogg and consisting of 3rd Battalion of the 504th Airborne Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, would be carried in OH-58A helicopters rather than the usual UH-1, as those were already allocated for other duties.
Madden Dam (TFA)
Tasked with the seizure of strategic locations, the first destination was the Madden Dam. Retaining the Chagres River and forming the 75 m deep Lake Alajuela, the dam was a key element in balancing the water system of the Panama Canal. It was also a road bridge for the highway connecting both sides of Panama and a hydro-electric generating plant, so the loss of this facility could potentially cripple both the canal and the country. A Company, 3rd Battalion, 504th Infantry moved overnight 32 km to seize the dam. They arrived to find the few P.D.F. guards ineffective and they quickly gave up with no casualties. TFA’s first key goal was taken.
Of note at Madden Dam is that, although it was one of the first locations seized during the invasion, it was also the last. Late afternoon on the 23rd, around 30 men believed to be from a Dignity Battalion and still armed, but carrying a white flag, approached the US forces still guarding the dam. When the US paratroopers approached them to collect their weapons they were fired upon and had to fire back. In this last exchange of fire, 10 American soldiers were wounded and 5 Panamanians were dead.
Next on 20th December, after Madden Dam, was the town of Gamboa, where 160 US citizens who worked for the Canal Commission lived. A Company, 3rd Battalion, 504th Airborne Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, was landed nearby at McGrath Field by a single UH-1C with 11 men and a pair of CH-47s with 25 men each. These troops quickly moved to disarm a small P.D.F. detachment and take over the barracks of the Fuerzas Femininas (FUFEM) (English: Female counter-intelligence soldiers). Most of the women of the FUFEM fled into the jungle. By 0300 hours, just 2 hours into the invasion, the town of Gamboa and its US citizens were secured. Fire had been directed against the helicopters as they came in, but as they were blacked out, none were hit and there were no casualties.
Renacer Prison (TFA)
The next target was the Renacer Prison, a relatively small facility on the other side of the Chagres River guarded by around 20 to 25 Panamanians. At least two American citizens and a number of Panamanian political prisoners were known to be housed there. Attacking it was C Company, 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division along with elements of 307th Engineer Battalion (Demolition), 1097th Transportation Company (landing craft), and three military police. The prison was the site where political opponents to Manuel Noriega were held, ranging from civilians who protested, to political opponents, all the way up to some of those who had taken part in the failed coup the previous year.
It was felt imperative to the US that these prisoners be freed, so an assault had to be actioned. Using helicopters from the landing ship Fort Sherman, two UH-1s from B Company, 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment would land inside the prison compound (each with 11 men of 2nd platoon), with a third UH-1 along with an OH-58C remaining airborne, circling around outside as support.
The remainder of 2nd Platoon (armed with M60 machine guns and AT-4 anti-tank weapons), along with 3rd Platoon, were then landed by Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) on the banks of the canal next to the prison. The OH-58C and UH-1 flying support outside the compound provided fire support from their 20 mm cannons and 2.75” unguided rockets. A company sniper located on the OH-58C provided additional security.
The sniper subdued the guard in the prison’s tower, followed by suppressive fire courtesy of the 20 mm cannon from an AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunship. The company moved in and resistance was intense but undirected and uncoordinated, even as the infantry entered the prison and released 64 prisoners. In a virtually perfect operation, the complex was fully captured within minutes with no US or prisoner fatalities. Five Panamanian guards were dead and 17 more were taken prisoner. Other than minor injuries for four US troops, six of the prisoners being hit, a single Cobra helicopter receiving a single bullet strike, and an incident with a 3 m high fence which was not on the plans and had to be cut with bayonets, the plan was a success.
Cerro Tigre (TFA)
The final objective for TFA was Cerro Tigre, where a major P.D.F. logistics hub was co-located with an electrical distribution centre. After all the previous successes, it was perhaps a pity for TFA that Cero Tigre was a mess. The helicopters to be used in the landing, CH-47s and UH-1s, had problems that delayed the landing. The two UH-1s had arrived on time at 0100 hours, but the pair of CH-47s were delayed. The 0100 ‘surprise’ was generally over anyway, but this extra 5-minute delay further alerted forces on the ground to the approach of the US troops (B Company, 3rd Battalion, 504th Airborne Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division). The result was that P.D.F. forces were firing at the US forces as the helicopters dropped them off on the golf course. Luckily for the Americans, no one was killed and no helicopters were shot down. Nonetheless, the element of surprise was gone and the guardhouse stubbornly resisted the US approach. It is perhaps fortunate that this assault counted with an AH-1 Cobra gunship which supported their operations by engaging multiple suspected P.D.F. positions with 2.75” rocket fire.
Two US soldiers were wounded in the action, possibly by shell fragments from friendly fire, and the P.D.F. forces eventually relented and melted away into the jungle. This was not the end of the resistance around Cerro Tigre. Having taken the outer buildings, the American forces still had to occupy the main compound and yet more gunfire was exchanged. Here, the fire and manoeuver skills of the infantry proved their worth and no one was killed, with the P.D.F. forces deciding discretion was needed and again disappeared into the jungle. An operation which had started rather messily had worked out well despite the flirtation with disaster.
Coco Solo (TFA)
Operations for TFA in the south were equally successful. The military police detachment assigned to TFA quickly closed off the entrance to Coco Solo Naval Station at Colon 30 minutes prior to H hour, shooting one Panamanian guard in the process. Unfortunately, this gunshot alerted the 1st Compania de Infanteria de Marina (English: 1st Naval Infantry Company), the troops of which moved to leave their barracks and head towards their motorboats (armed with machine guns and 20 mm cannons). A company from 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry had to rush to their positions around Coco Solo as gunfire began in the area.
Two boats belonging to the Naval Infantry managed to get out of the harbor and, despite US gunfire, managed to get to sea. By the time the US forces had cleared out the Coco Solo station, 2 Panamanian troops were dead and another 27 captured. The rest were presumed to have escaped in the boats or into town.
During the security phase of the seizure of the station just outside the City of Colon, one soldier was killed by Panamanian gunfire. Nonetheless, the routes in and out of Colon were secure by 0115 hours. In total, 12 Panamanian troops had been killed. The city, however, was a problem. There was significant lawlessness, with looting meaning a lot of civilians were present on the streets. This was a heavily populated area and, although P.D.F. forces were known to still be in the city, two operations to clear the city had to be cancelled for fear of civilian casualties.
The situation was stabilised by a phone call from a former P.D.F. officer to troops still in Colon to encourage them to give up. On the morning of the 22nd, those 200 did exactly that. With the risk of a gun battle in the city over, US forces entered the city from the seaward and landward sides and restored order, with the notable exception of the city’s Customs Police HQ building.
A US infantry company, supported by artillery, shot at the building until, seeing the futility of holding out, these forces also saw sense and gave themselves up. The result, however, was that Colon was not officially under US control until the end of the 22nd.
Fort Espinar (TFA)
The P.D.F. forces at Fort Espinar were likewise problematic. Even though the commander of the P.D.F.’s 8th Company, based there, had fled when he found out about the attack, his men were far more stoic. This force refused to surrender even after US forces liberally sprayed their barracks with 20 mm M61 Vulcan gun-fire. It was not until an offer of surrender was made that 40 P.D.F. troops surrendered, leaving one US soldier wounded. A second attack on a P.D.F. training facility nearby left another 40 P.D.F. soldiers in custody and 2 wounded, although 6 US troops were injured by a misthrown hand grenade.
The resistance at Coco Solo and Fort Espinar was, however, an exception. The other targets for TFA fell quickly without much incident, meaning that, within just a couple hours, the naval station, fort, France Airfield (Colon’s small airport), and Coco Solo hospital were all secure.
Task Force Pacific in Action – Torrijos/Tocumen Airport, Panama Viejo, Fort Cimarron, and Tinajitas
Torrijos/Tocumen Airfields (TFP and TFR)
The airports would be seized by Task Force Red and then serve as a base from which to launch Task Force Pacific to their targets. Troops from C Company, 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment with 1st Battalion, 75th Rangers found little opposition at the large commercial Torrijos Airport. At 0100 hours, two AH-6 gunships supported by a single AC-130 gunship began firing at targets, taking out the control tower and guard towers in a barrage lasting 3 minutes. At 0103 hours, four companies of Rangers parachuted in from 150 m with the goal of securing the airport within 45 minutes so that elements of the 82nd Airborne could arrive. There was a relatively brief and inconsequential exchange of fire and, on schedule, within an hour of landing, the airport was in the Rangers’ hands, having suffered just two wounded, but having killed 5 and captured 21 more.
The arrival of the 82nd Airborne was a problem. Bad weather in the US had caused delays in their arrival and, instead of dropping in one giant wave at 0145 hours, they were in fact dropped in five different waves from 0200 to 0500 hours, providing a tempting target for the Panamanians. Thankfully for the planners, the problem did not result in any casualties.
There, the close proximity of parachute drops over an area in which helicopters were in use meant there was a risk of unpleasant accidents involving helicopter blades and slowly descending troops. Somewhat thankfully, no one was hurt. A bigger problem was the desire to airdrop in their heavy equipment consisting of the M551 Sheridans and M998 HMMWVs, which went wrong. For a start, these vehicles had to be dropped away from the troops for fear of the obvious consequences of dropping both in the same place. This led to a delay in recovery of the equipment, which was not finished until 0900 hours, with some of it found outside the airport in the long grass. Second was damage from the drop. One M551 was utterly wrecked when it landed far too hard and a second was damaged. Of the M998 HMMWVs dropped, which were to haul light artillery, four of them were damaged in the drop. By 0900 hours, when the equipment had been found and recovered, this force was seriously diminished, with 2 tanks down, 4 HMMWVs damaged, and just two of the M102 howitzers operational. One vehicle was not recovered until 29th December (9 days after the attack), as it had been dropped in a marsh.
The delay in the landings of troops and equipment meant that the planned ‘hop’ by helicopter to their next operational goal was also seriously delayed. Helicopters clearly could not start moving even after the first wave of troops arrived, as more might be dropped on top of them. It was not until 4 hours after the attack should have happened, at 0615 hours, that troops from the 82nd got to Panama Viejo.
Despite the problems and delays, by the end of 20th, the primary international and military airfields at Torrijos and Tocumen were firmly in US hands. Overnight, into the 21st, another brigade of the 7th Infantry Division was landed at Torrijos to reinforce the US presence and then shipped to Rio Hato airfield to support and relieve the Rangers who had seized it. The rest of the 7th Infantry Division (along with various other military support elements, like communications and logistics forces) was landed at Howard Air Force Base by the 24th to provide additional security required by what was now an Army of occupation in Panama.
Panama Viejo (TFP)
The P.D.F. barracks at Panama Viejo stood on a promontory sticking out into the Bay of Panama. They housed around 250 troops, along with around 70 of their special forces related to counter-terrorist (UESAT) and commando units, and 180 men from 1st Cavalry Squadron, with a number armored vehicles.
Panama Viejo was to be seized in a simultaneous attack in conjunction with the attack on Tinajitas and Fort Cimarron. Thanks to delays, the attack on Panama Viejo did not start until 0650 hours, by which time it was daylight and there was zero element of surprise on the side of the Americans.
Straddling Panama Viejo were to be two rather small landing zones named Bobcat (north) and Lion (south) for the 2nd Battalion, 504th Airborne Infantry (Parachute Infantry Regiment), 82nd Airborne Division. These troops arrived in 18 UH-60 Blackhawks, supported by 4 AH-1 Cobras and a pair of AH-64 Apaches from Team Wolf Apache. The troops were fired upon by P.D.F. forces as they were being delivered, but the fire was mostly ineffectual.
They were to be delivered into these landing zones in two equal halves from 9 UH-60s at each location, starting at 0650 hours. The lack of effective opposition encountered was fortunate, as the first approach of troops at the landing zone closest to the Bay of Panama managed to land the paratroopers into the mudflats (LZ Lion) live on CNN. It was not until the helicopters were leaving that some small arms were directed at the helicopters. However, unable to identify the source, they did not return fire.
The UH-60 helicopters from 7th Infantry Division (Light) and 1st Battalion, 228th Aviation Regiment, which had dropped them off, had to come to rescue the troops stranded in the mud whilst some more were saved by Panamanian civilians forming human chains to stop them drowning in the morass. The presence of these civilians was obviously welcome for the stranded and somewhat helpless soldiers, who were sitting ducks for any P.D.F. forces who might want to shoot them. They also hampered the operation, as helicopter gunships could no longer fire on P.D.F. forces for fear of hitting the civilians.
The second landing zone went slightly better. They did not trap their men in an impassable bog, which was good, but did manage to deliver them into elephant grass over 2 meters high meaning they could not see a thing and were effectively lost. Just as with the first landings, some small arms fire was received on the way back. This fire did not bring any aircraft down but three helicopters were so badly damaged they could not be reused without repair.
It was not until 1040 hours that day that Panama Viejo had been seized and firing from P.D.F. forces ceased. In total, only around 20 P.D.F. forces had even been at Panama Viejo and the rest had left hours earlier with their commander. Had some semblance of resistance at this location been mounted and led on the ground, then instead of three damaged helicopters, it could have been a slaughter. US planners got very lucky. Seemingly, many P.D.F. troops did not even know that an invasion had even started, as some were arrested by US forces the next morning as they arrived for work in their cars.
Tinajitas Barracks (TFP)
The barracks at Tinajitas was home to the P.D.F. 1st Infantry Company, known as the ‘Tigers’, who had both 81 and 120 mm mortars. Located on a strategic hill (Tinajitas Hill), there were numerous electrical lines running nearby. This meant a very hazardous approach route for any helicopter, which would not only have to land forces on the edge of the sloping hillside, but under the observation of the forces in their elevated position on the hill.
A single UH-60 landed on a hill to the west of the barracks, near to a Baha’i temple, where it dropped a mortar squad to support the attack and also to deny the use of that high ground to the P.D.F. Six UH-60s were to go to the other landing zone near to the barracks, supported by three AH-1s.
Even prior to landing, these helicopters were seen and the defenders made sure of a hot reception with heavy fire from the ground. They had taken positions within a shanty town near to the barracks. The presence of so many civilians meant that the US crews were reluctant to return fire unless the target was clearly hampering the landing. Nonetheless, and despite this heavy fire, the paratroopers were landed, although two helicopter crewmen were hit by small arms fire and lightly wounded, along with 3 infantrymen who were seriously wounded.
A second mission was even more hazardous, using just 5 UH-60s, as 1 had to be diverted to Howard Air Force Base as a medevac for the wounded. Every helicopter was hit multiple times by ground fire during this second lift. More through luck than anything else, none were lost.
A combat team of AH-64 Apaches from Team Wolf Apache, along with a single OH-58C, supported these landings at Tinajitas and all three helicopters received hits from the ground.
Relieved by a second helicopter combat team, the source of the ground fire was identified, with 11 P.D.F. troops killed by 30 mm AWS fire at a range of 2,833 meters (ranged by laser). The stiff resistance put up at Tinajitas barracks in what was a confusing and somewhat messy attack had not lasted long. The barracks had been taken at a loss of 2 American forces killed and numerous wounded.
Fort Cimarron (TFP)
The final target of operations for TFP was Fort Cimarron. The fort was home to P.D.F. Battalion 2000, with around 200 men and which was equipped with Cadillac-Gage armored cars (V-150 and V-300), ZPU-4 air defense weapons, and heavy weapons, like 81 and 120 mm mortars. The ZPU-4 was a 14.5 mm heavy machine gun system, using four weapons on a common mount. This was a devastatingly dangerous weapon deployed both for support fire on the ground and also for shooting down helicopters. Despite the loss of some vehicles from this Battalion at Pacora Bridge, there was still a substantial military force there and also an unknown number of these armored vehicles.
Assaulting Fort Cimarron would be soldiers from 4th Battalion, 325th Infantry delivered by eleven UH-60s. 6 of them headed to the road to the south of Fort Cimarron and the other 6 landed to the west, forming a classic pincer maneuver. Having dropped off the troops, all 12 helicopters would then leave and come back with a second wave. Little resistance was met during these landings, but there were some P.D.F. forces there who continued to shoot at and harass US forces. However, the majority of forces had simply left, either in the attack at Pacora Bridge or simply left the Fort prior to the American attack. It was to take all day on 20th December to clear the Fort building by building, as this was not completed until midnight on 21st December.
Task Force Gator/Task Force Bayonet (TFG/TFB) – La Comandancia
La Comandancia was, in many ways, the heart of the P.D.F., as both the seat of power of Noriega and also a base for 7th Company P.D.F., known as the Macho del Monte. They were staunchly loyal to Noriega.
Things started poorly for TFG, with Panamanian police forces seeing their movements in preparation for the H hour attack and opening fire on the US forces at 0021 hours. The exchange of fire hit no one, but the attack was not going to be a surprise.
During the attack on La Comandancia, Task Force Gator, consisting of 4th Battalion, 6th Mechanized Infantry was under the operational control of Task Force Green, the same task force which was running the operation against Carcel Modelo Prison. Task Force Gator would therefore also be supported in its actions against La Comandancia by Special Mission Units, with 4th Psychological Operations Group, 1st Special Operations Wing and 160th Special Operations Aviation Detachment.
The P.D.F. forces defending La Comandancia had already started some preparation in the hours before the invasion, with roadblocks including one to the north, which was made from two dump trucks placed across the road. With H hour pulled forward by 15 minutes, the attack was led by Team Wolf Apache using their AH-64 helicopters. They took out several 2 ½ ton trucks with 30 mm cannon fire and a pair of V-300 armored cars with Hellfire missiles. An AC-130 gunship used its 105 mm gun to aid in the suppression of La Comandancia, along with further helicopter-launched Hellfire missiles.
As the helicopters of Team Wolf Apache attacked La Comandancia, the troops of the 4th Battalion, 6th Infantry set off from their side of the canal zone, less than a mile away. Using the M113 APC, they immediately encountered small roadblocks and small arms fire, although the direction of the fire could often not be established. In such a heavily built-up area and reluctant to randomly fire into civilian buildings, little US return fire was forthcoming. Either way, the small arms fire was of little consequence to the bulletproof M113s and their cargo of soldiers.
Despite the loss of the element of surprise, things did go better than may have been expected. While there was fire from P.D.F. troops, the armor of the M113 prevented any injuries and the roadblock P.D.F. troops had thrown up with cars was simply crushed and driven over. The same was not true to the north, where the M113s, at high speed, turned sharply onto Avenue B to find the dump truck roadblock. Traveling too fast to stop, the lead M113 careened into the side of one truck. The following M113 likewise saw the obstacle too late but it managed to swerve to the side to avoid crashing into the back of vehicle 1. The third vehicle then plowed straight into the back of vehicle 2. The result was a large mess, an even larger roadblock, and one crippled M113 with an injured soldier inside.
The P.D.F. plan was an ambush at this site and their roadblock worked too well. The US soldiers had an abundance of cover they would otherwise not have had approaching the roadblock in a more conventional manner. In the gun battle which followed, the roof gunner on one M113 was hit by P.D.F. forces and killed.
The second TFG M113 column also found their route blocked with a pair of dump trucks but managed to just drive around them, They also ran into fierce resistance from P.D.F. forces in a moving firefight. One soldier was struck and wounded and an RPG fired by P.D.F. forces struck one of the M113s but caused no injuries. The column was also engaged by a pair of P.D.F. 75 mm recoilless rifles but also evaded any injuries. The route to La Comandancia was open and these US forces would be able to fire on that compound.
The M113 proved just as valuable when they came to the rescue of the Delta Force troops who had been shot down with Kurt Muse from the raid on Carcel Modelo Prison. The same ability to ignore small arms fire was not true of the helicopters and an OH-58C was hit and crashed. Only the pilot survived the incident.
As American forces closed in on La Comandancia, resistance became more fierce and a column of three M113s moving up to the wall in order to plant charges to force an entry was repeatedly hit by around 20 rounds of what was believed to be enemy fire. The lead vehicle suffered such damage that it was disabled and the second one was knocked out by being set on fire. The infantry platoons of 3 M113s now all had to pile into a single vehicle with several men wounded in order to evacuate the scene.
It was not until later that it became clear they had been hit by 40 mm cannon fire from the AC-130 overhead, which had taken the M113s for enemy armored vehicles. This was compounded by smoke from fires from the compound and, rather than risk further blue-on-blue incidents, it fell to fire support delivered from Quarry Heights around 450 m away to try to crush the defense. This fire support came in the form of LAV’s of the USMC using 25 mm cannons, and also from the 152 mm guns of the two M551 Sheridans (C Company, 3rd Battalion (Airborne), 73rd Armor) positioned on Ancon Hill. There, these M551s fired 13 rounds. Just like with the AC-130 and helicopter gunships, however, the smoke obscured the target to such an extent that even these had to cease fire for risk of collateral damage or deaths. Airstrikes by helicopter and AC-130 gunships finally stopped the attack, as by now the building was well ablaze.
It was not until a deadline to surrender, given in Spanish, had expired that the Americans fired again. This time it was a ‘show of force’ using a 105 mm howitzer in direct fire mode against an empty building nearby. This did the trick and, by sunset on 20th December, the defense of La Comandancia had effectively ceased. Most of the remaining P.D.F. troops in the barracks very sensibly gave up. There were, however, still some isolated P.D.F. forces resisting in the base across various buildings and these had to be cleared carefully to avoid hurting any civilians who may have been trapped. To aid in this task, the battalion commander brought in a pair of M113 APCs (attached to the 5th Infantry Division) to deal with any sniper positions with their 0.50” caliber machine guns. These would support a Ranger company brought over from Torrijos Airport, which went in and cleared the smoldering building to be sure P.D.F. opposition was over.
Although no UH-60s were hit by ground fire during the operation, one OH-58C was hit by automatic weapons fire from the ground and crashed near La Comandancia. Ground fire against aircraft was found to be generally ineffective, as the helicopters were flying at night, with the pilots using night-vision goggles and the ground forces firing at them having none – they simply fired blindly, as all the helicopters were flying blacked out.
The ‘Smurfs’ burned out at Central Barracks, showing the original blue paint below the burned-out upper portions. The central barracks where these were located was transferred from the 1st Company Police Public Order unit to the 7th Infantry Company P.D.F. known as ‘Macho de Monte’. The scorching from the fire is obvious. Source: Armed Forces of Panama
Task Force Black Devil/Task Force Bayonet (TFBD/TFB) – Fort Amador
Fort Amador was a bit of an oddity during the entirety of the hostilities between the two countries before the invasion, and this continued on the first day as well. This was because American forces from 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry (Airborne), and P.D.F. forces in the form of 5th Infantry Company shared the base all along. The primary goal of Task Force Black Devil was the security of the base and the safety of US civilians in it.
Two companies from 1st Battalion, A and B, would be used for Task Force Black Devil (C Company was already part of Task Force Gator), along with a squad from 193rd Infantry Brigade’s 59th Engineer Company, D Battery, 320th Field Artillery, and a military police platoon. They would be equipped with all of the usual infantry equipment, but also a detachment of 8 M113 APCs, with two of them fitted with TOW missiles and a single 105 mm towed field gun from the Field Artillery unit. Aerial support came in the form of 3 AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships and a single OH-58. An AC-130 gunship was also available if required.
In the days running up to the invasion, the M113s used by TFBD were hidden on the base amongst the golf carts, which apparently was sufficient to disguise them.
With the onset of the invasion and gunfire and explosions rocking the city, the P.D.F. forces in Fort Amador made their move. Some of the P.D.F. forces took a bus and a car and tried to leave whilst, at the same time, two P.D.F. guards tried to arrest two American guards. The P.D.F. guards were killed and, as the bus and car headed towards the gate, where these men were, it was shot at, killing the driver. It cleared the gate but crashed outside the Fort. The car was fired upon and crashed within the base, killing 3 of the 7 occupants and wounding the others. With that, the gate to Fort Amador was left in US hands and blockaded.
Other US forces were landed via UH-60 Blackhawks on the golf course at Fort Amador, as P.D.F. forces that were still inside the barracks did not give up. Further exchanges of gunfire took place. With concerns over a pair of P.D.F. V-300s on the base, fire support from the AC-130 was requested. The AC-130 on this occasion was a failure. Three buildings were meant to be hit but it missed all three. By the evening, the base was still not completely in US hands and, in order to clear the buildings, a policy of spraying them liberally with heavy machine-gun fire was adopted. These were accompanied by firing from a pair of AT4 anti-tank missiles and a single shell from the 105 mm gun used in direct-fire mode. This did the trick and the few defenders at the base gave up, although this was not the end of the incident.
The AC-130 had failed to damage the V-300s on the base and, with them captured, the task force commander wanted to see them. As he was doing so, an unidentified US soldier decided they were a threat and fired an AT-4 missile at the vehicles, narrowly avoiding injury to the commander. The entire base was declared cleared and secure at 1800 hours on 20th December.
Task Force Wildcat / Task Force Bayonet (TFW / TFB) – Ancon Hill, Ancon DENI Station, Balboa DENI Station, and DNTT
Dominating the area of Panama City was Ancon Hill. Rising nearly 200 meters above the surrounding land, the hill provided views over the city and this was a location of strategic importance. On the reverse slope of the hill lay Quarry Heights, the headquarters for US Southern Command, although most of the hill and portions of Quarry Heights had already been ceded back to Panama in 1979 from US control.
Ancon Hill provided a clear view down into the city, including over La Comandancia and Gorgas Hospital. Although US Command was based there, there was only a token US military presence guarding it. The hill, surrounded as it was by P.D.F. facilities and very much undermanned, was clearly at risk of a preemptive P.D.F. attack. Tasked with securing the hill would be a small force known as Task Force Wildcat within Task Force Bayonet.
Consisting of A, B, and C Companies, 5th Battalion, 87th Infantry, 193rd Infantry Brigade, as well as A Company from 1st Battalion, 508th Infantry, and a military police unit, the targets were divided. B Company 5-87th would go for the DENI Station at Balboa in the south, which was along the route used by TFG to get to La Comandancia. C Company 5-87th would attack the DNTT building and the Ancon DENI Station to the north.
The attached Mechanised Company from 1-508th would set up roadblocks at key intersections to block any P.D.F. movements, whilst the military police would secure Gorgas hospital.
With operations starting before H hour, TFW likewise was in action, sending out its patrol. In a common story for the invasion, opposition gunfire was fierce but ineffective. The roadblocks were all in place within an hour. One US soldier was hit and killed and another two wounded at one of the roadblocks, but overall P.D.F. resistance had crumbled. Where a building was found to have a sniper, it was peppered vigorously with rifle and machine-gun fire from the 0.50 caliber machine guns carried on the M113. The gates of Ancon DENI station were blown apart with 90 mm recoilless rifle fire in a show of force and, by 0445 hours, Ancon DENI station was in US hands.
A similar story followed at Balboa DENI station and at the DNTT building, with the latter secure by 0800 hours 21st December and Balboa DENI Station following by 1240 hours.
Task Force RED (TFR) in Action
With Torrijos and Tocumen airfield in US hands thanks to TFR, there was also the large strategic airfield at Rio Hato to consider. Over 80 km from US forces based in the Canal Zone, this airfield served as the base for the 6th and 7th Companies of the P.D.F. Under the command of Colonel William Kernan, TFR was to conduct parachute-based assaults on Rio Hato Airfield. This site would be attacked by US forces predominantly from 2nd and 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, totaling 837 soldiers. They were to be supported by the overly macho sounding ‘Team Wolf Apache’ as part of TFR.
The operation was timed so that 2nd and 3rd Battalions would attack Rio Hato as the 1st Battalion took Torrijos and Tocumen airports. Both attacks were supported by the 4th Psychological Operations Group, 1st Special Operations Wing, and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, including the use of UH-1C Apache helicopter gunships and F-117s (this would be the operational combat debut of the F-117).
Team Wolf Apache, operating Apache helicopters, made sure that the Rangers were not shot down by neutralizing the P.D.F.’s ZPU-4 air defense systems with their own 30 mm Area Weapons System (AWS). Attacking under the cover of darkness with infrared night sights, these helicopters were virtually invisible and the P.D.F. forces had nothing they could see to shoot at.
Airborne fire support from the AH-6 successfully suppressed the air defense at Rio Hato for the TFR assault. A pair of F-117s (out of Tonapah Test Range, Nevada and refueled in flight) were to deliver a 2,000 lb. (1 US ton, 907 kg) GBU-27 laser-guided bomb each near to the garrison to create confusion and to disorientate the P.D.F. Unfortunately, they missed by several hundred meters due to poor targeting data and hit neither the garrison building nor landed close enough to cause confusion. Instead they succeeded in scaring a lot of local wildlife and waking the defenders. It would not have mattered anyway, as the initial strike for 0100 hours had already started early due to poor security and the Panamanian forces had already evacuated the building. More successful in subduing P.D.F. forces was the gunfire from the AC-130 circling overhead and the AH-1 and AH-64 helicopter gunships. Five minutes after these bombs had landed and strafing started, 2nd and 3rd Battalion, 75th Rangers arrived. Carried on 13 C-130 Hercules transport aircraft which had flown nonstop from the USA, they were dropped from just 150 meters, right into the sights of the P.D.F. troops, leading to a fierce gunfight which lasted for 5 hours. The results were that two Rangers were killed and four wounded, although this was not the result of the P.D.F. fire, which was fierce but largely ineffective. Instead, this was a tragic blue-on-blue incident when a helicopter gunship fired on their position in error. By the end of the battle, the airfield was in the Rangers’ hands and they moved quickly to cut the highway. The US Army claims to have killed some 34 Panamanians in the attack on Rio Hato, capturing 250 more, as well as numerous weapons. The US casualty toll is officially 4 dead, 18 wounded, and 26 injured in the jump. (Of note is that the 150 m parachute jump caused 5.2% friendly casualties according to US figures)
Task Force Black (TFB) in Action
Charged with reconnaissance and surveillance missions at Tinajitas, Fort Cimarron, and Cerro Azul (TV-2), TFB was under the command of Colonel Jake Jacobelly. Troops came from 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces and were supported by 4th Psychological Operations Group, 1st Special Operations Wing, and 617th Special Operations Aviation Detachment along with aircraft from 1-228th Aviation.
Fort Cimarron and Pacora River Bridge (TFB)
The Pacora River Bridge was a key strategic location on the road to Panama City. It was vital that the US seized this bridge in order to cut and control the highway, as this would prevent the Panamanian V-300s from P.D.F. Battalion 2000 from heading along the highway from their base at Fort Cimarron.
This task fell to Task Force Black (TFB) to support TFP. TFB’s troops came from A Company, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), along with 24 Green Berets, with fire support provided by an AC-130 gunship from 7th Special Operations Wing. The surveillance TFB had been conducting on Fort Cimarron revealed that at least 10 P.D.F. vehicles left Fort Cimarron in response to the US invasion and this convoy would be intercepted at the Pacora Bridge.
This operation flirted with disaster right from the outset when the troops being delivered by Blackhawk managed to get lost and flew right over the very convoy they were going to ambush. No chance of surprise remained after that and only by good fortune were the P.D.F. forces not awake enough to shoot down these rather fat, juicy, and easy targets right above them.
Having dodged an ignominious death, at 0045 hours, the Blackhawks, miraculously unmolested, deposited the 24 Green Berets troops on the western approaches to the bridge, on a steep slope, making movement more difficult but providing a dominant fire position over the bridge approaches. By the time the American special forces got to the bridge, the P.D.F. vehicles were there too and lighted up the American forces with their headlamps.
The first two vehicles in the convoy were quickly stopped with well-aimed fire from AT-4 anti-tank missiles and then a hazardously close-air-support mission delivered from an AC-130 Spectre gunship. The AC-130 also provided infra-red illumination of the convoy so that the special forces with night vision equipment had a view of the enemy. The P.D.F. forces broke and retreated or fled. This allowed the US forces at the bridge, who had snatched a victory from a potentially embarrassing defeat, to meet up at around 0600 hours the next day with the M551s from 82nd Airborne, creating a solid link to the airport and cementing US control.
A count of the losses from this critical action left 4 of the P.D.F. 2 ½ ton trucks, a pickup truck, and at least 3 armored cars behind, along with 4 P.D.F. dead.
Task Force Green (TFG) in Action
Carcel Modelo Prison (TFG)
H Hour was set for 0100 hours on 20th December, but minutes before the official start of the invasion, a special forces mission codenamed ‘Acid Gambit’ was initiated at Carcel Modelo prison. Located near La Comandancia, the prison was housing an American citizen called Kurt Muse. Muse was reportedly a CIA operative and, whether he was or not, he was detained due to his activities running a covert anti-Noriega radio station in May 1989.
Elements from TFG supported 23 troops from the Army’s Delta Force, who successfully landed on the roof and entered the prison to free Muse. There, they loaded him onto an AH-6 ‘Little Bird’. The aircraft usually carried a crew of two but was now ferrying four members of Delta Force, the pilot, and Muse, overloading it. This otherwise successful raid could have ended in disaster, as the slow and low flying helicopter he was on was hit by gunfire and shot down, creating additional problems for the whole operation. Fortunately for the planners, Muse and the pilot of the AH-6 survived and were rescued by troops from the 5th Infantry Division with an M113 APC. All four of the Delta Force on the AN-6 were wounded during this action.
Task Force Semper Fidelis in Action
The task of TFSF was the security of the Bridge of the Americas (a 1.65 km long road link over the canal), Arraijan Tank Farm (a major fuel depot), US Naval Air Station Panama, and Howard Air Force Base, as well as to control movement along the Inter-American Highway from the west. As a result, they ended up with responsibility for the security of around 15 km2 of Panama City.
TFSF had probably the most complex job in the whole operation, covering both a large area but also known hostile enemy forces and a variety of high-value sites to seize and protect.
Howard Air Force Base, for example, was the hub of helicopter operations but was seriously vulnerable to possible mortar fire and, with hills overlooking it, to sniper fire. The Arraijan Tank Farm was a major fuel depot and the loss of this would have been an unpleasant visual site for the evening news, with large black clouds from burning fuel a potential backdrop to an operation.
Add to this the problems the loss of a large fuel depot would pose for both ground and air operations and that it was occupied by hostile P.D.F. forces and this was a substantial problem. Other P.D.F. forces were dotted around the TFSF area of operations with various roadblocks as well, including one outside Howard Air Force Base, at the Department of Traffic and Transportation (D.N.T.T.) station. Unarmored forces mounted in HMMWVs or trucks could not drive on the roads or through urban areas with risk of being shot at, so the LAVs of 2nd LAI would lead all of those operations, relying on their armor to protect from small arms fire and using their firepower to clear up any opposing forces in the way. TFG also benefited from the use of a number of M113 armored personnel carriers, meaning that they could at least move troops protected from small arms fire.
With H hour set for 0100 hours on 20th December, TFSF assets were in place and ready at Rodman Naval Station. Shortly before H hour, a warning was received of Panamanian V300 armored cars in the city. Concerned that these might move on their assigned targets, blocking forces were sent out. Within 10 minutes, 13 LAV-25s belonging to 1st and 3d Platoons, along with 17 Marines and a single unarmored HMMWV belonging to a US Army Psyops team were heading for Ajjaijan Tank Farm.
As the column moved towards DNTT Station 2, their first target, they started to receive incoming small arms fire. The lead element of the column (tasked with this target), using 3 LAV-25s, broke off, plowed through the gates in their LAV-25, and opened fire on any points of enemy resistance, although the 25 mm cannons were not used for fear of unnecessary casualties. This restraint continued as the Marines began clearing the buildings one at a time until a Marine was shot multiple times and killed. With that, such restraint was dropped and room clearance was done via fragmentation grenade and automatic fire. This was the only Marine killed in the whole of the invasion and one other was wounded at the DNTT Station. One member of the DNTT was killed, 3 more wounded, and 3 taken into custody. The whole operation took less than 10 minutes and the station was secured. The 3 LAV-25s then left the station to catch back up with the rest of the column moving on to Arraijan.
The P.D.F. had set a large roadblock on the highway (Thatcher Highway) to the farm, consisting of a pair of fuel tracks guarded by 10-20 P.D.F. troops. Not wishing to assault the location or drive into an ambush, the task force leaders authorized the trucks destroyed by 25 mm cannon fire. With this show of force and no chance of an ambush, the P.D.F. forces withdrew and the column moved on to Arraijan to secure it.
TFSF operations had not been affected by delays like the operations at Torrijos/Tocumen, and the four Marine companies, supported by infantry, struck their objectives right on time, rolling right through what harassing fire they encountered. In a very short time, all of TFSF objectives were secured, roadblocks set up as required, and the rifle companies were scouring the hills overlooking the area for any P.D.F. snipers.
With all of TFSF’s objectives for H hour complete, they were then assigned additional tasks in the afternoon. One of these was to take the P.D.F. headquarters (HQ for P.D.F. 10th Military Zone) building at La Chorrera. The task was allocated to the Marines attached to the Fleet Anti-terrorism Security Team (FAST) platoon and troops from D Company. The operation was underway by 1530 hours. Once more, a P.D.F. roadblock in the form of buses was blocking the Inter-American Highway at 1545 hours.
Rather than stop, the column simply plowed straight through it, with the LAV-25s firing as a show of force. Faced with an armored force they could not stop and which was not stopping either, the P.D.F. option was to stand, fight and lose or to leave. They chose the latter option and the column closed in on the La Chorrera HQ building. Reconnaissance showed that the building was more substantial than first thought and that there was a potential for a bloody engagement between the Marines and the defenders in an area surrounded by civilian housing.
There followed a series of back and forth orders relating to aerial fire missions, which took over an hour until, finally, a mission was ordered. Using a pair of A-7 Corsairs to strafe the target with 20 mm cannon fire and guided by an OA-37 Dragonfly, the mission was a success. No civilian homes were hit and the convoy entered the compound. Little resistance was encountered other than sniping from the few defenders who had stayed and this was dealt with robustly via the 25 mm cannon on the LAVs. Having cleared the compound and seized the weapons, the building was on fire and the Marines pulled out to return to Arraijan.
Task Force White in Action (TFW) – Paitilla Airfield, Pote Porras
TFW was a special operations mission from the US Navy SEALS, consisting of 5 platoons along with 3 patrol boats, 4 river patrol craft, and 2 light patrol boats. This task force was divided into 4 task units; Charlie (TUC), Foxtrot (TUF), Whiskey (TUW), and Papa (TUP).
TUC was to ensure the safety of the entrance to the Panama Canal from the Atlantic side, whilst TUF did the same for the Pacific side. TUW was tasked with sinking the Pote Porras and TUP was to attack and occupy Paitilla airfield.
Task Unit Papa (TUP) – Paitilla Airfield
Half an hour prior to H Hour (0100 hours), 48 SEALs (3 x 16 man teams) from SEAL Team 4 landed south of the Paitilla airfield with orders to destroy Noriega’s aircraft to prevent him from escaping.
Noriega used a C-21A Learjet. With a pair of turbofan engines, the jet could carry 8 passengers in comfort with a range of over 5,000 km – certainly enough to escape to Havana (1,574 km), Caracas (1,370 km), or pretty much anywhere from northern Mexico to the northern half of South America as far as Rio de Janeiro (5,286 km). With that much ground to choose from, if he escaped, he would be hard to find.
The initial phase of the SEAL team operation went off without a hitch, with infiltration carried out on the southern side of the airstrip. This continued right up until about 5 minutes past H Hour when the simultaneous US invasion strikes across the country alerted the Panamanians to what was going on. Three V-300 armored cars were reported to be approaching the airfield (they were to actually drive past the airport and take no part) and a group of SEALs moved to intercept them at the hangers on the northwestern side of the airstrip, alerting them to their presence and resulting in a firefight. In this gun battle, the nine SEALs at the hangers were caught in the open and fired upon. Many of them were hit and wounded.
The rest of the SEALs who were there came to their assistance, continuing a fierce gunfight in which two SEALs were killed and 4 more wounded. In total, the airport operation left 4 SEALs dead and at least 8 wounded. Even so, the mission had been accomplished in a little over 7 minutes. The personal jet of Manuel Noriega was notably taken out during this action by means of an AT-4 anti-tank missile and the runway was blocked with another aircraft. In the morning of the 20th, they were relieved by the arrival of the 1st Battalion, 75th Rangers. Three P.D.F. troops had been killed and another 7 wounded. By 0330 hours, Paitilla airfield was considered to be secure.
Sinking the Pote Porras
With one SEAL team off to the airport to cripple Noriega’s aircraft and prevent his escape, another was dispatched to ensure he would not try to escape by sea. Known as the ‘Pote Porras‘ (recorded in the US military accounts mistakenly as the ‘Presidente Porras’, which was actually a ferry boat), the vessel was a Customs patrol craft and the largest vessel in the Panamanian Navy (registration P-202). This ship was to be mined with C4-filled haversacks by 4 SEALs from SEAL Team 2 in order to blow it up whilst it was berthed at Pier 18 in Balboa Harbor. During this operation, they were to get to the ship by swimming underwater using rebreather apparatus. However, they were spotted by Panamanian guards who shot at them and dropped grenades into the water. Other than being detected by the guards, however, the operation was a complete success and the boat was blown up.
Second Act
The attack on the 20th had, in the main, been successful. Mistakes are inevitable in a large operation and forgivable, although little things, like potentially trapping your landing force in a bog for the enemy to shoot at, are less so. American forces had been successful despite those mistakes and also despite the inability to keep the operation secret. They achieved surprise perhaps not in the exact timing, but certainly in the scale of the attack striking everywhere at once and totally overwhelming the resistance.
The P.D.F. resistance had often been fierce and sporadic, but with daylight on the 20th and the invasion appearing a fait-accompli, the Panamanians did not give up. Some P.D.F. and irregular forces had managed to disappear into civilian areas or the jungles. On the evening of the 20th, P.D.F. soldiers were reported as going into the Marriott Hotel looking for US civilians.
Fearing that some Noriega loyalists might seek retribution either by killing US civilians or by taking them hostage, US forces were dispatched to secure this location as well. A reinforced company of paratroopers was quickly sent and on route. In this somewhat last-minute operation along a relatively short route to the hotel, which was only about 3 km south of Panama Viejo, there was continual fire exchange between P.D.F. and Dignity Battalion forces in the area and the passing US troops. Sniper fire against American forces wounded two men and, in exchange, around a dozen Panamanian troops were killed. The US forces reached the hotel around 2130 hours that night and held it secure overnight, as there was no means by which to evacuate the guests staying there. Some hostages had been taken from the hotel prior to their arrival, although they were all released later. The remaining guests were evacuated on the 21st. In another hostage incident, a team from the Smithsonian Institute was abducted by a group of P.D.F. troops, only to be abandoned on the 21st in a remote area.
In the heightened tensions of those two days, two American civilians were killed. One was shot by P.D.F. forces shortly after H hour at a P.D.F. roadblock he tried to flee from, and US forces killed the other, who had tried to run through a US roadblock at around the same time.
Task Force Hawk (TFH) in Action – Cuartels
TFH helicopters of the 7th Infantry Division and 617th Aviation Company had one of the least known parts of the Panamanian invasion. It was headed by Major Gilberto Perez, commanding A Company, 1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne), supported by 2nd Brigade, 7th Infantry Division (Light). The plan was for the insertion of special forces to the airfields at the towns of Santiago, Chitre, and Las Tables to make contact with the small garrisons (known as ‘cuartels’) in those towns. An AC-130 gunship was on hand to provide a show of force should there be any hesitation. Having surrendered and put down their arms, the cuartels and towns would be occupied by the infantry to assure law and order. This was not one of the initial operational phases of the plan to start at H hour on 20th December. Instead, this was a follow-up as part of the pacification and normalization of the interior of Panama. The task started at 1400 hours, on 23rd December, at Santiago. With that success, next was Chitre at 0630 hours, 24th December, followed by Las Tables at 0900, 25th December. Even though this was not the most dramatic or action-filled mission of the Panamanian invasion, it was perhaps one of the most important, showing that US forces could be magnanimous in victory and were only occupying as long as they needed to.
Aftermath
Noriega was finally captured 14 days after the mission, after taking refuge in the Vatican City’s embassy for 10 days. After that, the somewhat ironically named ‘Operation Promote Liberty’ began by the occupying force which had just invaded the country.
During this time, there were no active combat operations undertaken, but the LAVs of D and then C Company 2nd LAI assisted Panamanian security forces in the quelling of some elements of local drug traffickers.
The LAVs later served a useful ‘hearts and minds’ approach, whereby they could be used to engage with local children, and then their families who would go and see these vehicles parked in prominent public places. The local populace grew to know these vehicles as the ‘tanquita’ (English: little tank).
Numerous other patrols by various US forces were conducted, often at the behest of local Panamanians or following reports of lingering Panamanian forces. These were aimed either to recover arms or to pick up the PDF soldiers. They were successful although there were isolated incidents of people shooting at US forces over the next few days.
Four AH-6 helicopters had been lost in total, with two shot down by gunfire around La Comandancia in the opening hours of the operations and a third shot down at Colon later in the day (both crewmen were killed). The fourth was lost 10 days after the invasion, on 30th December, when a parachute was blown into the rotor blades whilst it was hovering at Tocumen Airport.
In total, some 26 American troops died during the operation, with a further 322 (another US Army document gives a figure of 325) wounded. Civilian deaths are hard to count, but the US Army estimated around 200 died between the cross-fire and acts of disorder which took place in the collapse of law and order in places like Colon. Of the approximately 15,000 troops in the Panamanian military, US Army figures give the number of Panamanian dead as 314, with 124 wounded and over 5,000 taken prisoner. The one notable exception to this was, of course, Noriega himself. Huge efforts had been made to take out every possible escape route for him from the country. Yet, on the 20th, other than perhaps still being with that sex worker held up somewhere, the US had no idea where he was.
They had, in fact, narrowly avoided capturing him when the car he was in went past a US roadblock on the 20th. His capture, or rather the lack of it, was a serious embarrassment to the whole operation. Where was Noriega?
Where’s Noriega?
Lacking a distinctive striped scarf to make him stand out like a Where’s Wally cartoon book, finding Noriega was like trying to find a piece of hay in multiple stacks of needles. He knew the country backwards and had numerous loyalists and opportunities to create hideouts for bolt holes either in the city, the jungle, or simply to be smuggled out of the country. Operation Just Cause could not claim success, and Panama could not move towards a post-Noriega era whilst he still remained on the run.
Fearing he may take refuge in the embassy of an ‘awkward’ nation, like Nicaragua, Cuba, or Libya, where US forces could not recover him, those areas were tightly cordoned off by US forces. A massive manhunt was underway, so it was perhaps surprising that the diplomatic envoy (Papal Nuncio) of Pope John Paul II acting for the Vatican City, Monsignor Laboa, gave Noriega refuge in their embassy on Christmas Day 1989. For a man used to a bawdy lifestyle free with guns, violence, drugs, and prostitution, a stay at the embassy of the Vatican might have been a little disappointing for Noriega. It also underscores how desperate he was to not be captured and how little support he really had in the country. On the plus side, it also likely meant a more rapid end to military actions and troops on the streets.
He Fought the Law – the Law Won
As soon as General Thurman learned of the situation with Noriega and where he was hiding, there was obviously relief of ‘where’s Wally’, but also the question appeared of ‘now what?’. The ‘now what’ was to seal off the embassy so that no one could go in or out and then to solve the problem diplomatically. With crowds chanting outside against him, and in possibly one of the most unusual military moves ever, it was decided to force him out with Rock and Roll. Very loud rock and roll was blasted through speakers courtesy of broadcasting US Military Radio for Central America (Southern Command Network), with song selections coming inventively from many of the service personnel in the area.
Perhaps the first time most of the Papal Nuncio had heard the lyrical compositions of Guns ‘n’ Roses, Jethro Tull, The Clash, Alice Cooper, Black Sabbath, Bon Jovi, The Doors, and AC/DC, they likely would not have enjoyed the deafening volumes at which it was blasted at the embassy. No one inside would be able to talk or sleep for this appalling racket blasted outside.
After two days of this din, operations were handed off to the 4th Psychological Operations Group but shortly thereafter, after the absurdity of it all, the music stopped. Noriega had nowhere to go and the Vatican, embarrassed as well by the whole affair, wanted the situation over. On 3rd January, Noriega walked out to the gate with 3 priests, where he surrendered to US forces.
Noriega was later put on trial in the US and sentenced to 30 years. Incarcerated in the Federal Correctional Institution in Miami, he enjoyed accommodation far better than the other inmates thanks to his official status as a Prisoner of War, until his sentence expired in 2007. He stayed in US custody thanks to extradition requests until 2010 when he was sent to France for trial, where his status was reduced to that of a common inmate, and received a 7-year sentence for money laundering. He was later extradited back to Panama in 2011 and sent to El Renacer Prison. He died in custody on 29th May 2017.
Follow-up on the Invasion
The post-invasion analysis is complicated. The arguments over the legal (or lack of) justification for the invasion and the incredible complexity of trying to comprehend so many operations across a whole country at the same time are not helping factors. Just 8 months after the conclusion of Operation Just Cause came the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and military attention very much shifted to a much bigger and more complex conflict on the other side of the planet.
Several lessons were, however, starkly clear. Medevac by helicopter was crucial, with 25 US troops medevaced during the invasion operations on 20th December alone. In total, 470 people were medevaced by aircraft from 1-228 Aviation alone (although not all were US personnel).
Air support was obviously a crucial element in the win but had not been without incident. Too much confusion, too many friendly fire incidents, and near misses, were the result of inadequate training. However, aerial combat assets, particularly those for ground support*, were absolutely invaluable, whether helicopter gunships or the AC-130 gunship and despite their age as aircraft, the UH-1 and AH-1 performed well. Even such a relatively small invasion across just a couple of days involved 948 separate aerial combat missions totaling 3,741 flying hours. These missions were on the whole successful, more than in Grenada, because they happened in the dark thanks to advances in night vision technology. In fact, 742 of those 948 missions (78%) were carried out using night vision goggles. With combat and non-combat air missions counted together, there were a total of 1,117 air missions and 5,762 flying hours logged. Airpower, particularly the ability to move forces rapidly by helicopter, simply overwhelmed the Panamanians.
[* Ammunition wise, aircraft alone fired 1 TOW missile, 7 Hellfires, 29 CRV-7 Multi-Purpose Sub-Munitions (cluster bombs), 90 PD6, 3,300 rounds of 30 mm ammunition, 180 2.75” rockets (flare and HE types), 3,866 rounds of 20 mm ammunition, and 9,290 rounds of 7.62 mm ammunition.]
On the ground, the ancient M113 rolled through the events very well, often exceeding expectations. The tracked box was a versatile machine capable of moving men or the wounded in and out of hot areas very ably. The roof-mounted .50 caliber heavy machine gun, whilst not as capable as the 20 mm turret-mounted weapon on the M2 Bradley (replacing the M113 as the Army’s armored personnel carrier), was found to be incredibly useful, as it could elevate to strike very high targets in buildings which the otherwise excellent cannon in the Bradley could not. It was recorded, however, that more perhaps out of luck than anything else, an RPG did not take out one of the M113 columns in the advance on La Comandancia. Had it done so, the entire advance could have faltered and the additional protection offered by the M2 Bradley over the M113 would have been seen as being of substantial value.
One other note on the use of the M113 was the lack of capability as a mechanized unit for clearing obstructions. Cars could be driven over, but the dump trucks used by the P.D.F. to block routes to La Comandancia had crippled one M113 which rammed them and they had no good way of clearing them. A Combat Engineering Vehicle (CEV), particularly one with a large caliber (165 mm) gun for delivering a breaching charge, was strongly recommended. This could have both cleared the roadblock and also smashed through the compound walls and avoided the US troops having to get so close under the enemy guns.
The new HMMWV light trucks, replacing the M151 Jeep, were likewise well received and the Marine Corps LAVs likewise proved themselves to be capable and robust machines.
“the Light Armored Vehicle’s (LAV’s) firepower, mobility, and armor coupled with the Fleet Antiterrorist Security Team’s highly trained Close Quarters Combat Team (CQBT) provided a versatile and potent force, particularly for offensive operations and as a quick reaction force. The Loudspeaker teams (psychological operations) provided the means to offer an opportunity and in some cases persuade the enemy to surrender without a fight.”
MCLLS# 12559-16914 quoted in DeForest, 2001
The story of the M551 is more complex. They had been invaluable in delivering fire support against structures when their 152 mm ammunition delivered a nice and robust blast. There had, after all, been zero need for an armor-defeating action, so high explosive was much more useful. The M551 had been selected as most bridges in the country were not able to take the weight of heavier tanks, like the M60. The tank was considered by many as being basically obsolete by this point at the end of the Cold War and this was, after all, the first operational combat airdrop of one (which did not go well). The reality, however, was that any tank is better than no tank and, with enough armor to render any small arms useless, it was a substantial presence in the invasion. It had all the capability to take on any of the possible armor it could meet and the 152 mm was substantially more useful as a lobber of high explosive than it probably ever was going to be as a missile-firing system.
Financially, the cost of the invasion ran to US$163.6 m, with the bulk (US$155 million) of costs allocated to the Army, with substantially smaller costs (US$5.7 million and US$2.9 million) for the Air Force and Navy, respectively. The costs of US Marine Corps operations fall into the expenditure of the Navy and not the Army. Overall, this was a cheap operation in military terms and casualties had been light. There had also been a good display on the whole of restraint by US forces and this is shown in the relatively low civilian casualty figures, despite the density of population in the areas in which much of the operations took place. That is not to say that there were no incidents of excess by US forces because there were. US Army records show that 19 US personnel were court-martialed for offenses committed during Operation Just Cause and 17 of them convicted:
Two were from 82nd Airborne for the murder of a civilian and assault on another soldier (not guilty); 2 from 5th Infantry Division for Absent Without Leave (AWOL) and Assault x 2 (guilty); 2 from US Army South for theft (larceny) and AWOL/drunk (guilty), 76 from 7th Infantry Division for disobeying orders, the accidental shooting of another soldier, killing a civilian, losing a weapon x 3, conspiracy to smuggle x 4, negligent discharge and injury of a civilian x 2, and theft (all guilty).
The USA finally transferred control of the canal to Panama, as had been originally agreed, on 31st December 1999.
Following the successful tests of the Ansaldo Prototype Light tank in 1930 and 1931, the new suspension system, replacing the original rigid-wheel type, had shown itself to be robust and the tank had fulfilled the needs for armor and mobility. The Regio Esercito (Italian Army) would be getting these new light tanks to replace the CV29’s which had only ever been a temporary solution to the lack of a fast tank. First, though, a small number of this tank had to be made for acceptance trials. These new tanks would involve small changes from the 1931 Light Tank Prototype and, by the end of 1933, it was accepted into production as the Carro Armato Veloce Ansaldo (Ansaldo Fast Tank) of 3 tonnes, or ‘CV3’ for short. It is also often referred to as the CV33, not because it weighs 33 tonnes, but for the year of adoption. For ease of understanding the complex evolution of this vehicle which underwent numerous changes through its life, it is also sometimes classified as being the ‘CV3/33’ (Carro Veloce 3 tonne, 1933 Model) as a convenient way of distinguishing it from later models.
Trials and Development
With the lessons learned from the trials conducted over 1929-1931, Giuseppe Rossini, the engineering brains at Ansaldo, made a series of modifications to improve on the 1931 design with the four pre-series production vehicles ordered in 1932.
Layout Changes
The general shape and layout were retained, but changes were significant. First and foremost, the large, curved shield on the front and the large water-cooled FIAT Model 1914 6.5 mm machine gun were both removed. Instead, it had been replaced with the FIAT 6.5 mm Model 1914 aircraft (tipo aviazione) machine gun in a new mount. This was an air-cooled machine gun, meaning that the mounting for it was much smaller, as it did not have to accommodate the large water jacket on the earlier machine gun. It was also lighter but, like the other, earlier prototype vehicles, also had a separate tripod which was carried on the back deck of the tank for mounting the machine gun outside of the tank. This seems to be a simple hangover from the Carden-Loyd Mark VI which also carried a separate tripod for the same reason. This machine gun was now mounted into a new limited-traverse mounting on the front left. The machine gun had a wide field of fire as it was able to move 20 degrees in each direction horizontally and could be elevated between -12 and +18 degrees. There was space inside the tank for 3,800 rounds of ammunition for the machine gun.
The single-piece roof of the model 1931 was gone, replaced by a new roof with two large rectangular hatches cut into it. The all-welded upper bodywork from the 1931 model was retained, although the glacis now went all the way up the front of the casemate as far as the driver’s visor and was bolted down onto a frame, whereas previously this was made in two parts and was welded. The nose plate was also simplified. Rather than the heavily bolted plate and a reinforcing piece on the front of the 1931 model, this 1932 design was a cleaner plate bolted across the top edge to the frame of the tank. The towing ring was retained as a feature too but was smaller, held with 4 bolts to the nose instead of 8 as in the 1930 and 1931 vehicles (and the tractor prototype). Armor all-round ranged from 8 mm up to 14 mm thick.
Headlamps were added, one on each side, fitted to the new metal mudguards. Gone were the flimsy metal mudguards trialed on the tractor. The mudguards were now sleek and neatly fitted flush to the glacis, covering the track all the way back under the front part of the casemate. There were no mudguards on the rear. One often overlooked change was the toolbox. The semi-triangular toolbox which was located behind the drive sprocket on the prototype vehicles and tractor was moved on the pre-series to behind the casemate in front of the exhaust.
The back of the hull was changed significantly too. The 1930 design had 2 ventilation grilles on each side and more on the flat roof of the engine bay. Both were vulnerable to mud being thrown up by the tracks, and this pre-series vehicle did away with them, apart from the vents over the radiator. Instead of side and roof grilles, the air intake was moved forwards to the side of the casemate in the form of a large, rectangular multi-slat grille mounted alongside the driver’s head on the right, and the commander/gunner’s head on the left. This feature raised the air intakes, consequently improving the fording height of the vehicle and reducing the likelihood of being clogged with mud as well as providing airflow through the casemate to provide ventilation for the crew. It would also have the unfortunate side-effect that it replaced the side hatches, restricting visibility for the crew. These large side vents were dropped immediately after these four vehicles as a result.
Mobility and Suspension
There was little changed between the suspension on this pre-series vehicle and that of the 1931 Prototype. The front-drive sprocket had moved from the multipiece type on the prototype to a single-piece sprocket on the pre-series, and the rear supporting bracket for the rear idler was changed too. Instead of being short with a square hole and solid support wheel underneath to keep the track in place, this pre-series vehicle had a longer supporting bracket with a rectangular hole along with a single solid roller and a rubber-tire road wheel.
Power for the vehicle was supplied by the FIAT CV3-type 4 cylinder petrol engine, as was later adopted for the production vehicles. That 2.745 litre engine received various modifications to improve the power output over its production, but as it was fitted to the pre-series vehicle, it could produce 43 hp at 2,400 rpm. This enabled the tank, which only weighed 3.1 tonnes, to manage up to 42 km/h on a road and about 15 km/h off-road.
Conclusion
The 1932 ordered pre-series CV3 vehicles were a critical step in the development of the CV3, as they marked the conclusion of prototype trials and the final outlay of the engine bay, with the exception of the air vents which had to be moved following trials. The development process had gone fairly quickly for a tank, taking just 3 years from CV29 to the construction of the pre-series CV3/33. Trials in July 1933 had shown a few minor problems, such as the new headlamps being fouled or damaged by undergrowth, and the large vulnerable side vents in the casemate, but the design was successful and was formally adopted as Italy’s new light tank known as the Carro Armato Veloce Ansaldo. With the changes for the first production, the Series I CV3 approved, an initial order for 240 examples was ordered.
Over the course of the next several years, this vehicle would serve as the workhorse of the Italian army serving as far afield as Russia and East Africa and forming the basis of many modifications and specialist vehicles. The four pre-series vehicles would go on to be used as driver training vehicles. None are believed to have survived.
Pre-Series CV3/33 Light Tank specifications
Dimensions
3.15 m long, 1.4 m wide, 1.287 m high
Total weight, battle ready
3.1 tonnes
Crew
2 (Commander/Machine Gunner, Driver)
Propulsion
2.745 litre 43 hp FIAT CV3-005 4-cylinder petrol
Speed
est. 40 km/h road, 14 km/h off-road
Armament
Single FIAT Model 1914 air-cooled 6.5mm Machine Gun (tipo aviazione)
Armor
8-14 mm
Total production
1 built
For information about abbreviations check the Lexical Index
Tanks, the new wonder weapons of mechanical inspiration, armored leviathans running on steel tracks to smash their way through German positions on the Western Front, were first used at the Battle of Flers-Courcelette on 15th September 1916. Straight afterward, rumors of this new weapon started to circulate amongst the Central Powers and in the minds of the general public in Britain, France, and elsewhere. Nonetheless, the first public airing of a photograph of a tank did not get published until 22nd November that year. Yet, although the idea of an armored mechanical war weapon was not new and had appeared in both serious and some far less serious versions, including science-fiction stories beforehand, this was not the first use and first publicity which had the tank or ‘landship’ seize the imagination of the home front. It is then perhaps ironic or just coincidentally timed that Percy William Atherton, a London-based engineer, submitted a completely independent design for a giant wheeled land machine clad in armor and fitted with turrets exactly one week prior to the action at Flers Courcelette.
The Man
Percy William Atherton is not a well-known name in tank design or military circles. Indeed, he is elusive in the historical record save for a patent filed in November 1900 for an improved type of rim for pneumatic tires.
At the time of filing an application for that patent, he was already engaged as an engineer by profession and provided an address on Tenison Street, York Road, London – an area of the Southbank just north of Waterloo Railway Station.
In 1901, still with the address at Tenison Street, he filed another patent, this time for gloves or mittens which allowed their finger and/or thumb to be exposed without taking them off. He was now providing his occupation as a consulting engineer.
In 1908, Atherton revealed that he was obviously doing reasonably well financially, as he was the owner of a 3 cylinder 12 hp Clyde motor car (Clyde Motor Company Ltd. Leicester) and managed to entangle himself in an argument in a contemporary periodical over opinions on the reliability of the aforementioned brand of vehicle. Other than this, all that can be deduced at this time is that sometime between 1908 and 1916, he took a contract to work in British India as an engineer for the Public Works Department (P.W.D.) and was living at Shorkot Road Junction, Punjab, India – about halfway between Faisalabad and Multan in modern-day Pakistan. When, in September 1916, he gave this occupation, he also provided a UK address in Gloucester Street, Warwick Square, Westminster, London, southeast of the modern-day Victoria Coach Station.
He was also now a member of the Institute of Municipal Engineers (IMunE.), an organization which eventually (1978) merged with the Institute of Civil Engineers (I.C.E.), showing that he had continued to progress in his skills as an engineer. With a war waging in Europe and with his home nation forces stalled against a seemingly impenetrable wall of German wire and machine guns, Atherton turned his engineering skills to consider a mechanical solution to the problem.
The Design
Regardless of whatever engineering skills, training, abilities, or experiences he had by 1916, Atherton designed what has to rank as one of the most ludicrous wheeled vehicles ever proposed for any purpose – let alone military ones.
It is important to see that, whilst the wheels in themselves are ridiculous in proportion to the vehicle they are carrying, they are also ridiculous in their own right as they were to be up to 300 feet (91.4 m) in diameter. This was no armored car – it was meant as more of a wheeled warship and only half as sensible as that sounds.
The overall premise resembled a narrow pram or pushchair with ridiculously large wheels. Instead of a baby carriage, however, Atherton proposed not much shy of a dreadnaught mounted within these wheels. He described this heavily armed body mounted in that manner with four or maybe more wheels where the body of the vehicle actually lay above the axis of rotation of the wheels.
The body itself was essentially rectangular with a rounded front and rear and topped with turrets. The motive power driving the vehicle was pictured as being fairly rudimentary, with a clearly drawn drive belt or chain running from the center point on each side of the body to the rear axle.
Inside the hull, there were to be several floors (decks), with the primary magazine located in the center for protection and surrounded by drinking water tanks and hydraulic equipment. The drinking water served both to provide fresh water for the crew but also allowed the magazine to be flooded, just like on a warship, to prevent an explosion.
Armament
Atherton’s fort, in the tradition of the amateur inventor, was to be excessively well-armed, mounting no less than four turrets along with the heaviest possible guns – the sort normally fitted into fixed concrete mountings. These were to be complemented by an array of guns of other smaller calibers, and a slew of Maxim-type machine guns, as may be deemed necessary. He did not specify what size these guns were to be, but four turrets are clearly shown in the plan view with a pair of large guns each, for a total of 8. These guns would have been large, not only because of the scale at which they are drawn in relation to the massive vehicle but also because he carefully noted the use of hydraulic or other equipment to assist in the loading of the ammunition. Clearly, Atherton had some level of knowledge of loading large guns, presumably of a naval nature, but he also quite evidently had zero practical understanding of not only the issues of command and control over such a plethora of weapons but also the limitation of them.
He had made an obvious and conscious effort to avoid the turrets interfering with each other so that the gun turrets being rotated could not accidentally strike another turret, yet the central two turrets are close enough that they could, in theory, have clashed barrels if, for whatever reason, the leading central turret was rotated all the way to the rear. As shown in the side view by Atherton, although turrets 1 and 4 (front and rear, respectively) are positioned along the longitudinal axis of the hull, turrets 2 and 3 (the central pair) are offset to the left and right respectively. This is unlikely to be a mistake on such a simple drawing and is more likely to be an attempt to allow the guns to fire past each other to the front without causing interference. However, as each turret was more than half the width of the body, this was still not possible.
One final note on the turret size and position is that turrets 1 and 4 are clearly shorter than numbers 2 and 3, in what might be assumed was an attempt to allow the central turrets to fire over the top of them. However, the low position of the guns in all four turrets, as illustrated in the side elevation of the design, would preclude this and the purpose of the central turrets being taller is therefore unclear.
Atherton was vague on the turrets when he described that they may be arranged so as to deliver fire close to the machine. This presumably would require some turrets underneath for that purpose. He did mention, however, that a second battery of guns could be fitted at the ends and/or along the sides of the hull to provide fire at up to -45 degrees, although this would still leave a large dead zone directly underneath.
As well as all of the big guns and anti-infantry smaller guns, there was provision for anti-aircraft guns on the roof of the fort, although the author mentions no number or type. In perhaps the first hint of Atherton running out of ideas for new and fabulous weapons he could burden this already implausible machine with, he proposed that it could be used to discharge poisonous gases, although they would obviously have to be heavier than air in order to sink from the hull to the ground to affect the enemy troops below.
Construction
With an appreciation for its huge size and enormous weight, Atherton suggested its construction along similar lines to ships which weighed “thousands of tons” i.e. in a dockyard-type setting and built upon stocks – angled wooden poles. Parts for the vehicle and sections would then be moved into place using large rolling cranes, such as those of the Goliath-type. The crane would, however, have had to have been a monster in its own right, as the stocks would have to be tall enough to hold up the bottom of the hull so that the wheels could be put on i.e. they needed to be roughly as tall as the radius of the wheels. The hull, on top of this, meant more height and this Goliath-type crane Atherton was proposing would therefore have to straddle all of those parts in order to be able to lift and move items like guns, engines, and turrets into place.
It is perhaps for that reason that Atherton suggested the use of ‘pits’ alongside the stocks during construction to lower the overall height of the works being performed. Even so, this massive machine was still going to be a gargantuan operation to fabricate.
Dimensions
Although construction was to follow a battleship in terms of the use of the stocks and crane methods, the whole machine was, Atherton said, to be narrower than such a vessel, so as to allow it to be transported in floating docks if required. This could be forgone, however, if the wheels were made 300 feet (91.4 m) in diameter, as with wheels of this size, “the forts could cross for instance the English Channel with its maximum depth of 120 feet [36.6 m]”
This statement from Atherton has to be evaluated in itself, as it is not strictly correct. Topographical maps of the seafloor of the English Channel show that he would only be correct on this maximum depth in the region between around Beachy Head on the English South Coast and to the East up towards Dover. On the French side, a crossing from that point would have to land in France somewhere between around the mouth of the River Somme and Calais. Should Atherton’s enormous machine have tried to drive across the channel any further to the West in the English Channel, he would have floundered, as depths reach 120 meters or more in places, more than twice the wading capability of his concept.
Added to this depth calculation is that he was trying to make an allowance of sinkage into the seabed by the wheels of up to 30 feet (9.1 m). Assuming a wheel diameter of 300 feet (91.4 m) and this sinkage allowance of 30 feet (9.1 m), this means a maximum wading depth to the bottom of the hull as follows:
300’/2 – 30’ = 120 feet (36.6 m)
In order to assure safety and knowing the depth of the English Channel, this very much limited Atherton’s potential wading crossing to the area mentioned above and even then, the hull would, at times, be in the water.
Not only were the wheels to be up to 300 feet (91.4 m) in diameter, but each one was to be 30 feet (9.1 m) wide and the rearmost clearly also had a pronounced central circumferential rib, like the wheels on a tractor. With four wheels, this meant a surface contact area, when sunk to a depth of 10 feet (3.0 m), of 3,600 sq. ft. (334.5 m2). Working on a basis of soil being able to take a load of approximately 0.75 ton per sq. ft., Atherton calculated the four-wheeled fort could weigh up to 10,800 tons (10,973 tonnes), as each wheel could support a load of 2,700 tons (2,743 tonnes).
To reduce weight, Atherton proposed that rather than have the wheels be solid, they should be made in the form of giant cables made from “plough steel” tensioned between the centre and the rim to form spokes. Twice as many spokes would be fitted than were actually needed to support the weight of the machine in order to create a factor of safety should some be damaged by enemy gun fire or damage. Each spoke would be connected to the hub by a bolt and meet the rim at a large eye-bolt and the face of the wheel in contact with the ground would project past the bolts, holding these in place. This was effectively described as similar to that used in bicycle wheels and allowed for tensioning of each spoke as required. The actual rim itself would be made from multiple corrugated steel plates overlapping and bolted to each other and use a series of box girders to form a tread on the wheel.
Made in this way, these huge wheels provided an armored tread surface whilst being open and as light as possible in construction. Their size allowed for a ditch some 50 feet (15.24 m) wide and 50 feet (15.24 m) deep to be crossed with relative ease. This would be more than enough to simply drive over a huge barrier like a river or the Albert Canal, which at a modest 3.4 m deep and 24 m wide, would barely get the wheels wet.
Protection
Atherton was vague on the protection level he expected for this huge rolling target. The only comment on the armor in general was that it must be of “thickness that it cannot be penetrated by projectiles from such [large calibre] guns.”
When it came to overhead protection, Atherton was a little more descriptive. He proposed an armored roof with a layer of sand “a few feet in thickness” or made with sandbags. With the vehicle being as much as 400 feet (122 m) or so long and 50 feet (15 m) wide, a layer of sandbags even just 2 feet (0.6 m) thick would mean 40,000 cu.ft. (1,133 m3) – roughly 1,850 tonnes of sand.
Other Equipment
On top of a veritable plethora of guns and a small army to crew them, Atherton proposed some other essential features as well. First was a wireless telegraph – something which up to that point was definitely a novel idea in a military vehicle and one of the very very few worthy features of the design. To aid in signalling to friendly forces, the vehicle would also have a semaphore system and other manual signalling apparatus.
Due to the huge size of the fort, it was able to carry within, on top, or perhaps slung along its length, a series of secondary craft. These were to include small motor craft for use on water, motor vehicles, and even its own aircraft.
For the former, a section of the floor of the hull would open up to allow them to be lowered to the ground or water surface. For the latter, a hydraulically-actuated side panel could be used to deploy the aircraft, although details of this terrifying prospect for the pilot were omitted, as well as any idea for how they may get back on board.
As can be imagined, this vehicle served not only as a direct engine of war for bringing destructive firepower to bear on the enemy, or to cross enemy wire, trenches and vehicles under its mighty wheels, but also to be able to stop and deliver troops and equipment. The same type of lowering flap which could deliver vehicles to the ground could also open to allow a series of mechanical lifts operating down a heavily armored slide to discharge an undisclosed number of troops, animals, or stores.
Automotive
The designer was clearly familiar in technical terms with the fundamentals of how a wheeled motor vehicle was driven, both by his own patent prior to this one discussing automotive matters, and his ownership of a motor car.
Separate engines were to be used within Atherton’s fort, with each unit driving one wheel at the back. Steering was to be carried out by means of hydraulic jacks which would push each wheel on its bearing to turn slightly in the desired direction. These hydraulic rams were to be provided with their own engine, each modified from the type used on board a large ship, but could be controlled by a hydraulic system, electricity, or steam.
The primary engines for Atherton’s fort were to be either of the steam-boiler type or internal combustion type, although he expressed the view that the internal-combustion type may be unsuitable due to the low torque it produced at low speeds.
Cooling was to be done by water with a plentiful supply for the machine when under steam crossing something like the English Channel. Excess coolant water would be jetted vertically onto the hull in a manner he described as serving “as a protection from plunging fire or bombs dropped by airships or aeroplanes” although how this was to work is unclear.
Coal for the engines (or liquid fuel in the event an internal combustion engine was to be used) would be stored in the lower decks of the hull, along with the gearing and machinery of the vehicle.
Application
In actual use, the proposal for the fort seems to have been relatively simplistic, consisting of not much more than driving your protected bulk at the enemy, relying on its sheer mass and size to remove obstacles and to crush enemy positions – and that is about it as far as logic is concerned. Once static, the vehicle would almost be a kind of forward base from which troops and even aircraft could operate.
One particular mode of operation Atherthon proposed was to operate two such machines alongside each other, dragging a huge giant chain or series of grapples, with which wire obstacles could be dragged away and destroyed, similar to the Schuman super dreadnought.
Conclusion
Atherton, like so many of those who embarked on designing the enormous weapons of war, kept adding features often in order to overcome some serious shortcomings of the design. For example, the vehicle was so big it could not protect itself close by, so a second belt of guns was needed, and it was so high a complex series of lifts and winching was needed to be able to deliver troops.
The mass of Atherton’s fort is roughly the same as a British County-lass cruiser of WW2, but this fort was no agile warship at sea. Driving slowly through deep water, it would have been limited to channels which were not too deep or rutted for the wheels, with little or no ability to manoeuvre. Waddling slowly though something like the English Channel, it would have been a sitting duck for any enemy warship with a vaguely competent crew.
The fort would have fared no better on land either. Being well over 100 m high, the commander of the fort would have been able to see up to 36 km (22 miles) on flat terrain, but likewise he could also be seen from that far away. That is, assuming for a moment that the fort would move, not fall over, nor become hopelessly bog down, or just fall apart.
Given the nonsensical size of the wheels, which appear to have served just the single purpose of permitting a haphazard and improbable crossing of a particular stretch of water (The English Channel), Atherton had created the rest of the vehicle around that premise and, in doing so, managed to design a vehicle as unsteady as a one legged man after a hard night on the drink. Extremely high, with a huge mass on very light (proportionally) wheels, Atherton created a vehicle which would inevitably topple over sideways on the first side gradient it might encounter or even just on soft ground, where the wheels on one side sink slightly more. The centre of gravity of the vehicle is simply too high to be even vaguely practicable and, whilst he may indeed have been correct on the issue of sinkage, he utterly failed to grasp the toppling issue, the problems of propelling and even stopping such a gargantuan and heavy machine and on top of that – how on Earth it was meant to steer.
The machine from Atherton was likely submitted, like so many inventors before and subsequently, with the best of intentions, but it is hard to fathom whether he truly believed it would ever be built in any form. This was simply not what the British needed in WW1 – they already had no real problems with crossing the English Channel anyway, as they dominated the seas, so the primary purpose of the huge wheels was pointless. The idea of cramming hundreds or even a thousand men into one of these machines was also not going to find favour with the British high command, as it squandered the single most vital resource of the war – men. The British had plenty of ships and even naval guns, but the incredible volume of resources this would have consumed could easily have been turned into thousands of rifles, bombs, tanks, and bullets. On top of this, there were simply not spare thousands of men which would have been needed. The design was simply too wasteful, too preposterous, too big, too crude, and too ill-considered to ever gain any traction with any authorities even if it had ever been brought to their attention.
Post-World War I, what became of Atherton is unclear. Certainly, if he enlisted at some point, he survived or is somehow unrecorded by the Common War Graves Commission as a death in either WW1 or WW2. No further patents were submitted in his name and he appears to have disappeared into history. His fort, thankfully, disappeared as well, as the appearance of actual tanks ended many such ideas of fantastical, outlandish, and frankly, ill-conceived giant wheeled vehicles.
Atherton’s Mobile Fort specifications
Dimensions
Up to 150 m high and est. 15 m wide.
Wheels: 300’ (91.4 m) diameter, 30’ (9.1 m) wide
Weight
Up to 10,800 tons (10,973 tonnes)
Crew
Hundreds
Propulsion
Steam boilers or internal combustion type
Armament
4 primary turrets with a pair of large caliber guns
Secondary belt of smaller guns
Multiple Maxim machine guns
Poison gas projector/s
Armor
Heavy armor including a sand-filled or sandbag roof, and water jets
‘Hush Hush – A Tank Goes “Gallumphant” into action on the Western Front’, Daily Mirror, 22/11/1916
Institution of Civil Engineers. www.ice.org.uk
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Somaliland had been a British protectorate since 1855, covering some 176,000 square kilometres bound by French interests to the North West, Italian interests to the East and Abyssinia to the south. This tiny region supplied beef to Aden which was vital to British global interests as a stopping-off point for coaling ships between India and Great Britain. Aden also controlled the horn of Africa. The campaign to suppress an uprising there lasted from 1899 to 1920.
The Deervish uprising had begun a generation earlier, at the call of Sayyid Muhammed Abdille Hassan, also known derisively by the British as the ‘Mad Mullah’. This nickname started in 1899, when the Consul General J. Hayes-Sadler described him by saying “the Mullah has gone off his head” after an incident when he tried to shoot his nephew and managed to kill his own horse instead. This appearance of a loose grasp on reality was reinforced by Sheikh Salih, the head of the Islamic Salihiya Order in Mecca, who denounced Hassan as a sinner against Allah, his Prophet, and not a true Muslim.
Hassan, belonging to the Ogaaden clan and also the religious Salihiya Order, had a fanatical view of Islam that he wanted to instill on all Somalis, whether Muslim or Christian. As such, this was not a Somali uprising against British colonial rule as much as a religious civil war in the region, pitting the Muslim Salihiya adherents against both Christians and the Qadiriya Order of Islam. By 1899, this call to Jihad had amassed some 5,000 men and became widely known as the ‘Dervishes’.
Four land campaigns were mounted by the British between 1900 and 1905, costing some GB£3 million and over 1,400 Imperial (400 British and ~1,000 local forces) deaths. The Mullah had a particular fondness for beheading prisoners. Over his time, he was responsible for around 200,000 deaths in an area with a population of just around 3 million people.
Even with a somewhat weak victory in 1905, the situation was still volatile and barey concealed through 1908, when a new conflict began. Campaigns effectively followed the 1905 ‘victory’ for the next 15 years.
The war was a low key affair with few battles and mostly skirmishes, as the Dervish forces were unable to face the British forces in open battle on equal terms. When they tried, such as at the battle of Jid Ali, it ended with 58 dead British and over 1,000 dead Dervishes. Their best tactics were ambush, hit and runs and incidents such as the ambush at Gumburu Hill, which left 198 British and allied forces dead. These showed that the Dervish problem needed to be resolved permanently. Over the years of WW1 (1914-1919), the Dervishes were increasingly weakened by factional and tribal infighting, but they remained a substantial concern to the Empire, as they could foray far within that part of Africa and cause a lot of disruption – particularly if that disruption affected the vital Indian supply route. In total, the Mullah’s forces amounted to around 1,000 men, with his seat of power at the large fort complex at Taleh (known in Somali as ‘Taleex’), close to the border with Italian Somaliland. Taleh was a massive complex consisting of a large main fort (Silsilad), about 107 m wide by 91 m long, a walled prison (Dawad), the Mullah’s house (Falad), and a lookout post (Daar Illale), as well as a tomb built for the Mullah’s father and a mosque. The fort was built by the Mullah with assistance from skilled stone mason from Yemen between around 1909 to 1910. Lookout towers on the fort were around 15 m high, providing a commanding view of the area.
With the outbreak of WW1 in 1914, British and Empire troops were needed more and more in Europe and the Middle East. The Mullah was a continual nuisance and troops were also needed in this region. As of March 1915, the British had a force of over 1,600 men from the Somaliland Camel corps, Indian Army, and Somali Illaloes, along with a pair of 12-pounder field guns. This was a good sized garrison, but not sufficient to defeat the Mullah, so instead the plan was to keep him out of trouble. Mostly defensive operations were carried out to defeat incursions by Dervish forces, along with regular patrolling. The standard of the Mullah’s men was not great and they were regularly defeated by the Empire’s forces whenever they met. What the Mullah’s men did have on their side was surprise and mobility. The British goal was one of containment, to try and keep the Mullah in the eastern part of the protectorate and out of the Somali grazing grounds. The Mullah did receive some assistance from the Central Powers in the form of advice and technical assistance from the Ottoman Turks, although the German armorer sent to help him manufacture and repair weapons in 1916 was treated so badly he had to escape and, in 1917, died on his way out of the country.
With 1919 and the end of WW1, the British Cabinet could focus on the Empire’s issues to a greater extent. A new air arm, formed under Group-Captain Robert Gordon, was formed in Somaliland. This would be one of the first post-war operations for the newly formed Royal Air Force (formed April 1918) which replaced the Royal Flying Corps. Planning for the campaign was done by Major General Sir A. Hoskins. Anxious to put an end to the Mullah once and for all, the task force, designated ‘Z’ (‘Zed’) Force for reasons of secrecy, would break new ground for the British military, combining naval, land, and sea power in colonial ‘policing’.
Z force (‘Zed’ force)
Under the command of Gordon, 800 tonnes of supplies along with aircraft were delivered by HMS Ark Royal to the port of Berbera on 30th December 1919. HMS Ark Royal was a 7,080-ton aircraft carrier that started life as a merchant ship and had been converted to carry aircraft in 1914. She carried four 12-pdr. guns and 4 seaplanes as a normal complement of aircraft.
An advance party had already landed in Somaliland on 25th October 1919 and created a small landing strip at Las Khorai. The primary base for the campaign would be Berbera, with an advanced base as Eil due Elan. With the arrival of twelve DH9A aircraft, along with 36 officers and 183 airmen, on 30th December, these were moved to Las Khorai and assembled. By 19th January, assembly and flight testing were complete, meaning that the air campaign began on 21st January 1920.
This was an RAF operation, including all of the air and land forces. Ground operations would begin when the RAF said so.
The Royal Navy force off the coast would be able to provide fire support within the range of their guns, but also ensuring the security of the coastline. In this role, they were also assisted by an armed Dhow which was crewed by ratings from the Navy. HMS Odin and HMS Clio were both 1,070-ton sloops with a crew of 150 men and armed with six 4” guns and four 3 pdr. guns.
Between the 12 pdr. guns of HMS Ark Royal, and the 4” and 3 pdr. guns of the two sloops, the Royal Navy could provide fire support inland. The 12 pdr. could deliver a 5.67 kg (12.5 lb.) High Explosive shell to a target 9,970 meters away, whilst the larger 4” gun could land a 24.26 kg (53.5 lb.) shell some 14,950 meters inland. It was not far, but it was sufficient to ensure that the landing party could be covered for at least its initial phases.
Ground Forces
With no aerial opposition, the aircraft of Z Force would rule the sky, but land forces would be needed for the taking of the Somali forts. Ground support elements would accompany Z Force, namely ‘A’ Force with the Somaliland Camel Corps, portions of the 101st Grenadiers and some scouts; ’B’ Force with a battalion of King’s African Rifles and scouts; a force of tribal levies; a landing party from the Royal Navy; and a special transportation force to keep them all supplied.
The Plan
The plan was split into two phases. Phase A was for half of the aircraft (6 planes) to support ‘A’ Force in occupying Eil dur Elan, with the other half of the aircraft tasked to ‘B’ Force at Las Khorai. ‘A’ Force would then move towards El Afweina to create an aerodrome from which it would bomb the Dervish forces, whilst ‘B’ Force would go straight for the fort at Baran.
Once Phase 1 was achieved, with the aerodrome built at El Afweina and the Baran fort taken, Phase 2 would start, which was the full-scale bombing and strafing of Dervish forces until such time as they were felt suitably cowed for the ground forces to attack. This would be a systematic attack, taking one fort from Dervish control at a time, while closing on Taleh progressively. The Somali tribal forces were deployed all across the region to conduct the type of nomadic raiding they were used to and best suited for. They would thus hamper the Dervish supply routes and intercept any fleeing forces.
Opening Strikes
The combat phase of the campaign began on 21st January 1920, with the 6 aircraft assigned to ‘A’ Force making their first combat mission, with the target of the Dervish fort at Medishe. Mullah Hassan had heard of the British operation, although likely had no comprehension of what an aircraft either was or certainly what control of the sky meant. He had, however, moved the bulk of his forces from their base at Taleh to Medishe. Thus, this first mission targeted the very heart of his army.
Unfortunately for the British, navigation over what was often mostly trackless arid scrubland from the air was not as easy as it looked, with few points by which to navigate. The result was that these 6 planes struggled to find Medishe. One had engine trouble and had to make an emergency landing at Las Khorai with ‘B’ Force.
In fact, only one plane managed to locate Medishe and dropped its complement of eight 20-pound (9 kg) incendiary bombs, as well as liberally spraying the fort with .303 caliber ammunition from its Lewis gun. On the plus side of the navigation mishap was that the other four planes managed to locate the other fort at Jid Ali and, rather than waste an opportunity, delivered their munitions there, to the surprise of the roughly 1,000 troops there. The cost of surprise with the aircraft was the ability to have learned the terrain beforehand with aerial reconnaissance.
This was the first introduction of the Mullah to airpower and it was no casual lesson. One of his leading allied Amirs supporting him and his revolt was killed and he narrowly escaped with his life, as he suffered burns to his clothing from the bombs at Medishe. One can only surmise that, had the other four aircraft bombed Medishe as well instead of Jid Ali, he may have been killed right on day 1.
Over the following two days (22nd and 23rd January), more raids were carried out against Medishe, although it was not without incident. On 21st January, just four planes were available and one had engine problems, meaning it had to turn back. The other three once more got lost and missed Medishe but again found Jid Ali instead. They dropped a pair of 112-pound (51 kg) bombs on the fort, followed by their full complement of 20-pound (9 kg) incendiary bombs on the Mullah’s cattle herd.
The Mullah’s force was terrified by this bombing and the raids successfully scattered the Dervishes. The Mullah, escaping with his life, fled south with his retinue and bulk of whatever force had not been killed or ran away, heading for his base at the Taleh fort complex. Or so the British thought. Mullah Hassan had actually taken refuge in a cave at Medishe and hid there until the end of January. Only a token Dervish force remained at Jid Ali.
There, the dispatch of those irregular loyal tribal forces proved providential, as the retreating forces of Mullah’s were in such utter disarray that these friendly Somali forces attacked, looted, and slaughtered most of the Mullah’s forces before the SCC could arrive and do the job.
‘B’ Force was doing equally well in its opening phase, advancing on the fort at Baran, arriving there at noon on 22nd January. This was no small ‘mud fort’, but a solidly built masonry structure with towers and walls 12 m and 4 m high, respectively.
Around 80 Dervishes were located in the fort and began sniping at British forces as soon as they were within range. It seems that here, the decision was made to try and scare the defenders out rather than to destroy the fort, as the machine guns provided deliberate fire to ensure no more sniping would take place, and the Stokes mortars fired at it. Some 320 rounds were fired from the mortars but only hit the fort 6 times. They had been positioned too far away. The next day, after scouting by the Illaloes, the mortars were within 250 m and began firing again. Despite this and that 12 shells hit the fort, it was simply too substantial to make a significant difference and the Dervishes were not fleeing.
Rather than waste another day, it was decided at dusk to risk a small party to come and plant 45 kg of gun cotton by one of the towers, despite the open ground and Dervish snipers. This was done without injury and did the trick.
Just after dawn the next day (24th January), dozens of Dervishes were seen fleeing the fort to a small one further up the hill. Despite only being a reconnaissance platoon in strength, this force then assailed the remaining defenders in the fort to prevent their escape. The smaller position was dealt with by men of the KAR with no problems and all told, some 18 Dervish men, 3 women, and numerous animals had died between the somewhat ineffective bombing and the rush by men from the KAR the next morning. Three Askaris had been shot, although it is not known if they were killed or wounded. The rapidity of the action of the next morning and the gallantry of the demolition the night before earned these men of ‘B’ Force a pair of Military Crosses, a pair of African Distinguished Conduct Medals, and an Imperial Distinguished Conduct Medal.
If there had been some idea of saving the forts, this was gone by the 25th, when they were blown up to prevent them from being used again. ‘B’ Force was to move to Galgalla and wait for further orders.
Second Phase
Phase 2 of the operation was initiated on 24th January, as the Jid Ali and Medishe forts were all but abandoned and there were no more herds to bomb either. During one reconnaissance mission, one DH-9 was lost due to mechanical problems and had to land, forcing the two men into a 65 km march to the sea to be rescued by the Royal Navy.
On 28th January, ‘A’ Force moved out to Jid Ali and the token force there proved as stubborn as the one ‘B’ Force had found at Baran. A fresh air attack caused some of the Dervishes to leave. However, once more, the heavy masonry walls of the fort meant that the mortar fire was mostly ineffective. Rather than risk a full-scale attack and many deaths, it was decided to continue the shelling. It was then noticed the next morning (29th January) that the Dervishes had decided to leave the gate open. The fort was rushed by a British officer and two Illaloe scouts. Having taken Jid Ali, they found that the Dervishes had left the gate open when they had fled during the night, leaving behind numerous dead animals, 2 dead men, 76 rifles, and one small boy.
The troops from ‘B’ Force, who had been ordered to wait at Galgalla, had done so and, on 31st January, were ordered to move to Jid Ali to round up any remaining animals. It was in this operation that the remnants of an early war with the Dervishes were found on 6th February. This took the form of a pair of machine guns; a Maxim Nordfelt model 1895 and a tripod-mounted Vickers machine gun. Both had been converted from .450 caliber to .303 and appeared to have been dating from the battles of Erigo (1902) and Gumburu (1903). One other trophy, a bugle marked as belonging to the 2nd King’s African Rifles, was also recovered. The last post was blown on this bugle over the Jid Ali fort, as well as smaller ones as they were all blown up. The two machine guns were recovered back to base.
With the resounding defeat at Medishe and now faced with both Baran and Jid Ali in British hands, the Mullah, thoroughly beaten and humiliated, and who had been hiding in a cave, decided to make a break for it with whatever forces he had left to his power base at Taleh. The Somaliland Camel Force contingent of ‘A’ Force left in pursuit, heading straight for Taleh from Jid Ali, following his tracks.
There was other ground combat too, as the fort at Galbaridur needed to be seized as well. This was left to the Royal Naval force led by Captain Hewitt. With 100 men (including himself) from HMS Odin and HMS Clio, they were primarily armed with rifles, but also carried 3 Lewis guns, 2 Vickers machine guns, and had a single 12 pounder 4-cwt. naval field gun.
A small native contingent completed the force, including 28 of the invaluable Illaoe scouts and 112 native laborers to help move animals, supplies, and the field gun. The gun itself took 31 men to move and was hampered by the soft sandy ground over which they traveled. In anticipation of this, the wheels of the carriage had been fitted with large ‘feet’ to spread the load.
This force was disembarked at Sanak on 5th February and, having formed up into a cohesive unit, marched 5 km inland to a harbor area. This would allow them the first night under canvas whilst still being under the protection of the guns of their ships. The harbor area also had machine guns at each corner so that it was a well-protected square.
On 6th February, having taken breakfast with tea and bully beef, the force marched on the fort, arriving mid-afternoon. The RAF had dropped a load of bombs on it, but had done little damage. Galbaribur Fort was, like the others forts encountered, a large stout masonry structure with walls 1.7 m thick. Despite the best efforts of the Illaloes sneaking up to fire into the fort through its own loopholes, the Dervishes inside did not give up.
After breakfast on the 7th, the British decided to assault the fort with the men in an extended line, offering as few targets to the defenders as possible. Support fire was provided by the machine guns to keep the defenders as enclosed as possible and the 12 pounder gun blasted away with High Explosive shells at the upper levels. Despite some damage from the field gun, the fort did not collapse and the men who got to the wall could not climb it, as they were not provided with scaling ladders. The attack was called off and the troops retired for tea and a rethink.
By the morning of the 8th, new ammunition had been brought up for the field gun, including solid shot used as practice ammunition. Using a combination of these rounds to break up the exterior walls and then the HE rounds to smash holes, the next attack was substantially more effective and was covered once more by machine-gun fire from the Lewis guns on the nearby hillside. The attackers quickly occupied the roof of the fort and could both fire down onto the Dervishes below and throw grenades at them. Despite it being hopeless, there were still some resisting. After about 30 minutes, one Dervish, accompanied by some women and children, came out. The British implored the defenders to surrender to save any more women and children inside. They refused and three Illaloes were shot and wounded.
Nine more rounds from the field gun persuaded the Dervish commander to make a run for it, but he was shot down and killed. When the British entered the fort, they found all of the remaining Dervish troops had been killed and the 20 or so women and children were taken out. All told, some 15 Dervishes had been killed for no British loss. Like the other forts, this fort was also blown up to prevent it from being used again. The Naval landing party then turned about and headed back to their ships.
The Camel Corps pursuit of the Mullah had proven effective too as, on 9th February, just 20 km from Taleh, one of the Mullah’s sons told them he was at Taleh, besieged by 200 Somali loyalist troops, who prevented the Mullah from fleeing. Whether this was some family feud gone awry or a ruse de guerre to draw the SCC into an ambush is not known. The force was indeed ambushed that night while moving towards Taleh. The ambush was, however, fought off with great coolness, and an African Distinguished Conduct Medal was awarded for Sgt Mohammed of the SCC.
The ambush had failed to kill anyone or delay the advance on the fort. At night time, the tired men of the SCC had the fort almost in sight.
The Mullah, in his rush to get to the fort and with the speed of the pursuit, had not had time to secure much of his supplies. Thanks to the quick action of the SCC, as well as the tribal forces which had been harassing the Mullah, a huge prize had been taken. For the British, the arms and supplies were perhaps the most valuable thing to take from the Mullah, comprising some 51 rifles, 2,000 rounds of ammunition, and 300 camel loads of supplies. For the tribal forces for whom animals were worth at least as much or more than gold, there was a prize of 1,400 camels, 450 cows, and 50 ponies.
The approaching Camel Corps forces were also faced with a counterattack by the Dervishes, amounting to a force of around 80 men to try and break through the defensive screen put up by the native troops. This failed and the approaching forces routed the Dervishes, as the SCC attack panicked the 150 or so men who were in the fort.
If anything, this great prize was a hindrance, as the native forces were now more interested in the animals than in pursuing the Mullah. The SCC continued, however, taking 150 men forward and located the Dervish bodyguard of the Mullah protecting his wives and children. This bodyguard was then killed and the Mullah’s family now fell almost completely into British hands.
Exhausted, and with prisoners and booty they had to control, the SCC had to give up the chase temporarily. This was despite finding evidence that the Mullah and 20 men were nearby, heading to Taleh.
Harassment of the SCC continued by the Mullah’s men. The SCC proved themselves both more stoic than their Dervish adversaries, but also less prone to flight and resisted no less than three ambushes on Garrowei on the 22nd and two others after. During these, the Mullah’s forces were repelled and four more African Distinguished Conduct Medals, along with an Indian Distinguished Service Medal, were awarded.
These medals were a small price to pay for not having to besiege and assault the fort complex at Taleh. With almost all of his supplies captured, most of his men dead, and most of his family in custody, the Mullah fled over the border into Italian Somaliland. With this, the British had cemented a victory and the Mullah had his loss and his humiliating rout. The SCC then entered and occupied Taleh Fort unhindered. With the combat operations over, forward air operations were then moved to Berbera to continue in the colonial policing role.
After the Battle
With the threat of the Mullah gone, the British reasserted colonial rule in the region. The Governor of Somaliland was even able to fly out to see the success in person within just 48 hours of the victory, thus stamping the authority of the British firmly in the region.
Mullah Hassan, with just a few of his most loyal followers, had fled over the border into Italian-administered Somaliland and then into Abyssinia (modern-day Ethiopia). The governor of British Somaliland, Geoffrey Archer, tried to use this opportunity to persuade the Mullah to seek peace with his neighboring Sheiks.
The memory of these Somali Sheiks was long enough to recall Hassan’s penchant for beheadings and violent killing, murder, and torture of civilians and rejected this offer. Not that it mattered anyway, Hassan was unreliable and unreasonable, and negotiations fell apart.
A thoroughly beaten man managed to escape justice one last time by dying of influenza. Thus, on 23rd November 1920, when he died, the Mullah and the threat he posed to British Imperial interests and to his neighbors were over. Today, the Mullah is seen by some in Somalia as a symbol of resistance against British rule, carefully forgetting over 20 years of depravity and murder.
The real winner of the campaign was the RAF. A new organization had made sure it had a reputation for independent and coordinated action where airpower could be the decisive element in a campaign or battle. That was not the only victory for the RAF either, for not only did they show the potential power of bombing, but also that even rugged and remote areas were within reach. The areas to hide in for opposing forces had become much smaller. Finally, there was also the use of aircraft to ferry the wounded to help – something new in warfare.
“…had it not been for the demoralising effect of the aerial bombardment, the Dervishes would still be disturbing the peace in North-Eastern Africa”
Source: Jardine. p.280
Air-ambulance
Within Z Force would be a new novelty never before used by the British – the air ambulance. This was primarily an RAF operation rather than an army one and an RAF medical unit was attached to Z Force. Led by a medical officer called William Tyrell – a man who had already conducted secret surveillance of the area on the ground in November 1919. Of the 12 De Havilland DH-9 biplanes which were sent in pieces from Britain, one was equipped as an air ambulance. The primary modification carried out was the fitting of an enclosed cabin behind the pilot’s seat, in the rear fuselage of the aircraft. With the appearance of a large rounded lozenge, a single occupant could be placed inside in the lying position and evacuated.
All of the DH-9s, including the ambulance version, arrived just after Z Force, in January 1920.
This is perhaps the first air ambulance ever, anywhere and, if so, then Captain James Godman, aged 45, with necrosis of the middle toe on his left foot, was the first to benefit from it.
Such a ‘minor’ injury could easily have become infected and led to gangrene and even death. However, once evacuated, he and numerous others had their lives and health saved. In total, this ambulance ferried 13 officers and around 100 other ranks from the field to the hospital, and at least five other men wounded who were not admitted. Of all of these men, just 11 did not return to duty – a remarkable success rate for both the ambulance and the subsequent medical care the men received.
It is worth noting, however, that, along with the 11 standard DH-9s, the hospital version was also capable of offensive use. The red cross markings could be removed, as they were in the form of a sheet fastened around the rear of the fuselage, over the passenger cabin area. The new passenger cabin at the back replaced the bomb-aimer’s position behind the pilot and also stripped the aircraft of its single Lewis .303 caliber machine gun that would be operated from this position. Given the utter lack of any possible threat from the air, this was absolutely not a problem of any concern.
Other than that, this was a standard DH-9 with the same 12.9 m wingspan and 230 hp Siddeley Puma petrol engine. It is unclear if it actually carried any armament at any time but, given that the ambulance part could be used as required and that the plane was otherwise just a regular DH.9, there is no reason to suppose that it could not have been used for attacks on the Mullah’s forces if it needed to.
Conclusion – What about the Tanks?
It is perhaps obvious that tanks were not used in this conflict. The British had developed and deployed tanks in 1916 and were, even by 1919, still generally large and rather slow. The smallest and fastest British tank of 1920 was the Medium Mark A Whippet, capable of a blistering 8.3 miles per hour (13 km/h). Completely invulnerable to any armament the Mullah had at his disposal short of a field gun, this tank, even with a limited range of just 80 miles (129 km), might have seemed like a logical choice to take along. Or, if not a tank, perhaps an armored car, like a Rolls Royce.
At less than half the weight (under 5 tonnes fully laden, compared to the 14 tonnes) of the Whippet, and with a similar level of protection (again, all but invulnerable to anything the Mullah had access too short of a field gun), an armored car was perhaps even more logical. With a range of 150 miles (241 km), it could go nearly twice the distance of the Whippet and 5 times more quickly too, with a top speed on a good hard surface of a little over 40 miles per hour (64 km/h). Tanks had been used to good effect against the Ottoman Turks in Palestine during the war and the armored cars across the Middle East too, most famously by Major T. E. Lawrence. Less well known was their use in German West Africa during the war in East Africa in 1915, where, despite the terrain, they proved a useful force multiplier.
Yet, despite these successes, neither was used. That is not to say that post-campaign, they were not reported being used, because they were. Following a confused telegram from Nairobi at the conclusion of the campaign, several British newspapers reported the use of tanks during the campaign, which was completely untrue.
“The news of the downfall of the Dervish power was greeted with enthusiasm by the home pressmen [the British domestic media] who, misguided by a characteristically false news cable from Nairobi, added a panegyric of the efficacy of the tank in savage warfare to their usual recommendation in favour of a railway from Berbera to Bohotle”
Source: Jardine. p.284
Whilst, even before the existence of the RAF, there had been armored cars in non-Army hands – such as the work conducted by the Royal Naval Air Service (R.N.A.S.) in WW1 and even though the RAF did have some armored vehicles, they were simply not used.
It could be speculated that the reason why they were not was because the goal was to try and prove the power of aircraft over land forces, yet this had clearly been a gamble. The final outcome of the campaign supported this gamble as well. Casualties had, after all, been light amongst British forces – very light. The cost too was low, just GBP £83,000 (GBP £3.8 million in 2020 values). Even then, it was only so expensive because of the high value of the Rupee in which the locals were paid compared to the British pound at the time. The normal exchange rate was around half of the exchange rate at the time, so this sent a strong message. A campaign of colonial policing from the air was cheap and a major land campaign with light troops could be mounted for little expense without the need for costly tanks and heavy artillery. Indeed, this was exactly the lesson former Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Beatty (a veteran of the battle of Omdurman in 1889 against the Jihadist Islamic Mahdist forces of Abdullah al-Taashi), when he reflected on the whole affair in 1930, asking:
“How was the Air Service to be developed to take over those humdrum responsibilities. Mr. Churchill, who was Secretary of State for Air immediately after the War, said that the Air Service must accept in peace some of the responsibility of trying to keep the peace in countries and in waters that had been patrolled in the past by the Navy and the Army, and that, if it could not do so, it would not be bearing its fair share of the burden of Imperial defence.
At the same time, he proposed that the Air Service should be responsible for keeping peace and order in what was then known as Mesopotamia. The Air Staff willingly accepted that responsibility. Why did we accept it, and why did we think that we could possibly succeed? We thought that, if full use were made of the mobility and the moral effect of the Air Force, it could keep order in these wide spaces of the British Empire. I would ask your Lordships to remember that, outside Europe, the Empire consists of very wide open spaces. We thought that, if mobility in the air were fully used and if a rising took place 200 miles away, instead of having to take weeks, if not months, in organising and getting to the seat of the disturbance a ground force, within perhaps two hours, aeroplanes could be there. There would be no vulnerable lines of communication to attack; there would be no convoys to cut up; there would be no railways and roads to make; and that is what we mean by using to the fullest extent its mobility. In operations by ground troops in these open spaces…
…I do say that we should investigate and find out what other humdrum responsibility the Air Force is justified in taking over in peace time. What about the frontier of India? What about the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Sudan, and other places? All I say is that, if after inquiry, it is found that one of two points is not satisfied, then there is no justification to make any alterations in the existing system. Those two points are—if the Air Force can do it more efficiently for the same money, or as efficiently for less money. If neither of those two points can be met in any one case, I for one do not want to press for the Air Force to take over the duties, because I am really thinking of the efficiency of defence as a whole…”
Earl Beatty to the UK House of Lords 9th April 1930
He was, of course, partially correct. Airpower could reach far into the vast expanses at the corners of the Empire, whether it was the deserts of Somaliland or the mountains of Buchanaland, but this was exactly the gamble which had been taken. It is because this campaign was so successful, the enemy, most of whom knew nothing of man-made flight or the power of modern explosives, pastoral and often technologically ignorant forces who often fled at the sight of the machines and the bombs. When it came to fighting on the ground against the forts, it had taken just a few hardy and determined defenders to hold up a vastly superior opposing force supported by artillery and machine guns. Walls were not breached by cannon fire or the aerial bombardment but by the fortitude and fortunes of old-fashioned infantry attacks. It can therefore be speculated that, had the Mullah had even one properly positioned machine gun or dispersed his riflemen more effectively, far from a glittering success, this could have been yet another disaster for the British.
For sure such a defeat would have led to problems for the RAF, but it would also have avoided the tempting and inaccurate conclusion that a lightly armed and rapidly moving force was sufficient for colonial work. This, despite the fact there had been a very real risk of heavy assault-type warfare, and that, whilst airpower had scared the Mullah and made him flee, it neither secured the land nor brought a victory in of itself. A retreat to the Taleh fort complex, for example, would have protected the Mullah, as the size of the complex would simply have rendered the besieging forces as exactly that – a besieging force too small to take it by force and sat in the baking scrubland at the mercy of the climate. On the other hand – a couple of armored cars or even a tank or two could approach the walls with virtual impunity, spaying the defenders with fire or even used to plant charges to demolish sections. Yet none of this was done and thankfully for the British campaign, had not been needed.
The expedition had skirted with disaster, got away with it, and pulled off a tremendous success. In doing so, they had laid down a marker for future campaigns in other far-flung areas of the empire which required policing. For the following two decades, this type of campaign and mindset had loomed over the British military.
However, concerned over the costs of securing the Empire, there was a continual desire for small, fast tanks for fighting a lightly armed enemy and a reliance on fighting a poorly armed adversary. By the late 1930s, it was clear that this sort of thought which had taken hold during the interwar period had been a fallacy and, whilst this campaign was not the sole reason for the British tank fleet being dominated by small, light, and/or thinly armored vehicles, it was certainly a contributing factor. One can only speculate as to what the ‘lessons’ of this campaign might have had for tanks if they had been bought and used.
In 1939, France was on the cusp of a new war with Germany. At the time, many foresaw a return to the static type of attritional warfare of World War One. France was very well set for this type of warfare, with large numbers of well-protected tanks and the formidable Maginot Line on which was hoped to crush any German attack.
The great tank designer and industrialist Louis Renault had been a hero in the First World War with his groundbreaking 2-man FT design. Through the interwar years, his was a magical name in manufacturing and vehicle design, as famous for his cars as for his tanks. It is perhaps odd therefore that, in 1939, with a new war declared against Germany, he submitted a design not so much revolutionary or groundbreaking, but more like a squashed and flattened turretless Char B1. A vehicle with a singular purpose, this was Renault’s plan for a heavily armored and mine-proof tank.
Purpose
The objective of this proposal was to improve the design of existing tanks in service to make them more resilient to crossing minefields. This would be done by means of adopting both very wide tracks and also by making them run around the outside of the hull. The tracks would be so wide that the pair of them together would occupy not less than half the width of the entire vehicle.
Not only were the tracks to be extremely wide, but they were also to be very thick, with a large pitch, and feature a flange that extended over the wide edges of each link. This served to overlap and provide for a continuously moving armored belt. The drawing provided by M. Renault showed 34 links per side on the tank. The thickness of the track was actually specifically made to match the thickness of the armor on the tank and be made from steel of high hardness. Thus, M. Renault designed the tracks to be part of the actual armor of the tank. The pins connecting each of the links were also to be substantially thicker and heavier than a standard track pin and, thus, these tracks would be resistant to the explosion of any mine the vehicle would drive over.
Suspension for this very heavyweight track would be provided by rows of rollers under the floor and rear part of the tank, with no less than 5 rollers per link. These rollers would be provided with springing in order to provide both shock absorption from a mine blast or from normal travel. An additional roller could be held slung underneath the vehicle, in the narrow space not already covered by the tracks in order to detonate mines. Thus, this vehicle as it moved forwards would clear an entire width through a minefield as it traveled.
The remaining space
The tracks were extremely wide as a percentage of the width of the vehicle, wider perhaps than any other before or since. However, they were not limiting M. Renault’s tank concept. There would still be space in the hull for weaponry and M. Renault took pains to describe what he saw as an improvement over existing designs in this regard. Firstly, mounted centrally on the front in the narrow hull, would be a small ball-type mounting for a light cannon or machine gun. There was another one at the rear. There was obviously insufficient space for a turret. Even the rather small French turrets of the era would be too large and M. Renault proposed a simple cupola for the commander on top instead. In order to provide fire to the sides, another ball mount was placed almost directly above the rearmost point of contact of the track with the ground. Thus, the tank would have at least two machine guns and most likely three, with the rearmost position best suited to a machine gun and the front position to a cannon.
Inside
The large boxy interior would provide space for a powerful engine, sufficient to propel this design. M. Renault chose not to suggest any particular type or prospective power output. The engine, judging by the position of the air intakes in his drawings, would be either centrally located – something very awkward for the crew to cope with, as well as noisy and hazardous, or, more likely towards the rear, with a small access tunnel to the rear weapon position. Such a position would mean some ducting for the air intakes to get to the engine for cooling and combustion. However, it was actually divided inside, M. Renault described two chambers, an engine space and a ‘control and combat room’, meaning that, just like his famous FT design of WW1, the engine would be at least separated from the crew space. Drive from the engine to the tracks was provided by drive sprockets at the back.
Armor
M. Renault, as would be expected in a patent, provided no exact thicknesses or dimensions of parts or fittings of the design, save for the desire that the tracks be of at least equal thickness to the armor. It is hard to imagine that, in 1939, a man of M. Renault’s experience and capability would not be aware of the German 37 mm anti-tank gun and its capabilities. The British would essentially work off roughly 60 mm of armor as being necessary to protect against that gun’s armor-piercing round. The preeminent French Heavy tank of the era, the Char B1, had only 40 mm and was being improved to a 60 mm standard as the Char B1 bis. It is hard to imagine that anything less than 60 mm would be suitable for such a tank, as it would clearly have to be leading any attack, clearing the mines for following vehicles. Remembering that the tracks were to be equally armored to the hull, this would also mean that the tracks would be around 60 mm thick. Certainly, this would be sufficient to prevent the vehicle from being tracked by a regular anti-tank mine. It would also make for a rather hefty vehicle. The B1 bis was a large tank, over 6 m long, and nearly 3 m high, weighing in at around 31 tonnes. Being smaller than the B1 and bis versions, this vehicle was still carrying very heavy armor for 1939. It is hard to estimate the weight of the vehicle as being anything less than around 25 tonnes.
Crew
There was no detail provided as to the number of crewmen which would be needed for this improved tank, but a good estimate can be drawn from the details he outlines. For a start, the tank needed a commander positioned high up in the hull, using the cupola, and a driver located in the front, likely low down. A gunner, positioned higher up, could have operated the cannon. That was at least three crew, but this did not allow for anyone to operate the side or rear machine guns. However, three additional weapons did not mean three additional crew, as the rear-facing machine gun would have little real use to justify a crew member just for that. Just two additional crew might have been needed as gunners, totaling 5 people in the tank.
Potential
It is hard to gauge quite what potential a turretless tank might have offered the French Army of 1940. That army already had around 4,000 tanks of various types at its disposal, including the Renault R35 (10.6 tonnes, up to 43 mm of armor, armed with a 37 mm cannon and a single machine gun), the Hotchkiss H35 (11 tonnes, up to 40 mm of armor, armed with a 37 mm cannon and a single machine gun), the venerable 6.5 tonne Renault FT (with up to just 22 mm of armor and either a 37 mm cannon or machine gun), and the impressive 28 tonne Char B1 and B1 bis (with up to 60 mm of armor, a 47 mm gun in a turret ad a 75 mm howitzer in the hull, amongst others). France was well equipped in tank terms, so anything this new and “improved” tank had to offer had to go beyond the plethora of vehicles available.
The ability to drive over a minefield was clearly advantageous in an era where many foresaw warfare returning to some semblance of what was experienced a generation earlier, with heavily protected defensive lines. Other tanks also had the ability to cross and clear minefields with rollers and mine plows designed and able to be fitted to anything from the Renault FT to the Char B and R35.
Timing
The timing of M. Renault’s design was to ensure it would go nowhere. France, in company with Great Britain, had declared war on Germany on 3rd September 1939 in response to the invasion of Poland. Perhaps it was this event that spurred M. Renault to think up this design, as it was filed as an application on 21st December 1939. Six months later, however, on 5th June 1940, Operation Fall Rot (Case Red) – the invasion of France – began. At this time, M. Renault was actually in Washington D.C. at the behest of the French government to discuss plans for mass production of tanks with the Americans.
In less than three weeks, the French resistance had collapsed and, on 22nd June 1940, Marshal Petain signed an armistice with the Germans at Compiegne, bringing the invasion of France to an end. Renault’s factory at Billancourt was thus within the zone of occupation of German forces in northern France and squarely under the control of the French Vichy government – the collaborationist puppet government operating in France under German direction. Management of Renault’s factory was administered by the Germans and, whilst undoubtedly he did work under these conditions, it is hard to see what other choice he may have had in the matter.
It is perhaps surprising to many that the functions of government in France still continued during this Vichy period and this patent from M. Renault is a good example of this. Despite the occupation, his patent was granted on 17th February 1941 and published on 16th May that year. Whether or not this patent might even be considered valid is perhaps debatable, given questions over the legitimacy or otherwise of the Vichy government, but it would not matter to M. Renault. The vehicle was never built or deployed, it was too late to have any utility for French forces and, although it is hard to imagine that the German occupiers would not have seen it, they took no action either.
M. Renault died on 24th October 1944, just weeks after his incarceration in the prison at Fresnes, Val-de-Marne, south of Paris, awaiting trial for alleged crimes of collaborating with the Germans. This patent, like many others filed during this Vichy period, were filed and forgotten.
Sources
French Patent FR865243 filed 21st December 1939, granted 17th February 1941, published 16th May 1941
Vauvallier, F. (2014). French Tanks and Armoured Vehicles 1914-1940. Histoire and Collections, Paris, France
United Kingdom (1984-1986)
Main Battle Tank – None Built
The Newcastle-based firm of Vickers Defence Systems had been building tanks on Tyneside for decades but had struggled in the 1980s to find markets for its tanks. With the unveiling of the Chobham armor technology in 1976 and Vickers being brought into the committee on its use, they obviously wanted to make use of this latest protection technology for their own tanks to try and meet the new export markets. The first attempt to move beyond the otherwise very competent Mk.3 design was the Mk.4, later reworked and known as the Valiant. The Valiant was a solid design with several significantly advanced features such as the all-aluminum hull and brand new fire-control system. When the Valiant failed to receive any orders, plans were put in place to upgrade the mobility aspect of the vehicle, but the hull was lost to an accident leaving just the turret needing a new body. A solution proposed was to use the already in production Challenger 1 hull for this to create a brand new tank – the Vickers Mk.7.
The background
The Mk.7 started life as a goal to combine Chobham armor technology with the experience gained in the production of the Mk.3. The first attempt had been the Mk.4, a new turret made from cast steel with Chobham armor and an all-aluminum hull. That project was let down very early by the RO L7A3 105 mm gun which, despite being an excellent gun in its own right, was simply inadequate for the modern battlefield with a new generation of Soviet tanks like the T-72 fielded and exported in increasingly large numbers. The Mk.4 turret, therefore, was redeveloped quickly to be a ‘Universal’ Turret, one with a carefully designed mounting able to take the L7A3 105 mm, the L11A5 120 mm, and even the German 120 mm smoothbore. In this way, it could appeal to both first-world armies who wanted a 120 mm gun and also to an export market where a 105 mm gun might be considered a cost-effective alternative. The vehicle was quickly rebranded as the Valiant.
The Valiant had also included a state-of-the-art suite of fire control making it a very potent machine for delivering firepower on the battlefield. Its drawback had been an automotive one and despite plans in hand for an improved version, an accident wrecked the hull.
With the loss of the Valiant hull, ideas for improvements based on the Valiant’s automotives had to be shelved, as there was no budget to design and build a new hull. Instead, the work was done to salvage the turret, repair the optics, and hunt for a new hull with hopefully some improved mobility.
The first candidate for this new hull was that of their direct opposition, the Challenger I hull of ROF Leeds. Their proposed marriage would have been the first instance of the Vickers Mark 7, but it never got further than a proposal.
Optics
The optics for the Universal Turret were state of the art for the time. Firstly, the commander was provided with a slightly raised cupola consisting of 6 fixed x1 magnification non-reflecting Heliotype viewers. Sighting for the commander was provided by the French SFIM VA 580-10 2-axis gyro stabilised panoramic (360 degreesdegree) sight. This sight had various magnification modes, x3 and x10 and incorporated ana Nd-YAG-type laser rangefinder. In addition to this was a PPE Condor-type 2-axis gyro-stabilised image intensifier (Phillips UA 9090 thermal sight) displayed on a 625-line television monitor for both gunner and commander alike.
The gunner had a x10 magnification Vickers Instruments L30 x10 telescopic laser sight with Barr and Stroud LF 11 Nd-YAG-type laser rangefinder fitted with a projected reticle image (PRI) for ranging. In addition to this, he was provided with a Vickers instrumenta Vickers instruments GS10 periscopic sight for target acquisition. The loader was provided with a single AFV No.10 Mk.1 observation periscope. The driver’s optics consisted of a single wide-anglewide angle episcope in the centre-front of the hull
Firepower
The Universal Turret was able to mount a choice of main gun with the two primary options being the British 120 mm L11A5 rifled gun or the German 120 mm smoothbore from Rheinmetall with ammunition storage in the hull, turret bustle, and with a ready rack in the turret basket.
Elevation for the main gun was limited to -10 to +20 degrees and, loaded manually, the rate of fire was given as 10 rounds per minute (1 every 6 seconds) with the British 120 mm gun. A Vickers muzzle reference system (MRS) on the end of the barrel added additional information into the computer system and the barrel was clad in a thermal sleeve to reduce distortion.
The fire control system and gun stabilisation system was an all-electric system developed by Marconi. This system a built-in laser rangefinder and a brand new ballistic computer to improve the chances of a first-round hit against static and moving targets as well as for supporting firing on the move. This system used the SFCS 600 computer derived from the GCE 620 system installed on the Vickers Mk.3 with some improvements known as the Marconi Radar systems Centaur 1 system.
The RO L11A5 120 mm gun, made by Royal Ordnance, Nottingham, was 7.34 m long and weighed 1,782 kg. It featured improvements over the earlier designs by using a forged upstand for the muzzle reference system and featured a smaller volume and lighter fume extractor than the L11A2. As a result of these changes, the gun was out of balance so 7.7 kg of additional weights had to be added to counterbalance it normally.
Secondary armament included a single 7.62 mm machine Hughes chain gun mounted coaxially with the main gun and a second 7.62 mm machine gun (L37A2) in a remote-control mount next to the commander’s cupola on the roof. In total 3,000 rounds for these could be carried. Both of these weapons were interchangeable with a variety of commercially available 12.7 mm machine guns.
Layout
The turret was large and rectangular with vertical sides and an angled front made from flat panels and with the gun located centrally on the front of the turret. On the roof were two circular hatches for the commander on the right, and the loader on the left. A rectangular sight was provided on the front right of the turret roof for the gunner who, in keeping with British general tank-layouts, was located on the right, in front of the commander. All 3 turret crew were positioned on a turntable which rotated with the turret and which was supported on steadying rollers as opposed to the conventional turret-basket concept. The floor of this rotating platform was covered with non-slip aluminium plating and also contained the ready-ammunition stowage. The turret sat on the Challenger 1 hull which was conventionally arranged with the driver in the front, fighting compartment in the middle on top of which the turret sat, and engine compartment in the rear.
Armor
The turret was a steel base structure and, although the exact makeup was never released, it should be borne in mind that the original Valiant (or Mk.4 originally as it was) was based on the technology from the Mk.3. The Mk.3 had moved from an all-welded steel turret to a cast one to improve ballistic protection and, although the technology for the Mk.4 followed much of the lessons from the Mk.3, it appears to have switched back to an all-welded turret in order to accommodate the block-like Chobham armor packs on top. This would be in contrast to the Challenger 1, then coming into service, which used a front half made from a complex steel casting and welded rear portions with the Chobham packs over the front and sides.
Chobham armor covered the whole front of the turret and the sides to approximately ⅔ of the way back, at which point they became hollow boxes for storage around the rear corners. In the centre of the turret at the back was the large and effective nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare air filtration system made by Westair Dynamics. Mounted externally, the unit was easy to access making replacement and maintenance easier and consisted of a multi-stage high-efficiency filtration process and worked to create an overpressure inside the tank which served not only to keep gases out of the tank but also to evacuate fumes from the weapons.
The hull used heavy sections of Chobham across the front and sides with the driver sat recessed within the armour at the centre-front of the tank. Spaced armour covered most of the upper sections of the hull and all this combined to make the Challenger 1 one of the best protected tanks of the era.
Tracks and Suspension
The tracks and suspension for this vehicle were identical to those on the Challenger 1, with 6 large road wheels, each on a swing arm. Each wheel had a rubber tyre and ran on steel tracks fitted with removable rubber pads. The suspension was an improvement over the torsion bars of the Valiant and consisted of hydropneumatic units.
Automotive
Power for the vehicle was provided by the Rolls Royce CV12 26-litre diesel engine located in the rear of the hull. Producing 1,200 hp and delivering it through a David Brown TN37 automatic transmission with 4 forward and 3 reverse gears. As the complete Challenger 1, the vehicle had a top speed of 56 km/h and with the new turret would be around the same weight so likely a very similar performance as well.
The Rival and the Name
At this time, around 1983, Vickers Defence systems was a direct rival to the Royal Ordnance Factory Leeds which was producing the Challenger 1 MBT. The Challenger 1 was just entering service with the British Army as the replacement for the Chieftain. Both the Valiant and Challenger 1 had already been rivals during British Army trials in 1982 and, despite more capable the fire control system of the Valiant, the Challenger had won out. Vickers were left needing a new foreign market for the tank and a new hull. Asking for a joint partnership with ROF Leeds to use the Challenger 1 hull when ROF already had the Challenger in production and were seeking overseas orders was simply not viable and, understandably, the project ended before it even began. When the solution appeared in the form of the Leopard 2 hull being made available from the German firm of Krauss-Maffei, the turret found a new lease of life as the Mk.7/2, implying that Mk.7 was just to be the original Valiant turret/Challenger hull combo or that Mk.7 was the general ‘fit the Valiant turret onto an MBT platform’ project name.
Given that when the Mk.7/2 was unveiled, it was identified as the Mk.7, it is logical to assume the latter and that the ‘2’ was added retrospectively.
It is with some irony perhaps that in Egypt, in 1985, the Mk.7/2 was tested against the rival Challenger 1 and the fire control system once more proved itself to be superior to that of the Challenger 1, which was suffering from issues with firing on the move and engagement speed.
As it turned out, the Egyptians bought neither the Mk.7/2 nor the Challenger 1, and less than a year later Vickers Defence Systems bought the ROF Leeds plant and with it the rights to Challenger 1 and was awarded contracts for the Challenger-based Armoured Repair and Recovery Vehicle (C.A.R.R.V.).
At the same time, Vickers also acquired tank-design authority from Royal Armament Research and Development (RARDE) at Chertsey. Vickers, by 1986, therefore had all of the cards with the exception of the superior turret from the Valiant – that was repackaged and sold off to Brazil for their EE-01 Osorio. Instead of simply trying to get the British Ministry of Defence to replace Challenger 1 turrets with the Valiant Universal Turret as envisaged in 1984, Vickers had other plans.
Conclusion
In 1986, just a year after taking over ROF Leeds, Vickers submitted a completely unsolicited plan to the MOD for a new tank to replace the Challenger 1. At a time when the Challenger 1 was brand new in service, this was certainly a bold move. Development of the Challenger 2 was to start thereafter and a working prototype was ready by the end of 1989. The Challenger 2 was a completely new tank despite sharing a name and general shape with the Challenger 1 and built-in much of the preceding years’ worth of knowledge gained by Vickers. Development of the Challenger 2 finally gave Vickers the Chobham-armored tank they had wanted and started nearly a decade earlier.
Resolving the key problems with the Challenger 1, the Challenger 2 more than anything else perhaps best illustrates the potential Vickers had offered way back with the Valiant but which had been lost. The Valiant turret with the Challenger 1 hull would have resolved the fire control issues with the Challenger but it did not really resolve the mobility problem. The Mk.7/2 on the other hand, resolved the mobility problem but was stymied by the fact that the German government limited exports of the Leopard 2 tank hull. Having suggested using the Valiant turret on the Challenger 1 and being rejected, Vickers had simply moved on to a design to replace the Challenger so that, when they took over control, changing the turret on the old hull would not suffice. Instead, the new tank would improve on the old one in all areas.
Specifications
Crew
4 (driver, gunner, loader, commander)
Propulsion
Rolls Royce CV12 26-litre diesel engine producing 1,200 hp
Speed
56 km/h (road)
Range/consumption
190 km (118 mi)
Armament
L11A5 120 mm rifled main gun, coaxial 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm machine gun, roof-mounted remote-control 7.62 mm or 12.7 mm machine gun. Rheinmetall 120 mm smoothbore.
Armor
Welded steel and Chobham
Suspension
Hydropneumatic
Production
None built
Sources
Ground Defence International #69. November 1980
Ground Defence International #70. December 1980
Janes. (1985). Arms and Artillery. Janes Defence Group
Ogorkiewicz, R. (1983). Vickers Valiant. Armor Magazine March-April 1983
New tanks need to be designed, tested, and deployed carefully. Even with the pressures of war taken into account, the process should be methodical to ensure that mechanically reliable vehicles with good fighting characteristics and survivability get to the front line. The United Kingdom, in particular, had by 1945, suffered terribly economically, industrially, and with the bombing of its civilians during World War 2. This, combined with the need to produce a large number of tanks to field against the Germans and their allies, had all contrived to hinder the design and production of new tanks. In particular, by 1943, there was a desire to have a good cruiser tank, well protected and fielding the excellent 17 pounder gun. The much-delayed project was finally ready by 1944 and passed initial domestic trials. However, this new vehicle, the A.41 ‘Centurion’ could also be sent to mainland Europe for active trials in a war zone. The object of these first foreign Centurion trials was, therefore, to make use of the considerable battle experience of crews available in British forces in Europe and to conduct real-world trials under as near to combat conditions as possible.
The A.41 Cruiser Tank ‘Centurion’ had started life in October 1943 with a requirement for a 45-ton tank with a 650 horsepower engine, well sloped frontal armor, and carrying the new and powerful 17 pounder gun. Effectively, this would create a vehicle at least equal to the German Panther tank. When this tank was finally ready, the war in Europe was all but over. With some fighting still taking place there, it became a rush to get this brand new tank to Germany perhaps in the hope of some action. Even if it could not, the tank would be operationally deployed and the experience gained in a war zone would be invaluable in improving it. What this tank became was perhaps the finest tank ever made – the British Centurion, a tank in service for decades after the war, with hundreds of variants seeing combat around the globe.
Development
It was not until February 1944 that the final specifications for what the as-yet-unnamed A.41 Heavy Cruiser Tank (it would not be known as ‘Centurion’ until later – at this time, the name ‘Centurion’ was still being touted for the A.30 – the tank which would be known as ‘Challenger’) would look like. With those requirements set, it was planned to produce 20 pre-production prototypes in order to conduct evaluation trials.
In May 1944, the Director of the Royal Armoured Corps (D.R.A.C.) amended the order for 20 of this first pattern of A.41, so that small features could be evaluated. These included the choice between a 20 mm Polsten cannon and 7.92 mm BESA as a turret machine gun, or even a 77 mm gun (as fitted to the A.34 Comet), and a rear escape hatch vs rear facing BESA machine gun.
Technical Details A.41 P Series
The requirement for well-sloped frontal armor also meant that the idea of the vertical driver’s plate on the front of the tank, so recognizable on British tanks from the A.22 Churchill to A.34 Comet, was gone. This had been kept partially to make sure a hull-mounted machine gun could be retained for the tanks, but with only a single crew member in the hull and this single sloping front plate, this hull machine gun was finally removed.
A single large front sloping plate on the A.41 would make it look more like the German Panther, with the exception that, whilst that German tank had 80 mm or more of armor on the glacis, this A.41 had just 2.25” (57 mm) across the glacis and nose plate. Whilst this may seem like a problem, it is perhaps noteworthy that, although the Panther had more armor than the A.41, it would still be easy to penetrate by the 17 pdr. at any normal combat ranges, just as the A.41s would be vulnerable to the 7.5 cm KwK 42 gun of the Panther in return. However, production A.41 ‘Centurions’ would adopt a thicker glacis to more closely resemble the Panther.
The suspension was in the form of 6 doubled rubber-tired bogie wheels on each side, with the return of the 20” wide (508 mm) wide, 5.5” (140 mm) pitch track supported by rollers. The 108 links for the track on each side of the tank were made from cast manganese steel and were not fitted with rubber pads. The track and suspension were also usually hidden under a 6 mm thick ‘bazooka plate’ running the full length of the suspension. Each bogie was provided with a Newton-Bennett shock absorber and a coil spring and a hydraulic damper.
Powered by the Rolls Royce Meteor Mk.4A petrol engine delivering 635 hp at 2,550 rpm, it had a power to weight ratio of 13.7 bhp/ton (Imperial), which was only a problem in terms of fuel consumption. The 120 gallon (545.5 liters) petrol tank was only sufficient for 90 miles (145 km) of travel on a road. This meant the A.41 consumed some 1.3 gallons (6.1 liters) of petrol per mile (3.8 liters of petrol per km).
The 7-speed (5 forward and 2 reverse) Merritt-Brown Z51 gearbox combined with Girling brakes allowed for the steering of the tank under what was known as a ‘controlled-differential’ system. This was the preferred solution for a tank transmission, but it was decided to also try the Synchromesh Self-Shifting (SSS) system as well. Known as the Sinclair-Meadows Powerflow SSS system, this was a 7-speed (4 forward and 3 reverse) automatic gear change system by the Hydraulic Coupling and Engineering Company. This was an advanced and complex gearing system that had been experimented with during the war perhaps most famously on the TOG tank program. It offered the enormous advantage of allowing for a smooth transition from forward to reverse motion and vice versa via a fluid fly-wheel clutch.
On the A.41, the SSS system allowed for the tank to reverse at speeds of up to 14 mph (22.5 km/h), but only one A.41 was ever fitted with this system and was designated A.41S. The system was eventually abandoned after a series of minor problems and unpopular reports on it from the crews, for whom it was too different from what they were used to. The Merritt-Brown Z51 would eventually be the winning system from these trials.
Domestic Trials
Early domestic trials were, by all accounts, a pleasant change from many tanks during the war, where problems followed problems. The first automotive trials had actually taken place in September 1944 using that ‘soft-boat’ (the term for a non-armored steel test hull). Then, the only particular problem observed was excessive tracking to one side, which caused a lot of undue brake wear. There were no fundamental problems with the design and it immediately received a green light for the production of prototypes which were to start in January 1945. However, with every possible effort being pushed towards the D-Day landings (Operation Overlord) set for summer 1944, the production of A.41 could not start straight away. It would not actually be until April 1945 that the first prototype A.41, now designated as a ‘Heavy Cruiser’, was actually finished at Woolwich Arsenal. This first vehicle was delivered to the Fighting Vehicle Proving Establishment (F.V.P.E.) at Chertsey, Surrey, and immediately started a series of automotive trials. It was followed shortly thereafter for trials at Chertsey by the next two vehicles. The story for all three was the same – they were deemed excellent.
Pilot vehicle number 1 blew through its tests, covering over 1,055 miles (1,698 km) with 467 miles (752 km) of those off-road. Reaching a top speed of 23.7 mph (38 km), this brand new 45.5 ton (46.2 tonnes) tank was an impressive vehicle. By the end of May 1945, a 4th pilot vehicle arrived and this was sent for gunnery trials at Lulworth and this too went very well. In fact, by this time, the only notable criticism of any note was that the 20 round forward ammunition bin needed to be modified slightly.
To Europe
With domestic trials proceeding perhaps better than could have been expected and with the war going well, it was decided to send them to the front in Europe for evaluation by combat units. The plan for this evaluation was ‘Operation Sentry’ and had actually been proposed even before the first domestic trials had even taken place, such was the confidence in this vehicle. With such excellent initial results, there was no reason not to go ahead with it.
Of the 20 of this pre-production batch of A.41s ordered, 6 of them were to go on Operation Sentry. Three would be selected from Woolwich Arsenal (Royal Ordnance Factory, Woolwich), specifically P.3, P.9, and P.11. Three more would come from those produced by Royal Ordnance at Nottingham, specifically P.4, P.6, and P8.
Originally, it had been desired to test them with crews drawn from the Grenadier, Coldstream, Welsh, and Irish Guards regiments, so that they could be put into combat against the remaining elements of the German Wehrmacht. However, the remaining German military forces in northwest Germany, Denmark, and Holland surrendered to the British on 4th May, followed on the 7th by the signing of a full formal surrender of all remaining German forces to come into force the next day.
The war in Europe, therefore, came to an official end on 8th May 1945 with the surrender of all German forces to the Allies, although small pockets of forces remained to be collected. For all intents and purposes, the War in Europe was over and Germany had been utterly defeated. For the British, this had marked the culmination of a long and hard-fought war that had started nearly 6 years earlier and virtually bankrupted the Empire. It also marked the end of any prospect of getting the new A.41 into combat against the Germans.
There was, however, still a substantial number of vehicles and men in Europe, and all of the paraphernalia and restrictions of an active war zone. Thus, with the basics of the tank proven solid, these six tanks were quickly assigned to crews from 5th Battalion Inniskilling Dragoon Guards (5 I.D.G.) and 5th Battalion Royal Tank Regiment (5 R.T.R.), all part of the Guards Armoured Division. These were experienced units. 5 I.D.G., for example, had been in action in Europe since July 1944, fighting through France (Liseieux, 23rd August 1944), Belgium (Ghent, 5th September 1944), and into Germany (Rhine crossing, 25th March 1945) reaching Hamburg by May 1945. Trials would be split with 5.I.D.G., operating the tanks from 31st May to 11th June and then taken over by 5.R.T.R. from 12th June to 23rd June.
These crews trained on the tanks in the UK, having been brought back from the European Theater of Operations (ETO) specifically to do so. These were combat-experienced crews and they would be supported by personnel from the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (R.E.M.E.) who had been assigned to and working at the F.V.P.E. The entire test and evaluation team was then deployed to Germany as part of the 7th Armoured Division.
Itinerary
The six Centurion tanks were collected from Lulworth at noon on 13th May 1945 and immediately set off for the port of Southampton. They arrived at No. 20 Transit Camp in the evening. The next morning, they were embarked on Landing Craft Tank (L.C.T.) 798 and 1035 commanded by Lieutenant. C. D. Mitchell and Sub Lieutenant M. F. Bowe, respectively.
On Tuesday, 15th May, the L.C.T.s set sail from Southampton, but stopped overnight at Newhaven and Deal before arriving at Ostend and then finally Antwerp on the evening of the 18th. Disembarking on the 19th, they underwent two days of inspections, including final drive checks on vehicle P.11 before a road march to Nijmegen, a distance of 142 km.
By the 23rd, when they stopped overnight at the town of Brunen (77 km from Nijmegen), the tanks had covered 224 miles on the continent and the road march continued despite the wet weather, with overnight stops at Osnabruck on the 24th and Brentwede on the 25th. They remained there for two days until, on the 28th, the rain finally relented and they set off once more. This time, the drive took them to Hollendstedt, a distance of 80 miles (129 km), where again they stopped for two days. Finally, on the 30th, they left Hollendstedt and did a single 84 mile (135 km) road march to Gribbohn, arriving in the evening. During this transit from the UK and the road march through Holland, just two problems had occurred and both were gearbox failures. The first had taken place before the tanks had even started off at Lulworth and was likely a problem of manufacture. The second, over 700 miles (1,127 km) later, was just 40 miles (64.4 km) outside Hamburg. Other than that, maintenance had been straightforward, apart from a single quill shaft on an auxiliary engine failing. Nonetheless, all of the faults for all of the tanks were carefully logged.
Having arrived safely with little problems, the vehicles underwent their unit trials, followed, between 27th June and 14th July, by live-firing trials at the ranges at Lommel, Belgium. Other trials were then carried out, with the tanks simulating combat attacks and tactical movement – all of which went well.
Lessons
Valuable experience with this new tank had been obtained in a relatively short time. A summary of the various faults, whether major or minor, was logged. From this and from discussion within the D.T.D., amendments to the A.41 design would be made.
The gearbox failures were perhaps surprising only in that they were so irregular and uncommon. A lot of previous problems during the war with tanks had been centered around gearbox trouble and yet this new transmission proved itself to have learned those lessons. The design had indeed taken knowledge from the Z51 Merritt-Brown unit which had been used in the Cromwell and Comet. The change was centered around adding a differential lock to the 7-speed (5 forward and 2 reverse) speed box, as this would help the driver to control one track over another in the event of becoming bogged down on soft ground.
On top of this change, a dry oil sump was fitted with oil injection for the gears, which helped both lubricate and cool the gears. A new double reduction system was part of the transmission and this was known as the Z51. The new gearbox was efficient and greatly improved the gear ratios in use to produce the power required at the sprockets. With the high-speed reverse gear added later to improve the design yet further, the nomenclature of the Z51-type box was now ‘Z51R’ (R for high-speed Reverse).
The 7.92 mm BESA, venerable as its service had been, was requested to be replaced with the .30 caliber Browning machine gun. This was more reliable and another machine gun of the same type was requested for the commander on his cupola. All ideas of the somewhat impractical and wasteful use of a rear-facing BESA in the turret back were gone too.
The Polsten cannon idea had been to provide immediate firepower to destroy enemy anti-tank guns, where a machine gun was not powerful enough, and it was indeed a potent weapon in its own right. The real problem was that it simply took up too much space and a machine gun, like the BESA or the .30 caliber Browning, was simpler and allowed more space for the crew in the turret. Of the 6 tanks in Operation Sentry, only one had been fitted with the BESA and yet this was the preferred mounting – albeit replaced with the Browning.
The addition of the Morris 8 hp 3 kW auxiliary generator was a fine idea, as it would allow the tank to charge its radio batteries and gun control equipment even without the main engine turned on. However, it was felt that it would become unreliable over time and a new system would be needed. Nonetheless, the idea of having its own generator unit was novel and extremely valuable and would be kept.
To improve off-road performance and to handle the slightly heavier weight of the vehicle, the prototype 20” (508 mm) wide tracks were changed to 24” (610 mm) when the A.41 entered production as the A.41*. Other modifications would include the hull stowage bin, but also the gun cradle, towing cable assemblies, and the final drive housings. Overall, these were minor amendments to the tank which had shown itself to be both fundamentally sound as a tank design, as well as being popular with the crews.
Like all good tests and trials, areas for improvement had been identified. There had been no opportunity for these tanks to see any actual combat or fire their guns in anger, but that was not the important thing. With a live test of the A.41 in a war zone and all of the difficulties which that entails in terms of the limitations on transport and supplies, the A.41 proved itself robust and reliable.
This perhaps was the single most important element which had often been found to be lacking on earlier British tanks. Produced under the extreme hardships of a wartime economy with limitations of materials and labor, and whilst often enduring German bombing, the nation’s economy had taken a serious beating. Yet, despite all of this, the British had managed to produce a tank to replace a fleet that still consisted of things like the A.24 Cromwell, A.30 Challenger, A.22 Churchills, and a plethora of M4 Shermans.
Trial End
With the trials over and the 6 Centurions returned to Great Britain via Calais in July, the results were discussed by the Director of the Royal Armoured Corps (D.R.A.C.) Advisory Committee meetings on 22nd August 1945. The theatre trials had been a resounding success and there was little hesitation in ordering 100 of the new tanks (very slightly modified) as A.41* of the initial batch of an order for 800 such tanks. The A.41, therefore was simply the prototype Centurion and it was the improved A.41* model which became the Centurion Mk.1. The remainder of the batch (700), was improved yet further as the A.41A and appeared as the Centurion Mk.2.
It was hard not to be impressed by the reliable and rugged Centurion. The Operation Sentry trials covered over 2,300 miles (3,701 km) for all six tanks with 250 miles (402 km) off-road and only minor problems were encountered. The new tanks were proudly shown off to other units within the 21st Army Group, following the long British Army tradition of a unit showing off their shiny new equipment to units that did not have it.
The first 100 of those A.41A Centurions, later identified as Mk.2 tanks, would carry the same 17 pounder gun as before and then the rest (600 vehicles) were to carry a newer and even more powerful gun – the 20 pounder. The British had, by 1945, become masters of the gun, and this new 83.5 mm piece was a substantial step up in tank firepower beyond the 17 pounder. The big issue was that a new and larger gun beyond the 17 pdr., like the 32 pounder or this 20 pounder (originally a ‘21 pounder’ design), required a new fully cast turret to take it (the 95 mm Close Support (C.S.) gun version could be fitted to either turret).
Probably the biggest change from these P series vehicles to the first production vehicles would be the frontal armor. The 2.25” (57 mm) glacis was seen as being inadequate and this was increased to 3” (76 mm) for production vehicles, even though this thickness change is virtually imperceptible from the outside.
Production of the A.41 ‘Centurion’ would start in November 1945 from that August 1945 order, with serial production proper starting in 1946. Deliveries of that new tank started with the 6th Battalion Royal Tank Regiment in February 1946. This tank, the culmination of the British lessons of WW2, would go on to serve in dozens of armies over the following decades, and seeing combat all over the world. In the Centurion, and as proven by its trials on Operation Sentry, the British truly had produced one of the greatest tanks of all time, simple, rugged, reliable, and adaptable.
Survivors
Not many Mk.1 or even Mk.2 Centurions survive today and even fewer of this first trials batch, just one in fact. Today, only P.9 survives as a pre-series Centurion. P.9 is preserved in The Tank Museum collection, Bovington, UK.
A.41 P-Series specifications
Dimensions (L-W-H)
25’ 2” long, 29’ 7” long over gun, 11’ 0.75” wide, 9’ 2.75” high
Total Weight
46.9 tonnes
Crew
4 (Driver, Commander, Gunner, Loader)
Gun Elevation Range
+20 to -12 degrees
Speed
23 mph/h
Range
90 miles
Engine
Rolls Royce Meteor Mk.4A petrol 635 bhp at 2,550 rpm
Radio
No.38 AFV set, No.19 set, Infantry telephone
Fuel
120 gallons (545.5 liters)
Ground Clearance
20 inches
Trench Crossing
11´
Turret
360-degree rotation
Step
3’
Ford
4’ 9”
Armament
7 pdr., 7.92 mm BESA / 20 mm Polsten cannon, .303” Bren machine gun, 2” smoke bombs, multi-barrel smoke discharger
Armor
Hull Glacis: 57 mm @ 55 deg., Nose: 57 mm @ 45 deg., Sides: 51 mm @ 12 deg., Rear: 38 mm @ 7 deg., Floor: 17 mm, Roof: 29 mm (hull front) 16 mm (centre), 14 mm (rear), Turret Mantlet: 127 mm, Turret Front: 127 mm, Turret Sides: 76 mm @ 10 deg., Turret Rear: 76 mm @ 10 deg., Turret Roof: 25 mm @ 78 deg. (front), 25 mm @ 90 deg. (centre), 25 mm @ 78 deg. (rear).
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Operations Veritable, Blockbuster, and Grenade marked the breakout from Holland for Allied forces during February and March 1945. These were followed by a strong push across the border into Germany, bitter fighting in the Reichswald forest and then the crossing of the Rhine (Operation Plunder). Between the time of the crossing of the Rhine on 24th March 1945, and the end of the war in North West Europe on 5th May 1945, 21st Army Group suffered a total of 769 men killed and injured across 19 British Armoured Regiments, along with the loss of 333 Armored Fighting Vehicles.
Those 333 AFVs were primarily Cruiser tanks, such as the A.27 Cromwell, A.34 Comet, and A.30 Challenger. In addition, some units fighting in the area were equipped with A.22 Churchill tanks and the Canadian units were equipped with M4 Sherman tanks. In 1946, as a part of an ongoing effort to improve both the habitability and survivability of tanks, the Royal Army Medical School, on behalf of the Medical Research Commission (M.R.C.), produced a short series of analytical reports looking at the casualties and, in particular, at the causes of them. As the majority of actions led to capturing the ground being fought over, the British examiners, Captain H. Wright and Captain R. Harkness, managed to examine 65% of all of the vehicles lost to enemy action.
A close look at these reports provides a unique and interesting insight into the nature of tank warfare and provides clues into the design and operational use of armored fighting vehicles.
The Units
The armored units deployed by the British which formed part of the assessment of casualties came from a number of divisions, such as the 11th Armoured Division. That division consisted of the 15th/19th Hussars, 23rd Hussars, 3rd Battalion Royal Tank Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, which were equipped with A.34 Comet Tanks. The 7th Armoured Division consisted of the 8th Hussars, 1st and 5th Battalion Royal Tank Regiment and 5th Battalion Inniskilling Dragoon Guards, which were equipped with A.27 Cromwell tanks.
Within the 11th Armoured Division was also the Guards Armoured Division, which consisted of 2nd Battalion Welsh Guards, equipped with A.27 Cromwells, and 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards, 2nd Battalion Coldstream Guards, and 2nd Battalion Irish Guards, all equipped with M4 Sherman tanks. There was also the 4th Armoured Brigade, consisting of the Royal Scots Greys, 3rd/4th County of London Yeomanry, and 44th Battalion Royal Tank Regiment and these units were equipped with M4 Sherman tanks. Finally, there was 8th Armoured Brigade, consisting of 4th/7th Dragoon Guards, 13th/18th Hussars, Nottingham and Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry, and the Staffordshire Yeomanry, all of whom were equipped with M4 Sherman tanks.
Overview
In analyzing the data, the authors started by taking total losses for tanks of all types and looking for the various causes of damage and loss (Table 1). Unsurprisingly, some units with a majority of M4 Sherman tanks, the M4 Sherman suffered the greatest percentage of the losses. This was closely followed by the A.27 Cromwell and A.34 Comet tanks (Table 2). It is very clear from the results presented in Table 1 that High Explosive (H.E.) shells, such as from artillery, amounted to just 3% of total losses and were therefore a statistically insignificant source of tank loss. By far and away the greatest cause of losses to all tanks was from penetrations of the armor by enemy Armor Piercing (A.P.) ammunition (Table 3).
Mines
On the face of it, the identification of the type of mine involved in an incident with a tank is complicated by the total destruction of the device. The method used in the study was to take data from other mines located and cleared in the area to identify the most likely source of the mine encountered by the tank (Table 4). This was easy where a tank struck a mine and all that was found in the vicinity were other Riegel R.43 bar mines. That would make it very likely the culprit was one of that type. In a mixed minefield of Tellermines and Riegels, all that could be determined was that it was likely to be one of those two types. Many times, the paucity of other mines located or the lack of records as to which mine was found meant that no mine could reasonably be identified as the culprit encountered by the tank. On one occasion, an M4 Sherman tank was utterly destroyed by a large H.E. charge which had been buried and detonated under the vehicle. The crew were all killed and, whilst the incident was recorded, no data from that particular blast was included within the analysis, as it was a one-off and outlier as far as the study was concerned.
The Riegel R.43 (Sprengriegel R./Mi.43) was a bar mine – a long rectangular casing weighing 9.3 kg and containing 4 kg of TNT. A tank driving over the casing at any point would cause it to compress on the detonator and explode. The Teller-type mines, on the other hand, were cylindrical mines weighing just over 9 kg and holding around 5.5 kg of TNT. Although the Tellermines held more explosive, the cylinder was an inefficient shape, measuring just 31.8 cm in diameter (for the Tellermine T.Mi.35), whereas the Riegl bar mine was 80 cm long. This meant that a Riegel mine, once laid, had a greater chance of being under the track of a tank, although the effect once detonated was effectively the same.
Each of these types of mines and variants had multiple options for detonation. These included connecting mines together so that, when one was triggered, it could set off more mines, or by connecting them to trip lines, anti-handling devices, and stakes which, when touched by a tank, would trip the fuse and trigger the mine. However, none of those situations seem to have been encountered by the tanks of the 21st Army Group. An analysis of the position of detonation of mines by tanks clearly showed they were the simple track-crushing-mine-and-triggering-them type of incidents rather than a specific booby trap to cause the mine to go off under the belly (Table 5). The casualties resulting from these mine encounters were therefore considerably lower than could be expected from a mine going off directly under the hull (Table 6). Thus, efforts to improve mine protection to counter that type of explosion were not warranted.
The cause of casualties to tank crews in relation to mine encounters was dependent on whether or not the floor plates of the tank were buckled, allowing the explosive blast to enter the crew space and injure the occupants. In this regard, the important considerations for the floor plates were the method of manufacturing, their thickness, and the height of the floor plates from the ground. The construction of the floor plates of the A.27 Cromwell and A.30 Challenger was effectively identical and, therefore, those vehicle’s encounters were grouped together. Looking at the data, the low ground clearance and relatively thin floor plates of the A.27 Cromwell show that it was substantially more at risk from damage by a mine blast than the M4 Sherman. The M4 Sherman tank, in fact, recorded no significant casualties from landmines at all, even in the situation where one vehicle managed to detonate two mines while driving at high speed. Overall, it was concluded by the authors that, whilst the M4 Sherman was indeed better protected against land mines than the A.27 Cromwell, overall, these were simply not a significantly important source of casualties. It may also be considered that, at this time in the war, the mines being laid by the Germans were ad-hoc or not properly prepared. The mine threat – once considered so serious that a whole slew of anti-tank mine clearance devices was developed, was not so great as first thought. On the whole, the majority of mine encounters caused minor injuries, suspension damage and inconvenience for the unit rather than a way of depleting Allied strength in any significant numbers.
Vehicle Casualties
For crew men, the definition of a casualty was simply any member of the vehicle’s crew who was killed or wounded. For those wounded, only those evacuated for treatment were included. Men who were injured but remained in the unit were not included. Once tabulated, the primary cause of crew man losses was assessed as being the result of penetrations of the armor from enemy guns firing Armor Piercing (A.P.) projectiles (Table 3).
Having established that A.P. penetrations were the primary cause of loss and that Hollow Charge (H.C.) weapons like the Panzerfaust were the secondary one, it became important to consider where the tanks had been struck (Table 7), where the armor had withstood the enemy attack, and where the armor of the various tanks had failed (Tables 8a to 8e) and then to summarise those results (Table 9). This would provide useful data to inform future tank design and development in order to try and maximise protection for the tank and crew.
Sherman III W.D. No. 152104 belonging to 4th/7th Dragoon Guards. Hit numerous times, including several ineffective hits from Hollow Charge weapons on the front of the hull which failed to penetrate. A 75 mm A.P. round had pierced the front of the final drive, crippling the tank, and two rounds partially penetrated the machine gun housing on the hull and the glacis in front of the driver, respectively. At least 3 more 75 mm A.P. hits were received to the front left sprocket and three more on the hull front. One more 75 mm strike failed to penetrate the side of the tank and another the face of the turret. One H.C. penetration was received on the lower left side of the hull. No fire took place, although substantial internal damage was received. The crew escaped unhurt. Noteworthy is that this tank was carrying additional track links across the front, which were knocked off by the first 75 mm strikes, which were the ones which did not penetrate. The crew only bailed out after the third penetrating hit was received.
Sherman V DD (Duplex Drive) W.D. No. 232115 belonging to the Staffordshire Yeomanry. Struck by a 75 mm A.P. round at a range of 1,500 yards, the shell penetrated the rear applique armor, passed across the width of the tank and blew a jagged hole out of the other side as it exited. The tank caught fire instantly and the commander later died of wounds, the only fatality in the vehicle.
Sherman V W.D. No.147681 belonging to the 2nd Inniskilling Dragoons struck by a Hollow Charge at the base of the turret, leaving a 50 mm diameter hole, and by a 75 mm A.P. round (later identified as a 7.5 cm A.P.C.B.C. round from either a Pak. 40 or KwK. 40) on the hull side, below the left sponson. The H.C. caused only minor internal damage, but the penetrating 75 mm round left a hole 80 mm x 130 mm. No crew were injured and no fire resulted from either penetration. A third hit on the driver’s hatch left a mark only.
Stuart Light Tank W.D. No.287750 belonging to 4th/7th Dragoon Guards. The turret was struck in the upper right corner by a 75 mm A.P. round leaving an 80 mm wide entry hole (left). Passing through the turret, the round smashed out of the back (right) leaving a 90 mm wide exit hole. The vehicle was burnt out and the crew were unharmed, but this is believed to be due to exiting the vehicle for an unknown reason prior to being hit.
A simple clock-ray was then used to divide hits on a vehicle’s turret or hull into 8 sectors. Each sector was evenly sized, covering 45 degrees of arc, to complete a 360 degree damage assessment. Hits on the vehicles were then collated as either Armor Piercing (A.P.) or Hollow Charge (H.C.), regardless of whether they penetrated or not.
The results shown in Table 10 clearly show that around 40% of all strikes from A.P. and H.C. weapons on the hull and 50% on strikes on the turret came from the front 45 degree sector, 22.5 degrees each side of the centre-line of the tank. In total, accounting for all strikes of any kind across this frontal arc (sector 1), this amounted to some 92 strikes out of a total of 241, 38.2% of all hits in this area. Expanding a look at the importance of focussing armor protection on a frontal arc can be done by including sectors 2 and 8 in this analysis. This would therefore cover the entire front aspect of the tank across both sides. Including sectors 2 and 8 to include hull and turret strikes by both types of weapon covers some 135 degrees, 67.5 degrees each side of the centre line of the tank. Hits in this area amounted to 155 hits, 64.3% of the total. Obviously, this leaves around a third of all hits (35.7%) accounted for across the remainder of the vehicle.
Looking purely at side hits square on (sectors 3 and 7), these accounted for 53 hits, 22% of all strikes. Using an expanded view of how the sides could be struck would include sectors 8, 6, 2, and 4. All together, the sides were exposed to fire and struck, even from oblique angles, to a total of 137 hits, 56.8% of the total.
From the rear, straight on (sector 5), just 12 hits were recorded, just 5% of the total. Even if this additional view of the vulnerability of the rear was taken into account and results from sectors 4 and 6 are added in, this would still only account for just 33 hits, 13.7% of the total. This expanded method of looking at the vehicle’s vulnerabilities was not done by the original authors, and it is easy to misunderstand how this may assist in viewing the areas commonly hit, as sectors get counted more than once and percentages count up to more than 100.
What it does show, however, perhaps more clearly than simple tabulations of X number of hits in Sector Y, are that the front is more likely to be hit than the sides, but not by much, 64.3% compared to 56.8%, and that the rear is by far the least important for protection, with just 13.7% of hits.
This was certainly not the limit of the hit-analysis by the authors of the report. In addition to knowing from what direction a tank was most likely to be hit in combat, something of use to future designers of such vehicles, the authors then looked at height. That is, the height from the ground on the tank where they were hit (Tables 11a to 11e) and then summarised (Table 12). The primary tanks concerned in the study, A.27 Cromwells and M4 Shermans, were different heights, with the M4 Sherman being the taller of the two (up to 2.97 m for the M4 Sherman vs 2.49 m for the A.27 Cromwell). Two hundred and forty tanks had been damaged by enemy Armor Piercing and Hollow Charge shells and had caused 326 men to be killed or wounded. This meant that the sample size was certainly large enough from which conclusions could be drawn.
Hit height analysis on the Cromwell (left) and Sheman V (right). The frequency of hits within a relatively small area in the centre of the turret face on the Cromwell and on the transmission housing and driver’s area on the Sherman V are particularly striking. Source: Author
The examination of the shell damage from A.P. rounds provided additional information for the survey, because the penetrations and scoops left holes of varying sizes in the armor. Those holes could, in some cases, be directly attributable to a specific calibre of shell. On occasion, the enemy shell could be located as well and, in others, the source of the shell was seen or later identified looking at the captured battlefield. In this way of analysis, the authors were able to accurately or somewhat accurately ascribe to penetrating hits nearly two thirds of all rounds which hit the tanks, whether they penetrated or not (table 13).
Knowing the casualties from the tanks and then using this penetration analysis allowed the authors to accurately ascribe the risk of becoming a casualty based on the area in which a tank was penetrated (table 14).
The conclusions were that penetrations through the front armor of the hull were the most likely to cause injuries, whether the result of A.P. or H.C., accounting for nearly a third of total casualties and 40% of casualties from a single A.P. penetration. The difference in the rate of casualties from hull and turret penetrations by A.P. is particularly striking.
Further to Table 13, where the guns firing A.P. rounds were identified, the authors were able to use evidence from the crews and wrecked vehicles for both sides to work out the ranges at which these A.P. rounds were being fired (table 14).
Of known hits, 85 of them for which the range could be accurately found, it was determined that 50.5 of them (59.4%) occurred at 800 yards (732 m) or less and 83.5% at 1,000 yards (914 m) or less.
Having already identified that A.P. penetration was the primary cause of tank losses, the authors turned their attention to crew losses and the causes of them and this related directly to the penetrating agent. Table 16 shows that lethality was not even amongst the shells and that it was the larger, higher energy 88 mm shells which resulted in the most casualties. This assessment of the nature of the guns and their shells, combined with the combat ranges being encountered, meant that any consideration of improving the frontal protection of tanks, using the weight of armor to best advantage, had to take this into account (Table 17).
At best, the frontal protection on both A.27 Cromwell and M.4 Sherman was just around 100 mm, meaning that, at 500 yards (457 mm) from the front, both were penetrable by any of the commonly encountered German guns.
Worst still was that, at 500 yards (457 m), the evidence of combat showed that the chances of the German gunners missing their target was small, with survival chances for the crew halving every 6 seconds in a combat situation after the first round is fired. The implications of this were that a) the frontal armor had to be substantially improved on both tanks to make the armor invulnerable from that direction, and that b) the ability to deliver fire back at a target as fast as possible was of prime value.
The report went further than this too, and suggested that, as the majority of combat was forward or to the sides, all round traverse on a tank was not statistically a strict necessity. If, however, a tank could be made which was invulnerable to enemy fire from the front, even though it may have limited traverse, then the data supported that this vehicle would have substantial combat value (despite some limitations in supporting fire support for infantry) and improve survivability. In addition, as regarding potential future designs, the authors summarised this lesson as meaning that:
“if a vehicle of this type were designed in which the crew all worked from a sitting position, they could be protected from the front with a sheet of armor 7 feet [2.13 m] broad by 4 feet [1.22 m] high. Even if this were a foot thick, it would weigh only about 6 tons”.
In considering the effect of German guns, the combat ranges were generally relatively short and the 75 mm gun was also the cause of most tank losses, even though the 88 mm was substantially more injurious to the crew when it was encountered.
When these 88 mm rounds entered the vehicle, the fragments of armor and shell coming off, and the large round itself caused numerous injuries. Injuries were also caused further from the point of penetration than for a penetrating 75 mm shell. This was especially true of H.C. penetrations too, where injuries to the crew were tightly confined to the area near to the point of penetration. The primary cause of injury leading to death following penetration were wounds to the head or body (table 18). Non-lethal wounds were mostly to the limbs and head. With head injuries the most common amongst fatal injuries and one of the primary non-lethal injuries (table 19) the importance of head protection for tank crew was an obvious conclusion.
This analysis of fatal injuries by penetrative mechanism led into the second half of the study looking at crew casualties.
Crew Casualties
A vehicle casualty was defined for the purposes of the study as any A.F.V. hit by a weapon capable of causing major damage, which meant it would include anti-tank guns, landmines, etcetera, but not include small arms fire. Looking at tank crew losses in addition to the loss of the tanks themselves would provide insight into the relative dangers of the types of weapons to the men and to the mode of injury.
It had already been established that 34% (272) of all casualties were caused by single penetrations into the crew compartment and crews almost always immediately abandoned their tanks when it had been penetrated. It was noted that some even abandoned them when a penetration did not occur, as the follow up shot stood a high chance of doing so. It was also found that 3% (9) of all casualties were the result of penetrations into non-crew space, like the engine bay or final drive, and all were assessed to be the result of fires from the petrol igniting, although this was only recorded in Sherman tanks.
In one case, a 105 mm shell from a Flak 38 was recorded as having penetrated a Sherman in the side when it was exposed crossing a canal bridge. The round travelled through the crew space and blew out a 1’ (30 cm) square slab of armor from the opposite side as it passed right through both sides. The men inside were caught in a large and instant fire, burning all of them instantly. Only the driver and commander survived.
Just 9% (30) of the casualties were the result of non-penetrating hits. This was not due to any flaking of the armor on the inside face of the plates, but due to crews with body parts, like head or arms, exposed out of a hatch whilst driving.
A total of 371 men were wounded or killed, with 38% of those who were injured being killed (table 20). This would then enable the authors to assign casualties to particular tanks (table 21) to assess the relative risk and safety of each one (table 22).
The relative hazard is a simple measure to look at the chance of becoming killed, wounded, or burnt inside the tanks used. It does not take into account the combat action seen by a unit, the idea that a particular tank might be specifically targeted by the enemy or a variety of other factors. One notable example of these other factors was that the 5-man crew complement was not always carried in A.27 Cromwells due to the increased risk of mine-related injury. Likewise, the Challenger and Sherman with the 17 pdr. omitted this crew member too. What can be drawn from the results, however, is a general idea that, during this period, the Sherman was in general marginally safer to be a member of the crew than the A.27 Cromwell.
Particular care has to be drawn in judging the relative hazards posed of the crews of 75 mm-armed M4 Shermans compared to 17-pdr.-armed Shermans. Although the crew complement in the 17-pdr. vehicles was just 4, the relative hazard here shows effectively no difference to the 75 mm gun vehicle, which could be interpreted to say that the 17-pdr. gun tank was proportionally more hazardous to the crew. Whilst the study did go on to find that there was an increased risk of injury to crew members from a hull penetration, the lack of a co-driver, who would not generally have been injured from a turret-penetration, does not get to be counted in the survivability of the tank because he was not there. Thus, the authors took care to suggest caution when interpreting the figures.
Fire, in particular, was a major problem to be considered for vehicle and crew casualties, the cause of the fire, and the type of incident which led to the fire. It was then considered in terms of penetrations by A.P. as to where on the tank the penetration had taken place and the percentages of men burned as a result (Table 23) to establish whether or not there was a difference in casualty rates between penetrations of the hull and penetrations of the turret.
It is significant that the number of men who suffered burns was roughly the same between 75 mm and 88 mm A.P. penetrations into the hull, but that penetrations by 75 mm A.P. were more likely to lead to burn injuries when affecting the turret. Overall, however, the 88 mm A.P. was only marginally more likely to lead to burn injuries and a greater share of total casualties than the 75 mm A.P. The substantially greater energies involved with a hit from an 88 mm A.P. compared to a 75 mm A.P., would, on the face of it, have led to substantially higher numbers of burns injuries, but the conclusion was that this number was being masked by the increased fatality rate in tanks penetrated by that type of shell. The lower rate of burn casualties resulting from all H.C. penetrations was also notable. In a nutshell, penetrations by A.P. were substantially more likely to cause burn injuries than penetrations by H.C.
Considering this on a tank type basis allowed for a look at which tanks would be most likely, when penetrated by A.P., to burn and cause injury to the crews (table 24). The result was that, despite its reputation to crews for catching fire, the Sherman, when penetrated or catching fire, was not significantly more dangerous than the other tanks.
The risk of being burned was, in fact, more a function of where the crew were in the vehicle than to which vehicle they were in and this was established in table 25. In that table, it is clear that it is the commander, gunner, and operator who were most likely to be injured than the driver or co-driver. Some of this was due to the habit of entering combat with the hatches open on the turret (particularly for the commander) for observations or to aid evacuation in case of fire. The same was also true to an extent for the hull crew, some of whom were found to have been injured when driving with their heads out. One unit (unnamed) caused particular antagonism between crews and unit commanders by consistently going into combat with both driver and co-driver hatches wide open to ensure ease of escape in case of fire.
One final point on hatches noted that the Sherman escape hatches in the floor proved useful for collecting casualties under fire and that the side hatches in the Churchill provided the men a chance to escape from the tank with a modicum of protection from enemy small arms.
Fires
Fires after being hit and penetrated were substantially more likely when penetrated by an A.P. shell, especially if it was an 88 mm shell, and the risk of burn injuries to the crew was also significantly correlated (table 26).
A large cause of secondary casualties in tanks was found to be the result of ammunition catching fire and detonating. This was more prevalent in A.P. penetration of the tank than from H.C. penetration, with around 20% of A.P. penetration related casualties caused from this ammunition problem.
The suggested solution to ameliorate this was to use the additional armor, as applied on the Sherman sides around the ammo, in protecting the crew instead.
The majority of burn injuries to crews were to the hands and face (Table 27) – the parts exposed and not covered by clothing, and two-thirds of the burns were second-degree or less, meaning that men could usually return to duty (81% in fact) after treatment.
Fires started after penetration by H.C. weapons were often confined to the area near to where the penetration had occurred and burn risk was strongly correlated for the crew members next to the ammunition. Whilst all of the clothing worn by tankers proved to burn at some point, no easy conclusions were forthcoming on the most suitable clothing other than it should be fireproof and cover the man’s body and limbs. More important from a statistical point of view for reducing casualties was that any tank coverall should be in a camouflage material, such as the Denison pattern paratroopers smock, in order to reduce the casualties to crew exposed to enemy small arms when getting out of the tank.
Burn injuries to crews were found to be three times more common in vehicles penetrated by 88 mm and 75 mm A.P. rounds than from hollow charge weapons. Importantly, however, the study had also found that “The incidence of burns was not significantly greater in Shermans than in other types of vehicle”, something contrary to popular myth.
The study also investigated whether injuries could be the result of delays in escape from the tank. It had been found in experiments on escape times for the M4 Sherman and A.27 Cromwell that both vehicles took about 2.5 seconds for the commander to get out of his open hatch to a standing position on the turret roof (an experiment, so standing on the roof was simply there to standardise the time without worrying about a transit time for the crew member to the ground). The gunner took 5 seconds to do the same and this was considered to be roughly the same for the Comet. The gunner, therefore, was exposed to an internal fire for twice as long as the Commander and this was reflected in the real life casualty figures from Operation Veritable in the report.
This was an enormous take away for the report. Experiments had shown a potential problem and this had been borne out in real life combat analysis. The recommendation was that time to escape from a burning tank must be kept to 2.5 seconds or less to avoid burn injuries and 2.5 to 5 seconds to avoid men being burned to death. It was found to take 1-2 seconds just to open a hatch and these were supposed to be closed in combat, especially for the hatches other than the Commander’s. The authors strongly recommended the adoption of an instantaneously opening hatch to expedite crew evacuation in a fire.
65% of the commanders and just over 20% of operators who were casualties were wounded directly as a result of being exposed through an open hatch. Between 14% and 20% of those casualties were directly attributable to small arms fire because they were exposed, although this was reduced for tanks whose crews had improved splash shields around the hatches for the men.
One experimental device mentioned by the authors was the ‘fog apparatus’. Automatically triggered by an internal fire, this device extinguished fires within two seconds and, although it was available during the Operational period investigated, it clearly had the potential to substantially reduce the fire-casualty risk inside the tanks. However, the authors went one step beyond that point too. As the majority of penetrations (particularly by A.P. shells) led to fires (Table 28), they suggested that the ‘fog apparatus’ should be triggered not just by a flame detector, but primarily by a penetration detector. The problems of the apparatus being triggered by a penetration even when there was not a fire was a small price to pay to increase the chances of the crew getting out in time.
In terms of a major fire, that is a fire which destroyed the entirety of the tank and contents in both engine and crew compartments, these were the worst kind and led to the most injuries. This was in contrast to the minor fires, which were tightly contained to just a single compartment or section within a compartment and caused localised or minor injuries.
Despite the report concluding that the Sherman was at no greater risk of a fire than the other vehicles, the data showed a significant difference between the M4 Sherman and A.27 Cromwell, and to a lesser extent, with the Comet, for a relative risk of major fires following a hit by an A.P. shell. The Sherman was nearly twice as likely to suffer a major fire after such a hit than the A.27 Cromwell, and this remained the same for H.C. penetrations (Table 29).
A.P. penetrations created a risk of a major fire on average at a rate of 30.5% of penetrations and 61% of all major fires across the tanks. H.C. penetrations, on the other hand, caused a major fire at a rate of just 15.0% and accounted for only 30% of all the major fires. This was regardless of where the vehicle was hit or penetrated although, as previously established, penetrations into the Sherman’s engine bay stood a greater chance of leading to a fire than for other vehicles and that hull penetrations caused more burn injuries than turret penetrations (Table 30).
Adding up all of the major fires caused by A.P. and H.C. from Tables 28 and 29 provides for the final delineation between the relative major fire risk from penetrations by A.P. and H.C. and clearly shows the substantially higher risk from A.P. penetration (Table 31).
Although many fires were associated with the petrol inside the tanks catching fire, this was primarily a concern for engine-bay penetrations and especially so for the M4 Shermans, although it was only a minor cause of burn injuries. Despite this, looking at the number of fires which occurred in M4 Sherman tanks, the difference in diesel vs petrol engines versions was stark (Table 32). More fires, and fires which happened more quickly, giving the crew less time to escape, occurred in petrol-engined M4 Shermans than in diesel engined ones, with the obvious exception of the 17 pdr. armed vehicles, for which no clear explanation presented itself. Comparing the 75 mm-armed M4 Sherman with a petrol engine to the A.34 Comet or even the A.22 Churchill, both of which also had petrol engines, confirmed the additional fire risk from a petrol-engined vehicle. The Sherman with the petrol engine was simply more likely, after being hit, to have a fire start with little or no warning than either its contemporary tanks (the single data point for the A.30 Challenger here provides no insight), such as the A.27 Cromwell, A.34 Comet, or even A.22 Churchill, even the A.22 Churchill with the flamethrower which had extra fuel lines and a large bowser on the back – the Crocodile. Table 33 sums up these differences with a contrast readily apparent between the 75 mm armed M4 Sherman with a petrol engine and diesel engine, whereby ammunition fires accounted for ⅔ of all known fires in the petrol vehicle and the petrol accounting for the other third, compared to the diesel engined vehicle, with zero fires known to be connected to the fuel.
The major cause of fires and casualties was actually burning ammunition propellant from ruptured shell cases. This is particularly hazardous in the case of an Armor Piercing shell-casing, as it has a greater quantity of propellant inside and liberated enormous amounts of energy extremely quickly when burned. The combustion of the ammunition was also considered a secondary hazard by the authors of the report, as exploding ammunition inside the tank also led to other casualties. Ammunition stored in the crew compartment caused 19% of all related casualties and 16% of all A.P. and H.C.-related penetrations.
Conclusion
The study into these losses covered a statistically significant sample size of both men and vehicles in a relatively discrete time during this one operation. It does, however, warrant caution, as a report from which too wide of a conclusion may be drawn for the whole war. This was 1945 and Germany was collapsing, so the data here cannot be taken as reflective of combat in general.
There are, despite this reserve, some significant points which can be taken away. When it came to a threat to Allied tanks, the most significant threat was from enemy A.P.-firing weapons and H.C. weapons like the Panzerfaust. The majority of enemy gunfire was directed at the front of the tank and a negligible amount at the rear. The majority of casualties, both direct and indirect, were the result of penetrations of the armor by A.P. hits.
The majority of tank casualties were the result of fire from 75 mm guns, yet the 88 mm gun caused more fatalities per penetration and caused more fires. The general combat range for guns was under 1,000 yards (914 m) and mines generally were not a concern, although floor protection on the A.27 Cromwell was also inadequate.
Fires were mainly the result of ammunition burning or exploding (also a source of secondary injury). The conclusion drawn from both of those points was that the front of the tank should not only carry the majority of the armor, but also that adding additional armor on the sides of the M4 Sherman to protect the ammunition was better utilised directly on the front of the tank and also in protecting the crew from the ammunition inside.
Despite the report concluding that M4 Shermans were not generally more at risk of fires than other tanks, the data showed somewhat otherwise. The petrol engined M4 Shermans were more likely to have fires start with little or no warning than the diesel equivalent or even their petrol-engined contemporaries. Notwithstanding that, ammunition was cited as the primary cause of fires, the preponderance of petrol-engined 75 mm M4 Shermans to burn is not to be ignored.
Also for armor, the study, despite not being able to look directly at A.22 Churchill tanks, suggested that, due to the heavier armor, these suffer fewer casualties amongst men who were only partially exposed in those vehicles but the sample size was not large enough to make a determination on the point. When it came to penetration of the A.22 Churchill, it showed no more survivability for the crews than the other tanks, producing the same ratio of killed and injured.
It was also clear that the distribution of armor on a tank to protect against A.P. fire had to be differently emphasized on a vehicle to protect primarily against H.C. weapons and that the fatal effects inside the tank were more severe following an A.P. strike than from an hit by a H.C. weapon.
For the crew, they must be kept as far from the ammunition as possible, notwithstanding any efforts at fire suppression or efforts to protect the ammunition from damage. Further, the predominance of head injuries both fatal and non-fatal demanded action on ballistic head protection. The need to evacuate in a fire was extreme – all crew had to be able to egress the tank within two seconds and current hatches were grossly inadequate for this across all tanks.
What the series of reports tells is a complicated yet thorough assessment of survivability. The M4 Sherman tank was, in fact, more likely to burn following penetration than other tanks and some of that was indeed due to the petrol in the engine bay catching fire. The large majority, however, were not – they were, like the majority of fires in other tanks, a function of the ammunition burning inside.
The height of a tank was a factor in reducing the vulnerability to being hit by enemy fire but the additional height of an M4 Sherman over an A.27 Cromwell accounted for relatively few hits and penetrations. With the height being dominated by the turret, this also resulted in few injuries proportionally.
As far as reducing height went, attention should therefore be on reducing hull profile rather than turret or overall profile for survivability from a height point of view.
It is interesting to note, from a historical point of view, the statistical analysis of tank and crew losses indicated to the designers that a tank, even with limited gun traverse, emphasising armor immune to enemy fire from the front, could have substantial combat value. Comparing this to the decisions by the Germans in these later years of WW2 is interesting, with increasingly heavily protected S.P.-type guns, including the Jagdtiger. It should be noted however, that the key difference between the British lessons and the German practice was that the British wanted a seated crew in the hull rather than a giant casemate type design with men standing inside it.
Sources
Hills, A. (2021). An Unnecessary Burden. The Sherman Tea Tray Anti-Land Mine Device. FWD Publishing, USA
Medical Research Council Report BPC. 45/444. (1945). Casualties among Tank Crews in 11th Armoured Division in Operation Veritable. 27th February to 4th March 1945. Captain H. B. Wright and Captain R.D. Harkness, Royal Army Medical Corps.
Medical Research Council Report BPC. 45/419. (1945). The Distribution of Casualties Amongst the Crews of Cromwells and Shermans. Captain H. B. Wright and Captain R.D. Harkness, Royal Army Medical Corps.
Medical Research Council Report BPC. 45/453. (1945). Casualties In Armoured Fighting Vehicles. Captain R. Mayon White.
Medical Research Council. (1946). A Survey of Casualties Amongst Armoured Units in North West Europe. Captain H. B. Wright and Captain R.D. Harkness, Royal Army Medical Corps. Official History of the Canadian Army: The Victory Campaign. Chapter XIX: The Battle of the Rhineland Part II. Canadian Department of National Defense. Ottawa, Canada.
US Army Technical Manual ™-E-30-451. Handbook on German Military Forces. March 1945
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